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Thk first of the American Casebook Series, Mikell's Cases on Criminal Law, issued in December, 1908, contained in its preface an able
argument by Mr. James Brown Scott, the General Editor of the SeUntil 1915 this
ries, in favor of the case method of law teaching.
preface appeared in each of the volumes published in the series.
But the teachers of law have moved onward, and the argument
That such
that was necessary in 1908 has now become needless.
is the case becomes strikingly manifest to one examining three important documents that fittingly mark the progress of legal education
in America.
In 1893 the United States Bureau of Education published a report on Legal Education prepared by the American Bar Association's Committee on Legal Education, and manifestly the work
of that Committee's accomplished chairman, William G. Hammond,
by
in which the three methods of teaching law then in vogue — that
lectures, by text-book, and by selected cases — were described and comThe next report
mented upon, but without indication of preference.
of the Bureau of Education dealing with legal education, published
in 1914, contains these unequivocal statements:
not ithe exclusive,
"To-day the case method forms the principal,
method of teaching in nearly all of the stronger law schools of the
country. Lectures on special subjects are of course still delivered in
But for
all law schools, and this doubtless always will be the case.
law
the case
staple instruction in the important branches of common
for
use
practically evhas proved itself as the best available material
to-day the principal method
The case method
erywhere.
of instruction in the great majority of the schools of this country."
But the most striking evidence of the present stage of development
to be found in the
of legal instruction in American Law Schools
to
Foundation
Redlich
the
Carnegie
Professor
special report, made by
"The
in
on
Case
American
Method
of
Teaching,
for the Advancement
the
of
in
the UniRedlich,
of
Law
Faculty
Professor
Law Schools."
to
make
this
Vienna,
country
to
special
study
was
brought
versity of
in
the
United
States
from
the
standinstruction
of methods of legal
point of one free from those prejudices necessarily engendered in
American teachers through their relation to the struggle for supremacy
so long, and at one time so vehemently, waged among the rival sysFrom this masterly report, so replete with brilliant analysis
tems.
comment, the following brief extracts are taken.
discriminating
and
Speaking of the text-book method Professor Redlich says
"The principles are laid down in the text-book and in the professor's lectures,

ready made and neatly rounded,
(vii)

the predigested

essence
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of many Judicial decisions. The pupil has simply to accept them and
In this way the
to inscribe them so far as possible in his memory.
scientific element of instruction is apparently excluded from the very
first. Even though the representatives of this instruction certainly do
regard law as a science — that is to say, as a system of thought, a grouping of concepts to be satisfactorily explained by historical research and
logical deduction — they are not willing to teach this science, but only
its results. The inevitable danger which appears to accompany this
method of teaching is that of developing a mechanical, superficial instruction in abstract maxims, instead of a genuine intellectual probing
of the subject-matter of the law, fulfilling the requirements of a
science."

Professor Redlich comments as follows :
character of legal thought ; it goes now
the
scientific
emphasizes
it is a
a step further, however, and demands that law, just because
From this point of view it
science, must also be taught scientifically.
very properly rejects the elementary school* type of existing legal education as inadequate to develop the specific legal mode of thinking, as
inadequate to make the basis, the logical foundation, of the separate
legal principles really intelligible to the students. Consequently, as the
method was developed, it laid the main emphasis upon precisely that
aspect of the training which the older text-book school entirely neglected — the training of the student in intellectual independence, in individual thinking, in digging out the principles through penetrating
analysis of the material found within separate cases ; material which
contains, all mixed in with one another, both the facts, as life creates
them, which generate the law, and at the same time rules of the law
In the fact that, as has
itself, component parts of the general system.
been said before, it has actually accomplished this purpose, lies the
great success of the case method. For it really teaches the pupil to
think in the way that any practical lawyer — whether dealing with writIt prepares the
ten or with unwritten law — ought to and has to think.
student in precisely the way which, in a country of case law, leads to
full powers of legal understanding and legal acumen; that is to say,
by making the law pupil familiar with the law through incessant practice in the analysis of law cases, where the concepts, principles, and
rules of Anglo-American law are recorded, not as dry abstractions, but
as cardinal realities in the inexhaustibly rich, ceaselessly
fluctuating,
social and economic life of man. Thus in the modern American law
school professional practice is preceded by a genuine course of study,
the methods of which are perfectly adapted to the nature of the common law."
The general purpose and scope of this series were clearly stated in
the original announcement:
"The General Editor takes pleasure in announcing a series of scholarly casebooks, prepared with special reference to the needs and limiTurning

"It

to the case method
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tations of the classroom, on the fundamental subjects of legal education, which, through a judicious rearrangement of emphasis, shall provide adequate training combined with a thorough knowledge of the
general principles of the subject. The collection will develop the law
English cases will give the origin and
historically and scientifically;
development of the law in England; American cases will trace its expansion and modification in America ; notes and annotations will sugCumulative references will be
gest phases omitted in the printed case.
avoided, for the footnote may not hope to rival the digest.
The law
will thus be presented as an organic growth, and the necessary connection between the past and the present will be obvious.
"The importance and difficulty of the subject as well as the time that
can properly be devoted to it will be carefully considered so that each
book may be completed within the time allotted to the particular subject. * * * If it be granted that all, or nearly all, the studies required for admission to the bar should be studied in course by every
student — and the soundness of this contention can hardly be seriously
doubted — it follows necessarily that the preparation and publication of
collections of cases exactly adapted to the purpose would be a genuine,
and by no means unimportant service to the cause of legal education.
And this result can best be obtained by the preparation of a systematic
series of casebooks constructed upon a uniform plan under the super*
*
*
vision of an editor in chief.
"The following subjects are deemed essential in that a knowledge of
them (with the exception of International
Law and General Jurisalmost
for
is
admission to the bar:
prudence)
universally required

Administrative Eaw,

Criminal Law.
Criminal Procedure.

Equity Pleading.
Evidence.
Insurance.
International Law.
Jurisprudence.
Legal Ethics.
Partnership.
Personal Property.
Public Corporations.
Quasi Contracts.
Real Property.
Sales.
Suretyship.

Damages.
Domestic Relations.

Torts.
Trusts.

Agency.
Bailments.
Bills and Notes.
Carriers.
Code Pleading.
Common-Law Pleading.
Conflict of Laws.
Constitutional Law.
Contracts.
Corporations.

Equity.

Wills and Administration,

"International Law is included in the list of essentials from its intrinsic importance in our system of law. As its principles are simple
in comparison with municipal law, as their application is less technical,

pul:facb

X

and as the cases are g-enerally interesting, it is thought that the book
may be larger than otherwise would be the case.
"The preparation of the casebooks has been intrusted to experienced
and well-known teachers of the various subjects included, so that the
experience of the classroom and the needs of the students will furnish
a sound basis of selection."
Since this announcement of the Series was first made there have
books on the following subjects:

been published

Administrative Laiv. By Ernst Freund, Professor of Law in the
University of Chicago.
By Edwin C. Goddard, Professor of Law in the University
Agency.
of Michigan.
Bills and Notes. By Howard L. Smith, Professor of Law in the University of Wisconsin, and Underbill Moore, Professor of Law in
Columbia University.
Carriers.
By Frederick Green, Professor of Law in the University of
Illinois.
By Ernest G. Lorenzen, Professor of Law in
Conflict of Lazvs.
Yale University.
Constitutional Law. By James Parker Hall, Dean of the Faculty of
Law in the University of Chicago.
Contracts. By Arthur L. Corbin, Professor of Law in Yale University.
By Harry S. Richards, Dean of the Faculty of Law in
Corporations.
the University of Wisconsin.
Criminal Law. By William E. Mikcll, Dean of the Faculty of Law in
the University of Pennsylvania.
Criminal Procedure.
By William E. Mikell, Pean of the Faculty of
Law in the University of Pennsylvania.
Damages. By Floyd R. Mechem, Professor of Law in the University
of Chicago, and Barry Gilbert, of the Chicago Bar.
Equity. By George H. Boke, Professor of Law in the University of
Oklahoma.

By Edward
Evidence.
of
Chicago.
ty
Insurance.
By William
versity.

W. Hinton, Professor of Law in

the

Universi-

R. Vance, Professor of Law in Yale Uni-

Law. By James Brown Scott, Professor of International
Law in Johns Hopkins University.
Legal Ethics, Cases and Other Authorities on. By George P. Costigan,.
Jr., Professor of Law in Northwestern University.
By Eugene A. Gilmore, Professor of Law in the UniPartnership.
versity of Wisconsin,

International

PREFACB

XI

By Albert M. Kales, of
Marriage and Divorce).
Bar, and Chester G. \'ernier, Professor of Law in
Stanford University.
Pleading (Common Law). By Clarke B. Whittier, Professor of Law
in Stanford University, and Edmund M. Morgan, Professor of
Law in Yale University.
Property (Titles to Real Property). By Ralph W. Aigler, Professor
of Law in the University of Michigan.
Property (Personal). By Harry A. Bigelow, Professor of Law in the
University of Chicago.
Property (Rights in Land).
By Harry A. Bigelow, Professor of
Law in the University of Chicago.
Property (Wills, Descent, and Administration). By George P. Costigan, Jr., Professor of Law in Xorthwestern University.
Property (Future Interests).
By Albert M. Kales, of the Chicago
Persons

(including

the Chicago

Bar.

Quasi Contracts. By Edward S. Thurston, Professor of I^aw in Yale
University.
Sales. By Frederic C. Woodward, Professor of Law in the University
of Chicago.
By Crawford D. Hening, formerly Professor of Law
Suretyship.
in the University of Pennsylvania.
Torts. By Charles M. Hepburn, Dean of the Faculty of Law in the
University of Indiana.
Trusts. By Thaddeus D. Kenneson, Professor of Law in the University of New York.

It is earnestly hoped and believed that the books thus far published
in this series, with the sincere purpose of furthering scientific training
in the law, have not been without their influence in bringing about a
fuller understanding and a wider use of the case method.
William R. Vance,
June,

General Editor.
1921,

AUTHOR'S PREFATORY NOTE
Many law teachers have felt that Titles should

be the basis of the
volume
this
appears as numin
Although
course
Property.
beginning
of
the
law
Property, it is
ber tliree in a series of casebooks covering
volume,
with possibly some
believed that the subject-matter of the
shifts in order of the topics, is such that it may well be used in that

way.

it,

That most of the topics taken up in this volume are appropriately
considered under the head of Titles there cannot be much question.
A word of explanation as to the editor's plan may perhaps dispose of
any question that may arise as to why certain matters were included
here. It may be suggested, for instance, that the matter of Estates
should not be gone into to the extent to which it is herein considered.
It would be expected, however, that in a book on Titles there would
be a treatment of the important and troublesome matter of the extent
It has seemed wise not to
of the interest acquired or transferred.
limit here the discussion of Estates to their creation, but to take up
excluding,
the entire subject in the one connection and dispose of
of course, the detailed consideration of Future Estates and kindred

Ralph W. Aigler.

1,

Ann Arbor, Mich., May

1916.
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In fact, throughout, the plan has been to
topics, treated elsewhere.
would seem to belong, for pedagogic
topic where primarily
place
once for all.
or other reasons, and then dispose of
In the treatment of Uses before the Statute of Uses the editor has
frankly abandoned the case method as being unsuited to the accomvery brief statement,
plishment of the desired end, and has printed
more
complete discussion
which may serve as an introduction to
student who can gathe
The ditor has vet to find
by the instructor.
an coherent ideas as to Uses before the Statute from the fragmentary
of Gray
extract s._fr om secondary authorities printed in volume
And this seems quite commonly to have been the experience
Cases.,
of other teachers of the law of Real Property.
The editor desires, however, upon this occasion, to express his appreciation of and admiration for Gray's Cases on Property. Probably
no man in the United States had so large an influence upon our law
of Property as has Professor Gray, and the collection of cases which
bears his name has played no inconsiderable part in exerting that influence.
The editor acknowledges his indebtedness to Mr. Grover C. Grismore, Instructor in Law in the University of Michigan Law School,
for assistance in the preparation of this volume.
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CASES ON PROPERTY
TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY
PART I
ORIGINAL TITLES
CHAPTER I
POSSESSORY

SECTION

1.— SEISIN

TITLES
AND DISSEISIN

MAITLAND, THE MYSTERY OF SEISIN.
Any one who came to the study of Coke upon Littleton with some
store of modern legal ideas but no knowledge of English Real Property Law would, it may be guessed, at some stage or another in his
course find himself saying words such as these: "Evidently the main
clue to this elaborate labyrinth is the n otion of seisin . But what precisely this seisin is I cannot tell. Ownership I know, and possession
I know, but this tertium quid, this seisin, eludes me. On the one hand,
when Coke has to explain what is meant by the word he can only say
that it signifies possession, with this qualification, however, that it is
not to be used of movables, and that one who claims no more than a
chattel interest in land cannot be seised, though he may be possessed.
But, on the other hand, if I turn from .definitions to rules, then certainly seisin does look very like ownership, insomuch that the owner s hip of land, w hen not united with the seisin, seems no true ownership ."
The perplexities of this imaginary student would at first be rather
increased than diminished if he convinced himself, as I have convinced
myself and tried to convince others, that the further back we trace our
legal history the more perfectly equivalent do the two word s seisi n and
possession_become ; that it is the fifteenth century before English lawyers have ceased to speak and to plead about the seisin (thereby beAig.Pbop. —1

ORIGINAL
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ing meant the possession) of chattels. Certainly as we make our way
from the later to tlie older books we do not seem to be moving towards
an age when there was some primeval confusion between possession
We find ourselves debarred from the hypothesis that
and ownership.
within time of memory these two modern notions have been gradually
extricated from a vague ambiguous seisin in which once they were
blent. In Bracton's book the two ideas are as distinct from each other
He is never tired of contrasting them. In
as they can possibly be.
season, and (as the printed book stands) out of season also, he insists
that seisina or possessio is quite one thing, dominium or proprietas
He can say with Ulpian, "Nihil commune habet posquite another.
sessio cum proprietate."
2 Law Quarterly Rev. 481.

POLLOCK

&

MAITLAND, HIST. ENG. LAW.

On the whole we may say that the possession of land which the law
protects under the name of a "seisin of freehold" is t he occupation o f
land b y one who has come to it otherwise than as tenant in villeinag e,
te nant at _will^ t enant for term of vears or guardiaa : that occupation
being exercised by himself, his servants, guardians, tenants in villeinThis seems the best
age, tenants at will or tenants for term of years.
statement of the matter : Occupation of land is seisin of free tenement
unless it has been obtained in one of certain particular ways. If, however, we prefer to look at the other side of the principle, we may sav
that the animus required of the person who is "seised of free tenement"
is the intent to hold that land as though he were tenant for life or tenant in fee holding bv some free tenure.
2 P. & M. Hist. Eng. Law (2d Ed.) 40.

MAITLAND, THE MYSTERY OF SEISIN.
There is another side to the picture we have here drawn. He who
is seised, though he has no title to the seisin, can alienate the land ;
he can make a feoffment and he can make a will (for he who has land
is enabled to devise it b}' statute), and his heir shall inherit, shall inherit
from him, for he is a stock of descent; and there shall be dower and
there shall be curtesy, and the lord shall have an escheat and the king
a forfeiture, for such a one has land "to give and to forfeit."
This
make
seisin
much
look very
like ownership, and in truth our old
may
law seems this (and has it ever been changed?) that seisin does give
ownership good against all save those who have better because oldei'
title. Nevertheless we err if we begin to think of seisin as ownership
or any modification of ownership ; after all it is but possession . A termor was not seised, but certainly he could make a feoffment in fee and
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his feoffee would be seised.
This seems to have puzzled Lord Mansfield, and puzzling enough it is if we regard seisin itself as a proprietary right, for then the termor seems to convey to another a right that
But when it is remembered that s ubstantially seisin is
he never had.
n
My
possession, o more, no less, then the old law becomes explicable.
butler has not possession of my plate, he has but a charge or custody
of it ; fraudulently he sells it to a silversmith ; the silversmith now has
possession : so with the termor, who has no seisin, but who by a wrongful act enables another to acquire seisin.
2 Law Quarterly Rev. 488.

BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ANGLL^.
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.
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a

it,

Likewise a disseisin takes place, not only if any one ejects the true
owner when present, or his agent, or his family, or does not admi t
him, or repels him on his return f rom market or from a journey, but
lie also effects a disseisin, if he shall not permit the owner or his
or at least
agent or his family being in possession to make use of
hinders him from making
convenient use of it. And in which case,
nevertheless he
although he does not altogether expel [the owner
disseisin, since he akes away from him altogeth er
inflicts upon him
he convenience of using it^or hinders him from using
conveniently
uietly, and in peace, by disquietmg and disturbing his possession
Likewise
disseisin takes place not only according to what has been
said above, but also
any person of greater power wishes to make use
of the tenement of another against the will of the tenant, by ploughing, or by digging, by reaping and carrying away, contending that the
tenement, which
another's,
his own but
he has made no claim
o the tenement,
will be another thing. because then there will be a,
respass. and not
freehold or by turning in sheep,
disseisin from
or in some other manner imposing
servitude upon land, which was
free beforehand.
Bracton, fol. 161b; Twiss' Translation,
Tw. Br. 17.

LITTLETON'S TENURES.
is

a

is

And note that disseisin
man entreth into any
properly, where
lands or tenements where his entry
not congeable, and ousteth him
which hath the freehold, etc.
Section 279.^
t

j^e

a

a

1

wrongful takin cr ^^ny ,frnm fhp rp^il nwnPi' nt tus
"Disseisin was
ctual seisin . 'Disseisin was formerly
notorious act, when the disseisor
put himself in the place of the disseisee as tenant of the freehold and performed the acts of the freeholder and appeared in that character in the
lord's cdurt'
Lord Ellenborough, in William v. Thomas, 12 East, 141, 155
Or, as Lord Mansfield put it: 'Disseisin, therefore, must mean some
(1810).
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LEAKE, LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND.
Disseisin was a wrongful entry upon the land and ouster or dispo ssession of the freeholdej . An entry, or perception of rents and profits,
under colour of an adverse itle, although evidence of an ouster, might
be explained by the circumstances, and not amount to a disseisin.
The disseisor acquired, by his wrongful act, an e state in fee simpl e, as
against all but the real owner, and upon this title he might maintain
an a ction of ejectmen t against a stranger to tlie title who had ousted
The disseissee retained a mere right of entry which, if exerhim.
cised within the limits of ti me which were periodically fixed by law,
revested the estate in him.
Di sseisin of the tenant of a particular estate disseised or divest ed
a ll tlie estate s in remainde r or reversion, and converted them into m^re
rights ot entry, exerciseable in their order of succession .
The tenant himself of the particular estate whether for life, or for
years, having the actual seisin, had it in his power to make a feoffmen t
t o another by livery , which effectually conveyed the fee, if it in terms
imported to do so, irrespectively of his own estate or interest; and such
feoffment disseised all the estates in remainder or in reversion dependent upon his seisin and converted them into rights of entry. Feoff ment by tenant in tail operated rightfully at common law, but was
provided against by the statute De donis, giving a writ of formedo n
to the issue or reversioner or remainderman.
It tlierefore took away
the right of entry and left only the right of action under the stat* * *
ute.

J

An entry on the land within the time allowed by law restored the
seisin , and, if made by the tenant of a particular estate, it restored or
revested the estates in remainder or reversion, which were dependent
upon the same title. H ence a right of e.ntrv was sufficient to preser^ ^e
a contingent remainder.
It is to be observed that the entry of the disseisee before his right is barred by lapse of time restores him to his
former title by r elation back. He may therefore maintain an action

wa/ or other turning the tenant o n t ^f ^i^ l-pnnrp anrl iisurpiDg his pla ce
and feudal relation .' Taylor v. Horde, 1 Burr. 60, 107 (1757).
How this
was accomplished originall.v, unless the lord conspired with the disseisor,
we do not know.
It is sufficient for our purpose that disseisin was early
possible, and that every wrongful taking of seisin from the real owner was
not necessarily a disseisin.
Thati only was disseisin where some one en tered upon and ousted one who had taken actiial possession under claim o f
t reenold.' Certainly this was true of actual disseisin, though there was a
disseisin by election, where persons, to avail themselves of the remedy by
assize, frequently were allowed to suppose or admit themselves to be disseised when they were not. Whatever may be true of the law of to-day,
there was in the early common law a clear distinction between disseisin an d
o ther forms of adverse possession ; for unless actual seisin was interfered
with, or could be regarded as interfered with for the purposes of the action,
there was no disseisin, though there might perhaps be an abatement or some
other form of adverse possession."
Geo. P. Costigan, Jr., "Conveyance
of
Lands by Disseisee," 19 Harv. Law Rev, 268, 260.
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against a trespasser for a wrong done between tlie date of disseisin
and entry. And even before a change in the law enabled after-acquired
freehold estates to be devised, the entry of the disseisee validated a
devise of lands made while he -was out of possession.
The ri.qht of entry , arising upon a disseisin, was lost in certa in

heir of th e
descent
cast
; also by an aliendisseisor ; which was technically called a
ation of the fee by the disseisor to another, which was called a disco nOn the other hand, the right of entry
t inuance of the possession.
might be kept alive against a descent cast by the process of continua l
event^

:

as by the seisin being cast by descent upon the

claim.

right of entry was lost there remained a mere right of
action, to be prosecuted within certain limits of time in the form of
real action provided for the circumstances of the case.
The doctrines concerning rights of entry and of action and the proWhere

the

ceedings in real actions were highly technical and elaborate, and formed
a large and complicated branch of the law of real property, until the
amendments of the law made by the Real Property Limitation Act.
1833.^ By that statute, section 36, real actions were put an end to with
three exceptions, which were subsequently abolished, and the action
of ejectmenj;^ or as it is now known, an a ction for the recovery of land ,

is the appropriate remedy at law for the recovery of the possession of
land.
By the same statute the right of entry or action is no longer
defeated by a descent cast or a discontinuance (section 39) ; and it is
exempted from all other casualties e xcept lapse of time . But it mus t
be prosecuted within twelve years next after the accrual of the right ,
u nless the person entitled is under disabili ty.
Law ofi Property in Land (Randall's Ed.) p. 40 et seq.

BUTLER

&

HARGRAVE'S NOTE TO COKE UPON

LITTLETON.

The different degrees of title which a person dispossessing another
of his lands acquires in them in the eye of the law (independently of
any anterior right), according to the length of time and other circumstances which intervene from the time such dispossession is made,
form different degrees of presumption in favour of the title of the dispossessor; and in proportion as that presumption increases, his title
the modes by which the possession may be recovered
the person
dispossessed, to establish his title to recover.
Thus, if A. is disseised by B. while the possession continues in B.
it is a mere naked possession, unsupported by any right, and A. may
restore his possession, and put a total end to the possession of B. by
an entry on the lands, without any previous action.
If B. dies, the possession descends on the heir by act of law. In this
is strengthened

;

vary; and more, or rather different proof is required from

OHIGESTAL TITLES
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a lawful ..title, and acquires, in the
of
possession; which is so far good
right
eye
has lost his right to recover the
disseised,
that
he
against the person
case, the heix„,cpjue5-lCLlhe.laud^

of

the law, an apparent

is

is

if

is

a

;

is

a

it,

possession by entry, and can only recover it by an action at law. The
actions used in these cases are calle d Possessory Actions, and the
original writs by which the proceedings upon them are instituted, are
_ca ned Writs of . Entry -^
But if A. permits the possession to be ivithheld from him, beyond a
or suffers judgment in
certain period of time, without claiming
possessory action to be given against him by default, or upon the merits in all these cases, B.'s title in the eye of the law
strengthened,
and A. can no longer recover by
possessory action, and his only
remedy then
by an action on the right. These last actions are called
Actions,
in contradistinction to Possessory Actions. They
Droiturel
he fails to
are the u ltimate resource of Jthe person disseised.; so that,
bring his writ of right within the time limited for the bringing of such
writs, he
remediless, and the title of the dispossessor
complete.
The original writs by which droiturel actions are instituted are called

a

is is

it

:

a

it,

I,

It

is

Writs of Right.
The dilatoriness and niceties in these processes, introduced the Writ
attributed to Glanville,
of Assize. The invention of this proceeding
Chief Justice to Henry 11. (See Mr. Reeves's History of the English
Law, Part
ch. 3.)
was found so convenient
remedy, that peror
admitted themsons, to avail themselves of
frequently supposed
selves to be disseised, by acts which did not in strictness amount to a
disseisin.
This disseisin, being such only by the will of the party,
disseisin
by election, in opposition to an actual disseisin
called
a

disseisin as between the disseisor and the disseisee, the person,
only
thus propounding himself to be disseised, still continuing the freeholder
The old books particularly the Reas to all persons but the disseisor.
ports of Assize, when they mention disseisins, generally relate to those
Burr.
cases where the owner admits himself disseised.
(See
and see Bract, lib.
cap. 3.)
As the processes upon writs of entry were superseded by the assize,
so th assize and all.jQlher _real acti ons have been since supersed ed by:,
mode of
thejnodern process of ejectment. This was introduced as
trying titles to lands in the reign of Henry VH. From the ease and
now
are conducted,
expedition, with which the proceedings in
Booth, who wrote about
become the general remedy in these cases.
the end of the last century, mentions real actions as then worn out of
use.
It
rather singular that this should be the case, as many cases
writ of ejectment was not
must frequently have occurred, in which
sufficient remedy. Within these few years past, some attempts have
been made to revive real actions the most remarkable of these are the
Wils. 419, 541, and that of
case of Tissen v. Clarke, reported in
The writ of summons in this
Carlos and Shuttlewood v. Lord Dormer.
December,
1775. The summons to the
last case
the
of
dated
1st day
is

3

;

a

a

is

it
is

it

a

e

4,

1

Ill;
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four knights to proceed to the election of the grand assize, is dated the
22d day of May, 1'780. To this summons the sheriff made his return;
and there the matter rested. The last instance in which a real action
was used, is the case of Sidney v. Perry. In this case, it was adjudged
by De Grey, Chief Justice, and all the other judges, that the defendant,
in a writ of right, by proving his actual possession, without any evidence of his title, put the demandant to the necessity of producing and
proving his title, a point, of which, till that decision, some doubts were
That part of Sir William Blackstone's Commentary
entertained.
which treats upon real actions is not the least valuable part of that excellent work.
Note (1) to Coke upon Littleton, § 239a.2

SMITH

v.

(Supreme Court of New York, 1810.

BURTIS.
6

Johns.

197, 5 Am. Dec. 218.)

This was an a,ction of eject ment, brought to recover the possession
of a^house and lot of land, in the city of New York. The cause was
tiied at the sittings, held in the city of New York, the 12th' of June,
1809, before Mr. Justice Spencer.
The plaintiff proved, that Isaac Teller entered into possession of the.
2 In Leach v. Jay, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 42 (1S78), a devisee sought to recover
possession of certain lands.
The will provided: "I also bequeath and devise to him" (the plaintiff) "all real estate (if any) of' which I may die
seised." For some time prior to the death of the testatrix, the lands in question had been in possession of others who claimed to own same.
The court
held that the testatrix was not "seised" and that therefore the plaintiff did
not succeed to the lands.
James, L. J., said: "This lady, for some reason
or motive of her own, or for no reason, chose to use one of the most technical words in our law. The word has acquired no other meaning than its
technical meaning ; it has never got into ordinary use ; therefore we are
not at liberty to attribute to it any other meaning merely because we supIt
pose that the testatrix did not know the true meaning of the word.
has been argued in favor of the appellant that seisin now has lost its distinctive meaning, that all its consequences have long ceased to exist, and
therefore that you cannot predicate of anything that a testator died seised
of it in any other sense than that it was part of his real estate. I ,am of
opinion that there are such things as seisin and disseisin still. Mr. Joshua
Williams says in his late book on Seisin: 'If a person wrongfully gets possession of the land of another, he becomes wrongfully entitled to an estate
In fee simple, and to no less estate in that land; thus, if a squatter wrongfully incloses a bit of waste land and builds a hut on it and lives there, he
acquires an estate in fee simple by his outi wrong in the land which he has
inclosed.
He is seised, and the owner of the waste is disseised. It is true
that, until by length of time the statute of limitations shall have confirmed
his title, he may be turned out by legal process. But as long as he remains
he is not a mere tenant at will, nor for years, nor for life, nor in tail; but
he has an estate in fee simple. He has seisin of the freehold to him and his
heirs.
The rightful owner in the meantime has but a right of entry, a
right in many respects equivalent to seisin; but he is not actually seised, for
if one person is seised another person cannot be so.' "
As to the meaning of seisin in connection with covenants for title, compare Marston v. Hobbs, 2 Mass. 433, 3 Am. Dec. 61 (1807), and Mercantile
Trust Co. V. South Park Co., 94 Ky. 271, 22 S. W. 314 (1893).
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premises in question, about the year 1765, and erected a house thereon,
in which he Hved, with his family, from 1765 to 1775, when he died in
At the time of his death, he left five children, John, his
possession.
eldest son, and heir at law, Henry, his second son, one of the lessors,
Mary, (who intermarried with Peter Thalkimer,) Remsen, and Isaac,
other lessors of the plaintiff. The widow and children remained on
the premises until the British army took possession of New York, when
they left the place, and went to Hudson. John the eldest son, died in
1777, aged about 14 years; and Henry was about 8 years old when his
father died. After the British troops entered the city of New York,
(in 1776,) they took possession of, and occupied the buildings and premises, and on application of one of the creditors of Isaac Teller, permitted him, for thirty guineas, to take possession of, and appropriate to
his own use, the materials of the buildings, which were sold by him;
out of the proceeds thereof he retained the amount due to him; and,
a few years since, paid the residue to Henry, one of the lessors.
The
possession of the premises remained vacant during the war, and until
1'795, when they were taken possession of by the defendants, or the
persons under whom they claim.
The defendants offered to prove, that Isaac Teller, under whom the
lessors claimed, had no title to the premises in question ; and that the
defendants had a good and complete title to the premises, which was
not derived from Isaac Teller, or his children.
This evidence was objected to, by the plaintiff's counsel, on the
ground that there having been a descent cast upon the immediate heirs
of Isaac Teller, who died in possession ; and that the possessory title
being the only question in an action of ejectment, the plaintiff must recover.
The judge overruled the evidence offered by the defendants ; and a
verdict was thereupon found for the plaintiff'.
A motion was made to set aside the verdict, for the misdirection of
the judge, in overruling the evidence offered by the defendant, on the
ground of a descent being cast ; and aleo on account of newly discovered evidence.
Affidavits were read, stating the evidence discovered since the trial ;
but as the opinion of the court related only to the other ground, it is
unnecessary to state it.
Kent, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. The first and most
impo rtant question raised in this case is, whether a descent was cast,^
upon the death of Isaac Teller, so as to toll the entry of the true owner.
The counsel, upon the argument, entered into a discussion of the
general doctrine of disseisin ; but I do not think it will be necessary to
pursue at large that inquiry.
All the books seem to agree that the ancient learning on this subject has become abstruse.
Disseisin, in the
age of Bracton, was considered in an extensive sense, and far beyond
the idea which was first applied to it. Disseisin, by election, in opposition to actual disseisin, was introduced very early, and became very
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prevalent, in order to extend the remedy by writ of assise, which was
devised by Glanville, in the reign of Henry II. It must, therefore, be
difficult, in many cases, to know what species of disseisin was intended,
though it is said that the old books, and particularly the book of assise,
when they mention disseisins, generally relate to disseisins by election.
The present question appears, however, to lie in a narrower compass ;
and by confining ourselves to a few plain and familiar authomies_, we
shall discover the principle, that the doctrine of descent cas t applies
onl y to a seisin^_commenc ing by wro ng, a nd f ounded on an ouster of
Whatever may be the meaning of disseisin, in other
the_tru e owner.
cases, its meaning, when applied to the subject before us, embr a ces a
tortious ouster. There must be a disseisin in fact. The rightful owner
must have been expelled, either by violence, or by some act which the
law regards as equivalent in its effects.
"Descents in fee, which toll entries," says Littleton, (section 385,)
"are, as if a man seised of certain lands, is by another disseised, and
the disseisor hath issue and dieth of such estate seised ; now the lands
descend to the issue of the disseisor, by course of law, as heir unto him.
And because the law casts the lands upon the issue, by force of the deAnd in the next secscent, the entry of the disseisee is taken away."
tion, Littleton gives a like definition of a descent in tail, which tolls an
entry. Both he and Gilbert have a chapter devoted to the subject, and
they always speak or refer to a descent founded on a seisin commencing by wrong. "In descents which toll entries, it behoveth," says Littleton, (section 387,) "that the man die seised in his demesne as of fee."
A seisin in his demesne as of fee, is the strongest and highest estate
It wo uld then be very idle to talk of a
which the subject can enjoy.
descent cast, in the case of a rightful seisin in fee^ for there would be
no ri^t of entrj to be tolled in such a case. The doctrine can only
exist and apply in the case of a tortious seisin.
At the common law, if the disseisor, abator, or intruder, (and these
are mentioned by Coke, as the only wrongful acts of seisin, which will
cast a descent,) had died seised soon after the wrong done, the disseisee and his heirs were barred of their entry.
Co. Litt. 238, a. This
was deemed too harsh a rule, and the statute of 32 Hen. VI II-, c. 33,
was passed, saving the right of entry to the disseisee, unless the disseisor had been in peaceable possession for five years next after the
disseisin by him committed.
This statute shows pretty plainly, what
species of disseisin was then understood as applicable to this subject.
It is entitled, "An act that wrongful disseisin is no descent in law ;"
and it recites that whereas "divers persons have heretofore, by strength,
and without title, entered into lands, and wrongfully disseised the
rightful owner, and so being seised by disseisin, have thereof died seised, by reason of which dying seised, the disseisee or such other persons,
as before such descent might have lawfully entered, were thereby excluded of their entry and put to their action."
It is therefore enacted,
"that the dying seised of any such disseisor of any lands, having no
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right or title therein, should not be taken or deemed any such descent
in the law, for to toll or take away the entry of any person, which, at
the time of the descent, had good and lawful title of entry, except," etc.
The disseisin intended by this act, was one founded on a tortious exThis is giving the term its primitive and
pulsion of the true owner.

jS^

genuine meaning; and in this sense it is also used, when applied to a
A mere entry upon another is .no, disseisin, unless it be,
descent cast.
accompanied with expulsion, or ouster from the freehold.. Disse isin
is"an estate gained by wrong and injury ;. and therein it differs froni_
This is the uniform
dispossession, which may be by right or wrong.
language of the best authorities, from the time of Littleton. Litt. §
279; Co. Litt. 3, b, 18, b, 153, b, 181, a; Cro. Jac. 685; 1 Salk. 246,

; 1 Burr. 109.
This tortious seisin, the lessors of the plaintiff were bound to show
affirmatively, if they would put themselves upon the strict and ungracious right of a descent cast. A_i)eaceable entry upon land, apparently,
The benign and
\^cant, furnishes, per se, no presumption of wrong.
Holt,
According to Lord
legal intendment is otherwise.
(1 Salk. 246,)
a bare entry on another, without an expulsion, makes such a seisin
only, that the law will adjudge him in possession that has the right.
This court has frequently recognized the same rule, tjiat an entry not

n. 2

"3^

appearing to be hostile, was to be considered an entry under the_ ti tl e ^
It lay, then, with the plaintiff to show his entry
"of the true owner.
not congeabie, or to show a subsequent disseisin ; for he entered upon
vacant lands. We may infer title, from his ten years' possession, sufficient to put the tenant upon his defence ; but we ought not to infer a
tortious entry, or an actual ouster, sufficient to bar every defence. This
would be a most rigorous conclusion, for it makes tlie ancestor or the
plaintiff" a disseisor ; it tolls the entry of the true owner ; it shuts out
his defence, and drives him to his writ of right, which final remedy is
now subject to the limitation of 1rv\'enty-five years.
The subsequent use of the land by Teller was no disseisin. The case
of Matheson v. Trot, 1 Leon. 209, is a strong authority on this point.
In that case, Henry Denny, the heir at law, when he came of age,
claimed and sued out livery, or restitution of lands, out of the hands
of the feudal lord, who had seised them as guardian for the infant.
He then leased them for years, reserving a rent, and for years received
This was
the rents and profits from his tenant, and died so seised.
the
court addescent,
though
held not to be a requisite seisin to cast a
mitted, that his lessee had gained a wrongful possession in fee. If here
was not, during all this time, an actual pedis possessio by the heir,
(though the case says, he once walked over the lands with his tenant,)
yet he held and enjoyed the lands by his tenant; and the case showed
conclusively, that he held them without title, for the lands had been
This case, I think is, in every
devised in fee to his younger brother.
view, much stronger in favor of a descent cast, than the one before us.
As it was, therefore, ruled, at the trial, that a descent was cast, and

Ch. 1)

TITLES

POSSESSORY

11

of defence, inadmissible, the court are of
be
a new trial, with costs to abide the event
to
that
there
ought
opinion,
of the suit.
New trial granted.*
the evidence offered by way

SECTION 2.—EFFECTS

ASHER
(Court

V.

OF POSSESSION

WHITLOCK.

of Queen's Bench,

1865.

L. R.

1

Q. B.

Ejectment for a cottage, garden, and premises, situate at Keysoe
Row, in the parish of Keysoe, in the county of Bedford; the writ
stated that the female plaintiff claimed possession as heir-at-law of
Mary Ann Williamson, an infant deceased.
The defendant defended for the whole.
At the trial before Cockburn, C. J., at the last Bedfordshire Spring
Assizes, the following facts appeared in evidence : About Michaelmas,
in the ye§x— LS42, Thomas Williamson enclosed from the waste of a
manor a piece of land by the side of the highway ; and in 1850 he enclosed more land adjoining, and built a cottage; the whole being the
land as described and claimed in the writ. He occupied the whole till
his d eath in I860 . By his will he devised the whole property, describing it as "a cottage and garden, in Keysoe Row, in which I now dwell,"
to his wife Lucy Williamson, for and during so much only of her
natural life as she might remain his widow anH nnmnrnVfl ; and from
and after her decease, or second marriage, whichever event might first
happen, to his only child JM arv Ann Williamson, m fee . After the
death of Thomas Williamson, his widow remained in possession with
the daughter, and in April 1861 married the defendant; and from that
time they all three resided on the property till the death of the daughter, aged eighteen years, in February 1863. On her death, the defendant
and his wife, the widow of the testator, continued to reside on the premises ; the widow died in May 1863, and the defendant still continued to
occupy.

The f emak pla intiff is the heir-at-la w of the testator's daught er,
Mary Ann Williamson. The writ was issued 11th of April 1865.
These facts being undisputed, the Chief Justice directed a verdict for
the plaintiff for the whole of the property claimed ; with leave to move

3 See. too. Slater v. Rawson. 6 Mete. (Mass.) 439 (1843).
Section 374 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure provides that '^the,
jrjghLjQjLa person to the possession oi real property is not impaired. or al.-."
fected, by a descent being cast, in consequence of the death of a person in
Legislation to the same effect is found in a
possession of the property."
number of states. See 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 1404.
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to enter the verdict for the defendant, on the ground that the testator had no devisable interest in any part of the property.
A rule nisi was afterwards obtained to enter the verdict for the defendant, on the ground that no title in tlie plaintiffs was shown to
either portion of the land enclosed.
CocKBURN, C. J. I am of opinion that this rule should be discharged. The defendant, on the facts, is in this dilemma ; either his poss ession was adverse, or it was not . If it was not adverse to tlie devisee
of the person who enclosed the land, and it may be treated as a continuance of the possession which the widow had and ought to have given
up on her marriage with the defendant, then, as she and the defendant
came in under the will, both would be estopped from 'denying the title
of the devisee and her heir-at-law. But assuming the defendant's possession to have been adverse, we have then to consider how far it
Mr.
operated to destroy the right of the devisee and her heir-at-law.
Merewether was obliged to contend that possession acquired, as this
was, against a rightful owner, would not be sufficient to keep out every
But I take it a<; rlearly e^tahother person but the rightful owner.
l ished that possession is ^ood against all the world except the pers on
who can show a good title ; and it would be mischievous to change this
established doctrine. In Doe v. Dyeball, Mood. & M. 346 (E. C. L. R.
vol. 22), one year's possession by the plaintiff was held good against a
person who came and turned him out; and there are other authorities
to the same eft'ect.
Suppose the person who originally enclosed the
land had been expelled by the defendant, or the defendant had obtained
possession without force, by simply walking in at the open door in the
absence of the then possessor, and were to say to him, "You have no
more title than I have, my possession is as good as yours," surely ejectment could have been maintained by the original possessor against the
All the old law on the doctrine of disseisin was founded
defendant.
on the p rinciple that the_ disseisor's title was good against all but the
disseisee.
It is too clea r to admit of doubt tliat, if the devisor had bee n
t urned out of po s session he could_bavp_ m aintained ejectment.^
What
is the position ot the devisee
There can be no doubt that a man has
a right to devise that estate which the law gives him against all the
world but the true owner. Here the widow was
prior devisee, but
durante viduitate only, and as soon as the testator died the estate became vested in the widow; and immediately on the widow's marriage
the daughter had
right to possession; the defendant, however, anticipates her, and with the widow takes possession. But just as he had
no right to interfere with the testator, so he had no right against the
she lived she could have brought ejectment: .aldaughter, and ha
hough she died without asserting her right, the same right belongs to
er heir.
Therefore
think the action can be maintained, inasmuch
as the defe ndant had not acquired any title
ength of posses sion.
The devisor rmghT have brought ejectment, his right of possession
being passed by will to his daughter, she could have maintained eject-
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ment, and so there fore can her heir, the female plaintiff . We know
to what extent encroachments on waste lands have taken place; and
if the lord has acquiesced and does not interfere, can it be at the mere
will of any stranger to disturb the person in possession ? I do not know
what equity may say to the rights of different claimants who have come
in at different times without title; but at law I think the right of he
original posse ssor is clear. On the simple ground that possession is
good title agamst all but the true owner, I tliink the plaintiffs entitled
to succeed, and that the rule should be discharged.
Mellor, J. I am of the same opinion. It is necessary to distinguish
between the case of the true owner and that of a person having no
title. T he fact of possession is prima facie evidence of seisin in fee.
The law gives credit to possession unless explained ; and Mr. Merewether, in order to succeed, ought to have gone on and shown the testator's title to be bad, as that he was only tenant at will, but this he did
not do. In Doe v. Dyeball, Mood. & M. 346 (E. C. L. R. vol. 22), possession for a vear only was held sufficient against a person having no
title.
In Doe'v. Barnard, 13 Q. B. 945 (E. C. L. R. vol. 66), 18 L.
J. (O. B.) 306, the plaintiff did not rely on her own possession merely,
but showed a prior possession in her husband, with whom she was
unconnected in point of title. Here the first possessor is connected in
title with the plaintiffs ; for there can be no doubt that the testator's
I n the common case of proving a claim t o
interest was devisable.
will,
proof of the will and of possession or re landed estate under a
ceipt oi rent s by the testator is alwavs prima facie sufficient, wit hout
going on to show possession for more than twenty year s. I agree with
the Lord Chief Justice in the importance of maintaining that possession
is good against all but the rightful owner.
Lush, J., concurred.
-74^ ffU^^^U^ O^^.
Rule discharged.*
^
^i-^~f

i

PERRY
(Privy Council.

V.

CLISSOLD.

[1907]

App.

Cas. 73.)

This was an appeal from a judgment of the
Lord Macnaghten.-'^
High Court of Australia^ dated June 20, 1904, reversing a judgment
of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. It raised a question
under the Lands for Public Purposes Acquisition Act, 1880 (44 Vict.
No. 160), now superseded by the Public Works Ac t, 1900, which consolidates the law on the subject.
The act of 1880 in its preamble recites that it is expedient to make
provision for the acquisition on behalf of the Crown of lands required
* See, also, Hubbard v. Little, 9 Cush.
(Mass.) 475 (1S52);
Louis Railroad & Coal Co. v. Cobb, 94 111. 55 (1879).
5 The statement of facts is omitted.
The case sufficiently

the opinion.
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for certain purposes, including, among others, "sites for public
schools," and "to provide compensation for lands so acquired."
The following are the m aterial provisions of the Ac t.
When the Governor sanctions the acquisition of any land for a
school site he may, by notification in the Gazette, declare that such
land, if private property, has been resumed for such purposes.
Upon such publication the land is forthwith v ested in the Minister of
P ublic Instruction and his successors on behalf of the Crown^ for t he
p urposes of the Act, fo r an estate of inheritance in fee simple in pos s ession freed and discha rged fro m all other estates and interests.
The owners of the land or the persons who, but for the provisions
thereinbefore contained, would have been such owners are entitled to
receive such sum of money by way of compensation . for the land of
which they have been deprived under the Act as may be agreed upon
or otherwise ascertained under the provisions thereinafter contained.
The estate and interest of every person entitled to land so resumed,
or any portion thereof, and whether to the legal or equitable estate
therein, is by virtue of the Act deemed to have been as fully and
effectually conveyed to the Minister as if the same had been conveyed
by means of the most perfect assurances in the law. Every such esta te
a nd interest uponthe publication _of such notification as aforesaid js
t aken to have been converted intoa claim for compensation in pursu of

the provisions

thereinafter co n taine d, and every person upon
asserting his claim as thereinafter provided, and making out his title
in respect of any portion of the resumed land, is entitled to compensation on account of such resumption in manner thereinafter provided.
Every person claiming compensation in respect of any land so resumed is, within ni nety da ys_froni the publication of such notification
or at any time afterwards, within such time as a judge of the Supreme
Court appoints in that behalf, to s erve a notice in writing upon th e
Minister and a like notice upon the Crown solicitor, "which notice," j t
i s declared, "shall seTTorth the nature of the estate or interest of the
"
c laimant in such land together with anj^bstrart of hk titip
ance

a

;

AJ^^

\

I

^

.

.

y^

I

/.

a

cl

t)-)
^

Section 13 is in the following terms : "Within sixty days after the
receipt of every such notice of claim by the Crown solicitor he shall
f orward the same , together with his report thereon, to the Minister,
who shall thereupon (unless no prima facie case for compensation shall
p';fai-p- nr
have been disclosed) c ause a valuation of the land. or of
int erest of the
imant therei n to be rnade in accordance with the provisions of this A ct, and shall inform the claimant, as soon as practicable, of the amount of such valuation by notice in the form of the Second Schedule hereto."
piece of
By notification published in the Gazette of July 17, 1891,
land containing two acres and three perches at Canterbury, in the
county of Cumberland, was re sumed for ajpublic sch ool site- The land
was at the time in the possession of one Fredrick Clissold.
Notice
of the resumption was given to Clissold on July 22, 1891 but nothing
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further was done then. Cl issold died shortly afterwards, and his will
was proved on May 5, 1892.
In May, 1902, under an order of the Supreme Court, the responden ts
who are the pre sent trustees of Clissold's will , and of whom three are
his surviving executors, served notice of their claim to compensation
in respect of the land resumed by the notification of July 17, 1891,
stating that the claimants were the executors of Frederick Clissold,
"who at the date of resumption was in possession of such land as the
owner thereof, and in receipt of the rents of such lands, and had a
t itle thereto bv possess ion."
It appeared from the papers which were forwarded with the claim
that in the year 1881 Frederick Clissold entered into possession of the
land, which was then open and vacant, and enclosed it by a substantial
fencing, and that ever since the enclosure, up to the time of resumption, Clissold held exclusive possession of the land without notic£ -Qf

adverse claim , and let it to diflFerent tenants and received the ren ts
f or his own use and benefit, and d ul y paid all rates and taxes in respect
o f the land which stood in his~riatTie in the rate-books of the municipa li ty of Canterbury.
The Minister refused to entertain the claim to compensation.
The Supreme Court upheld the view of the Minister. The High
Court reversed this decision, and g^ranted a mandamus requiring the
Minister to cause a valuation to be made.
The only question on this appeal was whether or not a prima facie
a ny

case

for compensation had

been disclosed.

On the part of the Minister it was contended that, upon the plaintiffs' own showing, Clissold was a mere trespasser, without any estate
or interest in the land.
Their Lordships are unable to agree with this contention.
It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the
assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary
rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world
but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by process of law within_ the period prescr ibed
by the provisions of the Statute of Limitations applicable to the case,
hjs ri ght is forever extinguishe d, amL th^ po^^pssnry owner arq^J^'P'^
a n absolute title.
On behalf of the Minister reliance was placed on the case of Doe v.
Barnard, 13 O. B. 945, which seems to lay down this proposition, that
if a person having only a possessory title to land be supplanted in the
possession by another who has himself no better title, and afterwards
bring's an action to recover the land, he must fail in case he shows in
the course of the proceedings that the title on which he seeks to reIt is, however, difficult, if not imposcover was merely possessory.
sible, to reconcile this case with the later case of Asher v . Whitlock,
L. R. 1 Q. B. 1, in which Doe v. Barnard was citeHl The judgment
of Cockburn, C. J., is clear on the point. The rest of the Court con-
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curred, and It may be observed that one of the members of the Court
in Asher v. Whitlock (Lush, J.) had been of counsel for the successful
party in Doe v. Barnard. The conclusion at which the Court arrived
in Doe v. Barnard is hardly consistent with the views of such eminent
authorities on real property law as Mr. Preston and Mr. Joshua WilIt is opposed to the opinion of modern text-writers of such
liams.
and
authority as Professor Maitland and Holmes, J., of the
weight

Court of the United States.
T heir Lordships are of opinion that it is impossible t p say that no
pr ima facie case for compensation has been disclose d .
They do not think that a case for compensation is necessarily excluded by the circumstance that under the provisions of the Act of 1900
the Minister acquired not merely the title of the person in possession as
owner, but also the title, whatever it may have been, of the rightful
owner out of possession, who never came forward to claim the land or
as the Chief
and who
the compensation payable in respect of
this
"unknown
to
day."
Justice says,
apparently in
The Act throughout from the very preamble has
it

it,

is,

■Supreme

a

e

d

a

It

c

it

is

d

6

See Ex parte Winder,
Ch. D. 696 (1S77).
See, also, People v. Shearer,
30 Cal. 645 (1866), where the state claimed the power to tax the possessory
6

^

t

hat compensation would be pavable to every per gon
deprived of the land resumed for public purposes . It could hardly
have been intended or contemplated that the Act should have the effect
of shaking titles which but for the Act would have been secure, and
would in process of time have become absolute and indisputable, or
that the Governor, or responsible Ministers acting under his instructions, should take advantage of the infirmity of anybody's title in order^
Even where the true owner, after
to_ acquire his land for nothing.
iligent inquiry, cannot be found the Act contemplates payment of th
Court of Equit y.
ompensation into Court to be dealt with bv
only remains for their Lordships to express their opinion that
valua tion of the land as at the
the valuation to be made should be
ate of the notification of resumption.
will be for the claimants to take such
When the valuation
made
be
as
advised
to recover the amount, unless the
proceedings
they may
Minister thinks fit to pay them or to pay the money into Court.
Eor these reasons their Lordships humbly advised His Majesty that
the appeal should be dismis sed, and ordered the appellant to pay the
costs of the appeal.^
contemplation

interest of an occupant of public land of the United

States.

'f,^%^^''»
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COFFIN.

Massachusetts,

1S69.

101 Mass.

179.)

Writ of entry against John T. Coffin and tlie heirs of John C.
Parkinson, to recover a lot of land in Brighton. Coffin was defaulted.
Trial in this court, before Foster, J., who reported the
ly

as

follows

case substantial-

:

To show title,

demandants, among other evidence, put in and
proved a deed of the demanded premises from William F. Otis to John
T. Coffin, dated May 9, 1857, and a m.ortgage deed fr om said Coffin
to themselves, dated September 12, 1857, to secure the payment of
The heirs of Parkin$5000; both duly acknowledged and recorded.
deed,
or any conveyance of the
son offered no evidence of any title by
possessio
by
adverse
n.
premises, but c laimed title
There was evidence tending to show that John C. Parkinson was
in po ssession and occupation of the premises for many years prior to
his death in January, 1857, claiming title, and that in 1842 Coffin knew
that he claimed title ; that a few days after John C. Parkinson's death,
Co ffin's agent called upon Parkinson's hpirc; anri desired them to leave
t he premises , and they insisted that the premises were theirs ; that
afterwards and sometime before giving the deed under which the demandants claimed, Coffin himself called upon Parkinson's heirs, and
wanted them to leave the premises , and they told him personally that
they owned the land; that Coffin e ndeavored to buy them off, and
they refused his overtures; and that the mortgage deed of September
12, 1857, from Coffin to the demandants, under which they claimed,
was executed, acknowledged and delivered in Boston.
At the close of the evidence, the presiding judge proposed to instruct
the jury on the effect of disseisin as follows: "If, after the death of
John C. Parkinson while Coffin owned the fee, the heirs of Parkinson
were in actual possession of the demanded premises claiming a fee, and
this was known to Coffin ; and they continued in such possession at the
date of the mortgage deed from him to the demandants; then Coffin
was disseised so that no tjiing pa ssed by his deed, and the demandant s
cannot recove r." Thereupon the demandants declined to go to the jury,
and submitted to a verdict for the heirs of Parkinson, and the jury
found specially for the latter upon the sole ground that the deed to the
demandants pas sed no ti tle. To this ruling the demandants excepted,
and the presiding judge reserved for the full court the question whether the ruling was correct.
Chapman, C. J. The demandants cl aim title unde r a mortgage from
Coffin, and therefore they have joined Coffjn in the suit, as they are
permitted to do by the Gen. St. 1860, c. 140, § 8, though Coffin is not
a tenant in possession.
The t enants in possession are the h eirs of
olin C. Parkinson, who died in Tanuary. 1857 . A few days afterAig.Peop. — 2

J
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wards the agent of Coffin called upon them and desired them to leave
They refused to quit, and claimed title. Afterwards
the premises.
Coffin himself called upon them and wanted them to leave the premises.
They again refused, claiming title. He endeavored to buy them
T hey were thus in possession of
off, and they refused his overtures.
adversely to him. There is
t he demanded premises, and claiming title

Innothing to show that they entered under him or by his permission.
for
many
years,
in
possession
deed it is stated that their father was
claiming title, and that this was known to Coffin in 1842. While they
were thus in possession, namely, on September 12, 1857, Coffin made
the mortgage to the demandants. I f he had a right of entry, he mi^ ht
h ave entered upon the land and there delivered the deed, ^^f^ \}\'^ title
would have passed . But as he didjiot,_enter, but delivered the deed
while he was out of possession, and the tenants were holding the land
adversely, his deed wasjjioperatwe to pass the_ _title. Warner v. Bull,
All the grantees could acquire was a right to bring a n
13 Mete. 1.
a ction for possession in the name of their granto r.!. Cleav eland v.
Flagg, 4 Cush. 76. The ruling is based upon the assifrfi^iSh that the
title of Coffin was good, and that the tenants were mere disseisors;

Much more would the deg d
and upon that assumption it was correct.
of Coffin to the demandants be inoperative if no title had ever passed
to Coffin ; for in such case no action would lie even in Coffin's name.
It would be necessary to sue in the name of Otis or some other person
who had good title.
The facts stated in the report do not present a case of mere disseisin
at the election of Coffin; but this was an actual advers e occupation
. and holding him out.
See Washb. Real Prop. (3d Ed.) bk. 3, c. 2, § 7.
Judgme nt for the ten ants on the verdict.^
7 A., the paper title own er of certain lands, sues B. in an action o f Jrover
for the conversion ol stone and gravel dug out of and taken from said lands.
On the trial it develops that B. has bee n in adverse possession of the tract

from which

the stone and gravel were taken, thou"gB

lor ~a'

period less than

Mather v.
that of the statute of limitations. Can the action be maintained?
Ministers of Trinity Church, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 509, 8 Am. Dec. 663 (1817).
Could A. h ave
S uppose it had >^^" ^i ^yhn ^^""^tnirt^n thc> stone and gravel.
v. Hotchkiss, 10
See "Wheeler
s ued hi)? in trespasg q uare clausum f regit?
Connr22o' (1834).
-A very interesting question is presented when the ousted owner
ossession and sues to recover speci fically for crops and other things
fronfthe land by tile "adV«n^"t5^§essorr"See Liford's Case, 11 Co.
(161.5); Page v. Fowler, 39 Cal. 412, 2 Am. Rep. 462 (1870); Hooser
10 B. Mon. 72, 50 Am. Dec. 540 (1849).

^y^lOAJ,

/\j»^<,jgn>*^

4-^rO

^u^u.

^s^

/>-t<^w2/5-6t^n^

recove rs
severed
46b, 51b
v. Hays,

Cr*-^

)
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SECTION 3.— LAPSE OF TIME

STAT.

3

EDW. I,

c. 39

(1275).

And forasmuch as it is long time passed since the writs undernamed
were limited; it is provided, T hat in conveying a descent in a writ o f
right^ none shall presume to declare of the seisin of his ancestor further, or beyond the ti me of King Richard,..u ncle to King Henry, father
to the King that now is; and that a writ of Novel disseisin, of Partition, which is called Nuper obiit, have their limitation since the first
voyage of King Henry, father to the King that now is, into Gascoin.
And that writs of Mortdancestor, of Cosinage, of Aiel, of Entry, and
of Nativis, have their limitation from the coronation of the same King
Nevertheless all writs purchased now by
Henry, and not before.
themselves, or to be purchased between this and the Feast of St. John,
for one year complete, shall be pleaded from as long time, as heretofore they have been used to be pleaded.

STAT.

21

JAC. I,

c. 16, §§ 1, 2 (1623).

I. For quieting of men's estates, and avoiding of suits, be it
enacted by the King's most excellent majesty, the lords spiritual
and temporal, and commons, in this present Parliament assembled,
That all writs of formedon in descender, fo rmcdon in remaind er, and
f ormedon in reverfor, at any time hereafter to be sued or bought, of or
for any manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments, whereunto any
person or persons now hath or have any title, or cause to have or pursue any such writ, shall__be sued and takeii ^vithin twejity years next
after the end of this present session of Parliament; and after the said
twenty years expired, no such person or persons, or any of their heirs,
shall have or maintain any such writ, of or for any of the said manors,
lands, tenements or hereditaments ; (2) and that all writs of formedon
in descender, formedon in remainder, and formedon in reverter, of any
manors, lands, tenements, or other hereditaments whatsoever, at any
time hereafter to be sued or brought by occasion or means of any title
or cause hereafter happening, shall be sued and taken within twenty
years next after the title and cause of action first descended or fallen,
and at no time after tlie said twenty years ; (3) and that no person or
persons that now hath any right or title of entry into any manors,
lands, tenements or hereditaments now held from him or them, shall
thereinto enter, but within twenty years next after the end of this
present session of Parliament, or within twenty years next after any
other title of entrv^ accrued : (4) and that no person or persons shall
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make any entry into any lands, tenements or
hereditaments, but within twenty years next after his or their right
or title which shall hereafter first descend or accrue to the same ; and
in default thereof, such persons so not entering, and their heirs, shall
be utterly excluded and disabled from such entry after to be made;
any former law or Statute to the contrary notwithstanding.
II. Provided nevertheless, That if any person or persons, that is or
shall be entitled to such writ or writs, or that hath or shall have silch
right or title of entry, be or shall be at the time of the said right or
title first descended, accrued, come or fallen, within the age of one and
twenty years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned or beyond
C^nr^K i
the seas, that then such person or persons, and his or their heir and
heirs, shall or may, notwithstanding the said twenty years be expired,
bring his action, or make his entry, as he might have done before this
-.^^-V-t-'*-^
Act ; (2) so as such person and persons, or his or their heir and heirs,
4 -,»^^^^^^
shall within ten years next after his and their full age, discoverture,
coming of sound mind, enlargement out of prison, or coming into this
realm, or death, take benefit of and sue forth the same, and at no time
after the said ten years.
at any time hereafter

HOW. ANN. ST. MICH.

1913, c. 383.

Sec. 1. After the thirty-first day of December, in the year of our
Lord eighteen hundred sixty-three, no person shall bring or maintain
any action for the recovery of any lands, or the possession thereof, or
make any entry thereupon, unless suclLaction is commenced or entry
made within the time herein limited therefor, after the right to make
such entry or to bring such action shall have first accrued to the plaintiff, or to some person through whom he claims, to-wit:
First. Within five years, where the defendant claims title to the land
in question, by or through some deed made upon a sale thereof by an
executor, administrator or guardian, or by a sheriff, or other proper
ministerial officer, under the order, judgment, decree or process of a
court, or legal tribunal of competent jurisdiction within this state, or
by a sheriff upon a mortgage foreclosure sale ; or through a devise in
any will which shall have been probated in this state for fifteen years,
during which period no suit in chancery has been brought to test the
validity of such devise : Provided, that in_cases whe re such fifteen year
period has already elapsed such rights of entry or action shall be barred
after two years from the passage hereof, or in case such right has not
accrued, then after two years from the accruing thereof ;
Second. Within ten years, where the defendant claims title under a
deed made by some officer of this state, or of the United States, authorized to make deeds upon the sale of lands for taxes assessed and
levied within this State ;
Third. Within fifteen years in all other cases.
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If at the time when any right of entry, or of action, as
Sec. 5.
aforesaid, shall first accrue or have accrued, the person entitled to such
entry or action shall be, or shall have been, within the age of twentyone years, or a married woman, insane, or imprisoned, or absent from
the United States, unless within one of the British provinces of North
America, such person, or any one claiming from, by or under him,
may make such entry, or bring such action, at any time within five
years after such disability shall be or shall have been removed, although the time limited therefor in the first section of this chapter may
have expired.
HUGHES
(Supreme Court of Vermont,

This

v.

1867.

GRAVES.
39 Vt. 359, 94 Am. Dec. 331.)

of trespass quare clausum freg it. with counts
joined agreeably to the statute. The action, by

cause was an a ct

in trespass on the case
the agreement of the parties, was referred, to be decided according to
law, and the defen dant filed except ions to the report of the referees.
On the hearing upon the said report and exceptions at the March
Term, 1866, Kellogg, J., presiding, the court, pro forma, decided that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover of the defendant the sum of ten
dollars for his damages, as stated in the report, and rendered judgment
in favor of the plaintiff on the report accordingly,— to this decision and
judgment the defendant excepted.
The referees reported as follows : "The plaintiff and defendant, are
severally the owners and occupiers of adjacent lots of land in the village of Fairhaven, both lots being originally parcels of an entire lot
and e ach party deriving title to his lot from a common source. The
west line of the plaintiff's lot, as shown by his title deeds, runs from
the northwest corner of his dwelling house, southerly to the northwest
corner of the Whipple lot. This line formed the eastern boundary of
ancient highway, discontinued more than fifty years since, running over
the lot of the defendant.
Joshua Quenton an intermediate grantgr of
the plaintiff, obtained his title to the lot in 1806, and he and his heirs
owned and occupied it until May, 1847. During this period, the Quentons enclosed with a fence a strip of land about ten feet wide at the
north end, which extended southerly and adjoining the plaintiff's west
line from the said northwest corner of the plaintiff's dwelling house, to
and beyond the south line of the defendant's lot taken from said
ancient highway, making a portion of their door yard, and continued t o
occupy peaceably and adversely claiming it as their own for mnrp th-a n

f^-^'

/

|

| ^
j

'^
•

fifteen years . In the fall of 1847 an intermediate grantor of the de-^
fendant, claims this strip of land, sawed the fence in two where the_^
south line of the defendant's lot would strike it. But the fence after'
two or three months was rebuilt by the plaintiff's grantor and the occupation in them continued till March, 1861, as the fence was still stand-

-'A. /C-V
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j
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ing when the plaintiff took possession under his deed, and when the
defendant purchased his lot in April, 1862, he claimed it and in the
summer of 1862 erected a store which extended eastward within about
eight inches of the plaintiff's dwelling house and covered not only a
portion of the strip of land so enclosed by the Quentons taken from
the old highway and the plaintiff's lot, but also a small portion of land
included within the boundaries of the plaintiff's lot. None of the deeds
prior to the deed of Olive Kelsey to I. Davey, of March 23d, 1860, by
and through which the plaintiff claims title to his lot, in their boundaries included the piece of land enclosed by Quenton and taken from
said old highway, and which actually formed part of the door yard to
the plaintiff's house. If the court shall be of opinion that the plaintiff
takes nothing by Quenton's possessory title be cause the land so claim ed
w as not included in the boundaries of his dee d, then we only find for
the plaintiff to recover of the defendant seven dollars damages and
his costs, otherwise we find for the plaintiff to recover of the defendant ten dollars damages and his cost."
Steele, J. The plaintiff is in actual possession and by his deed from
fi
'Plive Kelsey, is entitled to the benefit of her possession. Her possesThe
sion was prior to any possession by the defendant or his grantors.
plaintiff" will therefore maintain this action of trespass as against the defendant by virtuej)f mer e prior possession, unless the defendant has
a right to the possession.
It is then the defendant's right and not the
plaintiff's which we are required to examine. The defendant shows a
faultless chain of title on paper, but it turns out he does not own the
land. One Quenton acquired the ownership by fifteen years possession
The defendant's chain of deeds
adverse to the defendant's grantors.
represents nothing in the disputed l&nd except what his grantors lost
If Quenton's title had been by deed from the
and Quenton gained.
defendant or his grantors, it is clear the defendant could not lawfully
have disturbed the plaintiff's prior possession. Quenton had no deed,
but his adverse possession for the statutory period gave him an absolute indefeasible title to the land against the whole world on which
he could either sue or defend as against the former owner.
That being
the case is there sufficient virtue left in the defendant's paper title to
warrant him in disturbing the plaintiff's possession. Under the present
English statute of limitations it is settled there would not be. The case
would stand precisely as if the defendant or his grantors had conveyed
The plaintiff would be liable to be interrupted in his posto Quenton.
session only by Quenton or some person under him. Holmes v. Newlands, 39 E. C. L. 48, (11 A. & E. 44.) In Jukes v. Sumner, 14 Mees.
& Welsby, 41, Parke, B., remarking upon the present English statute
3 and 4 W. IV, ch. 27, says the effect of the act is to make a parliamentary conveyance of the land to the person in possession after the
The several English statutes, and
period of twenty years has elapsed.
difference,
are commented upon in 2 Smith's
their supposed points of
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Lead. Cases, 469, 559, et passim, and the case Fenner v. Fisher, Cro.
Eliz. 288, is cited in Holmes v. Newlands, ubi supra, as an authority
under the previous statutes against the apphcation to these statutes of
the full extent of the rule applied to the statute of William IV.
Any extended discussion of these English statutes would be unprofitable here for our statute, though mainly borrowed at the outset from
the statute of James, was somewhat modified when transferred to Vermont, and has been materially altered in form in passing through the
several revisions to which our laws have been subjected.
It now pro- '^t^j^^^^v-JS^
vides after the section relating to actions that, "no person having right
'i^Cc-^K^.^^Cc
or title of entry into houses or lands shall thereinto enter but within
fifteen years next after such right of entry shall accrue."
The first
section takes away the remedy, and the second the right. G. S. p. 442,
and
The title
vested in the adverse holder for the statuoften said, "the adverse possession ripens into
tory period, or as
title." As
natural consequence the former owner
divested of all
the new owner acquires.
This interpretation giving to adverse possession for fifteen years the effect of
conveyance best accords with
the other well settled doctrines upon the subject of limitations as ap,.
A covenant to convey perfect title
satisplied to real property.
fied by conveying
title acquired under the statute. In this country,
as in England, an agreement made after the lapse of the statutory
not eft'ective, but the title
period to waive the benefit of the statute
remains in the party who has acquired
under the statute, notwithback with all the solemnities
standing his waiver, until he conveys
required in any deed of land. In language of the books, "by analog}'
to the statute of limitations we presume
grant of incorporeal rights^
It would certainly be an artifiafter adverse uses for fifteen years."
_
mere bar to the
cial construction of the statute which would make
It re- -^ "pc^^
owner's right against the person only who occupied adversely.
the
land.
It
makes
to .x^^^A/f
of
to
no
reference
to
the
the
party
lates
rights

a

J.

&
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a
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persons.
In this case,
the plaintiff's enjoyment of the land subjects him
to an action or entry by Ouenton, on the ground that Quenton and not
the defendant
the true owner,
ought not at the same time so subject him to action or entry by the defendant, on the ground that the
the true owner of the land. We are satisfied that no title
defendant
remains in the defendant, and that under our statute, he has no right
has been held that
to the possessioa.
plaintiff in possession without right could maintain trespass against even the true owner for
disturbance, while the right of possession was in
third person by
lease from the owner.
Miller, 23 N.
Law, 155.
Phillips v. Kent
Here neither the right of possession nor the ownership was in the defendant.
The plaintiff claims that upon
correct construction of the deeds he
has Quenton's title. This point we have not decided. The plaintiff's
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prior possession will enable him

to recover as against the defendant
whose grantors suffered Quenton to acquire the land by adverse possession for the statutory, period. Judgment affirmed.*

1
DOE
(Court

ex dem.

—

GOODY

of Queen's Bench,

v.

1847.

CARTER.
9 Q.

B. 863.)

Ejectment for a cottage, garden, &c., in Essex. Demise, 8th January, 1845.
On the trial, before Coleridge, J., at the Essex Summer Assizes,
1845, it appeared that the defendant was the widow of John Carter,
who died in 1834, being then occupier of the premises, which he had
held, as after mentioned, for a period short of twenty-one years; and
t he defendant had occupied thern ever sni gg.
The otner material~facts
stated
in
the
of
the
Court
delivered
this day) were as
judgment
(as
follows. Robert Carter, the father of John, purchased the premises
(amongst others) from one Havens, and was let into possession; but,
as he did not pay all the purchase money, no conveyance was executed
till the 14tli December, 1824, some years after the purchase. In the
meantime the father had let his son John, the husband of the defendant, into possession of part of the premises as tenant at will witho ut
p aying any rent._ T he father afterwards mortgaged the whole, on 23 d
March, 1829, for a term of years, now vested in the lessor of the plain The learned Judge directed the jury that, if they believed John
tiff.
Carter, the son, to have entered as tenant at will more than twenty-one
years before the day of the demise laid in the declaration, this action
was barred by Stat. 3 & 4 W. IV, c. 27 (sections 2, 7).« Verdict for defendant. Lush in the ensuing term obtained a rule nisi for a new trial
Premises were l eased to A. for 89 years . Shortly after the lease was
G. e ntered into possession and continued therein a dversel y to A. for 40
years, when G^as_signed the term to defendant.
The rent was regularly paTcl
by^. during the 40 years. In an action by the present owner of the reversion for breach of a covenant to repair contained in the original lease to A.,
it was held that defendant was not liable upon covenants in said lease.
Tichborne v. Weir. 4 R. 26, 67 L. T. 735 (1S9.3). Compare Re Nisbet and
Potts' Contract, [1905] 1 Ch. 391, where a restriction under the doctrine of
Tulk V. Moxhay, 2 Phillips, 774 (1848), was held enforceable against one who
had acquired ownership by adverse possession.
As to „an adverse possessor acquiring a right of way by necessity where
the property held adversely was surrounded by other lands of the paper title
owner, see Wilkes v. Greenway, 6 T. L. R.'449 (1890).^
8 Those sections provided as follows:
"II. And be it further enacted, that after the 31st day of December, 1833,
no person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any
land or rent but within twenty years next after the time at which the right
to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, shall have first accrued to some person through whom he claims ; or if such right shall not
ha>.e accrued to any person through
whom he claims, then within twenty
yea:.'s next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress
8

made,

l/'/f

u^
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on the grounds of misdirection, and that the verdict was against the
weight of evidence. Cur. adv. vult.
Lord Denman, C. J., now dehvered the judgment of the Court.
This rule was moved for on two grounds ; misdirection, and that the
verdict was against evidence. As to the latter, we think that there was
abundant evidence to show that t he defendant's husband John Carte r
e ntered into posses sion of all the premises sought to be recovered, a s
t enant at will to his tatlier, more than twenty-one years before the
bringing of this ejectmen t, which in truth was the only question for

jury.
The case, therefore, depends on the question whether the learned
Judge misdirected the jury. The facts were: [His Lordship here
stated them as they appear ante.]
Under these circumstances, it was
contended for the lessor of the plaintiff that, as the father was himself tenant at will to Havens till 14th December, 1824, when that tenancy w^as determined by the execution of the conveyance, the tenancy at will subsisting between the father and son was determined at
the same time.
We do not think that consequence followed, but are
of opinion that the conveyance to the father had no operation on th e
t enancy at will between him and the son.. Again, it was contended
that the mortgage by the father in 1829 operated as a determination of
the will. Assuming this to be so, still the son would thereby become
the

te nant by sufferan ce, and the twenty years under the late statute 3 & 4
W. IV, c. 27, having begun to run long before, would continue to run

unless a new tenancy at will or for some other term were created ; Doe
dem. Bennett v. Turner, 7 M. & W. 226, Turner v. Doe dem. Bennett,
9 M. & W. 643; and, indeed, the same observation would apply if the
conveyance in 1824 were treated as a determination of the will. Now
there was no evidence in this case from which the jury could .d jaw
the conclusion tliat a new tenancy between the father. and the son ha d
b een created at any time within twenty years before the bringing of
t his ejectment : and, therefore, the determination of the will of the
. father either in 1824 or in 1829 is not, in truth, material.
Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the learned Judge was right
in telling the jury that, if they believed the son to have entered as tenant at will more than twenty-one years before the 8th of January 1845
(the day of the demise in the declaration of ejectment), the statute 3
or to bring such action shall have first accrued to the person making
bringing

the same.

or

"VII. And be it further enacted, that when any person shall be in possession or in receipt of the profits of any land, or in the receipt of any rent,
as tenant at will, the right of the person entitled subject thereto, or of the
person through whom he claims, to make an entry or distress or bring an
action to recover such land or rent, shall be deemed to have first accrued,
either at the determination of such tenancy or at the expiration of one year
next after the commencement of such tenancj;^ at which time such tenancy
shall be deemed to have determined; provided always, that no mortgagor or
cestui que trust shall be deemed to be a tenant at will, within the meaning
of this clause, to his mortgagee or trustee."
CX^^fu^

i2--i.»A

pv^^Ji^

r:

X^C/fM-.A-v^^c*^
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& 4 W. IV, c. 27, was a bar to the actio n ; and that the jur>^ were right
in finding- that he did so enter. The rule for a new trial must, therefore, be discharged.
Rule

discharged.^"

v.

BARNARD.

(Court of Queen's Bench, 1849.

13 Q. B. 945.)

DOE ex

dem.

CARTER

a

a

a

it
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a
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Ejectment for a cottage in Essex. Demise, 13th May, 1848.
at the Essex Summer Assizes, 1848,
On the trial, before Coltman,
from
evidence
the
given for the lessor of the plaintiff, that
appeared,
in 1815 one Robert Carter purchased the premises, and was let into
possession but, as he did not pay all the purchase money until 1824,
no conveyance was executed till that time. Robert Carter, immediately
after his purchase in 1815, allowed his son John to occupy the prem and he continued so to occupy until
ses rent free as tenant at will
widow,
who was the lessor of the plain1834, when he died, leaving a
Robert Carter, the father, was at
tiff, and
son and other children.
he lessor of the plaintiff had occupied fro m
that .time still living.
he time of her husband's death, until a short time before the presen
broug ht The defendant claimed under
mortgage made
action wa
that,
contended,
was
the
defendant
by Robert Carter in 1829. For
of
Carter,
the
the lessor
title to have been shewn in John
assuming
verdict for
plaintiff could not recover. The learned Judge directed
the plaintiff, and reserved leave to the defendant to move to enter
nonsuit.

Cur. adv. vult.

a

;

;

Patteson, J., now delivered the judgment of the Court.
The lessor of the plaintiff proved no title, but relied on long possession viz. her own for thirteen years, and her husband's before her for
eighteen years but, in so doing, she shewed that her husband left sevwitness. If the husban d's
eral children, one of whom was called as
t

c

c

&
4

3

;

;

a

is

8

2

10 Willis V. Earl Howe
Cli. 545, 553; Kipp v. The Inc. Synod,
[1S93]
Compare Dixon v. Gayfere, 17 Beav. 421
etc., 33 U. C. Q. B. 220 (1873), ace.
Ryerse v. Teeter, 44 U. C. Q. B.
(1S7S).
(1853)
;

^

Jifif^
7^
^

r

f

^

f

h p

ossession raised a presumption that he was seised in ee^ that fee mus
ave descended on his hild, and, of our se, the lessor of the plaint iff
But she contends that, because the husband's possession
nust tail.
seisin in fee arises
k-^ was for less than twenty years, no presumption of
^
entitled to tack on her own possession to his and then that
that she
W. IV, c. 27, which enacts "that at the
the 34th section of Stat.
determination of the period limited by this Act to any person for making an entry or distress, or bringing any writ of quare impedit or other
action or suit, the right and title of such person to the land, rent, or
advowson for the recovery whereof such entry, distress, action, or
suit respectively might have been made or brought within such period,
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shall be extinguished," has put an end to the right and title of all persons, and transferred the estate to her. If she had been defendant in
an action of ejectment, no doubt the non-possession of the lessor of the
plaintiff, evidenced by her husband's and her own consecutive possession for more than twenty years, would have entitled her to the verdict on the words of the 2d section of the Act, without the aid of the
34th section. Therefore it is said that the 34th section must have some
further meaning, and must transfer the right. Probably that would
be so, if the same person, or several persons, claiming one from the
other by descent, will or conveyance, had been in possession for the
twenty years. But this lessor of the plaintiff showed nothing- tn c onn ect her possession with that of her husband by right of any sort : and,
if she be right m her construction of the 34th section, the same consequence would follow if twenty persons unconnected with each other
had been in possession, each for one year, consecutively for twenty
years : yet it would be impossible to say to which of the twenty persons the 34th section has transferred the title. Without the aid of this
statute twenty years' possession gave a prima facie title against every
one, and a complete title against a wrongdoer who could not shew any
right, even if such wrongdoer had been in possession many years ; provided they were less than twenty ; Doe dem. Harding v. Cooke, 7 Bing.
346; and t he effect of the 34th section would probab l y be to givejt he
right to the possessor for twenty years, even against the party in wh o m
t he legal estate formerly was , and, but for the Act, would still be,
where he had not obtained the possession till after the twenty years ;
but then we apprehend, as before stated, that such twenty years' pos s ession must be either by the same person or several persons claimin g
o ne from the othe r, whic h is not the case here .
The lessor of the plaintiff must therefore rely on her own possession
for thirteen years as sufficient against the defendant who has turned
her out and shews no title himself.
According to the case of Doe dem.
Hughes v. Dyball, Moo. & M. 346, that possession for thirteen years
would be sufficient; for in that case the lessor of the plaintiff shewed
only one year's possession, and yet Lord Tenterden said, "That does
not signify; tliere is ample proof ; the plaintiff" is in possession, and yo u
c ome and turn him out : .you must shew your title ."
See also Doe
dem. Humphrey v. Martin, Car. & Marsh. 32.
These cases would
have warranted us in saying that the l essor of the plaintiff had esta bl ished her case, if she had shewn nothing but her own possession fo r
t hirteen years.
The ground however of so saying would not be that
possession alone is sufficient in ejectment (as it is in trespass) to main^^^^
tain the action ; but that such possession is prima facie evidence o f
^^^•'^
title, and, no other interest appearin g i n proof, evidence of seisin in fe^ .
Here, however, the lessor of the plaintiff' did more, for she proved the
possession of her husband before her for eighteen years, which was
prima facie evidence of his seisin in fee ; and, as he died in possession
and left children, it was prima facie evidence of the title of his heir.
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possession for thirteen ye ars
c ould not prevail ; and, therefore, she has by her own shewing proved
the title to be in another, of which the defendant is entitled to take adOn this ground we tliink that the rule for a nonsuit must
vantage.^^
be made absolute.
Rule absolute for a nonsuit.
a gainst which the lessor

of

the plaintiff's

AGENCY CO.
(Privy Council,
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SHORT.
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Cas. 793.)

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Oct. 27, 1886) refusing a rule nisi for a new trial in an action of ejectment to recover
fifty acres of land situate in Botany Bay, in the Colony of New South
Wales.

;
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The facts of the case are stated in the judgment of their Lordships.
The proceedings in the Court below are reported in N. S. Wales Rep.
vol. 8 (N. S.) p. 365.
'
Chief Justice Martin t old the iurv at the trial that when any person
went into possession of another person's land, and exercised dominion
and the Statute of Limitations
over it with the intention of claiming
run
as against the owner of the land, such runnin
thereupon began to
that the intruder entirely aban was never stopped, notwithstanding
thp
oned the land long before
expiration of twenty years from
first entry and no other person took possession of such land, and that
the right of the true owner of the land would not again arise without
an entry by such true owner with the intention of repossessing himself
of such land that at the expiration of twenty years after such taking
possession of the land as against the true owner his right of action was
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J.,
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d,

f
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e
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;

if

defeated, notwithstanding that there may not have been twenty years'
Meredith, through whose possessio n
possession as against him th at
aimed, abandoned the land in the year 1853, and afte rth defendant
w ards, un
the detendant came there, no person was in possession
the lan
still the statute continued to run as against the plaintiff: an
hat the st atute barred the plaintiff's ri^ht of action herg in.
The Supreme Court (Martin, C.
Faucett and Windeyer, JJ.) affirmed this ruling.
The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
Lord Macnaghten. On the 3rd of December, 1885, the appellants,
as plaintiffs, brought an action against the respondent as defendant, to
recover fifty acres of land situated in the district of Botany Bay, in the
county of Cumberland, in the colony of New South Wales.
Will. IV, c. 27),
The defencfi^was the Statute of Limitations
of 1837.
which was adopted in the Colony by the Act No.
The action camie on for trial in September, 1886, before the late
Chief Justice Martin and
jury.
11 See

Christy

v. Scott, 14

How.

282, 292, 14

L. Ed.

422 (1852), contra.
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For the present purpose

the facts of the case may be stated very
The land in dispute was, until recently, waste open bush.
The plaintiffs at the trial proved a complete documentary title deduce d
from a Crown gr ant in 1810. But they failed to prove to the satisfaction of the learned judge at the trial that they or any person through
whom they claimed had been in a ctual occupation of the land at any
time during the period of twenty years immediately preceding the
commencement of the action. On the other hand the defendant, who
claimed to have purchased the land within the last few years, did not
prove to the satisfaction of the learned judge that he and the person
or persons through whom he claimed had been in c ontinuous possession
'
~
during the statutory period.
The Chief Justice told the jury that when any person went into possession of another person's land, and exercised dominion over
with
the intention of claiming
and the Statute of Limitations thereupon
began to run as against the owner of the land, such running was never
that the intruder abandoned the land long
stopped, notwithstanding
before the expiration of twenty years from his first entry, and no other
person took possession of such land, nd the right of the true owner to_
he land would not again arise without an entry by such true owne
with the intention of repossessing himself of such land_^ The Chief
Justice also told the jury that at the expiration of the twenty years
after such taking possession of the land, as against the true owner, his
right of action was defeated, notwithstanding there may not have been

t
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shortly.
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twenty years' possession as against him.
A ve rdict was found for the defen dant.
On the 27th of October, 1886, the plaintiffs applied for
rule nisi
for
new trial on the ground of misdirection.
The application was
heard before the late Chief Justice, Faucett, J., and Windeyer, J., who
refused the rule. The Chief Justice
reported to have said
"There
no doubt that there was evidence sufficient to justify the verdict of
the jury as to the occupation of the land more than forty years ago,
which caused the statute to run against the legal owner. That being
so, there was no evidence whatever that the legal owner during that
time ever retook possession, or even walked over the land. The statute having been set running there was nothing to stop it."
To this report Faucett, J., has been good enough to append the following memorandum for the information of their Lordships
"This
substantially a correct note of the reasons given by the late
Piief Justice for refusing the rule in this case. His judgment was
given in very few words.
"I may add that has been before held by this Court that when the
rightful owner of land has been dispossessed, and the statute has once
begun to run against him, the statute does not cease to run in other
words, the operation of the statute
not suspended until the rightful
owner has exercised some act of ownership on the land and that
the
rightful owner allows twenty years to elapse, frorh the time when the

^.^^-ijL^^

t^A-<rvv*--
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statute so first began to run, without exercising any such act of ownership, he cannot recover in ejectment against any person who may happen to be in possession at the end of the twenty years, although there
rnay have been an interval in the twenty years during which no one
was in possession.
"To stop or suspend the operation of the statute there must be some
new act of ownership on the part of the rightful owner. There must
be, as it were, a new departure."
The doctrine appears to have had its origin in the case of Laing v.
Bain, which was before the Supreme Court on a motion for a new trial
in March, 1876. Their Lordships were referred to a note of the case
in Oliver's Real Property Statutes, p. 79. Martin, C. J., is there reported to have said that "it was clear law that if the statute once commenced to run it would not stop except by the owner going into possession and so getting, as it were, a new departure."
Their Lordships are unable to concur in this view. They are of
opinion that if a person enters upon the land of another and holds possession for a time, and then, without having acquired title under the
statute, abandons possession, tlie riglitful owner, on the abandonment,
i s in Jhe same position in all respects as he was before the intrusion
took place. There is no one against whom he can bring an action. He
cannot make an entry upon himself.
There is no positive enactment,
nor is there any principle of law, which requires him to do any act, to
issue any notice, or to perform any ceremony in order to rehabilitate
No, new departur e is necessary^.
himself.
The pwDSsession of the intruder, ineffectual for the purpose of transferring title, ceases- upon
its abandonment to be effectual for any purpose. It does not leave behind it any cloud on the title of the rightful owner, or any secret process at work for the possible benefit in time to come of some casual interloper or lucky vagrant.
There is not, in their Lordships' opinion, any analogy between the
case supposed and the case of successive disabilities mentioned in the
statute. There the statute "continues to run" because there is a person in possession in whose favour it is running.
There is no direct authority on the point in this country. But such
authority as there is seems to be opposed to the doctrine laid down by
the Supreme Court. It is sufficient to refer to McDonnell v. McKinty,
10 Ir. L, R. 514, Lord St. Leonards' Real Property Statutes, p. 31, and
Smith V. Lloyd, 9 Exch. (Welsby, H. & Gor.) 562. In the latter case,
which was decided in 1854, Parke, B., giving the judgment of the
Court, says: "We are clearly of opinion that the statute applies, not
to want of actual possession by the plaintiff, but to cases where he has
been out of, and another in, possession for the prescribed time. There
must be both absence of possession by the person who has the right,
and actual possession by another, whether adverse or not, to be protected, to bring the case within the statute. We entirely concur in the
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judgment of Blackburne, C. J., in McDonnell v. McKinty, and the
principle on which it is founded."
Their Lordships have only to add that, in their opinion, there is no
difference in principle as regards the application of the statute between
the case of mines and the case of other land where tlie fact of possesIt is obvious that, in the case of
sion is more open and notorious.
mines, the doctrine contended for might lead to startling results and
produce great injustice.
In the result, therefore, their Lordships have come to the conclusion
that the direction given to the jury by the learned Chief Justice was
there was substantial miscarriage in the
not law, and they think that_
"
trial.
They will, therefore, humbly advise Her Majesty that the judgment
of the Supreme Court refusing the rule nisi ought to be reversed, that
a new trial ought to be directed, and that the costs in the former trial
and of the application for the rule ought to be costs in the action.

The respondent will pay the

costs

of

the appeal.

-^jP*^^

SHANNON
(Court

of Appeals

of Kentucky,

V.

1S17.

KINNY
1 A.

et al.

K. Marsh.

3, 10 Am.

Dec. 705.)

Boyle, C. J.^^ This was an action of eiectment. On the trial, after
the plaintiff had exhibited th e patent of the com monw^nlth to William
Shannon for the land in controversy, and had produced evidence conducing to prove that William Shannon, the patentee, was the son of
William Shannon, senior; that the plaintiff', John Shannon, was the
eldest brother of the patentee ; that the patentee was killed by the Indians in 1782; that William Shannon, his father, died in a year or two
thereafter, leaving John Shannon, the plaintiff, his eldest son ; and after
it had also appeared in evidence, that Hugh Shannon, a younger brother, had, in the year 1784, settled upon the land in controversy, claiming it as his own, and had used and sold part thereof, that for twe nty
y ears or upwards, John Shannon had been in habits of intimacy wit h
h is brother Hugh Shannon, and was fully apprised of his claiming_and
s ellino' said land ; the attorney for the defendant asked a witness whether said Hugh Shannon had not latterly become insolvent, avowing his
object to be to prove by that and other circumstances, a collusive destruction of a writing evidencing a transfer of said land, betwixt the
plaintiff and Hugh Shannon; to the asking and answering of which
question, the plaintiff" objected; but the court overruled the objection
and instructed the witness to answer the question, to which the plaintiff excepted.
Whether the court below erred in their decision of this point, is the
* * *
first question which is necessary to be determined.
12

The part of the opinion relating to the first question is omitted.
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whether the statThe only other question. presented by the case
tlie
It appears that
plaintiff's
to
bar
recovery.
was
Hmitation
ute of
twenty yea rs,
for
more
than
possession
continual adverse
here was
but that Hugh Shannon, who first took the possession of the land in
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had remained in possession twenty years, surcontroversy, before
render ed the possession to the defendants or those under whom th ey
held, n pursuance of
decree entered upon an award giving them the
an adverse claim, and that they had not had the land
and m virtu
years prior to the commencement of this suit .
n possession twen
This circumstance,
urged on the part of the plaintiff, prevents
bar to his recovery.
But we cannot
the statute from operating as
can have such an effect. Accord perceive any principle upon which
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it,

ll
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ng to the literal import of the statute, the plaintiff could only ente
upon he land with in tw enty 3^ears after his right of entry accrued, nd,
conseq uently, an adverse possession for that length of time, will to
in the reason and nature of the thing, produce
Nor can
ifference, whether the possession be held uniformly under one
title, or at different times under different titles, provided the claim
tle be always adverse to that of the plaintiff, nor whether the posse sion be held by the same or
succession of individuals, provided the
continued and uninterrupted one.
possession be
be affirmed

DOE

ex dem.

with costs. ^'

HARLAN

v.

(Supreme Court of Indiana, 1853.

BROWN.
4

Judgment must

Ind.

143.)

Error to the Fayette Circuit Court.

a

e

a

a

3

is Accord: Fanning v. Wilcox,
Day (Conn.) 258 (1808); Smith v. Chapin,
31 Conn. 530 (1863);
Wisliart v. McKniglit, 178 Mass. 356, 59 N. E. 1028, 86
Am. St. Rep. 486 (1901), explaining Sawyer v. Kendall, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 241
(1852), though the point perhaps was not necessarily
involved.
See, also,
Scales V. Cockrill,
Head (Tenn.) 432 (1859); Davis v. McArthur, 78 N. C.
3

N^

a

a

is

J.

a

lot in
RoACHE,
Ejectment^by the heirs of Joshua Harlan for
Verdict and judgment for the defendant.
the town of Connersville.
all set out in
The evidence
bill
Motion for
new trial overruled.
of exceptions.
The pla intiffs were admitted at the trial to be the heirs of Tosh ua
deed of conveyan.c
from John
Harlan . They then gave in evidence
It
Conner to their ancestor, dated the 30th day of November, 1818.
in
further
admitted
his
life.Harlan,
was
by the defendant that Joshua
time, laid out portion of the land embraced in the deed, into town lots,
as
part of the town of Connersville, and that the lot No. 87, in controversy in the suit, was one of those lots.
The defen(je set up by Brown, who was admittedly defendant under
the rule, was an adverse possession by himself and one Solomon Clay-

-357

(1878).
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pool, of t wenty years . The evidence introduced by him showed that
Joshua Harlan died about the year 1827; that some time between 1826
and 1828, Solomon Clay pool, c laiming to be the owner of the lo t,
l eased it for a term of years to be fenced and cleared ; that it was accordingly fenced and cleared by the lessee, in one of those years, most
probably in 1827; that at tlie expiration of that lease, he rented it to
a tenant to make brick upon it.
Shortly afterward, the fence was
removed, it does not appear by whom, and the l ot remained vacan t
and unenclosed up to 1843, a period of not less than ten years ; but
d uring all that period Claypool continuously claime d, and was generally understood, in the neighborhood, to be the owner ; that from
1830 to 1845, both inclusive, the taxes on the lot were annually charged to and paid by Claypool, in which latter year he died. The tax duplicates, which were in evidence, showed that i n 1827. the lot was no t
a ssessed to any on e ; that in 1828 and 1829, it w\is placed on the dupli"
cate, but was included in the list under the heading of unknown own '
ers^ ; and that in neither of those years were the taxes upon it paid by
either Harlan or Claypool.
The defendant also proved by one Bundrant, that he had known
lot No. 87 since 1837; that it was then unenclosed, and was called the
property of Solomon Claypool ; that i n 1843,. the defendant, (Brown ,)
went into possess i on of the lo t , fenced it and built a house , and has occupied it ever since.
This was all the evidence.
The plaintiffs asked for several instructions to the jury, all of which
the Court refused to give.
It is unnecessary, however, to examine
whether these instructions should have been given, as they were all
The jury
substantially embraced in the charge which the Court gave.
were fully and correctly instructed as to the law of the case. It only
remains to examine whether their verdict was sustained by the evidence.

In their instructions, the Court below charged the jury that

con tinuous, uninterrupted, peaceable possession of twenty years, under a
claim of title , was necessary to make out the defence relied on by the
defendant, and th at if it was necessary to add the possession of Brown
t o that of Claypool. to make up the twenty years, he. the defendan t,
rnust show that he was in possession under Claypool . This is the law.
To defeat the recovery of a plaintiff who produces a regular legal title, by a title founded on possession, strict proof must be made not only
that the possession was, from its inception, under a public claim of t it le adverse t o that of the real owner, but that both such claim an d possession have been continuous and uninterrupted . And this continuity
m ust be kept unbro ken through the full period of twenty years. If the
chain is broken at any point within that period, no title is acquired.
In the case where several tenants have, during the time, successively
occupied Jhe..pranises, J:Q_m.aks_their possession available it must be
Aiq.Prop. — 3
a

^«^

TITLES

ORIGINAL

34

(Part

1

shown that each one claimed to hold, and was in possession, under his
predecessor. Brandt v. Ogden, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 156; Doe v. Campbell,
10 Johns. (N. Y.) 475; Hawk v. Senseman, 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 21;
Coburn v. Hollis, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 125.
In the case under consideration, B rown could not make nut t he
t wenty years without connecting his possession with that of CInvpoo l,

by showing that he was in under hi m. If there was any evidence on
this point, we should not be disposed to disturb the verdict of the jury.
But if the bill of exceptions contains all the evidence, as it purports to
do, tliere is no proof tending to connect the possession of Brown with
N either one of them was in possession for a perio d
that of Claypool.
of twenty years . Claypool was occupying and claiming title for some
sixteen years, from about 1827 to 1843. Then, it is in proof. Brown
went into possession; but, how, or under what circumstances, is not
shown.
From aught that appears, he may have gone in as a mere
trespasser, against the consent of Claypool.
Having totally failed to
establish that his possession of the premises was a continuation of that
of Claypool, by showing that he was in under the latter, he has left a
c hasm in his title which is fatal to the defence he relies on.
The Court should have granted the motion of the plaintiffs for a new

trial.

Per Curiam.
ed, etc.

The judgment is reversed
~ with
~~

SHERIN

Cause remand-

BRACKETT.

et al. v.

(Supreme Court of Minnesota,

costs.

1SS6.

3G

Rlinn. 152, 30 N. W. 551.)
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The plaintiffs brought this action in the district court for Hennepin
county, to recover the possession of a strip of land in Minneapolis.
Upon the trial before Young,
and
jury, the plaintiffs having rested
their case, the action was dismissed, on defendant's motion, for plaintiff's failure to make out
case.
Plaintiffs appeal from an order refusing new trial.
Berry,
This
an action injhe nature of ejectrnent, in which the
plaintiffs, seeking to recover possession of
strip of land, alleged that
on October
1885, and long before, they were and now are owners
thereof; and further that they and their ancestors, from whom they
derive title, have been in the actual, peaceable, open, notorious, adverse,
and continuous possession thereof for more than 25 years prior and
1885, that on that day, while they were in such actual
up to October
possession, defendant unlawfully entered upon said strip of land and
wrongfully ejected them therefrom, and ever since wrongfully detains
possession thereof.
Doubtless the intent of the pleader was to set up title in fee based
upon what
called adverse possession.
But as the greater includes
the less, th^ complaint sufificientlj' pleaded actual possession at the time
of the defendant's alleged entry, so that
upon the trial the plaintiffs
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failed to make out adverse possession, such as would give them title
of the paper title, still, if they proved actual possession, they might properly insist that they were within the allegations
of their complaint, and had made out a case as against a mere tres-

as against the holder

passer. For as a gainst one showing no title in himself, possession is
title. Wild^FVTCity of St. Paul, 12 Minn. 192 (Gil. 116) ; Rau v. Minnesota Vallev R. Co., 13 Minn. 442 (Gil. 407) ; Sedg. & W. Tr. Title Land,

§§

717, 718.

The evidence upon the trial below in the case at bar showed that
were in possession of the strip of land in controversy at the
time of defendant's entry upon
and de fendant gave no evidence of
title in himself.
In this state of the evidence the plaintiffs
any right
were entitled to judgment, and hence the trial court erred in dismissing
the action at the close of the plaintiffs' testimony.
As this point
insisted upon by plaintiffs
cannot be disregarded, and so there must be
it

is

r

o

it,

{plaintiffs

a new trial.
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This disposes of the present appeal, but (as we surmise) not of the
real merits of the controversy, and therefore, with reference to
new
trial, we deem
expedient to determine certain other questions raised
upon the argument.
And, _first^ though there are a few cases which hold that the statutory period of adverse possession, which will bar an action for the recovery of land, may be made up by tacking together the periods of the
adverse possession of several successive holders between whom there
no privity, (see Scales v. Cockrill,
Head [Tenn.] 432; Smith v.
Chapin, 31 Conn. 530; Davis v. McArthur, 78 N. C. 357,) the rule laid
down by the great majority of courts and by the text-v/riters, and supported by the weight of authority, and which must be regarded as the
true rule,
that privity between successive adverse holders
indispensable. And this upon the principle that unless the successive adverse possessions are connected by privity, the disseizin of the real
owner resulting from the adverse possession
interrupted, and durmg he interruption, though but for
moment, the title of the real
owner
raws to
the seizin or possession.
Melvin v. Proprietors, etc.,
Mete. Olass.) 15, 38 Am. Dec. 384; Ha'ynes v. Boardman, 119 Mass.
414; McEntire v. Brown, 28 Ind. 347; Jackson v. Leonard,
Cow.
(N. Y.) 653 Wood, Lim. sec. 271 San Francisco v. Fulde, Z7 Cal. 349,
99 Am. Dec. 278; Crispen v. liannavan, 50 Mo. 536; Shuffleton v. Nelson,
413, 414; Sedg.
Sawy. 540, Fed. Cas. No. 12,822; Ang. Lim.
W. Tr. Title Land,
740, 745-747; Riggs v. Fuller, 54 Ala. 141.^*
Lessee of Potts v. Gilbert,
Wash. C. C. 475, Fed. Cas. No. 11,347 (1819);
V. Brown, 183 111. 575, 5G N. E. 181 (1900);
Sheldon v. Michiiian Cent.
R. Co., 161 Mich. 503, 126 N. W. 1056 (1910)
Moore v. Collishaw, 10 Pa. 224
Illinois Steel Co. v. Paczocha, 139 Wis. 23, 119 N. W. 550 (1909), ace.
(1849)
3

14

;

;

Ely

Lnder the statute
noclje' taclced even

in North Daliota successive adverse possessions could

thoufi;h there was privitv.
Streeter Co. v, Fredrickson,
N. D. 300, 91 N. W. G92"119a2);"~Tii"Souif!r'
Carolina tacking is allowed between heir and ancestor, but not between grantee and grantor,
Epperson v.
Stansill, 64 S, C. 485, 42 S. E, 426 (1902).
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Second. The privity spoken of exists between two successive holders
when the later takes under the earlier, as by descent, (for instance, a
widow under her husband, or a child under its parent,) or by will or
^^
transfer of possession. Leonard v. Leongrant, or by a voluntary
ard, '7 Allen (Mass.) 277; Hamilton v. Wright, 30 Iowa, 480; Jackson
V. Moore, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 513, 7 Am. Dec. 398; McEntire v. Brown,
supra; Weber v. Anderson, 73 111. 439; Wood, Lim. ,§ 271 ; Sedg. &

W. Tr. Title Land, §§ 747, 748.
Third. While to operate as a bar, adverse possession must be continuous, continuity will not be interrupted by the possession, during
any part of its period, of one who occupies the premises as a tenant of

In such cases the tenant's posgession is
the alleged adverse possessor.
jdiat of his landlorxL- San Francisco v. Fulde, supra; Rayner v. Lee,
20 Mich. 384 ; Sedg. & W. Tr. Title Land, § 747.
Fourth. Possession, to be adverse, so as to bar an owner's right of
action, must be actual, open^ continuous, hostile, exclusive, and accompanied by an intention to claim adversely,. Sedg. & W. Tr. Title Land^
sec. 731 et seq.

This is all which we deem it necessary to say in this case; for, as
there is to be a new trial, we forbear to comment upon the evidence.
Order reversed, and new trial awarded.
Tr
\

McNEELY

et ux. v.

LANGAN.

(Supreme Court of Ohio, 1871.

22 Ohio

St. 32.)

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton county, reserved
in

the District Court.
The original action was brqug]itJ>xth6J?!lailltiffs_^. error to recover
a strip of ground three feet wide, fronting on Longworth street, in the
city of Cincinnati.
The defense relied on was the statute of limitations.
The case was
submitted to the court upon the following agreed statement of facts :

Jane McNeely

et al. v.

Thomas Langan.

No.

32,026.

Hamilton

Common Pleas.

It

is hereby agreed between the parties that Stephen Burrows, on the
of January, 1842, lease d perpetually to R. G. Masterson the
following described premises, to which the said Burrows had a good
title in fee simple, viz. : beginning at a point in the south line of Longworth street as continued, and the east line of a lot of ground lately
belonging to tlie estate of Samuel Still, deceased, extending thence
south with said east line eighty feet, more or less, to the north line of a
1st day

15 See Memphis
& L. R. Co. v. Organ, 67 Ark. 84, 55 S. W. 952 (1S99);
Kendric-k v. Latham, 25 Fla. 819, 6 South. 871 (1889) ; Mortenson v. Murphy^
153 Wis. 3S9, 141 N. W. 273 (1913).
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ten foot alley; thence east along the north line of said alley twentythree feet; thence north parallel with said Still's east line aforesaid
eighty feet, more or less, to the south line of Longworth street as aforesaid ; thence west along the south line of Longworth street twentyThat R. G. Masterson conveyed said lot
three feet to the beginning.
More,
May 20, 1850; said More to E. P.
and leasehold to" Joseph
Cranch, April 10, 1854; and said Cranch to the defendant, Thomas
Langan, August 29, 1860. It is hereby further agreed that said Masterson, on or about May, 1842, built a frame cottage on the west line
It is further
of said lot and on the land described in the petition.
in their
of
said
land
described
that
the
owners
are
the
plaintiffs
agreed
said petition, if the same does not belong to the defendant by occupancy. It is further agreed between the parties that the land described
in their petition was not conveyed by deed to Masterson, nor by Masterson to More, nor from More to Cranch, nor from Cranch to the
defendant. Langa n. That the said Masterson, at the time of taking
possession under his lease from Burrows, entered into the possession
of the premises described in the petition, fenced it in with the other
property, built his house partly thereon, so as to occupy these three
feet as above stated ; and the said Masterson, More, Cranch, and the
defendant, Langan, have, by transfer of possession made at the time
of the several conveyances above mentioned, remained in continuous
possession and actual occupancy of said premises and cottage, including
said three feet, from May, 1842, to the present time. That neither
the plaintiffs, nor those under whom they claim, nor_t_he_defaTidant, nor
those under whom he claims, were aware of any question as to the
title to this strip of three feet, nor as to any error made in the original
location of said cottage and fencing, until October, 1860, when, by a
survey then made, it was discovered by the plaintiff's that these three
TeeiTwere noTmcTiKled in the perpetual lease made to Masterson ; and
thereupon the plaintiffs, in the year 1865, made, for the first time, a
demand upon the defendant for the possession thereof, which was refused tlien as it is now, and hence this suit.
Wm. Disney, Attorney for Defendant.
S. Clark, Plaintiffs' Attorney.
The court found in favor of the defendant, and rendered judgment
accordingly.
The plaintiffs filed a petition in error in the District Court, asking
a reversal of the judgment on the general grounds that the court erred
in allowing the defendant the benefit of the statute of limitation.
The case was reserved by the District Court for decision by this
court.
White, J. By the agreed statement, the court below was warranted
in finding the possession to have been sufficiently open, notorious, and
adverse to bring it within the operation of the statute of limitations.
The quesji^n is, whether it was, in a legal sensCj continuous.
For the plaintiff in error, it is contended that the continuity of pos-
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session was broken by each successive transfer of the premises in controversy ; and, consequently, that as neither the defendant nor any one
occupier under whom he claims held possession for the period of limitation, the statute is not available as a bar to the action.
There are authorities supporting this view, but we think the better
Fanreason, as well as the weight of authority, is against the position.
ning V. Willcox, 3 Day (Conn.) 258; Smith v. Chapin, 31 Conn. 531;
Shannon v. Kinny, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 3, 10 Am. Dec. 705 ; Chilton
V. Wilson's Heirs, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 399; Cunningham v. Patton, 6

Scheetz v. Fitzwater, 5 Pa. 126; Overfield v. Christy, 7
Serg. & R. (Pa.) 173; Johnson v. Nash's Heirs, 15 Tex. 419; Alexander V. Pendleton, 8 Cranch (U. S.) 462, 3 L. Ed. 624.
Possession itself is a species of title, of the lowest grade, it is t rue.
yet it is good against all who can not show a better, and by lapse of
time may become, under the statute, perfect and indefeasible.
In considering the question before us, it should be observed that, in
this state, it is not necessary to the running of the statute, that possesWhere there is possession of the
sion be held under color of title.
whether
there is color of title or not,
character,
the
question,
requisite

Pa. 355;

Lessee of Paine v. Skinner, 8 Ohio, 167; Yetzer
V. Thoman, 17 Ohio St. 130, 91 Am. Dec. 122.
But it is admitThe possession must be connected and continuous.
ted~tBat~tHe possession will descend to the heir without interrupting
the running of the statute ; and we see no good reason why the ancestor
may not voluntarily dispose of a possessory interest, which the law, in
the absence of such disposition, will transmit to the heir.
The mode adopted for the transfer of the possession may give rise
to questions between the parties to the transfer; but, as respects the
rights of third persons against whom the possession is held adversely,
it seems to us to be immaterial, if successive transfers of possession
were in fact made, whether such transfers were effected by will, by
deed, or by mere agreement either written or verbal.
Judgment af/'
firmed. ^^
j^
jt
is wholly immaterial.

16 Vikin? Mfg. Co. v. Crawford, 84 Kan. 203, 114 Pac. 240, 35 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 498 (1911) ; Wishart v. McKnight, ITS Mass. 356, 59 N. E. 1028, 86 Am.
St. Rep. 486 (1901); Vance v. Wood, 22 Or. 77, 29 Pac. 73 (1S92); Gildea v.
Warren, 173 Mich. 28, 138 N. W. 232 (1912) (but see Lake Shore & M. S. Ry.
Co. V. Sterling [Mich.] 155 N. W. 383 [1915]); Rembert v. Edmondson, 99
Illinois Steel Co. v.
Tenn. 15, 41 S. W. 935, 63 Am. St. Rep. 819 (1897);
Paczocha, 139 Wis. 23, 119 N. W. 550 (1909), ace. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co.
V. Le Rosen, 52 La. Ann. 192, 26 South. 854 (1899) ; Evans v. Welch, 29 Colo.
355, 68 Pac. 776 (1902) ; Messer v. Hibernia Sav. Soc, 149 Cal. 122, 84 Pac.
See Erck v. Church, 87 Tenn. 575, 11 S. W. 794, 4 L. R. A.
8.35 (1906), contra.
641 (1889), a case which probably was not well tried.

"If

the possessions join by delivery from predecessor to successor, there
for the true owner to become seised, and, after twenty
*
*
*
Possession
years' submission to such inability, he becomes barred.
and voluntary transfer thereof are physical facts provable by the testimony
of an eye or ear witness or any other evidentiary fact or conduct. The only
qualification to the possession is that it must be such as to exclude the true
owner, not derived from or in subordination to him. The only essential of

is no opportunity
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et al.

255 111. 98, 99 N.

E.

341.)

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Tazewell county ; the Hon. T. N.
Green, Judge, presiding.
Farmer, J. This case was before us at a former term and the
opinion then delivered will be found at page 455 of volume 248 of the
Illinois Reports, 94 N. E. 1. We reversed the judgment and remanded
the case for error in an instruction given for appellees, which, in effect,
placed the burden upon appellant of proving that appellees did not

Another
have title to the disputed premises by a dversejposs^ssion.
trial in the circuit court resulted in a verdict and judgment for defendants, and plaintiff' has again brought the case to this court by appeal.
Our former opinion contains a statement of the case and a history
of the controversy out of which this litigation arose. We will not repeat that statement here in full, but will briefly say the action was
quare clausum freg it brought by appellant, and the issues made by the
pleadings im;olved the title to a narrow strip of land off the west side
of the north half of the soudi-east quarter of section 5, township 25
north, range 2 west of the third principal meridian, in Tazewell county.
The strip of land inv olved is nine feet wide at th e sou th end, fifteen
feet wide at the north end, and extends from the south line of the north
half of the south-cast quarter of section 5 to the north line of said
tract.
Appellant has title of record to the whole of the south-east
quarter of said section 5. Christian Naffziger owns tlie north half of
the south-west quarter of said section, and his son, Peter Naffziger, is
his tenant.- Before Christian Naffziger became the owner of said tract
the whole of the south-west quarter of said section 5, belonged to
Christian Schwarzentraub, who died in November, 1888. By virtue
of a decree in a partition suit between the heirs of Schwarzentraub the
north half of the south-west quarter of section 5 was sold to Christian
Naffziger on June 5, 1889, and a deed therefor executed to him by the
master in chancery. At the time of said sale Fred Schwarzentraub was
in possession of said eighty-acre tract as tenant, and the decree provided the purchaser should have the rents for the year 1889 and the
possession of the premises on March 1, 1890. While the strip of land
in controversy was a part of the eighty acres to which appellant had
paper title, it was in the enclosure with the north half of the southwest quarter from 1885 until April, 1909, when appellant, without
leave of or notice to appellees, removed the south forty rods of fence
from the line Icnown in this record as the Oswald line, west to the line
the transfer is that the predecessor passes it to the successor by mutual consent, as distinguished from the case where a possessor abandons possession
^nerally^ and another, finding the premises unoccupied enters without con*
*" Dodge, J., in Illinois Steel Co.
*
tact or reTalion with the former.
V. Paczocha, supra.
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built on the Oswald line as early as
traub and his heirs had possession of
west side of the fence until the sale
March 1, 1890, he has continued in
land on the west side of the fence.
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The fence was

1885, and thereafter

Schwarzenand cultivated all the land on the
to Christian Naftziger, and from
possession and cultivated all the
Appellant and his predecessor in
title have during- all that time possessed and cultivated the land on the
east side of the fence.
It will be seen Christian Naffziger himself had not been in possession
of_the disputed premises quite twenty years, but if the possession of
Schwarzentraub be tacked to his, the period of adverse possession is
more than twenty years. The proposition principally relied upon by
appellant for reversal of the judgment is that there was no privity beand Christian Nafifziger, and theretween Christian Schwarzentraub
fore the possession of the former cannot be tacked to the latter. The
rule of law as laid down by the decisions of this and other States is,
that jprivity of estate or title is necessary between successive disseizor^
to authorize joining together the several possessions so as to make a
continuous possession. Acts of possession at different times, by different persons between whom there is no privity, cannot be joined.
Ely v. Brown, 183 111. 575, 56 N. E. 181.
It is conceded by appellant that if Christian Schwarzentraub or his
heirs, if adults, had conveyed the north half of the south-west quarter
of section 5 to Christian Naffziger and had delivered to him possession
of the entire enclosure up to the division fence, the possession of
Schwarzentraub could be tacked to that of Naffziger and form a con-

J^

tinuous possession, but it is insisted that as the conveyance of the
eighty acres to Naffziger was made„by tliejnaster in chancer}^ under
the decree in tlie partition suit there could be no privity of estate or
title between Naffziger andSchwarzentraub and that the two possessions could not be joined. ' Where a person having title, by deed, to a
lot or tract of land described in the deed also has enclosed with it and
is in possession of adjoining land to which he has no record title, and
conveys the land by the description in the deed and delivers with it
the possession of the entire enclosure, the continuity of possession will
not be broken and the two possessions will be joined and considered
This result, however, does not necesas one continuous possession.
sarily follow the making of the deed describing the land to which the
grantor had paper title. The title to premises in possession but not
described in the deed to the claimant does not depend upon a deed but
upon possession alone, and for that reason will not pass by a conveyance describing only the land to which the grantor has record title, but
possession of the land not described in the deed must be delivered.
The privity between two disseisors which will authorize tacking their
possessions is not, therefore, established by a deed from one to the
other.
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Hatter, 207 111. 88, 69 N. E.
751.
The deed is proper to be considered in determining whether pos-
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session of the land in the enclosure not described in the deed was taken
at the same time as the possession of the land described therein, and
where the deed is followed by the delivery of possession of the entire
enclosure it is sufficient evidence of a transfer of possession to raise
the requisite privity between tlie parties. But a paper transfer is tiot
It may be a means in esnecessary to connect adverse possessions.
Illinois Steel
fact
of
not
the only means.
privity but is
tablishing the
Co. v. Budzisz, 106 Wis. 499, 81 N. W. 1027, 82 N. W. 534, 48 L. R. A.
830, 80 Am. St. Rep. 54. In discussing the circumstances under which
the possession of disseizors may be joined, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court said in Illinois Steel Co. v. Paczocha. 139 Wis. 23. 119 N. W.
"
The on ly essential of the transfer is that the predecessor passes
550:
from the case
k^ to the successor by mutual consent, as distinguished
where a possessor abandons possession generally, and another, finding
the premises unoccup ied, enters without contract or relation with the
J^ormer."

In Weber

Anderson, 7Z ^1. 439, the owner of a lot conveyed all
of it but a ten-foot strip off one side to the president of a plank-road
company. The grantee took possession of the entire lot and enclosed
and remained in posit with a fence, claiming tide to the whole of
session from 1849 to 1863. It then sold the premises, and in the conit,
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veyance described them as they were described in the deed made to
but delivered to the purcliaser possession of the entire lot. The
purchaser held possession until May, 1870, and then conveyed
the entire lot to another.
One of the questions in the case when
was before this court w^as whether the possession of the plankroad company and its grantee could be joined and considered as
continuous possession for twenty years. It was contended by the
appellant that the transfer of possession could not be proved, by parol
but must be proved by deed. 'ihisTourt held that po deed
necessary
to support title by adverse possession, but that
sufficient for
claim of ownership and hold the premparty to take possession under
ises for the time required by the statute to complete the bar; that
deed^ isnot necessary to prove the transfer of the possession but such
traiisfer may_ be shown by parol. The court referred to and quoted
from decisions of other States, as follows
"In the case of Smith v.
Chapin, 31 Conn. 531, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in deciding
question similar to the one in this case, says
'Doubtless the possession must be connected and continuous, so that the possession of the
true owner shall not constructively intervene between them; but such
continuity and connection may be effected by any conveyance, agreement or understanding which has for its object
transfer of the rights
of the possessor or of his possession, and
transfer
accompanied by
of possession in fact.'
In Menkens v. Blumenthal, 27 Mo. 203,
was
held whether one occupant receives his possession from
prior one or
mere intruder upon an abandoned lot
question of fact, which
may be determined by any testimony which
legitimate and pertinent.
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We know of no rule of evidence which confines the proof to a deed or
written instrument.
In Crispen v. Hannavan, 50 Mo. 544, the doctrine announced in the last case cited is approved, and the court adds :
'Not even a writing is necessary if it appear that the holding is continuous and under the first entry.' In AIcNeely v. Langan, 22 Ohio St.
32, the same question arose, and it was there held : 'The mode adopted
forthe transfer of the possession may give rise to questions between
the parties to the transfer, but as respects the rights of third persons,
against wliom the possession is held adversely, it seems to us to be immaterial, if successive transfers of possession were, in fact, made,
whether such transfers were effected by will, by deed or by mere agree"
ment, either written or verbal.'
In Faloon v. Simshauser, 130 111. 649, 22 N. E. 835, it was contended
by the appellant that in order to avail of the bar under the Statute
of Limitations, privity of estate with the prior disseizors must be
shown by purchase and conveyance of disseizin.
Upon this question

it,

it

it,

it

joined.

The proof of appellees was abundant

to the eft"ect that their posses-

was not sufficiently weakened by the testimony
sion was adverse, and
on behalf of appellant that we can say the jury were not justified in
finding the evidence established title in appellees by adverse possession,
and in our opinion there was no error in the rulings of the court in the
We have
admission of testimony that unduly prejudiced appellant.
it

^

the court said : "It is a sufficient answer to this claim, and to the authorities cited to show it is essential to establish by a deed that appellees
are connected with the adverse possessions of Allen and Sarah B.
Withers, to say that the question is not an open one in this State, and
that, the rule having been years ago determined otherwise by this court
and it being a rule of property upon which many titles may depend,
such former ruling will be adhered to without any re-examination of
the conflicting authorities in respect thereto."
The privity required is that there must be a continuous possession by
mutual consent, so that the possession of the true owner shall not conThe possession of one who had abandoned the
structively intervene.
premises could not be joined with the possession of one who found
them unoccupied, and, without any connection with the former posIn the case before us Christian
session, entered upon the land.
Schwarzentraub was at the time of his death, and had been for some
He was prima
years, in the possession of tlie land in controversy.
was cast upon
and upon his death his estate in
facie the owner of
his heirs, to whom his possession was transferred by operation of law.
Gosselin v. Smith, 154 111. 74, 39 N. E. 980. They remained in possession until after the partition, when they surrendered their possession
to Christian Naffziger. The title he acquired by the master's deed did
not describe or embrace the strip of land in controversy, but the proof
and
shows' he succeeded the Schwarzentraubs in the possession of
must be held the two possessions are lawfully
we are of opinion
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read the evidence and are satisfied the verdict was v^^arranted by it.
We can see no reason to suppose that a different result might obtain
on another trial. The proof of appellees met the requirements of the
rule stated in Zirngibl v. Calumet Dock Co., 157 111. 430, 42 N. E. 431,
and other decisions of this court, upon the degree of proof necessary
to establish title by adverse possession.
No substantial error was committed by the trial court in giving and
refusing instructions. Judgment affirmed.

SECTION 4.— ADVERSE POSSESSION

RICARD

v.

WILLIAMS.

(Supreme Court of the United States, 1822.

7 Wheat.

59, 5

L. Ed.

398.)

Error to the circuit court of the United States for the district of
Connecticut.
This was a suit instituted by the defendants in error against the
plaintiff in error, in the court below. The original action is commonly
known in Connecticut by the name of an a ction of disseisin, and is a
real action, final upon the rights of the parties, and in the nature of a
real action at the common law. The cause was tried upon the general
issue, nul tort nul disseisin, and a verdict being found for the demandants, a bill of exceptions was taken to the opinion of the court upon
matters of law at the trial.
The^ demandants claimed the estate in controversy by purchase from
the adm inistrator of William Dudley, at a sale made by him for the
payment of the debts of his intestate, pursuant to the laws of Connecticut, which authorize a sale of the real estate of any person deceased,
for the payment of his debts, when the personal assets are insufficient
for that purpose. In order to establish the title of William Dudley
in the premises, the demandants proved that Thomas Dudley, the father of William, was, in his lifetime, possessed of the premises, as parcel of what were called the Dudley lands, and died possessed of the
same in 1769, leaving seven children, of whom William was the eldest,
being of about the age of fourteen years, and Joseph Gerriel, the
youngest, being about four years of age. Upon the death of Thomas
Dudley, Joseph Mayhew, the guardian of William, entered into possession of the Dudley lands, and of the demanded premises as parcel, taking the rents and profits in his behalf during his minority ; and upon his
arrival at full age William entered and occupied the same, taking the
rents and profits to his own use, until his death, which happened in the
year 1786, all his brothers and sisters being then living.
During the-
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life of William, no other person claimed any right to enter or occupy
the premises, except that his mother received one third of the rents and
profits, until she died in the year 1783. During his life, and while in
possession of the premises, William always declared that he held the
same only for life, and tlierefore would not allow any improvements
on them at his expense ; no leases were made by him except for short
periods ; and no attempt was made by him to sell or convey the premises ; and he declared that he had no right to sell them, and that upon
his death they would descend to his son Joseph Dudley, under whom
No adthe tenant derived his title, in the manner hereafter stated.
ministration was ever taken in Connecticut upon the estate of William
Dudley, until 1814, and his estate was then declared insolvent; and in
1817, the lands in controversy were sold by the administrator, by order
of the court of probates, for the payment of tlie debts found due under
the commission of insolvency.
To rebut the title of the demandants, and to establish his own, the
tenant proved that William Dudley died intestate, leaving seven children, the eldest of whom was Joseph Dudley.
Upon the death of his
father, the guardian of Joseph (the latter being within age,) entered
into possession of the Dudley lands, and of the demanded premises as
parcel, and used and occupied the same, receiving the rents and profits
in behalf of Joseph, until his arrival at full age, when Joseph himself
entered into possession, claiming them as his own, and taking the rents
and profits to his own use, and holding all other persons out of possession, until the year 18irand 1812, when he sold the demanded premises, and the tenant, either by direct or mesne conveyances under Joseph, came into possession, and has ever since held the premises in his
own right.
In the year 1811, Samuel Dudley, the brother of Joseph,
claimed title to some of the Dudley lands possessed by Joseph, and
brought an action of ejectment for the recovery of them, but the suit
was compromised by Joseph's paying him about $2,000, and about the
same time Joseph settled with another of his brothers, but did not pay
him any thing. But Joseph never admitted that his brothers or sister
had any interest in the lands; and said he could hold them, and did
hold them, in the same manner as he held the lands in Massachusetts.
The will of Governor Dudley, which was admitted to probate in
Massachusetts in 1720, was also in evidence, but neither party established any privity or derivation of title under it.
Upon these facts, the tenant prayed the court to instruct the jury,
that the demandants had not made out a title in themselves, nor in
William Dudley. Not in themselves, because the sale by the administrator to the demandant was void, by force of the statute regarding
the sale of disputed titles, the tenant being in possession of the property at the time of the sale, claiming it as his own, and that William
Dudley had acquired no title to the property in question by possession,
as he claimed to hold the same only during his life, and could therefore
acquire no title, except for life by any length of possession, and that
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if he could acquire title by possession, if this estate descended from
Thomas Dudley, said William could not in seventeen years, acquire a
title against his brothers and sisters, or at least against those of them
who had not been of full age for five years before the death of said
William ; and if the demandants could recover at all, it could only be
for that proportion of the estate which descended from William as one
of the heirs of Thomas Dudley.
The tenant further prayed the^ gomt to instruct the jury that if they
found that Joseph Dudley had, for more than fifteen years before he
sold the land in controversy, been in possession of the same, exclusively
claiming them as his own, and holding out all others, he had gained a
complete title to the property.
The tenant further claimed that the court ought to have instructed
the jury, that under the circumstances attending the possession of said
lands by William Dudley, the father, and by Joseph Dudley, and the
length of time which had elapsed since the death of said William, without any claim on the part of the creditors of said William, the jury
might presume a grant from some owner of the land to William for life,
with remainder to his eldest son. But the court did charge and instruct
the jury that the sale by the administrator under an order of court was
not within the statute regarding disputed titles, and was not therefore
void. That William Dudley, by mistaken constructions of the will of
Governor Dudley, might have claimed an estate for life in the premises,
and that such mistake would not operate to defeat his title by possession. That the length of time in which this estate had been occupied
by WilHam and Joseph Dudley, would bar any claims by the other children of Thomas Dudley, deceased, and that the jury were authorized
to presume a grant by said Children to their brother William Dudley,
deceased, and therefore, if the demandants recovered, they must recover the whole of the premises.
The court also charged the jury that, as against the creditors of
William Dudley, neither Joseph Dudley nor the tenant had gained title
to the lands in controversy by possession, and that tlie jury were not
authorized to presume a grant to Joseph.
To which several opinions of the court the tenant, by his counsel,
excepted.
Story, J.^^ The j^rincipal questions which have arisen, and have
been argued here, upon the instructions given by the circuit court, and
to which alone the court deem it necessary to direct their attention,
are: 1. Whether upon the facts stated, a legal presumption exists,
that William Dudley died seised of an estate of inheritance in the demanded premises ; and, if so, 2. Whether an exclusive possession of
the demanded premises, by Joseph Dudley and his grantees, after the
death of William, under an adversary claim, for thirty years, is a bar to
the entry and title of the demandants under the administration sale.
17

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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It is to be considered, that no paper title of any sort, is shown in WilTheir title, whatever it may be, rests
liam Dudley or his son Joseph.
upon possession ; and the nature and extent of that possession must be
anijquali—
judged of by the acts and circjumstances which accompany
person be found in posfy, explain, or control it. (Undoubtedly,
as his own, in fee,
prima facie evidence
session of land, claiming
of his ownership, and seisin of the inheritance. But,_it_is not the possession alone, but the possession accompanied with tlie ^aii^_fii_liie
fee, that gives this effect, by construction of law to the acts of the
Possession, per se, evidences no more than the mere fact of
party.
wrong;
present occupation, by right; for the law will not presume
present interest, under
just as consistent with
and that possession
From the very nature of the
lease for years or for life, as in fee.
must depend upon the collateral circumstance^^ what
case, therefore,
the quality and extent of the interest claimed by the party; and to
that extent, and that only, will the presumption of law go in his favor.
And the declarations of the party, while in possession, equally with his
If he claims only an
acts, must be good evidence for this purpose.
consistent with his possession, the law will
estate for life, and that
not, upon the mere fact of possession, adjudge him to be in under
larger estate. If, indeed, the party be in under title,
higher right, or
less estate
and, by mistake of law, he supposes himself possessed of
in the land than really belongs to him, the law will adjudge him in pos-^
mistake of
session of, and remit him to, his full right and title. rFor
and hisin
the
not,
such
of
case,
right
party;
law shall
prejudice the
"
possession, therefore, must be held coextensive with his right. This
the doctrine in Littleton, section 695, cited at the bar; and better auindeed so obvious
principle of justice
thority could not be given,
required any authority to support it. But there the party establishes
title in point of law greater than his claim whereas, in the case now
supposed, the party establishes nothing independent of his possession,
This
and that qualified by his own acts and declarations.
the distinction between the cases, and accounts at once for the different principles of law applicable to them.
It has also been argued at the bar that person who commits disseisin cannot qualify his own wrong, but must be considered as
disseisor in fee. This
rule introduced for the
generally true but
benefit of the disseisee, for the sake of electing his remedy. For
man enter into possession, under a supposition of
lawful limited right,
as under a lease, which turns out to be void, or as
special occupant,
not entitled so to claim,
he be
disseisor at all,
where he
only
at the election of the disseisee.
Com. Dig. Seisin, F.
F.
Roll.
Abrid. 662, L. 45; Id. 661, L. 45. There
nothing in the law which
prevents the disseisee from considering such
person as
mere trespasser, at his election or which makes such an entry, under mistake
for
limited estate,
disseisin in fee absolutely, and at all events, so
that
descent cast would toll the entry of the disseisee. But were
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Otherwise, in order to apply the doctrine at all, it must appear that the
party f ovmd in possession entered without right, and was, in fact, a disseisor; for if his entry were congeable, or his possession lawful, his
For
entry and possession will be considered as limited by his right.
the law will never construe a possession tortious unless from necessity.
On the ofher hand, it will consider every possession lawful, the commencement and continuance of which is not proved to be wrongful.
And this upon the plain principle, that every man shall be presumed
to act in obedience to his duty, until the contrary appears. When,
therefore, a naked possession is_m_proof, unaccompanied by evidence
as to its origin, it will be deemed lawful and coextensive with thS right
set up by the party. If the party claim only a limited estate, and not a
fee, the law will not, contrary to his intentions, enlarge it to a fee.
And it is only when the party is proved to be in by disseisin, that the
law will construe it a disseisin of the fee, and abridge the party of his
right to qualify his wrong.
Now, in the cas e^at bar, it is not proved of what estate Thomas DudHis possession does not appear to
ley died seised in the premises.
It
have been accompanied with any claim of right to the inheritance.
might have been an estate for life only, and as such have had a lawful
commencement. If it were intended to be argued that he had a fee in
the premises, it should have been established by competent proof that
No such
he was in possession, claiming a fee by right or by wrong.
fact appears. The only fact, leading even to a slight presumption of
that nature
that his widow took one third of the rents and profits
claim of dower, or any
during her life. But whether this was under
not proved. The circumstance
other right,
equivocal in its characof
ter, and
and the inference to be deduced from
unexplained
descendible estate in her husband,
rebutted by the fact that immediately on his death his son WiUiam entered into the premises, claiming
a life estate, and held them during his life as his own, without any
claim on the part of the co-heirs of his father to share in the estate.
then nothing^in the case, from which
can be judicially inferThere
redtjhat Thomas was ever seised of an estate of inheritance in the
descent from him to his heirs.
premises, and, of course, none of
Then, as to the estate of his son William, in the premises. It
argued that William had an estate in fee, by right or by wrong. That
his entry, either in person or by his guardian, was without right,
was
disseisin, and invested him with
wrongful estate in fee. If with
co-heir of his father, and a grant
must have been as
right, then
ought to be presumed from the other co-heirs to him, releasing their
title and confirming his.
The doctrine, as to presumptions of grants, has been gone into
largely on the argument, and the general correctness of the reasoning
not denied. There
no difference in the doctrine, whether the grant
relate to corporeal or incorporeal hereditaments.
A grant of land may
as well be presumed as
fishery, or of common, or of
grant of
way.
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Presumptions of this nature are adopted from the general infirmity of
human nature, the difficulty of preserving muniments of title, and the
public policy of supporting long and uninterrupted possessions. They
are founded upon the consideration that the facts are such as could
not, according to the ordinary course of human affairs occur, unless
there was a transmutation of title to, or an admission of an existing
adverse title in, the party in possession. They may, therefore, be encountered and rebutted by contrary presumptions ; and can never fairly
arise where all the circumstances are perfectly consistent with the nonexistence of a grant; a fortiori, they cannot arise where the claim is of
In
such a nature as is at variance with the supposition of a grant.
general, it is the policy of courts of law to limit the presumption of
grants to periods analogous to those of the statute of limitations, in
But where the statute applies
cases where the statute does not apply.
it constitutes, ordinarily, a sufficient title or defence, independently of
any presumption of a grant, and therefore it is not generally resorted
it,

2,

7,
§
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a
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a

presumption of a^
But if the circumstances of the case justify
in
other
and where .
case
as
in
one
the
made
the
well
be
as
^rant may
absolute
full,
no
there
and
are
circumstances
cogent
the other
very
of the
short
within
period
grant,
bar against the presumption of
p. 126;
See Phillips on Evidence, ch.
statute of limitations.
Foley V. Wilson, 11 East, 56.
to.
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If we apply the doctrines here asserted to the case at bar, we may
to presume any grant of
ask, in the first place, what ground there
was the quantity or
what
any,
the premises to William Dudley, and
no suffiquahty of his estate? It has been already stated that there
descendible estate in the
cient proof that his father died seised of
so, the entry of William by his guardian, or in person,
premises and
cannot be deemed to have been under color of title as heir; and in
point of fact he never asserted any such title. For the same reason,
so,
no estate can be presumed to have descended to his co-heirs; and

grant from
fails upon which the presumption of
them to William can be built for
they had no title, and asserted no
no reason to presume that he or they sought to make or
title, there
no pretence of any preThere
receive an inoperative conveyance.
other
person to William and as
sumption of
grant in fee from any
there
no evidence of any connection with the will of Governor Dudby William, there does not seem
ley, or of any claim of title under
any room to presume that he was in under that will, upon mistaken
this further difficonstructions of his title derived from it. There
William,
that at the
to
from
the
co-heirs
in
grant
presuming
culty
all
them were
of
that
of
his
guardian,
time of his own entry, as well as
valid conveyance. During this
under age, and incapable of making
period, therefore, no such conveyance can be presumed and yet William, during all this period, claimed an exclusive right, and had an exclusive possession of the whole to his own use; and his subsequent
continuation of the same claim without any interpossession was but
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In point of fact the youngest
ference on the part of the co-heirs.
brother arrived at age about the time of WilHam's death ; and as to two
others of the co-heirs, the statute of Hmitations of Connecticut, as to
rights of entry, would not then run against them. The pr esumption of
a grant from them is therefore, in this view, also, affected with an intrinsic infirmity.

in addition to all this, William nev er .claimed. .any estate in fee in
His declaration uniformly was that he had a life estate
thejpremises.
only, and that upon his death they would descend to his son Joseph.
Of the competency of this evidence to explain the nature of his posHis ti tle
session and title, no doubt can reasonably be entertained.
being^ eviden ced only by po ssessio n, it must be limite d in , itsextentjQ
If, indeed, it had appeared that he was
the claim which he asserted.
in under a written title which gave him a larger estate, his mistake of
the law could not prejudice him; but his seisin would be coextensive
with, and a remitter to, that title. But there is no evidence of any
written title, or of any mistake of law in the construction of it. JFor
aught that appears, William's estate was exactly what he claihied, a
It is
fife-estat e only, and the inheritance belonged to his son Joseph.
material also to observe that the acts of the parties, and the possession
of the estates during the period of nearly fifty years, are in conformity
with this supposition, and at war with any other. Why should William's brothers and sisters have acquiesced in his exclusive possession
during his whole life, if the inheritance descended from their father ?
Why should Joseph's brothers and sisters have acquiesced in his exclusive possession during a period of twenty-five years without claim, if
their father William was seised of the inheritance?
Why should the
guardians of William and Joseph have successively . entered into the
premises, claiming the whole in right of their respective wards, if their
title was not deemed clearly and indisputably an exclusive title, or if
they were in by descent under the title of their fathers? If, indeed, a
presumption of a grant is to be made, it should be of a grant conforming to the declarations and acts of possession of the parties during
the whole period; and if any grant is to be presumed from the facts
of this case, it is a grant of a particular estate to William, with a remainder of the inheritance to Joseph, or in the most favorable view of
an estate tail to William, upon whose death the estate would descend
to Joseph, as his eldest son per formam doni. If Thomas, the grandfather, were proved to have been the owner of the fee, there is nothing
in the other circumstances which forbids the presumption of such a
grant from him ; but as the cause now stands, it may as well have been
derived from some other ancestor, or from a stranger. It is therefore
the opinion of this court that the circuit court erred in directing the
jury that William, by mistaken constructions of the will of Governor
Dudley, might have claimed an estate for life in the premises, and that
such mistake would not operate to defeat his title by possession, for
Aig.Prop. — 4
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there was no evidence that William ever claimed under that will ; and
also erred in instructing the jury that they were authorized to preThe compromise
sume a grant by the children of Thomas to William.
entered into by Joseph with two of his brothers is not thought to
change the posture of the case, because that compromise was made
with an explicit denial of their right; and is therefore to be considered
* * *
as an agreement for a family peace.
The remaining consideration under this head is, whether the possession of Joseph Dudley can be considered as an adverse possession so
as to toll the right of entry of the heirs, and, consequently, extinguish,
by the lapse of time, their right of action for the land, as well as extinguish by analogy of principle the power of the administrator to sell
the land.
It is said that the entry of Joseph into the premises is consistent with the potential right of the creditors ; that he had a right to
enter as a co-heir of his father, and jf he_entered as co-heir, hi s pos-

session was not adverse, but was a possession for the other heirs and
creditors, and he could not afterwards hold adversely, or change the
nature of his possession, for the creditors might always elect to consider him their trustee. There is no doubt that in general, the entry o f
one heir will enure to the benefit of all, and that if the entry is made
as heir, and without claim of an exclusive title, it will be deemed an
entry not adverse to, but in consonance with, the rights of the other
heirs.
But it is as clear that one heir may disseise his co-heirs, and
And,
hold an adverse possession against them, as well as a stranger.
notwithstanding an entry as heir, the party may, afterwards, by disseisin of his co-heirs, acquire an exclusive possession upon which the
statute will run. An ouster, or disseisin, is not, indeed, to be presume;d
from the mere fact of sole possession ; but it may be proved by such
possession, accompanied with a notorious claim of an exclusive right.
And if such exclusive possession will run against the heirs, it will, by
parity of reason, run against the creditors. For the heirs, qua heirs,

They
are in no accurate sense in the estate as trustees of the creditors.
hold in their own right by descent from their ancestor, and take the
profits to their own use during their possession ; and the most that can
be said is, that they hold consistently with the right of the creditors.
The creditors, in short, have but a lien on the land which may be enforced through the instrumentality of the administrator acting under
the order of the court of probates.
But in order to apply the argument itself, it is necessary to prove
that th e ancestor had an estate of inheritance, and that the party
entered_as _hein Now, inthe c^e^ at bar, all the circumstances point
the other__wa3:.
There is not, as has been already intimated, any
proof that William Dudley died seised of an inheritance in the land;
and there is direct proof that he asserted the inheritance to be in his
son Joseph ; and the entry of the guardian of Joseph, as well as his
own entry, after his arrival of age, was under an exclusive claim to
the whole, not by descent, but by title distinct or paramount
There

Ch. 1)

POSSESSORY

TITLES

51

is certainly no incapacity in an heir to claim an estate by title distinct or paramount to that of his ancestor ; and if his possession is
exclusive under such claim, and he holds all other persons out until
the statute period has run, he is entitled to the full benefit and protection of. the bar. It appears to us, therefore, that the jury ought
to have been instructed, that if they were satisfied that Joseph's
possession was adverse to that of the other heirs, and under a claim
of title distinct from, or paramount to that of his father, during his
twenty-five years of exclusive possession, the entry of the purchaser,
under the administrator's sale, was not congeable, and that the powThere was thereer of the creditor over the estate was extinguished.
fore error in the opinion of the court to the jury, that. js_aga inst the
creditors of William Dudley ^ neither Jo seph nor _th e^ tenant had
gained any t itle tq^the land in controve r sy by possess ion^
For these reasons the judgment of the circuit court must be j;eto order
_yersed j and the cause remanded, with directions to the court
a venire facias de novo.^®
/
'^/■^

FRENCH

V.

(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,

PEARCE.
1831.

^-A.>^.^..

^a..

8 Conn. 439, 21 Am. Dec. 680.)

This was an action of trespass quare clausurn Jregit^; tried at Litchfield, February term, 1831, before Williams, J.
The plaintiff and defendant were adjoining proprietors of land; and
the land in controversy was the border between them, which was
wood-land, unfenced.
Both parties claimed under William French,
the fa ther of the plaintiff' and of the defendant's wife. The plaintiff's
title was admitted, unless the land was conveyed to the defendant's
wife, by a deed dated the 11th of May, 1809; in which the line on the
side adjoining the plaintiff was particularly described. A part of the
description was "from a butternut tree a straight line to Piatt's corner
— said piece being the same land v/hich the grantor bought of Rev. Mr.
The defendant contended, that as the deed to his wife reBenedict."
ferred to the land purchased of Mr. Benedict, he might shew where
were the bounds of that lot ; and claimed, that by those bounds, there
was not a straight line from the butternut tree to Piatt's corner. This
was accompanied with evidence, by which he claimed to have shewn,

Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L. Ed. 624 (1837).
posse ssion npr] occupancy of vacant land by a mere squatter is not
adverse, so as to ripen into a title by adverse possession . See Jll«lJ(ii'feou v"
Schamikow, IbO i'ed. bU, SO U. (J. A. 3*3, 15 L. K. A (N. S.) 1178 (1907)
Mattson v. Warner, 115 Minn. 520, 132 N. W. 1127 (1911).
W hether the possession \yas under a cTnim o f tii-lp, nr not, is a question of
fact, to be baSdled as such on the Trial, and conclusions thereon are ordi
narily not disturbed by reviewing courts. Mattson v. Warner, supra.
T here is no reouirement that th <^oinin^: nP fiflp be bona fld e. Rupley v
Eraser (Minn.) 156 N. W. 3^0 (1916); Kamapo Mt'g. Co. v. Mapes, 216 N. Y
362, 110 N. E. 772 (1915).
18 See
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that he had occupied and possessed the land in question for more than
fifteen years, although not included in the straight line mentioned in
the deed.
The plaintiff denied the occupation of the defendant; and
denied also any difference in bounds in consequence of the reference
to Mr. Benedict's deed, and any adverse possession by tlie defendant.
The judge charged the jury, tliat in considering where were the
boundaries of this lot of the defendant's wife, if the description in the
deed was doubtful, they might take into consideration the possession
or occupation of the defendant, for the purpose of determining those
bounds. But if they should find, that the defendant had possessed the
land in question, for more than fifteen years, claiming and intending
only to occupy to the true line, as described in his deed and no further, then his possession must be referred to his deed, and it would
such
not be adverse to the plaintiff; and the jury, notwithstanding
division.
line
of
determine
the
look
to
deed,
to the
possession, must
The jury returned a verdict for tlie plaintiff; and the defendant
moved for a new trial for a misdirection.
HosMER, C. J. Whether the line of occupancy was the dividing line_
between them, was the point of controversy between the parties. The
jury were charged, so far as relates to the deed, that if the line described in it was doubtful, they might take into consideration the possession and occupation of the defendant, for the purpose of determining it. This opinion seems not to be questioned ; nor is it questionAn occupation of land by the defendant as his own, under the
able.
plaintiff's eye, to what he supposed to be the dividing line between
him and the plaintiff, and which, for many years, the plaintiff' permitted without a question, from the mutual assent of the parties is strong
1 Phill.
Ev.
presumptive evidence of the true place of the line.
"420-422.
On the point of title by fifteen years possession, as the only objection made at the trial, was, that the possession of the defendant was
not adverse, it must be assumed, that none other existed.
Of consequence, the controversy is confined to that single point.
By a dverse poss^ssiori_is meant a possession hostile to the title of
another ; or, In other words, a disseisin of the premises ; and by disseisin is understood an unwarrantable entry, putting the true owner
out of his seisin. Co. Litt. 153, b. 181.
The enqujry, then, is precisely tliis ; what must be the character of
the act, which constitutes an adverse possession?
This question was directly answered, in Bryan v. Atwater, 5 Day,
A clear and unquestionable
181, 5 Am. Dec. 136, and by this Court.
rule was intended to be given. The court commenced the expression
of their opinion, by saying: "It will be necessary to ascertain precisely the meaning of the terms, 'adverse holding' or 'adverse posses"
sion.'
The first principle asserted in that case is, that to render a
possession adverse, it is not necessary that it should be accompanied
with a claim of title and with the denial of tlie opposing title. The case
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next affirms that possession is never adverse, if it be under the legal
proprietor and derived from him. After these preliminaries, it is en-,
quired: "But more particularly, what, in point of law, is an adyei'se.^
jossession ? It is," say the court, "a possession, not under the legal
proprietor, but entered into without his consent, either, directly or
indirectly given. It is a possession, by which he is disseised and ousted >
■
of the lands so possessed." That there should remain no doubt, they
After shewing negatively, i
next enquire, what constitutes a disseisin?
title,
or denying the title of
that it is not requisite to enter claiming
the legal owner, they remark affirmatively, that it is only necessary
for a person to enter and take possession of land as his own ; to take |
the rents and profits to himself ; and to manage with the property as ',
an owner manages with his own property; that is, tlie person thus •
possessing must act as if he were the true owner and accountable to
no person for the land or its avails. A criterion is then given to de"It is only necessary to
termine whether a possession is adverse.
find out," say the court, "whether it can be considered as the con-
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;
structive possession of the legal proprietor."
the
rea--*
in
which
case,
tliis
in
I have been thus particular
analyzing
sons were drawn up, by a very able and eminent jurist; as it presents,
in the plainest language, a sure and most intelligible land-mark, to ascertain when a possession is adverse. It is peculiarly observable, that by
the reasons given, anxiously laboured as they were, it was intended
The possession alone, and
to put the question at rest for the future.
No intimation
are
to
regarded.
the qualities immediately attached
wrongful
there as to the motive of the possessor. If he intends
title; or
disseisin, his actual possession for fifteen years, gives him
similar possession gives
he occupies what he believes to be his own,
him
title.
Into the recesses of his mind, his motives or purposes,
for this obvious reamade.
his guilt or innocence, no enquiry
and
adverse
possession, with an intention
the visible
sonjlthat
character,
and not the remote
to possess, that constitutes its adverse

is

a

2

is

1

&

&

is

a

is

is it

I

is

views or belief of the possessor.
should proceed further, as the point of
not necessary that
decision, in the case before us, has been settled, by this Court, and
with great precision.
At the same time,
may be the more satisfacin harmony with the decitory to shew, that the determination here
sions of other courts.
well
In Westminster-Hall, the character of an adverse possession
established. The possession of
person denying the title of the owner,
or claiming the premises, or taking the whole rents and profits withDoe d.
held sufficient evidence of actual ouster.
out accounting,
Bird,
v.
ux.
Doe
d.
217;
Hellings
Prosser,
Fisher
Cowp.
al. v.
name
s.
c.
the
741;
by
11 East, 49; Stocker v. Berny,
Ld. Raym.
defined
of Stokes V. Berry,
Salk. 421. The extent of the doctrine
tenant in comThe possession of
by the following considerations.
mon
held not to be adverse, without actual disseisin or its equiva-
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lent, as he is presumed to possess for his fellow commoner ; but the
possession of an individual entering not under another, is adverse, by
a perception of the profits only to his own use.
In the state of New York, the entering on land under pretence of
title, or under a claim hostile to the title of the true owner, constitutes
an adverse possession. Brandt d. Walton v. Ogden, 1 Johns. (N. Y.)
156; Jackson d. Griswold v. Bard, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 230, 4 Am. Dec.
267; Jackson d. Bonnell & al. v. Sharp, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 163, 6 Am.
Etec. 267.
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To the same effect is the law of Massachusetts. "To constitute an
"of him who was seised, the disactual ouster," said Parsons, Ch.
seisor must have the actual exclusive occupation of the land, claiming
i:o hold
against him who was seised, or he must actually turn him
out of possession."
Mass. 416,
Kennebeck Purchase v. Springer,
Mass.
418,
Am. Dec. 227. Boston Mill Corporation v. Bulfinch,
obvious, that
Am. Dec. 120.
129,
person who takes possession, does not the less claim to hold
against him who before was
seised, because he conscientiously believes, that he has right to possess.
The law of Maine, so far as
expressed in the case of Kenneal,
uec Purchase v. Laboree
Greenl. (Me.) 275, 11 Am. Dec. 79,
1^ in perfect harmony with that of the states already mentioned.
"The
doctrine on this^ subject," said Mellen, Ch. J., "seems to be plain jind
A possession must be adverse to the true owner, in orwell-settled.
der to constitute
disseisin.
The possessor must claim to hold and
He next
improve the land for his own use, and exclusive of others."
states, that in
count on the demandant's seisin,
was never incumbent on the tenant to prove more than his continued possession and
occupancy for thirt}' years next before the commencement of the action, using and improving the premises after the manner of the
owner of the fee
and he then subjoins, that such possession, unless
explained, affords satisfactory evidence to the jury, that such tenant
claimed to hold the land as his own.
In the case of Brown v. Gay, Greenl. (Me.) 126, the question was,
whether the tenant was in possession of certain land by disseisin. He
owned a lot denominated No.
and was in possession of lot No.
was part of the former lot.
He was, therefore, in
claiming that
possession through mistake. This principle was advanced, by the court,
to wit: "If the owner of
parcel of land, through inadvertency or
the
includes
of
line,
dividing
ignorance
part of an adjoining tract
disseisin, so as to prevent
within his enclosure, this does not operate
the true owner from conveying or passing the same by deed."
If the learned court meant to lay down the position, that although
the possession was adverse and a disseisin, yet that
was of such
character as not to prevent the owner from transferring the land by
But
was indeed, the case has no bearing on the one before us.
tended to declare, that there was no disseisin at all, by reason of the
before mentioned mistake,
There
cannot accede to the proposition.
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was a possession, it was not under the true owner, but it was under a
claim of right; and the rents and profits (if any) were received and
appropriated to the possessor's use,, without any supposed or assumed
accountabiHty. This is a disseisin, by all the cases on the subject, with
every mark or indicium of one upon its face. If the possession were
incidental to the taking of something off the property, it would be a
trespass only. But when the possession [s a permanent object, under
a claim of right, however mistaken, what can be a disseisin, if this is
not? That the possessor meant no wrong, might be very important,
if he were prosecuted for a crime ; for nemo fit reus, nisi mens sit
But the motive, which induced the taking possession, is remotely
rea.
distant from the possession in fact under a claim of right, and in no
It was adverse
respect tends to qualify or give character to the act.
full intention
and
with
the
possession
disseisin (innocently happening)
of the mind to possess exclusively ; and by necessary consequence, a
seclusion of the owner from the seisin of his property.
I agree with the learned court, that the intention of the possessor
But the person who ento claim adversely, is an essential ingredient.
e
on
belie
it
b
claiming
land
and
to
hls^wn, dqes^ tlius enter^
ving
_ters
poss
and
ess.
The very nature of the act is an assertion of his own
title, and the denial of the title of all others. ^t_"iatters not, that the
possessor was mistaken, and had he be en better informed, would not
have entered on th e land.. This /bears on another subject — the moral
nature of the action ; but it does not point to the enquiry of adverse
possession.
Of whatconse^uence is it to the person disseised, that
the disseisor is an honest man ? His property is held, by another,
under a claim of right; and he is subjected to the same privation, as
if the entry were made with full knowledge of its being unjustifiable.
In the case of Ross v. Gould, 5 Greenl. (Me.) 204, it is said, "a disseisin cannot be committed by mistake, because the intention of the
possessor to claim adversely, is an essential ingredient in disseisin."
It is as certain that a disseisin may be
.1 do not admit the p rinciple.
committed by rnistake, as that a man may by mistake take possession
of land, claiming title and believing it to be his own. The possession
is not the less adverse, because the person possessed intentionally,
But in the moral nature of the act, there is unthough innocently.
doubtedly a difference, when the possessor knowingly enters by wrong.
I have been the more particular in my observations, for two reasons.
The first
that the evidence of adverse possession, which
of very
frequent occurrence, might be placed on grounds clear and stable
The next, from
serious apprehension that in the law of disseisin, an
important change
Adopt the rule, that
inadvertently attempted.
an entry and 'possession under a claim of right,
through mistake,
new principle
does not constitute an adverse possession, and
substituted.
The enquiry no longer is, whether visible possession, with
the intent to possess, under
claim of right, and to use and enjoy as
one's own,
disseisin;
but from this plain and easy standard of
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proof we are to depart, and invisible motives of the mind are to be
explored ; and the enquiry is to be had whether the possessor of land
acted in conformity with his best knowledge and belief.
Inthe case before us, the plaintiff adduced evidence to show, that
he entered on the land in question, and possessed it more than fifteen
and exclusively, under a claim and belief of
years, uninterruptedly
right, and appropriating to his own use, without account, all the rents
and profits. This was^^adyerse possession and disseisin, and gave him,
title under the law of the state.
Upon this principle, the charge was incorrect, and a new trial is advised.

ihe other judges were of the same opinion, except Peteirs,
was absent.
New trial to be granted.^'

PREBLE
(Supreme

Judicial Court of

V.

MAINE CENT.

J.,

who

R. CO.

Maine, 1893. 85 Me. 260, 27 Atl. 149, 21 L. R. A.
St. Rep. 366.)

829, 35 Am.

This was a real action brought to deterrriine_ the_di vidin g Hne^ between adjoining .owner s..
The case is stated in the opinion.
A principal issue between tlie parties was that of adve rse occupatjon,
the plaintiff claiming that thereby he had acquired a title to the disThe testimony bearing upon this issue and coming
puted premises.
from the plaintiff's cross-examination, is as follows :
"O. Previous to your deed to the railroad of the two rod strip between you and them, was there anything to mark the western boundA. Yes, there was a fence on their western
ary of their location?
Then they took two rods more and moved the fence. I
boundary.
deeded it to them.
19 A. conveyed fifty acres of his land to B.
In building a Jiue_fen£e between the two properties A., b y mistake, inclosed seventeen acres of B.'s
land, and occnpipd samp for thp nprjori of the f^t'^^"^^' "f limi tatlO B^." In
ejectment by B. against A. to recover possession of the seventeen acres, A.
c laimed bv adve y;-ip nnsst^ssinn.
B. offered to prove that after the fence
was built A. said that "he thought the fence was on the con-ect line, but
if it left B. with less than fifty acres, the fence would have to be moved."
Was the evidence offered materia l? See King v. Brigham, 23 Or. 2G2, 31 Pac.
601, 18 L. H. A. 361 (1892); Schaubuch v. Dillemuth, 108 Va. 86, 60 S. E.
745, 15 Ann. Cas. 825 (1908);
Searles v. De Ladson, 81 Conn. 133, 70 Atl.

589 (1908).

L'.

An ignorant woman, a devisee of certain lands, inclosed 'more than she
was entitled to, and occupied same for more than the period of the statute of
limitations.
In ejectment against her by the paper title owner, she set up
the statute.
Qn examination during the trial g^i<^g?^iV^si^^ "b ad never wan ted more than tbe will gav^ Her, Put sne knew the will gave her what"she
luid In closed,"
Was
^ her possession adverse? Johnson v. Thomas, Zo App. L>.
141 (1904).
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"Q. It was your understanding and also the understanding of the
railroad company that the fence was moved back to correspond with
the new line? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Your occupation ever since has been based upon that understanding and supposition, has it not? A. I always supposed that was
the line.

railroad company of the tworod strip, and then occupied afterwards up to this fence, you did
not intend thereby to encroach on the land which you had just deeded
A, I supposed I was using my own land. I moved
to the railroad?
the fence in at one time two feet.
"Q. D'own to the time when you moved it in yourself, the fence
was kept as it was put up shortly after the deed of the two-rod strip?
A. They told me they had taken two rods.
"Q. How long after you delivered to the railroad company your
deed of the two-rod strip was the fence moved back to correspond
to the new line? A. The fence was moved back before I gave the
deed ; it was witliin that year. I was away at sea ; when I came home
"Q. When you made your

deed to the

they told me they had taken it.
"O. From that time since you have regarded the fence line as the
true line? A. I have.
"O. And occupied up to it on that account and on that ground? A.
Occupied it on account I thought it was my own land."
Whitehouse, J. In this writ of entry the plaintiffs seek to recover
a small piece of land, triangular in shape, now covered by a portion
of the defendant's freight platform at the Richmond station. The case
is presented on report and discloses no material controversy respecting
the facts.
The rights of the parties must, therefore, be determined
by applying the established principles of law to the fair and reasonable inferences drawn from the facts proved or admitted.
The original location of the defendant's railroad in 1848 was made
four rods in width at the point in question, its westerly boundary being the easterly line of the premises then owned by the plaintiff's father. But in 1852 the company purchased of the plaintiffs, who had
in the meantime acquired title to the property, an additional strip two
rods in width, extending across their lot, and adjoining the original
location on the westerly side. At the same time the fence which had
been erected on the supposed boundary line in 1848, was moved westerly by the defendant's servants for the purpose of enclosing the two
rods then purchased ; but the plaintiff, Israel Preble, testifies that in
re-building the fence in "1864 or 1866" he moved it two feet further
on to his own land.
Prior to 1889 the defendants had used only a
part of this additional strip, and hence there had been no occasion for
an accurate survey of the land. But when at the last named date, it
became necessary to enlarge the freight platform, measures were taken
to have the boundary line between the parties definitely ascertained
and fixed. It was then discovered from the record of the orisfinal lo-
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Dow v. McKenney, 64 Me. 138.
We are aware that the soundness of this doctrine has been questionnot the
ed in other jurisdictions. It has been said that the possession

§

8

is

a

it

less adverse because the person possessed intentionally though innocentintroduces
ly; and the further objection has been made that
new
principle by means of which the stable evidence of visible possession
under
complicated with an inquiry into the invisible
claim of right,
French v. Pearce,
motives and intentions of the occupant.
Conn.
439, 21 Am. Dec. 680; Wood on Limitati6ns,
263, and authorities
a

,/

by

is

isl

a,

is,

cation that the "central or directing line" of the railroad was not in
the centre of the four rods of land taken for the construction of the
road, but was twenty-eight feet from the easterly line and thirtyIt accordingly apeight feet from the westerly line of the location.
peared that the true boundary of the defendant's land on the west was
thirty-eight feet and two rods or seventy-one feet from the centre of
the main track of the railroad.
By this measurement the boundary
line was found to be west of the existing fence a distance of two feet
and eight-tenths at the southerly end and eight feet and ten inches
at the northerly end.
Whether the mistake made by the defendant's
servants respecting the distance tlie fence should have been moved in
1848, arose in part from an erroneous assumption that the central line
of the track was the centre of the location, or otherwise, does not appear, and it is not material to inquire.
There is not only no evidence
that the main track has been moved at this point since tlie original
location but it is satisfactorily shown tliat it has not been moved ; and
the simple process of drawing a line seventy-one feet westerly from
the centre of the main track and parallel with it now establishes beyond a doubt the location of the westerly line of the two-rod strip.
The triangular piece in controversy is thus conclusively shown to be
wholly on the east side of the true line, and hence a part of the land
purchased of the plaintiffs in 1852.
But Israel Preble, the surviving plaintiff, claims that he cannot at
this date satisfactorily locate his easterly line by measurement;
and
says that he has continually occupied the land to the fence as it existed
in 1889 upon the understanding and belief that it marked the true line,
and he now claims title to the disputed piece by adverse possession.
can this claim on the part of the plaintiff be susAnd the question
tained on the facts here presented?
Clearly not, unless the rule established by an unbroken line of the decisions of this court covering
now to be overturned.
period of nearly seventy years,
That rule
that one who by mistake occupies for twenty years, or mbre, land not'
his deed with no intention to claim title beyond his actual'
covered
boundary wherever that may be, does not thereby acquire title by adverse possession to land beyond the true line. Brown v. Gay,
Me.
126;
Gould,
204;
Ross
v.
Me.
v.
Lincoln
Edge(Greenl.)
(Greenl.)
comb, 31 Me. 345; Worcester v. Lord, 56 Me. 266, 96 Am. Dec. 456;
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is manifest, however, that those holding these views have not
the decisions of our court upon the subject, and
hence have failed to apprehend their true import and exact limitations.
A frequent recurrence to elementary truths in any science jsthe
greatest safeguard against error, and in the ultimate analysis of the
doctrine of adverse possession the distinctive element which supports
Indeed it is aptly
the rule above stated at once becomes apparent.
suggested in the familiar test imposed by Bracton: "Ouaerendum est
Co. Littl. 153 b; 8 Mod. Rep. 55.
a judice quo animo hoc fecerit."
The inquiry must be quo animo is the possession taken and held.
There is every presumption that the occupancy is in subordination to
the true title, and if the possession is claimed to be adverse the act of
the wrong-doer must be strictly construed, and the character of the
possession clearly shown. Roberts v. Richards, 84 Me. 1, 24 Atl. 425,
and authorities cited. "The intention of the possessor to claim adversely," says Mellen, C. J., in Ross v. Gould, supra, "is an' essential
And in Worcester v. Lord, supra, the court
ingredient in disseizin."
says : "To make a disseizin in fact there must be an intention on the
part of the party assuming possession to assert title in himself." Indeed the authorities all agree that this intention of the occupant to
claim the ownership of land not embraced in his title, is a necessary
element of adverse possession. And in case of occupancy by mistake
beyond a line capable of being ascertained, this intention to claim title
to the extent of the occupancy must appear to be absolute and not conditional ; otherwise the possession will not be deemed adverse to the
true owner. It must be an intention to claim title to all land within a
certain boundary on the face of the earth, whether it shall eventually
be found to be the correct one or not. If for instance one in ignorance
of his actual boundaries takes and holds possession by mistake up to a
certain fence beyond his limits, upon the claim and in the belief that it
is the true line, with the intention to claim title, and thus if necessary,
to acquire "title by possession" up to that fence, such possession having
the requisite duration and continuity, will ripen into title. Hitchings v.
See,
Morrison, 72 Me. 331, is a pertinent illustration of this principle.
575;
Hibbard,
Me.
Ricker
v.
Abbott,
v.
51
7Z
Me.
105.
Abbott
also^
cited.

critically distinguished

-"^i
:
!

on the other hand a party through ignorance, inadvertence or
mistake, occupies up to a given fence beyond his actual boundary, because he believes it to be the true line, butjias no intention to claim
title to that extent if it should be ascertained that the fence was on his
neighbor's land, ah indispensable element of adverse possession is
In such a case the intent to claim title exists only upon the
wanting.
condition that the fence is on the true line. The intention is not absolute^ut pro vision al, and the possession is not adverse. Dow v. McKenney, 64 Me. 138, is an exceTTeht illustration of this rule. In that
case a fence had been maintained on a wrong divisional line by mistake,
and it was found by the court as a matter of fact that "none of the
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parties had any idea of maintaining any line but the true divisional
line and that they occupied according to the fence only because they
supposed it was on the true divisional line between them." Upon this
finding it was held as a matter of law that such possession was not adThe unconditional intent to
verse to the right of the true owner.
See, also,
claim title to the extent of the occupancy was wanting.
Worcester v. Lord, 56 Me. 266, 96 Am. Dec. 456.
Thus it is perceived that possession by mistake as above described
Itjsjnot merely the existence, o.f_a_
may or may not work a disseizin.
mistake, but the presence or_absence of the requisite intention to claim
title that fixes the character of the entry and determines the question
of disseizin, ^he two rules are expressly recognized and carefully disThe distinction between them is
tinguished in our recent decisions.
neither subtle, recondite or refined, but simple, practical and substanIt involves sources of evidence and means of proof no more
tial.
difficult or complex than many other inquiries of a similar character
constantly arising in our courts.
The conclusions of fact which are fairly warranted by the evidence
leave no room for doubt that the case at bar falls within the principle
It has already been seen that, prior to 1889, both parties
last stated.
were ignorant of the fact that the fence erected by the plaintiff in
"1864 or 1866" was not on the true line. The plaintiff, Israel Preble,
himself testifies that after he moved the fence he had always regarded
it as the true line ; that he had occupied the land up to the fence upon
the supposition and belief that it was the true line and that he had so
occupied it because he thought it was his own land. This testimony,
viewed in the light of the circumstances and situation of the parties,
emphatically negatives the idea that during this time the plaintiff had
any intention to claim title to land which did not belong to him. We
are warranted in believing that it would do injustice to the plaintiff
himself, as well as violence to all the probabilities in the case, to assume that immediately after the plaintiff had conveyed the land to the
defendant for a satisfactory consideration, he formed the intention
of depriving the company of a portion of the same land by disseizin in
case the fence should not prove to be on the true line.
The conclusion is irresistible that the plaintiff held possession of the
locus by mistake in ignorance of the true line, with an intention to
claim title only on condition that the fence was on the true line. His
possession was, therefore, not adverse to the true owner, and cannot
prevail against the valid record title of the defendant. JLudgment for

,

Haskell, JJ.,

concurred.

Em-

,

Doolittle
v. Watts, 94 Me. 476/487, 48 Atl. ISO (1901)
52 N. W. 337 (1892) (but see Grube v. Wells, 3-1
v. Mills County, 111 Iowa, 654, 82 N. W. 1038 (190O)

Bailey, S."> Ii)\va. .^98,
Iowa, 148 [1871])
JNIiller

^

Richardson

and

;

20 See

V.

Virgin
,

J.,

the defendant.-''
Walton,
Peters, C.
ery, T., did not concur.

;

^
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O'GARA.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1900. 177 Mass. 139, 58 N. E. 275,
83 Am. St. Rep. 265.)

Writ of entry, to recover a tract of land situated in Leicester. Plea,
general issue. Trial in the Superior Court, before Gaskill, J., who
allowed a bill of exceptions, in substance as follows.
The d emandant claimed^tit^e through a deed to him on the premises,
by one Lanphear, dated March 11, 1899. Lanphear's title came from
a deed dated January 5, 1899, also delivered on.Jka.lan.d, to him, by
Kate Hanlon and her children, being the children and heirs of her deThe, tenant claimeii tjtlp thrnngh a
ceased husband, John Hanlon.
lease

fromjhe heirs of one Olney,

decease d,, dated December 9, 1898o

The paper title was shown to be in the heirs of Olney by a series of
conveyances beginning with the deed of one Burr to Buchanan, June
4, 1863. The demandant claimed that John Hanlon or his widow, Kate
Hanlon, or his heirs who signed the deed to Lanphear, had acquired a
title to the premises by possession^ for twenty years.
There was evidence tending to show that John Hanlon entered upon
the premises about the year 1864, cut the wood and timber, and thereafter occupied the same for a garden and for pasturing his cow and
for other purposes, the evidence tending to show that this occupation
was exclusive and continuous.
There was evidence tending to show
that John Hanlon entered upon the premises either in pursuance of a
verbal gift of the land to him by Samuel L. Hodges, or by a permission to occupy the same granted to him by Hodges, who became
owner of the premises by a deed from Patrick Hanover, dated October
30, 1865, and Hodges conveyed the same to one Gilbert and others on
October 19, 1866. John Hanlon died in 1873, and thereupon his widow continued to occupy the premises in the way in which her husband
had done, and in the way in which she occupied the adjoining farm,
the title to which was in John Hanlon at the time of his death.
Some
of her children, the heirs of John Hanlon, lived with her and worked
on the premises in question.
The evidence tended to show that this
occupation of John Hanlon during his life and that of Kate Hanlon
was ope n and continuous and exclusive, and the pr incipal question in
controv ersy was whether the occupation was under a claim of right or
under a license or permission from Jjodges.- Kate Hanlon testified,
and some of her children testified, and there was evidence tending to
show that the occupation was under the claim that Samuel L. Hodges
had given the land to John Hanlon, and that Kate claimed to occupy
it as her own because Hodges had given it to her husband.
Helmick v. Railway Co. (Iowa) 156 N. W. 736 (1916) ; Edwards v. Fleming,
Kan. 653, 112 Pac. 836, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 923 (1911); Skansi v. Novak,

Wash. 39, 146 Pac. 160 (1915).
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This evidence was controverted by the tenant, who put in evidence
that said Kate Hanlon had stated that Hodges had given to her husband and herself the right to occupy the premises and the right to cut
the grass, etc. The deeds from Burr to Buchanan, from Buchanan to
Hanover, and from Hanover to Hodges, reserved a right to the Leicester Reservoir Company, whose pond bordered on the premises, to take
material for its dam from the premises ; and there was evidence that
an employee of the Leicester Reservoir Company had crossed the
premises and had torn down a fence witliin twenty years, which had
been put up by Kate Hanlon, and tliat tliereupon Kate Hanlon had
restored the fence. After the employee had torn it down the second
time she left an opening where he could go through, and thereafter the
fence was left undisturbed.
There was no evidence, except such as may be inferred from the
evidence herein stated, that any of the owners of the paper title of the
land, except Hodges, had ever given any license or permission, or had
any knowledge of any license or permission to John Hanlon or Kate
Hanlon, or the heirs of John Hanlon, to occupy the premises.
The demandant asked the judge to instruct the jury as follows: L
If the owner of the land verbally gave the land to John Hanlon, and
thereupon Hanlon entered on the premises and occupied them continuously till his 'death, claiming to own them, and was not interfered with
in said occupation, and immediately upon his death his widow con-

5.

is

it

is,

tinued to occupy the same continuously in the same way, and the whole
period of such continuous occupation amounted to twenty years, the
jury would be authorized to find that the title was in Mrs. Hanlon, or
in her and the heirs at law of said John Hanlon, and that the title
passed to the demandant by virtue of deeds which were annexed as
Exhibits A and B. 2. If the occupation of Mrs. Hanlon has been sufficient to give a title, under the rules of law given you, but for some license or permission which might qualify such occupation, then the said
license or permission must appear to be a license or permission granted
by the owner before or at the time the occupation is going on, or in
3. Any license or permisforce during the time of such occupation.
in itself, of no legal imsion given by Hodges during his ownership
portance, as affecting occupancy by Mrs. Hanlon subsequent to the
could have no farce in this
date when he parted with his title, and
evidence that the grantees of Hodges, while owncase, unless there
ers, renewed or adopted, or in some way intentionally continued or
4. If the occupation of Mrs. Hanrevived, such license or permission.
in
for
of
the
question
lon
premises
twenty years was such that the real
owner of the premises could have sued her for trespass for such occupation, then said occupation was adverse within the meaning of the
law.
On the evidence in tlie present case the occupation by Mrs.
Hanlon of the premises in question, cultivating the same, cutting the
hay and grass on the same, and pasturing her cow thereon, was such
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a
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occupation as would support an action of trespass on the part of the
owner of the estate, in tne absence of any Hcense or permission given
by the person who owned the premises at the time of said occupation.
The ju dge refused to give_ the instnictions in the form requested^
but after generalmstructions as to adverse possession _ins^truc_ted_the
jury, in substance, that if Hanlon's occupancy was not by gift,-^ but
by permission only, he did not acquire any right against the owner of
the land; that the right of Hodges to continue that permission
ceased, as matter of law, with the deed given by him on October
19, 1866; that if Hanlon, wife or children, continued to occupy on
the belief that the permission continued, no right could be acquired,
but tha t
die occupancy was on the belief that the land was theirs,
and continued twentj^jears uninterruptedly, being adverse and open,
the first
He further instructed them that,
title_would_be-ac<iuired.
the
children
their
father
and
continued
the
was
adverse
occupation by
occupation, they could add the time of their occupation,
they claimthe mother's belief
not, then,
ed title, to that of their father, but,
was that Hodges had given the land to her husband, her uninterrupted
adverse and open, would give
occupation for twenty years,
good
title; and that
the occupation by Mrs. Hanlon or the heirs was exclusive, except as to tlie right reserved to the Leicester Reservoir Comwas sufficient, because that right was reserved by the deed and
pany,
exercised thereunder.
The demandant excepted to the refusal to give the instructions prayed for, and to the actual instructions given so far as they differed from
the instructions prayed for.
The jiary returned a verdict for the tenant and the demandant al-

n

a

is

y^

a

a

a

a
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a
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a

a
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leged ^x_cep±tQns.
Holmes, C.
This
writ of entry. The demandant claims title
under
deed from the widow and heirs of one John Hanlon, setting
There
title in them by the running of the statute of limitations.
up
was evidence that the holding of John Hanlon and his widow and heirs
claim of right adverse to all the world.
There was
had been under
license from one
also evidence that their occupancy had been under
in
Hodges, who owned the land after October, 1865, and conveyed
October, 1866. The question raised by the demandant's bill of excepwhether the fact that the license was ended in 1866 by the
tions
conveyance of Hodges necessarily made the occupation by the Hanlons
adverse,
they supposed the license still to be in operation and purbut were in such relations to the land that
ported to occupy under
they would have been liable to an action of trespass, or, better to test
the matter, to writ of entry at the election of the true owner.
ain. "If
man enter into possession, under
supThe answer
lease, which turns out to
lawful Hmited right, as under
position of
parol
donee under
48, 90 Atl. 535 (1914).
a

As to the possession of
Jolins v. Johns, 24i Pa.

a

21

see

gift being adverse or not,

v^^,

ORIGINAL

^4

*

*

if

(Part

1

it is only at the election
the party claim only a limited estate^
and not_a fee, the law will not, contrary to his intentions, enlarg e it to
iifie^' Ricard V. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59, 107, 108, 5 L. Ed. 398 ; Blunden V. Baugh, Cro. Car. 302, 303 ; Stearns, Real Actions, (2d Ed.)
be void,

of the disseisee.

^

*
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he be a disseisor at all,

*

If

*

6, 17.

It is true, of course, that

a man's

belief may

be immaterial

as such.

Probably, although the courts have not been unanimous upon the
point, he will not be the less a disseisor or be prevented from acquiring
a title by lapse of time because his occupation of a strip of land is unHis claim is not limited
der the belief that it is embraced in his deed.
_by^Jiis belief . Or, to put it in another way, the direction of the claim
to an object identified by the senses as the thing claimed overrides the
inconsistent attempt to direct it also in conformity to tlie deed, just as
a similar identification when a pistol shot is fired or a conveyance is
made overrides the inconsistent belief that the person aimed at or the
grantee is some one else. Hathaway v. Evans, 108 Mass. 267; Beckman V. Davidson, 162 Mass. 347, 350, 39 N. E. 38. See Sedgwick &
Wait, Trial of Title to Land (2d Ed.) § 757. So, knowledge that a
man's title is bad will not prevent his getting a good one in twenty
years. Warren v. Bowdran, 156 Mass. 280, 282, 31 N. E. 300.
In the cases supposed the mistaken belief does not interfere with the
But when the belief carries with it a corresponding
claim of a fee.
liniitation of claim tlie statute cannot run, because there is no disseisin
exc ept the fictitious one which the owner may be entitled to force upon_
Hoban v. Cable, 102 Mich.
the occupant for the sake of a remedy.
a
writ
of entry and disseisin are
466.
to
N.
W.
60
213,
206,
Liability
not convertible terms in any other sense. It is elementary law that adverse possession which will ripen into a title must be under a claim of
right. (Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328, 349, 17'L. Ed. 871,) or,^s it has"
been thought more accurate to say, "with an intention to appropriate
and hold the same as owner, and to the exclusion, rightfully or wrongfully, of every one else." Sedgwick & Wait, Trial of Title to Land
(2d Ed.) § 576. "As Co. Lit. 153b, defines, 'a disseisin is when one
enters, intending to usurp the possession, and to oust another of his
freehold;' and tlierefore quserendum est a judice, quo animo hoc
fecerit, why he entered and intruded." Blunden v. Baugh, Cro. Car.
302, 303.

The other matters apparent on the bill of exceptions were sufficient^
ly dealt with by the judge. Exceptions overruled.^
22 An administrator takes possession of land which
belonged to the deceased under the supposed authority of his office as administrator, though
in fact he had no such right to possession. Is his possession adverse to the
Suppose the administrator purports
heirs, who were entitled to possession?
to convey the land to his wife, but continues to reside upon the premises. Is
the possession adverse?
See Ashford v. Ashford, 136 Ala. 631, 34 South. 10,
^96 Am. St. Kep. 82 (1902).
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BALLANCE.

(Supreme Court of Illinois, 1848.

5

Gilman

41.)

Fo rcible detai ner, brought by the appellee against the appellants, and
originally heard before a justice of the peace of Peoria county, when
a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintilf. The defendants appealed to the Circuit Court, and the cause was tried at the October
term, 1848, before the Hon. John D. Caton and a jury, when a verd ict
was again rend e red in favor . ofj he original plaintili".
Trumbull, J. This was an action of forcible detainer, brought by
Ballance against Fortier & Blumb. Verdict and judgment of restitution
in favor of Ballance.
The evidence shows tliat Ballance leased the premises for the term
of six years from January 1, 1842, at the rate of ten dollars to be paid
every four months ; that he reserved by the lease the right to re-enter
and take possession of the premises in case of failure to pay rent as it
became due ; that the lessees occupied the premises for some time, and
afterwards assigned to Blumb, one of the defendants below, who entered into possession and paid rent for a time to Ballance ; that about
the month of February, 1846, Blumb made arrangements for the occupation of the premises with his co-defendant Fortier, to whom he
gave possession, and whose tenant he became, disclaiming to have anything more to do with Ballance, and alleging that Fortier was the owner of the land. Ballance, after having given notice and made demand
in writing for the possession of the premises, on the second day of
March, 1846, and before the expiration of the six years for which the
premises had been let, commenced this action.
The defendants below set up title to the premises in Fortier.
Two principal causes have been assigned for the reversal of the
First, that the action was prematurely brought, the time
judgment.
for which the premises were let not having expired. It is clear that
Ballance could not maintain this action till he was entitled to the possession of the premises, and it may be true, as insisted by the appellants, that he was not entitled to the possession under the clause in the
lease authorizing him to re-enter in case of failure to pay rent, for the
reason that there is no evidence to show either that a demand had
been made for the rent due, or any of those acts done which are necessary in the first instance to create a forfeiture for the nonpayment of
rent; but be this as it may, the evidence shows that Blumb was the
tenant of Ballance, that Fortier got into possession by arrangement
with Blumb, who thereupon disclaimed holding under Ballance, and
attorned to Fortier, as the owner of the premises. Thejnoment_that_
Blumb disavowed the title^of Ballance and claimed to set up a hostile
titJeJn^P ^rtier, the lease became forfeited, a nd Ballance's.right of entr-"
Aig.Pbop. — 5
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complete. Adams on Ej. 199. "A tenant cannot make his disclaimer
ancTadverse ciami so as to protect hmiseit dunng tne unexpired term
of the lease; he is a trespasser on hmi who has the legal title. The
relation of landlord and tenant is dissolved^ and each party is to stand,
the tenant disclaims the tenure, claims the fee aduponTiisTight.
a
third person or his own, or attorns to another, his
in
of
right
versely
possession then becomes a tortious one, by the forfeiture of his right."

If

VVillison v. Watkins,

3

Pet. 43, 7

Notwithstanding Blumb had

L. Ed.

596.

for

a term not then expired, the
to hold under the lease, and set up title to the
premises, his possession became adverse to his landlord, and it would
be s trange jf.whjlejii s title w as maturing by adverse possession, he
could claim the protection of the lease to prevent his being turned out.
"A tenant disclaiming his landlord's title, is not entitled to notic£_lQ.
Bates
quit ; but is liable instantly to a warrant of forcible detainer."
Blumb, in
'v. Austin, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 270, 12 Am. Dec. 395.
terminated
act
his
own
Ballance
to
that
of
by
title
adverse
a
up
setting
the lease, and put an end to the time for which the premises had been
let, just as effectually as if the full term of six years had expired.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed with costs. Judgment
a lease

monient he disclaimed

^

ex dem. PARKER v. GREGORY.
King's Bench, 1834. 2 Adol. & E. 14.)
of
(Court
On the trial before AlderEjectment for lands in Gloucestershire.
son, B., at the last Gloucester Summer Assizes, the following facts
Thomas Rogers, being seised in fee of the lands in
were proved.
question, devised them to his son Thomas Rogers for life, remainder
to William Rogers in tail male, remainder to the devisor's right heirs
in fee. The will gave a power to the tenant for life to settle a certain
portion of the lands upon his wife for life, by way of jointure. After
the death of the devisor, the son Thomas Rogers, being then tenant
for life, settled the lands in question, being not more than the portion
He died in 1798, leaving his wif.e
defined, upon his wife for life.
surviving, who afterwards married a person of the name of Vale.
In 1810, Mr. and Mrs. Vale levied a fine of the lands to their own
use in fee. In 1812, Mrs. Vale died, more than twenty years before

DOE

23 In England,
except in cases of periodic tenancies and of course tenancies at will, the disclaimer, in order to effect a forfeiture, must be by
record. Doe d. Graves v. Wells, 10 A. & E. 427 (1889). A tortious alienation by
the tenant was also effective under the older law to bring about a forfeiLitt. § 415. As to the situation to-day, where the tenant makes a
ture.
•conveyance in fee, see Gee v. Hatley, 114 Ark. .376, 170 S. W. 72 (1914). In
this country a few early cases announced the same doctrine as Doe d. Graves
V. Wells, supra.
De Lancey v. Ganong, 9 N. Y. 9 (18.53) ; Rosseel v. Jarvis, 15

Wis.

571 (1862).
See Newman v. Rutter, 8
120, 9 South. 598 (1890).

Watts (Pa.)

51 (1839);

Dahm v. Barlow, 93 Ala.
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of this action. Mr. and Mrs. Vale had continued
in possession of the lands until Mrs. Vale's death, and Mr. Vale from
thenceforward continued in possession till his own death, which occurred in 1832.
William Rogers died, leaving several children, all
of whom died before Mrs. Vale ; and of whom none left issue, except
one daughter, who died one month before Mrs. Vale, leaving issue a
son, who died without issue in 1814, within twenty years of the bringing of this action. The lessor of the plaintiff was heir at law to the
devisor, Thomas Rogers.
It did not appear how the defendant got
into possession. On these facts, the learned judge nonsuited the plaintiff, on the ground that the right of entry was barred by the Statute
of Limitations, but he reserved leave to move to set the nonsuit aside,
and enter a verdict for the plaintiff.
Per Curiam. The fine will make no difference ; but, as to the
question of the husband's adverse possession, we will take time to con-

the commencement

On
of

a subsequent day

Lord Denman, C.

J.,

sider.
delivered the judgment

the court.

S.

is

It

s

h
i

p

it

a

;

it

a

3

&

is

;

2

(2

a

a

The other points moved by my Brother Talfourd were disposed of
by the court, but we wished to consider whether he was entitled to
rule on the ground that there had been no adverse possession for
twenty years. The fact was, that the defendant had been in possession
for
longer period, from his wife's death, but he came in originally
in her right, and had not directly ousted tlie rightful owner, but merely
A case of Reading v. Rawcontinued where he was, to his exclusion.
sterne, reported by Lord Raymond and Salkeld,
Ld. Raym. 830;
s. c.
Salk. 423,) was mentioned
but in that case, though an actual
declared necessary, those words must be taken with referdisseisin
ence to the subject-matter,
from
and are there contra-distmguished
the mere perception of rents and profits, in the case of jomt-tenants.
271, the court was of
M.
But in Doe dem. Burrell v. Perkins,
opinion that a fine levied by
person who was in possession under the
same circumstances as the defendant here, operated nothing, because
was arhe came in by title, and had no freehold by disseisin
and
gued, that the defendant here was also to be considered as having entered rightfully, and committed no disseisin.
We are, however, of
opinion, that though this may be so for the purpose of avoiding
cannot prevent the defendant's
fine,
ossessjon_from being_ wron^;:_
wif e's death.
ful, from the very hour when his interest expired by
clear that he might have been immed iately turned out by._ilect^
ment.
We think, therefore, fliat his continuing the same possession for
twenty years entitles him to the protection of the Statute of LimitaRule refused.-*
tions, and that this ac tion has been brought too late.

t

2^*Henry Souter, the owner of premises, devised them to his wife for life.
The testator died in 1790, leaving John Sovflier. who cr ainied to be the eldes
son and heir at law, and his said wife, him survivingr In ITUi. the widow
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(Court of Appeals of Maryland,

1884.

(Part
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JOHNSON.
62 Md. 25, 50 Am, Rep. 199.)

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Kent County.
This was an action of ejectment, instituted on the 11th of April,
1882, by the appellants against the appellee. The case was tried upon
an agreed statement of facts, which are sufficiently set forth in the
By consent a pro forma judgment was entered
opinion' of the Court.
in tlie Court below in favor of the defendant, with the right of appeal
by the plaintiffs.

Robinson, J. This i s an ^ action ^f _ejectme nt^ brought by;Jhe appellants, as, heir g-at- l aw of Cat herine H^ Wroth, to recover an undivided half interest in a tract of land, of which she died seized.
The facts are these : Mrs. Wroth died in December, 1854, leaving
a paper purporting to be a will, by which she devised the farm in controversy to her husband. Peregrine Wroth, for life, with remainder in
fee to her nephew, George A. Hanson.
The will was not executed in due form to pass real estate, as required by the Act of 1842, chapter 293, then in force, because the consent of her husband, in writing, was not annexed thereto, and also
It was adbecause it was not executed sixty days before her death.
mitted, however, to probate by the Orphans' Court of Kent County,
,and under it her husband, on the 1st of January, 1855, entered into
possession of the property, claiming title as tenant for life, and so continued in possession until the 5th of February, 1868, when he united
with the remainderman, George A. Hanson, in a sale and conveyance
of the same to the appellee, and who thereupon entered upon said property, and has continued in possession up to the institution of this suit.
Mrs. Wroth never had any children, and the ^pellantSj._as_heirsaMgvv, are entitled to recover, unless their right is barred by the adverse possession of the appellee and of those under whom he claims.
A great deal has been said, as to what constitutes adverse possession, and it would be a wearisome task to examine at length the many
cases in which this question has been considered.
Prior to the StatIV,
ute of 3 and 4 Will.
chapter 27, it was an ever-recurring and troublesome question in England, but by th at S tatute, passed in 1833, the
doctrin e of adver se possession was .virtually^aBoIished, and by it pospf {-i^^ nrpmisps to Hnl l^ wliri j^nnk
and John Souter iniripfl iri q p/^r^-■~<:^,rqJ^r,p
Hu-ipin
nnsspmsion nnfL-pmriinprl
till 1.S14^ ^vlleD he Tlio'd, leavin g
nnr1i^f]]rl)P(1
whprehv he "devised the nieiuises to defeudaut s.
a _y(^^\.
Jn tact wniclier
Souter was the eldest sou and heir at law of Henry Souter, whom he surI n ISIO. AV^hicher made his will, wherebv he devised all his realt y
vived.
in 18 16
AVhicher
tSouter diecL sliortiv after makiug lus w_iil .
to trustees
t Ee piamtin: as lessee of the said trustees commenced an acfiou of ei jectmen t against the cietendants to recover possessio n,
jt was held thafil ie
t'il?lllMlll
snould recover , the indues vprpri-ing to Hull as a tenant at sufferance of VVhicher Souter. Doe d. Souter v. Hull, 2 Dowl. & R. 3S (1822).
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session of any kind for twenty years was made a bar, unless there was
eitlier a payment of rent or an acknowledgment of some kind by the
party in possession. The effect of the Statute, says Lord Denman, in
CuUey V. Doe dem. Taylerson, 3 Per. & Dav. 539, is to put an end
to all questions and discussions whether the possession of lands be adverse or not ; and if one party has been in possession for twenty years,
whether adversely or not, the claimant whose original right of entry
occurred above twenty years before bringing the ejectment is barred.
Nepean v. Doe dem. Knight, 2 M. & W. 911; Doe dem. Pritchard
V. Jauncey, 8 C. & P. 99.
This Statute is not, however, in force in this State, and the question
of possession in this case, is one to be determined by Stat. 21 Jas. I,
chap. 16, which provides that no one shall make an entry into any land
but' within twenty years after his right shall accrue.
Now when the question arose whether one was barred by twenty
years possession, it was determined by considering whether he had
been out of possession under such circumstances as had reduced his
interest to a right of entry; for if he had, then as tliat right of entry would be barred by the Statute at the end of twenty years, the posAnd in
session during the intermediate time was adverse to him.
order to determine whether he had been out of possession under such
circumstances as reduced his estate to a right of entry, it was necessary to inquire in what manner the person who had been in possession
during the time held. If he held in a character inconsistent with and
hostile to the title of the claimant to the freehold, the possession was
adverse. 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 531 ; Nepean v. Doe dem. Knight,
2 M. & W. 910; Taylor ex dem. Atkyns v. Harde, 1 Burr. 60.
"Twenty years adverse possession," says Lord Mansfield, in Taylor
V. Horde, "is a positive title to the defendant ; it is not a bar to the
action or remedy of the plaintiff only, but takes away his right of possession."
The question then of adversary possession in this case, resolves itself into this, was the possession of Doctor Wroth, under whom the
appellee claims, inconsistent with and hostile to the title of the appellants as heirs-at-law ? And in regard to this question there ought not,
it seems to us, to be any doubt. During the life-time of his wife he
received, it is admitted, the rents and profits of the farm in controversy. To these he was entitled by virtue of his marital rights. Upon
her death, this right ceased.
He was not tenant by th e curtesy, becaus ejii.s^yi,f.e never jiad any children.
He was not a tenant by sufferance, because an estate at sufferance Is where one comes into possession by lawful title, but keeps it afterwards without any title at all.
Or, as Lord Coke says, "one who originally comes in by right, but
continues by wrong." It is a tenancy founded originally on contract
and agreement, as a lessee for years, who continues in possession after
the expiration of his term, and without a renewal of the lease, or a
tenant at will, who holds over after the death or alienation of the
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lessor, or a tenant per autre vie, who remains in possession after the
death of the cestui que vie. Coke on Little. 57b.
After the death of his wife. Doctor Wroth took possession, claiming a life estate under her will. His claim of title was inconsistent
The
with and hostile to the title of the appellants as heirs-at-law.
property was a farm, under enclosure and under cultivation; his possession was actual, visible, and, according to all the authorities, ad-

a

9

it,

verse to the title of the lawful owner.
But then it is argued, to constitute adverse possession, one must
claim the entire estate, or claim to the exclusion of all other rights.
In one sense this is true. Possession will not be adverse if it be held
under or subservient to a higher title, nor if it be consistent with the
interest or estate of the claimant, for instance, where the possession
of one is the possession of the other, or where the estate of one in
possession and that of the claimant form different parts of one and
the same estate.
The mere entry and possession of one tenant in common, or joint tenant, or coparcener, will not be adverse to the co-tenant, because the possession of one, is the possession of the other. To
constitute adverse possession in such cases, there must be an ouster,
Nor
an entry and possession, hostile to the title of the co-tenant.
will the possession of a tenant for years, or tenant for life, be adverse
to the reversioner or heir in remainder.
The decisions in Smith v. Burtis,'9 Johns. (N. Y.) 180; Howard v.
Howard, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 667; Doe dem. Human v. Pettett, 5 Barn. &
Aid. 223; Dean et al. v. Brown, 23 Md. 16, 87 Am. Dec. 555 ; Bedell
V. Shaw et al., 59 N. Y. 46, were decided upon these well settled principles.
In this case, however. Doctor Wroth entered into possession, claiming a life estate under the will, the remainder being devised to another
person. The estate claimed by him was a freehold, and as there could
only be one possession or seizin of the same estate at the same time,
His poshis possession enured to the benefit of the remainder-man.
session was in law the possession of the remainder-man, and as such
it represented the entire estate, his own estate for life, and the estate
of George A. Hanson in remainder.
And his claim of title and possession being hostile to the title of the appellants as heirs-at-law, his
The will was
possession was as against them, adverse and exclusive.
invalid,
but Doctor Wroth having enteredinto possession^
it_is__true_
clain iingtit:le_ under
he would be estopped from denying the title_
of the remainder-man claiming under the same instrument.
This was
In
that
case,
B.
48.
decidfed in Board v. Board, Law Rep.
Q.
tenant by the curtesy undertook to devise the curtesy estate to his
daughter for life, with remainder to his grandson. Upon the death of
the testator, the daughter entered into possession, and having been in
possession for twenty years sold and conveyed the property in fee to
the defendant.
In the meantime the grandson sold his reversionary
right to the plaintiff, and upon the death of the daughter, he brought
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of ejectment, and it was held, that the daughter having_ eri:_
tered u nder the will, the defenda_nt claiminig under her,, was estopped
as against all those in remainder,_ f rom disputing the validity of tlie
\vill, and that the plain tiff wa s entitled to re cover.
Mellor, J., said, "The only person who could dispute the possession
of Rebecca, under the will, was the heir-at-law. He never disputed
the possession, and his title to the estate is barred by the operation
of the Statute of Limitations. A person cannot say, that a will is _
but invalid so far as
valid to enable him to take a benefit u nder
claim under, th^ ame
regards th interests pf those in remainder^wh
s

e

o

it^

an action

3

is

the claim

I,

&
4

case was decided,

Will. IV, but

it

true, after the passage of the Stat, of
of title and possession by the daughter,
being hostile and inconsistent with the title of the heir-at-law, her possession was adverse under the Stat. 21 Jas.
as against the lawful
title. And being adverse, the heir-at-law must bring his action within twenty years, or his title will be barred by the Statute of Limitations.

This

a

J.,

it,

is

it

it

is

a

is

if it

,

^

it

e

is

It

better, says the law, that the negligent owner who has omitted to
assert his right within the time prescribed by the Statute, should lose
his rights than one should be disturbed in his possession, and harassed
by stale demands after the proof on which his title rests may have
been lost or destroyed.
But whatever may be the reasons or th policy of the law, twenty years adverse posS£SsiQli_is_a bar to the title,
without regard to the „Qlii;inal right of the parties.
The possession being adverse and exclusive in tliis case, the only re^
has been continuous for twenty years?
maining question_is, whether
And this depends upon whether the possession of Doctor Wroth can
be united, or in other words tacked to the possession of the appellee.
of land between
,Now the possession .Qi§e]^rttL.disJtincJ;_occupa^
whom no privity exists cannot
tr ue^ be united to make up the
statutory period, for the reason,
one quits or abandons the possession, the owner will be deemed to be in the constructive possession of
The separate successive disseisins
the property by reason of his title.
in such cases do not aid each other, and their several possessions cannot therefore be tacked, so as to make
continuity of possession.
But we take
to be well settled that where there
privity of
estate between the successive parties in possession, then the possession of such parties may be united so as to make the twenty years required by the Statute. And
equally well settled that such privity
as
may be created by a sale and conveyance and possession under
well as by descent. As was said by Tilghman, C.
in Overfield v.

e

ILZgerald, [iSUVJ

1

I'

V?

O

2

2
5

In England the rule of Board v. Board is not considered as applicable
Ch. 70.
in facts such as appeared here. In re Anderson, [1905]
n th inte resting question as between the life tenant and the remaind ermanT^r lliusu claiming 'under them, the rights of the true owner aamu t^tlij
being oarred oy rne aa verse possession of tiie lite tenant, see, lurtner. Eialton
(Jh. 440.

'
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7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 177, "One who enters upon the land of
another and continues to reside on
acquires something which he
the possession of
may transfer by deed as well as by descent, and
such person, and others claiming under him, added together, amounts
to the time limited by the Act of Limitations, and was adverse to him
bar to a recovery."
who had the legal title, the Act
Angell on
Limitations, 414, 420; Wood on Limitations,
271; Tyler on Ejectment, 910.
In this case there was an adverse and exclusive possession of ihs
farm in question by Doctor Wroth for thirteen years. He then united
with George A. Hanson, the remainder-man, in a sale and conveyance to the appellee, who immediately entered and has continued in
possession up to the present time the possession of the appellee, thus
added or tacked to the possession of Doctor Wroth, makes
continuous adverse possession of twenty-seven years.
The possession under such circumst'ahces"!^ By the Statute of Limitations
flat bar to
the right of the appellants as heirs-at-law.
The judgment below must therefore be ffirmed
Judgment af-

DEAN

>

/-

firmed.^*

GODDARD

V.

(Supreme Court of Minnesota,

1893.
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Appeal by defendant, Fred E. Goddard, from an order of the District Court of Hennepin County, Thomas Canty, J., made December
1892, denying his motion for a new trial.
Dean, brought this action September
The plainli
Alfred
1891,
under G. S. 1878, ch. 75,
determine the adverse
aims of Godall other persons or parties unknown claimmg any rig ht,
dard, an
itle, estate lien or interest in the real estate described n th opmio n.
oddard alone answered.
He claimed to have the title in^fee derived
from the United States. Plaintiff replied that neither Goddard his
ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed of the lot
witliin fifteen years next before the commencement of the action.
That Alfred H. Lindley owned the lot in 1866 and he and wife on
to William D. Washburn, that on or
August 28, 1866, conveyed
1866, Washburn entered into actual possession of the
about June
lot under such deed and he and his grantees have ever since and for
more than fifteen years prior to the commencement of this action,

;

2
6

X.
Premises are owned by A., tenant for life, remainder in fee to B.
enters into adverse possession, and continues therein for more than the statutory period. What effect, if any, does such possession have upon the rights
Baldof A.? Of B.? See Moore v. Luce, 29 Pa. 2G0, 72 Am. Dec. 629 (1857)
ridge V. McFarland, 26 Pa. 338 (1855), where the remainder may have been
contingent.
Suppose, in the above case, A. should make a deed purporting to convey
the premises to X. in fee, who takes possession, and continues therein for the
statutory period.
See Cassem v. Prindle, 258 111. 11, 101 N. E. 241 (1913);
Hooper v. Leavitt, 109 Me. 70, 82 Atl. 547 (1912).
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been in actual, exclusive, open, hostile and adverse possession thereof,
under claim and color of title and that plaintiff is the remote grantee

of Washburn.

A jury

was waived and the issues were tried before the Court on
August 2, 1892. Plaintiff submitted evidence of the possession of the
lot by himself and his grantors and read in evidence the several instruments under which such possession had been held and rested. The
defendant Goddard then proved his paper title from the Federal Government down and rested. Th e Court fouji d plaintiff to be sole own er
in fee and in_possession of th e lot and jhat he and his_grantors and
predece ssors in interest had been in open, continuous, exclu sive and
adverse poss ession thereof, with color of title and paying taxes tHereon, for a period of twenty years and ordered judgment for plainti ff
as pr ayed in his compLaint.
The defendant moved the Court to amend its findings so as to show
that Washburn's adverse possession commenced on or about August
28, 1866, the date of his deed from Lindley and wife and not prior
thereto. This motion was denied. Defendant then moved for a new
trial, but was denied and he appeals, claiming the evidence does not
show actual, continuous hostile occupation of the lot by plaintiff and
his grantors for an uninterrupted period of fifteen years at any time
since Washburn obtained his deed from Lindley. The discussion here
was upon this evidence, whether it sustained the finding of adverse possession.
Buck, J. The jC|^uesti_on_raised in this case is whether the plaintiff
has acquired title by adverse possession to the premises described
in the complaint, viz. the front half of lots one (1) and two (2) in
block sixty-seven (67) in the city of Minneapolis.
The action was commenced in August, 1891. In his complaint the
plaintiff alleges that he is in possession, and is the owner in fee simple, of the premises above described, and that the defendants claim
some estate or interest in the premises adverse to the plaintiff, and
prays that the claims of the respective parties be adjudged and determined, and that title to said premises be decreed to be in the plaintiff'.
The defendant Goddard answered, and alleged the title in fee
to be in himself.
The plaintiff replied, and such reply will be referred to hereafter.
Plaintiff's contention is that he acquired titlQ by
possession held adversely for such a length of time as to create a. title
in himself.
Under G. S. 1878, ch. 66, § 4, the time limited for commencing actions for the recovery of real property was fixed at twenty years ; but
on April 24, 1889, the law was changed to fifteen years, not to take
effect, however, until January 1, 1891.
The law, as amended, would
be applicable to actions commenced after January 1, 1891, and prior to
the time of the- commencement of this action, in September, 1891 ; but
this would not render the law existing prior to the amendment inapplicable to causes of action, when there was twenty years' adverse
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possession before the time when the change took effect. The period,
however, rehed upon, need not be the twenty years immediately preceding the 1st day of January, 1891, It would be sufiicient if the possession relied upon was continuous for twenty years up to any certain
or definite time. Of course, the twenty years would have to be complete before the bringing of the action; but such twenty years need
not, necessarily, be those next before the time when the action is commenced. In this case, if the inception of the plaintiff's adverse possession was in the months of June or August, 1866, and became perfect by continued adverse possession until the month of June or August,
1886, then the title thereby created would not be lost or forfeited by
any subsequent interruption of the possession, unless by some other
adverse possession for such a length of time as would create title in
the possessor.
The court below found the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint
to be true, and that he was, at the time of the commencement of this
action, the sole owner, in fee, and in the lawful possession, of the
premises described in the complaint, and that he and his grantors and
predecessors in interest had been in the open, continuous, exclusive,
and adverse possession of the premises, with color of title, and paying
taxes thereon, for a period of twenty years, and that he was entitled
to the decree and judgment of the court declaring him to be the absolute owner of the premises.
We think a title acquired by adverse
possession is a title in fee simple, and is as perfect as a title by deed.
The legal eft'ect not only bars the remedy of the owner of the paper
title, but divests his estate, and vests it in the party holding adversely
for the required period of time, and is conclusive evidence of such
title. To say that the statutes upon this subject only bar the remedy,
as some authorities do, is only to leave the fee in the owner of the paper title ; thus leaving the owner with a title, but without a remedy.
We think the better and more logical rule is to hold that the occupier of the premises by adverse possession acquires title by that possession, predicated upon the presumption or proven fact that the prior
owner has abandoned the premises. Adverse possession ripens into a
This title the adverse possessor can transfer by conperfect title.
veyance, and when he does so he is conveying his own title, and not
a piece of land where the title is in some other person, who is simply
See Campbell v. Holt,
barred of any remedy from recovering it.
115 U. S. 620, 6 Sup. Ct. 209, 29 L. Ed. 483; Baker v. Oakwood, 123
N. Y. 16, 25 N. E. 312, 10 L. R. A. 387, and cases there cited. Now,
if there is any cloud resting upon such title, he has a legal right to
apply to the court, and have his rights adjudicated, and the title perConfected by judgment record, if the evidence sustains his claim.
siderations of public policy demand that this should be so, for the claim
of title to lands can thus be found of record, instead of resting in
parol, with all of its incidental dangers and trouble in establishing
title.
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Now let us consider the question raised by the defendant, as to
whether one of the plaintiff's predecessors, Washburn, entered into the
adverse possession of the premises June 1, 1866, or August 28, 1866.
The plaintiff claims such entry was on the 1st day of June, and the
defendant insists that the true date, if there was any such adverse
entry at all, is shown by plaintiff himself, in his reply, to be August
The importance of these dates arises from the fact tliat
28, 1866.
evidence
tending to show an adverse possession of the premthere is
ises by the predecessors of plaintiff' until the middle of July, 1886;
and if the period of twenty years commenced June 1, 1866, of course,
the expiration of that period would be June 1, 1886, and if the period
commenced August 28, 1866, the twenty year period would expire
August 2^, 1886. Thus, the true date becomes material. The plainviz. :
tiff", in his amended reply, inserted the following allegation,
"That on or about the 1st day of June, 1866, and more than fifteen
years prior to the commencement of this action, said William D.
Washburn, under the deed hereinbefore recited, executed to him by said
Lindley, and claiming thereby to be the owner of said premises, entered into possession and actual occupation of the same." The deed
referred to bears date August 28, 1866. It may be that there is sufficient undisputed evidence to show an adverse possession during this
particular time, but we think that, under the circumstances, the parties are entitled to the opinion of this court upon this phase of the
case.
The fa ult of the^defendant's position is this : That he allowed
the plaintiff to introduce and prove beyond dispute, by parol evidence,
without objection, that Washburn entered upo n these premises June
1, 1866 .

The rule, therefore,

that the written allegations of the pleadings
should control, does not apply. The defendant did not move to have
the pleadings made certain and definite, nor to compel the plaintiff' to
elect upon which of the dates he would rely as the time of W^ashburn's entry upon the premises, but remained silent, and allowed the
date of June 1, 1866, to be undisputably proven by the plaintiff. The
allegations in the reply were repugnant as to the dates of Washburn's
entry, but the defendant, by his conduct, waived his right to insist
now that the date of such entry should be determined as of August
He is esj opped by the admitted parol evidence from in28, 1866.
that
the written pleadings should be construed in his favor,
sisting
and against the plaintiff.
There is no dispute, however, that Washburn did procure a deed of
the premises from Lindley dated August 28, 1866; and the defendant therefore contends that Washburn's entry, if adverse at all,
should only be considered as having commenced on the date of the
deed.
To support this contention, he invokes the doctrine that one
who enters upon land under a mere agreement to purchase does not
hold adversely, as against his vendor, until his agreement has been
fully performed, so that he has become entitled to a conveyance. This
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doctrine is not applicable to this case. Washburn's entry and holding
was not under this defendant, nor any of his predecessors holding
As we have already stated, it appears that he was in
paper title.
possession on the 1st day of June, 1866; and whether by permission
of Lindley, or by his own voluntary entry, is immaterial, as to his
rights against parties other than Lindley, and Lindley is not complainNor is defendant
ing, or questioning his rights, or time of entry.
If
with parol
possession,
title
under
permissive
Lindley.
claiming
adverse
would
not
constitute
possession
executory conditions attached,
as between the parties, yet it might constitute adverse possession as
against third persons or strangers. 'Washburn's entry was adverse
If,
as against those under whom defendant claim's by paper title.
therefore, Washburn's entry, of June 1, 1866, was his own adverse
act, and he so continued in possession of the premises until long after
August 28, 1866, tliere is no need of considering the doctrine of tack-

of possession. Obtaining a deed
from Lindley would not destroy Washburn's previous
He ha d a right to
adverse possession, nor break its continuity.
ing, or the necessity of the continuity

to the premises

strengthen_his_ adverse claim to the premises, if possible, by as niany
written conveyances from other parties claiming any interest therein
as he saw fit, and thus give him color of title, and perhaps define the
boundaries of the premises claimed by him.
The essential ingredients necessary to create title by adverse possession are now so well defined and understood that we shall not enter
into any argument or discussion to show what they are. We merely
state them in this connection that we may the more conveniently apad verse, possesply them to the undisputed facts in this case. "To
sion mustbe actual, open, continuous, hostile, exclusive, and accomSherin v. Brackett, 36
panFed by an intention to claim adversely."

je

-^

llinn.

152, 30 N. W. 551.
This leads us to the question raised by defendant, that the court
below did not find, specifically, that plaintiff's possession, or the posBut it did find that such
session of his predecessors, was hostile.
possession was open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse during the
The greater includes the le^s. If it \yas adverse, it
requisite period.
was h ostile. In Sedg."& W7 Tr." Title Land, § 749, it is said that "it is
"

Such hostautology to say that adverse possession must be 'hostile.'
the
premtility may be manifested by acts of possession and use of
ises, plainly visible, actual, open,, and continuous, such as appeared in
this case, by using the premises for many years as a lumber yard,
building a barn and shed thereon in 1866 or 1867, and keeping the
same on the premises until they burned down, in March, 1884, and
keeping a large number of horses on the premises and in the stables
for many years. Also, storing machinery, lamp posts, castings, and
other personal property, putting a large sign on the lot, with notice
thereon that it was for rent, for a long term of years, were acts of
hostility, as tending to show very strongly that someone was assuni-
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ing dominion over the premises, and had intended to, or was usurping
the possession.

If,

Court in Stephens v. Leach,
adverse possessor "must keep his flag flying," yet it
as was said by the

19 Pa. 263, the
is no less essen-

tial that the actual owner should reasonably keep his own banner
The law, which he is presumed to know, is a continual warnunfurled.
ing to him that if he shall allow his lands to remain unoccupied, unand uncultivated, he may by adverse possession
used, unimproved,
for a long period of time, fixed by law, be disseised thereof, and be
deemed to have acquiesced in the possession of his adversary.
In
this case, the actual owners by paper title have never occupied tlie
premisessince the first owner obtained his title from the. government,
in 1855 or 1856. Considerations of public policy, demand that our
lands should not remain for long periods of time unused, unimproved,
Taxes should be promptly paid. It nowhere apand unproductive.
pears that the owners by paper title have ever paid any taxes, but
they have allowed the adverse occupants, during a period of many
years, to pay n early ^5,000 taxes upon the premises. Payment of taxes
sho wg claim of title. Paine v. Hutchins, 49 Vt. 314. We can readily
understand how these statutes are called "statutes of repose."
The
burdens of government must be met; its educational interests provided for; its judicial, legislative, and executive functions maintained ; and to do this our real property must be made productive, to
the end, among other things, that taxes may be raised and paid from
land not subject to continual litigation, but the titles thereto quieted.
If the selfish, the indolent, and the negligent will not do this, there is
no more merit in their claim than that of the adverse possessor, who
does so, whatever may be said of the harshness of the statute of limitation. The settlement and improvement of the country, with its consegiient prosperity, should be superior and paramount to the speculative rights of the land grabber, or selfish greed of those who seek_
large gains through the toil, labor, and improvements of others.
The hostile possession of the adverse claimants in this case fully
appears. The possession has been open, visible, hostile, and notorious,
as appears from the evidence.
It has been exclusive, for no one else
has made any claim to it. Those who have been on the premises, other than plaintiff or his predecessors, have made no claim of right, but
have paid rent to the adverse claimant, or were there simply as tresThe
passers, which would not break the continuity of possession.
intent to claim may be inferred from the nature of the occupancy.
Oral declarations are not necessary.
Possessory acts, to constitute
adverse possession, must necessarily depend upon the character of
the property, its location, and the purposes for which it is ordinarily
fitted or adapted. If a person should take possession of farm land,
build a barn and shed thereon, and allow them to remain there for
years, plow and cultivate the land and harvest the crops, pay taxes
on the premises, and actually occupy them, for such a period of time,
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done by the actual owner of such farm land, with such
open, notorious, visible, hostile, and exclusive acts as would destroy
the actual or constructive possession of the true owner, if continued
long enough, it would ripen into a complete title, although there might
not be actual residence upon the premises by the adverse claimant
or possessor. The acts necessary for such purpose might be different
with a city lot. The question is to what purpose may it be ordinarily
In a large manufacturing city,
fit and adapted, and reasonably used.
with vast lumber interest, the use of a lot for piling lumber thereon,
and there storing it or keeping it for sale, might be the best use to
which such lot could possibly be adapted. And, as part of such business, the building of a barn and shed thereon, for keeping and stabling
horses used in procuring logs, as a part of such lumber business, would
constitute a very strong ingredient of adverse possession.
Tlie jii ere fact that time may intervene between successive _acts of
occupancy^ while a party is engaged in such lumber business, as^By
taking his teams from such stable and shed, and using them in procuring logs to be sawed into lumber to be by him piled and stored upon such premises, does not necessarily destroy the continuity of pos-_
session. During such time, the lumber left upon the lot, the barn and
shed there remaining, and various_i mplements connected with such lumber business used upon the premises, would indic ate that s ome one
was ex ercising acts of dominion over the lot, even though the party
was occasionally and temporarily absent upon the business for which
he was using such lot.
We think the whole record herein presents such a state of facts
If there
that the court below was justified in its finding and decision.
was error in admitting testimony showing that sand was removed
from the premises after the commencement of this action, it certainly
could not have prejudiced the defendant.
We find no prejudicial error, and the order of the court below, de^^
nying a motion for a new trial, is affirmed.
as is usually

2 7 See

Rupley

V.

Skipwith v. Martin, 50 Ark. 141. 6
Fraser (Minn.) 156 N. W. 350 (1916).

S.

W.

514

(1SS7).

See,

also,

A. entered into the possess io n of land, snnpo^iing it belonged to the Un ited
SJates, and intending to ac(^T1it'e same unaer the United Stn tes i.nnrt Jaws.
I n tact thp innrt had already been acquiretl from^ the government by B. ILtteiA. has been- in possession for the period of the statute of Umitatlons, ne seeks
See Io\va Railto have his title quieted, or B. sues to recover possession.
road Co. v. Blumer, 206 U. S. 482. 27 Sup. Ct. 769, 51 L. Ed. 1148 (1906);
Maas V. Burdetzke. 93 Minn. 295, 101 N. W. 182, 106 Am. St. Rep. 436 (1904) ;
Boe V. Arnold, 54 Or. 52, 102 Pac. 290. 20 Ann. Cas. 533 (1909); Doe ex dem.
Alabama State Land Co. v. Beck, 108 Ala. 71, 19 South. 802 (1895); HeckSmith v. Jones, 103
eseher v. Cooper, 203 Mo. 278. 101 S. W. 658 (1907);
Tex. 632, 132 S. W. 469, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 153 (1910).

t-^fV-v

f3^.
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McSHANE LUMBER CO.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit,

1915.

220 Fed. 878, 1.36 C. C. A. 444.)

Walker, Circuit Judge. The testimony
Mitchell was to the effect t hat he had lived

of the plaintiff B. D./>^
on the land in question (p*^'

since 1889 and had been asserting claim to it since that tim e.
He did
not deny the making of the contract with the Beaumont Lumber Company, which showed a lease by that company to him of the league
of land which embraces the 160 acres sued for, but explicitly stated
t hat he never relinquished his claim to the 160 acres, but claimed it
all the time. The tendency of this evidence to prove adverse possession of the land in question by the plaintiffs for the length of time
required to confer upon them the legal title was not as a matter of law
destroyed by the proof of the execution by one of them of the lease
contract above mentioned. 'That contract evidenced an admission by
B. D. Mitchell that he held the land, not as his own, but as the tenant ^^ —
of another : but t hat admission was not conclusive against him in fa -^^^tlr
v or of the defendant in this suit. In this suit it was permissible for the
plaintiff B. U. Mitchell to contradict or explain away the statement or
admission shown by his signing the lease contract, which embraced
a league of land, and to prove that he in fact claimed the land sued
for as his own all the time. That instrument did not five- rise to a n
e stoppel upon him in favor of the defendant to the suit, which is a
stranger to that instrument, or debar him from proving^ that the fact
was other than wdiat the instrument indicated that it wa s.
"The rule against varying or contradicting writings by parol obtains only in suits between, and is confined to parties to the writings
and their privies, and has no operation with respect to tllird p^rcnng^
nor even upon the parties tKemselves in controversies with third per * * * But this rule is confined in its operation to the parties
s ons.

.

instrument.
W hen it comes in question collaterally, in
'irjjCvt%4t^
a suit to which a third party, a stranger tO t^""^ -nrj-ihinprc I'g a jp'-^y, '^
^i/v
neithe r party is estopped from contradicting
or from proving fac ts *j£k '^^
inconsistent with it." Robinson v. Moseley, 93 Ala. 70,
South. 372
Ala. App. 398, 59 South. 704 Johnson v. PortMyrick v. Wallace,
wood, 89 Tex. 235, 34 S. W. 596, 787; Barreda v. Silsbee, 21 How.
146, 169, 16 L. Ed. 86; Sigua Iron Co. v. Greene, 88 Fed. 207, 31 C.
C. A. 477; 17 Cyc. 750; Jones on Evidence,
296.
The case of Robinson v. Bazoon, 79 Tex. 524, 15
W. 585, which
much relied on by the counsel for the defendants in error, was one
between the parties to written contract relating to the land which was
the subject of the suit.
The rule there applied was the familiar one
which forbids either party to such a contract in
suit between him
and another party to
by parol evidence to contradict or vary the
terms or effect of the contract.
In the opinion rendered in that case
it

a

a

is

S.

§

;

5

;

9

ij

it,

to the written

so
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it was recosTiized that that rule would not have applied in favor of
the plaintiff if he had been a stranger to the contract.made by the defendants;
the court saying of the case with which it was deahng:
"It is not like the case of Portis v. Hill, 14 Tex. 69, 65 Am. Dec.
r,f Htip jn a
99, in which it was held t hat the mere ackn owledgrnpn^t hird party did not preclud e the defendant^; from claiming- that their
p ossession was adverse to the plaintiff ."
The situation developed by the evidence was that some of it — that
showing the making of the lease contract — tended to prove that- the
p laintiff's adverse holding was inter rupted on the 4fh dny nf ^Tay,
adverseJ aoId1 898, while some of it tended to prove that the plaintiffs'
interrupted
inciden
t.
This state of
that
terminated
or
i ng was not
bv
the evidence made the question in issue one for the jury ; and the
court erred in its ruling to the effect that there was no evidence to
support a finding in favor of the plaintiffs.
The j udgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause is remanded, -^
28 Adverse Possession in Case
of Minerals. — When the minerals and
surface are owned by the same party, as is ordinarily true, an adverse po sBut
s essiou of the surface is al-so an adverse possession of the minerals.
when the ownership or possession is divicfed, tne situation presents possiIn the latter case possession of the surface by
bilities of serious difficulty.
the one entitled thereto, no matter how long continued, can have no effect
upon the rights of the party entitled to the minerals ; and no lenstE^of nonWallace v. Elm Grove Coal Co., 5S W. Va. 449,
usage"(Wi atfect his rights.
52 S. E. 4S5. 6 Ann. Cas. 140 (1905).
B. entered into adverse possession of land owned by A. Before the statutory bar was complete, B. sold and conveyed by warranty deed the minerals
B. remained in posses sion
to P., who until later made' no entry thereunder.
of the surface beyond the statutorv period, and then died. P. then entered
into actual possession of the minerals and, learning that A. made some claim
thereto, sued to quiet title.
Should he maintain his suit ? Black Warrior
Coal Co. V. West. 170 Ala. 346' b4 South. 200 (1910), commented upon in 24
Harv. Law Eev. 5S2.
After being in
B. entered into adverse possession of land owned by A.
possession for a period sliort of the statutory period, B. ponvpyed the land
X. went into possession ~of the pu-TtiPi;^, nnd
t o X.. resei'ving the minerals.
tions' . _^n
c ontinued
therein until the tull running of the sfntute n f 11j;|^^|;a
meantime no nnp wfj? nnPTj]_fni<r/ti]p minpv^^
fh^r.^ f.r.nvpYp|^] j-tjp minto nnipt fiMe._ What result?
'als to P.. who
Moore v. Empire Land
g''c, 181 lla.'Wi, si^f^
61 isouth. 940 (1913) .

,.

j;
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SECTION 5.— CONSTRUCTIVE ADVERSE POSSESSION
JACKSON

ex dem.

GILLILAND

(Supreme Court of New York, 1S23.

v.

WOODRUFF.

1 Cow. 276, 13 Am. Dec. 525.)

Ejectment, f or one acre of land, at Salmon River, in Plattsburgh,
Clinton county, called the Fairman lot, and for one half acre of land
adjoining the same, on the north; tried before his honor, Mr. usti ce Woodworth. at the Clinton Cir cuit. June, 1821. Defendant relie d
u pon plaintiff's claim being barred by the Statute of Limitatio ns,
Woodworth, J.-" ^ ^ ^ The remaining question is — ^have the
defendants made out an ad verse possession ? The actual occupation
of the premises, by the defendants, is less than twenty years, as appears by the testimony of Winchell. He says that Moses Soper had
qlje^pQ(,L.aJ^i^ t^aacres. not including the premises, at Salmon River
Village, i n 1797 ; that_he. and Nathaniel Piatt, claimed the whole pro pThe validity of this claim will next be
e rtv. while it was in woods.

J

considered.

In

The statement of facts is abbreviated,

omitted.

6

Aig.Pkop. —

j

/-^

/

\.S^
and

a

2
9

sion, beyond the parcel so occupied.

>->v

^

a

September. 1794. Z. Piatt executed a quit-claim deed to Nathani el Piatt, for 7(66 acfes~<Tfiand^ purporting to convey, thereby, lands
the east and south lines of allotted lands in Plattsburgh,
lytng^befween
On examining the boundaries, and
and the line of Friswell's Patent.
it
will
be found not to include any land ;
case,
to
the
the map annexed
for there is no gore between the two patents. The description follows :
"Beginning at the distance of 7 chains, 8 links, north from the south
east comer of lot No. 99, in the second division of Plattsburgh ; thence
Now, as it has
east, 27 chains and 50 links, to John Friswell's patent."
on
the line canPatent
Friswell's
shown,
joins
Plattsburgh,
that
been
extended,
If it was so
it would run on
not be extended easterly.
lands included in that patent, which is not admissible, under the
The next course is to the north-west corner of
words of the deed.
the patent, which must be understood the true north-west corner of
Friswell, as proved by the plaintiffs ; thence east, in the east bounds
of Friswell's Patent, until the north line, to the lotted land in Plattsburgh, will include 783 acres, between that line and lot No. 101, in
By tracing these liv p'^, nn the n^^p.
the second division of Plattsburgh.
coai t will be seen, that a line, only, is given. No land is includ_ed:
sequently, the deed is a numty, ma'smuch as nothing is granted . The
'
question, then, is, whether "a^cTaiiTi Of title, under such an Tristrument.
good adverse posses-/
and an actual occupancy of part, can constitute
portion

of the opinion
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is well settled, t hat a continued possession, for 20 years, und er
or claim of right, ripens into a right of possession, wh ich
will toll an entry
It has never been considered necessary, to constitute an adverse possession, that there should be a rightful title.
Jackson v. Wheat, 18 Johns. 44; Smith v. Lorillard, 10 Johns. 356;
Smith V. Burtis, 9 Johns. 180; Jackson v. ElHs, 13 Johns. 120; Jackson V. Todd., 2 Caines, 183. The party who relies on an adverse possession, must, in the language of Kent, Chief Justice, in Jackson v.
"
Schoonmaker, 2 Johns. 234, show
a. substantial
inclosure , an actu al
ccupancy,
pedis
definite,
o
possessio. which is
a
positive an d rjniprinnc;^
when that is the only defence to countervail a legal title ;" and in Doe
V. Campbell,
10 Johns. 477, it is said, "adverse possession must be
marked by definite boundaries and be regularly continued down, to
render it availing."
Brandt v. Ogden, 1 Johns. 156. Tjiere is no dou btt hat actual occupancy, and a claim of title, whether such claim be b y
d eed or Otherwise,'' constitute a valid adverse possession^ to that exB ut, when a party claims to hold, adversely, a lot of land, b y
tent.
p roving actual occupancy of a part only^_ his claini must be under a
d eed or paper title . This distinction has been uniformly recognized,
i;^nd acted upon in this Court.
It is on this latter ground, the defendants must rest, if their possession can avail. \Theii" tlefence is, that Z. Piatt, in 1794, conveyed
783 acres to N. Piatt, including the premises ; that the first improvement was made in 1794, under Piatt, being a small parcel, not exceeding 2 acres, which, together with the premises in question, afterwards
taken under him, have been continued to the time of commencing this
action.
This proof does not make out an adverse possession to the
premises. Col or of title, under a deed, and occupancy of part, is su fficient proof as to a single lot; vet it follows, from the doctrine laid
down, that the deed, or paper title, under which the claim is ma de.
must, in the description, include the premises.
If the title is bad, it
is of no moment ; b ut_if no^aixds jire ^escribec;!, n othino- can p ass.
The deed is a nullity, and never can lay the foundation of a good adverse possession, beyond the actual improvement.
There is no evidence here, to show how far Piatt's claim extended, unless resort is
Boundaries, therefore, including the premises, were
had to the deed.
indispensable, in order to give this defence the semblance of plausibility.
The defendants stand on the same ground as if no deed had been produced ; and, then, the possession cannot extend beyond the place actually occupied.'"
p retence

3 "The courts have concurred, it is believed, without an exception, in defining
title' to be t hat which in appearance Is title, but which in
'59l2£9^
i ieality ?sTT?TTtfer '*'^Ir. Justic^e baulel, in Wright v. Mattisou, IS How. 50, 56,

L. Eel. 280 (1S55) .
While there is a decided conflict of authority the general rule seems clearly
to be that "color of'tifIe"" reauires some sort' of Avriting!
See the many
cases collected in 1 Cyc. 10S3; 2 C. J. 170. t^eeT also, l«-eolv-LTrw' Rev. 59.
So, also, the cases do not agree as to color of title being provided by an in15
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Dervient v. Loyd, decided October term, 1820,
but not reported, it appeared that the defendant had a deed for lot No.
4, but took possession of lot No. 5, adjoining, believing it to be his lot,
It was held, that the defendant could not
and claiming it as such.
establish an adverse possession, to the whole lot, by the actual improvement of a part, because no part of No. 5, was included in
dem.

the deed.

But, if the deed had been perfect in the description, and included 783
acres of Friswell's Patent, the occupancy of a part would not make out
The doctrine
an adverse possession to the whole quantity conveyed.
o f adverse possession^ applied to a farm, or sing^le lot of land, is, i n
In the first place, the quantity of land
i tself, reasonable and ji^s t.
thus taken, under a claim of title, are, general"Possessions,
is^small.
It is,
ly, for the purpose of cultivation and permanent improvement.
generally, necessary to reserve a part for wood land. Good husbandry
The possessions are,
forbids the actual improvement of the whole.
are marked
boundaries
others;
the
usually, in the neighborhood of
and defined. Frequent acts of ownership, in parts not cultivated, give
Under such circumstances there is but
notoriety to the possession.
l ittle danger that a possession of twenty year'; will he mature d ap-ainst
the right owner ; if it occasionally happens, it will arise from a want
of vigilance and care, in him who has title. It is believed, that no well
founded complaint can be urged against the operation of the principle ;
but the attempt to apply the same rule to cases where a large tract is
Suppose a patent granted
conveyed, would be mischievous indeed.
to A, for 2000 acres; B, without title, conveys 1000 of the tract to
C, who enters under the deed, claiming title, and improves one acre
only ; this inconsiderable improvement may not be Icnown to the proCould it be
prietor, or if known, is disregarded for twenty years.
gravely urged, that here was a good adverse possession to the one
thousand acres? If it could, I perceive no reason why the deed from
B to C might not include the whole patent, and after the lapse of twenty years, equally divest the patentee's title to the whole; for there
would exist an actual possession of one acre, with a claim of title
to all the land comprised in the patent. No such doctrine was ever
It may, therefore, be safely
intended to be sanctioned by the Court.
affirmed, [t hat a small possessi on, taken under the deed to N. Pia tt,
strument voifl on its face. G eBerally, where thp Inst.rnment. though void o n
its face, would seem to the ordinary layman to be good there is color^ See
the cases collected in 1 Cyc. 1087; 2 C. J. ITtj, 177. As to the necessity that
the claimant under the color of title shall have acted in good faith in taking the deed or other instrument, see Gregg v. Sayre, 8 Pet. 253, 8 L. Ed. 932
(1834) ; Foulke v. Bond, 41 N. J. Law, 527 (1879) ; Lampman v. Van Alstyne,
94 Wis. 417, 69 N. W. 171 (1896) : State v. King (W. Va.) 87 S. E. 170 (1915).
Color of title may also be of importance in other respects than constructive adverse possession. St atutes of limitat ions nnt nncnmmonly nrnviflp fnr
a different pprinri ^here there is ad verse po ssession under color of titl e.
~
T'he state statutes should De consuiiea:
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cannot, under any circumstances, be a valid possession of the who le
783 acres , but is limited to the parcel improved.
If the doctrine contended for, prevails, it would sanction this manifest absurdity, that a
possession under Piatt's deed, which conveyed no title, would, as to
its legal effect, be more beneficial, than a possession taken under the
proprietors of Friswell's Patent, where there is not only title, but a
good constructive possession, in consequence of the grant, and actual
It cannot be useful to puroccupancy and improvement of a part.
sue the subject farther.^^
I am of opinion that the plaintiff js entitl ed ^^ jurlprmpnt, fpr_anjind ivided fou rth part of the prerni sgiT

BAILEY

v.

(Supreme Court of New Hampshire,

CARLETON.
1841.

12 N.

H.

9, 37

Am. Dec. 190.)

Writ of entry, to recover two tracts of land in the lower village in
Bath, one of said tracts being ten rods in length, and the other being
f our square rods of land, situated immed iately gnnt]-] ^f ^ r\c\ adjninln pr
t h^ fir .st tract ; both constituting
a narrow strip of land, situated betwixt the main road through Bath village, and the xA.nionoosuck river.
The tract of land first described, and a house lot opposite to the
same, on the other side of the road, were c onveyed to Amp f^ To'^'^^" hv
Moses P. Payson, by two several, deeds, executed on the 27th o f
March, 1807 : and the tract containing four square rods was conveyed
by said Payson, in November, 1807, to Buxton & Blake, who sold to
one Morrison, and, in 1810, Morrison sold to said Town.
In February. 181.3. Amos Town sold the t hre e tracts of land to h is
b rother, Solomon Tow n, and in April, 1^1^, Solomon Town re-con veved the house lot opposite the demanded premises, to Amos Town,
but did not include, in the description, the strip of land opposite, and
now in controversy.
October 19th, 1815, Amos Town convpvpd the aforesaid three se veral tracts. g;-iving- separate descriptions of each tract, to Eben ezer
Carleton. _and subsequently Carleton's title was conveyed to the se
ff,

Sol c^mon Town, in Tune 1830. conveved the demanded premises t o
one John Welsh . Welsh, in February, 1837. conveyed to the plaj^

9

iii

&

&

;

31 Chandler
Thompson v. Burhans, 61 N. Y.
v. Spear, 22 Vt. 388 (1850);
Improvement
52 (1874)
Louisville
N. R. Co. v. Gulf of Mexico Land
Co., 82 Miss. ISO, 33 South. 845, 100 Am. St. Rop. 627 (1903), ace.
Hick^ v.
yf,^gr,,nr, ;>fL ^ni TOO !^^ Am. Dec. 103 (1864); Marietta Fertilizer Co. v. lilair.
See, also, Ellicott v. Pearl, 10
Am. f>\>i, Sff'^outh. 131 (1911), contra.
L. Ed. 475 ri836); Kentucky Coal, etc., Co. v. Kentuckv Union Co.
Pet. 412,
(D. C.) 214 Fed. 590, 629 (1914). The matter mav be affected bv statute. See
Stevens v. Martin, 168 Mo. 407, 68 S. W. 347 (1902).
The state statutes
should be consulted.
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for the recovery of

the

demanded prem-

1837.

It appeared that Ebenezer Carleton, on his purchase of Amos Town

in October,

1815, entered into possession

deed, and lived on an d o ccupied the same

of th e house lot named in his
for'many years , until it wa s

d

s

l

c

it,

conveyed to the defendant^ E. Carleton. Jr.
In 1821, Ebenezer Car leton caused a small building to be removed
on to the land in controversy, and from that time to the present it has
remained there, occupied by tenants under him and these defendants.
The defendants claimed to hold the land by virtue of peaceable a nd
undistQrbed possession, by themselves and their grantor, for a peri od
of twenty years, It appeared that until 1821 no building had been;
placed upon the premises, and that the premises had not been inclosed
in any manner; that from 1815 to 1821, and since, Ebenezer Carleton
had been in the habit, occasionally, of leaving carts, ploughs and farming utensils upon this land, and also of leaving lumber upon it. Evidence was offered to show that it had been a common practice, by
teamsters and owners of lumber, for thirty or forty years, to lay lumber upon that side of the road, in Bath village, upon this tract, and
above and below
and that said Carleton and other individuals had
been in the habit of laying lumber along the river bank in this manner.
It was ontended, by the defendants' rnnnse that Ebenezer Carleton
having entered upon the house lot, claiming title to and occupying the
same,
uch entry extended tn the rnnti^nnns tmrtc Hpsrn'hpr^ I'n fhf^
same
that entry and occupation of one of the tracts extende
deed._and
to the whole, in the same manner as though they had been conveyed

r

vi

^

a

s

a

y

a b

it

t

d

it

a

c

o

in one description —that the defendants' grantor having entered upon
and disseized the plaintiff's grantor, October 19th, 1815, and the
plaintiff never having reentered before action brought, he had no legal
seizin in the demanded premises within twenty years next before the
commencement of his action, and his suit, therefore, could not be
maintained — and that the laying of lumber on the demanded premises,
by persons claiming no right thereto, would not affect the exclusive
character of the defendant's adverse possession.
The ourt instructed the jury that an entry upon, and mi patinn jdj
one of the tracts conveyed, would not extend to the other tracts de scribed in the deed, so^as to give
title to them bv possession — that
entry upon, and occupation of, any portion of the demanded premises
would extend to the whole tract entered upon — that
was not essential that any portion of the land should be inclosed, in order to constitute an adverse possession — hat such possession might be acquire
the laying of lumber upon said tract, or otherwise occupying
place of deposit for farming utensils, &c ., but that such possession
must be n open,
sible possessi on, such as would give easonable notice of such adverse possession, to the owner.
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A

3

it,

ver dict was rendered for the plaint iff, and the defendants moved
to set the same aside, for misdirection.
Parker, C. J. The ge nera[ rule^ that where a party having- color of
title enters into the land conveyed, he is presumed to enter according
to his title, and thereby gains a c onstructive possession of the whole
land embraced in his deed, seems to be settled by the current of authorities. Riley v. Jameson, 3 N. H. 27, 14 Am. Dec. 325 ; Lund v. Parker,
3 N. H, 49, and cases cited.
And such entry may operate as a disseizin of the whole tract ; and
continued for the term of twenty years, may
the possession under
be deemed an adverse possession, which will bar the entry of the owner after that lapse of time.
N. H. 49; Jackson v. Ellis, 13 Johns.
118;
Smith,
v.
13 Johns. (N. Y.) 406;
Jackson v.
(N. Y.)
Jackson

Newton,

18

Johns. (N. Y.)

355.

cy.

Jackson

v.

Oltz,

8

a

a

is

;

is 6

1

a

is

h

One is,
ave been suggested to the rule in some cases.
Exceptions
small part
embraced in the deed, and
vhere
large tract of land
Cow. (N. Y.) 276, 13
only has been improved. Jackson v. Woodruff,
Am. Dec. 525 Jackson v. Vermilyea,
Cow. (N. Y.) 677. Another,
tract greater
made includes
where the deed under which the claim
than
necessary for the purpose of cultivation, or ordinary occupan-

Wend. (N. Y.)

440.

y

t

ri

is,

s

if

a

d

;

a

t
o

;

i

s

a

is

It

a

These exceptions seem not to be very definite in their application,
for lots, like other things, are large or small by comparison, and
tract which would be much too large for cultivation by one, would not
suffice for another.
But they serve to show the principle upon which
the rule
founded.
hat the entrv an pn<;c;p<; c;inn of the part
to
the
owner of
claim asserted to the land: that the limit
notice
appear
the owner for twenty
from the deed and that
of such claim
years after such entry, and after notice, by means of the possession,
that an adverse claim exists, asserts no rights^ he mav w pH b"" prp<^nmpd
have made some jQ-rant or convevance. co-extensive with the limi ts
possession u nof the claim set up or that, after such lapse of time,
er such circumstances, ought to be quieted,.
mere
There should be something more than the deed itself, and

— something from which

a

is

It

it

presumption of actual notice
not necessary to sh ow actna] Irnnw1pr1crp_r>f
may reasonably arise.
the j]eed.
Acts of Ownership, raising a reasonable. presuni2tii)n that
the owner, with knowledge of them, must have understood that there
entry under

a

is

8

a

,

claim of title, may be held to be constructive notice that is, conN. H. 264. The owner
clusive evidence of notice. Rogers v. Jones,
of
what
openly done on his
may well be charged with knowledge
The presumptio n of
character to attract his attention.
land, and of
was

notice ad se-s. from the ncrupation, long continued: and the notice of
the claim may well be presumed, as far as the occupation indicates that
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a character

of

of

the claim or possession,

to indicate

a
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of title, serve to define specifically
f the o ccupation is not oi.
which
claim
may be co-extensive witli the.,

a claim exists, and the deed, or color
the boundaries
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llien the principle that the party is presumed to
^nter adversely according to his title, has no sound application, and
the advers e possession may be limited to the actual occupation.
Thus cutting wood and timber, connected with permanent improvements, may well furnish evidence of notice that the claim of title extends beyond the permanent improvements, and the deed be admitted
to define the precise limits of the claim and possession, provided the
cutting was of a character to indicate that the claim extended, or might
It might, at least, well indicate a
extend, to the lines of the deed.
claim to the whole of a tract allotted for sale and settlement, of which
the party was improving part, unless there was something to limit the
presumption.] But no presumption of a claim, and of color of titl e
b eyond the actual occupation, could arise respecting other lots than
t hat of which the party was in possessio n. And where the possession
was in a township, or other large tract of land, which had never been
divided into lots for settlement, no particular claim, beyond the actual
occupation, would be indicated, and of course no notice of any such
claim of title should be presumed. Jackson v. Richards, 6 Cow. (N.
Y.) 617; Sharp v. Brandow, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 597.
I f the possession was not of a character to indicate ownership, a nd
to give notice to the owners of an adverse claim, although the grantee
might be held to be in possession according to his title, in a controversy with one who should make a subsequent entry without right, his
possession ought not to be held adverse to the true owner, to the extent of his deed, merely by reason of the deed itself, even if recorded,
nor by any entry under it. There are several cases which tend to sustain this view of the principle.
Poignard v. Smith, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 172,
176; Alden V. Gilmore, 13 Me. 178; Prop'rs of Kennebeck Purchase
V. Springer, 4 Mass. 416, 3 Am. Dec. 227; Hapgood v. Burt, 4 Vt.
155; Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L. Ed. 624; Little v. Megquier, 2
Greenl. (Me.) 176.
We are of opinion that the rule cannot apply to a case where a party,
having a deed which embraces land to which his grantor had good
title, and other land to which he had no right, enters into and possesses that portion of the land which his grantor ow^ned, but makes no
entry into that part which he could not lawfully convey. There is no
notice in such case to the owner of the land thus embraced in the deed,
and no possession which can be deemed adverse to him. . If it may be
said that the color of title gives such a constructive seizin and po ssessio n that the grantee could maintain trespass against any person who
d id not show a better right, (that is, a title, or prior possession,) the re
is nothmg in the nature of it which can give it the character of a dislimits
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1

seizin, or possession adverse to the true owner, so as to bind him . JEox
that purpose, there must b eactualoo^s^OiL of some portion oM he
l and of such owner , and that of a natu re to give notice of an adve rse
,,.
claim*
It is not necessary to settle whether an entry into an enclosed lot,
under a deed purporting to convey unenclosed lands adjoining, belonging to the same person, would operate as a disseizin of the latter.
Where two separate lots inr.lyded in thp <;pj7i^ de^d. belong to differe nt
owners, a n entry into on e ""can in no way operate as a disseizin in rela~
tion to the other.
The entry into the house lot, therefore, to which Amos Town, who
'^conveyed, had title, was no disseizin of Solomon Town, who had title
to the lot unenclosed, on the other side of the road,
^
The next question is, w hat en tryjnto th e land itself is s_ufficient.
Here was an entry in 1821, upon the tract in dispute, and a possesby Ebenezer Carleton, the grantor of
sion, by placing a building on
The
This was, without doubt, an act of ownership.
the defendants.
was
was adverse to the title of Solomon Town, and
character of
of a nature to give notice that Carleton claimed title to that land.
more ambiguous charBut the possession before that time was of

v

a

it

it

it,

y^-j

acter.

s

o

a

it

a

if

a

I

o

\f

Eb enezer Carleton. to whom the convevance was made in 1815.J 3iade
entry or use of the lot up tn 1821, e xcept bv pyi^S ^'^^bpr upon
deed,
or placing farming utensils there . Those acts by one having
sufficient
held
to
be
entry,
nothing further was shown, might be
apdisseizin of Solomon Town. But
and possession to operate as
far as the laying of lumber on the lot was concer ned,
peared that

n

e

a

:

d

it

o

,

c

t
o

.

t

x/

a

a

r

T

i

^,

t

his was no more than Carleton, and divers other persons, had bee n
n the habit of doino- hefor and thf|<- nfhpr<; rnntiTinff] to do the sam
hose acts, prior to 1815, were do ne by him, and otli ers.
afterwards.
without claim of title, and of course in subservience to. thetitleofTTie
IT not acknowledged trespasses, they must have been
true owner.
license from Solomon Town. The same acts continued afte
under
person having good title to thn-^e lands
a _ deed of other lands, by
deed
ould not operate as any notice to the owner of this tract, that
was
an
that
there
also
occupation
land
and
his
covering
ma
de
been
had
under that deed, or under any claim of right to occupy adversely to
him. The additional act of leaving farming tools on the lands does not
seem to change the character of the possession.
It was not, therefore, until 1821, when the building was removed n
by Carleton, from which
the land, that any entry was made upon
Town,
with knowledge of the entry, should have understoo
Solomon
and until
hat CarTeton made any claim to the ownersnip of the lot
that time, therefore, there was nothing from which an ouster can be
inferred, and no possession by him that can be deemed adverse, except

€h.
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Magoun v. Lapham,
at the election of the owner.
140; Thomas v. Patten, 13 Me. 336.
Judgment for the plaintiff.^^

RALPH

V.

21

Pick. (Mass.)

BAYLEY.

(Supreme Court of Vermont,

1839.

11 Vt. 521.)

Tr espass for breaking and entering plaintiff's clos e, being lot No.
62, in the first division of lands in Warren, and cutting timber thereon.
Plea, not guilty, with notice of special matter. Issue to the country.
Upon the trial in the county court, the plaintifi^ gave in evidence a
d eed of the lot in question from Smith, Booth & Ufford to the plaintiff, dated June 10th, 1836, and recorded in September, 1836.
The plaintiff also introduced testimony tending to prove that in July,
1837, he cornmenced clearing ten acres of said lot : that in the summer
of that year he ch opped down the trees growin p;' on about three acres
of the land, and that defendant, i n January, 1838. entered upon the l ot
a rid cut down and carried away a spruce tre e.
The d efend ai^t. ^ on his part, gave in evidence a deed of the lot in
uestion,
q
together with two other l ots of land lying in Warren, from
o ne Daniel Spencer to Araunah Spear, dated July 18th, 1836, and r ec orded in August, 1836, and introduced
testimony tending to prov e
that {^ppar. immediately after the recording of his deed and in the same
month, comme nced choj)ping on__said_lot, and c ut down t he timber
gro wing on about one acre of land : that in August or September,
1837, he caused the acre last mentioned to be cleared, and that the defendant entered upon the lot, by the direction of Spear, and cut the
spruce tree before mentioned.
The p laintiff then introduced testimony tending to prove that th e
la nd cleared by Spear was not a part of lot No. 62 .
It was conceded that the tree cut by the defendant, was not upon
tliat portion of the lot enclosed by, or in the actual possession of Spear.
The county court instructed the jury, that, if the plaintiff held a deed
of lot No. 62, made an entry upon, and took possession of the lot, in
the manner attempted to be proved, and the defendant entered thereon
and cut the tree in the manner complained of, the plaintiff Aynnid be
ent itled to recover against the def endant^ if he y^as a mere strang er,
aifd did not act by the direction or consent of Spear^ altho ugh , in fa ct.
Spear made the first entry on the lot.
3 2 Kentucky Coal & Timber Development Co. v. Kentucky Union Co.
(D. C.)
214 Fed. 590 (1914), ace.
5ee Hornblower v. Banton, 103 Me. 375, 69 Atl. 568, 125 Am. St. Rep. 30<^
(1907).
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The defendant
The jury returned their ve rdict for the p laintiff.
excepted to the charge of the court.
Other questions were presented in the bill of exceptions, but, as
they were not decided by this court, they are here omitted.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Bennett, J. We think there was error in the charge of the court,
as applied to this case.
The case shows that Araunah Spear received
of
lot
in
a deed
the
question from Daniel Spencer, in July, 1836, and
the deed was put on record in August following, and that the said
Araunah immediately entered into possession, claiming title to the
whole lot under his deed, and commenced a clearing and chopped over
about one acre, and that, in August or September, 1837, he caused the
clearing of this acre to be completed. It appears, also, that evide nce
w as given to the jury tending to prove the defendant's acts tn h ave
been i-.n np iniHer Sppar
The effect of this evidence is to extend the possession of Spear, by
The charge
CO nist ruction, to the whole lot, as described in his deed.
of the court assumes, that if the jury do not find that the defendant acted under Spear, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, though they should
find Spear's possession prior to any possession of the plaintiff, it being
an admitted point that the chopping of the defendant was not on that
portion of the lot cleared by Spear.
The plaintiff is a stranger as to the title, and his possession to a ny
pa rt of the lot is subsequent to the possession of Spear, an d it does no t
appear that the alleged trespass of the defendant was co mmitted upon
any part of the lot in the actual possession of the plamtitt. Spear having had the hrst actual possession of a part, and constructive possession
of the whole lot, there can be no subsequent conflicting possession extended by construction beyond the limits of the actual adverse possession. Crowell V. Beebe, 10 Vt. 33, 33 Am. Dec. 172; Barr v. Gratz,
4 Wheat. 213, 4 L. Ed. 553.
I t is, then, clear that the plaintiffs cou ld not maintain this action
The
iot.
a gamst Spear, and can he against a stranger .^ .We thmk
that,
in
the
defendant
settled,
is
set
well
ejectment,
doctrine
up,
may
as a defense, an outstanding title still subsisting in a stranger, though
he in no way connects himself with such title. In the present case, as
between the plaintiff' and Spe ar, the latter has^fhe better title, tha^is,
the first av ailable possession of that ^art of the Idf'wiiere the trespass
was committed, and all ac^jof the plaintiff there~wo HId be a trespass
agamst Spear, If the"" plaintiff is permitted to recover against "a' slranger, for tlie'trespass, it can be no bar to a second recovery, by Spear
for the same trespass, and we see no good reason why a stranger, when
sued by the plaintiff, may not set up a prior possession in Spear. It,
in effect, is the same principle that permits a defendant in ejectment to
set up an outstanding title in a third person. There is no occasion for

j
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deciding any other question, reserved by the bill of exceptions, as the
judgment below must, on this point, be reversed . A new trial is, therefore, granted.^ ^

SECTION 6.— DISABILITIES

DOE
(Court

V.

JESSON.

of King's Bench,

1805.

6 East,

80.)

of land, which
was tried betore Rooke, J., at the last assizes at Northampton; and
the principal question was, whether the action were brougnt in time
withm the 2d cla use_of_exceptions in the statute of limitations, 21 Jac^
I, c. 16. The person last seised of the premises, from whom the lessors of the plaintiff claimed, was one Thomas Jesson, on whose death
in the year 1777, David, his elder brother, took possession of them, and
This was an ejectment for

a house and a small parcel

Thomas
possession to the defendant his grandson.
him
Frances
and
a
surviving.
daughter
John
John
was baptized in 1767, and after the death of his father, being then
about 10 years of age, was put out apprentice to the sea service by the
parish, and was seen by a witness- on his return from his first voyage
transmitted

Jesson left

the

a son

33 "The complaint
Is made that instruction 8 was refused plaintiffs. It
reads as follows: 'If the jury l»elieve from the evidence thsit S. I. Robinson
under his patent entered upon the land embraced therein and took possession
of the same by himself or his tenant, then he was in possession of the whole
of said tract of hmd not actually in the possession of some otber party; and
if you believe that sucli possession has continued for more than ten years by
the said Robinson or his tenants, then his possession under his patent gave
you
him a perfect title to the land actually in his possession, notwithstanding
may believe some part of his survey may have been overlapped by an older
patent.' This would suggest to the jury the question of an interlock of the
defendant's older patent with plaintiffs' younger patent, and, if there was,
then plaintiffs would have the benefit of possession extending over on the
But there could not be such interlock when the plaintiffs'
defendant's land.
patent called for defendant's older patent, and to run with its lines. RobinThis tended to give Robinsou V. Sheets* 63 W. Va. .394, 61 S. E. 347 (190S).
But there is other objection
son the benefit of possession over his bounds.
Suppose an interlock between senior and junior grants.
to the instruction.
This instruction would say that a possession anywhere on the land of the
junior grant would take in land of the interlock, if possession under the
The junior, though in possession within
senior is not within the interlock.
his bounds, cannot be accounted in possession of the interlock, unless he
has actual physical possession in it. Constructive actual possession arising
from possession elsewhere will not do. Wilson v. Braden, 48 W. Va. 193, 36
S. E. 367 (1900).
see that it was discussed and disapproved in former deBrannon, J., in
cision. Robinson v. Lowe, 50 W. Va. 79, 40 S. E. 454 (1901)."
Robinson v. Lovs-e, 66 W. Va. 665, 66 S. E. 1001 (1910).
As to tacking successive constructive adverse 'possessions,
see Simpson v.
"~
"^
Downing 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 316 (TS40).~
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about a year after the father's death ; soon after which he went to sea
again, and had not been heard of since, and was beheved to be dead.
Frances the daughter, one of the lessors of the plaintiff, was baptized
on the 21st of May, 1771, and afterwards married George the other
lessor.
It was contended at the trial by the defendant's counsel that the
ejectment was out of time; for it was uncertain when John, the son of
Thomas the ancestor last seised, died, and that the 20 years given by
the statute began to run immediately on the death of Thomas in 1777,
and consequently expired in 1797; or that if the statute favoured
Frances the daughter till 10 years after the disability of her infancy
was removed, at any rate as she was of full age in 1792, she ought to
have brought her ejectment in 1802, and consequently this ejectment
brought in 1804 was too late. On the other hand, it was contended by
the plaintiff's counsel that supposing John to have died abroad, the
presumption of his death could not arise till seven years after he v/as
last seen in England previous to his going to sea, which would not be
till 1785 or 1786, till when the right of entry of the lessor Frances did
not accrue; and that she had 20 years in which to bring her ejectment
after that time; the statute having never begun to run by reason of
the continuing di^'ability, and consequently that this action was well
brought.
The learned Judge left it to the jury to say when and where John
died ; and observed, that it was fair to presume he had not died in
England, as none of his family ever" heard of his death. And as to the
time, that it was incumbent on the jury to find the fact as well as they
could under the doubt and difficulty of the case; that at any time beyond the first seven years they might fairly presume him dead, but the
not hearing of him within that period was hardly sufficient to afford
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and
such a presumption.
that John died als'road about the years 1785, 1786, or 1787, but not
In the last term it was moved to set aside the verdict and
before.
grant a new trial, on the ground that Frances, the daughter, was at
most only entitled to 10 years for bringing her ejectment after she
came of age, which was in 1792, even if she were not bound to have
made her entry within 10 years from the death of her brother, from
whom she claimed.
Lord Ellenborough, C. J. The time allov/ed by the statute for
making an entry might be indefinitely extended if the construction
contended for by the plaintiff \vere to be admitted.
There is no calit
be
carried l)y parents and children dying
might
culating how^far
under age, or continuing under other disabilities in succession. The
brother, John, through whom the lessor of the plaintiff, Frances,
claimc, being under the disability of nonage at the time of his father's
death, when his title first accrued, and dying under that disability, it
appears to me that the proviso in the second clause of tlie statute
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(where resort is to be had to it to extend the period for making an
entry beyond the 20 years,) required the lessor trances, as heir to her
brother, to make her entry within 10 years after his death : and that
not leaving done so, this ejectment was brought too late.
The_word
"de ath" in t hat clause must mean and refer to the death of the person
to w hom the right first accrued^ and_whose heir the claimantjsj
and
the statute meant that the heir of every person, to which person a right
of entry had accrued during any of the disabilities there stated, should
have 10 years from the death of his ancestor, to whom the right first
accrued during the period of disability, and who died under such a disability, (notwithstanding the 20 years from the first accruing of the
title to the ancestor should have before expired.)
As to the period
when the brother might be supposed to have died, according to the
statute 19 Car. II, c. 6. with respect to leases dependent on lives, and
also according to the statute of bigamy, (1 Jac. I, c. 11.) the presumption of the duration of life, with respect to persons of whom no account can be given, ends at the expiration of seven years from the
time when they were last known to be living. Therefore in the absence
of all other evidence to shew that he was living at a later period there
was fair ground for the jury to presume that he was dead at the end
of seven years from the time when he went to sea on his second voyThat was about the
age, which seems to be the last account of him.
year 1778, which would carry his death to about 1785.
Lawrencij, J. Upon the death of the father Thomas Jesson, in
1777, the right descended to John, the son, tnen under age, who died
under that disability.
The^ lessor Frances„is,..the_heir_oi_Jpl^^
the statute gives to the party to whom a right of entry accrues, and who
is„mider a disability, at the time, 10 years after: the disability removedj
notwithstanding the 20 years should have elapsed after his title first
accrued; and to his heir the statute gives 10 years after thejdeath..oL
Her e more than 10 years had
such party dying und er the disability.
elaps ed after the de ath of the brothe r before this ejectment wa s
It appears probable enougiritpon looking into the case of
bro ught
Stawell V. Lord Zouch (Plowd. 355), that the word death was introduced into the statute of James in order to obviate the difficulty which
had arisen in that case upon the construction of the statute of fines, 4
H. VII, c. 24, for want of that word.
Grose and Ls Blanc, Justices, assenting.

Rule
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absolute.^*

The construction

been the same.

of the American

See '2 C.

J.
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WALLACE

V.

FLETCHER.

(Supreme Court of New Hampshire,

1855,

30 N.

H,

434.)

This is an action on the case, for diverting the water from the plaintiff's mill, in New Boston, from May 1, 1848, to the date of the writ,

April

26, 1850.

to show that one L. Lincoln, under
whom he claimed, purchased the land on the south side of the Piscataquog river, in New Boston, bounded by the river, and in 1804 or 1805
erected thereon the gristmill now owned^ by the plaintiff, and extended
his dam across the ri^ver to the northJ)aiik. J. McLaughlin then owned
the land upon the north side of the rfver; and there was no evidence
tending to show that any consent was asked of McLaughlin, or given
by him, for the building of the dam, or that he, or any person in his
behalf, or in his right, made any objection to its being built.
McLaughlin died in the spring of 1807, and in September of that
year, one John Kelso applied to Abner Dodge, who had become the
owner and occupant of tte gristmill and its appurtenances, through two
or three intermediate conveyances from Lincoln, and asked him if he
had any objection that said Kejso should move his fulling mill, then
standing about half a mile above upon the river, and s et it at the north
end of his mill dam, if he would give Dodge an adequate compensation. Dodge told him that he had no objection, and Kelso moved his
mill, but the compensation was not fixed, though Dodge objected to his
cutting away the dam till it was done. Kelso cut away a part of the
dam and constructed a flume, and put his fulling mill in operation, and
continued to occupy the mill till his death, in 1822. It did not appear
that any other agreement was made by Kelso with the owners of the
gristmill, or that any compensation was paid by him, or any rate of

The plaintiff's evidence tended

compensation agreed on.
It appeared that the owners of the gristmill repaired and rebuilt the
entire dam, when there was occasion, and that Kelso and his heirs, so .
long as they retained'the property, did nothing and contributed nothing
towards the repairs of the dam, except to their own flume, and a few
feet of planking between the flume and the north bank of the river,
except that on one occasion when the dam was destroyed by a freshet,
said Kelso entertained at his house some of the neighbors who volunteered to assist in rebuilding it.
It appeared that at one time said Kelso, being asked why he did not_____
assist in repairing the dam, said he expected to have to pay rent for jt^
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In 1816, Kelso obtained of John McLaughlin, Jr., and a sister of his,
two of the five children and heirs of J. McLaughlin before mentioned,
a quitclaim deed of the land on the north side of the river, on which
the fulling mill stood, and his administrator, in 1828, obtained of another daughter of said J. McLaughlin, Sen., a similar deed, and there
was evidence tending to show that two others of said J. McLaughlin,
Senior's, sons enlisted in the army in the War of 1812, and have never
since been heard from.
It did not appear that said Kelso made any different claims, or made
any change of any kind in his relations to the owners of the gristmill,
after he obtained his deed of J. McLaughlin, Jr., so long as he lived.
The evidence tended to prove that during the life of said Kelso, and
ever afterwards, the ow ners of the gristmill claimed that they were entitled to the exclusive use and control of the entire water power created by their mill dam, on the ground that they acquired such right by
first building a dam there and setting up a mill, and that it was considered in the neighborhood a disputable matter whether the owners of
the north side of the river had any privilege there, but it did not appear
that^said Kelso ever disputed the claim in this respect made by the
owners of the gristmill; on the contrary, the evidence tended to prove
that during said Kelso's life, and until the sale of the interest of his
heirs, in 1826, the owners of the gristmill were in the habit of calling
on the occupants of the fulling mill, either personally or by rapping on
the side of the gristmill, to shut down their gates, and they were accordingly closed when the river was low, and the water was needed to
carry the gristmill, and that in such dry times the gates of the fulling
mill were sometimes closed by the occupants, of their own accord, and
sometimes by the o wners of the gristmill, and that said Kelso, at such
times, sometimes fulled his cloth in the night, when the gristmill was
not in operation, and sometimes took his cloth to be fulled at mills in
other towns.
The evidence also tended to prove that the owners of the gristmill
also claimed that the gristmill, as such, had a prior right to the use of
the water, when necessary, before any other mill or machinery on the
dam, and it did not appear that this right was denied or disputed by
Kelso, or his heirs or representatives.
It appeared that at Kelso's decease his children were minors, and
they so continued, except the eldest, for a short time, until their interest in the fulling mill and lot was sold by the eldest son, and by the
guardian of the others, by license of the court of probate.
The fulling mill was leased by the administrator of Kelso's estate
for two years, fill 18Z4, and by the guardian of the children for two
These leases conveyed the
years more, to 1826, in March or April.
fulling mill and water privilege for the clothing business, "except when
there was not sufficient water for the gristmill," and it appeared that
during those leases, the owners of the gristmill, when the water was

ORIGINAL

96

TITLES

(Part

1

a

a

;

a

a

it,

low, drew all the water, and the gates of the fulling mill were shut
down at such times.
A witness for the plaintiff testified tliat he was a referee with two
others, now deceased, to settle a claim made by A. Dodge against the
estate of Kelso, for compensation for the use of the water by the fulling mill. The parties stated to them that the owners of the gristmill
had built the dam, and had done all that had been done to keep it in
repair; that Kelso came in under an agreement to pay a reasonable
compensation for the use of the water, though it had never been agreed
what that compensation should be, and that Kelso had used the water
for a number of years under that agreement; that the most of the year
there was water enough for both, and when there was not water enough
for both, the gristmill had the preference, and when the water was low,
was to have all the water. The question submitted to them was, what
the estate of Kelso should pay towards the expense of supporting the
dam, or what should be paid for the use of the water, when there was
water enough for both mills.
He could not say what was said by
Dodge or the administrator, but what was said by either was assented
to by tlie other. There was no dispute between thern. The award was
It recited a submission by bonds, and
produced and verified by him.
had
an
award
other
of "forty dollars to be paid to Dodge
among
things,
for the use of the water privilege," and was dated March 26, 1823. At
the foot of it was written, "We agree to the above award," which was
signed by Dodge and the administrator.
To all this evidence of the acts and admissions of the administrator
of Kelso's estate, and of the guardian of his minor children, it was objected that neither an administrator nor guardian has any power, directly or otherwise, to create an easement on the minors' estate, or by
his acts or admissions to furnish or make any evidence of such an easement, to affect any other persons than themselves, and the whole evidence was therefore inadmissible against the grantees of the minors'
estate ; but the evidence was admitted, subject to exception.
It was objected that tlie award was not evidence of the submission
by bond, without the production of the bonds, or an account of their
absence, but it was admitted on the proof of the agreement of the parties, written upon
subject to the exception as to its admission and
effect.
It appeared by deeds produced by the defendants, that one of the
heirs of Kelso, then of age, and the guardian of the minor children,
under
license from the court of probate, sold and conveyed the fulling mill to D. Smith, on the 5th of August, 1826. Smith soon after
bond that
made contract with the defendant, Fletcher, and gave him
an
of
would
the
the
upon
property,
payment
agreed price,
he
convey
within a certain time that in the meantime Fletcher should occupy the
premises, paying' certain rent, and that when he paid $200 toward the
purchase, the rent should cease, and after that he was to pay only the
interest on the balance of the purchase money.
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Fletcher occupied, paying rent for two years,, till 1828, and then paid
them $200, and afterwards occupied^ as_^ owner, paying interest only.
During the time from August, 1826, to the fall of 1828, while Fletcher
occupied as tenant, Smith paid to the owner of the gristmill half a dollar a month for the use of the water. He testified he paid it because
it was unsettled and considered disputable, whether there was any privilege on the north side.
He said he was offered a higher price, if he
would warrant the water, but he considered it disputable, and declined
to do it. In April, 1830, he conveyed to one Austin, under whom the
defendants claim. While he owned the fulling mill, and paid rent, the
owners of the gristmill claimed they had the first right to the water,
and it was generally understood they had such right.
After. the payment of the $200 by Fletcher to Smith, the right of the
plaintiff to a preference in the use of the water, or to any rent or comwas denied by Fletcher, and he ceased to
pensation for the use of
shut his gates when the owners of the gristmill requested
but
did
not appear, howearly this resistance to the plaintiff's claim was first
""~

made.

a it

a

a

a

a

if

it

a

if

if

it
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a

if

The court instructed the jury that
the owner of the mill privilege,
under
claim of right, used and exercised the rights he claimed, without
interruption or opposition, for
period of twenty years, this gave him
a perp etual right, and that
was not material whether his claim of
right was^welFf ounded in law,
was so exercised and submitted to.
That
party had once acquired
right by such twenty years enjoyment, he would not lose
by any interruption afterwards, unless that
interruption continued for twenty years, and the burden was on the
party who asserted such interruption, to prove it. That
the jury
should find that the plaintifi', under
claim of right, had used the water to the exclusion of the fulling mill, in the dry season, when there
was only enough for the grist mill, or had permitted the owners of the
fulling mill to draw water from the dam for the use of that mill, only
on payment of
reasonable compensation, for the term of twenty years,
without interruption, they should find their verdict in his favor, notpart of that time the title
withstanding they should find that during
to the fulling mill was, by descent, in the hands of minors.
The jury found
verdict for the plaintiff,- which the defendants
aside,
moved to set
by reason of the said rulings and instructions of
the court.

7

2,

&

a

a

a

J.

Bell,
At common law, title acquired by possession during the
period and in the manner prescribed by the law, was called
title by
pre scription.
By the lapse of the requisite time, what was at first a
bare possession, becomes
right of property, perfect and indefeasible.
What,
Gale
on Easements, 62.
The doctrine of the common law, as cited by Coke, (Coke's Litt.
113, b,) from Bracton, (Lib.
fol. 51,) substantially agrees with the
civil law. "Both to customs and prescriptions, these two things are inAig.Peop. —
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cidents inseparable, viz. : possession or usage and time. Possession
must have three quahties, it must be long, continual, peaceable ; longa,
continua, et pacifica, for it is said, transferuntur dominia sine tituo et
traditione, per usucapionem ; sed, per longam, continuam, et pacificam
possessionem. Longa, i. e., per spatium temporis per legam definitam ;
continua, dico, ita quod non sit legitime interrupta; pacificam, dico,

■^1^

quia si contentiosa fuerit, idem erit, quod prius, si contentio fuerit
justa." "Longus usus, nee per vim, nee clam, nee precario," &c. G.

& W.
By

122.

civil law, the rule was "ut prescriptione longi temporis, id
annorum inler presentes, et viginti inter absentes, servitutes
adquirantur." 1 Hei. ad Pan. part 2, § 158; 2 lb. part 6, §§ 122But by the common law, the time
125; Domat's Civil Law, § 2190.
was not fixed to a certain number of years, but as it was expressed
by Littleton, (Ten. § 170) it was "de temps dont memorie des homes
ne curt a le contrarie," or as Coke (Coke's Litt. 115, a) quotes from
Bracton, "Docere oportet longum tempus et longum usum ilium; viz.
qui excedit memoriam hominum, tale enim tempus sufficit pro jure."
In 1275, by statute 3 Ed. I, writs of right were limited to rights
actually enjoyed after the first year of Richard I, (1189,) and by analogy to the period fixed by tliat statute, it was held that time of legal
the

est decem

a

it

&

5

2

if

I

J

r

J.,

J.,

memory reached to that date, and not beyond it. Being a fixed date,
it was of course continually receding, until it became absurd, since it
was practically impossible to prove any fact of so ancient date.
The courts might have held, when difficulties were found to result
from this arbitrary rule, that the ancient law, which fixed the period
beyond which actual memory did not reach, was still in force, or they
might have availed tliemselves of the passage of the statute of 32
Henry VIII, which reduced the limitation of writs of right to three
score years, to decide by analogy to that statute, as was done in tlie
time of Edward I, that the time of legal memory was reduced sixty
years. It appears by Littleton, sec. 170, that in his time it was seriously contended that the time of legal memory was not changed by
the statute of Edward I. And Rolle, C. J., was of that opinion, though
2 RoUe's Ab. Prescription, P.
he admits the practice was otherwise.
And many respectable authorities maintained, after the statute of 32
Henry VIII, that time oMegal memory was sixty years, as Rolle, C.
J., Sergeant Williams, 2 Wms. Saund. 175, n. a.. Lord Mansfield, 2
Com. 31, Abbott, C. J.,
B.
A.
Ev. Poth, 136, Blackstone,
215, and Dallas, C.
C. B. Moore, 558.
From causes which are not now apparent, neither of these views
prevailed, and the consequence was that no title to any easement could
be supported upon proof of occupation and enjoyment, however long
its origin could be shown.
V^ontinued,
rule so abThe natural and, indeed, necessary consequence of
surd, and one necessarily productive of so unjust consequences, was
that tlie courts were driven to evade
by refinements and fictions.
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seems by the case of Guernsey v. Rodbridge, Gil. Eq. Cases 4, s. c.
Vern. 390, under the name of Finch v. Resbridger, in 1707, that the
court of chancery first adopted the principle of presuming the former
existence and loss of a deed, where a long and uninterrupted possession of an easement was shown. I t was not until 1761 that this princ iple was adopted in the courts of common law in England.
Some
of the judges there were, at times, inclined to give to this presumption
the effect of a presumptio juris et de jure, a legal presumption binding
on both courts and juries, as a rule from which neither had a right
to depart, a presumption of a right constituting a perfect title or bar,
Wilmot, J., in Lewis v. Price and Dougal v.
as the case might be.
Wilson, Saund. 175, a; Eyre, C. J., in Hed v. Holcroft, 1 B. & P.
400; Lord Ellenborough,
in Balston v. Benstead, 1 Camp. 163, and
in Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East, 214; and Lord Mansfield in Darwin v.
Upton, 2 Wms. Saund. 175, a, and Mayor v. Horner, Cowp. 102.
B ut tlie current ^f__English decisions has gone no further_ than to
hol d that lon gjcontinued and uninterrupted possession is evi dence fro m
w hich a jury mav_ p rp'^nmp a (] ppc\
Keymer v. Summers, B. N. P,
74; Campbell v. Willson, 3 East, 294; Gray v. Bond, 5 Moore, 327,
s. c. 2 B. & B. 627; Cross v. Lewis, 2 B. & C. 686; Darwin v. Upton, 2 Wms, Saund. 175, a; Livitt v. Wilson, 3 Bing. 115.
The instruction given to the jury that such proof is competent evidence, from which they may infer the existence and loss of a deed, is
2

understood to be accompanied by a recommendation so to find the
fact, whatever may be their individual impression of its truth, and it
seems that verdicts rendered in conflict with such recommendations
would be set aside. Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East, 214, per Ld. Ellenborough,
C. J.; Bright v. Walker, 1 Cr., M. & R. 217, per Parke, B.; Jenkins
V. Harvey, 1 Cr., M. & R. 894, per Alderson, B.^
Many cases, in this country, have followed in the tracks of the
English decisions, though it is apparent that, in a newly settled country
like ours, where to a great extent every thing is of recent date, and
the history of our towns, of our roads, farms, mills and dwellings are
known, a rule like that adopted in England is in no respect adapted to
our situation.
On other subjects, the common law has been every
where modified, to adapt it to the wants of our community.
Tjie Engbeen
but
ha
ve
ions
on
thi
mr)d es_of_ey ading th e^ffect
s_subjert
lish^decis
decisions
of
their
court
s ^which have been found inco nsistent
jy
of^^ear
with the ^)rin ciples of justic ei and it is clearly as much within the legitimate sphere and customary action of the courts to disregard or
to overrule such decisions, as it can be to evade them by nice presumptions, either of fact or of law. Itwas the wise course, prescrib ed by
p rinciple as we ll as by public convenience, to o verrule the a bsurd d eci sions which sanctioned a fixed_2oi rit in the e a rly history of England ,
1 See, also, Cockburn, C.
113 (1S77); Thesiger, L. J.,

(1S7S).

J., in

Angus & Co. v. Dalton,

in same case on appeal,

3 Q. B. D. 85, 1034 Q. B. D. 1G2, 170-175
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as the Hmlt ^of legal mgmory, and at the same time to restore the principle upon which tliat decision appears to be made, that in cases where
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the Legislature have not fixed a precise rule of limitation, rightS-shall
beacquired and barred by a pre scription- of such length of tirn ejis has
been fixed_by_the JLegislature as the proper limitation _Jn__analogous
cases^_Ricard v. \ViIIiams, 7 Wheat. 110, 5 L. EOOSTlSunt vTSunt,
3 Mete. (Mass.) 185, Z7 Am. Dec. 130. •
in
I \X was to adopt here as the law, the strong view of Wilmot,
sufficient to give
possession of twenty years
Lewis V. Price, that
man title to
house, there can be no reason why
should not be
sufficient to give title to any easement belonging to the house.
Upon these views, we take the law to be here settled, as
laid down
Greenl. Ev.
539: "By the weight of authority,
by Prof. Greenleaf,
as well as the preponderance of opinion,
may be stated as the_genrule oL A merican law tliat an adverse, exclusive and uninterrupted
enjoyment for twenty years of an incorporeal hereditament affords a
conclusive presumption of_
right, as the case may be,
^ran_tj or
which
to be applied as
presumptio juris et de jure, wherever by
right can be acquired in any manner known to the law.
possibility
In order, however, that the enjoyment of an easement in another's land
unmust have been adverse that
may be conclusive of the right,
der
claim of title, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner
of tlie land, and uninterrupted
on
and the" burden of proving this
In support of this position, he cites
|;he party claiming the easement."
Mason, 402, Fed_Cas. No. 14,31
Ingraham v.
Tyler v. Wilkinson,
R, (Pa.) 63,
Hutchinson,
Conn. 584; Strickler v. Todd, 10 Serg.
Am.
69, 13 Am. Dec. 649; Sherwood v. Burr,
Day (Conn.) 244,
Arnold,
Dec. 211; Tinkham v.
Greenl. (Me.) 120; Hill v. Crosby,
Wheat.
Pick. (Mass.) 466, 13 Am. Dec. 448; Ricard v. Williams,
Pick. (Mass.) 504; Sargent
109,
L. Ed. 398; Coolidge v. Learned,
V. Ballard,
Pick. (Mass.) 251; Melvin v. Whiting, 10 Pick. (Mass.)
295, 20 Am. Dec. 524; Bolivar M. Co. v. Neponset M. Co., 16 Pick.
241
Bibb (Ky.) 582
Morgan v. Banta,
Simpson v. Hawkins,
Dana (Ky.) 306; Shaw v. Crawford,
Johns. (N. Y.) 236 John v.
Stevens,
Cow.
Vt. 316. To which may be added, Stiles v. Hooker,
Kent,
266;
444;
61;
Hill.
Ab.
v.
60,
Com.
Shumway
(N. Y.)
Simonds,
Vt. 53 Baldwin v. Calkins, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 166; and
Miller v. Garlock,
Barb. (N. Y.) 153, where the principles applicable in cases of this kind are very clearly stated and condensed
Hoyt
V. Carter, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 219; Valentine v. Boston, 22 Pick. 80,
33 Am. Dec. 711; Atkins v. Bordnian, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 302; Littlefield V. Maxwell, 31 Me.
Red.) 140, 50 Am. Dec. 653.
Am. Dec. 55,
N. H. 255,
In this State, in Bullen v. Runnels,
court,
that the. most conwas said by Woodbury, J., and held by the
clusive evidence as to tlie interests of parties in water-courses, was
the
the occupation of the parties during twenty years, because that
common and peculiar mode of acquiring rights to the use of water,
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and because so long an occupation of a stream not navigable raises
a presumption that the grants, now lost by time and accident, have
passed between tlie parties, in conformity to the occupation.
In Oilman v. Tilton, 5 N. H. 231, Richardson, C. J., says: "Some
have held that a term of twenty years of exclusive, uninterrupted enjoyment of the use of water, in a particular manner, is a conclusive
presumption of right, presumptio juris et de jure," It was not the
point directly before the court, and he says no more; but we think
The point
that the remark shows that the opinion met his approval.
decided was, t hat an_ a dverse e n jovment of water f or any period l ess
than twenty year s is not a lone^sufficien t to warr anLlhe presumpjion

of

a grant

.

of Watkins v. Peck, 13 N. H. 360, 40 Am. Dec. 156, it
was held that the ad verse , e xclusive use of water flowing through an
aqueduct, by the owners and occupants of a house, for the term of
twenty years, furnishes presu mptive evid ence of a grant from the
owner of the land through which it is brought, to have it flow in the
manner it has been accustomed to do for that period. And the learned
chief justice who delivered the opinion of the court, remarks of the
case: "During all that time, (more than twenty years,) the right of
the plaintiffs, and those under whom they hold their lands, thus to
take and use tlie water, has, so far as appears, not been contested by
any one; nor is there any express evidence of any permission asked
within the time or of any sum paid for the use, or any acknowledgment that the use was at the pleasure of those through whose land the
These facts, if they stood alone, would furnish
aqueduct passed.
abundant evidence of title in the plaintiffs to take and use the water,
as they and others, whose estates they hold, had been accustomed to
do for such period."
He subsequently says : "The plaintiffs' claim
does not rest upon a prescription.
There is no pretense that the use
has extended beyond legal memory.
T he plaintiffs must^;elx-U£0"
th e presumption of a grant, arising froma n undisturbed enjoymen t
o f the use of
flowing^through the land^wned by the defenda ntjor
so ong a per iod; which may be in the nature of
prescription, ex~
cept so far as time
concerned
apparent that the learned judge referred to
prescription such
as
recog nized by the ancient books of thejaw^ founded upon such
length of possession as the memory of man does not reach to, going back to the first year of Richard
three hundred years before the
discovery of our co ntinent. Such
prescription, of course, could not
in
exist
this case, nor in any case arising in this country.
And any
attempt to reason from the nature of such
prescription, so far as
related to time, might be properly rejected.
The analogy of the
presumption of title, or of grant, as the case may be, to
prescription,
except so far as time
concerned,
distinctly admitted. And there
seems to us both convenience and propriety in applying the term prescription in cases of this kind, since the prescription of the ancient
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books can never exist here, and even as to time, the limit recognized
here agrees with that of tlie civil law. Hein. ad Pand., before cited.
However this may be, this case furnishes strong evidence of the concurrence of tliis eminent judge in the general current of decisions in
this country, as stated by Prof. Greenleaf.
Upon this view of the law, we think tlie instruction given to tlie
jury, that if an owner of a mill privilege, under a claim of right, used
■
and exercised the rights he claimed, without opposition or interruption, for a period of twenty years, this gave him a perpetual right, was,
upon the facts presented by the case, correct, unless the court erred
in that part of the charge where they say that the exercise of the rights
claimed for twenty years, without interruption, entitled the plaintiff to
a verdict, not withstand ing they shouldLfindjtha^^Airing^j,^aTt^^
!
time the title to the property affe ct ed was, by descent, in the jiarids^ of
minors.
This question, in a different form, came before the court in the case
of Watkins v. Peck, and it was there said : "We are of opinion that
no grant can be presumed from an adverse use of an easement in the
land of another, for the term of twenty years, where the owner of_
the land w^as, at the expiration of the twenty years, and long before,
;
incapable of making any grant, whether the disability arose from infancy or insanity.
Perhaps a disability intervening during the lapse
of tlie term, but not extending to the termination of the twenty years,
might not be sufficient to rebut the presumption, but it would be absurd
to presume a grant, where it was clear that no such grant could have
existed."
This case is relied on by the defendants as decisive of the
)resent case, but we are unable so to regard it.
[n the present case, the period of twenty years, necessary to give a
title
by presumption of a grant or title, commenced in 1807, and ended
I'
in 1828, after which time the right was denied, and its exercise interfered with.
From 1822 to 1826, tlie title of the defendant's estate,
in which the easement was claimed, was in the minor children of
Kelso, the former owner, then deceased, and their interest was sold
in 1826, by their guardian, by license from the court of probate. The
disability of the owners did not extend to the end of the twenty
That case was not decided in
years, but ceased two years previously.
Watkins v. Peck, but was in express terms left undecided.
The case then before the court did not require the decision of any.
question on the subject, since it was he ld that the then def endan ts takiii g the wate r^by contrac t_jrom the premises of a third person, could
justjfy^jLindeOhaL_person3l-thg y couTd~not~standnonr'"tlfeir
own occupation. _ But it is not necessary here to question the ruling there
made, in tlie case then before the court.
But we think that, [n Ae present case, where it appeared that the
parties interested were of full age at the "time when the possession and
bser commenced, and for fifteen years after; and also at the time
when the full time of twenty years was completed, and for two years
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before, and the title of the minors intervened for some three or four
years between- those periods, th eir disabiHty would ii ot_p revent a title
fr om bein g^ acquired bv twenty yefir<^ p ossession .
^1.,-We have already stated our impression that by the law, as generally
recognized in this country, the party claiming title under such possession is not obliged to rely merely on a presumption__of_a_.graiit, but
he may rest on a pre sumption of righ t, or of any grant, reservation
or record, which may be necessary to establish his title; and it seems
to us this may properly be regarded as a species of prescription, established here by a course of judicial decisions, by analogy to the statute of limitations of real actions.
Coolidge v. Learned, 8 Pick. (Mass.)
504; Melvin v. Whiting, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 295, 20 Am. Dec. 524.
In cases where the party claiming title under such presumption, may
find it necessary to rely upon the presumption of a deed, we think that
long continued user is evidence of a lost or non-existing grant, from
some person who might, at some time, have made a valid grant to some
person capable of accepting it. It cannot prove more than this. User
a grant by A. to B., on a given day, unless there be
'^ cannot prove
""other circumstances, which confine the presumption to a particular
time, and to those persons only. The evidence of such limitation forms
no essential or natural part of the proof of user. Campbell v. Wilson,
3 East, 294 ; French v. Marstin, 24 N. H. 453, 57 Am. Dec. 294.
strikes us that the legitimate and natural tendency of evidence of
User may, in many cases, be rather to prove a deed existing before the
/commencement of the user, than one executed during the time of the
Tinkham v. Arnold, 3 Greenl. (Me.) 122.
/use, or at its termination.
T
ac
t
of
user
earliest
tends to prove ^ght thenj gxisting,
proved,
jie
j
u
the
that
who
witnesses
pon
he
principle
any en croachment upon his
I
ri ghts, without objection or opposition, seems to~admit, in "some d e. gre e, however slight, a right in the party who does it.
Suchjight_evide nce gain s^or ce by co jitinuedrepetition, until a.^the_e nd of twe nty
ye ars it be comes, unexplained, conclusive evidence of righ t.
This species of prescription being established here upon the necessity existing among us, of some mode of determining the rights to
easements, of a more rational character than the ancient rule of prescription, reaching back to the time of legal memory, and applicable
to all cases, tlie analogy of the statute of limitations, by which tlie
period of twenty years is adopted as the time of prescription, seems
reasonable and proper to be followed likewise, as to the exceptions
Those exceptions are of two kinds, the
M^r^ prescribed by that statute.
case of areve rsioner against whom the statute does not begin to run,
]
'
and by parity of reason, the time of prescription does not begin to run
until his interest becomes vested, so as to give him a right of action.
The tenant for life or years may grant easements, or permit them to
be acquired by user, and they will be valid against himself and those
who hold his estate during its continuance, and perhaps not afterwards,
where the reversioner had previously neither cause nor right to com-
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Daniel v. North, 11 East, 370; Bradburg v. Gimsell, 2 Wms.
plain.
Saund. 175, d; Barker v. Richardson, 4 B. & A. 579; Ang. Adv. Enj.
46; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 545.
/cTwnerswho ^ are under disab ilities when tlieir rigli ts_are-iinsL encroached upon, and the right~o I_actIon for such encroachm ent_jirst
accrues , have by tlie statutes five years to bring their actions, after
the disability is removed, though the period of twenty years may have
In such a case, we
long expired. j<'.oster,v._Mar shall, 22 N. H. 491.
think there would be the strongest reason for applying to the privileges of the house the same rule we apply to the house itself, and to
allow to the disabled owner tlie rule tliat he may have five years to
contest his liability, after his disability has ceased.
^ut_ under the staton cg commenced
r
the
has
statute
held_ihat_jite
ute jt_has always been_
ordinary
lim itation
to run^ no i ntervening disability will defeat the
Howell v. Zouch,
ati_sing frotii— twenty years___adxg l_se possessio n.
Plowd. 353; Doe v. Jesson, 6 EastTSO ; Eager v. Commonwealth, 4
Mass. 182; Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 74, 15 Am. Dec. 433;
Griswold v. Butler, 3 Conn. 227; McFarland v. Stone, 17 Vt. 165, 44
Am. Dec. 325; Mercer v. Selden, 1 How. 37, 11 L. Ed. 38.
The same rule seems to us proper to be applied, in case of disabilities
arising to the owners of real estate, after the user and enjoyment of
an easement has been commenced under a claim of right, with the
knowledge of the owner, and without question or opposition on his
part. Such interveni iig^dis abilities should not defeat the presum ption
o f title resulting from twenty years possession . Tyler v. Williamson,
4 Mason, 402, Fed. Cas. No. 14,312; 2 Kent's Com. 445; 2 Greenl.
Ev. 545; Cross v. Lewis, 2 B. & C. 686; Best on Presumption, 89;
Ang. Watercourses, 235.
The p oint relative to the award is not in s isted upon, and jthe plaintiff's answer to it seems sufficient.
udgment on the verdict."

J

LAMB

V.

CROSLAND.

(Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1851.

4 Rich. Law, 536.)

This was an actiorijm the case for obstructing a di tch.
The plaintiff's land, in
The lands of the parties^jvyere adjoining.
1817, belonged to her husband, one Alexander Lamb. The defendant's
Near Lamb's
land, then, belonged to one Bartholomew Cosnahan.
house were some ponds, which, in wet seasons, were filled with waterjjind^rodu^ced sickness. Lamb asked and obtainedjpennissiqn froniCosnahan to cut a ditch through his land, for tlie purpose of draining,
2Mebane v. Patrick, 46 N. C. 23 (1S53); Tracy v. Atherton, 36 Vt. 503
Scallon v.
(1864); Ballard v. Dommon, 156 Mass. 449, 31 N. E. 635 (1892);
Manhattan Ry. Co., 1S5 N. Y. 359, 78 N. E. 284, 7 Ann. Cas. 168 (1906), ace.
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those ponds. The ditch communicated with an old ditch, called the
meadow ditch, by which the water passed off into Crooked Creek. The
land through which the ditch was cut by Lamb, was then woodland;
it had since been cleared. Tliejditchjiad_been^kej)t g^^en a^^^
Lamb's land ever since, and worked on occasionally, when it suited
the convenience of those who owned the land. The plaintiff was in
possession of Lamb's land. Lamb died in 1836. No evidence of how
the plaintiff" derived title was given ; but it was understood, from the
course of the testimony, that it had been sold for partition, and she
B. Cqsnahan died in 1820, leaving a widov; and
was the purchaser.
infant children, one of whom was not of age until 1841. After his
death, the land remained in the posses'smn of his widow and the administrator, until 1833, when it was sold for partition, and purchased
by one E. Cosnahan, who sold it to one Feagin in 1836. From him
it passed to Green. About 1843, he sold to Dudley, and Dudley to
the defendant.
In_ 1847 (in January ,)_jn consequence of the lower
part of the ditch not being kept sufficiently open, four acres of the
defendant's landTon the^side of the ditch, were too wet to plough. He
but she did not do it.
sent to the plaintiff, requested her to open
In March the defendant filled up the ditch with 'dirt and logs. Some
negotiation took place, and the plaintiff opened the ditch, but as
turned out, not sufficiently, for in July there were very heavy rains,
and the water ponded on the four acres, and injured the growing crop.
The defenda nt again obstructed the ditch. ■ It remained so four days,
But in these four
w hen th plaintiff's son removed the obstruction.
For this injury
was
in
destroyed.
corn
pond
the plaintiff's
days, the
the action was^^qught, an^ the sole questiorL presented by.. the_case
prescriptive right to drain her land
wasTwhether theplaihtilf had
If she had, the defendant had no right to obthis ditch.
throug
up
she had not, then the defendant had a right to fill
struct it.
on his own land.
Evidence was given on the question, whether the use had been adverse, or only permissive.
That question was submitted to the jury,
who found for the plaintiff.
In his report of the case, his Honor, the presiding judge (Evans, J.),

a

ii

is

;

I

a

;

"It was clear, that from 1820 to 1833, the land of defendant_be-._
longed to in fants
and there was not the sTfghtest evidence to change
My
the original character of the use, up to the death of B. Cosnahan.
own opinion, founded on
pretty full argument, made in the case
tried at Kershaw, was, that the preof Boykin v. Cantey, which
sumption of title, arising from adverse use, did not arise when the
and that, even
owners were, at the time of its commencement, infants
in cases of intervening infancy, the presumption was suspended during
infancy, for the_p^resumption depends, not on the use alone, but the
no doubt about the
In this case, there
acquiescence of the.owners.
period of thirty
facts. The sg^ began in 1817, and continued to 1847,
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But during the, time, the land belonged to infants tliirteen
years.
years, leaving only seventeen years. Entertaining this opinion, if 1 had
left that point to the jury, they of course would have found for tlie
defendant; but I did not feel at liberty, after having spent more than
a day on the trial, to arrest the case by a nonsuit, on an undecided
The case was sent to the jury on
point, and one of difficult solution.
the other points, reserving to the defendant tlie right to renew his
motion in the Appeal Court."
The defendant appealed, and now moved for a nonsuit, or new
trial, on several grounds ; tlie f ourtli ground for a nonsuit was as
follows
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Because, admitting that the plaintiff had adverse possession for
twenty-nine years, it was in evidence, that for thirt een years of thi s
time, the proprietors of the servient tenement were infants, against
whom an adverse possession could not grow into a right.
Curia, per Evans, J. There are several questions presented by the
brief in this case, but as the decision depends on the fourth ground
for a nonsuit, none of the otlier questions will be considered. That
ground is in the following words, to wit, "admitting that the plaintiff
had adverse possession for twenty-nine years, thirteen years of this
time the proprietors of the servient tenement were infants, against
whom an adverse possession could not grow into a right." The facts
of the case, necessary to be stated in order to understand this ground,
'
In 1817, tlie ditch, which was the subject of controversy,
are these.
was dug by Lamb through Cosnahan's land, by his permission or consent, for the purpose of draining some ponds on the land of Lamb.
The ditch has been kept open ever since, until obstructed by the defendant, who now owns the land. In 1820, Cosnalian died, leaving a
widow and infant children his heirs at law, one of whom was not of
In 1833, the land was sold, under a decree of the
age until 1841.
Court of Equity, for partition, and purchased by one E. Cosnalian,
from whom, by several intermediate conveyances, the defendant derives his title.
The g^uest_ion_ arising on these facts
whether the plaintiff, who
the owner of Lamb's land, to drain which the ditch was dug, has
right of drainage against the owners
acquired, by the use thereof,
of the land. There
no doubt that, according to our law, as declared in
great many cases, (the adverse use of an easement for twenas fully as
deed for
right to the use of
ty years will confer
In
the
transactions
of manw^ere produced and proved.
ordinary
kind, we find that men are not disposed to allow others to exercise
When, therefore, we find tliat such
dominion over their property.
dominion has been exercised for
long period, without objection on
reasonable to conclude that such use began
the part of the owner,
founded on
in right, or
would have been objected to. This title
or
has
accident
destroyed.
the presumption of
grant, which time
But this
perhaps
legal fiction, which the law resorts to, to support
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ancient possessions, and to maintain what the acts of the parties show
they considered to exist.
There can be no doubt that, if Cosnahan had Hved for twenty years
after the use of the ditch commenced, and Lamb had used it adversely,
as the jury have found, the right would have been perfect; and I
suppose it equally clear, that if the time before Cosnahan's death,
added to the time which elapsed after the sale in 1833, together, made
the full period of twenty years, the right would be beyond dispute.
For in both cases there would be an adverse use, and an acquiescence
by those laboring under no disability, for the full period that the law
requires to support, the presumption of a grant.
In this case these two periods of time amount to only seventeen years, and un less the presump tion ca n arise against the infants,
the twenty years is incomplete.

is said (p. 538) : "It is a maxim of law,
is not to be imputed to an infant, because he is not sup-

In McPherson

that laches

on

Infants, it

In
to be cognizant of his rights, or capable of enforcing them."
Bacon's Abridg. title Infant, G, (5 vol. 110,) last edition, it is said:
"The rights of infants are much favored in law, and regularly their
laches shall not prejudice them, upon the presumption that they understand not their rights, and that they are not capable of taking noThe
tice of the rules of law so as to apply them to their advantage."
same doctrine is to be found in all the elementary writers from Coke
to the present time. The presumption arises from the acquiescence
of the parties interested to dispute
and
would be difficult to assign
reason for drawing any conclusion from the acquiescence of an infant, who
supposed in law not to be cognizant of his rights, or capable of enforcing them. Accordingly we find, that in all the cases which
have been decided^ so far as
know, no presumption has been allowed
against the rights of an infant, whether the question related to the
satisfaction of bonds for the payment of money, or the performance
of other acts, or to rights growing out of what Best calls
non-existIn Boyd v. Keels, decided in 1830,
was held that no
ing grant.
presumption could arise that the condition of
bond of an administrator had been performed, because the distributee, to whom he was
to account and pay over the money, was an infant. The same was afHill, 335. In Gray v. Givens,
firmed in the case of Brown v. McCall,
Hill, Eq. 514, Judge ^arper says "I think has not been questioned,
that the time during which the party to be affected has been under
disability, must be deducted in computing the lapse of time, in analog)'
to the Statute of Limitations.
Such was the case in Riddlehoover v.
Kinard,
Hill, Eq. 376. If the possession were taken in early infancy, the title might be matured before the infant arrived at age,
and before the Statute of Limitations had begun to run against him.
The decisions have been numerous, and the practice habitual and am
not aware of any doctrine or decision to the contrary."
We have no case involving the right to an easement, in which the
it
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question involved in this case has been decided by this court. In Watt
V. Trapp, 2 Rich. 136, Judge O'Neall, on the circuit, expressed the
opinion to the jury, tliat the presumption of a grant to a way would
be arrested by infancy.
But that point was not necessarily involved
in the case, and this court declined to express any opinion, as, accordIn otlier States the quesing to my recollection, it was not argued.
tion has been decided. In the case of Watkins v. Peck, 13 N. H. 360,
40 Am. Dec. 156, it was held, tliat a grant cannot be presumed from
the use and enjoyment of an easement for the term of twenty years,
when the party, who must have made the grant if it existed, was an
infant at the time of making it. This does not come up fully to the
case under consideration, because in this case the grant, if any, must
have been made coeval with the use, and that was in the lifetime of
But that can make no difference, unless
Cosnahan, who was adult.
we apply the rule, which has been acfopted in relation to some of the
clauses of the Statute of Limitations, viz., that where the Statute beBut
gins to run, it will not be arrested by any intervening disability.
tETs'has not been contended for, and tliere is no semblance of authority to support it. This construction arises on a positive enactment,
that the action must be within four years from the time the right of
action accrued; whereas presumptions arise from the assertion of the
right, and the acquiescence in
during the whole period of twenty
be said that the infants have acquiesced, when
years, and how can
they were incapable of asserting their rights
But the case of IMelvin v. Whiting, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 190, was a case
of intervening infancy.
The plaintiff claimed title to a several fishery, on the defendant's soil, and relied, to support his title, on proof
of an adverse, uninterrupted, and exclusive use and enjoyment for
twenty years. The jury were instructed by the Chief Justice that, to
raise such
must appear that such
presumption of conveyance,
exclusive right had been used and enjoyed against those who were able
in law to assert and enforce their rights, and to resist such adverse
claim,
not well founded
the persons against whom
and, tlierefore,
claimed, were under the disability of infancy,
such adverse right
the time during which such disability continued, was to be deducted
in the computation of the twenty years and this construction was supThe only dictum which
have found
ported by the Court of Appeals.
to the contrar}^
contained in the opinion of Judge Story, in the
The
Mason, 402, Fed. Cas. No. 14,312.
case of Tyler v. Wilkinson,
action involved the priority of right to use the water in Pawtucket
River, and in no way involved the question of the rights of infants.
The question which he was discussing was, whether the presumption
from adverse use was
presumptio juris et de jure,
question of law
fact to be determined by the jury. In
to be decided by the court, or
support of his argument, that
presumptio juris, he says the right
not affected by the intervention of perby presumption of
grant
This diesonal disabilities, such as infancy, coverture, and insanity.
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turn is noticed and disregarded in the New Hampshire case above referred to, and I may be permitted to say, without any disrespect to that
great and learned judge, that he di d not bear in mind the distinction
between a right claimed by prescription, and a presumption of right
from a non-existing- grant. The former requires a use beyond legal
memory7tlTe"latter may arise within twenty years. Best on Presump.
§ 88 ; 3 Stark. Ev. 911, 3d Ed. ; 2 Ev. Poth. 139.
We are of opinion, that the period of time^during which the infant
heirs of Cosnahan were the owners~oFTHe servient tenement, is not
to be computed as a part of the twenty years' adverse use necessary
to vest the easement in the plaintiff, and upon this ground the plaintiff should have been nonsuited on the circuit. It is therefore ordered
that the verdict be set asjdej, and the defendant have leave to enter
up a judgment of nonsuit.
O'NeaIvL and Frost, JJ., concurred. Motion granted.*
£^^

BAXTER
(Court

of King's Bench,

v.

mAjL^^

,

TAYLOR.

1832.

4

Bam.

& Adol.

72.)

Declaration stated that a certain close called Stoney Butts Lane,
situate in the parish of Plalifax in the county of York, was in the possession and occupation of J. H., J. E., and J. A., as tenants thereof to
the_plaintiffj the reversion thereof then and still belonging to the plaintiff ; yet the defendant, well knowing tlie premises, but contriving to
prejudice and aggrieve the plaintiff in his reversionary estate and interest, whilst the said close was in the possession of the said J. H., J.
E., and J. A., to wit, on, &c. wrongfully and unjustly, and without tlie
leave and license, and against the will of the plaintiff, put and placed
upon the said close diverse large quantities of stones, and continued
the same for a long space of time, to wit, from thence hitherto; and
also with the feet of horses, and the wh^Js^ of carriages, spoiled and
destroyed divers parts of the said close, whereby the plaintiff was
Plea,
greatly injured in his rev ers io nary_ estate and interest therein.
not guilty.
At the trial before Parke, J., at the last assizes for the
county of York, it appeared that the plaintiff was seised in fee of the
closes mentioned in the declaration, which he had demised to tenants ;
that the defendant had with his horses and cart entered upon the close
called Stoney Butts Lane ; and that after notice had been given him by
the plaintiff to discontinue so doing, he claimed to do so in exercise
of a right of way. The learned Judge was of opinion, that although
that might be good ground for an action of trespass by the occupier of
the plaintiff's farm, it was not evidence of any injury to the reversionary estate, and therefore that the action was not maintainable ; and he
3 See Saunders v. Simpson, 97 Tenn. 382, 37 S. W. 195
(1896)
Goodsyeed, 20 R. I. 537, 40 Atl. 373 (1898).
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nonsuited the plaintiff, but reserved liberty to him to move to enter a
verdict.
Taunton, J. I think there should be no rule in this case. Young
V. Spencer, 10 B. & C. 145, is not in point. That vv^as an action on tlie
case in the nature of wasteby a lessor against his ov^^n lessee, _Here_
the action is by a reversioner against a mere stranger, and a very different rule is applicable to an action on the case in the nature of waste
brought by a landlord against his tenant, and to an action brought for
an injury to the reversion against a stranger.
Jackson v. Pesked, 1 M.
& S. 234, shews, that if a plaintiff declare as reversioner for an injury
done to his reversion, the declaration must allege it to have been done
to the damage of his reversion, or must state an injury of such a permanent nature as to be necessarily prejudicial thereto, and tlie want of
If such an allesuch an allegation is cause for arresting the judgment.
material,
be proved.
and
must
count,
it
is
in
a
must
be
inserted
gation
over the
went
with
carts
defendant
the
was,
that
Here the evidence
close in question, and a temporary impression was made on the soil by
the horses and wheels ; that damage was not of a permanent but of a
transient nature; it was not therefore necessarily an injury to the plaintiff's reversionary interest. Then it is said that the act being accompanied with a claim of right, will be evidence of a right as against the
plaintiff, in case of dispute hereafter. But acts of that sort could not
operate as evidence of right against the plaintiff, so long as the land
was demised to tenants, because, during that time, he had no present
remedy by which he could obtain redress for such an act. He could
not maintain an action of trespass in his own name, because he was
not in possession of the land, nor an action on the case for injury to the
reversion, because in point of fact there was no such permanent injury as would be necessarily prejudicial to it; as, therefore, he had no
remedy by law for the wrongful acts done by the defendant, the acts
done by him or any other stranger would be no evidence of right as
against the plaintiff, so long as the land was in possession of a lessee.
In Wood V. Veal, 5 B. & A. 454, it was held that there could not be a
dedication of a way to the public by a tenant for ninety-nine years,
without consent of the owner of the fee, and that permission by such
I think
tfenant would not bind the landlord after the term expired.
action
maintain
the
present
; and
therefore that the plaintiff cannot
there is not doubt sufficient to induce me to think that there ought to
be a rule nisi for a new trial.
PATTitsoN, J. I am of opinion that the nonsuit was right.
Young
145,
reversioner
was
not
an
action
the
10
B.
&
C.
by
against
V. Spencer,
a stranger, but by a landlord against his tenant. It was an action on the
To entitle a reversioner to maintain an
case in the nature of waste.
action on the case against a stranger, he must allege in his count, and
It is
prove at the trial, an actual injury to his reversionary interest.
be
title
plaintiff's
because
the
maintainable,
may
action
is
that
this
said
for
but
then
claim
of
right;
under
a
prejudiced by a trespass committed
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such an injury the action must be brought in the name of the tenant,
who is the person in the actual possession of the land. It is true the
landlord cannot bring an action in the tenant's name without his assent;
but that, generally speaking, would be obtained without difficulty, and
may be always made matter of arrangement between the landlord and
his tenant. The landlord may even provide by covenant in his lease
tha^he shall be allowed to .,sue_in_tusjten.ant's name for any trespass
committed on the land.
Parke, J. I am clearly of opinion that there was no injury to the
plaintiff's reversionary interest; and to entitle him to maintain this action it was necessary for him to allege and prove that the act complained of was injurious to his reversionary interest, or that it should appear
to be of such a perm.anent nature as to be necessarily injurious. A simple trespass, even accompanied with a claim of right, is not necessarily
injurious to the reversionary estate, and what Lord Tenterden said in
Young V. Spencer, 10 B. & C. 145, must be construed with reference to
the subject matter then under consideration, an action on the case in
the nature of waste by a reversioner against his tenant.
Rule refused.*
y
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v. FORD,
Price,
Assizes,
1761,
"In Lewis v.
Worcester Spring
Saund. 172, 175
which was an action on the case for stopping and obstructing the plaintiff's lights, Wilmot, J., said, that where
house has been built forty
the owner of the adjoining
years, and has had lights at the end of
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ground Jbuilds against them so as to obstruct them, an action lies and
this
founded on the same reason as when they have been immemorial,
for this
long enough to induce a presumption that there w^as originally
and he said that twenty years
some agreement between the parties
sufficient to give man title in ejectment, on which he may recover the
should not be sufficient to enhouse itself
and he saw no reason why
title him to any easement belonging to the house. So in an action on the
case for stopping up ancient lights, the defendant attempted to show
that' the lights did not exist more than sixty years, Wilmot, C. J., said,
that
man has been in possession of
house with lights, belonging
to
for fifty or sixty years, no man can stop up those lights; possession
for uch
length of time amounts to
grant of the liberty of making

&

1

3

&

1

&

2

;

4

Cross v. Lewis,
But see Lund v. New Bedford, 121 Mass. 2S6 (1876)
B.
C. 686 (1824); Ballard v. Demmon, 156 Mass. 449, 31 N. E. 635 (1892),
where the user commenced less than the prescriptive period before the servient land v.-as leased. See, also, Reimer v. Stuber, 20 Pa. 458, 59 Am. Dee.
744 (1853), where the user took place while the servient land was in the possession of tenants from year to year.
What
A. owns lands in the possession of B. under a lease of 99 years.
would be the effect, as against B., of an adverse user for the prescriptive
R. 211 (1834); Wheaton v. Maple
period?
Cr., M.
See Bright v. Walker,
Co., [1893]
K. B. 457; Wallace v.
Ch. 48; Kilgour v. Gaddes, [1904]
Fletcher, 30 N. H. 453 (1855), supra, p. 94.

,'.
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them ; it is evidence of an agreement to make them. If I am in possession of an estate for so long a period as sixty years, I cannot be disturbed even by a writ of right, the highest writ in the law. If_mX-E^
se^Qn_of the house cannot be distu_rbed,_sha]l I be disturbed in my
It would be'absurSr * * * DougarvTWilson, Sittings C.
fights?
^Brr?in. 9 Geo.

iir/

WEBB
(Exchequer

Chamber,

V.

1863.

BIRD.
13 C. B. [N. S.] 841.)

This was a writ of error upon a case stated by an arbitrator for the
opinion of the Court of Common Pleas, upon the argument of, which
that Court held that the owner of a wind mill cannot c laim,_ ^ther by
of arrant arising from twenty years'
presjmption^^r^by^resumptjpn
acquiescence, to be entided to the free and uninterrupted pas sage of
the cur i:£nis.pf win d and air t o his mill ; and that such a claim is not
within the 2d section of the 2~^3 W. IV, c. '71, whic h is confined to
to be exercised upon or over the
rights of way or other__easements

3/ 7-

surface of the adjoining land.
WiGHTMAN, J., now delivered the judgment of the Court:
We took time for the consideration of this case on account of its
novel cha racter. It appears by the finding of the arbitrator to whom
the case was referred by order of Nisi Prius, that the plaintiff was the
owner and occupier of a windmill built in 1829; that, from the time
of its being built, down to 1860, the occupier had enjoyed as of right
the use and benefit of a free current of air
and without^interruption
from the west for the working of the mill ; that, in the last-mentioned
year, 1860, the defendants erected a school-ho use wit hin twenty-five

mill, and therejjy obstructed the current of air which
would have^come to it from~tTie~west, wherel)y lli'e workmg^Ttlie mill
was hindered, and the mill became injured and deteriorated in value.
Two cases were cited and mainly relied on for the plaintiff, — one in
the 2 Rolle's Abridgment, p. 704, and the other in 16 Viner's Abridg-

yards of

the

ment, tit. Nuisance (G), pi. 19 ; but both are shortly stated, and amount
to little more than dicta ; and it does not appear that they are anywhere
else reported, or in what manner or the terms in which such a right
There is a third
was claimed, whether by prescription or otherwise.
case, called Trahern's Case, Godbolt 233, which was the case of a nuisance caused by building a house so near as to hinder the working of
the plaintiff's mill; and the judgment of the Court appears in the first
instance to have been like that of the case in Rolle's Abridgment, that
5 "There were two nisi prius decisions at an earlier day (Lewis v. Price,
in 1761, and Dongal v. Wilson, in 1763); but the doctrine [that of acquisition
of easement of light and air by user for a definite period of time] was not
Ilnll until 17S6, when the case of Darwin v.
sanctioned in Westminster
JDpton was decided by the K. B. 2 Saund. 175. note (2). This was clearly a
Brouson,
"Hepiarture from the old law.'TTurv v. Pope. Cro. Eliz. 118 (1587)."
J., in Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 309, 318 (1838).
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much of the house should be thrown down as hindered the working
the mill.
But, the plaintiff contending that the whole house should
be thrown down, the case was adjourned, and no ultimate decision appears to have been given. These are all the authorities which we have
been able to find upon the subject.
We agree with the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas, that the
ment within the
right to the passage of air is not a right to an ease'"
meaning of the 2 & 3 W. IV, c. 71, §Z
The mill was built in 1829, and so the claim cannot be by prescription.
The distinction between easements, properly so called, and the right
to light and air, has been pointed out by Littledale, J., in Moore v.
Rawson, 3 B. & C. 332, 340 (E. C. L. R. vol. 10), 5 D. & R. 234 (E. C.
L. R. vol. 16).
It remains, therefore, to be considered, whether, independently of
the statute, the right claimed may be supported upon the presumption
of a grant arising from the uninterrupted enjoyment as of right for* a
certain term of years. We think, in accordance with the judgment of
the Court of Common Pleas, and the judgment of the House of Lords
in Chasemore v. Richards, 7 House of Lords Cases, 349, that the presumption of a grant from long-continued enjoyment only arises where
the person against whom the right is claimed might have interrupted
or prevented the exercise of the subject of the supposed grant. As was
observed by Lord Wensleydale, it was going very far to say that a man
must go to the expense of putting up a screen to window-lights, to preBut, in that
vent a right being gained by twenty years' enjoyment.
case, the right claimed, which was the percolating of water underIn the present case,
ground, went far beyond the case of a window.
it would be practically so difficult, even if not absolutely impossible, to
interfere with or prevent the exercise of the right claimed, subject, as
it must be, to so much variation and uncertainty, as pointed out in the
judgment below, that we think it clear that no presumption of a grant,
or easement in the nature of a grant, can be raised from the non-interruption of the exercise of what is called a right by the person against
whom it is claimed, as a non-interruption by one who might prevent
or interrupt it.
We are therefore of opinion that the judgment of the Court below
should be affirmed.
Bi^ACKBURN,
J.. I perfectly concur in the judgment, but wish, for
myself, to guard against its being supposed that anything in the judgment affects the common-law right that may be acquired to the access
of light and air through a window, or to the right to support by an
ancient building from those adjacent. I agree with my Brother Willes,
in the Court below, that the case of the right to light, before the statute,
stood on a peculiar gi-ound.
" '
Judgment affirmed.
- >Aig.Pbop. — 8
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STURGES

v.
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1

BRIDGMAN.

(Court of Appeal in Chancery,

1879.

11 Ch.

Div.

852.)

In the year 1865 hej)urcase was a physician.
f
chas ed the lease o a hous e in Wimpole Street, London, which he occupied as his professional residence.
Wimpole S.tjeetjuns north and. souths and is crossed at right angles
The plaintiff's house was on the west side of
by Wigmore Street.
Wimpole Street, and was second house from the north side of Wigmore Street. Behind the house was a garden, and in 1873 the plaintiff
greeted a consujtingjrqom at the end of the garden.
The defendant was a c onfectioner in large business m Wigmore
Street. His house was on the north side of Wigmore Street and his
kitchen was at the back of his house, and stood on ground which was
formerly a garden and_abutted on tlie portion of the plaintijflTs garden
So that there was nothing
on which he built the consulting-room.
and tlie defendant's kitchen
between the plaintift''s consulting-room
but the party wall, The defendant had in his kitchen twp_ large. marble
mortars set in brick-work built up to and against the party-wall which
separated his kitchen from the plaintiff's consulting-room, and worked
by two large wooden pestles held in an upright position by horizontal
bearers fixed into the party-wall. These mortars were used for breaking up and pounding loaf-sugar and other hard substances, and for
The plaintiff in this

pounding meat.
The plaint iff ^eged that when the defendant's pestles and mortars
were being used, the ^ise and vibration thereby caused were very
great, and were heard and felt in the plaintiff's consulting-room, and
such noise and vibration seriously annoyed and disturbed the plaintiff
and materially interfered with him in the practice of his pn)fession.
In particular the plaintiff stated that the noise prevented him from examining his patients by auscultation for diseases of the chest. He also
found it impossible to engage with effect in any occupation which required thought and attention.
The use of the pestles and mortars varied with the pressure of the
defendant's business, but they were generally used between the hours

M. and 1 P. M.
The glaintiff made several complaints of the annoyance, and ultimately brought this action, in which he claimed an injunction to restrain the defendant from using the pestles and mortars in such man10 A.'

ner as to cause him annoyance.
The defendant stated in his defence that he and his father had used
one of the pestles and mortars in the same place and to the same extent as now for more than sixty years, and that he had used the second
pestle and mortar in tlie same place and to the same extent as now for
more than twenty-six years. He alleged that if the plaintiff had built
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his consulting-room with a separate wall, and not against the wall of
the defendant's kitchen, he would not have experienced any noise or
vibration ; and he denied that the plaintiff suffered any serious annoyance, and pleaded a prescriptive right to use the pestl.es and mortars
under the 2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 71.
Issue was joined, and both parties went into evidence. The result
of the evidence was that the existence of the nuisance was, in the opinion of the court, sufficiently proved ; and it also appeared that no material inconvenience had been felt by the plaintilf until he built his consulting-room.
1879, July 1. Thesiger, L. J., delivered the judgment of the court
(James, Baggallay, and Thesiger, L. J J.) as follows:
The defendant in this case is the occupier, for the purpose of his
business as a confectioner, of a house in Wigmore Street. In the rear
of the house is a kitchen, and in that kitchen there are now, and have
been for over twenty years, two large mortars in which the meat and
other materials of the confectionery are pounded. The plaintiff, who
is a physician, is the occupier of a house in Wimpole Street, which
until recently had a garden at the rear, the wall of which garden was a
party-wall between the plaintiff's and the defendant's premises, and
formed the back wall of the defendant's kitchen.
The plaintiff has,
however, recently built upon the site of the garden a consulting-room,
one of the side walls of which is the wall just described. It has been
proved that in the case of the mortars, before and at the time of action brought, a noise was caused which seriously inconvenienced the
plaintiff in the use of his consulting-room, and which, unless the defendant had acquired a right to impose the inconvenience, would constitute an actionable nuisance.
The defendant contends that he had
acquired the right, either at common law or under the Prescription Act,,
by unmterrupte^ user for more than twenty years.
In deciding this question one more fact is necessary to be stated.
Prior to the erection of the consulting-room no material annoyance or
inconvenience was caused to the plaintiff or to any previous occupier
of the plaintiff's house by what the defendant did. It is true that the
defendant in the 7th paragraph of his affidavit speaks of an invalid
lady who occupied the house upon one occasion, about thirty years before, requesting him if possible to discontinue the use of the mortars
before eight o'clock in the morning; and it is true also that there is
some evidence of the garden wall having been subjected to vibration,
but this vibration, even if it existed at all, was so slight, and the complaint, if it could be called a complaint, of the invalid lady, and can be
looked upon as evidence, was of so trifling a character that, upon the
maxim de minimis non curat lex, we arrive at the conclusion that the
defendant's acts would not have given rise to any proceedings either
at law or in equity. Here then arises the objection to the acquisition
That which was done by him was
by the defendant of any easement.
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in its nature such that it could not be physically interrupted ; it could
not at the same time be put a stop to by action. Can userwhich is neiWe think not.
ther preventable nor actionable found an easement?
The question, so far as regards this particular easement clainiedTls
the same question whether tlie defendant endeavors to assert his right
by common law or under the Prescription Act. That Act fixes periods
for the acquisition of easements, but, except in regard to the particular easement of light, or in regard to certain matters which are immaterial to the present inquiry, it does not alter the character of easeThis
ments, or of the user or enjoyment by which they are acquired.
the
of
easements
stands
acquisition
by user
being so, the law governing
thus : Consent or acquiescence of the owners of the servient tenement
lies at the root of prescription, and of the fiction of a lest grant, and
Tience the acts or user, which go to the proof, of either the one or the
other, must be, in tlT,e language of the civil law, nee vi nee clam nee
precario; for a man cannot, as a general rule, be said to consent to or
acquiesce in the acquisition by his neighbor of an easement through an
enjoyment of which he has no knowledge, actual or constructive, or
which he contests and endeavors to interrupt, or which he temporarily
licenses. It is a mere extension of the same notion, or rather it is a
principle into which by strict analysis it may be resolved, to hold, that
an enjoyment which a man cannot prevent raises no presumption of,
consent or acquiescence. Upon this principle it was decided in Webb
V. Bird, 13 C. B. (N. S.) S41, tliat currents of air blowing from a par""ticular quarter of the compass, and in Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H.
L. C. 349, that subterranean water percolating through the strata in no
known channels, could not be acquired as an easement by user; and
in Angus v. Dalton, 4 Q. B. D. 162, a case of lateral support of buildings by adjacent soil, which came on appeal to this court, the principle
was in no way impugned, although it was held by the majority of the
court not to be applicable so as to prevent the acquisition of that parIt is a principle which must be equally appropriate
ticular easement.*^
to the case of affirmative as of negative easements ; in other words, it
is equally unreasonable to imply your consent to your neighbor enjoying something which passes from your tenement to his, as to his subjecting your tenement to something which comes from his, when in
both cases you have no power of prevention.
in
&Lit_the_^ffirmative easernent differs, from jthe negative__easement
this, that the latter can under no circumstances be interrupted except
by acts done, upon the servient tenement ; but the former, constituting,
as it does, a direct interference with the enjoyment by -the servient
owner of his tenement, may be the subject of legal proceedings as
To put concrete cases, the passage of
well as of physical interruption.

lightand air to your neighbor's windows may
6 See

the same case in the House of Lords.

be physically

interrupt-

6 App. Cas. 740 (1S81).
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ed by you, but gives you no legal grounds of complaint against him.
The pas sage of water from his land on to yours may be physically in-

terruptedj.or may be treated as a trespass and made tlie ground of action for damages, or for an injunction, or both. J^oise is similar to
currents o± air and the flow of subterranean and uncertain streams m
its practical incapability of physical interruption, but it differs from
Webb v. Bird and
them in its capability of grounding an action.
autliorities
direct
therefore,
governing
not,
are
Chasemore v. Richards
They are, however, illustrations of the principle
the present case.
which ought to govern it ; fo r until the noise , to take this case, became
an_actionaj3le_iiuisaJ!cej_which it did not at any time before the consulting-room, was built, the basis of the presumption of the consent^ viz., the
power of prevention ph ysically or_. by action, was never pres* * *

A'

J^^.^6t^

HUBBARD

V.

(Supreme Court of Vermont,

TOWN.
1860.

33 Vt. 295.)

PiERPOiNT, J.^ This action is brought to recover the damage claimed to have been su stained bv the plaintiff in consequence of the defen d-

ant's obstructing his light s.
It appears from the case that the building which has been owned
and occupied by the plaintiff and his tenants for more than twentyfive years prior to the acts complained of, stands upon the line between
his premises and the premises of the defendant, and that the defendant
has owned and occupied his premises during the aforesaid period;
that the windows in the plaintiff's building opened out toward the
premises of the defendant, admitting light from that direction, and that
they have so remained without obstruction, and without question on
the part of the defendant for the period ojLtwentyj^fiye years_or more;
that in 1859 the defenda nt e_reci£d-a.-b.uilding^ on his„owrL premises
immediately adjoining that of the plaintiff, so as to excludethe^light
from two of the plaintiff's windows.
The^nl)r question involved in this case is, wheth er the plainti ff by
such long~aiid umnterrupjted use of his windows, and tlie light passing
through them, has^thereb}' acquired the right so to continue his windows and thus to have the light pass through them, so that any act of
the defendant which shall materially obstruct such light, will make him
a wrong doer, and liable for any damage to the defendant that may

,

ensue therefrom.

The
1
8

well settled in England, that such long
of light, gives the right to contin ue' its use, and

rulg. seems now, to be

nd uninterrupted

use

The balance of the opinion is omitted.
The case sufficiently
The statement of facts is omitted.

the opinion.

appears from
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it,
is

to insist upon its remaining" unobstructed by the adjoining proprietor
for all time. The courts place this upon the same grounds as rights
"of way, and other rights acquired in and over tlie premises of another
by long and undisturbed use ; presuming from the long exercise of the
privilege by tlie one and an acquiescence tlierein by the other, tliat the
right had its origin in a grant.
^"
^hile the general doctrine has been universally adopted in this
country, its application to cases of this kind has not been generally
recognized, and in many of the States has been expressly denied.
'^""Our statute of limitations cannot be brought in aid of the plaintiff's
tlaim. The statute in terms only deprives the aggrieved party of the
right of action after the limited period from the time the cause of action accrues, and although our courts have held that the exercise of the
right by one party, and an acquiescence therein by the other, for such
period, vests in the party so exercising it an absolute right, still in determining the question whether such right has in fact become an abto be computed
solute one, the time that the one has so exercised
first
accrued to the
cause of action therefor
from the period when
so that no right can be lost or
other, which he has omitted to enforce
acquired by virtue of the statute, where there has been no act done by
and
remedy by action to the other
the one, for which the law gives
had
no
of
action
right
conceded in this case that the defendant
against the plaintiff for any act of his, in erecting his building and
opening and continuing his windows, on the side adjoining to, and
overlooking the defendant's premises.
This reason would seem to apply with equal force, against the plain-:
tiff's right to recover on the ground that grant will be presumed romi
•---lapse of time to sustain his claim.
that in no other
presumed
grant
The principle upon which
way can the acts of tlie parties be rationally accounted for. Such prerequired to account for the exercise of the right by the
sumption
period.
oi^e, and the acquiescence therein by the other, for so long
claim of
right so
The right must be exercised adversely or under
in
other.
must be acquiesced
by the
to exercise
by the one, and
This of itself presupposes that the exercise of the right by the one,_
otherwise
violation of some right of the other
without grant,
rule;
neither
could the
the
of
could not be adverse, within the meaning
other acquiesce, for that presupposes a legal right to object and resist.

If

a

if

a

is

is

is

then there
no violation of the rights of another, no presujnptiqn,
no occasion for it. There
of
grant by sucE other arises; there
no right exercised or claimed by the one, that belongs to the other, or
he should attempt it.
which he could grant,
How then can this doctrine of presumption apply to case like the
The erection of the building by the plaintiff on the line bepresent?
tween him and the defendant was no violation of any right of the de-
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a

a

a

a

a

e

a

it
is

it

;

?

if

it

:
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is

it,

fendant; he could not complain of, or prevent
and his assent or
dissent could in no manner atfect the transaction.
The legal right to
do the act was perfect in the plaintiff.
His right to erect his building
on the division line
not controverted, the wisdom of the act
more,
He
made
his
walls
solid,
haVe
thus
might
entirely exquestionable.
cluding the light from that direction; he chose to leave apertures
therein
thereby allowing the light to remain unaffected to that extent; but how can
be said that by excluding the greater part, he
better
acquires any
right to the remainder, than he would have had to
he had not excluded any
the whole,
He has not done any act which
has had any effect to control or influence the light, except to exclude
it. He did not^draw or cause the light to pass in upon his pr_enn_ses in,
remained upon and over the deany other than its natural manner
fendant's premises as
had always been.
As there was no interference with the rights of the defendant,
difficult to see upon what
Lapse of tim and the prethe presumption of
grant can be based.
sumption^ arising therefrom are resorted to, only to justify in one, that
which would otherwise be
usurpation of the rights of another.
If man can acquire, by use, right to an uninterrupted enjoyment
of light under circumstances like the present, why not acquire
right
to_A_lilie .enjoyment of the prospect from the same windows, or to a
free access of the air to the outside of his building to prevent decay,
and many other rights of
similar and no more ethereal character?
allowed, an utter destruction of the
The result of which would be,
value of the adjoining land for building purposes.
Windows are often of more importance for the prospect they afford,
than for the light they admit. The light may be obtained from other
directions, the prospect cannot, A pleasant prospect from the windows
of
dwelling, always contributes more or less to the enjoyment of the
occupants, and often enters largely into its pecuniary estimate. But to
admit that
mere enjoyment of such prospect for fifteen years, gives
shall remain uninterrupted for all future
him the right to insist that
time, would be to recognize
principle at variance with well established rules, and one that could not be tolerated in this country.
No such righ can be acquired by use for the same reason that its
no infringement of the rights of another, for which
exercise by one
the law gives an action.
Le Blanc, J., in Chandler v. Thompson,
Camp. 82, says, that although an action for opening
window to disturb the plaintiff's privacy, was to be read of in the books, he had
never known such an action to be maintained, and that he had heard
laid down by Eyre, Ch.
that such an action did not he.
We think the English courts, in applying the doctrine of the presumption of grants from long use and acquiescence to this class of
cases, clearly departed from the ancient common law rule as laid down
in Berry v. Pope, Cro. Eliz. 118, and the error as
seems to us, consists in placing cases Hke the present upon the same footing and mak-
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ing them subject to the same rules that govern another class of cases,
to which they really have no analogy. In ^ewis v. Price, Wilmot,
house had been built forty years and has had lights
said "that when
the owner of the adjoining ground builds against
at the end of

a

is

a

is

a

a

it,

it

h

it

it

a

a

a

is

;

is

founded on the
them so as to obstruct them, an action lies and this
been
for
this
immemorial,
same reason as where they have
long
presumption that tliere was originally some agreeenough to induce
ment between the parties, and that twenty years was sufficient to give
man
title in ejectment on which he may recover tlie house itself,
should not be sufficient to entitle him to an
and he saw no reason why
easement belonging to the house."
As we have already seen, no presumption of an agreement arises,
The man who occupies his
as none was necessary to justify tlie act.
at the end of that
own house for twenty years has no better title to
time, than he had in the outset. Does he acquire any greater right to
Clearly not;
the light by the occupation than to the house?
aving
of
in
none
The
error
can
time..
acquire
by lapse
usurpednprighthe
the reasoning is, in saying that because the man who takes possession
of his neighbor's house and holds
adversely for twenty years (his
title to
therefore the man
neighbor acquiescing therein,) acquires
in
in
house
that
no
his
own
windows
way interferes with
who opens
the rights of his neighbor, and of which such neighbor has no legal
right to complain, and keeps them open for twenty years, thereby acright to insist tliat no act shall be done by his neighbor on his
quires
own land, that in any respect interferes with, or obstructs the light to
an infringement of the rights
In the one case there
those windows.
remedy by action; in the other
of another for which the law gives
radical dilterence between the two
not. This constitutes
there
caseSj and that too in respect to the very point upon which the whole
doctrine of presumption in cases like those under consideration de-

\

it

is

is

a

it

a

a

a

pends.
It might be urged with much force that man who conveys house
with the privileges, etc., would not have right to make an erection on
his own land adjoining, that would shut out the light from the Vv^ndows
in the house so conveyed, and
may be said that he who has occupied
such
of
time and under such circumstances
house
another's
for
length
that
grant will be presumed, stands upon the same footing as an ordinary grantee. However that may be, this case involves no such question. In those cases the question turns upon the fact that the title to
the premises was derived by deed actual or presumed, from the party
who seeks to deprive his grantee of the enjoyment of the right he has
as
conveyed. The right does not depend upon the lapse of time, but
executed as
can ever
perfect in the grantee the moment the deed
iie^i Here the title to the premises of the plaintifl: was never in the de^fendant, but has been in the plaintiff through the whole period.
This question was fully considered in New York in tlie case of
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Wend. (N. Y.) 309, Bronson, J., says : "Upon what
in
courts
iiave applied the same rule of presumption,
England
principle
to two classes of cases so essentially different in character, i have been
If one commit a daily trespass on tlie land of
unable to discover.
another under a claim of right to pass over, or feed his cattle upon
back upon his land or
or divert the water from his mill, or throw
machinery, in tliese and the like cases lon^ continued ac quiescence
the case of lights there
affords strong presumption of right. ~But
no adverse user, nor indeed any use whatever of another's property,
laid for indulging any presumption against tlie
and no foundation"
no principle
think,
rightful owner." And again he says "T here
upon wdiich the modern English doctrine of ancient lights can be supv. Foote, 19

ported

is

I

."

:

is
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T
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,
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it,

Parker

(Supreme Court of Ohio, 1897.

V.

VANCE.
56 Ohio

St

162, 46 N. B. 898.)

Error to Circuit Court, Highland County.
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The same doctrine was held in Pierce v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436, 46
Rich. (S. C.) 312, in both
Am. Dec. 573, and in Napier v. Bui winkle,
of which cases the subject was fully discussed.
We see no reasons growing out of the nature or necessities of this
class of cases, that require us to extend the doctrine of the presumption of grants to them, but on the other hand, the establishment of a
man to erect
building or wall, that he did
rule that would require
not need, on his own premises, for the sole purpose of excluding the
light from his neighbor's windows, would lead to continual strife and
bitterness of feeling between neighbors, and result in great mischief.
The judgment of tlie county court
affirmed."
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Suit was brought by D.
Vance and others to enjo in the def endant.
A. E. Pavey, from closing up
cert ain wa^iise by the plaint iffs over
his land, which they claimed as appendant to their land. The defends
ant denied the right. The case was appealed to the circuit court, where
at the trial on the issues, the, court, at the request of the defendant, made
finding of the facts and its conclusions of law separately.
The
finding of facts
as follows
"That the pjaintiffs are the owners in fe sim ple of the lands deis

scribed as theirs in the petition, and that the defendant
the owner
the lands set out in the petition as his
that the plaintiffs acquired
;

of

&

4

6

8

;

;

1,

7

9

As to the somewhat analogous situation where the easement of lateral
support is claimed by prescription, see Richart v. Scott,
Watts (Pa.) 460, 32
Am. Dec. 779 (1838); Mitchell v. Rome, 49 Ga. 19, 15 Am. Rep. 669 (1873);
Tunstall v. Christian, SO Va.
56 Am. Rep. 581 (1SS5)
Sullivan v. Zeiner,
^^
^^ ^^^- 2^^' -^ ^'' ^- ^- "^30 (1S93)
Angxis v. Dalton,
Q. B D
^^'^■I'.^^
85 (ISTTT^Q. B. D. 1G2 (1878),
App. Cas. 740 (1881);
Solomon v. Vintners'
N. 585 (1859).
Co.,
H.
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from D. J. Vance; that D. J. Vance had occupied the
lands from A. D. 1857; that the defendant acquired the title to his
lands from Penelope Evans, who acquired it from Benjamin Barrere,
now deceased; that defendant had notice after he contracted to buy
said premises, and before his acceptance of the conveyance to him from
^vans, that D. J. Vance claimed the right of way contended for by
the plaintiffs in this suit; that, for^mqrethan twenty-one years prior
to the acquiring of title by defendant of the lands from Penelo pe Evans, D. J. Vance and his family, in going to and from his farrn and.
dwelling to the turnpike^jeading from Hillsboro to New Market, and_
others going to and from said pike to Vance's, had passed over the,
lands of defendant, using a way or road through defendant's farm
as a foot way, wagon way, carriage way, and for hauling produce to
and from said Vance's farm, and horseback way, without let or hindrance or obstruction from Benjamin Barrere in his lifetime, or Penelope Evans, or their tenants ; that said road was used by said Barrere and his successors in ownership, during all of said period of time,
as a farm road through his farm from the pike to the dwelling house
on the D. J. Vance farm, and to the back part of the farm to the
farm line of said Vance, said entire farm being inclosed during all
of said period of time, being inclosed by fences and gates; that the
Vances, and also the owners and occupants of defendant's lands, used
said way whenever they saw fit, and was also used as one of the
means of approach (but not the only road) to the Vance farm and
house, and for departure therefrom, to and from the said turnpike,
and was so used by said Vances and those going to and from the
Vance place, without asking leave of the occupants of defendant's
farm and without objection,
"The said roadway is described as follows : Beginning in the line of
the land of defendant and land of Jesse and Elizabeth McConnaughey
(formerly owned by Benj. Barrere); running thence a northwesterly
course over the lands of said defendant, Pavey, and, crossing a branch
of Rocky Fork creek, passes by the dwelling house on the lands of said
Pavey, and continued a northwesterly course to the said Ripley turnpike, at a point about twenty-seven rods southwest of the schoolhouse
on said turnpike known as the 'Kansas Schoolhouse,' there being
the legal title

three gates on said roadway, viz. one gate at the pike, one at the
Pavey dwelling house, and one at the line between the lands of the
and the
defendant and said Jesse and Elizabeth E. McConnaughey,
enters
land
where
it
that
of said
length of said right of way from
Pavey to its termination at said turnpike being about 116 rods. fThe
court further finds that the defendant, A. E. Pavey, obstructed* said
roadway in the spring of A. D. 1893, prior to the bringing of this suit,
by erecting a fence across the same, and ever since preventing the
Vajices' passing over the same, in vehicles and on horseback."
^he court found as a matter of law from these facts that the plaintiffs were the owners of a right^ of way by prescription over the lands
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of the defendant, and rendered judgment for the relief prayed for,
enjoined the defendant from obstructing the way, other than by the
use of gates as before maintained, and ordered the removal of the obThe defendant excepted to the court's conclusions of
structions.
law and judgment on the facts, and prosecutes error here for a reversal of the judgment, on the ground that it is not supported by the
^facts.

MiNSHALL, J. (after stating the facts). The plaintiff in error claims
that the court erred in its judgment because it does not appear from
its finding that the way was used for the requisite period adversely
to the defendant and his predecessors in title, and under a clajm of.
The court found;
right, nor is it found that it was not permissive.
that, for more than 21 years prior to the time the defendant acquired his title to the land, D. J. Vance, the predecessor in title of the
plaintiffs, and his family, "in going to and from his farm and dwelling
to the turnpike, and others going to and from said pike to Vance's,
have passed over the lands of defendant, using a way or road through
defendant's farm as a foot way, wagon way, carriage way, horseback
way, and for hauling produce to and from said Vance's farm, without
let or hindrance or obstruction"
from the defendant's predecessors
in title.
The plaintiffs' claim is based on a title by prescription to the roadway on the facts found. ^Easements of all kinds are said to lie in
"
in livery ; for the reason that, according to feudal
^rarTt7~c[nd^'"Tiot
ideas, they could not be created by livery, as livery would destroy the
seisin of the owner of the land subject to the easement.
But as a
right to that which an individual has long used and enjoyed as his own
without disturbance has ever been agreeable to a sense of natural
justice, the courts of England at an early day adopted the fiction of a
lost jeed in support of easements that had been enjoyed by the owner
^f the dominant estate and those under whom he claimed for a period
at a time beyond
beyond the memory .Qi,jnani__Thiswa.s_first^fi2ced
the reign of Richard I. But, by reason of the remoteness of the period,
the proof became more and more difficult, if not impossible ; and
finally the courts adopted a shorter period of 20 years, in analogy ,to
the limitation in possessory actions.
Still in this state of the law,
as the title rested upon the presumption of a lost deed, the courts held
that it might be rebutted, so that long possession still continued subject
to this contingency, and might be overthrown by a showing that it commenced and continued without deed.
This, however, is no longer the general doctrine. Washb. Easem.
(4th Ed.) 130-135; Railroad Co. v. McFarlan, 43 N. J. Law,_605 ;
Tracy v. Atherton, 36 Vt. 503. I Where an easement, as a way, is nowl
shown to have been used by an owner of land over the land of another for the requisite period, without interruption with all the incidents of ownership, the fact of such use is accepted as conclusive
prool of the right. The extent of the right is determined by the nature

'
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and extent of the use.
It is said : "Every species of prescription by
Iwhich property is acquired or lost is founded on the presumption
that he who has had a quiet and uninterrupted possession of anything;
^ or a long period of years is supposed to have a just right thereto,

,

a

i

is

it

'

a

is

a

is

is

it./

ithout which he could not have been suffered to continue so long- in
Brown, Inst. 418.
he enjoyment of it."
This is the principle of the civil law from wh ich title by pr escrip tion
is derived. It mUst not be confounded with usucaption, which simply,
by the lapse of a short time, cured defects in titles otherwise good.
Prescription WAS_ not regarded as a, source of title, buj as a rneans^
of defense against the assertion of an originally superior title^ — one
that would have prevailed but for the consideration given to longtime possession.
It would seem that this was made available by the
magistrate so framing the formula as to confine the inquiry of the
judge to the simple question of long-time possession, and this was done
by writing the limitation before the intentio.
Hence the significance
of the term "prescription/' which from its etymology means a writ-^
The prescription was inserted for the very purpose of
jn^before.
exclii^ng any other inquiry as to the rights of the party claiming
thereunder than such as arose from long possession of the land in the
character of owner.
Sander, Just. Introd. § 104; Hunter, Roman
Law, 288; Postes, Gaius, 581.
But it is not material on which ground we regard that a right to
an easement by prescription rests, — whether on that of a grant presumed from lapse of time, or from the justice and policy of protecting one who has long used and enjoyed a right in the character oi^
owner, — the practical result is the same. ' The party so using and enjoying the easement is adjudged as possessing the right in connection
with his land as an incident thereto. The substance , then, of a title ]
by prescription, whether it relate to the land or an ease ment in
the use and enjoyment of the land, or. the easement, for the requisite!
No inquiry beyond this
period as an owner.
The estabj
required.
lishment of the claim, however, necessarily requires proof
Jthat the us4
was adverse to the real owner, and lincler
claim of right.
Withoiii
such proof one could not be said to possess or use as an owner.
Nor
would the claim be consistent with
case where the possession
taken and held under the license or permission of the real owner.
But\
in the case of an easement
not required that the use should be
exclusive of the owner of the servient tenement. The latter may use
way in connection with the owner of the dominant tenement, as the
two uses are consistent; and the owner of the servient tenement may
maintain gates thereon where such was his custom during the period
of prescription.
The use made of the way and the mode of its en-j
joyment during this period determines the extent of the right ac-i
quired and its limitations.
Washb. Easem. 135. These views are''
fully sustained by the authorities cited by counsel for the defendanlj
in error.
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shows that the use made of the way was
oi the land. It prevented him from cultivating it as he might otherwise have done, or from making any use of it
inconsistent with the right of way as used. It also appears that it
was under a claim of right, as it was used without "let or hindrance"
and "without asking leave."
These circumstances are sufficient to
|
show that it was under a claim of right.
It is not necessary that it
should have been made to appear that the party using the way verbally
asserted the right to do so when using it. This may appear from
conduct as well as words ; using a way without asking leave imports^
a claim of ri ght tO -do-SQ..
It may be stated as a gener al rule , that
where a person uses a way in the enjoyment of his own land through
the land of another, without let or hindrance, for the period of 21
years, in the absence of anything to the contrary, he thereby Acquires
a right by prescription to continue the use as an incident to his own
land, and which wil l pa55-by_a conveyance jar-iiescent^ of,
The fact
of the use
open to explanation.
may be shown to have been perBut in such case the burden
missive.
upon the owner of the land
to show that the use was
permissive one. Garrett v. Jackson, 20 Pa.
331
O'Daniel v. O'Daniel, 88 Ky. 185, 10 S. W. 638. If the rule were
otherwise, the burden of proof would be placed on the party holding
seldom,
for
ever, done in civil suits
the negative, which
easier to prove an affirmative than
Such evidence may
negative.
have been offered, but the court evidently found, in this regard,
was without "let."
against the defendant, in finding that
The evidence
not incorporated in the record, and the finding must
^**
govern the disposition of tlie case. Judgment affirmed.
case the finding
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BARBER
(Supreme

Court of Vermont,

V.

BAILEY.

86 Vt. 219, 84 Atl. 608, 44 L. R. A.
[N. S.] 98.)

1912.

a

a

a

2,

t

a

a

a

Powers, J.^^ The orator owns piece of land on the northerly side
of Pine Street, in the village of Newbury, known as the "Spring House
house which stands just north of
Pasture." The defendant lives in
this pasture, and has lived there since sometime in 1846. During all
this time, he, and tlie members of his family, in going to and from
Pine Street and the postoffice, have aken
"short cut" through the
1908,
this
has
ever
to
until
on December
objected
£asture.^ No one
certain timber
'the orator asked the defendant to take and carry away
small brook in
which he, the defendant, had used as
bridge over
also, Fleming v. Howard. jnoCal. 28, 87 Pac. 90S (1906);
142 Ind. 604, 42 N. E. 2:^0 (l.^^oTT^nittir-Tr Pennington, 122
L. R. A. (N. S.) 149 (1906).
S. W. 730,
10 See,

8

Bain,
11

A portion of the opinion is omitted.

Mitchell
Ky, 355,

v.
91

'
'

I

it.

a dverse to t heowner
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the pasture.
This the defendant refused to do, and the orator cut
the timber in two, and the water floated it away. The defendant sued
the orator to recover damages for the loss of the timber, and with this
action pending, the orator brought this bill in chancery to enjoin the
action at law, to restrain the defendant from crossing the pasture,
A trial was had before the chancellor, who
and for an accounting.
found and filed the facts, and a decree, was tliereupon rendered for
From that decree the defendant appeals. The only questhe orator.
tion litigated below was as to the right of the defendant to cross the
pasture, a prescriptive
right so to do being the defendant's only
*
*
*
claim.
This brings us to a consideration of the main question in the case :
Has the defendant acquired a prescriptive right to cross the orator's
The finding is that for upwards of sixty years the defendpasture?
ant and his family have passed through the pasture to and from Pine
Street "openly, notoriously and continuously, without interruption."
_,^The right to an easement in another's land acquired by long use and
enjoyment is analogous to the right acquired by adverse possession;
and the rules of law applicable to the two cases are in harmony.
Mitchell V. Walker, 2 Aikens, 266, 16 Am. Dec. 710; Tracy v. Atherton, 36 Vt. 503.
One of the essentials, to the acquisition of §iich a
is
that
the
use
shall be adverse, — that is to say, it must be under
right
a claim of right on the ^art of the user.
Mitchell v. Walker, supra;
Lathrop v. Levam, 83 Vt. \,1\ Atl.'33i ;' Goodall v. Drew, 85 Vt. 408,
82 Atl. 680.
So the finding before us lacks one of the elements of a
prescription, for, as we have seen, it does not specify whether the defendant's use of tlie pasture has been adverse or permissive.
Prima
facie, the orator being the owner of the pasture, the defendant's acts
The burden of proof was on the defendant to
were mere trespasses^
establish his prescriptive right, if he had one.
Plimpton v. Converse,
42 Vt. 712.
And this was so, though the orator may have alleged
in liis bill that the defendant had no such riglit. For, though he alleges more, the orator need only prove that the defendant committed
acts which, in the absence of excuse or justification, amounted to a
Bosworth v. Bancroft, 74 Vt. 451, 52 Atl. 1050. Our attrespass.
tention is called to the statement in the findings to the eflfect that the
defendant never asserted that he crossed the pasture under a claim
of right, but this obviously refers to an express assertion, and leaves
untouched the effect of the defendant's conduct. I It was not necessary
for the defendant to make an express declaratioir of his claim ; it was
enough if his use of the way was of such a character as to indicate to
the owners of the pasture that it was under a claim of right.
Wilder
V. Wheeldon, 56 Vt. 344; Jangraw v. Mee, !':> Vt. 211, 54 Atl. 189, 98
Am. St. Rep. 816.
In establishing the adverse character of his use of the way, the defendant is aided by a presumption, which arises from the fact that the
ora'tor and the previous owners knew all about his crossing tlie
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pasture and made no effort to prevent it. This made it necessary for
the orator to come forward with evidence that the defendant's acts
were, in fact, permissive.
The rule in such cases was stated by Qiief
Judge Redfield in Arbuckle v. Ward, 29 Vt. 43, in these words: f'The
mere use, if so open and notorious as obviously to attract the notice
of the owner of the soil, or if expressly shown to have come to his
knowledge, will prima facie establish the right, and it will be incumbent upon the owner to show in some mode, that it was not used
under a claim of right to the water, or that he did not so understand
and was not bound to so regard
from the nature and extent of
the use."
The same thing was held in Perrin v. Garfield, 2>7 Vt. 304;
Dodge V. Stacy, 39 Vt. 558; and in Wilder v. Wheeldon, 56 Vt. 344..
But notwithstanding this presumption, the character of the use remains
question of fact, unless the proof and inferences are all one
way, Plimpton v. Converse, 42 Vt. 712, and the burden of proof reAnd here the proof and inferences were not
mains on the defendant.
all one way, for there were facts and circumstances shown from which
we think
could reasonably be inferred that the defendant's use of
The character and situation of the land,
the pasture was permissive.

a

s

j
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the use made of
by the other neighbors, and other circumstances,)
indicate, more or less strongly, that he defen dantl$_use of the_pasThis being so, there
ture was ex gratia and not hostile.
nothing
for this Court to do but assume, in aid of the decree, that the court of
the dechancery inferred this fact from those found, since without
In re Braley's Estate, 85 Vt. 351, 82 Atl.
cree could not stand.
Co. v.
Whitehead v. Whitehead. 84 Vt. 321. 79 Atl. 516; Perkins
Perley, 82 Vt. 524, 74 Atl. 231; Van Dyke v. Cole, 81 Vt. 379, 70
Atl. 593, 1103; Davenport v. Crowell, 79 Vt. 419, 65 Atl. 557; Sowles
V. St. Albans, 71 Vt. 418. 45 Atl. 1050; Russell v. Davis, 69 Vt. 275,
This
just what the
37 Atl. 746; Perrin v. Garfield, 37 Vt. 304.
Court did in the case last cited, except that was there necessary in
support of the judgment to assume that the court below inferred that
the use was hostile instead of permissive.
serious matter to interfere with privileges enWe reahze that
must not be forgotten that this
oyed fo more than sixty years, but
record according to the
^ourt its in error only, and must deal with
law,
and
without
to
its own notion^ of the
of
regard
establislie3_]riiles
*

*

d

*

meri ts^ of the_ controversy^.
and cause remanded.^'
Decree affirme

also, Bradley's Fi.sh Co. v, Dudley. 37 Conn. 130 (1870); Shea v.
Chicago, B.
Conn. .^.jO. r>4>Atl. P.CO, L. R. A. lOlfiA, GS9 (11)1.5);
Co. v.
(Jranitoid
Bniner
E.
940
202
111.
GO
R.
N.
Co.
V.
(lOD.S)
Ives.
00.
Q.
Cement Co., IGO Mo. App. 2'.).',, I;j2 S. W. GOl (1912): Moll v.
Glencoe Lime
Hagerbaumer, 97 Neb. S09, 151 N. W. 300 (1915); Id., 98 Neb. 555, 153 N. W.
12 See,

S9

&

;

&

Gavitt.

560 (1915).

Land entirely surrounded by other lands of the grantor was conveyed to A.,
who for more than twenty years made open use of a convenient way from
A. then buys a tract
the highway to his land over the land of the grantor.
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MILLS.

(Supreme Court of Washington, 1907. 46 Wash. 624, 91 Pac. 11, 13 L. R. A.
[N. S.] 990, 13 Ann. Cas. 923.)

HadlEy, C. J.

This action was brought to enjoin tlie defendants
and
maintaining a canal on and across certain lands
keeping*
which the plaintiff claims to own, and also from overflowing with water any portion of said lands by means of said canal together with
dams or dikes. Following largely the order of statement found in the
brief of respondents, we believe the following is a fair statement of
thejacts in the case: In the year 1879 one Briggs was the occupant,
but not the owner, of the land over which thii" controversy exists, and
which land the plaintiff now claims to own.
At that time it was believed the land would be included within the limits of the grant to
the Northern Pacific Railway Company when those limits should
be determined by the adoption of the line of definite location of the
road, such adoption not then having been made. Briggs expected to
purchase the land from the railroad company as soon as the latter
acquired the title and was in position to make a sale and conveyance.
But the land was then a part of the public domain, and Briggs was a
mere occupant.
While such was the situation, Mr. Mills, one of the
defendants in this action, constructed a water ditch and pond on part
of said land to serve the purposes of power for the operation of a
sawmill.
The ditch led from the Yakima river down to a depression
upon the land now claimed by the plaintiff, and by means of dikes
and dams, together with the natural topography of the ground, the
water was impounded in a lake or pond, a part of the land so flooded being a part of the land now claimed by the plaintiff.
The lower
end of the pond was upon land owned by Mills, and the water which
flowed into the pond was released through an outlet upon the land
of Mills.
Mills also constructed a sawmill, and the water so impounded developed the power for the operation of the mill.
Prior to the construction of the ditch, reservoir, and mill, said Mills
entered intp^an agreement with Briggs, the real nature of which is
in issue. , 'The plaintiff contends that it was a mere permission or
revocable license to Mills to construct and maintain the ditch and resi ervoir.
The defendants contend, and the trial court found, that it was
la verbal grant from Briggs to Mills of the right to construct and
\maintain said works upon the land. It is not disputed that Briggs at
|that time, and as a part of the agreement, undertook and promised
to execute a deed as soon as he should obtain title from the railroad
from

of land

Does he still have a
over which he may reach another highway.
right to use the first way? Suppose that for more than twenty years after
to use the old way as before.
. his purchase of the second tract he continued
Is the situation any different?
See Ann Arbor Fruit & Vinegar Co. v. Ann
Arbor R. Co., 136 Mich. 599, 99 N. W. 869, 66 L. R. A. 431 (1904).
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But the plaintiff claims that Briggs, in making the agreecompany.
ment, did not intend to give a deed without first being paid a further consideration in money, no amount being stated but the amount
to be subsequently fixed by further agreement. The defendants contend that this verbal agreement contemplated, so far as a verbal agreeMills has continued to
ment could, an absolute and perpetual grant.
from the time of
stored
operate his sawmill by means of the water so
said construction up to the present time. In 1882 he granted to Hutch-

inson and Dreisner a one-half interest in the said power for the purthem erected. The
pose of operating a flour mill, which was then by
in the water
interest
said flour mill, together with the said conveyed
Kendall
defendants
power, has by mesne conveyances passed to the
land
and Mack. The Northern Pacific Railway Company deeded the
the
to Briggs in J88?7 and he continued to own and occupy all of
October,
until
reservoir,
and
land except tTiat occupied by the canal
During all of said time the defendants and their predecessors
1898.
to imin interest continued to maintain the canal and reser\oir, and
the operation of
pound the water therein, and to utilize the power for
In October, 1898, Briggs executed to the Sullivan
said mill plants.
Savings Institution an instrument in the form of a deed purportmg
derives
to convey to said grantee the title to said land. The plaintiff
This action was
his. title through said Sullivan Savings Institutjon.
aforesaid, from
brought In January, 1906, to enjoin the defendants7as
was tried
cause
The
reservoir.
and
maintaining the ditch

further

for the
before the court without a jury, and judgment was rendered
defendants, to the effect that they have a perpetual easement against
or under
the plaintiff and all persons claiming or to claim through
h im? The pl ainirflThas appealed.
^
^Tinding Na 2, as entered by the court, is as follows: "That just
Mills enprior to the construction of said works the said defendant
then the
was
tered into an agreement with one Wilkin Briggs, who
land is claimed
occupant of the land hereinabove described which
undertook and
Mills
said
the
whereby
by the plaintiff, wherein and
and the
sawmill,
and
reservoir
agreed to construct said canal, dams,
and
agreesaid Wilkin Briggs, in consideration of said undertaking
verbally
Mills
ment of said J. L. Mills, gave and granted to said J. L.
said canal,
for
land
said
upon
and
over
a perpetual right of way
and forever
ditch and reservoir, together with the right to construct
land and to
said
upon
maintain said canal, ditch, reservoir and dams
and
reservoir
said
convey said water through said ditch or canal into
and
the
to impound said water in said reservoir and overflow
head of
occupied by said reservoir in order to make the required
run by said
water for the operation of the mills that were to be
no title
had
Briggs
power. That at that time the said Wilkin
then
was
same
to the land now claimed by the plaintiff but the
but it was then supa part of the public domain of the United States,
Aig.Pbop. — ^9
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posed that the same would be included within or covered by the land
grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company as soon as the route
of said company's railroad should be definitely located through said
county, and the said Wilkin Briggs then expected to eventually purAnd at the time of said verbal
chase said land from said company.
agreement between the said Wilkin Briggs and the said J. L. Mills the
said Briggs verbally agreed to execute and deliver to the said J. L.
Mills a deed evidencing said grant of said right of way and easement
upon the demand of said J, L. Mills as soon as the said Briggs himself received a deed to said land ; and the said Briggs then and there
waived any and all other or further compensation on account of the
construction and maintenance of said works and for the overflowing
of said land."
It was further found that Mills thereafter constructed said works
and sawmill and entered into the enjoyment of the easement and of the
rights thus verbally granted to him, openly, notoriously, and adversely
as against Briggs and all other persons, under claim of right, and
with the full knowledge and acquiescence of Briggs ; that all of said
construction was made in reliance upon, and on the faith of, the easement so granted and of the right to construct and perpetually maintain said works and conduct water through said canal and impound
the same, at an expense of $10,000, all of which was known to Briggs
who, during all the time of his occupancy acquiesced in the claim of

Mills and never disputed or denied it; that the grantees of Mills,

-^

who held the flouring-mill power, in like manner relied upon the right
to perpetually use said water and power and perpetually maintain the
reservoir, and by reason thereof they constructed their flour mill at
an expense of $8,000, all of which was known to Briggs during the
time of his occupancy and claim of title to any of said land, and he
never denied or disputed said rights, but always acquiesced therein.
Errors are assigned upon the findings, but we think they are sustained
by the evidence.
The findings establish that the agreement made by Briggs with Mills
was not a mere revocable license or permission to occupy, but that it
was intended to operate as a grant to be confirmed by deed when Briggs
acquired the title so that he could convey it. We believe it is unnecessary to discuss the testimony in detail, since we are satisfied that it
establishes _the intention to make an absolute grant, the. consideration of
which was the construction and operation of the mill at that place.
The use of the premises was thus initiated, and it continued uninterruptedly for more than twenty-five years, until this suit was brought.
Such use must now be presumed to have been adverse, unless it is
explained to have been otherwise.
"Where the use of an easement has continued for the prescriptive
period unexplained, it will be presumed to have been adverse, unless
it is of such a character, or the circumstances attending it are such.
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enjoyed by leave of the landAm. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1202. Moreover, the
use was not deprived of its adverse character or rendered merely permissive for the purposes of the statute of limitations by a showing
that it was preceded by an oral agreement amounting in terms to a
"It is generally agreed
grant, but void under the statute of limitations.
that use of an easement under claim of right by virtue of a parol
as to show that it was a mere privilege

owner."

22

a

a

it

is,

grant, may be adverse so as to give a title by prescription, although the
parol grant itself is void under the statute of frauds." 22 Am. & Eng.
Ency. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1198, and cases cited.
The following from the opinion in Covcnton v. Seufert, 23 Or. 548,
"An
32 Pac. 508, may also be set forth as pertinent to this subject:
if
Mr. Simpson purchased
easement cannot be granted by parol; yet,
from Mr. Jackson the right to use the ditch, and used the same for
ten years, and such use was acquiesced in by Mr. Jackson and his
grantees, it would be such an exercise of the easement, under a claim
of right, as to give a prescriptive right to the same. It is no objection
to_granting an easement by prescription that the same was originally
That the use began by permisgranted or bargained for by parol.
sion does not affect the prescriptive right, if it has been used and
exercised for the requisite period under a claim of right on the part of
Mr. Simpson and his heirs, and their grantees. If the use of a way is
under a parol consent given by the owner of the servient tenement to
use it as if it were legally conveyed, it is a use as of right : Gould, Waters, § 338; Washburn, Easem. (2d Ed.) 127. The plaintiffs have used
the ditch as if it had been legally conveyed to them, that
they have
would
over
over
as
man
his own
such
acts
exercised
of ownership
—
and the court must presume, in the absence of any evidence
property,
parol consent or transfer
to the contrary, that the settlement was
by Mr. Jackson to Mr. Simpson of the right to use the ditch, and

is

*

*

it

a

a

a

a

it

use as of right."
was
continuous adverse use by reThe facts in this case clearly show
spondents ami their grantors under claim of right for more than
This estajjlishes their title by prescription^ and
century.
quarter of
we find
unnecessary to discuss other reasons suggested in support
is
*
of their title.
The judgment
affirmed.
hence

13

The remainder of the opinion relating to another point Is omitted.
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R. CO.

v.

1

McFARLAN.

(Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, ISSl.

43 N.

J. Law,

605.)

The defendant is tlie lessee of the Morri!> C anal and
Depue:, J.^*
Banking Company . In 18/1, the property, works and franchises of
the latter compaiiy were granted to the defendant by a pprpp^iif|] jpn^p,
Pamph. L. 1871,
under the authority of an act of the legislature.
p. 444.

The lessor was i ncorporated in 1824, for the purpose of construc tto unite the river Delaware, near Easton, with the tid e
waters of the Passaic.
Pamph. L. 1824, p, 158. The canal was constructed from the Delaware to the Passaic about 1830. In 1845 it was
enlarged throughout its entire length to provide for navigation with
In 1857 the compan y renewed jie timbers
boats of greater capacity.
in its dam across the Rockaway river, and placed new flash boards
In 1875 the flash boards were replaced by timbers firmly
upon it.
spiked on the top of the dam, and made part of its permanent struc-

in g a canal

j

ture.

The plaiaiif£.i s
a bove tJTe site of

situate on the Rockawav rive r,
the dam. Pie complains of an injui*y to his mill by
back water cast back upon it by means of the dam. The damages
claimed are such as accrued between the 30th of December, 1876, and
the 22d of September, 1877. As his declaration was originally framed,
the t heory of his action was that the dam at its increased height w as
At the trial the declaration was so amended
ari unlaw ful '^i-m^tnrp
a
claim
for
as to present
compensation for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff between the days named, conceding that the canal company
by its charter had power to take and appropriate to its use, lands and
water, without compensation first made, and that therefore the dam
* * *
was not, in itself, an unlawful structure.
the owner

of

a mill

The dp/^TT g&P^^ ^so contended at the trial that tlie righ^to mainta in
i ts dam at its present height had been acquired bv adverse emovmen t.
or tlie canal company, under whom it claims, has acright in dispute by pr^^cJ;^^J^io^^Jhe subject already discussed
becomes of no importance in this litigation.
It will be necessary, therefore, to examine the instructions of the judge on this head.
The instruction -was, in substance and effect, t hat mere verbal pr ot ests and denial of the right, without any interruption or ohstmrt ion
in fact, of the enjoyment of tlie right, would prevent the acquisition
o f~an easement by adverse use r. This instruction follows the opinion
oFthe Vice-Chancellor, in Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. McFarlan, 30 N.
J. Eq. 180. * * *
11

the defendant,

quired the

('

14 That portion of the opinion relating to the plaintiff's claim to compensation, in which the court concluded the plaintiff was so entitl«»d, is omitted.
Other parts of the opinion also are omitted.
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The ow ner of the servient tenement cannot overcome tlie presum pti on of right ansingy from an uninterrupted user nf twenty y ears, by
pro of that no grant was in fact, made . He may rebut the presumption
by contradicting or explaining the facts upon which it rests ; but he
He may show that
cannot overcome it by proof in denial of a grant.
the right claimed is one that could not be granted away, or that the
owner of the servient tenement was legally inrapahle of making, nr the
owner of the dominant tenement i ncapable of receiving , such a grant.
Rochdale Canal v. Radcliffe, 18 Q. B. 287 ; Ellwell v. Birmingham Canal, 3 H. of L. 812; Staffordshire Canal v. Birmingham Canal, L. R. 1
H. of L. 254; Thorpe v. Corwin, Spenc. 312. He may explain the user
or enjoyment by showing that it was under permission asked and granted ; or that it was secret and without means of knowledge on his part ;
or that the user was such as to be neither physically capable of prevention nor actionable.
Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. of L. Cas. 349 ;
Webb V. Bird, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 841 ; s. c, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 268; Sturges
But if there be neither legal incomp eV. Bridgman, 11 Ch, Div. 852.
t ency nor physical incapacity^ and the user be open and notorious, and

be suc h a s to be actionable or capable of prevention by the servien t
owner, he can on ly defeat the .aff iui-^ition of t he rif ; ht on the ground
that the u st^ w-as r;pntcntious, o r the continuity of the enjoyment was
interruj3 ted_ d iiring th^peri od qt presc r iption .
In defining title by prescription, Sir Edward Coke says, both to customs and prescriptions, these two things are incidents inseparable, viz.,
po ssession or usage and time. Possession must have these qualities:
It must be long, c ontinual and peaceable ; long, that is, during the time
defined by law ; continuous, that is, that it may not have been lawfully
interrupted; peaceable, because if it be contentious and the opposition
be on good grounds, the party will be in the same condition as at the
Co. Lit. 113 b. By a long course of debeginning of his enjoyment.
cision, the word "interrupted," when applied to acts done by the servient owner, has received a fixed meaning as indicating an obstructio n
to the use of the easement, some act of interference with its enjoymen t,
which, if unjustifiable, would be an actionable wrong.
This meaning
has been given to tlie word as used in the statute 2 and 3 William IV,
(Parke, B., in Olney v. Gardner, 4 M. & W. 495,) and is its usual signification.
Sir Edward Coke gives no illustration of what was meant by contentious, except "opposition on good grounds," and by a quotation from
Bracton, who wrote in a primitive era of English law, before the doctrine of prescription, as applied to incorporeal hereditaments, had been
subjected to the formative processes of judicial expositions from which
the present state of the law is derived.
The expression "opposition on
good grounds" im p lies an act which would afford an opportunity to su bniit its validity to the test of judicial decision, and is more consistent
with the idea of an interference with the enjoyment of the right, such
as would give the owner ability to go into court and establish his right.
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than with the supposition that prescriptive rights should he forever kept
in abeyance by acts which gave persons claiming them, no power by
suit at law to establish the right. In the passage quoted by Coke from
Bracton, this early writer says : "I use the term peaceable, because if
it be contentious, it will be the same as before, if the contention has
been just; as if the true lord forthwith, when the intruder or disseizor
has entered into seizin, endeavors soon and without delay (if he should
be present, or if absent when he shall have returned) to repel and expel
such persons by violence, although he cannot carry out to its effect what
he has commenced, provided, however, when he fails he is diligent in
requesting and in pursuing." Bract, fols. 51, 52. Mr. Goddard, in discussing an enjoyment which is not peaceable, defines "vi" in the phrase
"vi clam aut precario," to mean violence or force and strife, or contention of any kind; and the illustration he gives is where the enjoyment has been during a period of litigation about the right claimed, or
the user has been continually interrupted by physical obstacles placed
with a view of rendering user impracticable.
Goddard on Eas. 172.
In the English cases, pcacefulness and acquiescence (when the servient
owner knows or might have known that a right is claimed against his
jiiterest) are used indifferently as equivalent to uninterrupted.
|n this country several decisions have been referred to as hold ing
t hat prohibitions,
remonstrances and denials of the right by thr '^wn er
tenement,
o ^the servient
unaccompa nied by any act o f interferen ce
w ith the eniovment of the easement, will prevent the acquisitionof th e
tight. _ T hese cases are a legitimate outcome of the doctrine that the
presumption is not a presumption juris et de jure, but is a presumption
merely, liable to be rebutted by the proof of circumstances overcoming
the presumption of a grant. This doctrine is supposed to have its chief
support in Powell v. Bagg, 8 Gray (Mass.) 441, 69 Am. Dec. 262.
In Powell V. Bagg, proof that the owner, when on the land, forbade
the party claiming an easement of the flow of water over his premises
to enter, and ordered him off, while there for the purpose of repairing
the acqueduct, was adjudged to be competent evidence of an interruption and an instruction that words, however strongly denying the right
claimed or forbidding its exercise unaccompanied by any act or deed,
was not an interruption of the user or enjoyment, was held,. to be defective and tended to mislead the jury. The evidence before-the.trial
court is not fully reported. Evidence that the owner of the land forbade the other party to enter, and ordered him off, was undoubtedly
Whether what occurred at
competent as part of the plaintiff's case.
th ^t time would amount to an interruption oTt he easement, would dep end upon circumstances, upon the conduct o t th e party when torb idLf the owner nf fhp ':;prvipn<- tpnpd en to enter or wlien ordered off.
ment, being on the premises, forbids tlie owner of the easement to
enter for the purpose of enjoying it and orders him off, and the latter,
on a well-grounded apprehension that the former means to enforce
obedience to his commands, desists and withdraws, an action on the
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for disturbance of the right would lie. This view must have been
present in the mind of the court, else why restrict the prohibition to
place — on the land? To give certainty to the owner's purpose? A prohibition delivered elsewhere might be so vehement and emphatic as to
leave the denial of tlie" right equally beyond a doubt. On any other
view of the case, as was said in C. & N. W. R. R. Co. v^JHijag, 90
of the place where the forbiddance was
111. 340, rt he circumstances
If f acts such_^
rn ade, whethel" on or off the land, would be immaterial."
as are above indicated, appeared in the case, the charge was, in the
language of the court, "defective, and tended to mislead the jury in
applying the evidence to the rule of law upon which the title of the defendant to the easement rested." Certain expressions from the opinion
have been quoted as indicating that a verbal denial of the right will
If that view be adopted,
operate, ipso facto, to determine the right.
or the suggestion of Mr. Justice Woodbury, (3 Woodb. & M. 551,)
that complaints and the taking of counsel against such encroachments
will bar the right, be followed, it is obvious that rights by prescription
will be of little value.
None of the authorities cited by the learned judge in Powell v. Bagg,
goes to the extent contended for. The passage quoted from Bracton,
[that an easement will be acquired by its exercise under a claim of right
per patientiam veri domini qui scivit et non prohibuit sed permisit de
consensu tacito, is followed by the comment that sufferance is taken
for consent, and th ai: if the lord of the property, through sufferanc e,
h as, when present and knowing the fact, allowed his neighbor to en toy
on his estate a servitude for a long time pcaccablv and without interrupt ion from such enjoyment nnrl t;iiffer;mrp, t here is a presumption. of
Bract, lib. 2, c. 23, § 1. fin the passage
consent and willingness.
re-|
ferred to in Greenleaf, the language is that the user must be adverse — \
that is, under a claim of title — with the knowledge and acquiescence of\
In j
the owner of the land, and uninterrupted.
2^Greenl. Ev. § 539.
Sargent v. Ballard, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 254, 255, Weld, J., in discussing the
methods by which a claim of title by prescription may be controverted
by disproving the qualities and ingredients of such a title, says that
"ev idence_piigbt be q-iven to prove that the use had bee n interrupt ed,
th erebv disproving a COn tJn'T^^I nrgniV^rprirp nf | )ip owner fnr tvypnty
I n Arnold v. Stevens, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 112, 35 Am. Dec. 305,
y ears."
the plaintiffs' claim was of a right to dj^ore, under a grant by deed.
They had not exercised the riglTt for forty years. In the meantime the
owner had occupied and cultivated the surface of the land. The court
held that there was no enjoyment hostile to the easement, for the owner
of the land had done "nothing adverse to the rights of the owners of
the easement — nothing to which they could object, or which would apprise them of the existence of any hostile claim, and no acquiescence,
In
therefore, existed from which a conveyance could be presumed."
Monmouthshire Canal Co. v. Harford, 1 C., M. & R. 614, evidence
was given of applications made on behalf of the claimants of the easecase

136

ORIGINAL

TITLES

(Part

1

ment for permission to exercise tiie right. The court held that permis
sion asked for and received was admissible to show that the enjoyment
"
was not of right nor continuous and uninterrupted, for every time, t he
occupiers asked for leave they admi tted t hat the former license had ex^
In nei]) ircd, an"crthat the continuance of the enjoyment was brokeri?
tlTer of these cases was the effect of verbal remonstrances or complaints, as evidence of an interruption of enjoyment, considered.
Nor do the additional English cases cited by plaintiff's counsel in his
In Livett v. Wilson, 3 Bing.
brief meet the point under consideration.
115, it is stated in the report that "as to undisputed use of the way
there was conflicting testimony, but the weight of the evidence showed
that the alleged right had been pretty constantly contested, and the defendant, upon recently taking some adjoining premises, the approach
to which by the entrance he claimed into the yard, said 'my right of
"
The
way from the street to the yard can now no longer be resisted.'
character of the acts of resistance does not appear in the report of the
case, either in 3 Bing. or in 10 Moore — whether they were verbal complaints or physical resistance. I do not find in either report of the case
any warrant for the assertion of Tucker, P., (Xichols v. Aylor, 7 Leigh
[Va.] 565,) that "repeated complaints and denials of the title of his adversary were considered as sufficiently rebutting the presumption of a
grant." The only pertinency this case has to the subject now considered, arises from the manner in which the case was left to the jury.
The judge left to the jury to find whether or not the right had been
granted by deed, instead of submitting to them the questions of fact
I agree that, if the issue upon
upon which the law presumes a grant.
such a claim of right is whether a deed in fact has been made, proof
of verbal complaints on or olt the locus in quo, as well as proof tliat
no deed in fact was made during the continuance of the user, would
be admissible and competent evidence; and such evidence would generally determine the issup. But this method of leaving the question to
juries has been condemned by the English courts, and is at variance
with the doctrine generally received by the courts of this country.
In Olney v. Gardner, 4 M. & W. 495, the decision was that, where
there was unity of possession of the dominant and servient tenements,
the time during which such possession was continued must not only be
excluded in the computation of the twenty years, but destroyed altogether the effect of the previous possession by breaking the continuity
of enjoyment. In Bright v. Walker, 1 C, M. & R. 211, it was held tha t,
a s against the reversioner, the enjoyment of an easemenfduring a t enancy for life was not to be recK'oned as part of the prescriptive per iod.
"Eaton V. Swansea Water Works, 17 O. B. 267, was an action for disturbance of a water-course claimed by adverse user. The court held
that interruptions, though not acquiesced in for a year under statute 2
and 3 William IV, might show that the enjoyment was never of right,
but was contentious throughout; and there being evidence that the
owner of the servient tenement was in the habit of stopping up the
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trench whenever it was made, the neglect of the judge to answer a question propounded by a juror as to what would be the effect in law of a
state of perpetual warfare between the parties was not a satisfactory
method of leaving the case to the jury. In Tickle v. Brown, 4 A. & E.
369, it was held that the words "enjoyed by any person claiming a
right," and "enjoyment thereof as of right," in the statute, meant
an enjoyment had not secretly, or by stealth, or by tacit sufferance, or by permission asked from time to time on each occasion or on
many, and that, therefore, p roof of a parol license was competent to
show tha^ the enjoyment was permissive, ?^nd not und fr ^ rlnini-rii.
r jglit . 'I'lie other two English cases referred to (Benneson v. Cartright,
5
S. 1 ; Glover v. Coleman, L. R. 10 C. P. 108) were simply interpretations of section 4 of the statute 2 and 3 William IV, and are not
authorities with respect to the principles upon which prescriptive rights
are acquired or prevented at common law. In each of the cases there
was an actual physical obstruction of the user, and these cases turned
upon the meaning of the words "submitted to or acquiesced in," contained in section 4, which provided that no act or matter should be
deemed an interruption unless it should have been submitted to or acquiesced in for one year. Mr. Goddard, writing after all these cases
were decided, in his excellent treatise, says: "It is commonly said that
no easement can be acquired by prescription if the user has been enThe word vi does not simply mean by viojoyed vi clam aut precario.
lence or force, but it means also by strife or contention of any kind —
as, for instance, that the enjoyment has been during a period of litigation about the right claimed, or that the user has been continually disputed and interrupted by physical obstacles placed with a view of renGoddard on Eas. 172.
dering the user impracticable."
1 have not discovered in the English cases any intimation
that mere
remonstrances,
the
of
or
denials
of user,
complaints,
right,
prohibitions
j
I will be considered interruptions of the user of an easement, or as indiOn the contrary,
eating that the enjoyment of it was contentious.
I
whenever the subject has been mentioned, it has elicited expressions
This is conspicuously
_oi-+riarked disapprobation of such a proposition.
apparent in the opinions of Bayley, J., in Cross v. Lewis, 2 B. & C. 689;
of Lush, J., in Angus v. Dalton, 3 Q. B. D. 85 ; and of Thesigcr and
Cotton, Lords Justices, in the same case, as reported in 4 Q. B. D. 172,
186. Thesiger, L. J., in considering the nature of the evidence which
shall contradict, explain or rebut the presumption of right arising from
an uninterrupted possession of twenty years, says that it is "not sufficient to prove such circumstances as negative an actual assent on the
part of the servient owner, or even evidence of dissent short of actual
In Angus v. Dalton, the
interruption or obstruction to the enjoyment."
easement was not such as came within the statute 2 and 3 William IV ;
and the case was discussed and decided upon the principles of the common law, independently of the statutory provision.
Some confusion on the subject has arisen from the failure to discrim-
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inate between negative and affirmative easements ; negative easements,
such as easements of light, and of the lateral support of buildings,
which cannot lawfully be interrupted except by acts done upon the
servient tenement; and affirmative easements, such as ways and the
overflowing of lands by water, which are direct interferences with the
enjoyment b}? the servient owner of the premises, and may be the subject of legal proceedings as well as of physical interruption. This distinction is pointed out by the court in Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch.-&r-^
In Angus v. Dalton, the Queen's Bench decided that the negative
852.
easement of lateral support of buildings could not be acquired by prescription, for the reason that the owner of the adjoining premises had
no power to oppose the erection of the building and no reasonable
means of resisting or preventing the enjoyment of its lateral support
from his adjoining lands. But this decision was overruled in the Court
of Appeals.
Angus v. Dalton, 3 Q. B. D. 85, 4 Q. B. D. 162. With
respect to such an easement there is great force of reasoning in the contention that slight acts of dissent should avail to defeat the acquisition
of a right ; for it would be unreasonable to compel the owner of the
adjoining lands to dig down and undermine the foundations or to put
him to legal proceedings quia timet to preserve dominion over his propBut no such considerations of hardship or inconvenience exist
erty.
when the easement is a right of vvay, which, whenever the right is exercised, is a palpable invasion of property and may easily be obstructed,
or is an easement of flooding lands, which is really, though not techni^
cally, a disseizin pro tanto, and can easily be interrupted.
polic
y. J It
is
founded
whole
doctrine
of
on
prescription
public
VThe
is a matter of public interest that title to property should not long remain uncertain and in dispute. The doctrine of prescription conduces,
in that respect, to the interest of society, and at the same time is promotive of private jiistice by putting an end to and fi.xinga limit t o^con ^
tention and strife. ICrQte&ts and m ere denials of right are evidence^ that
the right is in dispute, as distinguished from a contested right,
such protests and denials, unaccompanie dby anact which in law
arnnijptQ to a flUtnrhnni'P nnri ic actionable nSSU c HTISe'permittcd tO pUt
the i:ig4it in nheyr mce. the policy of the law wil l be defeated, and prescriptive rights be_2la££d- UPon the most unst able nf fnu ndntinrm.
SupIf after such
pose an easement is enjoyed, sa}', for thirty years.
continuance of enjoyment the right may be overthrown by proof of protests and mere denials of the right, uttered at soniejxniQte but serviceable time during that period, it is manifest that a right held by so uncertain a tenure will be of little value. If the easement has been interrupted by any act which places the owner of it in a position to sue and
settle his right, if he chooses to postpone its vindication until witnesses
are dead or tlie facts have faded from recollection, he has his own
folly and supineness to which to lay the blame. Bii^_if_Ji^_in£j:£_4)rotests and denia ls-l:m his adversary, his righ t_niight be ^efgatgdJiejYQiild
He could neither sue
be_£lacedat_an un conscion able -disadvantage.
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and establish his right, nor could he have the advantage usually derived
from long enjoyment in quieting titles.
P rotests and remonstrances bv the owner of the servient tenemen t
ag ainst the use of the easement, rather add to tlie streng^th of the claim
o f"a"prescriptive right; fpr^ holdin g in defij nc^_Qf_sucli_e>Lpxnstn1;itinns'
isjdemonstrative^PX Qof that th ejmjoyT-nent is under a claim of right,
fi ostjTe^d adverse ; and if they be not accompanied by acts amounting
t o a disturbance

of

the right in a legal

s e nse,

"

they are no interruptio n

or obstruction of the enjoyment .
The instructions of the judge were erroneous in this respect. Th e
j ur y^ should have be en told that a continuous enjoyment under a claim ^^nyxuyf^
o f right ior twenty years, not obstructed by some suable act, and ha v- x/^,^iXx.omlJ
qualities ot an adverse user, confers an indcteasible righ t .
in
^the other
It is said that the instruction was given in view of evidence tending to
show interruptions in fact of the right, and therefore the error was
As the judgment will be reversed on other grounds, and
harmless.
the case may be retried, we prefer not to discuss the evidence at this
time.

On the two exceptions considered here, we think
be reversed.

*

*

*

the judgment

should

15

ir-Dennith v. Annv(>-. 00 Ta. 1^1 (1.«:T0); Jordnn v. Lan?, 22 S. C. 159
Kiiiil)iill v. I.ndd, 42 Vt. 747 (1S70). ace. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. V.
Iloat,'. 00 III. .T'.n (1S7S) : Crosier v. I?ro\vii, Cf, W. Va. 27.".. Q5 S. E. r>20, 25
L. R. A. (N. S.) 174 (1000); Roid v. Cnnictt, 101 Va. 47. 4.". S. E. 1S2 (100.3),
contra.
See Andrics v. Detroit, (J. II. & M. R. Co., 10.") Mirli. r">7, (J.3 N. W.
52(; (ISO-.t;
I n som e
Rollins v. Blackdcii. 112 Me. 4."0. 02 Atl. .'.21 (1014).
s tates there arc s tatntes pnn i(]iiif thiit c ertiiin r'ofi<-i'v; sli-ill itinrnnr rii ijimi n^ of a tirescij jmvQ r{,<rht- s;.>,7 s;tims:nn'a Am. St Law, § 2204.
V\s to the olfeT-t of a fence hnilt or attempted to be built across way claimed hv prescrii)tion as intermiition of user, see Rrayden v. New York, N. H. &
H. R. R. Co.. 172 Mass. 22."). .".1 N. E. 1081 (1808), and Connor v. Sullivan,
(1,S85);

4

Conn!

2G

16 Am. Rep. 10 (187:'.).

with his use of Blackacre, had for five years
used adversely a way over B.'s land; A. then conveyed Blackacre to C, "with
ir the bn lanee of
and C. continued siic li ;i(]v"r>-o iw^
the aiipurtenances."
period^
Has C. acnuired the easement by prescript ion?
he nre.scrjptive
we re
wouIlI be the result If the words "with the api)urtenances'
^Vhat
What If C. were A.'s heir, and as such succeeded to A.'s rights in
omitted?
Allen (Mass.) 2l1 (18U3).
Blackacre? See Leonard v. Leonard,
KiN(i7V A., in connection

A^-o-^
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YARBOROUGH.

(House of Lords, 1S28.

5 Biug.

163.)

Best, C. J. My Lords, the question which your Lordships have
"
proposed for the opinion of the Judges is as follows:
A. is seised in
hjsdcmesne as of fee of the manor of N., and of the demesne lands
thereof, which said demesne lands were f ormerly bounded on one side
by tlie sea . A certain piece of land, consisting of about 450 acres, by
the slow , g raduaL-and i mperceptible projection^ lluvion subsidence,
and accretion of ooze, soil, sand, and matter slowly, gradually, and
imperceptibly, and by imperceptible increase in long time ca^t up, deposited, and settled by and from flux and reflux of the tide, and waves
of the sea in, upon, and against the outside and extremity of the said
demesne lands h ath been formed, and hath settled, grown, and accru ed
u pon, and against, and unto tlie said demesne lam lZ
Does such piece
of land so formed, settled, grown, and accrued as aforesaid, belong to
tlie Crown or to A., the owner of the said demesne lands ? There is
no local custom on the subject."
The Judges have desired me to say to your Lordships that land
gradually and imperceptibly added to the demesne lands of a manor,
as stated in the introduction to your Lordships' question, does not belong to tlie crown, but to the owner of the demesne land.
All the writers on the law of England agree in thisi/^iat as the King
is lord of the sea tliat flows around our coasts, and also owner of all
the land to which no individual has acquired a right by occupation and
improvement, the soil tliat was once covered by the sea belongs to him.
B ut this right of the sovereign might, in particular places, or. un der
c ircumstances, m all places near the sea, be transferred to crrfnin nf
his subjects by law. A law giving such rights may be presumed from
either a local or general custom, such custom being reasonable,' and
proved to have existed from time immemorial.
Such as claim under
the former must plead
and establish -their pleas by proof of the
existence of such a custom from time immemorial.
eneral customs were in ancient times stated in the plcadin.s^s of
as the custom o^^merchants, the custhose wno claimed under them
tonis
the realm with reference to innkeepers Shd catriers, and others of the same description.
has not been usual for
But
long time
to allude to such customs in the pleadings, because no proof
required
:

a

is

it
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v.

it,

^
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they are considered as adopted into the common
without any evidence.
law and as such are recognized by the Judges
to particular deapply
These are called customs, because they only
the subjects of the realm;
scriptions of persons, and do not affect all
to the classes to which they
but if they govern all persons belonging
laws; as an act of parliarelate they are to be considered as public
the whole body of the clergy,
ment applicable to all merchants, or to
act.
is to be regarded by tlie Judges as a public
of the owners of all laiu
right
I f there is a custom regulating the
custon as need not be set mit in
so general
bordering on th sea,
will be taken notice ot by the
Ui pleac lin.gs^o77f3ved by evidence, but
/We think there is^ custom by
Tud-es as part of the common law.
rej^raduaUy and imperceptibly
which lands from which the sea
to
the
person
the property ot
moved by the alluvion of soil, becomes
and
mans,
has been in the fundus
attached, although
whose land
V^^^^^^^^
reasonably ^^ recustom
Sjich
as such the property of the King.
il; bene<r.r.U thPrirdits of theKing. and the subjects_cl nimmr ynd^f
established by satisfactory
fidal to the public; anritTexistence is
•
legal evidence.
,,
by alluvion, and
formed
land
between
difference
great
There
useful soil by
and formed bv nlluvion must become
derelict land.
'
by one
dcpositcd
what
of
1^^^'^
ncrr... too slc jw tO h^ v^T'---'-^^
emAn
next.
removed by the
tide will be so permanent as not to be
out tlie sea
sufficient consistency and height to keep
bankment of
Ilut the sea frequently retires suddenmust be formed imperceptibly.
large space of land uncovered.
ly, and leaves
are considered, this
When the authorities relative to these subjects
material distinction in the law that
difference will be found to make
Unare formed by
applies to derelict lands, and to such as
alluvioi^
must pass away before lands formed
less trodden by cattle, many years
wide to be used beneby alluvion would be hard enough or sutTiciently
As soon as
ficially by any one but the owner of the lands adjoining.
cattle from the adjoming lands
alluvion lands rise above the water, the
on them; and prepare them
will give them consistency by treading
which tliey will drop on them.
for -rass or agriculture by the manure
lands may
yard wide the owner of the adjoimng
When they are but
to
use
the^ing
no
of
Thus lands which are
render them productive.
adjoin ing lands, and he will^cauire
will be nc.fnl to the owner of the
that all titles to lan chjiaye^been
tle to them on the same princip
a
nT:;^nired by individuals, viz. bv occupation and improvenient.
Government, in which he deiocke in passage in his Treatise on
God
right of property, says:
scribes the grounds of the exclusive
imthat
earth;
is.
subdue the
and man's reason command him to
upon it
for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something
prove
He that in obedience to that command
that was his own, his labour.

i
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A
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/
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is

it,

subdued, tilled, and sowed any part of
somethereby annexed to
thing that was his property which another had no title to, nor could
without injury take from him."
This passage proves the reasonableness of the custom that assigns
lands gained by alluvion to the owner of the lands adjoining.
The reasonableness
further proved by this, hat the land so gain ed
compensation for the expense of embankment, and for losses
w hich frequently happen from inundation to the owners of lands nea

t

he se a.

is

is

;

is

2,

2,

is

i

t;

o

e

a

o

it

a

a

it

is

is

This custom
be neficial to the pub lic. Much land which would rein consequence of this cusmain for years, perhaps for ever, barren,
tom rendered productive as soon as
formed.
Although the sea
gradually and imperceptibly forced back, the Icind formed by the alluvion will become of
size proper for cultivation and use; but in the
mean time the owner of the adjoining lands will have acquired
title
to
by improving it.
The riginal deposit constitutes not
tenth part of its value, th
ot her nine tenths are created by the labour of the person who has c^c upied
and, in the words of Locke, the fruits of his labour cannot,
without injury, be taken from him.
The existence of this custom
established by legal evidence.
In
Bracton, book
there
this passage: "Item, quod per allucap.
vionem agro tuo flumen adjecit, jure gentium tibi acquiritur.
Est
autem alluvio latens incrementum
et per alluvionem adjeci dicitur
quod ita paulatim adjicitur quod intclligere non possis quo momento
temporis adjiciatur.

erit."

In

Si autem non sit latens incrementum, contrarium

:

is

§

1,

it it

is it

2,

is

is

It

it
is

ly

;

passage,

is

treatise which
it

a

published as the work of Lord Hale, treating
said "That Bracton follows in this the civil law
and yet even according to this the common law doth regularhold between parties.
But
doubtful in case of an arm of the
sea.'.'
Hale de Jure Maris, p. 28.
true that Bracton follows the
civil law, for the passage above quoted
to be found in the same
words in the Institute, lib.
tit.
20.
But Bracton, by inserting
this passage in his book on the laws and customs of England, presents
to us as part of those laws and customs.
Lord Hale admits that
the law of England in cases between subject and subject; and

of this
writers

it

7)

a

a

would be difficult to find
reason why the same question between the
crown and
subject should not be decided by the same rule. Bracton
wrote on the law of England, and the situation which he filled, namely,
that of Chief Justice in the reign of Henry the Third, gives great
authority to his writings. Lord Hale in his History of the Common
Laws (cap.
was much improved in the time of Bracton.
says, tliat
This improvement was made by incorporating much of the civil law
with the common law.
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are borrow-

from
and are still quoted in tlie language of the civil
law.
Notwithstanding the clamour raised by our ancestors for the
restoration of the laws of Edward the Confessor, I believe that these
and all the Norman customs which followed would not have been sufficient to form a system of law sufficient for the state of society in the
times of Henry the Third.
Both courts of justice and law writers
were obliged to adopt such of the rules of the digest as were not inconsistent with our principles of jurisprudence.
Wherever Bracton
got his law from Lord Chief Baron Parker, in Fortescue 408, says,
"as to the authority of Bracton, to be sure many things are now altered, but there is no colour to say it was not law at that time.
There
are many things that have never been altered, and are now law." Th e
l aws must change with the state of things to which they rolnt e ; but,
according to Chief Baron Parker, the rules to be found in Bracton are
But the augood now in all cases to which those rules are applicable.
thority of Bracton has been confirmed by modern writers, and by all
the decided cases that are to be found in the books. The same doctrine
that Bracton lays down is to be found in 2 Rolle's Abr. 170; in Com.
Dig. tit. Prerogative, (D. 61 ;) in Callis, (Broderip's edition,) p. 51 ; and
in 2 Blac. Com. 261.
In the case of the Abbot of Peterborough, Hale de Jure Maris,
"Quod, secundum consuetudinem patriae,
p. 29, it was holden :
domini maneriorum prope mare adjacentium, habcbunt marettum et
sabulonem per fluxus et refluxus maris per tcmporis incrementum ad
In the treatise of
terras suas costerae maris adjacentes projecta."
Lord Hale it is said, "here is custom laid, and he relies not barely on,
the civil

ed

Liw

.

the case without it." But it is a general, and not a local custom, ap-i
plicable to all lands near the sea, and not to lands within any particular,
The pleadings do not state the lands to be within any district,'
district.
and such a statement would have been necessary if the custom pleaded
were local. The consuetudo patriae means the custom of all parts oi
the country to which it can be applied ; that is, in the present case, all
sucji parts as adjoin the sea.
The case of The King v. Olds worth (Hale de Jure Maris, p. 14) confirms that of the Abbot of Peterborough as to the right of the owner
of the adjoining lands to such lands as were "secundum majus et minus
That case was decided
prope tenementa sua projecta" (Id. p. 29).
against the owner, because he also claimed derelict lands against the
crown.

Here it will

that there is a^ dis tinction made between
lands derelict and lands formed by alluvion : which distinction, I think,
is founded on the principle that I have ventured to lay down, namely,
th at alluvion must be gradual and imperceptible but the derelictioiij Qf
land by the sea is frequently sudden, leaving at once large tracts of its
be observed

OJjLMAt^r^

dLcAAjU^XMfV^.
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bottom uncovered, dry, and fit for the ordin ar y purposes for w hich
l and is used .
But still what was decided in this case is directly applicable to the question proposed to us. The Judges are, therefore, warranted by justice , by p ublic policy, by the opi i^jons of learned w riters,
and the auth ority of decided ca ses, in giving to your Lordships' question the answer which they have directed me to give.
My Lords, the answer to your Lordships' question is the unanimous
opinion of all the Judges who heard the arguments at your Lordships'
bar. For the reasons given in support of that opinion I alone am reMost of my learned Brothers were obliged to leave town
sponsible.
for their respective circuits before I could write what I have now read
to your Lordships. I should have spared your Lordships some trouble
if I had had time to compress my thoughts ; but I am now in the midst
of a very heavy Nisi Prius sittings, and am obliged to take from the
hours necessary for repose the time that 1 have employed in preparing
this opinion.
If it wants that clearness of expression which is proper
for an opinion to be delivered by a Judge to this House, I hope that
your Lordships will consider what I have stated as a sufticicnt apology
for this defect.

The Lord Chancellor. My Lords, I beg to express my thanks
to the learned Chief Justice, and to the Judges, for the attention they
have paid to this subject; and I have only to add that I entirely concur
in the conclusion at which they have arrived ; and 1 would recommend
to your Lordships, as a necessary consequence of the opinion which
has been expressed, t hat the judgment of the Court of King's Bench
u pon the matter should be affirmed

Earl of Eldon.

.

My Lords, I heard only part of the argument,

and therefore I have some difficulty in stating my opinion in this case;
but having had my attention called to subjects of the same nature on
former occasions, it does appear to me, I confess, after reading the
finding of the jury, th at the opinion of the Judges must be that whiclT_
th e learned Chief Justice has now expressed . 1 therefore concur in
the opinion the Lord Chief Justice has expressed.
'
'■'
■■^
r^
. •■
Judg ment affirme d.^
-.
1 "Blackstone says (vol. II, cliap. XVI), 'As to lands gained from the sea, either h r alluvion by the washing up of sand and earth, so as in time to jnake
terra hrma. or by dereliction , as when the sea slmjiks back below the usual
water mark ; in these cases the law is held to be,rt hiit if this 'z-a\\\ be little b y
l ittle, bv
and imperce ptil^lo flPP-rppt/lT g hall go*To tUp nwiipr of flip lan ("
Somali
ad.ioining.'
BlackstOne then introduces by way ot explanation a reference fr„
a douDrrui brocard de minimis non curat lex, which Lord Chelmsford in Attorney General v. Chambers, 4 De G. & J. 55, at page 66, properly disclaims.
The
true reason for the principle of law in regard to foreshores is the same reason
as the principle in regard to river banks, i. e., that it is founded upon security
and general convenience."
Atty. Gen. of Southern ^'igeria v. Holt, [1915] A. C.
599, 613, per Lord Shaw of Dunfermline.
See Banks v. Ogden, 2 Wall. 57 IT
L.. Ed. 818 (1864).
"Courts and text-writers sometimes give very inadequate reasons, born of a
fancy or conceit, for very wise and beneficial principles of the common law ;.
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HALSEY

V.

McCORMICK.

(Court of Appeals of New York, ISoS.

18 N.

Y.

147.)

Appeal from the Supreme Court.
This was an a ction against Jacob McCormick , to recover a small
pi ece of land in the villas^e of Ithaca, ly ing between what was formerthe present centre of that
ly ThrnortOanFoTslxM^^
the land in
creek. The lotoftlie plainti-ff, whicft, as he claims, covers

:^

Bennett, under whom
dispute, is described in a conveyance to one
!'^^Q^^,u«JZi^jA'
the b ank of Six
to
holds, as running "s outh from the turnpike
^^^^^^^^TT;^^ ',
'<^<*'^^'<-~j
Bennett was also the grantor of Jacob McCormick, to whom,
Creek."
title, he con- x^*.^'^ C^
subsequently to the deed under which the plaintiff derives
adjoinin g
Creek,
Mile
of
Six
bed
in
the
veyed a parcel of land lying
been
caused
having
creek
th e land of the plaintiff. The water of the
the
the foot of
\3 nk,/^^^;^
to recede, a st rip of dry ground was formed at
action.
this
m
in
dispute
which was the land
On the first trial, hi 1853, the court held that the plaintiff was boundnorth bank of the creek.
ed on the south by the h igh water mark of the
holdUpon appeal to this court, the judgment was reversed, the court
13 N. Y. 296.
m ark.
ing that the plaintiff's land extended to l ow water
Lu^^
action was
the
and
died,
After this decision, the original defendant
Upon the second trial, it appeared
continued against his executors.
water, formed the
that formerly the north bank of the creek, at low
defendant, Jacob
the
original
that
but
south line of the land in dispute,
south sid^ ^nd
the
on
McCormick, by d eepening the bed of the stream
pl acing stones upon a ridge in the centre, had turned the water so as
trTiPovp ^ nnrfjnn op the north side of what was the bed of the stream
djy, and thatupon this portion he had con structed a race to his mi
the stream .
th north bank of which was the original north bank of
jury, and the judge tound as "facts
l^he cause was tried without
in
"that the south line of the plaintiff's land was north of the premises
the
plaintiff
they
pass
where
creek,
hat the waters of the
question;
OU^
lot^dojow and have for many years, run further to the outh than *^>|^^ve.
and that the change in the channel was^f^^,^
wh^TTh TcITkc was ereckil
:\IcCormick," the original decaused by ar tificial means used by Jacob
He therefore ordered jud^g njjrTlt for the
fendant, as above indicated.

^

qs^
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,

^

s

t

s

a

e

ll,

—

64* 111. 5G. 58, 16

Am. Rep. 516 (1872).

Aig.Pbop. — 10

1'^ I^- I^- ^-

v. St.

*^".^^'
Clair County.

!

■ H---*.

Lovingston

;'

t

'

er" LiiinVu'ev v. biaic. )!! Minn. LSI, 'jW ^.
sTliep. 541 (iso;!), per Mitchell, J. See also

\^

^^
^U(r^%^
^^^

^A

n

a

a

riparian
the right of
and we cannot help thinking this is somewhat so as to
usually
reasons
The
land.
his
of
front
in
relictions
and
owner to accretions
lex
maxim.
the
within
falls
it
given for the mle are either that
(Je^unnimi.s
lose soil by the acnon curak or that because the riparian owner is liable to
the beneht of any
tioli or encroachment of the water, he should also have
rule rests upon a
the
that
to
us
seems
it
But
land gained bv the same action.
much more important purpose in view, viz
much' broader principle, and has
others depend, and
to ni eserve the fund ai nnntm rinnrinu riu-ht^ which all
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defendant s, which was affirmed at general term in the sixth district,
and the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Pratt, J. It was settled by this court, when this cause was before
it upon a former occasion, that the pl aintiff's south line did not orig ina lly extend to the centre of the rrp^k, hut only to thpjm e of low w a-

Assuming this to be settled, tlie plaintiff does
not claim that as the creek originally ran, the land in dispute was emBut if I understand
he
braced within the boundaries of his lot.
it,

t er on the north bank.

it

is

3

;

2

is

is

;

§

a

e

is

t

it

B

is

entitled to
as a
laims that the land in dispute is^alluvioti^ and he
ut to acquire title to land as alluvion,
neces sary
riparian owner.^
hat its increase should be imperceptible — that the amount added in
When die change
ach moment of time should not be perceived.
so
in
one
time,
moment of
the proprieany
gradual as not to be perceived
thus increased,
river
entitled to
tor, whose land on the bank of
Kent,
Bl. Com. 262
53
the addition.
Ang. on Watercourses,
enough that no such fact

is

It

is

519.

,.

found in this case, as that this piece

stands,

y

is

it

y

against the party who caused it.
If the accretion was formed under all the other circumstances necesalluvion,
can scarcely suppose that
sary to constitute
person
could successfully resist die otherwise valid claim of the riparian owner, by alleging his own wrong, by showing that the accretion would
he had not himself wrongfully placed impedinot have thus formed
not before us. It
enoug
ments in the stream. But that question
hat this case does not how that the land in que stion was alluvio n.
The judgment, therefore, must be affirme with costs.^

h

d

t

s

is

is

if

a

I

it

y

,

s

f

II

"If portions of soil were added to rcfel estate fHreadj' possessed, by gradual
deposition, through the operation of natural causes, or by slow and imperceptible accretion, the owner of the land to which the addition has been made lias
Upon no principle of reason or justice should
Va perfect title to the addition.
2

j^ "yx

^

I

a

it

I

b

a

is

e

not necessary to pass upon the questi on
distinction between the case of alluvion formed
w hether there
find no such distinction in the books.
natural or artificial mean s.
If, by some artificial structure or impediment in the stream, the current should be made to impinge more strongly against one bank, causimperceptibly to wear away, and causing
corresponding accreing
not
bank,
am
to
that the riparian
prepared
the
say
opposite
tion on
owner would not be entitled to the alluvion dius formed, especially as
case

•

As tli

■

a

I

a

.

it

it

is

was formed by imperceptible accretion.
alluvion — that
of ground
was not thus formed
The evidence shows that
McCormick deepened the bed of the stream on the south side, and placed stones along the
centre so as to confine the water in the channel thus deepened, and by
this means the land in question was left bare.
He may have been
of
violation
the
riparian
these
of
acts,
rights of the plainguilty, by
know of no rule of law which would constitiff or his grantors, but
transfer of the title.
tute an illegal act of the kind
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GAS CO. v. CHAPLIN.

(Ontario High Court of Justice,

1912.

27 Out.

Law Rep.

34.)

Action by the Volcanic Oil and Gas Company , T ohn G. Carr. a nd the
Na tural Gns Comp a ny of Canada Limited (added by order in
Chambers), plaintiffs, against Cha£lin_^and^^_Curr^ defendant^ , for a
certain lands, and
d eclaratio n of the plaintiffs' rightofoMnT^rshipoi
for an i njunction a nd damages in respect of trespasses alleged to have
TTnion

been committed by the defendants

thereon.

Falconbridge;, C. J. The plaintiffs

is

pl

Volcanic Oil and Gas Company carry on busjnessjn the counties of Essex and Kent in tlic p rod uction and sale of petroleum and natural gas ; the plaintiff Carr is
a farmer; the defendant C haplin is described as a w heel manuf acturer ; the (d efendant Curry) is an o il and gas drilling oper ator.
aintiff Carr
The
the owner and occupant of the westerly half
of lot 178, Talbot road survey, in the township of Romney.
It was
granted by the Crown by patent dated the 29th January, 1825, to Carr's
predecessor. The lands are described in the patent in manner followto say: "All that parcel or tract of land situate in the towning, that
ship of Romney, in the county of Kent, in the western district in our
said Province, co ntaining by admeasurement one hundred acre s, be
the same more or less, being the south-easterly part of lot number
178 on the north-westerly side of Talbot road west, in the said township, together with all the woods and waters thereon lying and being,
the

It-

is

/^

a

is

I

under the reservations, limitations, and conditions hereinafter expressed, which said one hundred acres are butted and bounded or may
'be otherwise known as follows, that
to say: commencing at the
• north-westerly
side of the said road in the limit between lots numbers
177 and 178 at the easterly angle of tlie said lot 178; thence on

3

;

3

;

*

'

p

*

t

h
e

be deprived of accretions forced upon Mm hy the labor of another Avlthou
hfs coTTseut or connivance, and thus cut oft" from the benefits ot his origin al
roprietorship .
In the case at bar, the accretions have not been sudThe city of St. I^ouis, to
den, but gradual, as we gather from the testimony.
preserve its harbor, and to prevent the channel from leaving the Missouri
shore, threw rock into the river, and the coal dykes were made to afford acThe ferry company process to boats engaged in carrying across the river.
tected such accretions by an expenditure of labor and money. The accretions,
then, are partly the result of natural causes and structures and work erected
Api)ellants should no t.tbpr<^bY ^"'^p'
and performed for the good of the public.
on the river and be debarred ot valuable ng];hts heretofore entheir frontage
joyedr'—Ixjvingston r. «t. Clair CouTny, tj4 in. bu, U4, tlu, 1(3 Am. Kep. 516
Adams v. Frothingham,
(1872)1 affirmed in 23 Wall. 46, 23 L. Ed. 59 (1S74)
Tatum v. St. Louis, 125 Mo. M8, 28 S. W.
Am. Dec. 151 (1807)
Mass. 352,
1002 (1894), ace.

;

&

.t.

b

4

b

n

f

"O course an exception m ^^^\ alwn yg l;^p mnde of cases where the operati ons
bfTs oewn loha ve
u pon "the part3-''so w n land are not only calculated, but cn
een intended, to prod uce tbls gra dii al acqufsition of the seashore, howev er
De
v. Chambers,
Attorney-General
di' fficult such proof ot intention may e."
55, 69 (1S.j9), per I^rd Chelmsford, L. C. See Revell v. People, 177 111.
G.
Attorney-(ien468, 52 N. E. 1052, 43 L. R. A. 790, 69 Am. St. Rep. 257 (1S9S)
eral v. Holt, [1915] A. C. 599.

^

^yg^
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course about sixty degrees west along- the north-westerly side of the
said road twenty chains seventy-one links more or less to the limit between lots numbers 178 and 179; thence north forty-five degrees
west sixty chains more or less to the allowance for road between the
townships of Romney and Tilbury East; tlience east twenty-nine
chains more or less to tlie limit between lots numbers 178 and 177;
thence south forty-five degrees east 47 chains more or less to the place
of beginning."
The pl aintiffs claim that the original T albot road, which formed the
s outh-westerly
boundary of the la nTls mcl udcd m the above patent, ran
near the bank of Lake Erie, which at this point is many feet above
therefrom, having a clay front
the beach, and rises perpendicularly
facing the waters of the lake. The pl aintiffs further alle.g^e that alo ng
t he shore of Lak e Erie ^ in thnt Jocality, the waters of the l ake have
b een encro aching upon the lands, undermi ning the bank, causmg it to
s ubside, and then gradually washing it awav : that, by reason of this
encroachment of the lake, Talbot road at an early period g rew dang er- '
o us and unsafe for public t ravel, until, about the year 1838, it was j
abandoned as a means of public travel, and a new road, which has for
many years been known as the Talbot road, was opened up and dedicated to public travel ; and that this road still continues to be the
travelled road known as Talbot road, but the original Talbot road
a cross the lake front has long since been w ashed away by th e wate rs
n^tlip Inkp, nnH now those watcrs have advanced beyond where they
were at the time of tlie original Talbot road survey; so that they have
washed away the reserve left in front of the Talbot road, also the
Talbot road itself and some rods of the front of the surveyed lots;
s o that now so much of the lands patented to Carr's predecessor, a nd
n ow owned bv him, as are now above the waters of Lake Erie, bo rder
on the waters of th e Inke, an d nnt on the original Talbot road.
"The above statements are denied by the defendants, but 1 find them
o have been proved, as I shall hereinafter state.
On or about the 4th July, 1908, the plaintiff Carr executed and delivered to the plaintiffs the Volcanic company a grant and demise of
t he exclusive right to search for, produce, and dispose of petrolcu m
a nd natural gas in, under, and upon the said lands, together witli all
r ights and privileges necessary therefor, etc.
By instrument under the Great Seal of the Province of Ontario,
dated the 1st August, 1911, known as Crown lease number 1836, the
Go vernment of the Province demised and leased unto the defenda nt
C haplin, his heirs, executors, etc., the whole o f "Sat parcel or tra ct
o f^land under the waters of Lake Erie in front o f this lot, am ongst
otliers (the particular description of which is set out in paragraph 5
of the statement of defence of Curry).
Ab out the month of September 1911, the defendant Chaph'n m nHp
a verbal contract with the defendant Gurrv. for putting down a w pII
ior the productionof petroleum and natur al
in and upon the land s
^as
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demised by the Crown to Chaplin ; and Curr y, actincr under s uch
con tract, entered upon what the plaintiff Carr claims to be his la nd,
with men and teams, and constructed a derrick and engine-house, etc.
The plaintiffs, cl aiming th at this entry was w holly unlawfu l, made
objection thereto; and, on the~defendants persistmg in their operations, the plai ntiffs obtained an injunction from the local Judge, whi ch
SO

^

injunc tion was continued until the trial. The plaintiffs now ask: (1)
^tS^^JT/*^
That the injunction be made pe rpetuaj ; (2) a d eclaration of their
rights as to the ownership of the land, a nd as to riparian righ ts ; and
(3) damages .

if

the waters of the lake have
washedC^^^^^^
»
away the bank and encroached in and upon lot 178 the lands up to
the foot of the high bank before-mentioned became the property of
the Crown, and that the south-westerly external boundaries of the lot
shifted as the waters of the lake encroached thereon, giving full right
to the Crown to enter into the Crown lease before-mentioned.
The point involved is extremely interesting, and is one which, if I
correctly apprehend the English and Canadian cases, has never yet
been expressly decided, either in the old country or here.
The surveyors who were called all agree that, by reason of the
original survey having been made so long ago, and of the disappearance of original monuments, etc., they could not now lay out upon
Numerthe land and water, as tliey now exist, the old Talbot road.
ous witnesses were called who remembered that road and could speak
of its boundaries, and of the erosion of the beach causing the road
to be carried away north to its present position — many rods north of
T he evidence is overwhelming^ (I disregard the
its original situs.
curio us evidence of Samuel Cooper), and I find it to be the fact th at
t he locus now
is part of the lot 178 north of the o ld
in^ ^controversy
bot
road".
T^
Having come to this conclusion, it follows that, if the plaintiffs'
contention in law is well founded, it is quit e -immaterial whe ther or
n ot^ the construction of the derrick is entirely in the wat er, or partly
in the water and partly on the beach — the fact being that it is on Carr's

The defendants claim that,

<

C^

prq2?rty.

In Gould on Waters (3d Ed.) para.

155, pp. 306 to 310, inclusive,

after stating the general rule that "land f ormed by alluvio n, or the
gradual and imperceptible accretion from the water, and l and gained _
by j-elictiop . or the gradual and imperceptible recession of the water,
belong to the owner of the contiguous land to which the addition is
made," and th at "conversely land gradually encroached upon bv na v;^
_^u>ig able waters _cea ses to _^elpng to the former owner." quoting
the^^^\!f
onus debet sentire commodum," the aut hor prornaximJ'Oui sentit
-^...^
"
ceeds (p. 309) ;
But when the line along the shore is clearly an
y^w-.^
" d |
*^
ri gidly fixed by a_^de e d or survey, it will not, it seems, afterwards be
c hanged because of accr eti ons, although, as a general rule, the rig ht
"
t o alluvions
passes as a riparian right.
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In Saulet v. Shepherd (1866) 4 Wall. (U. S.) 502, 18 L. Ed. 442, it
was held that the right to alluvion depends upon the fact of contiguity of the estate to the river — where the accretion is made before a
strip of land bordering on a river, the accretion belongs to it and not
to the larger parcel behind it and from which the strip when sold was
separated; citing at length the judgment in a case of Gravier v. City
of New Orleans, which is in some Httle known report not to be found
in our library at Osgoode Hall.
In Chapman v. Hoskins (1851) 2 Md. Ch. 485, tlie general rule is
stated as follows (paragraph 2, head-note) : "Owners of lands bordering upon navigable waters are, as riparian proprietors, entitled to any
\ increase of the soil which may result from the gradual recession of
yhe waters from the shore, or from accretion by alluvion, or from any
/other cause; a nd this is regarded as the equivalent for the loss they
(n iay sustain from the breaking in, or encroachment of the waters upo n

(

t heir lands^
Now, in the case in hand, the

plaintiffs say that they could gain nothing by. accretion, by alluvion, or other cause ; and, consequently, they
should not lose by encroachment of the water upon their land, to
which fixed termin i were assigned by the grant from the Crown. This
doctrine seems to be well supported by decisions of Courts which are
not binding upon me, but which command my respect, and which would

—

-— s
seem to be accurately founded upon basic principles.
In Smith v. St. Louis Public Schools (1860), 30 Mo. 290, the prin-'

if

I

2

is

is

it

;

it,

ciple is very clearly stated : "The principle upon which the right to
alluvion is placed by the civil law — which is essentially the same in
this respect as the Spanish and French law, and also the English common law — is, t hat he who bears the burdens of an acquisitio n is en tit led to its incidental advantages,; con sequently, that the proprietor o f
a field bounded by a river, being exposed to the danger of loss fro m
its floo
i s entitled to the increment which from the same caus e
ds^
maybearmexeil„tP.J.t-^ This rule is inapplicable to what are termed
hmited helds, agri limitati ; that is, such as have a definite fixed boundary other than the river, such as the streets of a town or city." The
reference in the judgment to the English common law is not quite
so positive as the head-note states it.
The Judge (Napton) in the
course of a very learned opinion says (30 Mo. 300) : "It will be found,
indeed, that upon this subject the Roman law, and the French and
Spanish law which sprung from
are essentially alike,
we except
mere provincial modifications
and
believed that the English common law does not materially vary from them. This uniformity necessarily results from the fact that the foundation of the doctrine
laid
in natural equity."
In saying this he may have had in his mind the
language of Blackstone, to be now found in book
(Lewis' Ed.) pp.
261-2, although he does not cite him. There are some earlier English
authorities to which
shall refer later.
Then there
a case of Bristol v. County of Carroll (1880) 95 111.
is

^-^
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: "3. To entitle a party to claim the, rig^ ht
-/r
or land gained from a lake hv alluvium, f} ^e.
* —
l ake must form a boundary of his land.
If^ny_]andjies j3etween his ^
"'^^'^^
boundary linean d_the lake._h
e_cannot_clair n such formation ."
TnDoe dem. Commissioners of BeauTort v. Duncan (1853) 46 N. C. ^-'■**''^*
234, at page 238, Battle, J., says : "Were the allegations supported by
the proof, an interesting question would arise, whether the doctrine
of alluvion applies to any case where a water boundary is not called
for, though the course and distance, called for, may have been coterminous with it? We -do not feel at liberty to decide the question,
because we are clearly of opinion that the evidence given on the part
of the defendant does not raise it."
Cook V. McClure (1874) 58 N. Y. 437, 17 Am. Rep. 270, is a judgment of the Court of AjDpeals of tlie State of New York.
The headnote is as follows : il t seems, the rule that, where a boundary li ne
i s a stream of water, imperceptib le acc retions to the soil, resulting; from

84 (para. 3

of head-note)

t o an al lu\dal_for niation,

\^

I

natur aL causes. Erelong to the riparian owner, applies as well where he
|
b oundary
is u pon an artihcial pond as upon a running stream: . In
an action of ejectment, plaintiff claimed under a deed conveying premises upon which was a mill and pond.
The boundary line along the
pond commenced at 'a stake near the high-water mark of the pond,'
running thence 'along the high-water mark of said pond, to tlie upHeld, that the line thus given was a fixed
per end of said pond.'
and permanent one, and did not follow the changes in the high-water
mark of the pond ; and that defendant, who owned the bank bounded
by said line, could not claim any accretions or land left dry in consequence of the water of the pond receding, although the gradual and
imperceptible result of natural causes."
In The Schools v. Risley, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 91, 19 L. Ed. 850, the
"
A street or tow-path or passway or ot her
decision was as follows:
open space permanently established for public use betw een the river
an d the most eastern row of blocks in the 'lorn^g T tow n of St. Louis ,
w jicn It was first laid out, or established^ or founded, would prevent
tlje owners of such lots or blocks from being riparian prop rietors
of the land between such lots or blocks and the river. But this would
n ot be true of a passage-way or tow-path kept up at the risk a nd QjUaU^^
c harge of the proprietors
of the lots , and following the changes of A/^^J^n!X^
^
the river as it receded or encroached, and if the inclosure of the proprietor was advanced or set in with such recession or encroachment."
In re Hull and Selby Railway (1839) 5 M. & W. 327, the general
law as to gradual accretion or recession is stated. Alderson, B., says
(p. 333) : "T he principle laid down by Lord Hale, that the party wh o
s uffers the loss shall be entitled also to the benefit, governs and~3 eci desme qu estion. That which cannot be perceived in its progress is
tt'
taken to be aTTT^it never had existed at all."
See also Giraud's Lessee y. Hughes (1829) 1 Gill & J. (14 C. A. Md.)
249.

^
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The defendants' counsel, in tlie course of a very elaborate and careful argument, cited numerous authorities in support of the view that
I
\ t he plaintiff Carr had lost the land by the encroachment of the wat er.
i do not cite all of these, because they are set out at large in the exJ
/ tended report of the argument ; but I do not think that there is any
it has been expressly held that a person in the position
of this individual plaintiff loses his property because of the grad ual
encroa climent of the w^ater past the land in front of the road , pas t
He could
t he road^and past the fixed boundary of the p]^intiff<^'Jnnd■
not have gained an inch of land by accretion, even if tlie lake had receded for a mile; and, therefore, it seems that the fundamental doctrine of mutualit v. formulated in the civil law and adopted into the
jurisprudence of many countries, cannot apply to him.
Perhaps the strongest English case cited by the defendants' counsel
was Foster v. Wright (1878) 4 C. P. D. 438: "The plaintiff was lord
of a manor held under grants giving him the right of fishery in all
the waters of the manor, and, consequently, in a river running through
it.
Some manor land on one side of, and near but not adjoining the
river, was enfranchised and became the property of the defendant.
The river, which tlien ran wholly within lands belonging to the plaintiff, afterwards wore away its bank, and by gradual progress, not visible, but periodically ascertained during twelve years, approached and
eventually encroached upon the defendant's land, until a strip of it
became part of the river bed.
The extent of the encroachment could
be defined.
The defendant went upon the strip and fished there.
Held, that an action of trespass against him for so doing could be
maintained by the plaintiff, who had an exclusive right of fishery
which extended over the whole bed of the river notwithstanding the
gradual deviation of the stream on to the defendant's land."
That case goes a long way in support of the defendants' contention.
But Lord Coleridge, C. J., concurs only in the result arrived at by
Lindley, J. He thinks the safer ground appears to be "that the lan* * ♦ a right to take fish, and to
guage (of the grant) conveys
it
irrespective of the ownership of the soil over which the water
take,
flows and the fish swim. The words appear to me to be apt to create
a several fishery, i. e., as I understand the phrase, a right to take
fish in alieno solo, and to exclude the owner of the soil from the right
of taking fish himself ; and such a fishery I think would follow the
slow and gradual changes of a river, such as the changes of the Lune
in this case are proved or admitted to have been."
There is a reference in the argument, and in the judgment in this
case, to some of tlie old authorities; for example:
Britton, book 2,
ch. 2, sec. 7, Nichol's translation, p. 218: "But if the increase has
been so gradual, that no one could discover or see
and has been
added by length of time, as in
course of many years, and not in
one day or in one year, and the channel and course of the water
itself moving towards tlie loser, in that case such addition remains the

is

a

it,

case in which
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purchase and the fee and freehold of the purchaser, if certain bounds '^^
are not found."
Lindley, J., seems to think that in In re Hull and Selby Railway .to
which I have already referred, the Court declined to recognise this /
principle.
As against the authorities in the United States which I have cited,
there is a very strong case of Widdecombe v. Chiles (1903) 173 Mo.
195, 73 S. W. 444, 61 L. R. A. 309, 96 Am. St. Rep. 507, a judgment
of the Supreme Court of Missouri. The note is as follows: "Defendant was the owner of the south half of a section of land between
which and the river bed there was originally a strip of 8 acres, forming
The river
the fractional north half, which had not been patented.
changed its bed until it had washed away the 8-acre strip, and flowed
through defendant's land, when it began to rebuild to defendant's land
Plaintiff
all that it had washed away, and about 200 acres additional.
then received a patent for the fractional north half of the section as
Held, that, t he accretion being t o
described by the original survey.
And Valliant,
defenda nt's land , plaintiff took no title by his patent."
J., says
at page 204, 73 S. W. 446, 61 L. R. A. 309, 96
Am. St. Rep. 507) : "This Court has not said in either of those cases,
and we doubt if any Court has ever said, that land acquired under
a deed giving metes and bounds which do not reach the river — which
in fact did not reach the river when the deed was made — does not
become riparian when the intervening land is washed away, and the
river in fact becomes a boundary." ^
In considering authorities which are not binding upon me, and when
I have to decide ' ^ipon reaso n untrammelled by authority" (per Werner, J., in Linehan v. Nelson^ il9l0]~r97' NV Y. 482, at page 485, 90
X. E. 1114, 35 L. R. A. [N.
1119, 18 Ann. Cas. 831),
prefer
have earlier cited. There have
^hosj_Umted_States_ decisions, which
also been cited to me authorities which
contended dispose comrepletely of the Widdecombe Case, viz., the Lopez Case, which
ported as Lopez v. Muddun Mohun Thakoor (1870) 13 Moo. Ind. App.
Ind.
467; Hursuhai Singh v. Synd Lootf Ali Khan (1874) L. R.
App. 28; and Theobald's Law of Land, p. 37.
was strongly contended by tlie junior counsel for the plaintiffs
that, apart from the main question, and granting that the erosive action of the lake has encroached upon the plaintiff Carr, and that he
down to the
has lost some of his land, then at any rate he only loses
take about
But, having regard to the view that
low water mark.
the main question,
not necessary to consider that argument.

\^
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feuker v. Canter, U2 Kan. 363, 63 Pac. 617 (1901) Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn.
Am, St. Rep. 48 (1S87), ace.
But see Gilbert v. Eldridge, 47
292, 10 Atl. 565,
-Minn. 210, 40 X. W. 670, 1:5 L. li. .V. 411 (1801)
Ocean City Ass'n v. Slinver, 64
Hempstead v. Lawrence, 70
X. J. Law, 550. 40 Atl. COO. 51 I.. R. A. 425 (1000)
See also Cook v. McClure, 58 N. Y.
Mi.sc. Rep. 52, 127 N. Y. Supp. 040 (1010).
-4.37, 17 Am. Rep. 270 (1874), where the boundary was upon a millpond.
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do not see that the statute 1 Geo. V, ch. 6, has any application to
this case; nor do I see that the Attorney-General ought to bring the
action or is a necessary party — the plaintiffs being concerned only with
the trespass upon their lands, and not with any supposed public right.
The good faith, or the opposite of the defendants, in making the
trespass, is a matter of no consequence in the disposal of the action.
I find, therefore, that there has been a tre.=;pn.s.s by \]^p defpnfLTnts
upon the piaintift's' land, and that they are entitled to have the inj un c ti on herem made perpetual, wi th full costs on the High Court scale
and $10 damages.*

SUPPLEMENTARY

NOTE

Eminent Domain.— A'c/urr of Ti7?c.--T be title acquired n.s a result of eiiiin eut
d oiiiaiii inuceediiiyj is an original or new title, as distiuiriiislicd fiotu a dcri va tiv e^title or one L)ased upon nrivity. It is said in Weeks v. (Jraee. 191 Mass.
2"JUr.S0 N. !•:. liliO, I) L. K. A. (N. S.) lO'.rJ, 10 Ann. Cas. 1077 (10(17) that: "The
power when exerei.sed acts npon the land itself, not upon the title, or the sum
of titles, if tliere are diversified interests.
Upon ai)iiropriation all inconsistent
proprietary rijjhts are divested, and not only privies, Ijut strangers are coucluded. * • ♦ Thereafter whoever may have heen the owner, or whatever
may have been the quality of his estate, he is entitled to full compensation

according to his interest, and the extent of the taking, hut the paramount right
is in the puldic, not as claiming under him by a statutory grant, but by an
independent title." See, also, Emery v. Boston Terminal Co., 17b Mass.' 171',
.09 N. E. 7tj;J, SO Am. St. Kep. 47:; (1901); Todd v. Austin, .34 Conn. 7S (1S07).
Couas ^uently eviction un der en anent domain proceedings does unt consti tute
a brea'li oi WVtMltints iul' lllh', Ulullier sheMal or geinTal7~ ~Ake v. Mason. 101
Pa. 17 (l.ss-'): Dobbins v. Hrown, 12 Pa. 7.j (ls4I)i; Folt.s v. Huntley, 7 Wend.
(N. Y.) 210 (1&31) ; Stevenson v. Loebr, 57 111. 509, 11 Am. Rep. 36 (1S71) ; Kuhn
V. Ereeman, 15 Kan. 420 (1875).
E.rtcnt of the Interest Ac(/iiired. — I n the absence of constitutional rest ricti ons it rests within the discretion of the l.eirisliiture to determine wliat interest
or estate shall vest , .^ee bnscoii v. Aew Haven, ib C6nn. 92, .^2 Atl. CIS (1V102) ;
Georgia (Jranite K. R. Co. v. Venable, 129 (ia. .".41, OS S. E. 804 (19U7);
Dingley V. Boston. 100 Mass. 544 (ISUvS) ; Sweet v. P.utTalo, N. Y. & Phila. Rv. Co.,
79 N. Y. 29;J (1S79); Eairchild v. St. Paul. 40 Minn. 540. 49 N. W. ;J25 (1891).
W hen the extent of the interest is not si)eci[ied. oidv such an estate or inte re st will vest a s i.c! necess ary to iieriiiit the dccumi.lislimeiit
of tlie p urpose for
Clark v. Worcester T'.". Mims: ""I! /IK'i'K> ;
M -liich the land is apt)roiii-i:ite(l.
N'ewtun v. Newton, 1S8 Mass. 226. 74 N. E. .340 (1905) ; Smith Canal Co. v. Colorado Ice & Storage Co., 34 Colo. 485. 82 Pac. 940. 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 114S (1905).
See, also, lleyneman v. Blake, 19 Cal. 579 (1802) ; Quick v. Tavlor, 113 Ind.
But see Driscoll v. New Haven, 75 Conn. 92. 52 Atl.
540. 10 N. E. ,588 (188S).
618 (1902).
Where the fee vests, as to whether it is an absolute fee. see Haldeman v. Penn R. Co., 50 Pa. 425 (1805) ; Ma lone v. Toledo. 28 Ohio St. 043 (1870) ;
Nelson v. Fleming, 56 Ind. 310 (1877) ; Kellogg v. Malin, 50 Mo. 490, 11 Am.
Kep. 420 (1872) : People v. White, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 26 (1851).
Where less than
the fee vests, the reversion remains in the original owner, his heirs and assigns. Chambers v. Great Northern Power Co., 100 Minn. 214, 110 N. W. 1128
(1907); McCombs v. Stewart. 40 Ohio St 047 (1SS4) ; Lazarus v. Morris. 212
Pa. 128, 61 Atl. 815 (1905).
A ^s to the rights of the parties where only an_ easement is acquired , see Blake v. Rich, 34 N. II. 282 (1S50) ; Upper Ten Mile
Plank Road Co. v. Braden, 172 Pa. 400, 33 Atl. 562, 51 Am. St. Rep. 759 (1896).
When Title Passes. — I t is generally held that title vests O'dy upon payme nt
City or Chicago V. 'Birbian, 80 in. 4si (1875) ; Levering v.
of compensation.
^Mladelphia G. & N. K. Co., 8 Watts & S. (Pa.) 459 (1844) ; Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 103 U. S. 599, 26 L. Ed. 550 (1S80) ; New Orleans & S. R. R. Co. v. Jones,

Apportionment of Accretions. — See case note to Northern Pine Land Co.
84 Wis. 157. 54 N. W. 496 (1893), in 21 L. R. A. 776, et seq. ; also
Angell on Water Courses (4th Ed.) 47 et seq.
4
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68 Ala. 48 (1880) ; Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247 (1852) ; Stacey v. Vermont
Cent. R. Co., 27 Vt. 89 (1854).
In the absence of constitution,-!! rpsfrminti; |Jip legislature may in its discre tio nJI^ermine when title shall rest. .Sweet v. Rechel. 159 U. ». oJiO, 1(3 tjup.
Cfr43, 40 L. Ed. 188 (lS9o). See, also, City of Pittsburg v. Scott, 1 Pa. 309
(1845).

No extended discussion of this question will be attempted as each case is
very larj:ely dependent UE)on the words of a particular statute or the state con-

stitution.
Tax Titles. — T he nature and extent of the title acouir pd hy g piir,^i>pgar <^f
a tax sale depends largely upon the terms of the particular statute unde r

which the taxes are kn-iedf Where the tax Is made a charge directly uiion the
land itself, and the proc-eedings for its collection are strictly ii^Ji;iii> ^^^*^
^'^^^
deed (j)rovided all the proceedings have been regular) will ha vetne effect of
de stro ,viug all t)rlor interests in the estate, whether vested or co utinL'eiit, f>yecuted or executory, and whether in noss^^-ssii^)ii. i-t'Vi-r><ion , or reni.-iiiider . Such
a title is in no .seii.se derivative.
I^ucas v. I'urdy, 1411 Iowa, .'JuU, 120 N. W,
1063, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1294, 19 Ann. Cas. 974 (19U9) ; I'.rown v. Austin. 41 VL
See, also,
Ivahle v. Nisley, 74 Ohio St. 328, 7S N. E. 52U (190<;).
2(52 (18(iS);
Osceola I>and Co. v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 84 Ark. 1. 1(J3 S. W. (!09 (1907);
Atkins V. Hinman, 7 111. (2 Cilnian) 4:}7 (1845i; McFadden v. Goff, 32 Kan.
v. Crean, 109 .Md. (;52, 71 Atl. 995 (19U9) ;
415, 4 I'ac. 841 (1884); McMtihon
Langley v. Chai)in, i:{4 Mass. 82 (iss;5); Cole v. Van Ostnind, 131 Wis. 454, 110
Mnt. Life Ins. Co., 12:{ U. S. 747,
N. W. 884 (1997); Hefner v. Northwestern
W here, however, the taxes when levie d
8 Sup. VL 'Ml, 31 L. Ed. 309 (1S.S7).
c onstitute a debt due from the owner wlikh ma y Lie collected in an action i n
persu Lia nT; and wliere the law in terms or uinin a fair construction permits
the n
a saleol' the land oidy when all other remedies have been exliaiiste(l,
t he tit le ac( |uircd is deriv ativ e, and includes only the Interest of tlie perso n
taxeij: — See .MeTTTTiaid v. Hannah (C. C.) "1 l-'eil. 7:>. (1M)2); dross v. Taylor, 81
CaTsO. G S. E. 179 (IS'^S); (wites v. Lawson, .32 (Jrat. (Va.) 12 (1879); Coney
Hunn v. Winston. 31 Miss. 1.35 (18.50);
12 I.a. Ann. 74S (1857);
V. Cummings,
Dyer v. liranch Hank at Mobile, 14 Ala. (522 (1S4.S) ; Ex parte Macay. 84 N.
C. 03 (1881): Jlisper County v. Wadlow, 82 Mo. 172 (1SS4); Ferguson v. Quinn,
Clenn v. West. lOO \a. :;56,
97 Tenn. 4fi. .3(! S. W. 57li, .33 L. K. A. (iSS (l.SDti);
See, also. Irwin v. Hank of I iiited State.s, I I'a. 349 (1845),
5U S. E. 14;? (19071.
as to situation where .separate interests are se|>arutely a.ssessed.
See on the subject generally Black on Tax Titles.
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COMMON LAW

Feoffment

LITTLETON'S TENURES.
But of feoffments made in the country, or gifts in tail, or lease
for term of life; in such cases where a freehold shall pass, if it be by
deed or without deed, i t behoveth to have livery of seisin.
Section 59.

COKE UPON LITTLETON.
"Livery of sefsin."

Traditio, or deliberatio seisinre, is a solemni ty,
for the passing of a freehold of lands or ten ernents by delivery of seisin thereo f.
Intervenire debet solennitas in
mutatione liberi tenementi, ne contingat donationem deficere pro det hat the law recju i reth

fectu probationis.
And there be two kinds of livery of seisin, viz. a li very in deed ,
and a l ivery in law . A li very in deed is when the feoffor taketh the
ring of the door, or turf or twig ot tlie land, and d ehver eth the same
uj)on the land to the feoffee in name of seisin of the land , &c., per
hostium et per haspam et annulum vel per fustem vel baculum,
'''
* *
&c.

A livery in law

&

1

For the background of the subject-matter
Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, SO-lOti.
(156)

of this chapter,

see

2

:

,

a

is

t

in

f

d

(I

is,

when the feoffor saith to the feoffee, being in
the view ot the house or land,
^ive ynn ynndpr l^nH to you an
your heir s, and go enter into the same, and take possession thereo
accordino-ly) and the fe offee doth accordingly
the life of the feoffor enter, his
good feoffment for signatio pro traditione habetur.
And herewith agreeth Bracton
Item dici poterit et assignari, quando
res vendita vel donata sit in conspectu, quam venditor et donator dicit
Pollock
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and in another place he saith, in seisina per effectiim et per
But if either feoffor or the feoffee die before entry Ih e
aspectum.
hvery is void . And Hvery within the view is good where there is no
And such a Hvery is good albeit the land lie in andeed of feoffment.
other county. A man may have an inheritance in an upper chamber,
though the lower buildings and soil be in another and seeing it is an
se tnidere

:

inh eritance cor poreal it shall pass by livery.
4Sa7~B:

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
For prevention of many fraudulent practices , which are commonly

endeavored to be upheld by perjury and subornation of perjury; (2)
be it enacted by the King's most excellent majesty, by and with the
advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of
the same, That f rom and aj te r the four and twentieth day of Jun e. Ouv*.^
w hich shall be in TITe year oTour Lord one thousand six hundred S£v- Q
p ntv seven, all leases, estates,
interests of freeliol d. or tc^m7s^of^j>:eaTS,
nKiiio rs,
o r any u nccrUiurii^^
made or created by livery and
lands .^encmentsorhereditanients,
writing, and signed by the p arparol
in
by
not
only
and
nut
,
or
s eisin
thereunto lawfully
authorized by writing, shall have the force and effect of leases or
or
estates at will only, and shall not either in law or equity be deemed
on
ta ken to have any other or greater force or effect ; any considerati
or
law
former
or
estates,
or
any
f or making nny such parol leases
contrary
notwithstandin,c: .
us age, to the
Except nevertheless all leases n ot exceeding the term of three
y ejirs from the making thereo f, whereupon the rent reserved to the

ties so making or crcatin^^

the same, or their

JJ

\h

AT '

a^!::^cnts

■

IL

during such term, shall amount unto two third parts at the
least of the full improved value of the thing demised.
in. And moreover, That no leases, estates, or interests either of
freehold', or terms of years, or any uncertain interest, not being copymanors,
hold or customary interest, of, in, to or out of any messuages,
four
said
the
time
after
at
any
lands, tenements or hereditaments, shall
assip
^ned. ffrantcd or surren(J ereii--unand twentieth day of June b e
party so n.swniles s it be by deed or note in writing, signed bv the
j n'grgTanting or surrendering^ the same, or their agents thereunto lawfu lly authorized by writinc^. or by act and operation of law.'
landlord,

^■^Car.

II,

c. 3,

§§

F or

-

n

thougli

.

JUJ-

^

..^^

/^

^^^

^

1-3^

writing;,
a l ong time prior to thfi Statute of Frauds
comnionly employea ns evidence ot
nece s^^iiry to an ettectivo T(:-('iHmeDt,^ was
~~
Ih b "Lra usaction a nd im [rrrTTF :
„ „. ,t ^
^
er
<.
9 Vict. c. IOC, § 3) that a feoffment
8
&
In 184o. i'ariiamoDt prov i d ed (St.
d
be
deeme
infant,
should
other than a feoffment made under a custom by an
deed.
a
evidenced
void unless
b}2

•
^
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CHALLIS. REAL PROPERTY.
A

feoffment, the most venerable of assurances, survives to thi§ ^^y,
It, is believed that certain old corporate bodies
still retain, at all events to some extent, the ancient practice of conI t is the only assurance (not being matter of
veying by feoffment.
re cord, as a fine or recovery) by which, at the comm on law, legal est ates of freehold in possession can be conveyed to a person ha ving
n o subsisting interest in the land and no privity with the person mak ing
t he assurance.
It consists simply and solely in the livery of the seisin;
and some phrases in common use, which seem to imply a distinction
between the feoffment and the livery, are so far incorrect.
By the common law, any person having actual possessio n (not necessarily actual seisin), of lands, j^ould^ bv a feoffmen t, give to any person, other than the person having the next or the immediate estate of
freehold in the lands, a n immediate estate of freehold , having any
If the feoffor was actually seised, and the estate which
quantum.
passed by the feoffment was no greater than the estate of the feoffor,
the feoffnient took effect rightfully
eoffor yv as not actubu
^he
the estate which passed by the feoffment was grea ter
ally seised, or
han his estate, the feoffment was styled
nd
tortious feoffment,
was said to take effect by wrong.
In accordance with the maxim that no one can qualify his own
tortious feoffment devested the whole fee simple out of th
wrong,
owner
or owners .
does not follow that the tortious feoffrightful
ment was necessarily
feoffment in fee simple
and
might in fact
be for
less estate.
In such
case, the feoffee took only the less
estate, but the whole fee simple was devested out of the rightful
owner or owners,
nd such part of
as was not disposed of by he
eoffment became vested in the feoffor by way of
tortious revers ion
upon the tortious particular estate created by the feoffment.
The tortious operation offeoffnjmnts made after 1st October, 1845,
Vis prevented by
Vict. c. 106,
The ossession of
termor for years, or tenant at will, or by sufferance, sufficed to enable the termor, or tenant, to make
tortious feoft"ment; and thus to convey an immediate estate of freehold which fulfilled many of the purposes of
rightful estate, though
affor ded
no defence against the title of the rightful owne r. Upon the subject
generally, and especially upon the case of Doe v. Horde,
Burr. 60, in
which Lord Mansfield, striving after an unattainable equity did his
best to throw the law into confusion, see Butl. n.
on Co. Litt. 330b.
feoffment was made by anv person other than
a. tortious
ten ant
n tail actually seised, the person rightfully entitled (or any other
eron acting in his name, even though without his assent) might at com mon law destroy the tortious estate of the feoffee by mere entry (Co.
f
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b ut is now little use d.

the feoffee's heir had succeeded by inheritance

be-
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^.J^d^^

J

1^^

fore entry made, the h eir's estate could not be affected by entry, a nd
rightful claimant was put to his actio n. (Litt./sect. 3S5.)
His
was
said
to
be
olled
.
t
dcsccnt^'^ast
was
entry
technically
Entry
by
t pllcd by a descent cast in fee tail (when the disseisor made a giit in
t aij) as well as in fee simple.
(Ibid. sect. 386.) But on the extinction
of the entail by failure of issue, the entry was revived against the
remainderman or reversioner.
(Co. Litt. 238b.)
The 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, § 39, eiiacts that no descent cast after 3 1s t ->i^
December, 1833, shall toll any right of entry^ This enactment made /-<g ^U<' ^' '
the learnmg of descents cast, and also of continual claim whereby'^^^
-l^^^*.*^
rights of entry' might be protected therefrom, equally obsolete.
^'^^/y
x.X^
the

A
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c
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a

a

a
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.
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in

a

a

a
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3d Ed. by Sweet, pp. 397, 405, et

seq.^

a

b
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A

a

strictly sppfikins:, was properly used only '"'hon the convoynnce
tHe conveyance
t>e tn
iiiii)le/ Ylien the estiue cre;ited was
gift, und when
iile estate t-he coiTrgySnce waa by lease .

'

is

'

t

p

e

it,

feoffment, made by a tenant in tail actually seised, operated as a
A^-^r^
d iscontinuance of the estate tail, and devested all remainders, and t h e
reversion, expectant upon
kmg .
unless they were vested in th
Stone V. Newman, Cro. Car. 427, at p. 428.
By such discontinuance
the ersons entitled under the entail, and in remainder or reversio n,
were barred of their right of entry, and resi)ectively put to their ac ion as the only means to enforce their claims.
The learning relating to discontinuance, though obsolete in respect
In
still sometimes of practical importance.
to the common practice,
1884
case was litigated in the House of Lords in which the validity
claim partly depended upon the properties at Jthe common law of
of
discontinuance
tortious fee simple, which had been gained by
the preceding century, by
feoffment made by the survivor
effected
of two joint donees in special tail.
n all cases where the ri^ht of entry was tolled or barred, the net real action. An _^ctionofcjcctful action to recover tiic seisin was
Prest. Abst. 328.
lent eiectione rma;) would not suffice
Tiiere were tvvodcgrees of remoteness in
right of action, the first
possessio
n, and the second
i
ght
founded
of
upon
being said to be
right
mere
and there were two kinds of real actions
being styled
corresponding thereto, possesso ry actions, grounded upon writs styled
writs of entry , and djoitural a^ t[o
grounded upon writs styled writs _
mere right, either
of rigiit. A right of possession might be turned to
bar to
writ of entry,
time to elapse as would be
by suffering such
or by suffering adverse judgment by default in an action on such
But the di son Co. Litt. 239a.)
writ. (See, on this subject, Butl. n.
ontinuance of an estate tail by the tortious feoffment of the tenant
in tail in possession, forthwith turned the right of the issue in tail_ to
mere right, without passing through any mtermediate stage s.
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II. Fine
BLACI^STO^'fS^-

COMMENTARIES.

A

fine is som e times said to be a feofifment of record : though it
might with more accuracy be called a n acknowledgment of a feurimen t
on record . By which is to be understood, that i t has at lenst tho .'^nme
f orce and effect with a fenttrnpnt, in the conveying and assurins: of
lancls.: though it is one of those methods of transferring estates of
freehold by the common law, in which l iverv of seisin is not ncrrs'^n rv
t p be actually ^iven : ._the supposition and acknowledgment thereof in a
court of record, however fictitious, mducmg an equal notoriety . But,
more particularly, a fine may be described to be an amicable compos iion or agreement of a suit, either actual or fictitious, by leave of th e
k ing or his justices:
whereby the_ lands in question become, or a re
/ acknowledged to be the right of one of the partie s : In its original
it was founded on an actual suit, commenced at law for recovery of
Vossession of lands or other hereditaments ; and the possession thus
-'gained by such composition was found to be so sure and effectual,
that fi ctitious actions were, and continue to be, every day commen ced,
for the sake of obtaining the same securi ty.

Book

2, star p. 348.

III.

Common

BLACKSTONE'S

Recovery

COMMENTARIES.

A

common recovery is so far like a fine, t hat it is a suit or actio n,
either actual or fictitious ; ^and in it the lands are recovered again st
t he tenant of the freehold : which recovery, being a supposed adjudication of the right, b inds all perso ns, an d vests a free a nd_ ^bsol ute
f ee-simple in the recover or. A recovery, therefore, being in the nature
of an action at law, not immediately c ompromised like a fine, but carried on through every regular stage of proceeding, I am greatly apprehensive that its form and method will not be easily understood by
the student who is not yet acquainted with the course of judicial
proceedings; which cannot be thoroughly explained, till treated of at
large in the third book of these Commentaries.
Book 2, star p. 357.*

-V
<^

Jj^'

^

jj>jJ^

4^
fjjA>^\

* For an account of the procedure in common recoveries, see Pollock, Land
Laws, SO; Williams, R. P. 95 et seq.
By the Fines and Recoveries Act. 3 & 4 W. IV, c. 74, i t is provfdetl-^at after
D ecember 31. 18:^3. no fine shall be levied ~"or commog recovery siiffered of
l»«lds of any tenure.
"If*^
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IV. Leas^
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES.

A

lease is properly a conveyance of any' lands or tenements (usuin consideration of rent or other annual recompense), made fo r
a less time than the less or
lifCj^f or years, or at will, but^ jil\va;^s
for
be for the whoTe interest,
more prophatti _iQj:li£_pr ^r{ii^
rly an assjgnm^ than
lease.
The usual words of operation
are, "demise, grant, and to farm let dimisi, concessi, et ad firmam tradidi." Farm, or feorme,
an old Saxon word signifying provisions;
and
came to be used instead of rent or render, because anciently the
part of rents were reserved in provisions
in corn, in poultry
reater
.i nd the like
till the use of money became more frequ ent. So tliat
farmer, firmarius, was one who held his land upon payment of a
gradual departure from he
rent or feorme
though at present, by
brought to signify the very estate or
riginal sense, the word farm
ands so held upon farm or rent. By this conveyance an estate for
life, f^^rveaji^, or a^vv
may be created, ither in corporc^Torinorporeal hereditaments
indeed incident and
though livery of seisin
leases for life of corporeal
necessary to one species of leases, viz.
hereditaments
but to no other.
Book
star p. 317.
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V. ExcHANce

BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES.

2,
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An exchange
mutual grant of equal interests, the one in consideration of the other. The word "exchange"
so individually requisite and appropriated by law to this case, that
cannot be supplied
^o^^;^
The estate
by any other word, or expressed by any circumlocution.
xchanged must be equal in quantity, not of value, for that is im ma- ^j^iL*..-^ ^^-'^^
enal. but of interest; as feQ;^sipTp4^g fonf^e-siiTiple,
l^ase jor.t^viinty..^;;.^.^.^
And the exchango?
yg^j^ for ^ l^s^ i^or wejity. years, and the like.
ut no livery
may be of things that lie either in grant or in livery.
necessary to perfect the con eisin, even in exchanges of freehold,
veyance
for each party stands in the place of the other and occupies
his right, and each of them hath already had corporal possession of his
either part
own land. But entry must be made on both sides, for,
entry,
void, for want of sufficient notoriety .
die before
the exchange
Book
star p. 323.'
Aig.Peop. — 11
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VI. Partition
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES.
A partition is w hen two or more joint-tenants, coparceners, or te nants in common. agree_^to divide the lands so held among tliem in seve ralty, each taking a distinct par t.
Book

2, star p. 2)2Z^

VII. Grant
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES.
concessiones ; the regular method by the commo p Inw nf
t ransferring the property of incorporeal
hereditaments, or such thing s
w hereof no livery can be had. For which reason all corporeal hereditaments, as lands and houses, are said to lie in livery ; and the other s,
a s advowsons. commons ,
.
rcnts^ r eversions, etc.. to lie in errant . Snd
/ the reason is given by Bracton : "traditio, or livery, nihil aliud est
quam rei corporalis de persona in personam, de manu in manum, transatio aut in possessionem inductio: sed res incorporales, qua^ sunt
psum jus rei vel corpori inha^rens, traditionem non patiuntur" Qiyis merely the transferring from one person to another, fro m one
hand to another, or the induction into possession of a co rporeal hered itament; but an incorporeal hereditament, which is the right itself t o
a thing, or inherent in the person, does not admit of
delivery) . These ,
t herefore^ pass merely by the delivery of the deed . And in seigniories,
or reversions of lands, such grant, together with the attornment"
of the tenant (while attornments were requisite), were held to be of
equal notoriety with, and therefore equivalent to, a feoffment and livI t therefore diflfers but Ij ttle
ery of lands in immediate possession.
f rom a feoffment , exc^^t in jts subjec t-matt er ; for the operative words
thenein commonly used are dedi et concessi, "have given and granted."
Book 2, star p. 317.
Grants,

r.fzi

infra, pp. 687, 6S9,
Litt. 551, 5G7-5C9 ; Co. Litt. .309. a, b.
"And be it further enacted by the nuthority afore.<?aid. TJiat from and afte r
t he first day of Trinity term
all grants or conveyances thereafter to ie
made, by fine or otherwise, of any manors or rents, or of the reversion o r
rayiainder 9f a"ny messuau^e s or lands, shall Iip gonf ]^ an d effectual.~to all Intents and purposes, wif|iti^j--^np^^nttornmi2it of _f he lepan ts of any such
manors, or of the land out of whiclisuclT rentslTall be issuins:, or of the particular tenants upon whose particular estates any such reversions or remainders shall and may be expectant or depending, as if their attornment had
6 See

6 See

J

had and made."
St. 4 Anne (1705) c. 16. § 9.
to necessity for attornment in the United States, see Tiffany, Landlord
& Tenant, § 146f.
been
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Strange, 909.)

the proseha been
common passage under the defendan t's
cutor proved, that
house as far back as anv witnesses could remember. But the defendlease made for fifty-six years of this way, to the intent
ant producing
might be
passage during the term, and he term expiring in 1728
th e Chief Tustire rRAVAfONn) held the defendant not guilty: and as to
would not be lon enough to
open since, he said that
hejenving
mount to
to the public
gift of

it
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HUDSON.

V.

(Court of Kins's Bench, 1732.
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Dedication

/
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SHEPHERD.

V.

(Court of King's Bench,

1735.

2

LADE

Strange, 1004.)
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ase was made, that the place
Upon trial of an ction of trespass
where the supposed trespass was committed was formerly the prope rty
street upon U. which_ bas
of the plaintiff, who some years since built
That the defgniljint had land conhighway.
ever sinceTecn used as
ditch, and that he laid_a_l) ridge ver the ditch,
tiguous parted only by
was insisted for the
he end whereof rested on the highway . And
dedication
street,
was
defendant, tliat by the plaintiff's making
liable
to an inbe
he
however
might
and therefore
of
to the public
him
as for
nuisance, yet the plaintiff could not sue
dictrnenftor
Tt
rertninlv
a
per
Curi.vm.
Sed
trespass on his private property.

t.

j
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a

l.
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d

edication to the public, so far as the public has occasion ^^^ n, ^v'"^'^"'
right of passage
only for
Rut ij_ never was understom LJo
So the plaintiff had
transfer of the absolute property in the soi
be
dgmen
dedicat ion
to presume
T'ser fo
Knst. .'^75. note.
declaration of iiitontioii to ded icnte. lipid
eiL^hn-fn" months, where th ere w as
^t. Mary, Isiinyton. 21 W. K. 2U(J (1.^72).
London \l. Co.
rnicient in
dedication;
is not. like
"Xo particular time i.s necessary for evidence of
the act of dedication be unequ ivfiraiit, presumed from length "of time;
um ible
man Diiiias
may take place imuiediatcly
for instance, if
ocal,
street^
ow of houses opening into an ancient street at each end - niaking
uimmore, J., in
and sells or let^ thP hnn'^ps. that, is instantly
nigpway^
Taunt. 12."> (181.''>).
WOudver v. iladden.
porA. dedicates
A. is tenant for life, the remainder in fee being in B.
What effect, if any. would such dedication
highway.
tion of the land as
Ch. 12.
have upon B.? See FarquharV. Is'ewbury Rural Council, \lWd\
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mat six yenrs mnv be sufficient time whert^in
fr om use r, isee Rugby c''hnnty V. Merrywentnor. 11
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an i ndictment
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2

LLOYD.

(Court of King's Bench,

This was

TITLES

1 Camp. 260.)

180S.

for obstructing

a hi^qhwa y.

it,

It appeared that tlie place in question is a narrow passage lying on
the north side of Snow-Hill, called Cock-court; and being of an oblong
shape, leads from one part of this street to another, without having any
outlet elsewhere. The houses all the way round had once belonged to
the same individual ; and the d efendant, having purchased tliose at th e
top of the court, built a wall across there, interceptmg all comm unicannlrm Irpirn}' nf Snn-jv T^ill
t ion between the i-wn <;if]p"
Till then, the
passage had been open as far back as could be remembered ; and though
it could in general be of no use to those walking up and down SnowHill being a most circuitous route which no one would willingly take,
yet it was convenient for the public when the street was blocked up bv
a crowd.
The passage had been lo ng lighted bv the citv of Lo ndon
or any mark to denote its
and there had n ever been any chain acr oss
being private property.

Lord EllExborougii.
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if

think, that
places are lighted by public
bodies, this
right of way over
strong evidence of the public having
particular lace
say that this right cannot exist because
them and
does not lead -coftveiiicixtly from one street to another, w ould go to cx rn guish all highways w here Tas in Oueensauarc'l there is no thoroughIf the owner of the soil throws open passage, and neither
fare.
marks by any visibly, distinction, that he means to preserve all his
nor excludes persons from passing through
by positive
rights over
to the publ ic.
prohibition, he sh all be presumed to have dedicated
Although the passage in question was originally intended only for private convenience, the public are not now to be excluded from
after
so long without any interruption.
being allowed to use
- . --■
The defendant wa«; fnnnH ym'liy
Tlmt there cannot
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be
dedication to
vnrtion of the nubll
i=ifp r»"»^Q v.
M.
W. S-JT (184:;).
But see Worinley v. Worniley, infra.
public bridge by dedication, altliough the right of the
A bridge may be
public to use same is limited to such times as the river is not fordable.
Rex
M.
V. Northampton,
S. 2G2 (1S14).
As to dedication for limited i>nrposes,
B.
see Stafford v. Coyney,
C. 257 (1S27);
Gowen v. Philadelphia Excbauge Co.,
S. (Pa.) 141, 40 Am. Dec. 4S9 (1S43).
Watts
And as to dpdication subject to re.servations on behalf of tbe owner, see Mercer v. Woodgate,
Li. R.
Q. B. 26 (1869), where the owner claimed the right to plough up the
way periodically; Attorney General v. Horner, [1913]
Ch. 140, where the
owner claimed land had been dedicated for street purposes subject to
right
private market
City of Noblesville v. Lake Erie
of overflow from
W. R.
Co., 130 Ind.
29 N. E. 484 (1891), where the dedication
of
street was
claimed to be subject to the right to lay down
railroad therein.
Huskin^^on,
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WHITE.

(Supreme Court of the United States, 1S32.

6

Pet. 431, 8 L. Ed. 452.)

Error to the Circuit Court of Ohio. The case came before the cour t
on a bill of exceptions , taken by the plaintiffs in error, the defendants
in the circuit court, to the instructions g iven by the court to the jury,
on the request of the counsel for the plaintiff's in that court; and to
the refusal of the court to give certain instructions as prayed for by
the defendants below.
In the opinion of the court, no decision was given on those excepn
tions, save only on that which presented the question of the dedication
of the land in controversy for the use of the city of Cincinnati ; which,
and the facts of the case connected therewitli, are fully stated in the
opinion of the court. The arguments of the counsel in the case, on
the matters of law presented by the exceptions, are, therefore, necessarily omitted.
Thompson, J., delivered

the opinion of the court.
The eiectnie nt
in this case was brought by Edward White, who is also the defend ant
in error, ^o recover tJo.ss(;^ssi()n of a small lot of ground, in the city o f
Cincinnati. lyin!£- in thai uart of the city usually denominated the co m-

HiSin.

To the right understanding of

the question upon

which the opinion

rests, it will be sufficient to state, generally, that on the
of October, in the y ear 1788. Jo hn Cleves Symmes entered into
a contract w ith the then board of treasury, under the direction of
congress, for the p urchase of a large tract of land, then a wildern ess,
i ncluding that where the city of Cincinnati now stands.
Some negotiations relative to the payments for the land delayed the consummation
of the contract for several years ; but on_ thc 30th of September 179 4,

of

the court

15th

a patent was issued , conveying

to Symmes and his associates, the land
contracted for ; and as Symmes was the only person named in the patent, die f ee was, of course, vested in him . Before the' issuing of the
patent, however, and, as the witnesses say, in the year 1788, Matth ias
P enman purchased of Symmes a part of the tract inrlndrH in ^he paten |yandcniba_aan^j^
That in
the same year, Denman sold one-third o f his purchase to Israel LudThese three persons, Denlow, and one-third to R o"bert Patterson.
man, Ludlow and Patterson being t he equitable owners of the ]^;\iA
(nn Ipo-nl |j|]p having hppn crr.nntpd ), proceeded, in January. 1789. to
A plan was made and approved of by all the prolay out the town.
prietors ; according to which, the ground lying between Front street
and the river, and so located as to include the premises in question,
was set ap art as a common, for the use and benefit of the town for
ever, reservmg only the right of a ferry ; and no lots were laid out on
the land tlius dedicated as a common.
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The lessor of the plaintiff made title to the premises in question under Matthias Denman, and produced in evidence a copy, duly authenticated, of the location of the fraction 17, from the books of John C.
Symmes, to Matthias Denman, as follows: "1791, April 4, Captain
Israel Ludlow, in behalf of Mr. Matthias Denman, of New Jersey,
presents for entry and location, a warrant for one fraction of a section,
or 107.8 acres of land, by virtue of which he locates the 17th fractional
section in the 4th fractional township, east of the Great Miami river,
in the first fractional range of townships on the Ohio river; number
of the warrant, 192." In March 1795, Denman conveyed his interest,
which was only an equitable interest, in the lands so located, to Joel
Williams; and on the 14th of February, 18C0, John Cleves vSymmes
conveyed to Joel Williams in fee, certain lands described in the deed,
which included the premises in question; and on the 16th of April
1800, Joel Williams conveyed to John Daily the lot now in question.
And the lessor of the plaintift, by sundry mesne conveyances, deduces
a title to the premises to himself.
In the course of the trial, several exceptions were taken to the ruling
of tlie court, with respect to tlie evidence olifered on the part of the
plaintiff, in making out his claim of title. But in the view which the
court has taken of what may be considered the substantial merits of the
case, it becomes unnecessary to notice those exceptions.
The merits of the case will properly arise upon one of the instructions given by the court, as asked by the plaintiff; and in refusing to
give one of the instructions asked on the part of the defendant. PAt
the request of the plaintiff', the^ court instructed the jury, "that to enable the city to hold this ground, and defend themselves in this action,
by possession, they must show an unequivocal, uninterrupted possession for at least twenty years."
On the part of the defendants, the
court was asked to instruct the jury, "that it was competent for the
original proprietors of the town of Cincinnati to reserve and dedicate
any part of said town to public uses, without granting the same by
writing or deed to any particular person; by which reservation and
dedication, the whole estate of the said proprietors in said land, thus
reserved and dedicated, became the property of, and was vested in, the
public, for the purposes intended by the said proprietors; and that,
by such dedication and reservation, the said original proprietors, and
all persons claiming under them, are estopped from assertiQw any claim
or right to the said land thus.jpserved and dedicated." The court
fused. to give the instruction as, asked, but gave the following iastruction: "That it was competent for the original proprietors ..oi the town
of Cincinnati to reserve and dedicate any part of said town to public
uses, without granting the same, by writing or deed, to any particular
person ; by which reservation an^ dedication, the right of use to such
part is vested in the public for the purposes designated ; but that such
reservation and dedication do not invest the public with the fee."

r^
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The ruling of the court, to be collected from these instructions, was,
that although there might be a parol reservation and dedication to the
public of the use of lands ; yet such reservation and dedication did
not invest the public with the fee; and that a possession and enjoyment of the use for less than twenty years was not a defence in this
action.
The decision and direction of the circuit court upon those
points come up on a writ of error to this court.
It is proper, in the first place, to observe, that although the land
which is in dispute, and a part of which is the lot now in question, has
been spoken of by the witnesses as having been set apart by the proprietors as a common, we are not to understand the term as used by
them in its strict legal sense, as being a right or profit which one man
may have in the lands of another ;| but m its popular sense, as a piece'
of ground left open for commons and public use, for the convenience
"~^
and accommodation of the inhabitants of the town.
Dedications of land for public purposes have frequently come under the consideration of this court; and the objections which have
generally been raised against their validity have been the want jofa_
grantee competent to taketlie titlej applying to them the rule which
^revails^in private grants, that there must be a grantee as well as a
But that is not the light in which this court has considered
grantor.
such dedications for public use. The law applies to them rules adapted to the nature and circumstances of the case, and to carry into execution die intention and object of the grantor, and secure to the public
the benefit held out, and expected to be derived from and enjoyed, by
'\
the dedication.
for
charitabla
dedications
of
land
bar,
at
the
admitted
It was
ithat
and religious purposes, and for public highways, we re valid, without
TtTfhough such are
any grantee to whom the fee could be conveyed^
to
are
be found in the
occur
and
most
frequently
which
cases
the
well
distinction
can be
how
any
grounded
books, it is not perceived,
made between such cases and the present. The same necessity exists
in the one case as in the other for the purpose of effecting the object
intended. The princip le , if well foundedjn the law, must have a general applicatiqn_Jo_all appropriations and dedications for public use,
where there is no g rantee in esse to take the fee. But this forms an
exception to the rule applicable to private grants, and grows out of the
In this class of cases, there may be instances,
necessity of the case.
contrary to the general rule, where the fee may r emain in abeyance,
until there is a grantee capable of taking; where the object and purpose of the appropriation look to a future grantee, in whom the fee is
to vest. But the validity of the dedication does not depend on this;

it will preclude the party making the appropriation from re-asserting
any right over the land, at all events, so long as it remains in public
use, although there may never arise any grantee capable of taking the
fee.
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The recent case of Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. 266, 7 L. Ed. 521, in this
court, is somewhat analogous to the present. There, a lot of ground
had been marked out upon the original plan of an addition to Georgetown, "for the Lutheran Church." and had been used as a place of
burial, from the time of the dedication.
There was not, how'cver, at
the time of the appropriation, or at any time afterwards, any incorporated Lutheran church, capable of taking the donation.
The case
turned upon the question, whether the title to the lot ever passed from
Charles Beatty, so far as to amount to a perpetual appropriation of it
to the use of the Lutheran church. That was a parol dedication only,
and designated on the plan of the town.
The principal objection relied upon was, that there was no grantee capable of taking the grant.
But the court sustained the donation, on the ground, that it was a
dedication of the lot to public and pious uses; adopting the principle
that had been laid down irLthe case of the Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9
Cranch, 292, 3 L. Ed. 735,»that appropriations of this description were
exceptions to the general rule requiring a granttnTl That it was like a
dedication of a highway to the public. This last remark shows that the
case did not turn upon the bill of rights of Maryland, or the statute of
Elizabeth relating to charitable uses, but rested upon more general
principles ; as is evident from what fell from the court in the case of
the Town of Pawlet v. Clark, which was a dedication to religious uses;
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yet the court said, this was not a novel doctrine in the common law.
In the familiar case, where a man lays out a street or public highway
over his land, there is, strictly speaking, no grantee of the easement,
but it takes effect by way of grant or dedication to public uses.
And
in support of tlie principle, the case of Lade v. Shepherd, 2 Str. 1004,
was referred to ; which was an action of trespass, and the place where
the supposed trespass was committed was formerly the property of the
plaintiff, who had laid out a street upon
which had continued thereafter to be used as
and
public highway
was insisted, on the part
of the defendant, that by the plaintiff's making
street,
was
dedication of
to the public, and that although he, the defendant, might be
liable for
nuisance, the plaintiff could not sue him for
trespass.
But the court said,
dedication
to
the
so
far as
certainly
public,
the public has occasion for
which
right of passage;
only for
but
never was understood to be
transfer of his absolute property
in the soil. The doctrine necessarily growing out of that case has a
.sirong bearing upon the one now before the court, in two points of view.
4it shows, in the first place, that no deed or writing was necessary to
Iconstitute
valid dedication of the easement.
All that was done, from
^iljflhing that appears in the case, was barely laying out the street by
the owner, across his land. fAnd in the second place, that
not
necessary that the fee of the land should pass, in order to secure theT
easement to the public.
And this must necessarily be so, from the
nature of the case, in the dedication of all public highAvays.
There
no grantee to take immediately, nor
any one contemplated by die

.
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can
party to take the fee at any future day. No grant or conveyance
it
and
let
land,
the
of
be nec essary t o pass .the iee_out of ,the._Q\vner
the
indeed,
remain in abeyanc e, until a grantee shall come in esse; and
case^reTelTeHtoTn Strange considers the fee as remaining in the original owner; otherwise, he could sustain no action for a private injureto the soil, he having transferred to the public the actual possession^__
If this is the doctrine of the law, applicable to highways, it must apof land to
ply with equal force, and in all its parts, to all dedications
of a
public uses ; and it was so applied by this court to the reservation

McConneU y.
public spring of water, for public use, in the case of
6
L. Ed. 735.
582,
Wheat.
12
Trustees of the Town of Lexington,
a
public spring, for
The court said, the reasonableness of reserving
was so republic use, the concurrent opinion of all the settlers that it
understood,
served, the universal admission of all that it was never
appropriathe
early
and
person,
that the spring lot was drawn by any
claim.
the
tion of it to public purposes, were decisive against
The right of the public to the use of the common in Cincinnati must
rest on the same principles as the right to the use of the streets ; and
out
no one will contend, that the original owners, after having laid
could
ade,
m
improvements
and
thereon,
streets, and sold building lots
^
claim the easement thus dedicated to the public. All public dedications'
must be considered with reference to the use for which they are made ;
and streets in a town or city may require a more enlarged right over
intended,
the use of the land, in order to carry into effect the purposes
counin
the
for
a
highway
than may be necessary in an appropriation
owner
try ; but' the principle, so far as respects the right of the original
to disturb the use, must rest on the same ground, in both cases ; and_
streets,
applies equally to the dedication of the common as to the
was for the public use, and the convenience and accommodation of the
inhabitants of Cincinnati ; and, doubtless, greatly enhanced the value

fit

property adjoining this common, and thereby comi>enAnd
sated the owners for the land thus thrown out as public grounds.
such,
and
prias
use,
and
enjoyed
for
public
aiterJbdng^thuAselapart
conlaw
the
to
reference
vate ^n£indiyidualj^ights acquired with
an estoppel in pais, which precludes the origiiders
in the nature
violation of good
It
nal owner from revoking such dedication.
private property
have
acquired
who
those
to
"and
faith to the public,
granted.
thus
publicly
use
the
with view to the enjoyment of
The right of the public, in such cases, does not depend upon twenty
doctrine, applied to public highways and the
years' possession. Such
streets of the numerous villages and cities that are so rapidly springing
conup in every part of our country, would be destructive of public
447,
Dean,
Bing.
v.
of
Jarvis
veniencc^and private right. The case
of
posseslength
sho\i:5,\that rights of this description do not rest upon
The plaintiff's right to recover in that case, turned upon the
certain street, in the parish of Islington, had been
question, whether
Chief Justice
common public highway.
dedicated to the public as
3
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Best, upon the trial, told the jury, that if they thought the street had
for years as a public thoroughfare, with the assent of the
owner of -the soil, they might presume a dedication ; and the jury
found a verdict for the plaintiff, and the court refused to grant a new
trial, but sanctioned the direction given to the jury and the verdict
found thereupon ; although this street had been used as a public road
only four or five years; the court saying, the jury were warranted in
jii;esuming it was used with the full assent of the owner of the soil.
I The point, therefore, upon which the establishment of the public street
'rested, was, whether it had been used by the public as such, with the
assent of the owner of the soil ; not whether such use had been for a
length of time, which would give the right by force of the possession;
nor whether a grant might be presumed ; but whether it had been used
with the assent of the owner of the land; necessarily implying, that
the mere naked fee of the land remained in the owner of the soil, but
that it became a public street, by his permission to have it used as such.
Such use, however, ought to be for such a length of time that the public accommodation and private rights might be materially affected by
an interruption of the enjoyment.
In the present case, the fact of dedication to public use is not left
to inference, from the circum5j:ance that the land has been enjoyed as
aj;:Qmmon-4^i'-many years. IfBut the actual appropriation for that pur)ose is established by the irlbst positive and conclusive evidence.
And
'indeed, the testimony is such as would have warranted the jury in presuming a grant, if that had been necessary. And the fee might be considered in abeyance, until a competent grantee appeared to receive it;
which was as early as the year 1802, when the city was incorporated.
And the common having then been taken under the charge and direction of the trustees, would be amply sufficient to show an acceptance,
if that was necessary, for securing the protection of the public right.
'
But it has been argued, that this appropriation was a nullity, because
the proprietors, Denman, Ludlow and Patterson, when they laid out
the town of Cincinnati, and appropriated this ground as a common, in
the year 1789, had no title to the land, as the patent to S'ymmes was
It is undoubtedly true, that no legal
not issued until the year 1794.
title had passed from the United States to Symmes. BuMhe proprietors had purchased of Symmes all his equitable right to their part of
This
the tract which he had under his contract with the government.
objection is more specious than solid, and does not draw after it the
conclusions alleged at the bar.
There is no particular form or ceremony necessary in the dedication
of land to public use. All that is required is the assent of the owner of "^
the land, and the fact of its being used for the public purposes inThis was the -doctrine in the case of
sanded by the appropriation.
referred
to, with respect toa_,st£££l.;_aGd the
Dean,
V.
already
Jafvis
same rule must apply to all public dedications ;|ran3~from the mere use
of the land, as public land, thus appropriated, the assent of the owner
been used

w
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In the present case there having been an actual
be presumed.
contined assent will be presumed, until
dedication, fully proved,
and
this
shown
should be satisfactorily established by the
dissent
dedications;
In the case of Rex v. Lloyd,
partjc ^laim ing against the
the owner of the soil throws
Campr2627 Lord Ellenborough~s"aysr
passage, and neither marks by any visible distinction that he
open
nor excludes persons from
means to preserve all his rights over
by positive prohibition, he shall be presumed to have
passing through
if
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of Cincinnati was laid

ou.t by the
no
legal title
proprietors, and the common dedicated to public use,
But as soon as Sj'mmes became vested with the
had been granted.
legal title, under the patent of 1794, the equitable right of the proprietors attached upon the legal estate, and Symmes became their
trustee, having no interest in the land but the mere naked fee. And
has the
the assent of the proprietors to the dedication continuing,
had originally been made, after the
same effect and operation as
subsequent ratification and
may be considered
patent issued.
the time the plan
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very satisfactorily
ffirma nce of the first appropriation.
the plaintiff delessor
of
whom
the
Williams,
from
that
proved,.
Joel
Denman, and
of
he
understood,
when
purchased
duces his title, well
public
for some years before, that his ground had been dedicated as
The original plat, exhibiting this ground
common by the proprietors.
common, was delivered to him at the time of the purchase. And
as
deed from Symmes, he
when he, afterwards, in the year 1800, took
known that he was a
in
have
case,
the
evidence
to
the
must, according
the notoriety of
fee.
from
And
mere trustee, holding only the naked
common,
the fact, that these grounds were laid open and used as
fairly to be presumed, that all subsequent purchasers had full knowlthe fact.
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contended, that the lessor of the plaintiff has shown tlie
enough to
/legal title to the premises in question in himself, which
and that the defendants' remedy,
any
entitle him to recover at law
in
court of equity. And such was substantially the
they have,
opinion of the circuit court, in the fourth instruction asked by the
the said proprietors did
plaintiff, and given by the court, viz "that
and afterwards acthereto,
title
no
having
said
appropriate
ground,
not inure so as
title
could
that
equitable
quired an equitable title only,
to vest
legal title in the city or citizens, and enable them to defend
person
themselves in an action of ejectment brought against them by
hol^iing the legal title."
be admitted, that
We do not accede to this doctrine. For should
of
the
tlie
lessor
plaintiff,
by no means
in
naked
was
mere
fee
the
is

is

possession of the comraojLjnjaDL
follows, that he
entitledJi>-i:^COver
a possessory action, and the plaintiff, to
action of ejectment. fThis
entitle himself to recover, must have the right of possession; and
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whatever takes away this right of possession, will deprive him of the
Adams's Eject. 32; Stark, part 4, p. 506-7.
remedy by ejectment,
This is the rulejaid down by Lord Mansfield in Atkyns v. Horde, 1
Burr . 119 -^^/f^n ejectment," says he, "is a possessory remedy, and
JnTy competent where the lessor of the plaintiff may enter; and every
plaintiff in ejectment must show a right of possession as well as of
property." And in the case of Doe v. Staple, 2 T. R. 684, it was held,
that although an outstanding satisfied term may be presumed to be surrendered, yet an unsatisfied term, raised for the purpose of securing
an annuity, cannot, during the life of the annuitant; and may be set
up as a bar tQ the heir-at-law, even though he claim only subject to the
chafge.^ Thereby clearly showing, the plaintiff must have, not only the
le, but a clear present right to the possession of the premises ;
cannot recover in an action of ejectment. And in the case of Doe
Jackson, 2 Dow. & Ry. 523, Bailey, Justice, says, '^An action of
ejectment, which from first to last is a fictitious remedy, is founded on
the principle that the tenant in possession is a wrongdoer; and unless
he is so, at the tirfte the action is brought, the plaintiff cannot recover,"

If,

\y

.

then, it is indispensable, that the lessor of the plaintiff should show
a right of possession in himself, and that the defendants are wrongdoers, it is difficult to perceive, on what grounds this action can be sustained.
The later authorities in England which have been referred to, leave
it at least questionable, whether the doctrine of Lord Mansfield in the
case of Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Burr. 143, "that ejectment will lie by the
owner of the soil for land, which is subject to a passage over it as the
king's highway," would be sustained, at the present day, at Westminster
Hall. It was not, even at that day, considered a settled point, for the
counsel on the argument (page 140), referred to a case, said to have
been decided by Lord Hardwicke ; in which he held, that no possession
could be delivered of the soil of a highway, and therefore, no ejectment
would lie for it. This doctrine of Lord Mansfield has crept into most
of our elementary treatises on the action of ejectment, and has apparently, in some instances, been incidentally sanctioned by judges.
But
we are not aware of its having been adopted in any other case, where
it was the direct point in judgment.
No such case was referred to on
the argument, and none has fallen under our notice. There are, however, several cases in the supreme court of errors of Connecticut, where
the contrary doctrine has been asserted and sustained, by reasons much
more satisfactory than those upon which the case in Burrow is made
to rest.
Stiles v. Curtis, 4 Day (Conn.) 328; Peck v. Smith, 1 Conn,
103, 6 Am. Dec. 216.
But if we look at the action of ejectment, on principle, and inquire
what is its object, it cannot be^justained, on any rational ground.
It is
to recover possession of the land in question ; and the judgment, if carried into execution, must be followed by delivery of possession to the
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lessor of the plaintiff. The purpose for which the action is brought, is
not to try Jhe^ mere abstract right to the soil, but to obtain actual pos^
session ; the very thing to which the plaintiff' can have no exclusive or
This would be utterly inconsistent with the admitted
private right.
public right; that right consists in the uninterrupted enjoyment of the
possession; the two rights are therefore incompatible with each other,
and cannot stand together. The lessor of the plaintiff seeks specific
relief, and to be put into the actual possession of the land. The very
fruit of his action, therefore, if he avails himself of
will subject him
to an indictment for
nuisance; the private right of possession being
in direct hostility with the easement or use to which the public are entitled and as to the plaintiff's taking possession subject to the easement,
It well said, by Mr. Justice Smith, in the
utterly impracticable.
case of Stiles v. Curtis, that the execution of
judgment, in such case,
as
involves
great an inconsistency as to issue an habere facias possessionem
certain premises to A., subject to the possession of B. It
said, cases may exist where this action ought to be sustained for the
public benefit, as where erections are placed on the highway, obstructing the public use. But what benefit would result from this to the public?
would not remove the nuisance.
The effect of
recovery,
would only be to substitute another offender against the public right,
but would not abate the nuisance. That must be done by another proceeding.
said, in the case in Burrow, that an ejectment could be maintained, because trespass would lie. But this certainly does not follow.
The object and effect of the recoveries are entirely different. rThe one
inconsistent with the ento obtain possession of the land, which
to recover damages
joyment of the public right; an^' the other
in perfect
merely, and not to interfere with the possession, which
the fee
supposed to reSo also,
harmony with the public right.
main in the original owner, cases may arise where perhaps, waste, or
private injury to such
special action on the case, may be sustained, for
owner but these are actions perfectly consistent with the public right.
But
carried into execution,
recovery in an action of ejectment,
directly repugnant to the public right.
Upon the whole, the opinion of the court is, that the judgment must
be reversed, and the cause sent back with directions to issue
venire
de novo. Judgment reversed.
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PHILADELPHIA.

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

1904.

208 Pa. 189, 57

Atl.

523.)

Appeal from award of jury of view. Before Biddle, P. J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Verdict and judg ment for plaintiff for $3,00 0. Defendant appealed.
Potter, J.* This was an issue framed under an appeal from the
finding of a road jury upon a cl aim for damages caused by the wide ning of Waln ut street. On the lot now owned by the plaintiff' at tlie
southeast corner of l5th street and Walnut, a building was erec ted
some thirty-five or forty years ago upon a line about four feet fro m
t he street Ime , and the inte rvening space was left open for use and wa s
the sidewalk.

All

on
line.
On June 30,
the bureau of surveys to
of Walnut street confor m
and on January 15, 1894,
in pursuance to the ordniance, the new s outh line o f Walnut street was
thus fixed.
Plainti ff purchased th e p roperty in question in 1898, and took dow n
the oldbu ilding and erected a"new one upon the line estab l ished in 189 4.
This practically coincided with the line of the old building, although
there is some evidence which indicates a further recession of a few
inches. The p laintiff claimed damages for the value of the entire foi ir
f eet between the original street line and that established in 189 4. The
city claimed that the plaintiff' was entitled to no damages whatever,
averring that the former owner had dedicated this four feet of ground
to the use of the public. The court instructed the jurv that there w as
ji evidence in the case that would iustifv them in findin g thn^ tlipre
o^
h a^ been a dedication of the ground to public use , and restricted the
jury to the single question of the amount of damages to be awarded.
In this we think there was error.
There is much evidence in the case tending to show that the strip of
ground in question was for many years used as p^rt nf the sidewalk ,
a nd that the owner made no use of it which would indicate that he regarded it as ministering in any wav to his special benefi t. There was
no door upon the Walnut street end of the building and no steps leading to the street, as the entrance was from the 15th street side. It is
claimed by the city, and considerable evidence was offered tending to
show, that, during a period of time exferir|in cr fnr many yeart; mnre
t han the statutory period "f limitations, the owner never made any obu sed by the public as part^ot

the block were erected substantially on the
1892, an or dinance was passed authorizing
revise the city plan so as to make the width
t o the line of the buildinp-s erected there^g m ;

the other buildings

same

jection to the full and free use of this ground by the public as part of
the highway, and never, during that period, made any claim of ownership therein.
W here there has been long continued use of land as a street by th e
public without objection on the part of the owner of the soil, the jury
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Schenley v. Com., 36 Pa. 29, 59, 78
may presume_a_valjci dedication.
Am. Decr359. No par Vr^'^^^r fprmnHty I'g rpqnfQitp tf> rnnptitute a dedic ation upon the part of the ownef . Any act which clearly indicates an
intention to dedicate is sufficient. "Proof of the animus dedicandi may
be by circumstances, and may rest in pais. One of such circumstances
which will be considered eyidence of dedication, is the use of the way
by the public, wit h the knowledge and assent of the owner of the soil ;
and when such use extends through a long series of years, the animus
dedicandi is presumed. The reason of this rule is, that when the own er of the soil so long acquiesces in the usin g- the wny, havin cr knnwlpdg- p'
t hereof, he is estopped lo deny his prior dedication ."
Wilson y. Sexon,

2/ Iowa,

15.

It was also said, in City of 'Richmond

y. Stokes, 31 Grat.

(Va.) 713: "Where streets and alleys haye been opened by the owner
of the soil and used by the public with his consent for years, a dedication of the easement may be presumed, and the continued and uninterrupted use with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner will justify the presumption of a dedication to the pulilic, pr ovided the use h as
be en continued so long that priya te rights and public conyen ience might
b e materially affected by an interruption of the enjoymen t.
But any
a cts of owners hi p by the owners
presum
p' of the soil would repel the
~
t'l^nTZ

In State v. K. C, etc., R. R. Co., 45 Iowa, 139, it was pointed out
that in the strict sense of the term a highway cannot be established by
prescription, since there can be no such thing as a grant to the public,
but co mmon usage has applied th e term to highways whose existence is
b ased upon long use and occupatio n.
There are many cases holding that the period required for the statute of limitations to bar the right of the ovyner wo uld from analogy be
s ufficient to establish a presumption of de dimtinn from lapse of ti me.
Thus Knox, J., says, in Com. y. Cole, 26 Pa. 187: "The use of the
ground by the public as a highway for more than twenty-one years
made it a public road just as effectually as though it had originally been
laid out and opened by the proper authorities."
And in Schenley y.
Com., 36 Pa. 29, 59 (78 Am. Dec. 359) it is said : "T he period of tw ent y-one years of enjoyment
after which a presumption of a grant is
''
made, is fixed fro'T^ nnnl'"'?)^ tr. tliP <;f.qtiitp ^ f limitations .
There is also abundant authority for the proposition that the owner
of the soil ma y be concluded by a user by the publ ic for a .much -shor4er
period of time, when th ere arejothe r (j-irrnmst^nc p', from whighthe jnt ention to dedicate may be inferred. • As in Pittsburg, etc., Railway
"
Co. V. Dunn, 56 Pa. 280, Reed, J., says :
Eight years is quite sufficien t
t i me for presuming a dedication of the way to the public.
In_a great
c ase which was much contested, s ix years was held sufficient, 11 East,
^75 (note) ; and in Jaryis y. Dean, 3 Bing. 447, Chief Justice Best said
'as it had been used for four or fiye years as a public road, the jury
were warranted in presuming that it was used with the full assent of
"
the owners of the soil.'
But where it is obyious that a space has been

Xf
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left open for the accommodation of the owner and not of the public the
presumption of dedication does not arise. Gowen v. Phila. Exchange
And where the owner of and
P-o., 5 Watts & S. 141, 40 Am. Dec. 489.
m
for
his
his
fence
back
fro
the
own convenienc e and uses.
sets
highway
(s
private
the mtervenmg space until his death for
purposes,"the municiI
/ pal authorities cannot restrain a subsequent owner of the property,
'even years after the death of the former owner, from setting back the
fence to the old line and enclosing the intervening space : Griffin's Appeal, 109 Pa. 150. But there the use of the land by the public was simply by sufferance of the owner: in that case Justice Green said (page
^'
Dedicatio n i s a matter of intention, and when clearly prov ed,
/ -//.^m ^ 155):
/, it is as complete m one dav as in twenty-one year s.
OA*^^i^^^^
Where there is no
continued
proof,
use
the
is
evidence
of an inpublic
opposing
long
by
^j3£;;^<A/<*^
■''^^
tention to dedicate, but it is by no means conclusive and always yields
to contrary proof of a satisfactory character."
In Weiss v. So. Bethle<f
hem Borough, 136 Pa. 294, 20 Atl. 801, the question of the intention to
/
dedicate was submitted to the jury, and they were instructed that a
mere permissive use by the public of a piece of ground left open by the
owner in front of his property, and used by him in his own business
and for his own convenience, was not a dedication to public use and
conferred no right upon the public as against the owner.
The ju ry
, ^w ere further told tha t the question whether or not there was a dedi cat ion depended upon the tacts m evidence aajo the op enin g of the lan d,
the c haracter of the use by the publi c, the character of the property,
^^^ other nrnimthe n ature of the land and its snrrmir]din crs^

j

Jix'^
^

'

1

is

V

I

a

if

a

it

:

§

in Dillon, ^Municipal Corporations (4th Ed.)
"A
639, as follows
street may be widened by the dedication of
strip of land adjoining
and such dedication may be shown by long use by the public and acthe street has been long used
quiescence in such by the owner. And
and built upon to
particular line, which has been acquiesced in by the
adjoining owners, who have built and made improvements to correspond with siich line, such owners and the public acquire rights in consequence and one or more of such owners cannot afterwards change
or narrow the street by showing that the original survey made the line
of the street different from that which "had been long regarded, built
upon and acquiesced in as the line of the street."
n the prese nt case we think the question of dedication should have
The evidence showed
been submitted to tne jury
long use^oT the
strip of ground in question by the public, as part of the pavement.
Whether or not this was simply permissive, by the owner, and was accourse of conduct which would indicate
companied by
continued
claim of ownership, was for tlie jury to determine. Whether the owna

'

_

a

.

,

"Yl

•yv*|

^UlLli'

s^nces i n the cjise^. and if they found that there was ^ah" iiil:ehtion to
dedicate on the part of the owner, they would be warranted in finding
that there was an actual dedication, and in that event their verdict
should be in favor of the defendant.
A general statement of the doctrine applicable to this case
found

a

7j^^*^
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er of tfie_soil_gave up the n.'^p nf the strip to tjip pn1-»1iV^ wi'tlmm- qimiifj\vlietherjie ever attempted in a ny way to li mit the rights of
t^ public therein..were questions of fact." The court should have given
to the jury an adequate definition of what facts or circumstances would
amount to a legal dedication and it would then have been for them to
find from the evidence and all the circumstances of the case, tlie existence of facts to fit the definition.
The fifth, sixth and seventh assignments of error are sustained.
The judgment is reversed and a venire facias de novo is awarded.®
c ation, o r

Q^U^^Uh-^^4^

WORMLEY

-^^

(Supreme Court of Illinois, 1904.

V.

J^

WORMLEY.

207 111. 411, 69 N.

E.

865, 3

JL. R. A.

[N. S.] 481.)

This is a Wll jn chance ry, filed in the circuit court of Kendall county on June 10, 1899, by the plaintiff in error, George D. Wormley and
all of the defendants in error except John T, Wormley, (said defendants in error, except John T. Wormley, being ten in number,)

against defendant in error, John T. Wormley, as deA general demurrer was filed to the bill. On January 4,
fendant.
1901, the demurrer was_ sustained.
Subsequently on April 3, 1901,
the bil l was dismisse d for wa nt of e quity, and the costs were taxed
against the complainants below, and it was ordered that the defendas complainants,

9

Not uncommonly

f

it

is snid that an adverse use of Innd for highway

pur-

/)
Xdo-i^r"

7:j

rnr thp^ppiinrl of flip statute of liinitatioiis will result In
p oses oy rnp nnhii
a highway being created |>y "prpspT-i^fti^n^
See Jennings \. Tisbury, 5 Gray
('jnass.)
Prescription in this connection can hardly have quite the
(l!li55').
same meaning as in the case of the creation of pi-ivate easements, at least
implies
supposed lost grant.
so far as
In this connec tion the presumption is of ii past dedica"~tion. Thomas v. FordTHSTild. 34^," 52 Am. Hep.
a

it

in

oisnssoi:

^4-

^
(jgS

§

;

;

a

a

2

3

a

t

"/

There may be statutes directly applicable to the situation.
In California,
/^T\
for instance, there is a statute hat "all roads used as such fcr a period of ^—"^'^iV.
\J^
^"^*'
highwavs
n
\\\c
v
v
more thii
ears are
T This statute was construed as in "the
nature of
statute of limitations. Bolger v. Foss, 65 Cal. 250,
Pac. 871
^
^'K'{2^^
^-^^-r* ^
There is a similar statute in Michigan, the period of time specified
(1884).
Comp. Laws,
being ten years.
4061.
. —
J.'he stat ute, however, docs not
is merely permissive. ^l^Hciney v. Township of Sodus,
cJ ^"t/C^^^
2J2I2liLto_a_use^_^^vhich
y^T^
131 Mich. 510, 91 N. W. 745," 59 L. R. A. 287' (1902).
The owner of
city had the same plattract of land in the outskirts of
ted into blocks, lots, and streets.
A map was made, showing the arrangement, and lots were sold and conveyed with reference to the map.
Some
of the streets were opened and used.
In proceedings by the city to have
opened certain other streets shown on the map the owners of lots abutting
upon such streets claim compensation.
Are they entitled to any? See QuickHaiTington v. Mansail V. PhiladelDhia,
177 Pa. 301, 35 Atl. 609 (1896);
chester, 76 N. li. 347, 82 Atl. 716 (1912)
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore V. Frick. 82 Md. 77, 33 Atl. 435 (1895)
Reis v. City of New York, 188
N. Y. 58, 80 N. E. 573 (1907); State v. Hamilton, 109 Tenu. 276, 70 S. W. 619
(1902).
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The present writ of error is sued
ant below have execution therefor.
out for the purpose of reviewing the decree, so entered, which dis/?/?
missed the bill for want of equity.
^•.,/,/
In the bill, the orators therein bein£_ plaintiff in error, Gggrge D ,
Wormley, and ten other perso ns, who are defendants in error herein
wTth the defendant in error, John T. Wormley, alleged that in Feb -_
ruary, 1839, and prior thereto and thereafter^one John H. Wormley
was the owner in fee of a certain tract of eighty acres of land in said
countv. and also was the owner in fee of other lands particularly described in the bill; that such other lands so described constituted
i n all one-half acre ; that said one-half acre of land so described
was generally known as the "Wormley cemetery," and had been so
known and recognized ever since the year 1839; that, in February
and June of 1839, two of John H. Wormley 's re latives were bu ried
in said one-half acre of land, that in 1845 a brother-in-law of his
was biiried on said half acre; that in 1845 John H. Wormley, being the owner of said one-half acre, and of other lands about the
same whereon he resided, dedicated by words and acts snid half nrx e
for a burying ground for the uses of the Wormley familv. and the ir
relatives : Jhat ever sinc e J.8 39 said half acre has been used by t he
Wormley fa mily , ^jldj^he neigjjhoriiptjd, for the uses of sepulture;
that, since the year 1845^ there have been buried on said dedicated
land many persons, the names of about thirty of whom are mentioned
in the bill, being of the Wormley family, and relatives of orators;
t hat monuments have been erected over the graves of many of saj .d
many of them by orators ; that orators, and other relatives
d^ecedents,
of said decedents, have continued to protect the remains of those
buried in said cemetery, and to preserve the identity and memory
of their said relatives ; that orators have not in any manner neglec ted
to preser ve the monuments, erected to indicate the identity and pr eserve the memory of their said rp 1ativp<; nr trt giVp anH rnntmiie tO
1^.

,a

e

a

e

i

s

a

a

t

,''f

o i

tl

v4

said cemetery the character and name of a burial ground, except
so far as th ey have been prevented by
Wormley, the^de^ejidJohn_
antj that ttiere were~!hefi, at l:he time^T filing the bill, in said cemetery more than eighty graves, cared for and kept by orators, and other
relatives of the deceased;
iat John H. Wormley settled in Osweg o,
n Kendall county, several years before 1839. and resided prf
nd
wned the farm on which said cemetery
located, from the tim of
su ch settlement until the time of his death about th year 1890; that
during all that time he recognized said cemetery, as the burial ground
of his relatives and the neighborhood, and ssisted in maintain inphe same as such;^ that, during his lifetime, he. with Qtlifr relati ves
qt those buried m said cemetery, caused to be erected and maintained
a suitable fence, enclosing said half acre dedicated by hinT~as
ceme tery; that such fence was kept up by orators, and other relatives of the
deceased, until prevented by the defendant in
violent and unlawful
Wormley.
manner; that, upon the death of John H.
the defendant.
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T. Wormley.^s his son and heir, came into the ownership and

of the farm , on which said cemetery is located, and still
owns and possesses tlie same; that, for many years after his coming
into such ownership of said farm, he recognized the said cemetery
as the burying ground of and for the Wormley family and neighborhood, and t hat the sani^e had been dedicated by his father, John H.
Wormley , _for such purpose s ; that said cemetery is located on said
farm on the line of the Aurora and Oswego wagon road, a nd ingress
a nd egress in and out of said cemetery can be had without in any way
i nterfering with, or trespassing on, the lands or premises of the de p ossession

J

fendant, John T. Wormley
that lately said defendant has torn down
the fence, surrounding said cemetery, and is pasturing cattle, horses,
and swine therein ; t hat he has defaced and is defacing, the monum ents
a nd desecrating the graves in said cemetery : that he threatens to
s hoot and kill any persons, who attempt tofence said cemetery, or care
for the monum PTitt; and g raves therein ; that he threatens to enter and
remove the monuments therein, and to plow and cultivate the land
therein ; that, by threats and force, he prevents orators, and other relatives of the buried, from replacing the fence or caring for the monuments and graves in said cemetery ; that orators fear that he w ill
c arry jTJs_tlire ats into p\'Pl;'}^t^ an^ nnless re!=;l;r nined by the orderof the
c ourt.
The bill thereupon prays that John T. Wormley may be restrained by injunction from defacing, or in any manner interfering
with, the monuments and graves in said cemetery, or with orators,
or any one of them, in fencing said cemetery and preserving the monuments and caring for the graves therein, or in any way interfering
with the fence or fences of said cemetery, now or hereafter erected ;
t hat. , u pon_a^n al he.nrm v^^ it may be order e d and decreed that s aid
"
descri bed one-half acre of land, known as the Wormley cemetery ,"
has bee n dedicate d, t o the Wormley fa mily, and their relatives, and
neighborhood contiguous thereto, as a burying ground; that said inj unction may be made perpetual, and orators may have such oth er
re lief as equity m^ y require

MagrudEr, J.

,

etc.

First— It is well settled in the United States, that

for which land may be dedicated ;
and it is held that, upon such dcdicaiiun, the owner is precluded trom
5 Am. & Erig. Ency. of
exercising his former rights over the land.
in
notes.
784,
and
cases
referred
to
Law (2d Ed.) p.
It i s also well settled, t hat a court of equity will enjoin the owner
defacing, or meddling with, graves on land, dedicated to
o^ ^land from
the public for burial purposes, at the suit of any party., having deceased relatives or friends buried therein
Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet.
585, 7 L. Ed. 521; Davidson v. Reed, 111 111. 167, 53 Am. Rep. 613.
In the case of Beatty v. Kurtz, supra, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in speaking of property consecrated to cemetery purposes, held
that the removal of the memorials, erected by piety or love to the
memory of the good, are such acts as can not be "redressed by the
ce meteries are among the purposes,
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ordinary process of law. T he remedy must be so ug ht, if at all, in th e
pr otecting power of a court of chancer y; operatmg by its injunc tion
to "preser ve the repose of the ashes of tlie dead, and the religious sens i"
In Davidson v. Reed, supra, two persons, resbilities of the livin<^.
idents in the neighborhood of a public burying ground, having friends
buried there, filed a bill to enjoin the party owning the tract of land,
on which it was located, from defacing the grave, and to preserve the
ground for the public use for burial purposes ; and it was there held
that they could maintain the bill in their names, for the benefit of
themselves, as well as if all others directly interested had joined.
I t is also well settled, that no par ticular form or ceremony is n ecessary to dedicate land for the purposes of a cemetery . All that need
be shown to constitute such dedication is the assent of the owner, and
the fact that the land is used for the public purposes, intended by the
Stak ing off ground as a cemetery and allowing burials
appropriation.
An express setting apart of land" for""
therein amounts to a dedication.
"such a pUrpose by the owner may constitute a dedication of the land
5 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d
as a burial ground or cemetery.
784;
28;
9
Id.
v. Dittmar, 24 Kan. 42; Hayes
p.
Hagaman
p.
Ed.)
Houke,
V.
45 Kan. 466, 25 Pac. 860.
It has been held tha t the noto ri ous use of property for twenty years for burial p '^^'P'"'!^!^ wi*^^"' "^^
acquies cence of the owner affords presump tive ev idence of its ded icatio n tor such purpo ses. Boyce v. Kalbaugh, 47 JMd. 334, 28 Am.
Rep. 464.

In Davidson v. Reed, supra, this court held that a dedication of
land to the public for any public use may be shown by grant, by user,
or by the acts and declarations of the owner, coupled with evidence
of acceptance by the public; and that, where there was evidence of
an intent to dedicate, no particular form or ceremony is necessary .
In Davidson v. Reed, supra, it appeared that the owner of a quarter
section of land as early as 1844 buried a child in a comer thereof, since
which time the same had always been used by the people of the neighborhood as a public burying place, and the declarations of such owner
showed an intent to devote the land to such use, and the subsequent
owners of the quarter section of land made no objection to such use,
but recognized the same as a public burial place ; and it was there
held that these facts were sufficient to show a dedication of the land
so used to the public for a place for the interment of the dead.
In Alden Coal Co. v. Challis, 200 111. 222, 65 N. E. 665, we have
■
recently hel^ that the Statute of Frauds does not apply to dedication of
ground to the public, but that the same may be evidenced by acts and
declarations without any writing, and that no particular form is nece ssary to the validity of the dedication , it being properlv
a questio n
of intention, and that a dedication mav be established by parol . See
also Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. 440, 8 L. Ed. 452. In Alden Coal Co.
V. Challis, supra, we also held that the acceptance necessary to complete such dedication may be implied from acts and from user; and
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that, wl ien the dedi cati on is beneficial or greatly c onvenient or np rp<;will be implied from slight ciixu ms ary to the public, an "acceptance
stancgs^

a

it,

By comparing the allegations of the bill in the case at bar, as the
same are set forth in the statement preceding this opinion, with the
allegations of the bill, passed upon by this court in Davidson v. Reed,
supra, it will be found that the two cases correspond in all essential
It appears from the allegations of the bill in the present
particulars.
case that, during the lifetirrie of John H. Wormley, the original owner
of the land dedicated for the purposes of the Wormley cemetery, _he
r ecognized the half acre of groun d here in question as a cemetery for
trom l8>^9 to h is~5eath in
a ^period of about fl f ty^t i£__ ^ars", to-wit,
1 ^90.
During that time he not only buried his own relatives upon this
half acre, and permitted others to bury their dead there, but he indi cated h is- intention tojmake suchdedication. and to continue
by posHe, with others who buried their dead upon the
itive and open acts.
suitable fence, enhalf acre, caused to be erected and maintained
closing such half acre. He permitted the persons, who buried their

it

d

by

it

it

it
is

is

a

it

T

;

it,

a

dead there, to erect monuments over them, and to protect and preserve
the identity of the remains buried there. The bill alleges that more
than eighty persons have been buried in the cemetery, and that their
graves have been cared for and kept up by their relatives.
John H.
Wormley died in 1890, and the defendant, John T. Wormley, his son,
for more than ten years after that date, recognized the half acre as
cemetery, and did nothing to interfere with its use as such, until
about the time the present bill was filed.
The bill also alleges that
he has committed acts of depredation upon the cemetery by tearing
down the fence surrounding
and by pasturing his horses and cattle and swine therein
and also that he not only threatens to kill persons, who attempt to re-build the fence around the cemetery, or care
for the monuments and graves therein, but also threatens to remove
the monuments erected to commemorate the dead, and to plow and
cultivate the land therein.
he demurrer, filed by the defendant, ad UTJts all these allegations of the bill to be true .. When the land descended to John T. Wormley from his father, he inherited
subject
to the rights, which had been acquired in this half acre as*
cemetery.
The assent of his father to its use for such purposes
clearly averred
in the bill, and
also alleged therein, and shown, that
was acfor the purposes, for which
was dedcepted by the parties using
icated
the owner.
Under the facts and under the authorities applicable thereto, we
are of the opinion that the court below erred in sustaining the erm]rrpr_tn the biUr ^nd_t hat such demurrer should have be en pverruled.^"
10 See

Colbert v. Shepherd, S9 Va. 401, 16 S. E. 246 (1892).
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SULLIVAN.

(Supreme Court of Nebraska, 1906.

75 Neb. 847, 106 N.

W.

1027.)

Albert,

C. This is an appeal from a d ecree enjoinino^ the def endfrom maintaining a fence on an alleged public road. The defendant Babcock owns the sout hwest quarte r of the no rtTTu^est quar ter of
a certain section of land, and his codefendant
owns the southeast
quarter of the northeast quarter of the section adjoining on the west.
a nts

T he

road extends north and south on the section line between t he
tracts . That the d efgndarga, a short time before the
suit was commenced, er ected a fence on the road is not disputed ; t he
o nly controversy being the sufficiency of the evidence to show the ex i stence of a public road. That the county board never made any order for the opening of the road is conceded. It does appear, however,
that many years ago th e coun ty board entered an order decl aring all
s ection lines- within tlie county public roa ds.
But as this amounted
to a reiteration oi section 46, chapter 78, Compiled Statutes 1905 (Ann.
St. 6049), it was mere brutum fulmen, and, of itself, has no bearing
on the question at issue.
One
contention of the plaintiff
is that t he alleg
—■1ed road is a—high
—.
*
■
way by dedication . The evidence seems to bear o ut this contention.
t wo forty-acre

s

...

It appears that for many years
Hills country was al ong trails i n

and from the Black
the vicinity of this road.
It does
not appear to have been confined to any particular track, and as the
county was largely unsettled s ection lines were di«;rporar£W j
Although
it was denied by the defendants, it sufficiently appears tliat^aijiLDSt
2 years ago the defendant Babcock and one through whom the oth er
defendant traces his title, and who then owned the Sullivan forty ,
forthe purpose 6i inducing the public travel to follow the section lin e
b etween their respective tracts, built fences and planted trees o n
th eir respective sides of the section line, leaving a space about 66 fe et
w ide for public travel, and that thereafter, until about the time of the
commencement of this suit, the travel was confined to that space,
which has ever since been used by the public as a highw ay .^ Snr h
u se has been»uninterrupted, save that about a year before this suit wa s
b egun one of the defendants placed a fence on the road, but was direc ted to remove it by the county attorney, and did so.
It should be remarked, however, that there is evidence tending to show that the use
of the easement was interrupted several years ago by a fence which
was maintained for some time.
But the evidence on this point is
conflicting, and we are not prepared to say that a finding against the
defendants thereon is not sustained by sufficient evidence. Taken in
i ts entirety the evidence satisfies us that the owners of the land, more
t han 15 years ago, dedicated that portion now claimed as a public_ jx>ad
to the public , and the public at once accepted the grant, and, practically speaking, have been in the uninterrupted enjoyment thereof ever
the

travel

to
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since. It is true, there is no evidence that the public authorities ever
authorize^ any work on the road, or did any act indicating an acceptance of the grant. But a dedication, in order to become binding; upon
t he dedicator o rjijs^ privies in estate, need not be accepted by the p ublic_a utlK)rities , butjiiavJpejL^ceuted b ^^he g eneral^ ixiblic^ The gener al
p ublic accepts, as in this instance, by entermg upon the land and en jo ying tl)p privil^cTp nff ered. in other words, by user .
Streeter v.
Stalnaker, 61 Neb. 205, 85 N. W. 47; Attorney General v. Abbott,
154 Mass. Z2Z, 28 N. E. 346, 13 L. R. A. 251 ; Rees v. City of Chicago, 38 111. Z22\ Alden Coal Co. v. Challis, 200 111. 222, 65 N. E.
665.

is

:

is

It

,it;

Considerable stress is laid on the fact that the road in question
is connected with no public road at the south, and that it is some 80
rods from the north line of the defendants' lands to a public road with
wliich this road would connect at the north ; in other words, that th is
r pad is disconnected from all other public roads. In view of the en tire
e vidence , th-lt ^^^^ '"'^'^ "'"^ '^pp''in Lgignificanc e.
The travel from other
public roads to this road is over private property and with the permission of the owners, who, unlike the defendants, are not shown to
have dedicated a right of way for the use of the public. When such
permission is withdrawn, if the travel over such lands is merely permissive, the authorities may take the proper steps to establish highways
connecting with this road, or, if the road is not required, the proper
steps may be taken to relieve the defendants of the burden of the
easement.
But that has nothing to do with this case. The evidenc e
sh gws that t he road is a public highway, and so long as it remain s
s uch the detcndants have no right to obstruct
recommended that the decree of the district court be affirmed.
DuFFiE and Jackson, CC, concur.
By the Court For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the
dec ree of the district court
affi riTied.
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COATESVILLE BOROUGH.

(Supreme Court of Penn.sylvania,
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to recover dam ages for personaHnjurics.
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From the record
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appeared that plaintiff was Injured
falling
hole on
sidewalk in the borough of Coatesvill e. There was evidence that the portion of the street in which the hole was located
had been hrown open to pub lic use by
former owner of an adjo inng property, but there was no evidence that the strip in question ha
public stree by the bor ough.
been accepted as
The court entered
compulsory nonsuit which
subsequently refused to take off.
take off nonsuit.
rror assigned was refusal
n

it
—
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^^•'^C^^J^jU*^

yiL'UyO,

DERIVATIVE

184

(Part

2

The learned judge below conceding that throwing
P^R Curiam.
open a strip of his lot as a part of a street to the public for^ number
of years, rnay amount to dedicatio n to public use as against the owner,
nevertheless states accurately the rule t hat such action by the ow ner
c annot of itself make the land part of the street so as to bind the municipality . Someactofaccept^ce on the part of the municipality
must be shown beToreiT'caii be held liable for failure to keep in repair, etc., citing In re Alley in Pittsburg, 104 Pa. 622 ; Com. v. Moorehead, 118 Pa. 344, 12 Atl. 424, 4 Am. St. Rep. 599, and Steel v. Borough of Huntingdon, 191 Pa. 627, 43 Atl. 398.
Applying this rule to the facts before him the judge said: '^
ou r_^case there was no evidence whatever of the acceptance of this sid ew alk by the borough by either act or deed ; i t a pparently was thrown
o pen to the public street by Miss Perkins tor the r^nv^^^'^nrf
?"'^
ac commodation of her tenants, for on her property immediately north
wHere she resides, she still retains her fence along the eastern side of
the roadway."
Tliis amply sustains the nonsuit. Judgment affirmed.^*

OGLE

V.

CITY OF CUMBERLAND.

(Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1899.

90 Md. 59, 44

Atl.

1015.)

t
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a

it

a
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ScHMucKER, J. This case was instituted by the appellant to recover damages from the city of Cumberland for personal injuries sust ained by him from falling into a ditch or sewer at the point wherTi t
c rossed a road w hich he contends was a public street of tliat city.
The
facts ot the case are substantially as follows :
Prior to the year 1887 persons and vehicles having occasion to pass
in either direction between Creek street, in the city of Cumberland,
and the basin of the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal, were in the habit o f
c rossing in a nsarly direct line over the land of the canal company l yi ng between the basin and the corner of Creek and Canal stre etsEarly in 1887 the West Virginia Railroad Company acquired this land
from the canal company by condemnation , and e rected trestl es and
other structures upon
which prevented its use as
roadway, and
thus made
necessary to provide
new way of access to the canal basin from the corner of Creek and Canal streets. In the condemnation
proceedings by which the railroad company acquired this land,
was
agreed in the presence of the jury, and set forth in the return of the inquisition, hat another road, 24 feet wide, extending over the co ndemned

§

6

&

a

a

&

5

11 In King v. Leake,
B.
parish was held properly conAd. 469 (1833),
victed under an. indictment for the nonrepair of
road, though there had
been no acceptance beyond the public use thereof.
The Highway Act of 1835
Wm. IV, c. 50,
23), however, prevents the liability of the parish to
repair from arising until assent has been given as prescribed.
See Cabab^ v.
Walton D. C, [1914] A. C. 102.
(5

>^
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from Creek street near its intersection with Canal street to the basin, sho uld be "kept open for the use of the canal and the public for
passing for all purposes for which a public road is commonly used to
and between Creek street and the canal." ■This new road crossed the
railroad track by passing under the trestle which supported the track,
and just before passing under the trestle the road crossed the ditch o r
sewer into which the appellant fell when he was injured . The appellant
kept a saloon in a house near the basin, which he rented from the canal
company! He was in jured by falling into the ditch after dark on the
evening of February 1, 1894, as he was gomg from Creek street along
the new road towards his saloon. He s ued the citv of Cumberland for
damages , alleging that this new road was a public street, which it was
the duty of the city to keep in repair, but that it had negligently been
permitted to be in a dangerous condition, etc. There never was any
grant to the city of the new road as a street, nor was there ever any
formal acceptance by the city of its dedication to public use, but the'
appellant relies upon the facts about to be mentioned as amounting to
an i mplied acceptance by the cit y : In January, 1891, the city council,
in response to a petition addressed to it by the appellant, o rdered a li ght
t o be placed "at or near the railroad crossing under the trestling- of the
\yest Virginia Rai l road leading to the towpath ," and appointed a committee to execute the order.
This committee, finding a light already
located within 50 feet of the place where the road crossed under the
trestle, advised that this lamp be moved into such a position as would
throw its light upon the crossing under the trestle; and the council
ordered it to be done, but it had not in fact been done when the accident to the appellant occurred.
The ditch into which he fell had fo r
many years carried the surface water from Creek and other stree ts
d own to the canal basin, and on one or more occasions prior to the accident the employes of the city had been seen to clean out the ditch,
In Novembe r,
and scrape the surface of the streets which it drained.
1 8S6, the city council
passed an ordinance accepting an offer of th e
r ailroad company to locate its freight depot so as to occupy a po rtion o f
the east side of the bed of Canal street at and near its intersection with
Creek street, u pon condition that the railroad companv would give to
l and

its
t he city sufficient land on the west side of the street to maintain
original width.
The court below being of the opinion that none of the transactions
appearing in evidence were legally sufficient to show an acceptance by
the city of Cumberland of the 24-fcot road on which the accident occurred, as a public street, granted the prayer of the defendant, taking
the case from the jury, and the plaintiff appealed.
T here_can be no question that the facts of this case establish a ded ication to public use by the railroad companv of the road upon which
t he appellant was injured . As between the owner of the land covered
by the road, and the public, the latter were entitled to use it as a highwa}^; but that did not of itself impose upon the city the obligation to
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for accidents occurring from
Before the appellee can be held

keep the road in repair, nor make it liable
the defective condition

of tlie road.
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liable for tlie iniurv for which the present suit was institu ted, it mus t
through the acts of its
a ppear tha t there h ad been an acceptance by
authorized ^public departments or officials, of the road on which the acits ublic streets.
Kennedy v. Mayor, etc.,
ident happene as one
A'tr234, 57 Am. Rep. 346; State v. County Com'rs of
65 Md. 520,
Kent Co., 83 Md. Z17 35 Atl. 62, 33 L. R. A. 291 Valentine v. City of
642.
These
Dill. Mun. Corp.
Hagerstown, 86 Md. 486, 38 Atl. 931
street by
municipality "ma
authorities hold th at the acceptance of
either express, and appear of record, or they may be implied fr om
epairs knowingly made or paid for by the authority which has the leg
power to adopt the street or highway, or from long use by the publi c."
relied on to establish the acceptThey also hold that, when public use
ance, there must have been an uninterrupted use by the public fQ£ _at
east 20 year
and such use for
less time will be insufficient.
It not contended in the present case that there has been an express
municipal acceptance of the alleged street, or public use of
for more
there, in our opinion, proof of any acts or transacthan 20 years nor
tions on the part of the city or its authorized officials, in reference to
affording proper evidence of an implied acceptance. Certainly the occasional cleansing of the ditch, and the scraping of Creek and the other
drains, by the employes of the city, can have no imstreets which
appears from the evidence hat
or
portant bearing upon the subject;
he ditch had been in exic;fpnce_ for 40 years before the road wa
the fact that the city council were willing to grant the
opened^ Nor
appellant's request to have
light placed near the crossing of the road
under the railway trestle important.
The appellant himself, although
he offered the facts just alluded to in evidence, did not strongly rely
upon them in argument but he claimed that the leaving open by the
railroad company of the new road, in its condemnation proceedings,
and the passage shortly thereafter by the city council of the ordinance
portion of the bed of Canal
allowing the railroad company to use
street, m ust be taken as arts of
co mmon scheme to
ccommodate
both the railroad company and the city, from which an ac"ceptance by
the latter of the new road as one of its streets is to be implied.
An examination of these two proceedings makes
quite plain that
a
nnot
be
maintain
ed.
the
this contention of
Each of the two
appellant
itself,
and neither one refers to, or
decomplete in
proceedings
The condemnation proceedings took away
pendent upon, the other.
from the canal company the land over which access had theretofore
been had to its wharf and basin from Creek street, and the new road
was simply provided by the railroad company in lieu of the one taken
party to the conde mnation proceedings, nor
away. The city was not
does the former road over the condemned land appear t6 hav<i..igt^
been accepted bv the citv as a stree
The ordinance in reference to
Canal street fully covers the matter to which
relates, and requires
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railroad company to give to the city additional land on one side of
Canal street in lieu of the portion on the other side of the street to be
Further, t his ordinance, on its face, recites that ,
occupied by the depot.
w hen its terms have been carried out, "the width of said street f or trafficjHi rposes will be increased 33 per cent . '
The record fails to disclose any such acceptance by the appellee as
the law requires of the road on which the accident to the appellant occurred, and therefore the court below properly took the case away from
the jury. The j udgment will be affirmed, w ith costs.^^
the

IX. Release
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES.
Releases; w hich are a discharge or a conveyance of a man's right in
l ands or tenements, to another that hath some former estate in po ssession. The words generally used therein are "r emise d, rekased, and
fo rever quitclaim ed." And these releases may enure either/1. JBy way
of enl^j;^^^ig^^_^r}^_fistg^te, or enlarger Testate: as if there be^^nant for
life or years, remainder to another in fee, and he in remainder releases
all his right to the particular tenant and his heirs, this gives him the
But in this case the relessee must be in possession of some
estate in fee.
estate, for the release to work upon ; for if tliere be lessee for vea rs,
a nd before he enters and is in his possession, the lessor releases to him
all his right in thexeversion such release is void for want of possessi on
i n the relessee .X2.y^V way of passing an estate, or mitter Testate: as
w hen one of two coparceners releaseth all her right to the other, this
passeth the fee-simple of the whole . And in both these cases there
must be a pr ivity of est ate between the relessor and relessee ; that is,
one of their estates must be so related to the other, as to make but one
and the same estate in \^\Y3^yr>y way of passing a right or mitter le
droit : as if a man be disseised, and releaseth to his disseisor all b is
right, iTereby the disseisor acquires a new right, which changes
the quality of his
renders that lawful which before was torestat£.^and
tious or wrongfuL/^4>.xCy way nf ^vtingni<;hnipntas if my tenant for
life,
A
for
B
and
his heirs, and I
life makes a lease to
remainder to
release to A ; this extinguishes my right to the reversion, and shall
enure to>fe< advantage of B's remainder as well as of A's particular
estate./SyBy way of entry and feoffment: as if there be two joint
disseisors, and the disseisee releases to one of them, he shall be sole
seised, and shall keep out his former companion ; which is the same in
eft'ect as if the disseisee had entered, and thereby put an end to the disseisin, and afterwards had enfeoffed one of the disseisors in fee. And
12 See Arnold v. City of Orange, 73 N. J. Eq. 2S0, 66 Atl. 1052 (1907), where
the construction of a sewer in a dedicated street by direction of a village
ordinance was deemed suthcient to show acceptance.
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eupon we may observe, th at when a man has in himself the possesion of lands, he must at the common law convev the freehold by feoff ment and livery ; wlji ch rnak gs ^a notorietyLJn the _countr ^: but if a man
has only a right or a future interest, he may convey that right or ,nl erest by a mere release to him that is in possession of the land : for
the occupancy of the relessee is a matter of sufficient notoriety already.
Book 2, *p. 324."

j

j

X. Confirmation

BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES.
A confirmation is of a nature nearly allied to a release . Sir Edward
Coke defines it to be a conveyance of an estate or right in esse whereby
a voidable estate is made sure and unavoidable, or whereby a particular estate is increased : and the words of making it are these, "have
given , granted , ^ratified , _appro've d, ' and confirmed."
Book 2, *p. 325.^*
XI. Surrender
COKE UPON LITTLETON.
"Surrender," sursum redditio, properly is a yielding up an estate f or
or years to him that hath an immediate estate in reversion or r emainder . _vvherein the estate for life or years may drown by mut ual
l ife

agreement between them.^ °
co pimon modern
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quitclaim deed is an outgrowth of the common-law
Generally the quitclaim deed has been enlarged into a primary or
original conveyance. It s operation, however, is limited to the intpi-{^ , whir
he grantor has at the time of~tGe execution of the dee d.
1* In Boquillas Land
Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U. S. 339, 29 Sup. Ct. 493,
53 L. Ed. 822 (1909), it was contended that
confirmatory patent from the
United States enlarged the rights of
grantee from one of the Mexican
states. The court said: "But, while it is true that in Beard v. Federy,
Wall. 478, 491, 18 L. Ed. 88 (1865), Mr. Justice Field calls such
patent
quitclaim, we think it rather should be described as
confirmation in a
strict sense. 'Confirmation is the approbation or assent to an estate already
created, which, as far as in the confirmer's power, makes it good and valid
so that the confirmation
doth not regula rly crea te an state; but yet such
words may be mmgted m the cOhfil'ma[loii,-^gnriiray~cFeate~^nH"'eiilar'ge
an es tate-i but tliat is by tne torce or sucn words tnat are for eign to the biisTness
of confirmation?
wiiDerr, Tenures (o. it Is not to be underst(X)d that \vhen
the United States executes a document on the footing of an earlier grant by
former sovereign, it intends or purports to enlarge the grant."
Per
Holmes, J.
13 See Heroy v. Reilly, 84 N. J, Law, 671,
87 Atl. 112 (1913). in which su it
was brought against
lessee on
contract made with the plaintiff, whereb
the le:;see agreed in case, or
"saie. assignment or transter'^ of the term to
pay
oyer to the plaintiff one-third of the net profit from such'fgale ot trau sfgri__^The lessee's administratrix had entered into an arrangement with the
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surrender properly taken is of two sorts, viz., a surrender in deed .
or_b^Ljex£ress_ words, (whereof Littleton here putteth an example,) and
a s urrender in law w rought by consequen t by ope ration of law^ Little-

ton here putteth his case of a surrender of an estate in possession, for a
And it is to be noted, that a surrender
right cannot be surrendered.
i n law is in some cases of greater force than a surrender in deed . As
if a man make a lease for years to begin at Michaelmas next, this future interest cannot be surrendered, because there is no reversion
wherein it may drown ; but by a surrender in law it may be _drowned.
A s if the lessee before M ichaelmas take a n ew lease for years either to
b egin presently, or at Michaelmas, this is a surren der in law of the
f ormer lease . Fortior et asquior est dispositio legis quam liominis.
Also there is a surrender without deed, whereof Littleton putteth
here an example of an estate for life of lands, which may be surrendered without deed, and without livery of seisin ; because it is but a
yielding, or a restoring of, the state again to him in the immediate reversion or remainder, which are always favored in law. ^And there
is also a surrender by deed: and that is of things that li^ jn grmii- ,
whereof a particular estate cannot commence without deed , and' by
consequent the estate cannot be surrendered without deed. But in the
example that Littleton here putteth, the estate might commence without
And albei t
deed, and therefore might be surrendered without deed.
may
deed,
it be surrendere d
a particular estate be made of land by
vet
without deed, m respect of the nature and quality of the thi rfg demi^^d^
because the particular estate might have been made without deed ; and
If a man be tenant by the curtesy, or tenant in
so on the other side.
dower of an advowson^ rent, or other thing that lies in grant ; albe it
there_ the estate begin without deed , yet in respect of the nature and
quality of the thing that lies in grant it cannot be surrendered witho ut
And so if a lease for life be made of lands, the remainder for
deedL.
life ; albeit the remainder for life began without deed, yet because remainders and reversions, though they be of lands, are things that lie
in grant, they cannot be surrendered without deed.
See in my Reports
plentiful matter of surrenders.
337b,

338a.^°

3)

§

&
9

8

3.

§

c

i\]

lessor whereby the former " waived , gm'tclnlmpd an d surrendered" all rights
to a renewal of the lease, and all rights by virtue thereof, and agreed to
" retaining the right to
"a sslgi^. sublease and pnt th e lessor
fi]]i fontrnl
The pli^intiflf
ollect rent.< un t'TTlie date of the exni ration of the lease.
claimed that this arrangement entitled him under his contract to recover onethird the profit made thereby.
16 See the Statute of Frauds,
supra, p. 157.
it is provided
By the Real Property Act of 1S45 (St.
Vict. c. lOG,
that surrenders of estates other than those which might by law be created
without writing, shall be void at la^, unless made by deed.
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Declaration. — That the plaintiff bY_de£d^ated the 6th May, A. D.
1856, let and demised to the defendant all that building called "H er
Majesty's Theatr e." situate in the Haymarket, in the county of Middlesex, for the term of four years and nine calendar months, to be
computed from the 25th day of March then last mentioned, at and under (amongst other rents) the rents following, that is to. say, tlie rent
of il934. 14s. for the first year of the said term, and the yearly rent
of £6275. for every of the second, third, and, fourth years of such
term, and the sum of i4706. 5s., for the last nine calendar months
of the said term, such rents to be payable beforehand, or one quarter
in advance, by four equal quarterly payments on each of the first four
years of the said term. T hat after the making of the said deed, t he
de fendant entered into and upon the said premises, for the said term ,
and afterwards, during said term, to wit, on the 21st June, A. D. 185 8.
the sum of £4569., of the rent aforesaid,
for three quarters then
elapsed, became and was due and owing from the defendant to the
plaintiff, and the same is still in arrear and unpaid.
Plea. — That the said deed, by which the plaintiff demised the said
premises to the defendant, was made between the plaintiff and th e
defendant , and was sealed with the seal of the defe ndant ; and the
defendant never was in any way liable to pay to the plamtitt the said
rent or any part of it except under and by virtue of covenants made
by the defendant with the plaintiff, and contained in the said deed ;
which covenants bound the defendant to pay the said rent to th e
p laintiff at the times and upon the terms in the declaration particu larly
mentioned ; and the defendant never entered upon or occupied the
said premises, or any part thereof, except under the said deed so made
between the plaintiff and defendant, and sealed with their seals as
aforesaid, and containing the said covenants. That after the mak ing
of the said deed, and before this suit, the said deed was and now is
v^holly c ancelled by and with the assent of the plaintiff and of th e
defendan t; and also all th e est ate, t erm , and intere st of the defendant
in the said premises was duly surrendered to the plaintiff Ijy act an d
o peration of law, a fter the said r ent became due under the said cov en ants as atoresaid ana petore tnis su it.
"
Demurrer and joinder therein.
Martin, B. We are all of opinion that the plea is bad. When a
man demises land for a term of years, reserving to himself a rent,
the effect of it is t o create two estates , viz., the e state of the lesse e.
and the reve rsion of the lessor , and The rent is incident to the rev ersion. When the day of payment arrives, the rent still remains annexed to the reversion.
Her e, the q u estion is w hether the simply ca ncelling a lease destroys thelfessor's right of action tor the recovery
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of opinion that it does not, because the cancelling
destroy
a lease d oes not
the estates already vested or their incident s.
W ATSO N, B. I am of the same opinion. Where the contract arises
from the deed itself, and the deed is destroyed, no action can be maintained in respect of it. But this case is very different, for here, upon
tli .^ypmtinn nf the deed, there ^gg'^d ^^'''^''■ithf! ^ssor to tlie lessee
estate which was not sffpr^^d by the rancellation of the lease . The
incident to the relessee holds the estate subject to the rent which
version in the lessor. According to the argument for the defendant,
he may hold the estate without payment of rent.
But the authorities
ar clear that the cancelling
deed does not divest the estate ot he
essee or deprive the lessor of his right of action upon the demi se.
^^
Martin, B., added The Lord Chief Baron, who has left the Court,
of tlie same opinion.
requested me to say that he
udgment for the plaintiff.-^
t
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ALLEN

JAQUISH.

v.

(Supreme Court of New York, 1839.

21 Wend. 62S.)

,

This was an action of ejectment tried at the Delaware circuit in
May, 1837, before tlie Hon. James Vanderpoel, then one of the circuit
judges.
the 25th August, 1834, an agreement under seal was entered into
by the plaintiff and John Jaquish, Junior, whereby the laintiff bound
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himself to urnish
mill on
certain stream and as much timber
could be cut and sawed into lumber and manufactured into shingl es
bv Taguish during ten years next ensuing the date of the agreem ent,
from certain specified lots to keep the mill in rep air, and withm one
good road from the mill to the river Delaware — giving
year to m ake
by the agreement imr nediate possessio n to Jaquish of the mill, mill-lot
and house, and uthorizing him to clea as much land as he saw fit.
Jaquish on his part agreed to erect two shingle machines and put
them in operation in the mill by the 1st June, 1835, to keep them in
repair or supply their places, and to saw as much lumber and manufacture as many shingles as could be made during the stipulated time
for which privileges he agreed to leave at the mill one-third of all
^y an ag reethe lumber and shingles which should be manufactured,
m gnt endorsed on the above instrument, the plaintiff authorized aui.sh to have a' jack made at the expense of the plainti ff. In October,
1835, another agreement in writing, but not under seal, was signed by

Brewer v. B'ld'g Assoc, 16<i
v. Fish. 14 111. App. 29 (1SS3);
N. E. 752 (1897).
may it be surrendered by paro LI See
A^ term is properly oi-Piifpf] hy pni-n
^Vatts (Pa.)
Logan V. Barr,
Har. (Del.) 546 (1S47)'; Mckinney v. Reader.
Smith v. Devlin, 23 N. Y,
128 (18.38)
Ross v. Schneider, 30 lud. 423 (1S68)
17 See

Beidler

363 (1861).
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after reciting

(Part
the

on his part to put up two shingle machines in the
tiff, he stipulated as follows : " do hereby engage,

I

2

former agreement
mill of the plain-

if I do not put

up

mill and get them in operatip n
I will then reli nquish the contrac t and

the said shi ngle machine s in the said

by the first day of |une, 1836^
gi ve up every thing I have done, and le ave all things on the pre mises,
provided I shall be entitled to~l-eceive two-thirds of all the lumber
sawed at the mill until the said first of June, 1836." The shingle machines n ot being erected and put into operation b v the first day of
June, 1836, the pl aintiff caused a notice to quit to be served on Joh n
J aquish, Jun., on the tenth day of Tune . A similar notice having two
days before been served upon Cornelius Jaquish and John W. Jaquish,
who were made d efendants jointly wit h John Jaquish, Jun., in this
action, which was commenced shortly afterwards ; the declaration being returnable at July term, 1836.
The plaintiff having rested, the def endant's counsel asked for a no ns uit on the following ground s :
1. That the suit was prematurely
brought under the notice to quit; 2. That the plaintiff had failed to
shew performance of the stipulations on his part as contained in the
contract, as to the making of a good road, &c. ; 3. That there was no
proof of a joint possession of the premises by the defendants in tlie
and 4. That the second agreement was void, being without
action;
consideration and not sealed.
The j udge refused to nonsuit the p laintiff. The defendants then offered to prove non-performance of sundry" stipulations in the contract on the part of the plaintiff; which evidence being objected to, was rejected by the judge.
The evidence of
a joint possession of the premises by the defendants resting in circumstances, the counsel for the defendants asked the judge to require
the plaintiff to elect, against which of the defendants he would proceed, insisting that a joint possession had not been shewn, or to nonsuit the plaintiff. The judge refused to do either. Whereupon the
cause was summed up and the i urv found a verdict for the plainti ff
a gainst all the defendants ; who now moved for a new trial.
CowEN, J.^*
[After ruling against the defendants tlie minor objections raised in the case, such as that a joint possession was not
shown in the defendants, and that the evidence offered of nonperformance by the plaintiff of the stipulations in the first contract on
his part agreed to be performed ought not to have been rejected, tlie
judge proceeded as follows:]
T he second ag reement was, I think, valid. One objection raised on
the argument wa~s, that tHe agreement not being under seal, it should
have expressed a consideration.
It was evidently intended as a modification of the firs t agre ement or leas e! it was signed by the defendant, John Jaquish, Jun.7 the original lessee, and accepted by the plaintiff on account of the delay and non-performance; perhaps, of both

ISA

portion

of the opinion is omitted.
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parties. J^hn Jaquish, Jun., deeming himself most in fault, aoreed , on
mentioned in his second agreement ,
ac count ot his non-pertormance,
rip-jnal lea^.
to repair the omission by a given day, or relmquish his n
He meant the last contract should operate as a part ot the first; and
is plainly enough collectable from the
the motive or consideration
face of the new contract. He was to have a share of tlie lumber sawed
at the mill in the mean time, and the plaintiff had been damaged by
the breach. H ere are two concurring considerations, the satisfactio n
of damage to the plain Uft, and a clear right or benefit acquired by

should be ex, It was not necessary that these
It is enough that they are
pressly mentioned as the consideration.
obviously so in fact, from the recital and nature of tlie instrument.
If the lease became void, in consequence of not fulfilling the second
agreement, or, if the latter operated as a surrender, the case was not
T hat is never re one in which any noti^e^tojiuit was necessary.
q uired where the p nrJMes have bv mutual agreement fixed tlie terms
The lessee may always waive the
o n which the lease is to terminate.
reason, the right never ar ises
the
same
for
notice
and
;
right to require
^^"'^
^^n
h'lnitation. or the pa rties
fpfs
years
exoi
1-»y
w here a lease for

J ohn Jaquish, |um

If a
Conventio vincit legem.
ajl
his interest to another, he is
party has, in any form, transferred
I f he do not, an ejectment lies aga jnst
b ound to quit the pos session.
h im immediately.
The important question is, in w.hat way did the second writing be('tween these two parties operate ?y Did it enure as a mere prom ise, a
If
d efeasance , or modi fication of the lease; o r was it a surrender?
a mere promise, ejectment will not lie upon it; but only an action of
To warrant the present action, therefore, it must have
assumpsit.
to
operated
extinguish the lease, or pa ss the interest o f the lessee to
the plaintiff. * * *
Viavp ritheri ^yit^p made

an

end of it.

Q^ "J
^"-^

j

\\

^
—

as a defeasance, the
next question is, w hether it could operate as a contingent surrend er,
There is no doubt that eithe r
i t^ being in the nature of a re-demise_.

The second agreement thus failing to operate

or demise may be etfec"ted by a simple writing not sea led.
M agennis v. MacCuUogh, Uilb. Kq. Cas. 235, 6; Co. Litt. 338, a, note
(1); Farmer v. Rogers, 2 Wils. 26. The^erative words of, ,a ,sur2 Black.
render are, "hath surrendered, granted and yielded up."
"Cbmm. 326 ; Co. Litt. 337, b ; Woodf . Land, and Ten. 185 (Lond. Ed.
of 1804). There is no doubt, however, that a surrender may be effected by equivalent words ; and when complete, it is as it were a
re-demise. Woodf. Land, and Ten. (Ed. before cited) 186; Perk. sec.
607. I t may be made upon condition; that is. to become void upon
Perk, sec. 624. And though no case goes so far as to say
condition.
that a surrender may be made to become good upon condition precedent, yet there seems to be no objection to that in principle, if the
a surrender

'

interest surrendered
Aig.Pkop. — 13

be not a freehold.

That cannot, in general,

be

^
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granted so as to take effect in future; but a term for years can.
T he surrender of a term to operate in futuro is equa lly free of the
objection . Con tracts of parties, whether by deed or otherwise, sha ll
always take effect a ccording to their rea l in tent, if that be possib le,
c onsistently with the rules of law , in VVhitlock v. Horton, Cro. Jac.
91, Mary Milton, by indenture between her and the defendant, covenanted, granted and agreed, that tlie defendant should and might, have,
hold and enjoy, from and after the death of E. W. the moiety of certain lands, for sixty years, &c. And it was held that tliese were apt
words to make a lease for years, and might enure as a lease in futuro.
Richards v. Sely, 2 Mod. 79, is a like case. And there, Maynard,
Serj., conceded that the word "covenant" would of itself make a lease,
which is adopted and repeated in Woodf . Land, and Ten. 7 (Lond. ed.
"
The latter author, at p. 6 says it is a general rule, that what1804).
e ver words are sufficient to e xplain the intent of the parties, that on e
or
shall divest himself of the possession, and the other come into
license
uch
determinate time, whether they run in the form of
and will, in con ovenant or ag re£ment, are of themselves sufficient
th
truction of law, amount to
lease for vears. as eff'ectually as
most proper and pertinent words had been made use of for that pur Otherwise of the most apt words,
pose."
they appear to be only
made,
Bac. Abr. Leases, &c. (K),
future lease to be
preparatory to
surS. P. We have seen that Woodfall, in another place, speal<s of
render operating as of the nature of
re-demise.
Suppose the owner
of land promises another in writing, for good consideration, that on
the other paying so much, he, tlie owner, will relinquish and give up
rent.
Is there
the land to the promisee for ten years at such
doubt, that on paying the money, the promisee might enter or bring
qui te
lessee?
should tliink not. The case at bar
ejectment as
^<^he
^v'l'
th
lessee
he
failto
for
that
perform,
strong;
agrees
No farther act
spoken
inquish his lease and give up everything.
and
annu and ren der the lease inoper ative
of! The meaning was
ma y,
demise, yet
could not enure as a defeasance or as
although
surrender, on the contingency ha pthink, enure and take effect as
pening. Test the case by the rule in Woodfall.
Can any one doubt
of
the possession, and let
that the lessee intended to divest himself
for the whole remaining term of the lease? In tliis
tlie lessor take
sustainable, and a new trial must be
view the verdict at the circuit
denied.

\^^^

accomplish

a surrender.

&

3

a

'J

10 Mundy v. Warner, 61 N. J. Law, 395, 39 Atl. 697 (1S9S), ace.
npi
sn rvppflpr tn fs^kp. plnpp in
vg pr jStioDsjlv of oijiiiion that there caunot be
"
''
I'arke, B., in Doe (i."'AluiTell v. Milwara,
M.
W. 328 (1S3S).
futuro
"SeeTIarris v. HifscocU, 91 N. Y. 3i0 (1883), as to suHlciency of language to
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IVE'S CASE.
(Court of Common Pleas,

1597.

5 Coke, 11a.)

Ive br ought an action of waste against Sammes , and counted of a
lease made to the defendant of the manor of Tottenham in the county
of Essex for 30 years; the defendant pleaded, non dimisit; and by
special verdict it was found, diat the lessor made a lease for 30 yea rs
of the said manor, except all woods and underwoods growing or being
o n the manor : and afterwards m ade a second lease to the same lessee
of a ll the woods and underwoods grow ing or being on the said manor
for the term of 62 years without impeachment of waste, and afterwards made a third leas e of the said manor to the said lessee for 3
v ears, witliout exception, to begin at a day to come, scil, from the ex -

piration of the said first lease for 30 vears ; and after the term 30 years
expired; the lessee cut trees ; Ive in revers ion. brouj^ht an acti on of
waste ; and it was adjudged for the pla intilf. And in this case three

* * * ^°
points were resolveS!
3. That by the acceptance of a future lease to begin divers years
after, the said lease of the wood for 62 years was presently surrjendeij:,
ed, be cjiuse the lesse e by acceptance thereof had affirmed the less or
t o have ability to make the new lease, which he had not, if the firs t
I gase shall stand ; as if lessee for 20 years takes a lease for three years,
to begin 10 years after; itj ^a j^^e^^l, ^£Ui;ren der of thewhole terjii^
for it cannot be a surrender of the last 10 years, anSi^mainTor the
first 10 years, and so to make a fraction of the term, nor can he who
h ath a lease for 20 years surrender the last 10 years by any express
"
Vide 14 H. 8, iSf 2T^r .
surrende r saving to him the first iU y ears.
112.
57.
21

4
21

H.

Mar.

H.

141.

7, 6.

7, 12, 40.

3, 25, 26.

25

E.

3

Eliz.

200.

Ass. p. 26.

31
13

3,

R.

2.

H.

272.

8, 46.

Dower. 40 E.

13.^^

DAVISON

Eliz.

10
32

Eliz. 280. 35 H. 8,
H. 6, 17. 14 H. 7, Z7 .

11
Z7

3, 24, 43.

41

E.

3, 13.

44

E.

^

ex dem.

BROMLEY

(Court of King's Bench,

1768.

v.
4

STANLEY.

Burr.

2210.)

B

it,

This was a case reserved from the assizes; upon an ejectment, tried
before Mr. Justice Yates.
so far as concerned the point now determined, was,
The short of
that W dliam
romley, Esq., being seised in fee, in the year 1686, de-^That part of

it

a

7

4

it

t

/

a

the report dealing with the first two points is omitted.
lease of the same lands for 40 years to begin
2/"Lessee for 21 years took
Wmediiitely after the death of J. S. It was holden in this case that the
same was not any present surrender of the first term; ^vX if J. S. die vvj thin
surrender, for
may be that J. S. shan"5Ut'yTvg the
is
he term then
first teriiL" Anon.,
Leon. i>0 (15S8).
N. Y. 472, 57 Am. Dec. 538 (1852),
~^e Tracy v. Albany Exchange Co.,
wherp tiia new lease was to take effect on expiration of existing term.
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mised for ninety-nine years, to hold from the day of the date. Afterwards, William Bromley, upon the marriage of Francis Bromley, with
Ann Walsh, joi ned in a s ettlement_jvar^'' ^"'^s un cle Francis Brom ley,
duced his former e stqtp in fee tn an estate for H fe. Thi s wa s a
?)nd_re
v oluntary settlement, and had a power in it ; but it was not pretend ed
t hat the second lease was made according to that powe r. After this,
William rheino- then nnlv tenant for life) in 1693. makes a new lease
f or ninetv-nine years, to the same tenant, of the same premises, wit hout communicating to the tenant the alteration which he had made of
his estate, by rednrin p- his fee to a hte-estate : and this was acquiej ^^d
In the mean time,
i n, and the rent paid and received, for sixty yea rs.

and before any objection was made with regard to these leases, William
Bromley died, and his effects came into the hands of Lord Montfort.
T he less or of the pla inti ff was tenant in fail under the settleme nt ;
and clai med a right to disjjossess the tena nt
\lie only question upon which the Court gave their opinion, was —
''whether the acceptance of the second lease operated as a surrend er
of*the forrner lease ."

Lord Mansfield

agreed, that the acceptance of a second good
But the reason does not
lease will operate as a surrender of a former.
hold, in the case of accepting a new void lease, or one that the lessee
can't enjoy.
In the present case, Mr. William Bromley had probably forgott en
t hat he had altere^iis estate m fee to an estate for life; at least, h e did
not tell the lessee, that he had so do ne.
'i"he hrst lease was for ninety-nine years from the day of the date :
the second lease is for ninety-nine years, to commence immediately;
The tenant
and there is not a word said of the settlement or power.
consideration.
Thfi-aecmade a fair contract, bona fide, for a valuable
or id lease was a deceit upon him ; for the lessor had no title to gra nt
But the present lessor oFthe plaintiff says he sFall
t his new lease.
lose the former lease too; because the latter is inconsistent with the

former ; and he could not hold under both.
Where the first could be of no use, if he had had

v/

and
both parties so intended; there is no inconsistency in the acceptance of
But the accepti ng
a new good lease being a surrender of the former.
a, new void lease, which the lessee is not to enjoy, could not she\v_an
Therefore, the reason why this
i ntention to surr ender the other^
A void contract for a
surrender,
an
implied
totally fails.
should be
sense and re ason,
common
hing
that a man cannot enjo3^, cannot in
t
i mply an agreement to give up a former contract . And Mr. Price has
shewn that the law is so ; and that cases of this nature appear to have
been grounded upon solid reason, when they are well considered.
lam very clearjhat the acceptance of this new lease, which did n ot
pass an mterest according to the contract, cannot operate as a su rrender of the former. And this is sufficient : I will not enter into any
other questions about the other parts of the case.
the second

;
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second lease did not pass an interest according to the contrac t.

The plaintiff has no right to recover.

I give no opinion whether the acts of the
made the new lease good for the whole of the
The three other Judges were clearly of the
Per Cur'. Let the postea be delivered to
that a nonsuit may be enter ed. ^^
ZICK

v.

lessor have or have not
term.
same opinion.
the defendant;
in order

LONDON UNITED TRAMWAYS,

(Court of Appeal, King's Bench

Division.

[1908] 2

LIMITED.
K. B.

126.)

Appeal from the judgment of Jelf, J., in an action tried by him
without a jury. [1908] 1 K. B. 611.
The action was in form an action for trespass brought by the plaintiff Zick, who was the oc cupier of a s hop, house, a nd forecourt, numbered 84, Merton High Street, Wimbledon, and carried on business
there as a furniture dealer, t o recover damages from the defend ant
r>n
C Ompanv for enter ing ^^^^ tregpn'^sing upon the plaintiff's
prf"'"''^^"^
March 20, 190 7, and the following days, and for depriving him of the
use of the said forecourt and thereby interfering with his business.
On the pleadings the defendants, besides putting the plaintiff to the
proof of his case, set up the following defence :^hat by the London
United Tramways Act, 1902 (2 Edw. VII, c. 247), incorporating the
Land Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, they were authorized to acqui re
c ompulsorily the sai djgre court for widening the roadwa y ; that on
May 28, 1905, thev se rved notice to treat on Coope and Heatley, the
l easeholders , being mortgagees in possession of the said premises an d
forecourtpTor the purchase of their interest in said forecourt ; that
at the date of the service of said notice the plaintiff was not the occ upi er nor in possessio n of the said premises or forecourt, and had_no
in terest therei n; that notwithstanding the service of the said notice,
C oope and Heatley purpo rted af ter the date of such service to grj^ ^nt
to the plaintiff an mterest m tTj e~said premises and forecourt by mean s
of an agreement of tenancy, and that such an agreement of tenanc y
* * ^^
was invalid in law against the defendants .

^

Archbishop of York,

6 East, 86 (1805). ace.
See Doe v. Courtenay,
Doe v. Poole, 11 Q. B. 713 (1848).
Premises were in possession of H. as tenant from year to year when H.
and M. agreed to take a lease of same for seven years at a yearly rental ;•
the agreement was in writing, but the contemplated lease was never drawn:
H. and M., however, entered and held possession for a time, M. then dropping
No rent having been paid, the lessor took
out, leaving H. as sole occupant.
possession and kept S. out. In an action by S. in trespass the question was
JJeld,
whether the original tenancy from year to year had been terminated.
that the fo rmer tenancy had come to a n end by surrender in law^ Hamerton
v! b'tead, 8 B. & (J. 4'<8 (1824).
23 The statement of the facts and pleadings is omitted ; the case sufficiently appears in the opinions. The concurring opinion of Kennedy, L. J., is also
omitted.
22

Roe

V.

11 Q. B. 702 (1848);

'
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The learned judge gave judgment for

2

the plaintiff.
I am of opinion that the concluPresident.
sion arrived at by the learned judge is right, and I can put my view of
the case very shortly.
An agree m ent was made on March 15. 19 05.
b y which Fellowes. as ag ent tor the morteagees in possession of th e
premises in question, l et them to one Sinclair for a term of three ve ars.
which would expire on March 14. 1908. On May 15, 1905, the defendants served the notice to treat on the lessors' agent.
Rv_ _an agreem ent
d ated January 23, 1906, Sinclair, without any knowledge of h£_notice
t o treat, sold to the plaintiff Zick the furnit ure an d effects on the pre mises, with c ertain exceptions, and agreed to stand possessed of the lease
of the premises in trust fori-hp pb intiff ; and in February the plaintiff
entered on the premises. Afterwards, in order that the plaintiff should
have not only the beneficial but also the legal possession of the premises, Sinclair informed Fellowes that he desired to trans fer to the pj aintjff the unexpired portion of his tenancy, and Fellowes sai d t hat he
thought he could arrange with his prmcipais tor a surrender of
ie
e xisting tenancy and the granting of a fresh agreement to the plainti ff
f or a term of three years, ins tead of the plaintiff taking a transfer of
a term which had only two years to run.
The plaintiff accepted this
proposal, and accordingly, o n February 14, 190 6, an agreement wa s
executed for a new tenancy which would expire on Febru ary 14,~ 1909.
Under tnese circumstances the defendants contend that the plaintiff is
not entitled to any compensation.
The objection taken by the defendants to the plaintiff's right to compensation appears to me to be purely
technical and to have no merits. The p arties to the transaction, Sinclair, the plaintiff, and Fellow es^ pntprprj into jlie agreement iff F'^^^''"a ry 14, i^iJb, for a new tenancy extending beyond the unexpired pej iod
o f the former tenancy, thinking, no doubt, that it would operate a s a
s urrender of the old term.. But, in consequence of the service of the
notice to treat, the m ortgagees in possession of th e premises had no
l onger any righ t to create a new tenancy which extended bey ond the
period ot ttie existing tenancy . The result, as it apppq|-<; tn rn p^wnnlH
b e that the surrender never came into operation bera^ ise the rn nside ration for it failp^T So Sinclair remained entitled to treat the original
tenancy as subsisting, and to claim compensation in respect of it as
trustee for the plaintiff. The plaintiff appears to have offered to join
Sinclair as plaintiff in the action, but it does not seem to have been considered necessary, inasmuch as it was agreed that the real question for
decision at the trial was whether the plaintiff, under the circumstances which I have mentioned, was a person who had such an interest as
entitled him to compensation in respect of the period extending up to
the date on which the original tenancy of Sinclair would have expired.
For the reasons which I have given I think that the decision of the
learned judge was in substance correct.
it be necessary to add Sin;n nrrl^r trx nrpf rw^rpr
^g Q
teclinical diffJCultV . I thiuk
p]^\r,uff^
^f^y
p1;^iV
t hat should be.
.
dnn^

X

Sir GorelIv Barnes,

l

Jj

Ij
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Farwell, L. J.

This is i n form an action of trespass , but it is
agreed that t he only questio n really involved is whether the pla intiff.
Zick is entitleg to compensation^! In March, 1905, an agreement was
made under which Sinclair became tenant of the premises in question
for a term of three years from March 14 at a yearly rent of £30. In
May of the same year notice to treat in respect of the premises was
served on the lessor's agemf After service of that notice the lessors
co uld create no new interest in the premises sn as to throw any fre sh
burden on the defendants . In ignorance of the notice to treat S inUpon his inc lair sold to the plaintiff his interest in the premises.
the
lessors'
interest, _he
he
to
transfer
that
wished
his
forming
agent
a nd the plaintiff and the lessors' a o^pnt rame to the conclusion,th^t the
b etter arrangement would be that the old tenancy should be surren dered and a new one created for a longer term, which was accordingly done by the agreement dated February 14. 1906. That agreement the
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24 See
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defendants were entitled to treat as void, and they did so treat it. The
law is laid down by Coleridge,
in Doe v. Courtenay (1848) 11 Q. B.
688, at p. 712, "t hat, where the new lease does not pass an interes
according to the contract, the acceptance of
will not operate
surender of the former lease
that, in the case of
surrender implied
ught also to
new lease,
condition
by law from the acceptance of
understood as implied by law, making void the surrender in case th
n ew lease should be made void
and that, in case of an express surrender, so expressed as to shew the i;itenti on of the parties to make the
surrender only in consideration of the grant, the sound construction of
such instrument, in order to effectuate the intention of the parties,
would make that surrender also conditional to be void in case the grant
should be made void." If the learned judge in the Court below has not
think, by what he said on
expressed himself quite in the same terms,
p. 616 of the report in the Law Reports, he meant the same thing.
do not think that he meant to say that the agreement for the new tenancy might be remodeled, so as to make the term co-extensive with the
remainder of the term under the original tenancy, but that
acted on
rule that, where
new lease
gran te on th
he well-established
ooting hat an
surrendered, upon the avoidanc of the new
lease
void, the consideration for
having faile
ease the surrender
that
should
ssed.''*
this
be
dismi
ap peal
agree
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CARPENTER.

(Supreme Court of New York, 1S3G.

15 Weud.

400.)

This was an a ction of covenan t, tried at the New York circuit in
April, 1834, before the Hon. Ogden Edwards, one of the circuit
judges.

The plaintiff declared on a lease under seah made by him to Edmund T. Carpenter, bearing date 1 st April, 182 9, demising a dwelli ng
hous e and lot of ground of 5% acres, situate in the twelfth ward
of the city of New York, for the t erm of six years, subject to an
a nnual ren t of $325, to be p aid quarterly . The lease was a tripartite
indenture, Daniel S. Hawkhurst and Daniel Carpenter being parties
thereto, and u nking with the tenant in the covenants to be perfom ied
on his partj^ and they were joined as defendants in the suit with the
tenant. The defendants, amongst other things, covena nted for the pay ment of the rent: that the tenant should during the term, keep the
dwelling house, fences and every part of the demised premises in good
c ondition and repai r, and, at the expiration
of the term, yield them
up in like good repair ; that he w ould not remove, injure or destr oy
any root, plant, bush or tree growing on the premise s, or suffer the
same to be done; that~4ie wo uld not underlet or assign the premise s,
e ither directly OT'lSy-^aperation of law, without the written consent ol
t he landlord : and that during the term, the dwelling house sh ould no t
be occupied as a public house, inn or tavern^ without the like written
consent. The plaintiff assigned, as breaches of the covenants: 1. That
on the 1st July, 1833, there was one year's rent in arrear and unpa id ;
2. That on the 1st January, 183f, the tenant perrnitted the dwelling
house and fences, i&c, t o fall into bad condition , and to become ruinous
and to decay for the want of necessary repairs, and so permitted them
to remain until the commencement of the suit; 3. That on the 1st
January, 1831, he s uffered fruit trees, gooseberry bushes, aspar agus
roots, and ornamental flowering plants growing on the premises to be
lopped, uprooted, removed and destroyed by persons and animals;
4. That from 1st November, 1832, until 1st June, 1833, the dwelling
house was us ed and occupied as a public house , without the consent
of the plaintiff. The defendants pleaded the general issue, and gave
notice of various matters to be proved on the trial.
On the trial of the cause, the plaintiff claimed to recover the rent
of a quarter of a year, ending 1st July, 1833, and damages for breaches
of the covenants to keep the premises in repair, and not injure them,
&c. The plaintiff proved that the premises were in good repair at the
date of the lease, and when the tenant went into possession ; and that
in February, 1833, the dwelling house was in a ruinous state, the fences
prostrated, and the garden wholly destroyed, and that th e expen se
of putting the p remises in repair w ould be b etween $400 and $500^ He
also proved that the premises had been occupied tor a year by two men
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the name of Wood and Matthews, who were rail-road contractors,
and had many persons in their employ who resided on the premises.
The defe ndant offered to prove that the plaintiff held the demise d
p remises onlv in rio'ht of his wife, and insisted that inasmuch as an
action of waste might be brought in the name of the husband an d wife
in the character of reversioners, the claim of damages for injury to
the demised premises ought not to be sustained in the present suit ; the
evi dence was rejected by the judg e. The defendants also offered to
prove that in tlje autumn of 1831, an agreement w as entered into between the plaintiff, the def endant Edm und T. Carpenter and t wo per sons of the names of Mills and Owen, that Carpenter s hould quit a nd
su rrender up the premises to the plaintiff, t hat the lease declared on
s hould be delivered up and cancelled, and a new lease of the premises

should be executed bv the plaintiff to Mills and Owen for the term
o f 8 or 10 years . That in pursuance of such agreement. Carpenter, in
the autumn of 1831, surrendered up the premises to the plaintiff, and
paid all the rent then due to the plaintiff, a nd Mills and Owen to ok
possession of the premises and occupied the same pursuant to such
agreement as tenants to^he plaintiff', .who accepted them as such, and
r eceived rent from thcnrL That Mills and Owen occupied the premises
until the autumn of 1832, when they left, and were succeeded in th e
possession by Woo d and Matthews, to whom also the premises were
l et by the p laintiff, and from w^ho p he a kn rereived rent : these facts
the defendant offered to establish by parol proof.
The counsel for
the plaintiff objected that parol evidence of the alleged agreement or
surrender of the lease was inadmissible ; and also that the evidence,
if intended to be urged in discharge of the covenants, ought not to be
received, f or the reason that a covenant cannot be discharged by paro l
before breach . The judge s ustained t he objection.
The defendants
then proved that Mills and Owen went into possession of the premises
on the 1st November, 1831, and that previous to their entry, Edmund
T. Carpenter (the tenant) put the premises in as good repair as they
were in when he entered; they were thus repaired, because Mills and
Owen were to take possession. The plaintiff, on being spoken to on
the subject, said that he was satisfied with the repairs, if Mills and
Owen were satisfied. It was also proved, that after Mills and Owen
quit the premises, they were occupied by Wood and Matthews, who
had a large number of men in their employment as laborers on a railroad and housed on the premises. Wood and Matthews were in possession six months, and paid rent to the plaintiff.
The counsel for the defendants insisted that the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover in this action more than nominal damages for the
breach of the covenant to keep the premises in repair, and for the injury done to the premises, as the tenant might put the premises in
complete repair before the end of the term, and if he did so the plaintiff would have no cause of complaint; if he did not do so, then the
plaintiff' would be entitled to bring his action, and to recover damages^
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and requested the judge so to charge the jury. The judge declined to
do so, and, on the contrary, c harged the jury that the plaintiff w as
e ntitled to his verdict for one quarter's rent, (which was admitted to
b e all that was due at the bringing of the suit ;) and, further, that
they were n ot bound to limit their verdict on the covenant of repai rs
irto nominal damages but might give such sum as, under all the
c umstances, they should consider the planititf entitled to recover, pcuvided thev were satisfied that the defendants had violated their co venants. The jury found a verdict f^-tli£ ^laiiit2ff_\vith $481,25 d amThe defendants ask for a new trial. The cause was submitted
ages.
on written arguments.
Nelson, J. This case has been elaborately argued upon paper by
the respective counsel, and all the authorities and principles bearing
upon the points disputed, have been referred to and examined ; and
were it not for some recent cases in the English courts, that are very
confidently urged by the defendant's counsel, it seems to me there
would be but little difficulty in disposing of the case.
A surren der
i s defined to be a yielding up of an estate for life or years to TTm T

c

J

^

I

This was called a
was sufficient for that purpos e.
surrender in fact. There was also a surrender in law. It was effecte d
by the acce ptanc e of a new lease of the premises from the lessor, fo r
the whole or a part of the time embraced in the former one, becaus e
i t^ necessar ily implied a determination and surrender of that lease ;
otlierwise the lessor would be unable to make^the second, or the lessee
to enjoy
and
was therefore but reasonable to presume both par ties intenHed to waive and relmquish the benefit of the first one . The
second lease before the statute referred to, of course need not have
The
been in writing to operate an effectual surrender of the first one.
estates,
interests of
statute of 29 Car. enacted "that all leases,
freehold or terms of years, or any uncertain interests of, in, to
or out of any lands, &c. made or created by livery and seizin only, ^
ut in writing &c. shall have the force and effect
parol, and no
eases or estates at will only," &c. excepting leases not exceedmg tJi
And also, "no leas es,
erm of three years from the making thereo
estates or int erest either of freehold or term of years, or anv uncer tain
nterest, &c. oi, in, to or^out ot any messuages. &c. shall be assigne d.
ranted or surrendered, unless by deed or note, in writing, or operatio n
R S.
of law. " Our statute
St. Ed.] p. 134, sec.
provides
term not
that "no estate or interest in lands, other than leases for
exceeding one year, &c. shall hereafter be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered, &c. unless by act or operation of law, or by deed or cun-
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who hath the immediate estate in reversion or remainder, wjierein th e
fstate for hte or years may drow n by mutualagreemegt . Comyn's
Landlord & Tenant, ZZ7 ; 2 Co. Litt. ddi; ^ (^ruise, i5d; 4 Bacon's
Abr. 209; Shep. Touch. 300, 307. Before the statute of frauds and
perjuries, a ny form of words without writing, whereby an intention ap peared to surrender up the possession of the pre mi'^pc; tn tlip 1p':;(;;nr
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" Every
veyance in writing-" &c.
Sec. 8.
contract for the leasing fo r
a longer period than one year. &c. shall be void,'' unless in writing.
S ^nce these statutes, a parol lease in England for more than thre e
years, and in this state for more than one, i s entirely void ; though if
the tenant enters into possession, he shall be deemed a t enant at wil l,
and for the purpose of notice to quit, from year to year, and n otwith standing the lease be void, it may regulate the terms- of ho l^jng-^s to
rent, time to quit. &c . 5 T. R. 471 ; Comyn's L. & T. 8: Woodf. 14,
15; Bradley v. Covell, 4 Cow. 350; Jackson ex depi. Church v.
Miller, 7 Cow. 747. But as a lease for the purposes for which it was
given, it is considered wholly void. It is, however, co nclusively settled
b y authority, that the second lease must be a valid one, so as to convey,
the interest it professes to convey, to the lessee, and al so to bind him to
t he performance of the" covenant or agreement in favor of the lessor ,
i n order to operate as an effectual surrender of the hrst one.
Burr.
1807;
Burr. 1980, 2210;
East. 86; Comyn's Dig. tit. Estate,
13
Bac. Abr. 215.
Without this, the reason before given for the implied surrender would fail, and the intent of the parties be altogether
defeated. Instead of being but
surrender of the first lease,
would
be
surrender of the whole estate and interest in the premises, and
a virtual determination of the existence of any tenancy.
Now he
ground upon whi ch th surrender
mainly argued is,, not
this case
new lease was given to the original lessee, but that
that
was given
to JMills and Owen with his consent, for the period of eight or ten
years. Assuming this, amounts to the same as
given to Carpenter;
it_i impossible to rnaintain that any valid^ lease lias been proved in the
case, or any lease whatever for aUefinite period.
The most that was
offered to be proved was, that Mills and Owen went into possession
with the consent of the defendants, under
lease
parol agreement for
for eight or ten years ajid
be viewed as- an agreement for
lease .
or as
virtual lease for that time^
void under fhp t;tatntp nnd rnnld
not be enforced by either of the parties. A inip ied tenancy at wi
n hLwa created, which enabled Mills and Owen to hold trom'year
):ear ^ror the purpose of notice to quit, but which they could terminate
at any moment they pleased . The agreement and entry in pursuance
of
conferred no rights upon the plaintiff, further than to recover
his rent while they continued to occupy, and perhaps
quarter's rent,
they abandoned the occupation after the commencement of
quarter
and before its termination.
Suppose this agreement had been made with the original tenant,
and the defendants can claim no more from
as offered to be proved,
could
be contended that
virtual surrender of the lease
operated as
for six years, and that the plaintiff could dispossess the tenant on
giving six months notice to quit? This would be the consequence of
the doctrine urged in the defence.
The tenant would become
mere
tenant at will. TIie_authoritii "s alr^n^jj,^ ^pfprrpH tn [-lenrly establish
that the second lease, to have the effect claimed, must pass the inj^r-
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e st in the premises according^ to the contract^ or in other words, carr y
i nto legal effect the intent of the parties executing
3 Burr. 1807;
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4 Burr. 1980, 2210; Comyn's Dig. tit. Estate, 8, 12; 6 East, 661 ; Van
Rensselaer's Heirs v. Penniman, 6 Wend. 569 ; 1 Saund. 236, n. b. It
is stated by Baron Gilbert, 4 Bacon's Abr. 210, that since the statute of
frauds the new lease must be in writing in order to operate as an
implied surrender of the old one, for it is then of equal notoriety
with a surrender in writing. This position is also adopted by Serjeant Williams, in his notes upon the case of Thursby v. Plant, 1
Saund. 236, n. b. But as surrenders by operation of law are expressly
excepted out of the statute, as a necessary consequence they are left
as at common law ; and t here it is clear it need not be in writing to
have the effect to surrender the old one, e v en if by deed . 2 Starkie's
Sv. 342; 20 Virrer, 143, L., pi. 1, n. ; 1 Saunders, 236, n. c. I am in c lined therefore to think that a valid parol lease, since th e sta tute, mig ht
p roduce a surrender in law within the reason and prmciple upon wh i^h
t his doctrme is founded .
The jtrU-?- L^^ seems to be that laid down
by Mr. Starkie, 2 Starkie's Ev. 342, as follows: The taking a new
l ease by parol is by operation of law a surrender of the old one, al t hough it be by deed, provided it be a good one, and pass an interest
according to the contract and intention of the parties ; for otherwise
the acceptance of it is no implied surrender of the old one .
If the first lease in this case has not been surrendered, then there is
no ground of defence against the action upon the express covenants
contained in
even
we should concede
legal assignment from
the tenant to Mills and Owen, and the acceptance of them expressly
or impliedly by the plaintiff.
T. R. 98, 100;
Saund. 241, n.
Woodf. 278; Cro. Car. 188; Comyn's Land.
Tenant, 275, and cases
there cited. But the plaintiff stipulated against assignment or unde rparol license
etting unless permission was given in writing
and
herefore inoperative.
590;
T. R. 425;
R.
Madd. 218;
T.
Piatt on Cov. 427.
his clause in
lease would be nugatory,
cou rts
hould allow parol evidence to control in the matter . Besides
parol
void under the statute of frauds.
assignment
The case of Thomas
V. Cook,
Starkie's R. 408,
supposed to have
strong bearing upon
In that case there was
this one.
lease
from
parol
year to year to
Cook, who under-let to Parkes.
The rent being in arrear, Thomas
distrained upon him, and he paid
bill of exchange on receiving
by
which he declared he would have nothing more to do with Cook.
Afterwards, however, he brought his action against him for rent then
due.
For the plaintiff
was insisted that there was no surrender
the
of
frauds.
within
statute
Abbott, C. J., left
to the jury to say,
whether the plaintiff had not accepted Parkes as his tenant, with the
assent of Cook; and the jury finding in the afffrmative, the plaintiff
was nonsuited.
The court at the ensuing term, when the case was
moved, were of opinion there was
surrender by operation of law.
They say
lessee assign and the lessor accept the assignee of the les-
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in point of law puts an end to the privity o f
of debt cannot be brought to recover the ren t.
true, but if the lease had been in writing, according
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That I admit to be
to the cases above cited, a suit might still be maintained upon the exthough the privity of estate was gone. Besides,
press covenant in
Campb.
the assignment was void as such under the statute of frauds.
cited;
there
and
cases
55,
25;
Ten.
Land.
318;
Comyn's
Bing.
law,
accep
of
the
trule
that
Woodf. 277. A ^ain. the court say
of^g
surrender
subsequent lease by parol operates as
ance of
true under the circumstances we have
ormer lease by deed._ That
undoubtedly the legal ground upon
before endeavored to explain, and
The case sufficiently shows that
which that case may be maintained.
valid one to the extent inthe implied parol demise to Parkes was
lease from year to
tended by both parties; the one to Cook was
year, and the acceptance of Parkes, as tenant in his place, impliedly
gave him the same tenure and term no writing was necessary for that
said to stand by
the ground upon which the case
purpose. This
term,
Barn.
in
subsequent
the court, in commenting upon
Cres. 922.
Cres. 324, the lease was
Barn.
In the case of Grimman v. Legge,
dishouse,
by parol for one year, for the first and second floor of
she
said
tenant
the
the
before
end
of
year,
the
arisen
pute having
her.
rid
of
be
to
would
he
The
landlord
said
glad
get
would quit.
She accordingly left the premises, and possession was taken by him.
rescindment of the
The facts were submitted to the jury, to presume
original contract between the parties. The case of Stone v. Whiting,
Starkie, 235,
precisely like the case of Thomas v. Cook, and stands
In the case of Whitehead v. Clifford,
upon the same principle.
Taunt. 518, the lease was by parol from year to year, and stands upon
In the case of Hamerton v. Stead,
the footing of Grimman v. Legge.
tenant from year to year entered into an agreeCres. 478,
Barn.
lease to him and another, and from that time
ment in writing for
both occupied.
was held that the new agreement, coupled with the
joint occupation, determined the former tenancy, and operated as
surrender in law, though the lease contracted for was never granted.
If the new agreement and occupation were viewed as tenancy from
year to year, which was of equal tenure with the first lease, there was
The judges obviously were someat least no hardship in this decision.
what embarrassed in their endeavors to place the case upon princiEast, 86,
ple, and some of their observations conflict with the case in
which they admitted to be good law. The first case was by parol from
year to year, and might well have been put upon the footing of the
have referred, where the facts were submitted to the
cases to which

l

r

a

jury to find the first contract rescinded.
to repai
coveng^nt
The jaw seems to be well settled, that under
ike the one in question, the landlord need not wait tjll^.the expiration
of the term before bringing^ an action for the breacfi,' under an idea

TITLES

DERIVATIVE

206

2

(Part

t hat the tenant mav. before he leaves the premises, put them in gox )d
1 Barn. & Aid. 584; 2 Ld. Raym. 803, 1125;
condition
1 Salk. 141;

Comyn's Land. & Ten. 210. If the covenant was
only to leave the premises in as good a condition as the tenant found
them, it seems an action would not lie till the end of the term. Shep.
Touch. 173; Piatt on Cov. 289.
The defendant canno t question, in this action, the title of the la ndlord. , The action is upon an e xpress covenant between the parties,
and the suit, if sustained at all, must be by the plaintiff alon e.
j
New tr ial denie d.
^

WHITEHEAD

r

v.

'

;

1.

'

•-'

Piatt on Cov. 289;

CLIFFORD.
5

(Court of Common Pleas, 1814.
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This was an action for the use and occupation of house which was
tried at the Middlesex sittings after last Michaelmas term, before
Mansfield, C.
when, fter the Plaintiff had proved that the Defen dant had been tenant from year to year of the Plaintiff's house, the
eproved
fendant
parol agreement, that the Plaintiff would give up
laim to the rentj _ on the Defendant's giving up immediate possessi on
n the middle of the quarter: both parties accordingly went before
magistrate, and the Defendant then gave up the key, which the Plaintiff" accepted, and the Defendant was never after that time in the possession of the premises.
he Plaintiff sought to recover for
tim
st jbsequent to his resuming the key
and he insisted that the tenancy
was not thereby determmed, by reason of the statute of frauds; and
cited Mollet v. Brayne,
Camp. 103.^-'^ Mansfield, C. J., reserved the
vjerdict for the Defenda nt.
question, subject whereto the ury found
Best, Serjt., in Hilary term, 1814, had obtained
rule nisi to set
aside this verdict, and enter
verdict for the Plaintiff.
GiBBs, C.
The ause of the statute of frauds v>diich restricts states created by parol, to three years, has nothing to do with that
which requires surrenders to be in writing . In Mollet v. Brayne both
parties did not act on the parol notice to quit, but the tenant only. The
present action can never succeed.
The action for use and occupation
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25 In the case cited the defendant had been in possession as tenant under
yearly rent for several months when a dispute arose between him and the
lessor;
the defendant threatening
to quit the premises, the lessor said,
"You may quit when you please." The defendant accordingly left
few days
later. The lessor sued for rent accrued after defendant quitted the premises.
The defendant tendered the rent accrued up to a day after he had left.
" Lord Ellenborough was of opinion
that the tenancy was not
etermined
merely by" the landlord giving the tenant
parol ncense to quit, and th teji.ant quitting accordingly
At the time tuere was
subsisting term in the
premises, and tue statuTe of frauds (St. 29 Car. II, c.
rovides that
ease or term of year
or ny uncertain interest
shall be s!u rrenaered, unless py d^tJU or UOt^ ih writing, oi- by act and operation of 1^ .
ilere there was no aeea or n ote in writin g, and not hing is proved which can
be considered
surrender by operation of lavy" (ISOSJI
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depends either upon actual occupation, or upon an occupation which
the Defendant might have had, if she had not voluntarily abstained
from it. H ere the Plaintiff himself takes possession of the hous e,
a nd makes the profit of the premises ; and it was therefore impossible
for the Defendant, during the same time, to have used and occupied
the premises, if she would.
As to the case in Campbell, it is verydifferent from this, and we do not throw out any opinion against it;
but when the like circumstances arise, it will be proper to consider

R ule discha rged.^ °

-

THOMAS

.

V.

(Court of King's Bench, ISIS.

d

/4:^i^l±fr^f'*^

'

COOK.
2

Barn.

&

Al

A ction for

use and occupation . At the trial of this cause at the
London sittings after Trinity term before Abbott, J., it appeared that
the pla intiff had originallv let the premises_^ consisting of a house in
Long-L.ane t o the defendant ^as tenant from year to year . After he
had resided tliere for some time, the defeqd^pt underlet them to one
Perkes. commencing at Christmas 1816. At Lady-Dav 1817. defend.dji^trained pprke' s goods for rent in arrear . Rent being then due
a^
f rom the defendant to Thn mas , the latter gave notice to Perkes no t
to pay the rent to the defendant, but to him : and upon Cook's refusing to take Perke's bill for the amount then due, the plaintiff agreed
to take it himself in payment of the rent due from Cook to him, saying that he would not have any thing further to do with Cook. j\n d
a fterwards^ in October. 1817. the plaintiff himself distrained the goo ds
of Perkes for rent in arrear . The jury found, by the direction of
the learned Judge, a v erdict for the defendant, on the ground tha t
T homas had, with the assent of Cook, accepted Perkes as his tenant o f
t he premises .

Topping moved for a new trial. By the third section of the Statof Frauds, "No lease or term of years or any uncertain interest of I
or in any messuages, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall bej
surrendered unless by deed or note in writing."
Now the utmost th at
a ppeared on the trial was a parol surrender by Cook of his interes t
in the premise^ , and in Mollett v. Brayne, 2 Campb. 103, it was held
by Lord Ellenborough that a tenancy from year to year could not be
determined by a parol license from the landlord to the tenant to quit,
and the tenant's quitting accordingly.
The same point was ruled in
Doe v. Ridout, 5 Taunt. 519. T hen if this surrender be void the c ase
ute

Phene v. Popplewell. 12 C. B. (N. S.) 334 (1862) ; Millis v. Ellis, 109
81, 122 N. W. 1119 (1909).
Cf. Oastler v. Henderson, 2 Q. B. D. 575
nc77^ : Newton v. Speare Laundering Co., 19 R. I. 516, 37 Atl. 11 (1S96) ;
Smith V. Hunt, 32 R. I. 326, 79 Atl. 826, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1132, Ann. Cas
1912D, 971 (1911).
26 See

Minn.
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within the autlinn'ty of Bull v. Sibbs .

p laintiff is entitled to a verdict

Abbott, C. J.
'enacted "Th at no
of years, or any
l ands, tenements
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other uncertam interest in any messuages, mano rs.'
or hereditaments shall be surrendered, unless b y
And the
deed or note in writing, or bv act and operation of law T'
whether what has been done will amount to
question in this case
su rrender by act and operation of law
Now the facts of the case
The plaintiff Thomas had let the premises in question to
re these.
the defendant as tenant from year to year, and the def endant underl et
them to Perkes.
The rent being in arrear, the defendant, on Ladybill
Day 1817, distrained the goods of Perkes, who having tendered
in payment of the rent which the defendant had refused to receive, the
plaintiff then interposed, took the bill in payment, and accepted Perkes
as his tenant: and afterwards in October 1817, himself distrained the
goods of Perkes for rent then in arrear.
left
to the jury to say
whether under these circumstances the plaintiff' had not, witli the assent of Cook, accepted Perkes as his tenant of the premises, and the
jury found that fact in the affirmative.
jhjnk therefore this amnn ntya lirl <^^irrpndpr ^^ Cook's interest in the premis es, being a surto
render by act and operation of law.
The consequeTice is that" the

plaintiff can have no claim for rent against the present defendant, arid
that the verdict therefore
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lessee
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is
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is
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is
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If

a

was right.
assigns over his interest, and the lessor accepts the assignee as his tenant, he privity of estate
thereby de troyed, and on that ground
not competent for the lessor to brin
ebt agamst the lessee . Where, indeed, the contract
by deed, there
he may bring covenant by the Statute of Hen. VIII. In this case, the
landlord has ac cepted Perkes as his tenant, and must be consi dered
have made his election between Perkes and Cook
And the case
of Phipps V. Sculthorpe,
Barn.
Aid. 50,
an authority to she.w
that the plaintiff has no right to recover.
This was a surrender of
Cook's interest in the premises by act and operation of law, and the
ury were quite rig^ht in presuming that Cook harl agQpntpd_lQ_iJ2 ^
cceptance of Perkes as tenant to the plaintiff: for that assent w as
learly for Cook's
enefit.

BaylEy,

HoLROYD,
render in order

a

J.

appears from the Statute of Frauds, that
surther by deed or note in writing
or by act and operation of law^ In Mollett v. Brayne,
Campb. 103,
there was only
parol surrender, and no circumstance existed in that
case which could constitute
surrender by act and operation of law.
But injjiia_j:aae, -tbere
merely
not
declaration by the plainliff,
_ajhi-^ tenant, hnt there
he will no longer consider Cook
also the
cceptance by him of another person as the tenant, and that acceptance
Now,
assented to by Cook
lease be granted to an individual,
and there be
subsequent demise of the premises by parol to the same
a

if

.

a

•
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a
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to be valid, must be
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Then the cirperson, that will amount to a surrender of his lease.
cumstances of Cook having first put in another person as undertenant,
and having afterwards assented to a second demise by the plaintiff
to that person, will in the present case amount to a virtual surrender
of his interest by act and operation of law. Notwithstanding ther ef ore the third section of the Statute of Frauds, I am of opinion, tha t
t he facts here found by the iurv amount to a valid surrender of Co ok's
i nterest a nd a re-demise of the premises by the plaintiff to Perke s.
^
In that case there will be no ground for disturbing the present verdict.
Rule refused.^'

WALLS

V.

ATCHESON.

(Court of Common Pleas, 1826.

11

Moore, 379.)

for assumpsit, for use a nd occupation . The
cause was tried before Lord Chief Justice Best, at the sittings at Westminster, in the present Term.
The pla intiff, a widow, let to the defendant part of a furnished hous e
i n Manchester Square, at the rent of sixty-five guineas, for one yea r
1824.
c ertain, from the 14th of September^
The defendant q uitted at
e nd of the first quarter, viz. on the 14th December, p aying ren t up
t o that day. About three weeks afterwards, the plaintiff let the apartments to . another person, at the rent of one guinea per we ek. At the
expiration of the second quarter, the plaintiff se nt in an account to
the defendant, charging him for a quarter's rent according to the
t erms of the original takmg, deducting the sums received from^ the
This was

an

a ction

had re-let the apartments , and making the deher
for the sum of £7. 5s. Od. ; which sum the_ defendant debtor to
f endant paid . The second tenant quitted in the beginning of July,
1825, from which time, until the 14th of December following, the
apa rtments remained vacant .
The plaintiff accordingly brought this
action, to recover from the defendant, £21. Os. 6d., the balance of rent
due to her from him, by the terms of the original letting.
His Lor dship, being of opinion, that, by letting the^ apartment s_to
a nother, the plaintiff had rescinded the previous contract with the
d efendant, directed a nonsuit .
Mr. Serjeant Vaughan now applied for a rule nisi, that the nonsuit
might be set aside and a new trial had. * * *
Lord Chief Justice Best. By her own act, the plaintiff prevente d
th g^ defendant fr o m occupying these premises. S he let them to ano yier
p erson to whom

she

Walker v. Richardson, 2 M. & W. 882 (1S37); Lynch v. Lynch, &
Rep. 131 (1843) ; Creagh v. Blood, 8 Ir. Eq. Rep. 688 (1845).
Cf. Decker v. Hartshorn, 60 N. J. Law, 548, 38 Atl. 678 (1897).
2 7 See

Ir. Law
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Ca n a landlord have two tenants , and be rp rpivino- rent-icnm
o ne, and at the same time holding the other liab le? The case of Mollett V. Brayne is altogether distinguishable from the present. In Whitehead v. CHfiford, 5 Taunt. 518, it was held, that, if a landlord, in the
middle of a quarter, accept from his tenant the key of tlie house
demised, under a parol agreement, t hat, upon her then living up the
p ossession, the rent shall cease, and she never afterwards occupies the
p remises, he cannot recover, in an action for the use and occupatio n
o f the house, for the time subsequent to his accepting the key . Lord
Chief Justice Gibbs there said : "In Mollett v. Brayne, both parties
did not act on the parol notice to quit, but the tenant only. T he pres t enant.

e nt action can never succeed .
The action fo r us e and occupation jdep ends. either upon actual occupation, or upon an occu pation whirh th e,

jf sliH had not voluntarr[yabstained- £rom
himself
takes possession of the house, and makes
plaintiff
i^
the profit of the premises ; and it was therefore impossible for the
defendant, during the same time, to have used and occupied the premI think both law and justice are with the defendises, if she would."
d efendant might have tiad.

Here,

the

ant.

I am of opinion that my Lord Chief Justice
nonsuited the plainti ff; and that there is no colour for calling upon us to disturb that nonsuit. The case of Mollett v. Brayne is
very different from the present: there, the tenant had a subsisting
term, which could not be determined by a mere parol surrender.
Here,
the plaintiff, by her own act, rescinded the contract with the defen dant, and dispensed with the necessity of a surrender . In Redpath v.
Roberts, the landlord had only offered to let the premises, but had
not in fact let them : thus there was nothing to obstruct the defendant's occupation of them, had he been so minded. In Lloyd v. Crispe,
5 Taunt. 257 the lessor having, by receiving rent from him, assented
to the occupation of an assignee, he was held, by Sir James Mansfield,
to have waived the necessity of a license for the subsequent assignment, notwithstanding a covenant in the lease, that the premises should
not be assigned without the licence of the lessor.
In Whitehead y^
Chfford, the plaintiff, the landlord, had accepted the key, and thus the
So, here, the c ontenant was prevented from occupying tlie house.
d uct of the plaintiff in re-letting the apartments, signified as complete
a n acquiescence m the tenancy being determined, as could be conv eyed bv the acceptance of the key.
Mr. Justice Park.

p roperly

Mr. Justice Burrough. If the tenancy on the part of the defendant in this case were to be considered a continuing tenancy after the
period at which he ceased to occupy the premises, the letting of them
to another person was, on the part of the plaintiff, a tortious act; it
was in the nature of an eviction.
I think the case discloses abun dant
evid ence that the contract was put an end to with the asse nt of lEhe
pfaintlffherself.
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Mr. Justice GasEleE. If the plaintiff had given the
notice, that, if he would not occupy tlie apartments himself,
let them to another tenant, on his account, the case would
different.
Un der the circumstances, I sec no reason for
the nonsuit .
Rule

defendant
she

would

have been
di sturbi ng

refused.^*

GRAY

V.

KAUFMAN DAIRY

(Court of Appeals of New York, 1900.
5S0, 76 Am.

1G2

St

&

ICE CREAM CO.

N. Y. 3SS, 56 N. E. 903, 49 L. R. A.
Rep. 327.)

Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court in the second judicial department, entei^ed May 5, 1897, affirming a judgment in favor_ol. plainti ff_entered upon a decision of the court
at a Trial Term, a jury having beefi waived.
'
This action was br ought to recover two months' rent of the prem ises
7f^ 7 Eighth avenue, in llie rity nf New York .
knn^,vn ^^Nn
In July,
1893, the plaintiff let the said premises to the defendant f or ten yea rs
from August 1st, 1893, at the ye arly rental of $2,400, pay able mon thly
in advance, and also the ex tra water rent charged against the defendant for its business. The defendant to ok possession about July, 1893,
and pa id rent tn Nnvpmhpr Kf, 1893 , h '^^ refused to pay for the months
of November and December of that year, the rent of which became
due and payable on the first days of those months respectively.
T he answer, in effect, admits the making of the lease, but denies an y
i ndebtedness under it and sets up the eviction of the defendant, a_ sur render and rescission of the lease, and claims credit for the rent r ec eived from the undertenant.
On or about the 28th or 29th of October,
1893, the plaintiff had a conversation with Mr. Kaufman, the president
of the defendant, upon the demised premises. The plaintiff's version
of this conversation is as follows : "They were pulling up the store and
the things, and were going to move out.
They had not said anything
to me about moving out prior to that time.
I asked Mr. Kaufman
the
store.
He said he was going to
what he was doing, pulling up

'1

I

ff

I

y

b

T

I

if

it,

move out, and I asked him why, and he said because he couldn't make
and that
would
any mone}'', and I told him that he had a lease on
'Well,' he says,
he went out.
hold him responsible for the rent
"
don't make my rent.'
don't want to stay where
am moving out,
he defendant moved out and sent the kevs of the store to the plainti
mail.
Plaintiff received them about the 2d of November, 1893.
2
8

See, also, Nickells v. Ather.stone, 10 Q. B. 914 (1847); Haycock v. Johnston, 97 Minn. 2S9, 106 N. W. 304, 114 Am. St. Rep. 715 (1906); Rogers v.
Dockstader, 90 Kan. 1S9, 133 Pac. 717 (1913); Hotel Marion Co. v. Waters
(Or.) 150 Pac. S65J1915).

"212

DERIVATIVE

TITLES

(Part

2

On the 3d of November, 1893, plaintiff served upon the defendant a
notice of which the following is a copy :
"New York, November 3, 1893.
"To the Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co. :
"Yesterda v I received the keys of 787 Eighth Av f^^ii^ ^y "injl^ I
hereby notify you that I do not accept a surrender of the premises, and
f or the rent under tlie leas e. _ I
t hat 1 intendto hold y ^u rf'^P'^^'^i^^fccount,
and hold you for anv loss wh ich
a
s hall let the premises on your
m ay be sustained.

"Yours, etc.,
John Gray."
The defe ndant made no answer to t his notice. On the 17tli of November, 1893, the plaintiff went to Kingston and saw Mr. Kaufman,
the president of the defendant, Mr. Spore, the secretary, and a Mr.
Bruin. The pl aintiff asked Mr. Kaufman for the November rent, a nd

latter replied that no rent was due ; that he had not made a le ase ;
there was nothing due and he would not pay ; that he had given up
t he store and plaintiff could do what he liked withit .
Thereupon the
The
and
started
for
home.
president
plaintiff
secretary of the defendant went to the railway station and there h ad a conversation with_t he
pl aintiff about compromising the matter bv taking the cellar of said
p remises for fifty dollars a month for the term of the lease if th e
plaintiff would cancel the same as to the rest of the premise s. The
plaintiff' said' he would think over the matter and see what he could'
The plaindo with the remainder of the property, and let them know.
tiff' testifies that thereafter, and on the 27th of November, 1893, he
wrote to the defendant as follows :
"Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co. :
"Gentlemen : I have an offer for the store you leased from me, 787
Eighth Ave. the parties will pay $1,500 to the first of May and $1,600
for three years from May. I think this is about as good an offer as
can be expected, considering the times. P lease let me know if you w ill
k eep the cellar and pav the dift'erence between the $1.jOO and $2.400
t o^jSIay, and $1,600 — ^2,400 after . An early reply will much oblige.
"Yours respect.,
J. Gray, 323 Washington Avenue."
The plaintiff further testifies that he inclosed this letter in an envelope directed to the defendant at Kingston, N. Y., deposited it prepaid in the post office at Brooklyn and recei ved no reply the reto. Tlie
d efendant had tenants in the cellar when it left the premis es . Thes e
te nants attorned to the plaintiff .
On or about the 1st of December, 1S93, plaintiff let the premises
which had been previously demised to the defendant to one Mary Ann
Keogh for the term of three years and fi ve months at an annual re nt
ot ^l, :)UO per year tor ihe tirst hve months, and $1,600 per ^^r for the
remamnig three years, to be paid in equal monthly installments in ad v ance.
The defendant pleaded eviction, but gave no evidence upon that subject, and upon the trial admitted that it had no excuse for leaving the
t he

t hat
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premises. Kaufman admitted having a conversation with the plaintiff
before the defendant left the premises, in which the plaintiff stated that
he would hold the defendant for the rent, but denied that he, Kaufman,
had stated that the defendant would not stay where it did not make
any money. Kaufman also admitted the receipt of the letter dated November 3d, but both he and Spore denied receiving the one dated November 27th. Both admitted the conversation testified to by the plaintiff as having taken place at Kingston, and Spore testified that on that
occasion Kaufman stated distinctly that the defendant did not owe any
rent ; that it had given up and surrendered the premises ; that there was
some talk at the railroad station about renting the cellar from tlie
plaintiff at fifty dollars per month during the term of the lease, but
there was nothing said in that conversation about plaintiff's reletting
Abraham L. Gray, a son of the
the premises on defendant's account.
the
latter's
behalf
that he went to Kingston with
testified
on
plaintiff,
his father to see Kaufman and was present at the conversation at the
railroad station. He testified that Mr. Spore offered the plaintiff fifty
dollars a month for the basement if he would let the defendant off on
the store, and the plaintiff replied that he would think it over and let
them know. T he lease to the defendant contained no provision again st
s ubletting, except for "any saloon
or liounr busmess.
and_contained no provision for a reletting of the premises by th e plaintiff
i n case the defendant vacated tlie same during the term of the lease .
After the evidence was all in, tbe parties waived the jury and submitted the facts to the court for decision. The defendant admitted its
liability for the November rent, but claimed that it was released as to
the December rent by the reletting of the premises to said Mary Ann
foun d^iat
he court loun
Keogh on the 1st of December. Upo n these facts the
jnths of Noveinljer
the plaintiff" was entitled to recover rent for the mont
/f)^^ ^f^Ztt
thnt
a nd December, less the amo unt re ceived from the iinderfennnts;
'
of the premises : that th e
t he plaintiff refused to accept a surrender
p remises were at no time surrendered to the plaintiff, and that the ele tting of the premises was done with the assent of the defendant.
Werner, J. This controversy arises out of the conventional relation of landlord and tenant under circumstances governed by fixed
principles of law. The first and most important question in the cas e is
whe ther the plaintiff^s reletting of the premises deicribed in the lease ,
f
'
a ?terthe defendant's attempted surrender of the same, changed or af ie cfed the legal status of the parties under the originaljease. It is so
well settled as to be almost axiomatic that a surrender of premises is
created by operation of law when the parties to a lease do some act so i^. x ^^ ^^
in consiste nt with the subsisting relation of landlord and tenant as to
^
as mad e, y^'^^/v'-*'***^
i mply that they have both agreed to consider the surrender
It has been held in this state that "a surrender is implied, and so effected
by operation of law within the statute, w hen another estate is create d
b y the reversioner or remainderman with the assent of the termor inCoe v. Hobby, 72 N. Y.
c ompatible with the existmg state or term ."

Un^

r
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145, 28 Am. Rep. 120. The existence of this rule has been recognized
in this state in Bedford v. Terhune, 30 N. Y. 453, 86 Am. Dec. 394;
Smith. V. Kerr, 108 N. Y. 36, 15 N. E. 70, 2 Am. St. Rep. 362; Underhill v.^ColHns, 132 N. Y. 271, 30 N. E. 576, and in other jurisdictions
in Beall v. White, 94 U. S. 389, 24 L. Ed. 173 ; Amory v. Kannoffsky,
117 Mass. 351, 19 Am. Rep. 416; Thomas v. Cook, 2 Barn. & Aid. 119;
Nickells v. Atherstone, 10 Ad. & El. N. R. 944; Lyon v. Reed, 13 M.
& VV. 306, and Washburn on Real Property, vol. 1, pp. 477, 478. It is
conceded that defendant's offer of surrender was declined by the plaintiff, and that after the defendant's abandonment of the premises the
plaintiff relet the same in his own name to one Mary Ann Keogh for a
term of three years and five months. S uch a situation, unqualified by:
o ther conditions, would create a surrender by opera t ion nf law.
We
niust, therefore, ascertain whether the conduct of the parties takes this
case out of the operation of this r ule.
it is urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the reletting
was done with the consent of the defendant under circumstances which
bring the case directly within the rule laid down by Judge Haight in
Underbill v. Collins, 132 N. Y. 270, 30 N. E. 576. In that case the
landlord and tenant had a conversation a few days before the latter vacated the premises. The tenant asked the landlord to take the same
off his hands. This the landlord declined to do, insisting that he would
hold the tenant for the rent and would lease the premises for his benefit. In the case at bar there was also a conversation before the premises were vacated ; but in this conversation there was nothing said
about a reletting.
The plaintiff" simply said that he would hold the defendant for the rent. On the 2d of November, 1893, a day or two after
defendant's removal, the plaintiff received the keys of the premises..
He returned them with a note stating that he would relet on defendant's account and hold it responsible for any loss that may be sustained. To this note the defendant made no reply.
On the 17th of
November, 1893, the plaintiff and his son went to Kingston and saw
Kaufman and Spore. In the conversation which took place between
them and the plaintiff there was no suggestion of reletting.
The plaintiff" made a demand for tlie rent which was unpaid, and the defendant
made an offer of compromise, under which it agreed to take the cellar
of said premises at fifty dollars per month if the plaintiff would cancel
the lease as to the store.
This offer the plaintiff agreed to consider.
On the 27th of November, 1893, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant
that he had an oft"er for the store of $1,500 per year to the first of the
next ensuing May, and $1,600 per year for three years thereafter.
He
requested the defendant to let him know if it would keep the cellar and
pay the difference between the rent fixed by the lease and the amount
offered by the intending tenant. To this letter tlie defendant made no
reply.
It will be observed from this brief resume of the facts that there are
several distinct features in which this case differs from the Underbill
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Case. In the latter case there was a personal interview before the
tenant had vacated, in which the subject of reletting the premises was
discussed. He re the subject of reletting Avas not mentioned until afte r
t he tenant went out, and then the suggestion came in a letter to which
t he defendant made no reply .
Obviously the only theory upon which
the defendant can be held to have assented to the reletting of the premises is that by its silence it acquiesced in the act of the plaintiff.
We
decide,
that
if
communications
assume,
we
do
not
the
although
may
upon the subject of reletting had been made verbally in the course of
conversation between the parties, even after the tenant had vacated the
premises, the rule as to agreements by implication laid down in the UnBut here, as we have seen, the
derbill Case might be held to apply.
l andlord's propos al to relet was in the form of two letters . In the first
of these, dated November 3d, he makes the unequivocal assertion that
he will let the premises on defendant's account, and will hold it for any
loss that may be sustained. Defendant's failure to reply to this letter is
followed by a personal interview on the 17th of November, in which
there is no reference to a reletting of the premises, and in which defendant's president, after denying any liability for rent, tells the plaintiff to do what he likes with the premises. Then follows the letter of
November 27th, informing the defendant of the offer which the plaintiff had received from an intending tenant, and asking defendant if it
would pay the difference between the amount offered and the rent reserved in the original lease.
It will be observed that, even if we were to give these written communications the same force and effect as verbal statements made in personal interviews between^the parties, the facts here are easily differentiated from those in the Underbill Case
T here the tenant vacated the
pr emises upon the oft'er of the landlord to relet for his benefit nnd nnd er such circumstances as tn permit the infe rence that he accepted t he
o ffer.
Here the landlord's statement to that effect, made after the tenant's abandonment of the premises, is followed by negotiations in which
the tenant expresses a willingness to keep the cellar at fifty dollars
per month if the landlord will cancel the lease as to the rest of the
These steps are succeeded by a communication from the
premises.
landlord, in which he requests the tenant to decide whether it will keep
the cellar and pay the deficit which will arise by an acceptance of the
offer which the former then had under consideration.
It may well b e
d oubted whether ver bal declarations made in personal jntprvipw; h pwnu 1d
t ween the partie s, u nder the circumstanc e*' nhnvp na^rfitfr],
s upport the plaintiff's theorv of this action .
To create a contr act by
equi
unq iiiTlfie^asser| lQ^_of
an
un
be
vocal
and
^rernust
impii^ation^.lh
a
y\ one qf^jh e parties. aaSTiuc h silence bjY_ _the-Qther_^as^ to-sup-

J

ri^liO

poji^theJ^^alJjiipi^ilcejoijTi^^
But it is clear, both upon principle and authority^ that we have no
right to indulge in the assumption that the letters above referred to
have the force and effect of verbal statements made in the presence of
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the defendant's officers.
The rule is precisely to the contrary.
It is
well expressed in Learned v. Tillotson, 97 N. Y. 12, 49 Am. Rep. 508,
as follows : "We think that a distinction exists between the effect to
be given to oral declarations made by one party to another, which are
in answer to or contradictory of some statement made by the other
party, and a written statement in a letter written by such party to anotlier. It may well be that under most circumstances what is said to a
man to his face, which conveys the idea of an obligation upon his part
to the person addressing him, or on whose behalf the statement is
made, he is at least in some measure called upon to contradict or explain ; but a failure to answer a letter is entirely differe nt. ^nd ther^
n o rule of law which requires a person to e nter into a correspondenc e
with another in referenc etoa matter m dispilte between them, or which
holds that silence should be regarded as an admission against the pa rty

Js

j

a

i

c

s

e

it

is

s

le

it,

t o whom the letter is addressed.
Such a rule would enable one party
to obtain an advantage over another and has no sanction in the law."
To the same effect are Bank of B. N. A. v. Delafield, 126 N. Y. 418,
27 N. E. 797, and Thomas v. Gage, 141 N. Y. 506, 36 N. E. 385.
I t is man ifest^heref ore, that the act of the plaintiff in reletting_ said
p remises under the circumstances referred to operated as an" acceptan ce
of the defendant's oft'er to su rrender. The judgment herein can be supported upon no theory that is consistent with the established rules of
law. As the views above expressed are decisive of the case, it is unnecessary to discuss the other questions raised by the defendant.
The ju dgment of the court below slio uld be reversed and a new trial
granted, with costs to abide the event.
Landon, J. (d issenting). The trial court found that "Plaintiff
refused to accept a surrender of the premises, and did not accept
and the premises were at no time surrendered to the plaintiff". The
tting of the prem ise was done with the assent of the defenda nt."
The order of affirmance by the Appellate Division does not state that
was unanimous, but tliat
not important here, for the record contains evidence tending to support the findings.
The evide nc tends to
how that the defendant inten ded by its conduct to threaten the plain tiff with the loss of his rent, and thus to oerce him to relet the ^preinses, nd then deny its assent^ iotwithstanding after its receipt of the

t

t

h

it

old the plaintiff he could do as he liked wit
plaintiff's first letter,
he premises . The defendant thus replied to the plaintiff''s letter, at
least so the trial court, in view of all the circumstances, might find, and
did find.

J.,

Parker, Ch. J., and Gray, O'Brien and Haight, JJ., concur with
Werner,
for reversal. Landon, J., reads dissenting memorandum.
CuLLEN, J., not sitting.
Judgment reversed,

etc.**

;

2» See Welcome v. Hess,
Pelton v. Place, 71
(1891)

(\0

90

-JLs^-l
Cal. 507, 27 Pac.

Vt. 4J|J^4y Atl.

eJ-^'^

oG9, 25
63 (1899).

Am.

St. Rep.
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WIESENFELD.

(Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1903.

97 Md. 165, 54

Atl.

969.)

Briscoe, J.'° On the eighth day of June, 1900, the appellees instituted a suit in covenant in the Superior Court of Baltimore City,
against the appellant, to recover rent due and owing iinrlpr a l easp dafa4
t he 1st day of April, 1895, f or a store and dwelling known as No. 50 7
South BroaHwa y , Baltimore . The lease is in writing and is fully set
out in the record. The property was rented for the te rm of five year s,
beginning on the first day of April, 1895, and ending on the 31st day
of March, 1900, at $ 900 per yea r, paya ble in equal monthlv installmen ts
on the fi rjt day of each and every month. It was provided by the terms
of the lease that its provisions and covenants should continue in force
from term to term after the expiration of the term mentioned therein,
provided the parties thereto or either of them could terminate it at the
end of the term, or of any year thereafter, by giving at least ninety days
previous notice thereof in writing. I t was further provided, in rase
t he rent should be ten days in arrear and not paid when the same shoul d
due, then the lessor may re-enter and take back the premi ses
become
without demand. There was no covenant in the lease for making repairs to the premises.
The declaration states that the sum of six hundred and five dollars
was due and unpaid for rent with interest from April 1st, 1900, over
and above all discounts, according to the following bill of particulars,
which was filed, on demand, in the case.
Bill of Particulars.
Mr. Henry Oldewurtel to Bernard Wiesenfeld and Joseph Miller,
Trustees of the Estate of Betsey Wiesenfeld.
To 5 years rent of No. 507 S. Broadway, at $900 per year, as per
lease of April 1st, 1895
$4,500 Ofl
Less $10 per month, waived for the months of Aug., Sept., Oct., Nov.
and Dec, 1897, and Jan., 1898, respectively
60 00
Credits.
By cash from April 1, 1895, to June 1. 1898
By Hughes & Co., from Sept. 1, 1S9S. to Jan. 1, 1899
By Wheeler & Hughes, from Feb. 1. 1899, to Aug. 1, 1899
By C. Walmacher, from Oct. 19, 1899, to March 31, 1900

$4,440

00

$2,865
280
370
320

00
00
00
00

$3,835 00
605 00

To balance

The undisputed facts of the case out of which the controversy arose
briefly stated are these: The defendant, the lessee, continued in po s3 The portion
of the opinion
action is omitted.

relating to the correctness

of the form of
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of the demised premises until Tune 1st, 1898. when he paicL the
rent to that date and left the key at the office of tlie plaintiff in his ab sence^ stating to the clerk "that he had moved out the house and here
was the key."
On June 2d, the next day, the plaintiff wrote him the following lets ession

ter:
"Henry Oldewurtel, Esq.,
"Dear Sir : I have been informed that you left the key of No. 507
I beg to notify you that I refuse to acSouth Broadway at my office.
cept t he key and that it is still at my office a t your risk and'dispos al.
I als o hereby no tify you t hat we will hold yo u subject to all the cove nants of the lease, executed by you.
'
Bernard Wiesenfeld."
'Wery truly yours,
The plaintiff not receiving a reply to the foregoing letter, a second
letter dated June 3, 1898, was written the defendant as follows:
"Henry Oldewurtel, Esq.,
"Dear Sir: I herein beg to notify you that I int end to make an effort to get a tenant for the premises known as NoTbO/ South Broad way, without abandoning anv rights. Mr. Miller and myself as executors and trustees may have against you as tenant under our lease to
you for rent. In case we get a tenant we will allow you credit for
such rent as we may collect, and hold you for the balance as due under
your lease.
"Yours truly,
Bernard Wiesenfeld."
sign
ub
was put in the window of the premises that the
S
^equently a
p roperty was for rent , . and it was rented from time to time, and the
d efendant credited with the rent to the date of the expiration of th e
lease.
The plaintiff's testified that they refused to accept a surrender
of the premises, never made any alteration of the original lease, by a
subsequent agreement, and never ousted the defendant from the premises, and that necessary repairs were made to the property.
The defendant, on the other hand, testified that he vacated the property beit had been condemned by the building inspector of BaltimoFe^
and was not tenantable, and he notified the clerk when he paid the rent
that he would no longer be liable under the lease.
There was other
evidence in the case, but as the material facts are not disputed and
have been heretofore stated it will not be necessary to further set
them out. At the trial below, the Court granted the two pravers off ered on the part of th e, plaintiff, and rejected th o se presented by the defendan t, except, tbe-^fi fih.
It also granted the plaintift''s special exception to the defendant's first prayer, that there was no legally sufficient evidence to show that the terms of the lease were ever modified
by any legally binding agreement. The whole case was presented on
the prayers and the special exception, and we shall proceed to consider
them.
The^ pravers on . the part of the plaintiff were demurrers to the ev id ence an d w ere to the efiFect that as a matter of law there was no leg g.1cause
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suffic ient eviden c e of the acceptance of a su rrender, or of an ouste r
1^
by the plaintiff .
The generaFrule is well settled that to constitute a valid surrender
of rented premises by a tenant during the term there must be the
a ssent of both parties to the rescinding of the contract of renting, and
such assent may be e xpressed o r implied froip such acts as would reasonably indicate that the parties have agreed that the tenant shall
abandon the premises, and the lan dlord assume its possessi on. Biggs
V. Stueler, 93 Md. 110, 48 Atl. 727.
The appellants admit that the defendant returned the key before
the expiration of the lease.
It was not accepted and therefore up to
this time no surrender took place. It is further conceded that the
plaintiffs had a right to enter for the purpose of taking care of the
property, of repairing the premises and to put a "for rent sign" in the

window.
But it is earnestly urged that the re-renting of the property fpr the.
b gnent of the tenant without h is assent was an acceptance of a su rtSJid^r, an nn^tfr nf the tpnant^ and rele ased him from liability for re nt

under the lease^ ,
There are some authorities to the effect that a re-entry and reletting
of abandoned premises by the landlord without the consent of the tenant, would create a surrender, by operation of law. Underbill v. Collins, 132 N. Y. 271, 30 N. E. 576; Gray v. Kaufman, 162 N. Y. 388,
56 N. E. 903, 49 L. R. A. 580, 76 Am. St. Rep. 327 ; Day v. Watson, 8
Mich. 535 ; Rice v. Dudley, 65 Ala. 68.
The best approved cases, however, assert the contrary doctrine, and
h old that where a tenant repudiates the lease, and abandons the demjsed premises, and the lessor enters and relets the property, that such
r e-renting does not relieve the tenant from the payment of the rent
u nder the covenants of the lease . Auer v. Penn. 99 Pa. 370, 44 Am.
Rep. 114; Meyer v. Smith, ZZ Ark. 627; Bloomer v. Merrill, 1 Daly
(N. Y.) 485; Scott v. Beecher, 91 Mich. 590, 52 N. W. 20; Rich v.
Doyenn, 85 Hun, 510, ZZ N. Y. Supp. 341 ; Alsup v. Banks, 68 Miss.
664, 9 South. 895, 13 L. R. A. 598, 24 Am. St. Rep. 294.
In Biggs V. Stueler, 93 Md.
48 Atl. 729, this Court said: "The
acts upon which the appellee in this case relies to prove a surrender are
the acceptance of the keys by the appellee, the repairs to the house and
the reletting.
But th ose are insufficient of themselves to show acc epta nce, unless under all the circumstan rp<; thfV ^''^ " f such a Hi^imrter
to show a purpose on the part of the tenant to vacate and on th e
a^
p art ot the landlord to resume possession, to the exclusion o f tbp. ten-

Ill,

ant."

In the

under consideration all of the acts of the lessor,
of June 2nd and 3rd cl early show that the appe ll ees did not intend to ac cept a s urrender of the property and to releas e
the tenant from his liability for rent . On the contrary the letters distinctly state the property would be rented subject to the covenants of

including

case now

the letters
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if a tenant could be secured, and rent collected, the lessee
would be credited therewith, and be liable for the difference.
The case of Big-gs v. Stueler, supra, is also relied upon by the appellant to sustain the proposition urged by him, t hat the assent of the
t enant is absolutelv necessary -hefore the landlord ran r^ l^^t rlpmi'cpri
premises. In that case there was a statement that would seem to sustain the appellant's contention but an examination of the whole case,
will clearly show that the case cannot be given such a construction.
It was not necessary for the decision of the case, and would not be in
accord with the conclusion reached by the Court, under the facts of the
the lease and

case.

As to the rulings of

the first and second exceptions
upon the admissibility of evidence but little need be said as the evidence was afterwards admitted, and the defendant was not injured
thereby.
The pl aintiff's special exception to the defendant's first praver w^a s
p roperlv sustamed . There was no evidence legally sufficient to show
that the terms of the lease had been modified by an oral agreement,
and what was said by us on the demurrer to the declaration, disposes
of this question.
For the reason we have given, the defendant's prayers were prope rly
r ejected, and as the correctness of the Cou rt's rulings on the pl amtiff's
prayers established the right of the plai ntifls to recover, the judgment
will be affirmed.
' ' ■
Jud gment affirme d with costs.'*
the

Court on

31 "Upon the trial in the court below the learned .Indgje Instructed
the jury,
as set forth in the second assigrnment of error, as follows: ' 1^ a man refu ses
t o continue your tenant, g ives up the house into your hand s, why, th en, sou
have a right to put a bill ui mhi the hinisp nnil try to rent i t; bec ause, if you
rent it, it: is so much saved to Mr. Auer, no much saved to the surety of
the tenant, because you have to give an account of every cent you make out
of the house; a nd cert ahilv it is much better for the tenant, that t he lan dI grd should rent the ho use aivl get sonietliinLT fnr TI, tli;in to siuiiily Fockj Uie
door and lay by an d sue tlie tenant or surety fer the whole ainnn nt of , the
r ent tor the who le ter ni for whlcF he lias taken it ; so that, being for the
benefit of both parties, it is no presumption that the landlord has accepted a
surrender, that he has taken and leased the house.' We see no error in this.
It'is good sense as well as good law." Auer v. Pennsylvania, 90 Pa. .370, .'576,
44 Am. Rep. 114 (1882), per Paxson, J. In the case, however, it appeared that
the landlord had notified the surety of the tenant who moved out that he
would be looked to as continued security for the rent.
"May a landlord, after his tenant has vncnterl arwj ^han c\qh(h[ the premi ses without cause, resume possession fEere6f, and re-lease the same to an other, after giving notice to the original tenant of his intention of holding
him for the rents reserved , and that he had resumed possession for the pnrpose of protecting the reversion, and had relet them to reduce the damage s
which he might otherwise sustain, without being held to have crpnfptiM
surrenaer by operation of law . * * * The arpnprnl mlp n o doubt Is thnf.
i f the tenant abandons the pr em ises and the L4hdlord I'e—
-f en'ts them ^a~suF
render is estabUsliedT^ Stobie v. Dills, (JL! 111. 4oi> (l^TI).
J:5ut nearly every
rule nas its excpptlons, and one of the excentioi^s to the rule l.ust quoted is
t hat if the landlord re-leases the m fo r and'bri Account of the tenant n sn frenaer is not to be interred . *—- *— * If tney gave appellees notice that
they intended to hold them for the rent, and re-rented simply to reduce the-
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Parke, B.^^ This was a special case argued in Easter Term. It
was an action of debt by the pla intiff, as assignee of the reversion of
certain houses"an3 rope-walks at i5hadwell,"li o_lde rrun(ier a lease trom
the Dean ofS't. Paul's against the defendants, who are executors of
ihe plaintitt claims from the defendShake speare Reed, Deceas ed,
ants nmeteen years' rent, accrued due between Christmas, 1820, and
Christmas, 1839, partly in the life time of Shakespeare Reed, who hel d
t he premises during his li
fe^and partly since his decease , while the
premises were in the possession of the defendants, his executors.
The material facts are as follows :— The premises in question are
parcel of the possession of the Dean of St. Paul's, and it appears that,
on tlie 26th of December. 1803, the then dean demised a large estate at

/ ^

A'iA^'-'^

/I

§hadweli^ jjid ^ing the houses and premises in question, to two per s ons of the names of Ord andPlanta ( who were in fact Jrustees fo r
tlieI3^jtY£sJamily) for a te rm of forty years , commencing at Christmas,
1803, and which would, therefore, expire at Christmas, 1843.
On the
24 th jjf March, 1808, Ord and Planta made an underlease of the houses
and rope-walks in question to~StTakespeare Reed for thirty-four year s,
cx) mmencinfT
from Christmas, 180/, so that the term created bv th\is
underlease wo uld expire at Christmas. 1841. leaving a reversion of two
The rejjl sought to hox^zo^^^^i^dj^J^^ej:^^
years in Ord and Planta.
du^-^pniheuijjierlea^e;^^
It appears that, previously to the month of October,
Cl^i§ti^asJJ^39^^
1811, Robert Hartshorn Barber a nd Francis Charles Parry were .appointed by the Court of Chancery t rustees for the Bowes family, in /-iXit/CCu^
9r^
t he place ot Urd and Planta ; and by an indenture dated the 3d of
October, fell, endorsed- on the lease of 1803, all the property at Shad
well Remised by that lease was assigned by Ord and Planta to Barber
and Parry, the new trustees . Soon after this assignment, the Bowes
family appears to have negotiated with the dean for a renewal of the ^
< Jix4y>*- ^
'
dean,
-j
the
lease of 1803, and accordingl y a n ew lease was executed by
y^
^

^

"^^SLO^

damages — and this is made to appear by satisfactory evidence — there is no
reason for holding that there was a surrender, and that the original tenants
Brown v. Cairns, 107 Iowa, 727, 737,
were released from their obligation."
See Kean v. Rogers, 146 Iowa,
77 N. W. 478, 482 (1S9S), per Deemer, C. J.

559, 123 N. W. 754 (1909).
" What does or does not constitute a surrender of the lease
and _ ^^^ Qf»ppptance tlTereor must be determined trom all the facts it L-£a.Ch particular cas e.
■vVtrhout" stfitlhg
in detail all the testimony on that point m this case, we
^«^-g" pb a sux think it is a fair deduction from the testimony that therp
render h ere, ana an acceptance of it. especially in view of the fnrt ttiP^ ^"
Appellan t nevefjnot iged the lessee at any time, not pvpti pftpr r^rmy^p;? tvia
no uncation ilfpgpember. 1905. that they would not renew the lease, that he
expected to"h(Ma the lessee tOr tll'5 rent."
Stein v. Hyman-Lewis Co., 95 Miss.
293, 299, 48 South. 225, 226 (1909), per Whitlield, C. J.

^^f^

/^

y

32

The opinion only is printed; the case suthciently appears therefrom

^>^;5*^

2

d ated on the 7th of April, 1812, for a term of forty years, frnm r;.|iri<; tmas, 181 1. a n3~which term, would therefore, endure till Chrktma
~851.
"On fortunately this lease, instead of being made to Barber and
Parry (the new trustees) in whom the old term (subject to the underlease to Reed) was vested, was made tq Ord and Planta, the old tru stees
the fact of _the_ch ange of trustees and the assignment of the 3d
of October, 1811, having, at the time scaped observ ation. In this
state of things, a private act of Parliarnent was passedTenabling the
dean and his successor for the time being
grant leases of the Shad well estate to the trustees of th Bo wes family for successive terms of
ninety-nine years, renewable for ever
The act, which
intituled "An Act to enable the dean of St. Paul's,
London, to grant
Lease of Messuages, Tenements, Land's, and Hereditaments in the parish of St. Paul's, Shadwell, in the County of Middlesex, and to enable the Lessees to grant Subleases for building on
and repairing, that Estate," received the royal assent on the 22d of
July, 1812. It begins by reciting the will of Mary Bowes, whereby she
bequeathed her leasehold estate at Shadwell, held under the Dean of
St. Paul's, (being the estate afterwards demised by the leases of 26th
December, 1803, and the 7th April, 1812,) to Ord and Planta, on certain trusts for the Bowes family.
It then recites the lease of the 7th
of April, 1812, and after stating that
would for the reasons therein
mentioned, be beneficial for all parties that the dean should be empowred to grant long leases of the Sha dwell property, perpetually renewable, and further stating that Ord and Planta were desirous of being
discharged from their trust, and that John Osborn and John Burt had
agreed to act as trustees in their place
enacted, that
should be
lawful for the dean and his successors for the time being, and he and
they are thereby required, on
surrender of the existing lease, to
demise the Shadwell estate to Osborn and Burt, their executors, administrators, and assigns, for
term of ninety-nine years, and at the
nd of every
new lease on payment ot
fty years to grant
nomfn
provisions
necessary
with
varTous
to
be
fine^
(not
stated) torTecuring
to the dean and his successor
proportion of all improved rents to be
thereafter obtained.
And by the second section of the act
ncted, that, immediately on the execution by the dean of the first lease
for ninety-nine years
granted in pursuance ot the act, the lease
ot April, 18iZ, should become void.
the
It
plain, from the
provisions contained in this act, that the persons by whom
was obtained were not aware, or had forgotten that, in the month of October
preceding, Ord and Planta had assigned their interest in the property
to Barber and Parry, the new trustees appointed by the Court of
In pursuance of the act of Parliament by an indenture of
Chancery.
hree parts, dated the 31st day of Au gust, 1812, nd_ma^gJ.^£lS£au-tFe
dean of he first part, Th omas iJowes"(the party "beneficially interes ted
forJiis Trf"e)_q the'seTondl^art^ and Os born and Burt of the third part,
the dean demised the Shadwell property to Osborn and Burt for
term

';^
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o f nJnetvTnine years , and the dp t-^i,';^ ig pypressed fahe maHf^ h<^;v^]1 in
of the surr e nder of the lease of die 7th of April, 181_2 ,
ic onsideration

"being die lease last existing," as also of the rents and covenants, &c.
Mr. Bowes, and Osborn and Burt, his trustees, appear to have discovered, before the month of January, 1814, the mistake into which
they had fallen, and two further deeds were then executed for the
purpose of curing the defect. By the former of these deeds, which
bears date the 6th Januarv\ 181 4. and is made between Barber and
Parry of the one part, and the dean of the other part, reciting that, at
the time of the granting of the lease of the 7th of April, 1812, the
estate and interest created by the original demise of the 26th of December, 1803, was vested in Barber and Parry, and also reciting that
the fact of the assignment to them by the deed of the 3d of October,
1811, was not known to the parties by whom the said act was solicited, it is witnessed, that Barber and Parrv did bargain, sell and su rr ender. tfl _ the dean the whole of the said Shadwell estate, to the inten t
that the term of forty years, created by the lease of the 26th o i-Xle cember. 1803 , mi o;^lu.be merged in the freehold, and that the dean might
execute a new lease to Osborn and Burt according to the said act. By
the other deed, which bears date the 29th of January, 1814, and is
made between the dean of the first part, and the said Thomas Bowes
of the second part, and the said Osborn and Burt, of the third part;
of the effectual surrender of the two prior^
the^ dean. in consideration
ecember, ISO:
l eases of the 26t h ot
for the 61
e state, pu rsuant to the sai
act of Parliament, to Osborn and Burt .
their execu:
rs, admim
rator s. and assigns^ for a term of nin etvtnine
years. The interest of Osborn and Burt, under these two leases to
them, has, by various assignments, be come vested in the plaintiff and
tl ^ere is no doubt but tha tj ig i§^ entitled to recover the rent in question ^
in this action, if Osborn and Burt would have been so entitled

JJ

Such being the principal facts, we must consider how they bear on
the several issues raised by the pleadings. The declaration, after stating the demise from the dean to Ord and Planta in 1803, and the underlease from them to Reed in 1808, goes on to state, that, by the deed
of the 3d of October, 1811, Ord and Planta assigned all their interest in the premises to Barber and Parry, and th at the dean, bei ng
seise d of t he rev ersion expectant on the term of forty vears so assigne d
t oBarEer jTd Farry, by the indenture of the 31st of August. 181 2.
d emised tKe'p remise s to Osborn and Burt for a term of ni n ety-nin e
yearSj by virtue whereof they became entitled to the reversion for that
term.
The declaration then goes on to state that, by the indenture
of the 6th of January, 1814, Barber and Parry assigned their interest
to the dean, to the intent that he might grant a new lease to Osborn
and Burt; and that afterwards, on the 29th day of the same month
of January, 1814, the dean, by the indenture of that date, made a
new demise of the premises to Osborn and Burt for a fresh term of

I

pi

SUi
C'

i^^ytru-^^^f
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ninety-nine years, they by the same indenture s urren dering thejoriner
t erm crejj;e(i by t he demise of the 31st of Augiist^ _18|Z
THedecla ration then traces the title in the present plaintiff by assignment from
Osborn and Burt previously to Christmas, 1820, and so claims title to
the rent accrued due after that date.
To this declaration the defendants pleaded six plea s : Firs t, a plea
traversing the averment that, at the time of the demise toTTsborn and
Burt of the 31st of August, 1812, the dean was seised in fee of the
reversion.
S econdly a plea traversing that demise. Thirdl y, a plea
traversing the assignment by Barber and Parry to the dean, to the
intent that he might grant a new lease to Osborn and Burt. Fourth ly,
a plea traversing the surrender by Osborn and Burt of the first term
of ninety-nine years, fifthly, a special plea stating the indenture of
the 7th of April, 1812, whereby Ord and Planta became entitled to
the reversion for forty years from Christmas, 1811, and so continued
imtil, up to, and after the execution of the indenture of the 29th of
January, 1814. Sixthl y, a plea traversing the demise to Osborn and
Burt by the indenture of the 29th of January, 1814. Issue was joined
on all the pleas except the fifth, and to that the plaintiff replied, that,
after the making of the lease of the 7th of April, 1812, and before the
lease of the 31st of August, 1812, the private act of Parliament was
passed, authorizing the dean, on the surrender of the existing lease,
to grant a lease for ninety-nine years to Osborn and Burt; and the
replication then avers that the lea se of the 31st of August, 1 812, w as
dulv made in pursuance of the act, and ttiat. at the time when it w as
m ade, the lease of the 7th of April. 1812^ was duly surrendere d. To
this the defendants rejoin, traversing the surrender of the lease of the
7th of April, 1812, and on this issue was joined.
The second, third,
and sixth issues, it will be observed, are mere traverses of the execution of deeds which are found by the special case to have been duly
'
executed ; and, as the traverse merely puts in issue the fact of the
execution, and not the validity of the deeds or the competency of the
parties to make them, the verdict on those issues must certainly be
entered for the plaintiff ; and so must that on the fourth issue, whereby
the defendant traverses the surrender by Osborn and Burt of the first
term of ninety-nine years, when the demise of the second term was
made to them.
It^ is quite clear t hat the acceptance of the secon d
demise w as of itself a surrender m law of the first , even^ if no surr end er m tact w a^_ipad e.
For whom, then, is the verdict on the remainThe issue on the fifth
ing issues, the first and fifth, to be entered?
plea is, it will be observed, whether the lease of the 7th of April, 1812,
was duly surrendered at the time of the making of the indenture of
J, the 31st August, 1812.
And the issue on the first plea is substantially
( the same; for if the plaintiff succeeds in showing that the indenture of
1 the 7th April, 1812, was duly surrendered as set forth in his declarajtion^ then it follows that the dean was at that time seised of the reVyersion, and so the plaintiff must succeed on the first issue; if, on
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the 'other hand, he fail on the fifth issue, he must also fail on the
jjS^^""^
first.
"^^^^-^^"^
The rea l qiiestinn. therefore, for our consideration
whether th e/
.^
laintiff has succeeded in showing that the term of the 7th April wa
urrendered previously to the execution of the indenture of the 31s
was argued by the counsel for
of August, 1812. On this subject
the plaintiff, first, that the circumstances of the case warranted the
and
that be
conclusion that there was an actual surre nder in fac
surre nder in point
not so, then, secondly, that they prove conclusively

ofjaw.

of these propositions separately. And first,
surrender in fact. The subject-matter of the lease of the 7th
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ease was not surrendered.
a

The circumstances on which the plaintiff mainly relies as establishsurrender by deed, are the statements in the two leases
ing the fact of
to Osborn and Burt, that they were made in consideration, inter alia,
of the surrender of the lease of the 7th April, and the fact of that
lease being found among, the dean's instruments of title. These cir-
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cumstances, however, appear to us to be entitled to very little weight.
for the leslease
The rdinary course pursued on the renewal of
see to deliver up'the old lease on receiving the new one, and the new
made in consideration of the surrender
lease usually states that
necessary, where, as
omof the old one. No surrender by deed
monly the case, th former essee takes the new lease, and aU whi ch
Aig.Pbop. — 15
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1812, was,

it

matter, theremust be observed, a rpyprc;iQn;
fore, lyingingrant^ an not in liver y, afld of which, therefore, there
«**«=^
an
what i^
could be no valid surrender in fact otherwise than bv deed
•^''^'^'^^^^^^^^
^
that, •
the plaintiff must make out, therefore, on this part of his case
se for nmety-nme year
'Ord and
befo re tTie exec uti on of the first
^'A-i ^''^^^
AjM>'"*^
fanta^y some deed not n ow forthcoming, assigned or Surrendere
to the dean the interest which they had acquired under the lease
there to warrant us in holding that any
the 7th of A pril. But what
deed
Prima facie
person setting up
such deed was ever executed?
bound to produce it. But undoubtedly this
in support of his title
Where there has been
general obligation admits of many exceptions.
ong enjoyment of any right, which could have had no lawful orig in
xcept bv deed, then
in^favour of such enjoyment, all necessary deeds
nothing to negative such presumption .
there
may be presumed,
Has there, then, in this case been any such enjoyment as may render
has been founded? The
unnecessary to show the deed on which
only fact as to enjoyment stated in this case has precisely an opposite
stated, so far as relates to the property, the rent of
tendency;
the
which forms
subject of this action, namely the houses, &c., underand herefore, as to tha
let to Reed, that no rent has ever been paid
port ion of the property included in the lease of April, 1812, there ha
ertainly been no enjoyment incon sis tent with the hypothesis that that

April,

226

Oj^

l*^'

TITLES

(Part

2

ordinarily done to warrant the st atement of the su rrender of _the
old lease as a part of the consideration for granting the new one, is,
t hat the old lease itself,, t h e parchment on which it is engrossed, is del ivered -UP.
Such surrender affords strong evidence that the new
lease has been accepted by the old tenant, and such acceptance undoubtedly operates as a s urrender hv operation of law , and so both
We collect from the documents
parties get all which they require.
that this was the course pursued on occasion of making the lease of the
26th December, 1803, and the lease of the 7th of April, 1812; and we
see nothing whatever to warrant the conclusion that any thing else was
done on occasion of making the lease to Osborn and Burt.
Wl iere a surrender by deed was understood by the parties to be
ecessary,
n
as it was with reference to the term assigned to Barber and
Parry^ th ere it was regularly made , and the deed of surrender wa s
There is no reason for supposing that
e ndorsed on the lease itself !
the same course would not have been pursued as to the lease of April,
If any surrender
1812, if the parties had considered it necessary.
been
found with the
had been made, no doubt the deed would have
other muniments of title. No such deed of surrender is forth-d oming,
a nd we see nothing to justify us m presuming that any such dee d
-1 eyer_existed.
We may add, that the statement in the new lease, that
the old one had been surrendered, cannot certainly of itself afford any
evidence against the present defendants, who are altogether strangers
to the deed in which those statements occur.
It remains to consider whether, although there may have been n o
.surren der in fact^ the rirrnrrT^tances of the case will warrant us in hold i ng^^t there was a surrender by act and operation nf l^w- On the
part of the plaintiff it is contenaec^^" Tiiat there is sufificient to justify
us in coming to such a conclusion, for it is said, the fact of the lease
of the 7th of April, 1812, being found in possession of the dean, even
if it does not go the length as establishing a surrender by deed, yet
furnishes very strong evidence to show, that the new lease granted to
Osborn and Burt was made with the consent of Ord and Planta, the
And this, it is conlessees under the deed of the 7th of April, 1812.
tended, on the authority of Thomas v. Cook, 2 B. & Aid. 119. and
Walker v. Richardson, 2 AI. & W. 882, is sufficient to cause a surrender
by operation of law.
In order to ascertain how far those two cases can be relied on as
authorities, we must consider what is meant by a surrender by operation of law. This term is a pplied to cases where the owne r of a part icular estate has been a party to some act, t he validity of which he
i s by law afterwards estopped from disputing, and which woul dno t
estate had continue d to exist.
e valid if his particular
TFere the
Thus,
act
to
aw treats the doing of such
as amounting
a surrender.
he
years
f lessee for
is.,e stoppe d
accept a new lease from his less or.,
rom saying that his lessor had not power to make the new leas e ; and,
as the lessor could not do this until the prior lease had been surrenis
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dered, the law says that the a c ceptance of such new lease is of itself a
surrender of the former.
So, if there be tenant for life, remainder to
another in fee, and the remainderman comes on the land and makes
a feoffment to the tenant for life, who accepts livery thereon, the tenant for life is thereby estopped from disputing the seisin in fee of
the remainderman, and so the law says, that such acceptance of livery
amounts to a surrender of his life estate.
Again, if tenant for years
accepts from his lessor a grant of a rent issuing out of the land and
payable during the term, he is thereby estopped from disputing his lessor's right to grant the rent, and as this could not be done during his
term, therefore he is deemed in law to have surrendered his terra to the
lessor.
It is needless to multiply examples ; all the old cases will be found
to depend on the principle to which we have adverted, namely,_an
a ct done bv_or to the owner of a particular estate, the validity of which
h e^ is estopped from disputing, and which could not have been done
particular estate continued to exis t.
i
w lJ Te?:£.^s3 j( s^thgt
f_the
^]he-Ja
t lie .ac t itself araQlinta.to _ja ^u jTender.
n
In such case it will be observed
there can be no question of mtention. Th e_ surrender is not the resu lt ^-{>t^;vvfirikf^ '^
It takes place independently, and even in spite of inten ->^ / ^.^a^**'^ *^
o f intention.
Thus, in the cases which we have adverted to of a lessee taking^^^
t ion .
.
,^
a second lease from the lessor, or a tenant for life accepting a feoff'- 't^^ct^-^^t'*'^''*^
ment from the party in remainder, or a lessee accepting a rent-charge
from his lessor, it would not at all alter the case to show that there was
no intention to surrender the particular estate, or even that there was ^
'Ajl^ ^/^
^''^
I n all these rases th e
/
an express intention to keep it unsurrendered.
law,
prevail
in spite of th e
of
and would
surre nder would be the act
~
i ntention of the parties.
^rhese principles are all clearly deducible
from the cases and doctrine laid down in Rolle and collected in Viner's
Abridgment tit. "Surrender," F and G, and in Comyns' Dig. tit. "SurBut, in
render," T, and I, 2, and the authorities there referred to.
all these cases, it is to be observed, the owner of the particular estate,
by granting or accepting an estate or interest, is a party to the act
That he agrees to an act done by the
which operates as a surrender.
Brooke, in his Abridgment, tit. "Surreversioner is not sufficient.
render," pi. 48, questions the doctrine of Frowike, C. J., who says —
"If a termor agrees that the reversioner shall make a feoffment to a
stranger, this is a surrender," and says he believes it is not law ; and
the contrary was expressly decided in the case of Swift v. Heath,
Carthew, 110, where it was held, that the consent of the tenant for life
to the remainderman making a feoffment to a stranger, did not amount
to a surrender of the estate for life, and to the same effect are the
authorities in Viner's Abr. "Surrender," F, 3 and 4.
If we apply these principles to the case now before us, it will b e
seenthat they do not at all warrant the conclusion, that there was a su rand nperatian
r ender^f the l ease o f the 7th of April, 181
2^ bvact_
lawl Even adopting, as we do, the argument ot tHe plaintiff, that
oit

^
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deliv ery up_ by Ord and Planta of the lease in qu e stion affor ds
cogent evidence__of their having consente d t o the making of the ne w
leas_e^stdl there is n^estoppe l in^ such a case^ It is an act which, like
any other ordinary act in pais, is cap able of being explain ed, and its
effect must therefore depend, not on any legal consequence necessarily
attaching on and arising out of the act itself, but on the intention of
the parties. Before the Statute of Frauds, the tenant in possession of
a corporeal hereditament might surrender his term by parol, and
therefore the circumstance of his delivering up his lease to the lessor
might afford strong evidence of a surrender in fact; but certainly
could not, on the principles to be gathered from the authorities, amount
to a surrender by operation of law, which does not depend on intention at all. On _all these g roun ds, we ar^ of opinion that there was in
th is case no surrender by operation of l aw , and we should have con the
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calculated to create.
The...actg>ii Lpais which bind parties by way
_of estoppel
is

doctrine

arejajiijew,

nd are pointed out by Lord Cok e. Co. Little. SSTaT'^'Tfiey are all "acts
which anciently really were, and in contemplation of law have always
continued to be, cts fjl£tori.et y. not less formal and sol emn than the
execution of
as livery^ entry, acceptan ce of an estate, and
deed, su
h

c

party had or had not concurred in an act of this
matter which there could be no difRculty in ascer-
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sideredJ Jie case as yite clear had it not been for some modern rase s,
to whi ch we;, must n ow advert.
TEe first case, we believe, in which any intimation is given that
there could be a surrender by act and operation of law by a demise
from the reversioner to a stranger with the consent of the lessee, is
that of Slone v. Whiting, 2 Stark. 236, in which Holroyd,
intimates
his opinion that there could; but there was no decision, and he reserved the point. This was followed soon afterwards by Thomas v.
/'Cooke,
B.
Stark. 408,
Aid. 119. That was an,adia D"of debt by^
andlord against his tenant from year to year, under
parol demise .
The defence wal, that the defendant Cooke, the tenant, had put another person (Parkes) in possession, and that Thomas, the plaintiff,
had, with the assent of Cooke, the defendant, accepted Parkes as
his tenant, and hat so the tenancy of Cooke had be en dete rmined.
urt
King's Bench held, that the tenancv""was deterrn ined.
V^T hf
act and operation of law.
IS maiier oi great r^ret that
case involving
question of sO'
much importance and nicety, should have been decided by refusing
motion for a new trial.
train for
Had the case been put into
more solemn argument, we cannot but think that many considerations
might have been suggested, which would have led the Court to pause
before they came to the decision at which they arrived.
Mr. Justice
Bayley, in his judgment says, the jury were right in finding that the
original tenant assented, because, he says,
was clearly for his benefit, an observation which forcibly shows the uncertainty which the
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But in what uncertaining, and then the legal consequences followed.
tainty and peril will titles be placed, if they are liable to be affected
If th e
by such accidents as those alluded to by Mr. Justice Bayley.
d octrine of Thomas v. Cooke should be extended, it may very much
a ffect titles to long terms of years, mortgage terms, for instance. _i n
which it frequently happens that there is a consent, express or implie d,
by the legal termor to a demise from the mortgagor to a third person.
To hold that such a transaction could, under any circumstances.
a mount to a surrender by operation of law, would be attended wit h
most serious rnnsegnernpf^s,
The case of Thomas v. Cooke has been followed by others, and acted
upon to a considerable extent. Whatever doubt, therefore, we might
feel as to the propriety of the decision, that in such a case there was a
surrender by act and operation of law, we should probably not have
felt ourselves justified in overruling it. And, perhaps, the case itself,
and others of the same description, might be supported upon the
ground of the actual occupation by the landlord's new tenants, which
would have the eft'ect of eviction by the landlord himself in superseding the rent or compensation for use and occupation during the continuance of that occupation.
But we feel fully warranted in not ex - -yy^^^
case,
of
which is open to so much doub t,
that
tending the doctrine
b
especially as such a course niight e attended with very mischievou s ^-^VT»-/2L^
c onsequences to the security of titles .
If, in compliance with these cases, we hold that there is a surrender
by act and operation of law where the estates dealt with are corporeal
..^...^
and in possession, and of which demises may therefore be made by
VivC"^^
»- —
parol, or writing, a nd where there is an open and notorious shifting o f
'
t he actual poss ession, it does n ot follow that we should adopt the^same
d octrine where reversions or mcorporeal hereditaments are disposed o f,
w hich pass only by deed . With respect to tnese, we'think we oughtto
abide by the ancient rules of the common law, which have not been
broken in upon by any modern decision, for that of Walker v. Richardson, 2 M. & W. 882, which has been much relied on in argument, is
not to be considered as any authority in this respect, inasmuch as the
distinction that the right to tolls lay in grant was never urged, and
probably could not have been with success, as the leases, perhaps,
Moreover, according to the repassed the interest in the soil itself.
port of that case, it would seem that the new lessees had, before they
accepted their lease, become entitled to the old lease by an actual assignIf this were so, then there could, of course,
ment from the old lessee.
be no doubt but that the old lease was destroyed by the grant and acIt is, however, right to say, that we believe
ceptance of the new one.
this statement to have crept into tlie report inadvertently, and that
there was not, in fact, any such assignment. The result of our anxious
consideration of this case is, that the verdict on the issues on the first
plea and on the rejoinder to the replication to the fifth plea, must be

-
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entered for the defendants, and as those pleas go to the whole cause
the ju dgment must be for them.
^t-cd^Cj •
stated,
it
dia not appear that there
In the case, as it was originally
had been any change of dean since the original demise in 1803. We
desired to have the case amended on this point, in order that the fact
Eor
might appear, if the case should be turned into a special verdict.
durin g the incumbency of the dean, who made the lease for ninetv-nin e
years, that lease would be good independently of the private _act, and as
t he immediate reversio n ^ o n which the defendant's lease, depended^ was
ass igneB to the dean by Barber and Parry previously to the demise o f
t he 29th of January.
1814. th at reversion un doubtedly passed to O sclaiming under
hnni^gnd j^irj^ fii-irl would enablethemTortKeplaintiff
them, to sue for the rent so long as tlie estate of the same dean continued, whether the lease for ninety-nine years was or was not warranted by the act ; and '^n _Hip pbintifF might possibly have been entitl ed
It appears by the case as now
t o judgment non obstante veredicto.
amended, that the Bishop of Lincoln who was the dean granting the
leases of ninety-nine years, ce ased to be dean , and was succ ££ded by
Dr. Van Mildert in October, 1820, before any part of the rent sought
to be recovered in this action had accrued due, and therefore no question on this head arises.
N either will the second private act stated in the case a M_tl2e _plain.tiff. It appears that, in 1820, the difficulties in which the parties had
involved themselves by neglecting to get a proper surrender of the
lease of the 7th of April, 1812, was brought under the consideration
of the Court of Chancery, in a suit there pending relative to the affairs of the Bowes family. Master Cox, by his report of the 15th of
February, 1 1820, st ated, that he was ofo £inion that both t he leases of
ni nety-nine years were voTcI, the hrst because it was m a de when t he
o riginal term of forty years wardutstanding in Barber and Parry , and
the latter b ecause at the time of its creation the lease of the 7th of
April, 1^12, was still outstanding, t hus showing clearly his opinion that
nothing had happened to cause a surrender of that lease by operation
of law ; and he re commended that an act of Parliament shou ld be obt ained to remedy the defect . His report was afterwards confirmed, and
the second act stated in the case was accordingly obtained.
The act
received the Royal assent on the 15th of July, 1820, and i^ wa_s..the'reb v
e nacted, that the lease of the 29th of January, 1814, should be vali d
to all intents and purposes ; and further, that immediately after the
passmg of the act, the leases of the 26 th of December, 180 3, the 7th of
A pril. 1812. a nd the 31st of August, 1812 , s hould be void to all intents
and purposes. Th e' effect of this was to degtfoy altoget her t he reve rsi on in respect of which the rent now sought to be recovered was payable,^ and it may therefore well be doubted whether, even if all the issues had been found for the plaintiff, he could have had judgment.
It
is, however, sufficient for us to say that the act certainly does not entitle the plaintiff, to any thing which he would not have been entitled to
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no such act had passed.
More especially when it is considered, that,
by the saving clause, the defendants are excepted out of the operation
of the act. The re sult_ tl"'^'"pf'^TC ^'^i ^J2^ the verdict on the 1st and 5 th
is sues must be entered for the defendan t._a n_d on the other issues for
the plaintiff , and the judgment will be for the defendant.
Judgm ent for the de fendant.^ ^

//-^XII.

Assignment

BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES.
An assignment

t he right one has in any estate

life or years.
Book 2, star

or making over to another, of
but it is usually applied to an estate for

is p roperly a transfer,
;

p. 326.

XIII.

Defeasance

9r^

BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES.

A defeasance is a collater aLjkcd. made at the same time with a feo ffment or other conveyance, contammg certa i n conditions, upon the pe rfo rrnance of which the estate then created may be defeated or totally
u ndone . -^
Book 2, star p. 327.
33 See

5

Irish Jurist,

117.

the d efeiidnnt hciTip thp lessee in possession of the premises ,
t he pliiiutiff. his huidlord . wUh hi.^; consent, let them to a new tenant., and
piit him in nos.session . and Tliscliarged the defendant from his liability as
The judire who tried the case held that these facts constituted a
tenant.
s urrender by oijeration of law , and therefore a defence against the plaintiff's
clafmfor rent. The correctness of that holding has been brought into question before us in consequence of tlie opinion expressed by the Court of Exchequer in Lyon v. Reed, 13 M. & W. 2.S5. .305-.310 (1844); but we are of opin*
*
*
Where there is an agreement to surrender a
ion that it is correct.
particular estate, and the possession is changed accordingly, it is more probable that the legislature intended to give effect to an agreement so proved as
a surrender by operation of law than to allow eitlier party to defeat the
agreement by alleging the absence of written evidence. Although we do not
upon the line of ca^-es. from Thomas v. iCn dk.
n gspnt
to flif^ observations
given in Lyon y. Keed. IJL -M.
d ^wnward^ i i. in the" learned and able iudLrment
m the decision la
& \V. 283 (lM^'4>,"w e' wish to express our entire concuri'enil'e
"
t l^at ca.st^r
Lord "Denman, C. J., in Mckells v. Atherstoue, 10 Q. B. !J44
See. also, Wallis v. Hands, [1893] 2 Ch, 75; Feun^r v. Blake, [1900]
(1847).
L. R. 1 Q. B. 42G.
As to surrenders by operation of law against the intent of the parties, see,
further, Van Reussalaer's Heirs v. Tenniman. 6 Wend. 569 (1831); Smith v.
Kerr. lOS N. Y. 31, 15 X. E. 70 (1887); Flagg v. Uow, 99 Mass. 18 (186S);
Thomas v. Zumbalen, 43 Mo. 471 (1869) ; Johnson v. Northern Trust Co., 265
U'N'eil v. Pearse, 87 N. J. Law, 382, 94 Atl. 312
111. 263, 106 N. E. 814 (1914);

"In tliis

(1915).

case,
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DEVIS15

LITTLETON'S TENURES.
some boroughs, by the custom, a man may devise by h is
his lands and Jenements^ which he hath in fee simple withj ji
t he same bo roug h at the time of his death ; and by force of such devise,
he to whom such devise is made, after the death of the devisor, may
e nter into the tenements so to him devised, to^ have arid to hold t o
him, after the form and effect of the devise^, without any livery Q f
seisin thereof to be made to him. &c.
Section 167.^*
«

Also, in

t estament

SECTION 2.— UNDER STATUTE OF USES

L

UsiiS BEFORE THE

Statute of Uses

Shortly after the Norman conquest a practice began to grow up of
ma king feoffments of lands to trusted friends to be held on behalf o f
th ef c offer or a third person or to be disposed of as directed at the tini e
of the conveyance or thereafter .^ ^ Under such conveyances t he leg al
o wnership was of course in the feoffee , and in his hands was subject
to all the burdens and iiiciden^of the feudal land law, to avoid many
of which it bec ame common to make the conveyances to two or mox£-as
j oint tenant s. '^^ This method of disposition
in its early use was resorted to i n order that corporations, societies and individuals that we re
i ncapable under the law of owning land might have the benefit there qV^'' Later it was availed of to secure the land to certain persons after
the death of the f coffer or to such persons as he should nominate by his
last will, and also as a means of avoiding forfeiture by reason of t reason, etc.^^
84 By the Statute of Wills (32 Hen. VIII, c. 1), power NYfls given to every
tenant in fee simple to dispose o f all liis lands hold by sooai^o temuv, aii(i_aL
twb-thiras or b£s lanas neld Dy~l^n^ht-sei:xi£a>
The Statute of 12 Car. II, c.
'2i, wnicn converted tlie tenure by kuiglit-service
into socage tenure, had the
effect of making all lands of fre ehold tenure disp osable by will. FurtlTer, on
the history of the law 'or wnis, seelJostigan's "Cases" on Wills, pp. 3-9.
There were other modes of conveyance by special custom, as in the case of
copy hold lands.
On this the student may well consult 2 Blackstone's Commentaries, c. 22.
,
35 2 P. & M. Hist. Eng. Law (2d Ed.) 231.
See the same, pp. 228-232, for an
historical account of the origin and growth of "uses." See, also. Holmes in 1
L. Q. R. 1G2 et seq.
so Williams, R. P. (22d Ed.) 170, 171; Leake, Prop, in Land, 80.
37 2 P. & M. Hist. Eng. Law (2d Ed.) 231.
38 Sanders, Uses and Trusts, 10, 17.
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The p^s on to whom the land_was conveye d

came to be ca lled the
the
uses
."
on
whose
behalf
the
land was held the
person
tp
"feoffee^/
,"
"cestui ^iueuse and the beneficial interest which the "cestui" had was
known as the "use." T his ''use" was not in any sense ownership . On
t he contrary it dist in ctlv was not ownershi p.^° The feoffee to uses was
supposed to deal with the property as directed under the confidence
in which the conveyance to him had been made and to allow the cestu i
que use to have the ben efi cial occupation of the land and to take the
p rofits thereof . The cestui que use in possession with the consent of
the holder of the legal estate, however, was in the position, so far as the
common law courts were concerned, of a tenant at will .^" and a cestui
que use out of possession in entering upon the land without consent
could be proceeded against in those courts as a trespasser.
For many years after the practice of conveying land to uses had become common there was no really effective way of compelling the feoffee to uses to observe the terms of the confidence, nor remedy against
one who had proved unfaithful,*^
Some time during the reign of Edward III, however, it seems that the Chancellor, the head of the rapidly
broadening Court of Chancery, began to entertain proceedings agains. t
s uch feoft'ees to compel their observance of the trust and the directions
*'^
During the time of Henry
q f^tlie person on whose behalf they held.
VI it was held that the h eir of the feoffee to uses was subject in the
chancery to the same duties as the feoffee himself,*^ and only a little
later the remedy was extended as against the t ransferee of the feoft'e e
to uses who took as a volunteer or with notice.** Now that a really
eft'ective means of enforcing the terms of the trust was at hand, the
c u stom of conveying lands to uses became even more popular, s o popular in fact that Blackstone says that during the civil commotions be tween the, houses of Lancaster and York "uses grew almost unive r-

After the jurisdiction of the Chancellor to enforce uses became well
established and settled, g radually the use came to be considered th e
s ubject of ownership apart from the ownership of the land .
Gour_t_s
oi law recognized still only the legal estates; to the law courts there
A_.use_ is a trust or confidence reposed in some other, which is not issuing
f t of the hind, but as a thuig coUater al. annexed in privit y to the estate ot

4

Litt.

,

b.y

the laud, and to the person touching the land, scilicet, t hat cestui que use shal l
take the profit, and that the terre-tenant shall make an estate according to
his direction.
So as cestui que use has neither jus in re nor jus ad rem, %^
O Qly a confidence and trust, for which he had no remedy
the common law
Co.
but for hreach of trust his remedy was only by suDpoena in chancery."
272b.

Leake, Prop, in Land, 79.

a

- -Ai Jenks, A Short History of English Law, p. 97. In Williams, R. P. (22a
remedy for breach of faith in the ecclesiasEd.) 171, it is said that there was
162 et seq.

45

2

4* r>urgess

V.

Wheate,

Bl. Comm.

*329.

1

7,

1

tical courts. See Holmes in
L. Q. R.
42 Keilw. 42, pi.
per Vavasour, J.
*3 Id.

Eden, 177, 218 (1759), per Mansfield, C.

J.
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"use."
lie "use" in equity tlius bec ame
could be no such interest as
n equ ita ble estate and equitable ownership therein was established .
The "use" could be transferred, inherited, and devised, and the
w as
equitable ownership could be divided up into equitable estates.
ossible to have in the "use" estates in fee simple , fee taiL etc., in posway of remainder or reversion
The legal estates were
session, or
restricted in their creation and conveyance by the demands of the law
regarding the seisin,*'* but th ese equitable estates were not subi£ £L.to
uch restrictions, there being no seisin^m the case of
"use
Accor dprovided
an
estate
of
freehold
could
be
for
to
arise in
equitable
ngly
springing
u
ch
uses
known
were
uses
.
And
as.
was possible
futuro..
use to
to hmit
man and his heirs that should upon the happening of
an event specified shift over to another person and his heirs.
Such
uses were known as hifting uses,.
Also uses co uld be devised by wi
for no livery of seisin was required in the transfer of
use.
n case of the death of the cestui que use intestate, the use was held
to descend to his heirs according to the course of the common law . The
equity courts allowed great latitude in the creation of equitable estates
by purchase, but they djd not allow the common law of descent to >e
vari ed_even in the case of
use. *^
a

h

^he use ccnie to be consirlered as
sort of metaphysical entity in whic
miaht he estates very similnr to those which cnnhl ht^ creati-il in liind .
states in possession reiiiaitide r. reversion,
states di^sceiidiljle in this way or
that." Maitland, EquTty, 33.

_

e

,

e
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Id.
"A feoffment might

be made with an express appropriation of the seisin
series of estates in the form of particnlar estiite and remainders, and the
livery to the inunediate tenant was then effectual to transfer tlie seisin to or
on behalf of all the tenants in remainder, according to the estates limited.
Hu
uture estates could only be limited in the form of remainders, and any Umiallons operating to shift the seisin otherwise than as remainders expecta nt
ipon the determination
of the preceding estate weie void at common law
Thus, upon a feoffment, with livery of seisin, to
for life or in tail, and npou
the determination of his estate to B., the future limitation takes effect as a
feoff'ment to
i-emainder immediately expectant upon A.'s estate. But upon
or to A. in fee, and upon
A. in fee or for life, and after one year to B. in fee
his marriage to B. in fee; or to A. in fee or for life, and upon B. paying A. a
sum of money to \^. in fee. — jie limitations shifting the seisin from A. to B.
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tl

;

a

.

\.

T he

exigencies. of tenure required that the seisin or immediate freehold should

^

L

a

tenant investejj
n£.ver be in abeyance, but that there should at all times be
^th the seisin ready, on the one hand, to meet the claims of the lord for the
duties and services Of the tenure, and, on the other hand, to meet adverse

a

\

4
8

a

a

a

if

11

a

t

it

for the successors in the title. This
claims to the seisin, and to preserve
rule had important effects upon the creation of freeliold estates; for it followed as an immediate consequence of the rule, as also from the nature of the esgrant of the freehold cou ld
sential act of conveyance by livery of seisin, hat
future time, leaving the"l(Jl!»IU'y acant duri_i ig
n ot be made to comm ence at
feoffment were made to
As I'Ulisd'LiuehOtJ bt the same rule
tjLte interval.
A. for life and after his death and one day after to B. for life or in fee. the
tenant
limitation to B. was void, bec-ause it would leave the freehold without
or in abe\Lance for
day after the death of A." Leake, Prop, in Laud, 33.
Sugden's Gilbert on Uses, 26 et seq.
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"
and it could
use there \^as no such thing as dower or curtesy.^
^^
Nor cottlj a use be tort'elted for felony
not be reached by creditors.

of tenure were not applicab le
Bacon wrote : "A man, that
that
to the use. It is not to be wondered
had cause to sue for land, knew not against whom to bring his action
or who was the owner -oi it. Th e wife was defra uded of her thirds ;
th e husband of his curtesy : the lord of his wardship, relief, hcriot. an d
poor tenant of hi s
ej^cheat ; the creditor of his extent for debt: and the
l ease." ^^ "To remedy these inconveniences abundance of statutes were
provided, which made the lands liable to be extended by the creditors

or

treason.^''

The

co mmon law incidents

of the cestui que use (Stat. 50 Edw. Ill, c. 6; 2 Ric. II, sess. 2,
Hen. Vli, c. 15); made him liable to actions for waste (Stat.

VI,

c. 3 ; 19
11

Hen.

established his conveyances and leases made without the conhis feoffees (Stat. 1 Ric. Ill, c. 1) ; and gave the wardship
of
currence
heir,
with certain other feudal perquisites (Stat. 4 Hen. VII, c.
of his
17; 19 Hen. VII, c. 15)."^*
Th ese uses were created upon a cpmmon law conveyance, e. g.. a
feoffrcenj^nrl nkn jnflpppnrlpnfly nf such a conveyance. A feoffment
tFA. and his heirs to the use of B. and his heirs of course created a use_
i n fee simple in B . So commonly were conveyances made to hold to
the use of the feoffer that it was presumed that the use was to remain
'"'
in him."''^ I n such cases the use was said to result, and was known as a
r esulting use . This presumption co uld be rebutted bv an express lim i^"
also by showing that considerta tion otTTTe use to designated parties ;
ation was given for the conveyance or that a consideration was expressed.^^ Relationship between feoft'er and feoffee was also sufficient
And the use could result A^^c-k
to rebut the presumption of a resulting use.
in part, as in a feoffment to A. and his heirs to the use of A. for life.
There the use is in A. for life, and the balance of the use in fee has
resuhed to feoff'er.^*
Co nsideration and recitals of consideration ac^
very
important in conveyancing.
ordingly
c
became
5

c. 5)

Id.
Id.

;

pp. 48, 49.
pp. 75, 7G.

62

Id.

pp. 77, 79.

of the Law, 153.
Coiiim. *332.
55 Beckwith's Case, 2 Co. 5Sa (15F9) ; Armstrong v. Wolsey, 2 Wils. 19 (1755).
See Shoitiidiie v. Lauiplusli, 2 Salk. 67S, 2 Ld, Rayui. 70S, 7 Mod. 71 (1702).
5 Stephen's Case, 1 Leon. 138 (15SS) ; Same's Case, 2 Roll. Abr. 791.
6 7 Porter's Case, 1 Co. 24a (1592).
See, generally, Sanders, Uses and Trusts,
60, til.
"If the feoffment or conveyance of t*he legal possession be made for a
/ ^
particular estate only as a gift in tail, or a lease for life or for years, th e ry\^i/i4/9^ ^^
t enure alone thereby created^ with its attendant services and obligations. sur >- ^-'
p lied a consideration sutficient to prevent tne use from resu lting, a nd to carr y
i t to the donee or lessee : and this doctrine applies at the present cTay . But au
express use declared in favor of another would rebut the use implied from
the tenure in such cases." Leake, Prop, in Land, 84.
58 Co. Litt. 271b;
Sanders, Uses and Trusts, 101. And a consideration gi ve n or recite d will be deemed to be on account of the use expressly provided fo r.
A te6Ttment in fee to the use of the feoffo r
Sanders, CSSs and Ti-ustsri02!
f or life or years w ill leave the iise in fee in tht^ f^of[ee. for to allow the un disposed of use to result would accomplish by merger a destruction of the use
51

53 L'se

54 2 l?!.

dAK^''^

(^
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Uses arose independently of a common-law conveyance by an agr eement of sale of the land supported by a valuable consideratio n.^^ Also
by a declaration o r agreement in a writing under seal by the owner who
was seised that he would thereafter "stand seised" for the benefit of
The former came to be known as a "b argain an d
some near relative.®"
"covenant
to stand seisgd."
latter
as
a
the
sale,"

II. The Statute: of

Ushs

Where by the common laws of this realm, l ands, tenements an d
hereditaments be not devisable by testament, nor ought to be transfer red frorn one to another, but by solem n livery and seisin, matter of record, writing sufficient made bona fide, without covin or fraud ; yet
nevertheless divers and sundry imaginations, subtle inventions and
practices have been used, w hereby the hereditaments of this realm have
b een conveyed from n np t(7 ^^nntlipr by fra ,udu1ept fe offments, fines, re ntlipr a'^qnr^nrp g craftilv made to secret uses, intents and
anH
covenes,
'
—~"
■
■'
— -^. -■■■
_
■
7
trusts ; and al so by wills and testame nts, sometime made by nude parolx
and words, sometime b y signs and tokens , and som etime by w riting,
and for the most part made by such persons as be visited with sickness,
in their extreme agonies and pains, or at such time as they have scantly
had any good memory or remembrance ; at which times they being provoked by greedy and covetous persons lying in wait about them, do
many times dispose indiscreetly and unadvisedly their lands and inheritances ; by reason whereof, and by occasion of which fraudulent
feoffments, fines, recoveries, and other like assurances to uses, confidences and trusts, divers and many heirs have been unjustly at sundry
times disinherited, the lords have lost their wards, marriages, reliefs,
harriots, escheats, aids pur fair fils chivalier & pur file marier, jan d
s cantly anv person can be certainly assured of any lands by th,e rn purc hased, nor know surely against whom they shall use their action s^r
e xecutions for tlidjij ights. titles and duties ; also men married have
lost their tenancies by the curtesy, women their dowers, manifest perjuries by trial of such secret wills and uses have been committed; the
for life or years in the larger use in fee, which would manifestly be contrary
But it would be* otherwise in case the feoffor should provide
to the intention.
for the use to himself and the heirs of his body, for there a merger woxild be
Dyer, 111b, in margin.
impossible.
59 1 Co. Rep. 176a (1582-1584);
Barker v. Keete, 1 Freem. 249, 2 Vent. 35,
1 Mod. 262, 2 Mod. 249 (1677), where a rent of a peppercorn was deemed suffl■cient to raise a use upon a bargain and sale.
60 Sharington
See Ricker v. Brown, 183 Mass.
v. Strotton, Plowd. 298 (1565).
"But a covenant was not necessary; a declaration
424, 67 N. E. 353 (1903).
of intention made by deed poll would serve equally well (Sljep. I, 508) ; a mere
parol promise was not sufficient (Collard v. Collard, Popl. 47, Serj. Moore's Rep.
Challis
687, 2 Anders. 64 [1593] ; Page v. Moulton, Dyer, 296a, pi. 22 [1570])."
U. P. (3d Ed.) 419, 420.

Ch.

1)

MODE OF CONVEYANCE

237

King's Highness hath lost tlie profits and advantages of the lands of
persons attainted, and of the lands craftily put in feoffments to the uses
of aliens born, and also the profits of waste for a year and a day of
lands of felons attainted, and the lords their escheats thereof ; a nd many
ot her inconveniences have happened and daily do in cre ase among the
K ing s subj ects , to their great trouble and inquietness , and to the utter
subversion of the ancient common laws of this realm ; for the extirping
and extinguishment of all such subtle practiced feoffments, fines, recoveries, abuses and errors heretofore used and accustomed in this
realm, to the subversion of the good and ancient laws of the same, and
to the intent that the King's Highness, or any other his subjects of this
realm, shall not in any wise hereafter by any means or inventions be
deceived, damaged or hurt, by reason of such trusts, uses or confidences: it may please the King's most royal majesty, That it may be
enacted by his Highness, by the assent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by
the authority of the same, in manner and form following; that is to
say. T hat where any person or persons stand or be seised, or at any
ti me hereafter shall happen to be seised, of and in any honours, castle s,
rnanors. lands, tenements, rents, services, reversions, remainders .o r
other hereditame nts^o t he use, confidence or trust of any other per s on or persons. oF ot any body politick, b}^ reason of any bargain, sale ,
fe offment, fine, recovery, covenant, contract, agreement, will or othe r-

J) V

any manner means whatsoever it be; that in every such. case,
all and every such person and persons, and bodies politick, t hat have o r
h ereafter shall have any such use, confidence or trust, in fee simple ,
f e_e tajl, for term of life or for years, or otherwise, or any use. confi <dence-or trust, in remainder or reverter, shall from henceforth staad
and be seised, deemed and adjudged in lawful seisin. esta ^T ^^^^ P""s ession of and in the same honours, castles, manors, lands, tenement srents, services, reversions, remainders, and hereditaments, with their
appurtenances, to all i ntents, constructions and purposes in the law, o f
a nd jn .such like estates a s^tliey had or shall have in use, trust or confid ence of or in the same; "and tnat the estate, title, right and possession
that was m such person or persons that were, or hereafter shall be
seised of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, to the use, confidence
or trust of any such person or persons, or of any body politick, be from
henceforth clearly deemed and adju dged to be in him or them tha t
have, or hereafter shall
trust, after suc h
have^ such use^ confidence or
q uality, manner, fo rm and rondilinn .qg tlipy HaH hpfnrp
in or tn the
use, confidence or trust that was in them.
n. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, Tliat where
divers and many persons, be or hereafter shall happen to be, jointly
seised of and in any lands, tenements, rents, reversions, remainders or
other hereditaments, to the use, confidence or trust of any of them
that be so jointly seised, that in every such case that those person or
persons which have or hereafter shall have any such use, confidence
wise^

S^e^ttte

of Us<:s.-. —

<■

/T"
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t
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:

li.

or trjst in any such lands, tenements, rents, reversions, remainders or
hereditaments, shall from henceforth have, and be deemed and adjudged to have only to him or them that have, or hereafter sliall have
any such use, confidence or trust, such estate, possession and seisin, of
and in the same lands, tenements, rents, reversions, remainders and
other hereditaments, in like nature, manner, form, condition and course
as he or they had before in the use, confidence or trust of the same
lands, tenements or hereditaments ; saving- and reserving- to all and
s mgular persons and bodies politick, the ir heirs and successors, other
than those person or persons which be seised, or hereafter shall be
seised, of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, to any use, confidence or trust, all such right, title, entry, interest, possession, rents a nd
action, as thev or any of them had, or mi.ght have had before the making_£tiJllis_acjt.
III. And also saving to all and singular those persons, and to their
heirs, which be, or hereafter shall be s eised to any use , al j^such for mer
r ij^ht, title, entry, interest^_ possession. rents, customs, services an d acti on. as thev or anv nf t]'\p\]^ miV1-||- \^^ye. had tn his or their own proper
u se, in or to any manors, lands, tenements, rents or hereditamgn js.
whereof thev be . .or hereafter shall be seised to any other us e, as if this
present act had never been had nor made ; any thing contained in this
act to the contrary notwithstanding.
IV. And where also divers persons-stand and be seised of and in any
lands, tenements or hereditaments, in fee-simple or otherwise, to the
use and intent that some other person or persons shall have and perceive yearly to them, and to his or their heirs, one annual rent of x.
or more or less, out of the same lands and tenements, and some other
person one other annual rent, to him and his assigns for term of life or
years, or for some other special time, according to such intent and use
as hath been heretofore declared, limited and made thereof
V. Be therefore enacted by the authority aforesaid. That in ever
su ch case h£,aaJIL
persons, heirhe irs and assigns, that have such us
nd interest, to have an perceive any such annual rents out of an
ands, tenements or hereditaments, that they and every of them, the
girs and assigns, be adjudged and deemed to be in possession nd
eisin of he samp rpnt. nf anH I'n qhpIi HV^ PQfaf^ oc th^y In^^ j^^ the
title, interest or use of the said rent or profit, and as
sufficient grant,
or other lawful conveyance had been made and executed to them,
such as were or shall be seised to the use or intent of any such rent to
be had, made or paid, according to the very trust and intent thereof,
and that all and every such person and persons as have, or hereafter
shall have, any title, use and interest in or to any such rent or profit,
shall lawfully distrain for non-payment of the said rent, and in their
own names make avowries, or by their bailiffs or servants make conis-.
ances and justifications, and have all other suits, entries and remedies
for such rents, as
the same rents had been actually and really granted
CO them, with sufficient clauses of distress, re-entry,
or otherwise, ac-
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cording to such conditions, pains, or other things hmited and appointed,
upon the trust and intent for payment or surety of such rent.
St. 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10.«^

III.

Uses

After Statute of

i n Connection

{A) Uses Raised

GREEN

V.

with

a

useof

T.

nce

Owen 8G.)

The defe ndant pleaded that a feoffment was ma de
S. the lessor of the defendant , who by force thereof,

an ejectment

to the

Common-Law Conveya

WISEMAN.

(Court of Common Pleas, 1600.

In

Uses

.

and of tETstatute. was seised, and m ade a lease to the defendan t ; and
that one Green entered and made a lease to the [>laintiff, and did not
And all the question was, whethe r
say that he entered upon J. S.
when a feoffment is made to the use of another, if he have such a seisi
b efore his entrv. whereof he may be disseised .
Glanvile. He hath no freehold, neither in deed nor in law before
entry.

WalmselEy. This is contrary to all the books: for a possession
in law is so translated from the feoffee to cestui que use, that the wife
of the feoffee shall not be endowed.
Owen. He ought to have alleged a disseisin.
Anderson. As he might have possession by force of a devise at
common law, so he shall have possession of the land here by force
of the statute, and it is in cestui que use, before agreement or entry,
but if he disagree, then it shall be out of him presently but not before
And after viz. Hillar. 42 Eliz.
he disagree.
Williams moved the case again, and W almselEy said then, that h e
m ight be disseised before his entry or agreement, and the pleadi ng
s hall be that he did enter, and did disseise him, but he shall not hav e
a trespass without actual entrv,_ for^jhatisgroun ded o n a pos session :
Glanvill agreed to this, and advisedWTiliams to adventure the case
thereupon. *^^
ci As^ to how far the Statute of TTses is a part of the law of "the America ' n
states.'-s ee 1 Perry oh Trusts (titb Ed.) § 2'J!)n.
62 See Heelis v. Blain, IS C. B. (N. S.) 90 (1864) ; Hadfield's Case, L. R. 8 C.
P. 306 (1872) : Witham v. Brooner, 63 111. 344 (lS72j ; Hutchius v. Heywood, 50
N. H. 491 (1871).
In Egerton's Case, Cro. Jac. 525 (1619), it was held that a fine levied "to
Lucas
the use of the wife of J. S." save to the wife an estate for life only.
V. Brandreth,
28 Beav. 274 (ISCO) ; McElroy v. Same, 113 Mass. 509 (1S73) ;
Nelson v. Davis, 35 Ind. 474 (1871), ace

^

^

^ fZ
.

.^

^T*^'^*
^ i^,

'^l^ft^^fy
^

-^
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LAMPLUGH.
1702,

2 Salk. 678.) «'

H. b rought covenant as assignee of a reversj gn, and shewed, that
tlie lessor, in consideration of 5/. b argained and sold to him for a
year, and a fterwards released to him and his heirs, y irtute quarundam
indentur, bargainse venditionis & relaxationis necnon vigore statuti de
usibus, &c. he was seised in fe e- And it was objected, that the use
must be intended to be to the releasor and his heirs, because no consideration of the release nor express use appeared by the pleading;
so that without considering the operation of tlie conveyance, tlie question was upon the pleading. Whether the use shall be intended to th e
releasor, unless it be averred to be to the releasee ? Et per Holt, C.
J., to which the rest agreed.
This way of pleading was certainly good before the statute 27 H,
8, so is Plowd. 478; and many precedents in Co. Ent. of feoffments
averred in the same manner ; for the use was a matter that was extrinsical to the deed, and depended upon collateral agreements at
common law, and then the use might, as since the statute of frauds
by writing, be averred by parol, and therefore in pleading the conv eya nce was taken to the use of him to whom the convevance was made ,
till the contrary appeared : if it were otlierwise. it ought to come on
the other side; and 27 H. 8 has not altered tlie course of pleading,
which is rather confirmed by the statute; b ecause, if now the use be
c onstrued to be to Jhe releasor or fe o ffor, the conveyance will be to.n o
rnanner of purpose , it being still the old estate to which the old warranty and other qualities remain annexed ; whereas before the statute
there might be some end in making the feoffment, viz. to put the freehold out of him and prevent wardship ; and Co. Lit. goes no farther,
than where there is a feoffment to particular uses and estates, the
r esidue of the use shall be to the feoffor, which is reasonab lej._for
the raising those particular estates appears a sufficient reasonfor tlie
And PowEL, J. doubted, whether there could be a rec^nvpyanrp
sulting use on a lease and release, unless, where particular uses are
limited ; for this way of conveyance is grounded on the ancient way
of releasing at common law, wherein there was a merger of estate,
which is a good consideration, as where the lessor confirms to the lessee
and his heirs. In error of a judgment of C. B. which was affirmed.
63

The case is also reported in

2

Ld. Raym.

79S, and

in

7 Mod. 71.

-^ft^At
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^ARMSTRONG v. WOLSEY.

(Court of Common Bench,

1756.

2

Wils.

19.)

tried at Norwich before Parker, Ch. Baron, who reserved this short case for the opinion of the Court. A. B. beingL in
possession of the lands in question, le vied a fine sur co^usans de droit
corne_ceo, &c., with pro damations to the conusee and his he irs, in tlie
6th year of the present King, with out any consideration expr essed, and
widiou t declaring any u se thereof : nor was it proved that the conusee

E jectment,

x

a

a

it

a

it

;

.

c

a

I

a

f

o

is,

^

if

2,

(1

;

a

is

it,

a

it

will operate as a ba r.
n on-claim
And in the case of
recovery suffered, the same shall enure to
no
commonly the vouchee,)
the use of him who suffers
(who
him
his
heirs
and
to
gennew
estate
but
he
be
declared
gains
uses
eral; and although before the recovery he was seised ex parte materna, yet afterwards the estate will descend to his heirs ex parte
Wils.
paterna, as was determined in Martin v. Strachan, ante.
2

Stra. 1179.
Sed vide tliat case,
Bar, the ancient use was in the conusor at the tim
seems to have been long settled before this
of levying the fin e; and
consideration, or uses thereof declare^
any
case,
hat
fine without
was at the time of
vyhall enure to the ancient use in whomsoever
*^^^ 'y^\^'^
here
in
that
the fine
he
COnusor
at
TlP,
t^I
vv;;^^
^r\(\
ment must be for tlie plaintiff."*
66.)

it

;

t

it

s

VAN DER VOLGEN

v.

YATES.

(Court of Appeals of New York, 1853.

9

J

T^
^y

le

,

a

t

it

I

e

n the case at

N. Y. 219.)

a

d

t

a

lot
On the 27th of April, 1790, Nicholas Van der Volgen owned
in Schenectady, the land out of which this controversy arose. On hat
ay, by indenture of release reciting that the releasees were in posse s"
bargain and sale to them thereof
sio n of the premises by virtue of
made for one whole year, by indenture bearing date the day next be-

;

;

2

64 See Grev v. Grev,
Jackson v. Cleveland, 15 Mich.
Swans. 594, 598 (1677)
Blodgett v. Hildreth, 103 IMass. 484 (1870).
94, 90 Am. Dec. 266 (1866)

Aig.Pkop.—

16

~^

was ever in possession.
^—
^
whether the fine shall enure to the m
So that the single question
1— ^
And after two arguments, the Court
the conusor or the conusee,?
was unanimous, and gave judgment for the plaintiff, who claimed as
heir of the conusor.
fine come ceo. &c.. where n o uses are deCuria — n the case of
lared, whether the conusor he in possession^ or the fine be of
%in
of
be
shall
uses,
n
d
conusor
the
the
old
shall
enure
to
version
n
d
f
ter
five
years
and although
passes nothing, yet
the ol3 use
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fore the day of the date of these presents, and by fo rce of the st atute
^for transferring uses into possession," and i n consideration of £10 0.
he released the premises to Robert Alexand er
1 paid by the releasees,
^Omju^^^^ji^
and
\
seven other persons named, of whom Joseph C. Yates, the origin al
<^-^U^
[ defendant in this action, was one , "and to their h eirs and assigns^F orever ." The deed then declared that the conveyance was "upgntrusi,
"Z^'J^^^
>.nevertheless, t o the on ly proper use, benefit and behoof of Cornelm s
( Van Dyck," and twelv^ other persons named^ "members of St. Geo rge's
-,^
^
\M^^'
) Lodge, m the town of Schenectady, and all others who at present a re
or hereafter may beco me members of the same, their survivorsan d
* J
I successors forever, and to and for no other use, intent and purpos e
\ whatsoever ." Then follows a covenant for further assurance to the
releasees, their heirs and assigns, "to and for the uses and purposes
hereinbefore specified and more particularly mentioned;"
and a covenant for the qu iet and peaceable possession of the releasees, their heirs
and assigns, "for the uses and purposes aforesaid." No conveyance of
the premises, subsequent to this, was ever mad e.
In 1797 Nicholas Van der Volgen died, leaving a will in which, not
having specifically disposed of the reversion of the premises in question, he m ade Lawrence and Petrus Van der Volgen his residua ry
devisees. In 1819 Petrus died, having devised all his estate by willj o
Myndert Van der Volgen, Lawrence and Myndert bei ng thus the le gal
representaTtives
of Nicholas m a ny devisaPie estate in the premises
which he may have had at the time of his death.
I^ 1S33 the a ct to incorporate th e Utica and Schenectady Railroad
d/^y,
f/fu
was passed.
Under its authority the company instituted
Company
yUA^*'*^^^
pr oceedings to appropriate the lot in question to the use of the roa d.
•^
To these proceedings Lawrence and Myndert Van der Volgen, Joseph
i/t/v*^'
C. Yates, now the sole survivor of the releasees in the before mentioned conveyance, and certain persons claiming to be members of St.
George's Lodge were made parties, all of the cestuis que use named
in that instrument being dead.
The commissioners awarded six cen ts
^^
t
o
Van
the
two
der
and
Volgens,
$2755 to Yates "as trustee under he
Jly*^^^ I
aA^ release ;" and the two former filed their bill in chancery against the
latter to compel the payment of the money to them as the representaSfl^/^^^^
tives of the releasor, and entitled to the land or its proceeds.
The
aA '
vice-chancellor (Gridley) dismissed the bill, and this decree was affirmed by the chancellor (Walworth).
3 Barb. Ch. 242.
The complainants
appealed to this court.
All the original parties to the. action had died since the commence ment of the suit, and their personal representatives were the presen t
parties.

(J

^

J

I

J

RuGGLES, Ch. J. In determining this case it will be assumed that
the deed executed by Nicholas Van der Volgen to Robert Alexander
and seven others for the use of Cornelius Van Dyck and twelve others,
was a valid conveyance by lease and releas-C . operating by fpnce of the
statute ofTuses. to vest in_\la.n Dyck and other'? ^y|in nrp t^pppjally nam-
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as_cestins que use , an estate for their joint lives and the life of the
survivor but not an estate in fee ; and that the limitation of the further use to "all others who were then or thereafter might become members of St. George's Lodge, their survivors and successors forever,"
was v okl for uncertainty ; and that the use of equjiabl^Jnter^ thus
ed

attempted to be given to the members of the lodge not specially named,
ca nnot be sustained either as a legal estate bv force of the statute of
uses, or as an executory trust, or as a charitable use . Upon these assumptions the only remaining question is wh ether upon the death o f^
t he last surviving cestui que use the estate resulted back to the reprg i
sentatives of the grantor, who are the complainants . If it did so, thc}'^
are entitled to the money in controversy, otherwise not.
Before the statute of uses, and while uses were subjects of chancery
jurisdiction exclusively, a use could not be raised by deed without a
sufficient consideration ; a doctrine taken from the maxim of the civil
law, ex nudo pacto non oritur actio. In consequence of this rule the
court of chancery would not compel the execution of a use, unless it
had been raised for a good or valuable consideration ; for that would
be to enforce donum gratuitum.
1 Cruise,
tit. xi, ch. 2, § 22. _^id
w here a man made a feoffment to another w^ithout any consideration .
yji*
equity presumed that he meant it to the use of himself : unless he ex
pressly declared it to be to the use of another, and then nothing was
presumed contrary to his own expression s. 2 Bl. Com. 330. If a person had conveyed his lands to another without consideration, or declaration of uses, the grantor became entitled to the use o r pernancy of
the profits of the lands thus conveyed.
T his doctrine was not altered by the statute of uses. Therefore it />">■ ^ a •/ /I
became an established principle, t hat where the Ic.gal seizin or pos_s es- t/yt^L^O-'*^''*^
s ion of lands is transferred by any common law conveyance or assu rC^ l,,*.**^^
''
ance, and no use is expressly declared, nor any consideration or ev iorigi
dence of intent to direct the use, such use shall result back to the
nal owner of the estate ; fon^h^re t here_is ne it her consideration noj declarati on_ofuseSj nor any circumstance to show the in te ntion of the
parties^ it cannot be supposed that the estate was intended to be given
away. 1 Cruise, tit. ii. ch. 4, § 20.
B ut if a valuable consideration appears, equity will immediatel y
(jiA A/y^'^CJ^
raise a use_correspondcnt to such consideration . 2 Bl. Com., 330. And
{
in_such case no use is expressly declared, the person to >vhniTi th er G{h^»
l egal estate is conveyed, and from whom the consideration moved, wj

^
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be entitled to the use

The payment of
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it
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it
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t
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it

it

.

leads the use/
unless
The use results
be expressly declared to some other person.
tlie original owner where no cnnsiderg tinn ap pears, because
ca nand
not be supposed that the estate was intended to be given away
the same rule
will not result where
consideration has been paid
ecause in such case
cannot be supposed that the parties intended
lajid
the
should go back to him who had been paid for
The statute of uses made no change in the equitable principles which
the consideration
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It united the legal and equita ble
governed resulting uses.
so that a fter the statute a convevance of the use was a conve yance of the land : and the land will not result or revert to the original
owner except where the use would have done so before the statute was
Cruise, tit. x, ch. 4, § 20.
passed.
It is still now, as it was before the statute, "t he intention of the p arties to be collected from the face of the deed that gives effect to resu lt1 Sanders on Uses, 104 (Ed. of 1830).
ingjjses^'
As a general rule it is true that where the owner for a pecuniary
consideration conveys lands to uses, expressly declaring a part of the
use, but making no disposition of the residue, s o much of the us e as
Cruise, tit. xi, ch. 4, §
t he owner does not dispose of remains in him.
21. For example, if an estate be conveyed for valuable consideration
to feoffees and their heirs to the use of them for their lives, the reIn such case the intent
mainder of the use will result to the grantor.
of the grantor to create a life estate only and to withhold the residue
of the use is apparent on the face of the deed ; the words of inheritance
in the conveyance being effectual only for the purpose of serving the
declared use. The consideration expressed in the conveyance is therefore deemed an equivalent only for the life estate. The residu£ -of the
u se rema ins i n or results to the grantor, because there was no gra nt
and because
has never been aid
of it, nor any mtention to grant

previously
estate,

p

it

it,
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le
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Cy(^

'f'Jiu^
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case n
But the general rule above stated
clearly inapplicable to
which the intention of the grantor, apparent on the face of thejd eed.
J^to dispose of the entire use, or m other words of his whole estate in
The
the case now before us for determination.
he land .
Such
consideration expressed in Van der Volgen's deed was £100; and
perfectly clear on the face of the conveyance hat he intended to art
with his whole title and interest in the land. He limited the use by the
terms of his deed "to Cornelius Van Dyck and twelve other members
of St. George's Lodge in the town of Schenectady, and all others who
at present are, or hereafter may become members of the same, their
survivors and successors forever." He attempted to convev the use
either as a corp oand beneficial interest to the members of that Indo
forever,
capable
takmg
or
to that associ aof
rate body,
bv succession
perpetuitv.
the conveyIn either case,
charitable use or
on for
\vould
ance had taken effect according to the grantor's intention,
ave passed his whole title and no part of the use could have resu lted to him or his representatives.
Admitting that the declaration of the uses was void except as to the
cestuis que use who were specially named, and good as to them only
cannot be doubted that the parties believed when th
for life, et
deed was executed that the grantor conveyed his whole title in fee, an
he intentions of the parties that the entire use and interest of th
the limitation of the whole use
rantor should pass,_
as clear as
•had been valid and effectual.
This intent being established
follows,

it

^
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as a necessary consequence, th at the sum of ilOO consideration was
paid and received as an equivalent for what was intended and supposed

The express
. that is to say for an estate in f eg.
declaration of the use in the present case, instead of being presumptive evidence that the grantor did not intend to part with the use in fee,
is co nclusive evidence that he did so intend ; and the extent of the
express declaration is as much the measure of the consideration as if
the whole of the declared use had been valid. T he complainant's claim
t o the resulting use, or reversion of the land, being founded solely on
must, tlierefore
tlie assumption that the grantor never was paid for
ail because the assumption
the
deed
itsel
bv
disproved
A use never results against the intent of tlie parties. " Where theie
any circumstance to show the intent of the parties to have been that
he use should not result,
will remain in the persons to w^hom th
"
egal estate
41. In this case
Cruise, tit. xi. Use, ch.
limited.^
there are at least two such circumstances.
They have already been
convey the land in fe
alluded to first, the intent expressly declared
P in perpetuity for the benefit of the members of St. George's Lodge
resulting use . The two intents
This effectually repels the idea of

>
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was insisted on the argument that where an estate
conveyed
for particular purposes or on particular trusts only, which by accident
or otherwise cannot take effect, trust will result to the original owner
or his heir; and that the present case falls within that principle.
We
But on
were referred on this point to Cruise, tit. Trust, ch.
56.
looking at the cases cited by Mr. Cruise, they are found to be cases not
of uses, but of active trusts all excepting one created by devise, where
of course no pecuniary consideration was paid, and the land therefore
was not diverted from the heir-at-law on the failure of the trust. The
case in which there was
conveyance in trust has no resemblance to
the case now in hand.
inThat the rule above cited from Cruise
applicable to the present case appears on Sir Edward Coke's author-
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Secondly, the
ayment of the purchase money,
which enough has been already said .
If be said that the express declaration
presumptive proof that
the grantor did not intend that the grantees of the legal estate should
have that part of the use which was effectually declared, the answer
that the express declaration
proof at least equally strong that he did
not mean that the use should result to himself.
Conceding then that
the intention of the parties in regard to this residue of the use cannot
be carried into effect, the equity which governs resulting uses settles
the question between them. It gives the residue to the grantees because
the grantor has had the money for
and the language of the conveyance
sufficient to pass it. The g^rantor cannot have the purchas
money and the land also . Payment of the, purchase money for th
entire title, vests the entire use in the grantees excepting only so much
of
as may be effectually declared for the benefit of some other per-

-.. are incompatible.
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ity, in The Queen v. Porter, 1 Rep. 24, 26, that upon a feoffment made
without consideration to charitable uses void by statute, the feoffee
should, notwithstanding the declaration of such uses, be seized to the
feoffor and his heirs; but that if the feoffor had reserved but a penny
rent, or had taken a penny in consideration of the feoffment, then, although the statute makes void the use expressed, yet the feoffees shall
be seized to their own use and not to the use of the feoffor.
This was
said in the argument for the defendant Porter; and Coke, who was
solicitor for the Queen, in a note at the end of the case, referring by a
marginal note to this part of the argument, says: "And it is good
policy upon every such feoffment (to charitable uses) to reserve a small
rent to the feoffor and his heirs, or to express some such consideration
of some small sum, for the cause before rehearsed." Thus it appea rs
t hat upon a feoffment to a void use, upon a pecuniary consideration .
however small, the t i tle vests m the feoff'ee for his own benefi t. The
conveyance in the present case was by lease and relea se, which operated in this respect like a feoffment, and vested the estate, legal an d
equitable, in the releasees, from and after the expiration of the valid
use.

Whether they took this residue of the estate as tenants in common
as joint tenants is a question which does not arise in this case.
It
has been assumed that the use expressed in favor of the members of
or

St. George's Lodge, not specially named, was not valid as a charitable
But it was not necessary to decide that question. The decision
of this case must not be understood as settling any question as to the
title to the money in controversy, except that no part of it belongs to
the complainants.
Judges Mason, Morse, Johnson and Gardiner concurred in the
foregoing opinion.
Willard and Taggart,
dissented.
ecree affirmed *^°
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65 Cf. JIcElroy v. McElroy, 113 Mass. 509 (1S7.3), where the case, as stated in
the syllabus, was as follows: A, by deed of wa rranty, wifh covemmts to the
"grantee, his heirs and assiajns," and n consideration of one dollar aid by
B. (his brother), "trustee of" Q. ^another brotner), and of "the love an"cl atfecparcel of land to B., "it being my intention" " ta
tion" he liore to C, onveyed
" to nave ann lo no ia to he said grante e,
onvey" to B., "in trust tor"
h.
us
C.^
assigns,
heirs and
to his and tlieir use and liehoorTort^VH r.
it was ht ^Fcl fHat
the re was a" resuitlflg tl'hst in the grantor m me remainder after th(; lite estate
•"
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of a Common Lazv Conveyance

THE STATUTE OF ENROLMENTS

d.

t
o

St

27

Hen.

VHI,

c. 16, (1536).

;

is

ii.

is

d.

d.

is

ii.

Be it enacted by the authority of this present Parliament, That from
the last day of July, which shall be in the year of our Lord G od 1536 ,
no mano rs, lan ds, tenements or other hereditaments, shall pass, alter
or ch ange from one to another, whereby any estate of inheritance^ or
freehold shall be made or take effect in any person or persons, or any
use thereof to be made, by reason only of any bargain and sale thereoTj e xcept the same bargain and sale be made by writing indented
s ealed, and inrolled in one of the King's courts of record at Westmin manors,
ster^ or else within the same county or counties where the same
lands or tenements, so bargained and sold, lie or be, before the Custos
Rotulorum and two justices of the peace, and the clerk of the peace of
the sarne county or counties, or two of them at the least, whereof the
clerk of the peace to be one ; and the same enrolment to be had and
made within six months next after the date of the same writings indented ; the same Custos Rotulorum, or justices of the peace and clerk,
tak ing for the enrolment of every such writing indented before them ,
where the land comprised in the same writing exceeds not the yeax ly
v alue of forty shilling s,
s. that
to say, xij.
to the justices, and
xij.
to the clerk; and for the enrolment of every such writing indented before them, wherein the land comprised exceeds the sum of
xl. s. in the yearly value, v. s. that
to the said justo say, ii. s. vi.
and
s.
vi.
d.
to
the
said
clerk
for
the
tices,
enrolling of the same;
and that the clerk of the peace for the time being, within every such
county, shall sufficiently enroll and ingross in parchment the same
deeds or writings indented as
aforesaid
and the rolls thereof at the
end of every year shall deliver unto the said Custos Rotulorum of the
same county for the time being, there to remain in the custody of the
said Custos Rotulorum, for the time being, amongst other records of
every of the same counties where any such enrolment shall be so
made,
the intent that every party that hath to do therewith, mav_j :esort j.nd see the effect and tenor of every such writing so enroU ^d.
"TLProvided always, That this act, nor any thing therein contained,
extend to any manner lands, tenements, or hereditaments, lying or being within any city, borough or town corporate within this realm,
wherein the mayors, recorders, chamberlains, bailiff's or other officer
or officers have authority, or have lawfully used to enroll any evidences, deeds, or other writings within their precinct or limits; any
thing in this act contained to the contrary notwithstanding.

.
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GREY & EDWARDS CASE.
(Court of King's Bench, 1577.

In

I

Y^

.

.

'■^1^

W*^

T

V

.-j^

r

V

L'

4 Leon. 110.)

against Edwards it was holden by Wray,
that if one makes a deed, and that by these
words (dedi) conveyeth lands to another, wrthou^_aiiy_jwwxh_^f_bargai p and sal e, and that for a sum of money ; if tlie deed be debito
mode enrolled, the use ^hall x>ass as well as if the words of_barggin
and s^Jj&Ji ad been in the deed^ because that a sum^ rnoney was paid
for tlie Iand.«»
an

attaint by Grey

Gaudy, and

Jkoffries,

LUTWTCH
(Court of Wards,

V.

MITTON.
Cro. Jac. 604.)

1620.

was resolved by the two Chief Justices, Montague and Hobart,
and by TanfiEld, Chief Baron, that upon a d eed of bargain and sale
for years of land s whereof he himself is in possession, and t he ba rgai nee never entere d; if afterwards the bargainors make a grant of
the reversion (reciting this lease) expectant upon it to diverse uses
that it is a good conveyance of the reversion ; and the estate was
executed and vested in the lessee for years by the statute; and was
divided from the reversion, and not like to a lease for years at the
common law; for in that case there is not any apparent lessee until he enters : but here, by operation of the statute, it absolutely and
actually vests the estate in him, as the use, b ut not to have trespas s
without. _entry and actual possession: wherefore they would not per-

It

(

jL-^ti,'
M-.4^!LCk

^.
"^

mit this point to be further argued.

JACKSON

ex dem.

HUDSON

(Supreme Court of New York, ISOS.

3

v.

ALEXANDER.

Johns.

484, 3 Am. Dec. 517.)

This was an ^ction of eiectment . for lot No. 68, in the town of Milton, in the county of Cayuga.
The cause was tried before Mr. Justice Spencer, at the Cayuga circuit, on the 1st July, 1808.
On tlie
trial, th e pla in tiff gave in.evld e nce an exemplification of a patent, da ted
t he 8th July, 1790, grantmg the lot in question to Joseph Brown, for
his military services, and a writmg executed by Brown, in the f ollowing- words :
"F gr value, received .of Dani el Hudson & Co., I hereb y make ov gr
a nd grap't for m yself. heirs7 ana executors, unto the tJUJd Daniel Hud•8

Taylor

v. Vale, Cro.

Eliz.

166 (1589), ace.
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& C o., his hei rs" and assigns, my right and claim on the public or
66u acres of "land. Witness my hand and seal, tli'is 7th day of May,
s on

1784.

"In presence of

A

Joseph Brown.

•

[L. S.]

"Solomon Coures.
"John Dolson."

verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the
court, on a case containing the above facts ; and it was agreed, that
if the court should be of opinion, that t he instrument in writin g .from
Brown to Hudson, one of the lessors of the plamtiff, was a sufficie nt
c onveyance of the premises in question, then judgment was to be en ter ed for the plgi intiff ; otherwise, the verdict was to be set aside, and
a nonsuit entered.
The cause was submitted to the court without argument.
Thompson, J. This case has been submitted without argument, and
the question presented for our decision is, u^ether the instruipent in
w riting given by To_seph Brown to Daniel Hudson, be sufficient to con -
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it,

vey the title to the premises in question. The want of any consideratibn either expressed on the face of the instrument, or proved at the
trial, is the principal objection to its operation. A ll deeds by whi ch
l and may be convey e
their effect from the common law, ^ r
d^ d_erive
from the statute of uses. It cannot be pretended that this instrument
can take effect as a common law conveyance, either original or derivative. 4 Cruise, on Real Property, 100. I f it is to have any op erat ion, it must be as a bargain and sale, by virtue of the statute of use s.
That statute has given rise to several new forms of conveyance,
which operate contrary to the rules of the common law. It is a general rule of the common law, that it is not absolutely necessary, that
T he thoiight and dp a consideration should be expressed in a deed.
liberation, which was supposed to attend the making and executing of
expressed .
deeds,
rendered them valid, without any consideration
Soon, however, after the chancellors had assumed a jurisdiction m
cases of uses, they adopted the maxim of the civil law, "ex nudo pacto
non oritur actio," and in conformity to
they determined not to lend
their aid |to carry any deed into execution, unless
was supported by
univer sal
has becor|ie
Cruise, 24.
Hence
some. consideration.
consideration;
and a, barrule. _that
use cannot be raised without
gai n and sale, being merely
conveyance of
cannot be_ eff,ecus e,
consideration, which must be valuable^ for the very
uai without
name of the conveyance imports
Co. 176, a; Sanquid pro quo.
Cruise, 173-8. That
conside raders on Uses, 340;
Inst. 671;
almost
ever
recognized
by
principle
to
raise
use,
requisite
tion
repeatedly
lementary writer on the subject
sanction ed
and has been
Comm.
adjudged case s. The expression of Sir Wm. Blackstone,
deed or grant, made with296,) may be too broad when he says, that
to be construed to enure,
out any consideration,
of no effect, and
or be effectual only, to the use of the grantor; yet Professor Chris-
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tian, in his note on this passage, admits this position to be true with
respect to a bargain and sale. B aron Corny n, also, says, that n har.n -ain
a nd sale of land, whereby a n.^e. arises^ niighf tn he made upon.^
v aluable consideration, oth e rwise no use _ arises ; and the consideration must not be too general, but must import a quid pro quo. 2
We find the same principle recCom. Dig. 6; 3 Com. Dig. 275-7.
late
editor
of
Bacon's
Abridgment, (1 Bac. Abr. 469.)
ognized by the
Shep. Touch. 220. It is there said, that by a bargain and sale of and
no use arises, unless there be a consideration of money ; for selling,
ex vi termini, supposes the transferring a right of something, for money, and i f there be no such consideration, it may be an exchang e, 3
Qovenant to stand seise37a grant, & c. y but can be no sale within the_ statThe judgnient of the court, in Mildmay's Case, 1 Coke, 176, was
ute.
governed by the same principles ; and in Doe ex dem. Milburn v.
Salkeld, Willes, 675, Lord Ch. J. Willes, in delivering the opinion
of the court, upon the nature and operation of a deed, set forth in
the case, observes, it cannot be considered as a bargain and sale, be~~
cause there was no money consideration.
In the case of Ward v. Lambert, Cro. Eliz. 394, the deed recited,
"that whereas I. S. was bound in a recognizance, and other bonds for
him, he, for di vers good consid erations, bargained and sold the land
to him and his heir^; and this~was held not to be a good bargain
and sale. T he court said, that in every bargain and sale there ought to
be a quid pro quo: but thevendor there had nothmg for his land^ and
t herefore, it was void.
If a man give land, or bargain, and sell land

i

If, then, a valuable consideratio n
to his son, no use arises thereby.
be necessar y to raise a use, the next ques tion ^vill be. whether the in es trument before us, upon the fax:e ot it, miports the consideration
If it does,
q uired in a bargain and sale, under th e statute of uses .
it must arise either from the internal torce of the words "for value
define
received," or by virtue of the seal. A valuable consideratign
knqwn
the books, to mean money, or any other thing that bears
24.
This
in
v.
Cruise,
court,
AIcKillip,
the
case
of
Lansing
valuer
Caines, 286, considered the words, for value received, of little force
consideration.
and importance of themselves, towards making out
cannot discover more effiIndependently of that decision, however,
cacy in these words than in many others which have been used in instruments, that have been adjudged inoperative as bargains and sales.
All the cases
have cited to show the necessity of
considera tion.
to be inferred fr om the face of the dee
plainly inHi(^ ate, that
ouoht to be so express ed as necessarily to import value
It rnu st
not, n the langua ge^ ot Baron Comyn, be too general.
seems to
me, tTiaFas much rnay be inferred from "the word consideration as
the word value.
And
has repeatedly been adjudged, that an acconsideration generally was not
knowledgment of the receipt of
sufficient. Although this may have the' semblance of
technical nicety,
incompatible with the broad principles of justice, yet the rule appears
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firmly established to be overturned. Many of the common law principles, applicable to other contracts, cannot be applied to
bargains and sales under the statute of uses.
In Mildmay's Case, and also that of Ward v. Lambert, before referred to, the words^ di vers good considerations , were considered insuffi c ient to raise a use. Leing- but general parlance, implying nothing, unles s
e xpress;
considerations were shown ; for otherwise none would be
intended. So in Fisher v. Smith, 5 Vin. Abr. 406, note, the court were
clear, that i f^one pleads a bargain and sale, in which no consideratio n
9f monev is expressed, th en he nn orht to supply it by an avermenLth at
it was for mone j/ : and that the words, for divers good considerations,
shall not be intended for money, without an averment ; but if the deed
expresses, for a competent sum of money, it is sufficient, without
showing the certainty ot the sum ; and none shall say that no money
was paid; for against this express mention in the deed, no averment
that no money was paid shall be admitted. An acknowledgment in th e
d eed of the receipt of monev. ex vi termini, imij-orts value, and the
amount of the consideration is immaterial . It has been repeatedly
ruled that, if in pleading a bargain and sale, no valuable consideration
is shown, it will be ill on demurrer.
In many cases the verdict has
been deemed to cure this defect, which must have been on the ground,
that after verdict, the consideration is presumed to have been proved
on the trial.
1 Lord Raym.
; 1 Wils. 91 ; 2 H. Black. 261.
Froni
y
njl fhp; rn ses referred to. it is evident that the court did not consider tlie jAjtAjP
>U^
s eaL as yirtuallv importing the requisite consideration;
for the instrii |
nients. although under seal, were deemed inoperative, as bargains an d Pfr^ti^ hJLi
sales . It would have been competent for the plaintiff, in the present
case, to have proved a co nsideration paid,
Yin. 507,) which, in my Ccn-voX^^/u,
opinion, vvoukT liave'^Tnade the deecl eTifectual to transfer the title
the word grant being sufficient to pass the land by way of use,
Mod.
should be inclined to grant
new
253.) Under this view of the case,
trial, to give the plaintiff an opportunity of producing this proof,
in
new action
his power, without the expense of
but according to th
tipulation in the case,
judgment of nonsuit, in my n])ini()n^ nngl it
to be entered
Kent, Ch.
am of opinion that the deed from Brown to Hudson
was sufficient to convey his interest in the premises.
operates at all, must operate as
agree that the deed,
bargain
and sale under the statute of uses.
feoffment or lease was valid, without any
At the common law ,
consideration, in consequence of the fealty or homage which vvas incident to every such conveyance. The law raised
consideration out of
the tenure itself.
But after the_statute of Quia Emptores. (18 Ed. I,)
\''^
to me to be too
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Perkins says, that
consideration became requisite eveJi to the validity
feoffment,
of
as none could be implied, since, according to tlie statute
eudal duty or service resulted to the immediate feoffor . (Perkins,
sects. 528-537.)
The general, and the better opinion
that the no-
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tion of a consideration first came from the court of equity, where it
was held necessary to raise a use ; and w hen conveyances to uses w ere
i ntroduced, the courts of law adopted the <;nmp if1pa..p and held that a.
consideration was requisite in a deed of hargajn and sal e.
This
new principle in the doctrine of assurances by deed, met, at first,
with a very strong resistance from the ablest lawyers of the age. Plowden, in his argument in the case of Sharington v. Stroffen, 1 Plowden,
308, 309, which arose upon a deed under the statute of uses, contended,
with great force of reason and authority, that a deed, which was a
solemn and deliberate act of the mind, did of itself import a consideration ; that the will of the grantor was a sufficient consideration,
and it neyer could be called a nudum pactum.
Lord Bacon, in
on
the
statute
notice
this
uses,
of
takes
of
argument of
This reading
Plowden, and gives it the weight of his sanction. "I would have one
- a
a se showed/' snid he, "\i Y men learned in the law, wIiptp" there 15^
deed, ^nd yet there needs a rnrr^ideratinn
As for parole, the law adIjudgeth it too light to give an action without consideration ; but a deed,
/even in law, i mports a consideration , because of the deliberation and
I ceremony in the confection of it; and, therefore, in 8 Reginais, it is
argued that a deed should raise a use without any other conthis
sideration."
Bacon's Works, v. 4, p. 167. But notwithstanding
(solemnly
strenuous opposition, the rule from chancery prevailed, and it has_b een
l ong' settled, that a consideration, expressed or proved, was necessa ry
to give effect to aje ed of bargain and sale . I am not going to attempt
to surmount the series of cases on this subject, though I confess myself a convert to the argument of Plowden. I admit the rule that a
consideration is necessary to a conveyance to uses ; but I think that
here is evidence of a consideration, appearing on the face of the deed
before us, sufficient to conclude the grantor, and to give effect to it
as a bargain and sale.
The rule requiring a consideration to raise a use, has become mere ly
nomin;al. jmd a_matter of form ; for if a sum of money be mentioned,
it is never an inquiry whether it was actually paid, and the smallest
sum possible is sufficient: nay, it has been solemnly adjudged, that a
__£epper-corn was sufficient to raise a use. 2 Vent. 35. Since, then,
the efficacy of the rule is so completely gone, we ought, in support of
deeds, to construe the cases which have modified the rule, with the utmost liberality.
The deed in the present case states, that "for value received of the
grantee, he doth grant," &c., and can it now be permitted to the
grantor to say there was no value received?
Value received is equ iva lent to saving^ money was receiv e d, or a chattel was receive d.
It is
an express averment, ex vi termini, of a quid pro quo.
In Fisher v.
Smith, Moore, 569, there was a bargain and sale for divers considerations, and it was held not to be enough, without an averment, that
it was for money. "But if the deed express for a competent sum of
money, this is sufficient without mentioning the certainty of the sum.
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and against this express mention in the deed, no averment or evidence
All the cases that
shall be admitted to say that no money was paid."
I have examined, which say that a general consideration is not sufficient, are cases in which the words in the deed were for divers good
considerations.
I. have not met with any case which goes so far as
t o say, that an averment in the deed of value received by the grantor,
It is said, in 2 Roll. Abr. 786, pi. n, that "an aver\yas not sufecient
ment that a bargain and sale was in consideration of money or other
If the words had been
valuable consideration given, was sufficient."
for money received by the grantor, then the deed would have fallen
exactly within the decision in Moore, and would have been good, according to the admission in all the books. I cannot perceive any essential difference between the two averments ; v alue received does, in
j udpnent of law, implv monev. or its equivalent .
The grantor must
be estopped by this express averment in his deed.
He admits not only
a value, but a value received from the grantee ; and if we will not
intend this value to be something valuable, or equal to a competent
sum of money, we seem not to construe charters as they did in the case
of Fisher v. Smith, and as the law axiom requires them to be examined, benignly, and in support of the substance. The statute of 9 and
10 Wm. Ill, c. 17, regards those words of so much import, that if
a bill contains them, the holder is then entitled to recover interest and
damages against the drawer and endorser; and in Cramlington v. Evans, 1 Show. 4, Carth. 5, Lord Holt laid great stress on these words.
"I f the drawer^" he says, "mention for ynlnp rprpivpH thpn hp Jg
chargeable at co mmon law ; but if no such mention is ma^ . thpn ymi
must come upon the custom of merchants only ." I mention these authorities only to show that these words mean something ; and that, in
certain cases, at least, the law has attached the meaning of real actual value to the averment of value received, and that in those cases,
it has been co nsidered as equivalent to saying for money receive d.
The law from the beginning has been very indulgent in helping out
If no consideration be ex deeds, on the ground of consideration.
pressed, one may be averred in pleading, or proved upon the trial.
Mildmay's Case, 1 Co. 175 ; Fisher v. Smith, Moore, 569. In pleading
a bargain and sale, in which no consideration
is expressed, it was
held, in Smith v. Lane, Moore, 504, that the bargainee need not aver
This was after^vards held
payment of money, because it was implied.
otherwise;
but it has been lately held by the Court of C. B. (2 H.
Black. 259) that this averment was but matter of form, and the omission of it cured, on a general demurrer.
This last decision seems to
have almost done away even the form of the old rule, for it can hardly
be necessary to prove upon trial under the general issue, a fact which
is matter of form, and not of substance. A plaintiff is bound to prov e
onlv what would be considered as material averments, and matte rs
which go to the substance of the actio n.
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plac e mv opinion on the ground that the deed contains a suffi cient averment of a consideration, to estop the grantor, and to give th e
I am not apprized of any
deed operation under the statute of uses.,
In Lansing v. Mccase which is an authority against this conclusion.
Killip, 3 Caines, 286, two of the judges intimated that value received
did not supersede the necessity of averring and proving a consideration in a special agreement; but another of the judges went largely
The case, however, was not
into the support of a contrary opinion.
decided upon that ground, but upon another, viz. that where the plain-,
tiff alleges two good considerations in his declaration, he must prove
them as laid.
T he next point in the case
whether the words, "make over nd
Thfij^ord
interest
the land
be
sufficient
to
Brown's
convey
g^rant,"
by
way
use,
to
land
of
Mod.
253
been
held
sufficient
pass
graiitjias
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Though in its original meaning, the word ai)plied only
conveyance of incorporeal hereditaments, which could not pass
by livery of seisin, yet
conveyances under the statute of uses,
ufficient,
the g^ranting words are competent to raise
use
for he
tatute then performs the task of the ancient livery of seis in.
enAly opinion on both points, accordingly, is, that the plaintiff
titled to judgment.
Van Ness, J., and Y.\TEs, J-, were of the same opinion.
Judgment for the plaintiff.*^
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The opinion of Spencer, J., to tbe same effect as the opinion of Thompson,
is omitted.
In
deed the consideration
was recited as "four thousand three hundred
line drawn throngh the "four thousand three hundred."
.No
dollars." with
consideration having been proved, the question was whether the deed could
operate as one of bargain and sale. Catliu Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 180 111. 398, 54
K. E. 214. 72 .Am. St. Rep. 216 (IbOD).
"AV heii tiip rotiv^i deration in
covenant to stand seised to uses, or in
bargain and sale, isguod^and
he person cert ai n , there that perscii may make
n
according to the truth of TTi
vernient that TlTe consideration was paid an
ut when the person is uncei-tain and the coiisider.ition ffpiipr.-il
case
there
no,averi iiPiif cnn li^ f--^l^
T» bv anv nersom In the first case tlie averment by
the particular person is but rechicing the general consideration to some certainty, and making out that in particular, in favour of the i)erson who was
good
before included in the general words, which is very reasonable, in case
consideration were bona fide paid by him
but in the latter case the intent
of the covenantor was void ab initio, for it appearing that he designed nobody
in particular, for the benefit of the use he would raise, no person in certain
could aver any particular consideration why he should have the use. because
it plainly appears by the deed he did not design him for the use an.v more than
any other person, and the law will not give _ psp tn ^nvbn tiy contrary to th
"
etc.
Gilbert's Uses (Sugdeu's
ii],teiit of the party mentioned in the seUlement,
Case,
Mildmay's
Oo"
i'<S
4rJ.
See
(loSi!).
Edl)
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TRANMER.
2

Wils.

75.)

Upon the trial of this cause it appeared *in evidence, that Thomas
Kirby, being seised in fee of the lands in question, m ade and execu ted
The lease, dated November 9,
c ertain deeds of lease and release .
1733, made between the said Thomas Kirby of the one part, and Christopher Kirby his brother of the other part, whereby it is witnessed
thaLlb e said Thomas Kirby. in consideration of 5s., did grant, bar gain, and sell to the said C. Kirby. his executors, administrators, an d
assigns, the lands in question ; to have and to hold the same un to_the
and assigns, from the day
s aid C. Kirby. his executors, administrators,
before the date thereof for the t erm of one yea r under a pepper-corn
rent, to the intent that by virtue of these presents, and by force of the
statute for transferring uses into possession, he the said Christopher
may be i n the actual possession of all the pre mises, and be enabled t o
t ake and accept of a grant, and release of the reversion and inheri tance thereof to them and their heirs, to, for, and upon such use s,
i ntents, and purpo'^t ;"^, ns in nnd l^y the said grant and release shall be
d irected or_ declared._ In witness, ^c, executed by Thomas Kirby.
The release, dated November 10, 1733, made between Thomas Kirby
of the one part, and C. Kirby his broth.er of the other part, witnesseth,
that f or the natural love he beareth toward his s aid brot her, and fo r
a nd in consideration of £100. to the said Thomas Kirby. paid by the sai d
C. Kirby. he the said Thomas Kirby hath granted, rel eas ed, and con firmed, and by these presents, doth grant, release, and confirm unto t he
s aid C. Kirby. in his actual possession ther e of now being, by virtue of_ a
bar gain and s ale for one whole year to him thereof made by the said
I' Fiomas ivirby , by in denture dated the day next before the day of
the date hereof, and by for ce of the statute mad e for transferring of
uses into possession, after the death of the said Thomas Kirby, all that
one close, &c. (the premises without any words of limitation to the releasee) ; t o have and to hold the said premises unto the said C. Kirb y
and the he i rs of his body lawfully begotten, and after their decease to
ohn WilRinson. eldest son of my well-beloved uncle John Wilkinson
o f North Daltori-J n the county of York, gentleman, t o him and h is
heir' ^ nnd nq<;ig^n<;, anrl tn the Only proper use and behoof of liini th e
said John Wilkinson the Younger, his executors, administrators or .a ssi gns forever, h e the said John Wilkinson the Younger paying or causing to be paid to the c hild or children of my well-beloved broth er
Stephen Kirby the sum of £200. ; and for want of such child or ch ildren, then to the child or children of my well-beloved sister lane "Ki rb^ and for want of such issue, then to- the yo unger children of my
well-beloved uncle, John Wilkinson, of North Dalton aforesaid ; and
for want of such younger children, th en the said estate above mentioned to be free from the payment of tTie above-named sum oi ±200.
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Then

the re leasor co ven ants that he is

he hath good right and

full power

(Part

lawfully

seised

in fee, and

2

t hat

to convey the premises to the s aid

C. Kirb ^^hd Uso that it may and shall be lawful to and for the
said C Kirby, or the said John Wilkinson the Younger, from and
after the death of him the said Thomas Kirby, pe aceably and quietl y
t o have, hold, use, occupy, possess, and enjoy the said messuage, land s,
a nd premises, with the appurtenances, not only without the lawful le t,
suit, &c. of him the said Thomas, but all others claiming under jijip,
•
Then it is covenanted by all the
&c. free from all incumbrances .
parties, that all fing^and re cover ies, and deeds of the premises, levied,
suffered, or executed by the parties or any of them, or by any other persons, sh all be and enure to the use of the said C. K irby and, his

of his body lawfully begotten ; and for want of sucli^ -4^sue.
t hen to the us^ nf the ■«;aid Tohn Wilkinson junior, his heirs and^asIn
sjgns for ever, according to the true intent of these presen ts.
witness, &c. executed by Thomas Kirby.
It further appeared in evidence, that C. Kirby on the 10th of November 1733, p aid to the said Thomas Kirby i20. in moncv, and gave hjm
his note for £80. payable to the said Thomas Kirby, wlio signed__a receipt on the backside of the said djp pd of relea se in these words ; viz.
Received the day and year within written of the within named C.
Kirby the s um of one hundred pounds, being the full consideration I say, received by me,
money within mentioned to be paid, t" meThomas Kirby. Witness M. J. S. T.
It further appeared in evidence, that C. Kirby died without issue in
1740, and that Jo hn Wilkinson the lessor of the plaintiff is the same
John Wilkinson named in the deed of release ; but it did not appear
that the said John Wilkinson had notice of the said deeds of lease
and release until a short time before this ejectment was brought.
This being the case for the consideration of the Court, the general
question is, wliether the lessor of the plaintiff has a title to recov er
h eirs

u pon the lease

WiLLEs, C. J.

rp1pa<;p

?

®^

*

*

*

It

it

is,

is admitted and agreed on all hands that this deed
is void as a release, because it is a grant of a freehold to commence
shall ta ke
in futuro; and therefore the only question
wjiether

I

is

it

a

ffect as
covenant to stand seised to uses? and we are all of opinio n
iat
shall fmv Brother Bathurst. not being here, authorized me
of the same opinion).
to say he
have been cited on both sides, some of which are very
cases
]\Iany
inconsistent with one another, and to mention them all would rather
tend to puzzle and confound, than to illustrate the matter in question;
shall only take notice of those things we think most
and therefore
material, and of some few cases nearest in point for our judgment.
It appears from the cases upon this head, in general, that the judges
have been astuti to carry the intent of the parties into execution, and to

tl e

^

an*^

68 A summary
omitted.

of the arguments of counsel given in Wilson's report is liere
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give the most liberal and benign construction to deeds ut res magis
valeat quam pereat. I rely much upon Sheppard's Touchstone of Common Assurances, 82, 83, (which is a most excellent book,) where he
says, when the intent is apparent to pass the land one way or another,
there it may be good either way.
,
By the w ord intent i s not meant the intent of the parties to pass the
la iTcl bv this or tEat particular kind of deed, o r by any par ticular mod e *Uvjla*.>».4^
or form of conveyance, b ut an intent that the land shall pass at a ll
1^
^
^
e vents one way or other j
^^^^Xjla^
Lord Hobart, (who was a very great man,) in his Reports, fo. 277,
says, "I exceedingly commend the Judges that are curious and almost
subtil, astuti, to invent reason and means t o make acts according t o
the just intent of the parties, and to avoid wrong and injury, which by
rigid rules might be wrought out of the act ;" and my Lord Hale in
the case of Crossing and Scudamofe, 1 Vent. 141, cites and approves
of this passage in Hobart.
A 1t hough formerly, according to some of the old cases, the mode- O r
f orm of a conveyance was held material, 3^et in later times, where th e
inteM appears that the land shall pass, it has been ruled nt h^ ^wise^ n nd
certainly it is more considerable to make the intent good in passing the
estate, if by any legal means it may be done, than by considering the
to disappoint the intent and principal thing, which
manner of passing
was to pass the land.
Osman and Sheafe,
Lev. 370. Upon this
ground we go.
every thing- nere'^'^a ry
We are all of opinion that in this case there
make
good and effectual covenant to s^ seised to uses .cTFirstT
diMjJi
here
the word g^rant alone
dee^ ^ecoridl>^^ere are apt word
would have been siithcient7but there are other words besides which are
^ ^i \*T%n
material
viz.
covenant that the grantor has power to grant, and
^^^^
covenant that all fines, recoveries, &c. of these lands shall enure to the* /»j!!1jx>m-*'»^
*
uses in the deec^
"Thi^ dlyf* the cov enantor was seised in fey'^'^ourthlv.^
*^«
'
here appears
most plain intent that Wilkinson the lessor of the plain »

^^*^

(Ip

^^^

9,

&

2

1

3

2

1

2

1

2

a

in

plaintifL for the covenantor
the deed names him to be the eldest son 6, ^^^""^Vj^
of his well-beloved uncle; tl^seare all thej:ircumstances necessary to aJcAjl/^^^^
good deed of covenant to stand seised to uses
make
In support of their opinion the Chief Justice only cited and observed /t^"*-* ^ '^
Mod. 175,
upon these cases, viz. Crossing and Scudamore,
Lev.
Lev, 213; Coultman and Senhouse,
Vent. 137; Walker and Hall,
Tho. Jones. 105, Carth. 38, 39; Baker v. Hil
M. B. R.; OsW.
min and Sheafe, Lev. 370.
The Chief Justice lastly cited two of the strongest cases mentioned
for the defendants, as Hore and Dix,
Sid. 25, and Samoh and Jones,
Vent. 318, and said he did not (for his own part) understand them;

if

he had sat in judgment in those cases, he should have been
and that
Aig.Pbop. — 17
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a different opinion in both ; however, he said the present case differed from these two cases. Lastly, he said the whole court were clear
of opinion that a man seised might covenant to stand seised to thejise
qf another person after the covenantor's dea th, Postea delivered to
the plain tiff. «»

of

MURRAY
(Court of Appeals of Maryland,

KERNEY.

V.

115 Md. 514, 81

1911.

Atl.

6, 38

L. R. A.

[N. S.] 937.)

of the Court.

delivered the opinion

the appellee, pl amtift" below, filed his bill allegino^ that
mple, of a lot of land in Baltimore Citv. itnwnpr, in fpp
s

'di
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e

h

J.,

Pattison,
In this case

t

u ated at the corner formed by the intersection of the west side of Cen ral avenue and the southeast side of Gav street that he had acquired
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from one Jane
Murr ay by deed ated September 13th, 1905.
The bill alleges .that Jane
Murray cquired title to this property by
written
;reement executed on the 2d dav of December, 1885, by th
Murray and her three sisters who were at the time owne rs
aid Jane
of said lands as tenants in common. The agreement was executed and
acknowledged by them with all the formalities required in the execution and acknowledgment of deeds and was duly recorded, and
as
follows
"We, the undersigned, daughters of the late Peter and Elizabeth
Murray, named and subscribed to this instrument of writing, do ente
nto an ag reem ent that for the benefit of each and all of them nam ed
nd subscribed to this agreement and are now living in and owne rs
ointlv the property being their joint interest left them, Lyicy A.
Murray, Ann Murray, Sara A. Crawford and Jane
Murray, as heirs
of the above Peter and Elizabeth Murray, property situated on the
th
southwest corner of Gay and Canal streets (now Central avenue)
by death should take one of he
that in case that
bject of this

t

y

ei

ij

r

o

is

is

cf

if

v

b

if

arties, the other three sisters are the owners and
two are taken
by dea th
eath, then the two remaining sisters are the owners, and
taken then the last surviving sister
the ow nne of the two sisters
er^ and in order to carrv faithfully this agreement, we hereunto set ou
^ppk anH ^nh^r rihe nur names this second day of Decem ber.
iTgnH-:; an
"
in the ear g-htP Pn j^nnrlrpH anH f^JCTJ-ily-flvp
The bill further alleges that he three sisters all died in the lifetime
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a^Ht^ed
riMd.1 .'^27,
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There have

a

6
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been many cases in Avhicb the courts have been astuteto u pHaT. S, J.
as operative in some maimer
See Cheney v. WatUiiis,
Am. l)po. .'S.SO (1804). snst ainJDir as
feoffment
deed defective as
pro;)er consideration
I'erry v. Price,
.Mo.
bart^ain and sale, for wnnt of
553 (181'5), same; Havens v. Sea Shore Land C^o., 47 N. J. Eq. 365. 20 Atl. 497
ustaining as
conveyanpp in the words "reinjjs e.
bargain and sale
(1890),
I'elease liecause the estate was in expectanc y;
release and onitplniin," void as
tSawy. 5:J3, i'eo: Oas.
Lambert v. Smith,
ileld v. Culumijet,
Or. 185 (1881)
No. 4,7tJ4 (1864).

old
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of Jane J. Murray, l eaving her surviving them , the owner, as it alleg es.
o f said propertv under and by virtue of said agreement, and that sh e
d ied on the 26th dav of Tanuary. 1908 . The bill also alleges that said
property, for a long time prior to the acquisition of it by the plaintiff,
was o ccupied bv him and wa's in his possession at the time of the fili ng
o f the bill That at the time of the death of the said Jane J. Murray,
she was seized of the property adjoining the property so acquired by
him, which was also embraced in the property mentioned and described in the agreement above mentioned, signed by th§ said Jane J. Mur-

ray and her sisters aforesaid, and w hich he r h^jrs, nft^r her dpnth,
a greed to^pll tn th^ "Mprth r.ny S;trfp ^ Perman mt Rnilrliiio- and T.Q.nn
Association of B^ ltimn rp Tify , but upon examination the purchaser
was not satisfied with the title of Jane J. Murray thereto, its objection
being based upon the sufficiency of the agreement above given to pass
title to her in said lands, and proceedings were instituted in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City "for the sale of said property and the ratification of the contract of sale to the said corporation, which proceedings
have long since been completed and the title of said adjoining property
conveyed to the said corporation."
. • "-^^
A s the legal sufficiency of the title of Tane T. Murray in and to_ the questioned
, the
la nds sold as aforesaid had been
^l^^tift" thought i tC/'<*|klAy4*^^
best, as he alleg es^ ^f^ ha^^ pve<:"'^pd to him, by the heirs of fane T .
cCtA^
Murray, a confirmatory deed for the propertv so conveyed unto him by *^*'*'^^ .

To this end he called ui)on the heirs to execute the
her as aforesaid.
^
confirmatory deed and all of them executed the same except the d e- ^^|t^^:i^^=^
f endants, who refused to do so- It was then that he determined to file /TjLu/i4 ^0%
the bill asking the Court, as he did, to construe said agreement and by ^y
-.
*y
'■'*''^ '
its decree "remove any cloud which might exist or be supposed to exist"-^'*''*^'^^
upon his title to said lands.
The d efendant s Mary J. Murray and William A. Murray ansvi^ered,
stating tiiat as to the construction of the paper writing or agreement
mentioned in the bill, and as to the relief prayed therein, they consent^i^jw^ju* ^
ed to and desired that the Court should pass such decree as to it might
The other defendants, James
seem just and proper in the premises.
E. Murray and Thomas F. Murray, also answered neither admitting
nor denying the things alleged in the bill, but requiring proof thereo f.
To these answers the general replication was filed, and the testimony
of the plaintiff alone was thereafter taken, which substantially sustains
the allegations of the bill.
The qu estion presented by this appeal is, did

Jane

J. Murray,

th e

s urvivor of the sisters, who were, as it is conceded, at the time of tj ie
execution of the paper writing above set forth, the owners of sa id-land
i nvolved in these proceedings as tenants in common, acquire their int erest therein under and by virtue of such written agreemen t?
""It is not difficult to ascertain the meaning of said paper writing. It
was evidently the purpose and intention of the sisters that they should
continue to own said property so long as all of them should live, and
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upon the death of any of them tlie three surviving sisters should be
the owners of said property, and upon tlie death of tlie second sister
the two surviving sisters should be the owners thereof, and upon the
death of tlie third sister the surviving sister was to become the owner
of the entire interest formerly held by the four sisters, or the owner of
B ut is this instrument of writing legally sufficient to
the property.
e ffect the purpose and meaning aforesaid ?
"Where theintent of the
grantor to pass the land is apparent, if for any reason the deed or instrument by which the transfer of title was intended to be effected can
not operate in the way contemplated by the parties, the Court, if poss ible, will give it effect in some other way, and judges have been very
a stute in s uch cases in their en deavors to make the conveyance oper ative one way or the other t o carry mtoeffect the intention of the gr gji^
toTor dono r." Bank of U. b. v. Housman, 6 Paige's Ch. (N. Y.) 534.
If for any of the reasons assigned by the appellant the instrument of
writing mentioned in this case should be inoperative as a common law
deed, weJlmk that it is effective as a covenant to stand seized to u ses
under the Statute of Uses .
"
^
/'
Blackstone defines a covenant to stand seized to uses as A speci es
^
/^
U^f,.,^^ ^ I o f conveyance by which a man seized of lands, covenants in consider aAji>*^ \ t ion of blood and marriage that he will stand seized of the same t ojhe
B
Z**"^^
m^
I u se of his child, wife or k i nsman, for life, in tail, or in fee" Hut this
I conveyance can only operate when made upon such weighty and inter^>^,
'^^^
Book 2, 338.
Vesting considerations as those of blood and marriage."
"
No particular word or form of words is necessary to constitute a
'
'
covenant to stand seized.
The consideration is the chief requisite
to characterize it and to support it as such a conveyance.
This consideration is bl ood and marriag e. I f the consideration appears in a
deed, though there be no express words of consideration, yet it is s uffi"
c ient to raise a use by way of conveyance.
Barry v. Shelby, 5 T^nn.

Hayw.) 229, 231.
"
Lord Coke, in treating the Statute of Uses, says : The intention o f
the parties is the principal foundation of the creation of uses ," and m
Slay v. Mehan, 1 Lewt. 782, the Court says: "There is no covenant
that admits of such a variety of words as that of a covenant to stand
seized." Hayes v. Kershow, 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 263.
T he covenant must, of course, be by deed in order to constitute it a
covenant; and the usual term employed in creatmg it is. "covenan t."
though any other words may be adopted which are tantamount there2 Washburn on Real Property, § 1379.
to.
The deed or instrument of writing that was before the Court in the
case of Fisher v. Strickler, 10 Pa, 348, 51 Am. Dec. 488, was as follows : "Now, know ye, that we, the said Jacob Strickler and Christian
Strickler, have this day agreed with each other, that in case if one of
them shall happen to die unmarried, or intermarried and without lawful issue or issues that should arrive to the age of twenty-one years,
that then and in that case the survivor of them shall be the sole heir
(4
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one both to the real and personal estate of tlie deceased, without any further deed or conveyance ; to hold the real estate as
well as the personal estate of the deceased unto the survivor and to his
heirs and assigns forever." The Court in adopting the opinion of the
lower Court said : "Tloe instrument of writing set forth in this case is
The
what is technically c alled a covenant to stand seized to uses.
words are sufficient to create the covenant7the'iriteiitron being apparent
on the face of the deed, that each party should stand seized to the use
And the
of the qtlier surviving him, under the circumstances stated.
consideration of n at ural lov e, though not expressed, is manifest from
the relation of the parties. Milbourn v. Salkeld, 'WilTes, 673 ; Bedell s
Case, 7 Rep. 40; Crossing v. Scudamore, 1 Ventr. 137; 3 Cruise's
Dig., Part. IV, 186-190."
I n this case, as it is conceded, the four sisters were seized in fee, as
t enants in common, of the lands in question, and being so seized executed the deed or agreement above set forth. Each was seized of._a
o ne-fourth undivided interest in said land and by this deed or instr ument of writing each covenanted to stand seized of her interest therei n
to her use during her life , and upon her death to the use of such of
her sisters as surviv ed hei. successively to and including the last survivor, who became seized thereby, i n_fee. of the interest of all the sisters in said lands.
From what we have said we do not think the Court below erred in
its ruling and will therefore affirm its decree.
Decree affirme d, with costs to the appellee.
-^ />_£,tt._«->jr a-.^-^

of the

deceased

(C) Limitations Upon

the Operation

of

the Statute

of Uses

TYRREL'S CASE.
(Court of Wards, 1557.

Dyer, 155.)

by
ery
G. Tvrrel her son and heir apparent, by indenture enrolled in chanc
in the 4th year of E. VI, bargained. _so ld, g_a v e^ granted , covenante d,
and c oncluded to the said G. Tyrrel all her manors, lands, tenements.
&c., to have and to hold the said &c. to the said G. T. and his hei rs
f or ever, to the use of the said Jane during her life, without impeacj iment of waste ; and immedi ately after her decease to the use xtf-the
said G. T. and the heirs of his body lawfully begotten ; ^and in defa iilt
of such issue, to the use of the heirs of tlie said Jane for eve r. Quaere
well whether the limitation of tliose uses upon the habendum are not
void and impertinent, because an use cannot be springing, drawn, or
reserved out of an use, as appears prima facie? And here it ought
to be first an use transferred to the vendee before that any freehold
or inheritance in the land can be vested in him by the enrollment, &c.

Jane Tyrrel, widow, for the sum of four hundred pounds paid

'^t'

^l^^rx,"-*^
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M'^'j^

ex dem.

X m

^

I

^

^,

'ffl ^/P^^'^*'^wf
>^,

'

\

rLoMJl

(Co"''^

LLOYD

of King's Bench,

v.

1827.

PAS SINGH AM.
6

Barn.

& C. 305.)

Ejectment for lands in tlie county of Merioneth. Plea, the general
issue. At the trial before Burrough, J., at the last Summer Assizes
■^^^Salop, it appeared that the lessor of the plaintiff claimed as devi see
i n tail under the will of Catherine Lloyd, who was co-heiress, with
In 1746, by inher sister Mary, of Giwn Lloyd, who died in 1774.
denture made between himself, G. Lloyd, of the first part, Sarah Hill
of the second part. Sir Rowland Hill and John Wynne of the third
part,, and Sir Watkin Williams Wynne and Edward Lloyd of the fourth
part ; in consideration o L- an intended mar ri age with the said_^rah
Hill, and of a sum of £8000., being the marriag e .po rtion of the sa id
rah Hill, p aid or secured to be paid to him Giwn Lloyd, he. Giwn
^a
0ovd, did grant, release, and confirm unto the said Sir Watkin Willia ms Wvnne and Edward Lloyd in their actual possession then bejn g,
by yirtue of an i ndenture of bargain and s a le. &:c.. and to their he irs
a nd assigns, certam premises therein particularly described . , an d,

L/>'^^>^*''^^

X
1

2

J

A ^gtiKA^^-"^

>v

(Part

And this case has been doubted in the Common Pleas bef(5re now :
But all the Judges of C. B. and Saunders, Chie f
ideo quaere legem.
ustice, thought that the limitation of uses above is void, &:c. for suppose the statute of InroUments (cap. 16.) had never been made, but
only the statute of Uses, (cap. 10.) in 27. H. VIII, then the case above
could not be, because an use cannot be engendered of an use, &c. See
M. 10 & 11 Eliz. & fol.^0

^^
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^

f

others, the premises in question ; to have and to hold the
said premises with their appurtenances, unto the said Sir Watkin Williams Wynne and Edward Lloyd, their heirs and assigns ; to the on ly
p roper use and behoof of them the said Sir Watkin Williams Wynn e
a nd Edward Lloyd, their heirs and assigns for ever. , i^pnp Vw^^ , nevertheless, and sub je ct to the several uses, intents, and purposes ther ein-

a mongst

a fter mentioned^ that is tosay, to theuseof_ the_ s^idJ^^wn
h is heirs until tlie said in tenoe^^'nramage
should take effect^

Lloy

Jfrom
and

and
and after the solem nization of t he said intended marriage, then to
t he use and behooi ot Uiwn JLloyd and Sarah his intended wife, a nd
their assigns, for and during the term of their natural lives, and the
longer liver of them, as and for her jointure and in lieu and full satisfaction of dower; and from and after the decease of such surv ij^or
t o the use of Sir Rowland Hill and John Wynne, their executors, administrators, assigns, for the term of TOOO years, t o and for the several intents and purposes theremafter mentioned ; and from and after
the expiration or other sooner determination of that estate, to tlie use
TO See

(N. Y.)

Wall.

Sambach v. Dalton, Tothill, ISS (1G34) ; Jackson v. Cary, 16 Johns.
Reid v. Gordon, 35 JVld. 183 (ISTi:) ; Croxall v. Shereid, 5

.^>04 (1819) ;

2G8,

18

L. Ed.

572 (1866).
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of the body of the said Giwn Lloyd _on the
Hill,
h is intended wife, lawfully to be begotten,
of
the
said
Sarah
body
and the heirs male of the body of such first son lawfully issuing; ^nd
for _d^fault of _ such issue, to the use and behoof of the second son
i n like manner ; and then to tlie daughters ; aj id for rlpf^nli- of snrh
i ssue, to J:he use and behoof of th e ?aifl Oiwri T.lnyd, hi;:; heirs and
assigns for eve r. And.it was thereby declared and agreed by and bea nd behoof

of tlie first

son

tween all and every the said parties to the said indenture, that the term
of 1000 years thereinbefore limited to Sir Rowland Hill and John
Wynne, w as upon trust that they did and should immediately after th e
d ecease ofJ Lwn Lloyd, by sale or mortgage ot the" whole or qny part
t hereof, raise the '^^m nf ^39 00 ^^ be paid and applied in manne r
t heremafter mentioned .
And it was thereby declared and agreed by
and between the parties to the said indenture th at a sum of £4000. of
th e said sum of £8 000. should imme diately after the solemnization of
t he saiH mtenfled marriage be p aid mto the hands of them the sai d
Sir Rowland Hill and Tohn Wynne, upon trust that the same should
be paid, laid out, and applied by them with all convenient speed in
the purchase of freehold lands , tenements, or hereditaments in f ee
s imple, in the county of Merio neth aforesaid or elsewhere in the pri ncipa lity of Wales, or in that part o f Great Britain called Engbtid , with
the approbation of them tlie said Giwn Llovd and Sar^h 11111^-h is intended wife, or the survivor of tliem, testified by any deed or writing
under the hands and seals of them the said Giwn Lloyd and Sarah
Hill, and the survivor of them, duly executed in the presence of two
or more credible witnesses ; a nd that the said lands, tenements, an d
h ereditaments, when so purchased, and every part and parrel thereof .
with their appurtenances, should be conveyed to them the said Si r
Watkin Williams Wvnne and Edward Llovd , and their heirs, and t o

l

the
the

survivor of them and his heirs , to and for the use and behoof of
several persons, and for such estate and estates as the premises

thereinbefore

mentioned, and thereby granted and released by the said

Giwn Lloyd were conveyed, settled, limited, and appointed. And it
w as thereby also further df^cj-jpr pd and agreed that in case th e re
s hould be no issue of the said intended marriage and that the sa id
S arah Hill should be minded by her last will and testament to give o r
devise any sum not exceeding £4000.. or the estate thereby intended
to be purchased therewith, or any part thereof as aforesaid, to any
person or persons whatsoever, it s hould be lawful f^ ^^'^ fo'" h<>r thp
s ajd Sarah Hill, notwithstanding
her coverture^ to p;-ive and devise th e
s ^me, or any part thereof, to such person or persons, and to and-J or
s uch estate and estates,
and such uses, intents, and purposes, as sh e
s hould limit, direct and appoin t : and in such case they the said Sir
Watkin Williams Wynne and Edward Lloyd should sta nd seised ofj all
and every the lands, tenements, an3 hereditaments so to be purchased
as aforesaid, to them and their heirs, t o and for such uses, inten ts,
a nd purposes, as she the said Sarah Hill should, by such her last will,

>

>«^.
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direct, and appoin t ; and then and from thenceforth all and evthe
uses and limitations to the said Giwn Lloyd and his heirs, of
ery
and concerning the said lands, tenements, and hereditaments to be purchased as aforesaid, should cease, determine, and be absolutely void,
to all intents' and purposes whatsoever.
Gjwn Llovd died in 1774, and Sarah his wife in 1782. intestate, a nd
without having had any issue . Catherine Lloyd, the testatrix, continued in possession of the estate from the death of Sarah Lloyd until the time of her own death, in 1787. For the defendants, it w as
c ontended, that the legal estate was vested in Sir W. W. Wynne an d
Edward Lloyd, by the deed of 1746. and consequently, that neitli er
Giwn Lloyd nor tlie testatrix had any legal estate ; and, therefore, th e
l essor of the plaintiff could not derive any such estate from her . The
learned Judge reserved the point, and the plaintiff having obtained
a verdict, a rule nisi for entering a nonsuit was granted in Michaelmas
term.
BaylEy, J, I am of opinion that we ought not to make the rule abs glute for entering a nonsuit, but that there should be a new t rial in
this case.
Considering the length of time that has elapsed since the
purposes of the settlement made by Giwn Lloyd were at an end, I
think the question as to presuming a reconveyance of the legal estate
ought to be submitted to a jury. The first point for our considera tion
i s upon the construction of the settlement! for if it vested the legal
e state in the trustees, then the lessor of the plaintiff had nni- the 1p<T.ql
estate unless there had been a rf'cr'^^^^y^^^^
The limitation is to Sir
W. W. Wynne and E. Lloyd, and to their heirs and assigns, habendum
to tiiem their heirs and assigns, to the only proper use and behoof of
I felt upon first
them their heirs and assigns upon certain trusts.
appeared to
that tliis was in
reading
very singular form, and
me that the words "To the use and behoof of them their heirs and
now
assigns," had been introduced by an accidental mistake, but
think that they were introduced by design, but through ignorance. J.t
certainly singular that Giwn Lloyd should part with tlie legal esta te
mmediately on the execution of the settlement, and that he and
also_singular that
wife should onlv"be equitable tenants for life. It
mere
the term created for the purpose of raising portions should be
with
the
£4000.
to
and
that
lands
be
term,
the
purchased
equitable
doubtful whether
manner as to leave
should be limited in such
or no the cestui que trust would take the legal estate. That would not
necessarily be the case, for the direction, that the estate purchased
should be limited "for such estate and estates," as the other premises,
and, therefore, this
not absolutely
might mean for equitable estates
inconsistent with the idea that the trustees were to take the legal estate. And on the other hand, he power which Giwn Lloyd and
w ife would have had to defeat all the contingent limitations if the
purpose to
rustees did not take the legal estate, shows so strong
construing the deed according to the strict legal operaanswered
it

is

h

is

by

e

b

t

a

,

t

;

a

it

a

is

h
is

i is

I

a

it,
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I think we are not at liberty to pu t
upon the words than that which thev usually
Now, ever since I have belonged to tlie profession of the law,
b ear.
I have inv ariably understood that an use cannot be limited upon an U>i4_ ^4>— f
use.
That is admitted to be so in general, b ut a distinction has bee n ^ ^ca,^i^
t ak^n where the limitation is to A., to the use of A. in trust for B .,
a nd it is said that then A. is in by the common law . That is true;
but he is in of the estate clothed with the use, which is not extinguished,
but remains in him. In the case of Meredith v. Jones, cited in argument to show that where an estate is limited to A., to the use of A.,
he is in by the common law, it is said, "For it is not an use divid ed
frg ni.^^"'^ pstptp, as where it is limited to a strange r,j3Ut the use and th e
e state go ■together ."
That case therefore shows, that although the
tr u stees in fliis case might be in by the common law, yet they were i n
b oth of the estate and the use. There are two cases expressly in point.
Lady "IVhetstone v. Bury is a very clear case, and the words used
were precisely the same as those found in tlie deed in question, and it
was there decided, and also in The Attorney General v. Scott, which
came before Lord Talbot, one of the greatest real property lawyers
that ever filled the office of Lord Chancellor, th at the le gales tate ves ts
.
,
i n him to whom by the words of the instrument
the use i^hmit ed,
Upon the authority of these two cases, I am of opinion that the u se ^^-^ap«j%-*
'
Then, upon
k "To f tlie estate in question was executed in the trustees..
the other question tiiere is certainly some proi niH fnr prp=n"T'"g a
'^'^\
ut, on the, one hand.
think the Court would be going
^v*"s
reconveyance
presumption, and, o n
great deal too far were they to make such
t ion

of the language used, that

a

I

b

think the lessor of

the

^\j^'

plaintiff ought to have an opp orj^^'X - The rule should, therefore,

-yy^

V'l

l

■

V^

''^vjh

V**

,

I

a

J.
I

a

a

t

unity of submitting that pojpt <"0
be made absolute for
n^ej^J^rial.
HoLROYD,
agree with my brother Bayley, that in this case there
new trial.
ought to be
Upon the first perusal of the deed in question
had no doubt that the legal estate was vested in the trustees

.

t

I

he other,

'

a

;

*^:

a ny other construction
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having always understood that an use cannot be limited upon an use
and although
was struck by the ingenuity of the distinction pointed
out by Mr. Taunton, yet upon further consideration
appears to me
S
that his argument does not warrant it. The argument is, that as he
tr ustees did not in the first instance take to the use of another, but
a
they
were in by the common law and not the statute
themselves^
^. ""^ Cytrtr
^^^^
that the
rst use was, therefore, of no effe ct, and he case was to be
onsidered as
the deed had merely contained the second limitation
.
be true that the trustees
Bu^ll^^J; is* nqt go. for although
use^
.
a
take the seisin by the common law, and not by the statute, yet they
r;^
^
themselves,
and not to the use of another . J-^dj^:^^ —
take that seisin to the use of
n which case alone the use
executed by the statute.. They are, there - y'uJLAx^ -^
ore, seised in trust fnr another, and the legal estate remains in them . yOy^i,*.^aXt^*
were intended that the deed
As to the question of intention, even
that
should operate in
different mode from
pointed out by the law.
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w hen the le^al estate is ^iven to trustees, that Intention cannot count ervail the law. But the intention appears to me~altogeffier doubtful ; the
absence of trustees to preserve contingent remainders affording a
st rong reason for supposing that the parties meant to give the leg al
estate to the trustees .
LiTTLEDALE, J. I am entirely of the same opinion. It is said, that
by the construction now put upon the deed the intent of the parties
will be defeated. • If we were not construing a deed, I should feel disposed to give a liberal effect to the intention, but if all matters of
convenience and inconvenience which raise a presumption of intention
are to be taken into consideration, as affording rules for the construction of deeds, and are to have the eft'ect of overruling the plain words
of such instruments, the law will very soon be thrown into utter conHere, however, there is a balance of inconveniences, and
fusion.
therefore we may come at once to the legal construction of the settlement. I never entertained a doubt that a second series of uses coujd
not be executed . It is true, that certain cases shew these trustees to
have taken the esta te by the common law, but tliev to ok it coupled
with the use. The cases cited upon this point are perfectly clear, and
they are well collected in a note, by Serjt. Williams, to Jefferson v.
Morton, 2 Saund. 11, n. (17). However for the reasons given, I think
that there ought not to be a nonsuit, but a new trial.
Rule absolute for a new trial.

URE

v.

(Supreme Court of Illinois, 1900.

URE.
1S5 111. 216, 56 N.

E.

10S7.)

BoGGS, J. The ch ancellor entered the decree here appealed frpm on
the theory th e tru st.cr eated by the second clause of the will of Mar gar et Ure, deceased, w as a passive, or dry^ust^, a nd that the Statu te of

U ses instantly operated to vest the legal title to

the real estate

of

in jthe

.
Whether such is the true construction
is the only question presented by the record. The clause reads as fol-

c estui que trust

lows:

the clause

"Second — After the payment of such funeral expenses and debts,
I_givej d evise and bequeath to my son John Francis Ure all niy cow s,
bulls and calv es, except one cow and my horse s Rosy, Jessie and Doll,
and tlie rema inder of my real and personal estate equally to my two
sons, R obert Arnold U re and Jo hn Francis Ur e: Provided, however,
that the portion of my estate that I hereby give, devise and bequeath to
my son Robert Arnold Ure shall be held bv a trustee, and said t rustee
t o be the executor of this my will hereinafter nanied, to hold and con
in
said
he,
trust,
the
trol said property for said Robert Arnold Ure
RobertArnolj^ Ure, to h ave th e income^ only, from said e_state_toJiis
o wn use and benefit as long as he may live, and on his death said esta te
to revert to his natural heirs," etc.

\>t
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from the will, consisted of t^th real a nd
The
St
atute
of Uses has no application to persoj ial
£sonal
property, and the title to that portion of the trust property was not affected by that statute. 27 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. Ill, and cases
cited in note 1 ; 3 Jarman on Wills, p. 51, note 2. Speaking of the rule
of construction adopted in some instances when a trust estate consists
in part of property the fee whereof necessarily vests in the trustee, it
"
is said in Jarman on Wills, (vol. 3, p. 85, 5th Am. Ed.) :
It seems th at
wlTere a will is so expressed as to leave it doubtful whether the tes tato r mtended the trustee to take the fee or not, the circumstance that
The trust

estate, as appears

property

pe

.

j

there is included in the same devise other property which necessarily
vests in the trustee for the whole of the testator's interest affords i
g round for g iving. \hfi will thf s nnie rnnstruction as to the estate in
qU£^Uop."

The income of the estate, both personal and real, is be queathed to
Arnold Ure during his lifetime and the remainder in fe e
d evised to his "natural heirs ." The trustee is empowered to "hold and
control" the property in trust, etc., and these words measure and fix
the duties of the trustee.
The word "hold," which was a technical
word as employed formerly in the tenendum clause of a deed, has now
no technical meaning when used in such instruments.
Bouvier's Law
Die. "Tenendum"; Wheeler v. County of Wayne, 132 111. 599, 24 N.
E. 625. Among others, the foljowing definitions of the word 'Uioldl'
"
are given by Mr. Webster:
To derive title to : to retain in one's keep"
i ng; t o be in possession oL l t o occupv : to maintain
authority over.
The" word "control" has no legal or technical meaning distinct from that
given in its popular acceptation. Webster employs the word "superintendence" as expressive of the meaning of the word "control," and gives
the word "control" as one of the synonyms of the word "superintendence." The same lexicographer defines the word "superintendence" as
follows : "The act of superintending ; care and oversight for the purpose of direction and with authority to direct."
The word "manage"
sa id Robert

is defined to mean

"to direct

(Anderson's Law Die.)

be en held to be synonymous

Power

;

control

;

govern

;

administer

;

oversee ;"

"control" and "manage" hav e
(Youngworth v. Jewell, 15 Nev. 48.)

the words

; a nd
.

to hold alid the duty to control

the trust estate involve the
custody and possession of the trust property, both real and personal,
and s uch a trust is not merely passiv e. It is not indispensable to the
power and duty of a trustee to
the trust property and collect the
rent thereon, the devise shall in pcpress terms so empower him. It is
e nough if the intent to invest ham with such power can be gathered
from th e_^ll. 3 Jarman on w/lls (5th Am. Ed.) p. 56. It was mani'festly the intention of the maker of the will here under consideration,
t he executor, as trustee, shoulg enter into and retain possession of the
t rust estate during the lifetime of the said Robert Arnold Ure. and
should diligently devote hijg energy^ judgment and discretion to the
management and control oi the property , to the end that the greatest
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The Statute of U ses
possible incQme should be secured therefrom.
does not execute a t rust o f t his character . Meacham v. Steele, 93 111.
135 ; Kirkland v. Cox, 94 111. 400; Kellogg v. Hale, 108 111. 164.
The decree must be reversed, and the cause will be remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with the views here expressed. Reversed and remanded.''*
-y:'

SECTION 3.— UNDER MODERN STATUTES

ABBOTT
(Supreme

v.

Judicial Court of

HOLWAY.
Maine, 1S81.

72 Me. 298.)

This is an a ction on the case for was te. The writ is dated September 28th, 1878.*""""
The plea is the general issue and brief statement denying the plaintiff's title and claim.
At the trial it was admitted tliaf^ Jampc; Ab^<^^-t ^"'•^g, ^" the 30th of
April, 1872, and long had been, the hjusband of th e plaintiff: that he
died May 5th, 1875; tliat the defe ndant is the administrator on his estate ; that he owned, on the 3Uth of April, 1872, and long had owned,
tlie premises described in tlie writ, a valuable farm in Pittston, upon
which was a large timber and wood lot; that he continued to live on
the farm with his wite managing and taking the crops tliereof until his
death, she now surviving him ; tliat in the winter and spring of 1875,
without the consent and against the remonstrance of the plaintiff, he
caused to be cut and hauled to market, a quantity of mill logs, cut for
t hat purpose, and n ot tor fencing or repairs.
Since Abbott's death, his administrator has sold the lumber made
from the logs and received the money therefor.
The p laintiff" put in evidence the deed from James Abbott to h er,
dated April 30th, 1872, embracing the premises described in the writ
and upon which the alleged waste was committed, and proved i ts execu tion an d delivery on the day of its date, and i ts record i n the Kennebec
It is made part
registry on the same day by plaintiff's procurement.
of the case.
71 A tract of land was conveyed to H. upon the following uses and trusts :
"This conveyance is made to the said H. as trustee to hold the said property
for the sole use and benefit of K., v/ife of M., free from dominion, debts, or •
liabilities of her present or any future husband, and the rents, profits, proceeds of, or sale or profits of said property, or any portion thereof, shall be
held under the same trusts." Was the le.^al estate vested in the wife? See
Hart V. Bayliss, 97 Tenn. 72, 36 S. W. 691 (1896) ; Georgia, C. & N. Ry. Co. v.
Scott, 38 S. C. 34, 16 S. E. 185, 839 (1892) ; Sutton v. Aiken, 62 Ga, 733 (1879).
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"Know all men by

.

^

2G9

.

"^

these presents, tliat

*C^
I, James Abbott of Gardiner

in the county of Kennebec, i n consideration of one dollar paid by my
wife Clarissa B. Abbott, and for the purpose of providing and securing to my said wife a comfortable support in the event of my decease
during her life, the receipt whereof I do hereby acknowledge, do her eby give , grant , bargain, s ell and convey, unto the said Clarissa B. Abbott of said Pittston her heirs and assigns forever a certain lot of land
* * *
si tuate in said Pittston and bounded.
andop erate as a conveyance u ntil
^'This deed is
no^ to take effect
my decease , and inc ase 1 shall survive m y said wife, this d eed is not
t o be operative _a s a conveyanc e, it beingthe sole purpose and object
of this deed to make a provision for the support of my said wife if she
shall survive me, and if s he shall survive me then and in that even t
o nlv t his deed shall be operative to convey to mv said wife said pre mi ses in fee simp le! Neither I, the grantor, nor the said Clarissa B. Abbott, the grantee, shall convey the above premises while we both live
without our mutual consent. If I, the grantor, shall abandon or desert
my said wife then she shall have the sole use and income and control
of said premises during her life.
"To have and to hold the aforegranted and bargained premises, with
all the privileges and appurtenances thereof to the said Clarissa B, if
she shall survive me, her heirs and assigns, to their use and behoof
A nd I do covenant with the said Clarissa B. her heirs and asforever.
s igns, that I am lawfully seized in fee nf \\\e p re mises ; that they are
free of all incumbra nces ; that I have good right to sell and convey the
same to the said Clarissa B.if she shall outlive me, to hold as aforesaid
A.nd that I and my heirs shall and will warrant and
at my decease.
d efend the same to the said Clarissa B. if she shall survive me. and h er
h eirs and assigns forever, against the lawful claims and demands of
persons .

^

"In witness whereof, I, the said James Abbott, have hereunto set my
hand and seal, this tliirtieth day of April in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and seventy- two.
"

"James Abbott.

Si?"ned

.

sealed,

and d elivered in presen ce of

[Seal]

"N. M. Whitmore.
"L. Clay."
Djily acknowledged a^ d _recorded^
Barrows, J. The plaintiff's right to maintain this action must de-

it

it,

pend ultimately upon the construction to be given to the deed or instrument under which she claims title, and upon the force and effect of the
terms used therein to define the interest which she acquired by virtue
thereof.
Our statutes (R. S. c. '73, § 1) prnvi'f^p tViai- "a person owniii p^ re al
-estate and having a right of entry into
whether seized of
or not,
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a

it,

nrall Viig interest in
may rn ]-|Yry
deed to be acknowledg ed
by
and recorded as hereinaiter proviaed."
JJetailed regulations as to the
mode of execution and as to the torce and effect of conveyances thus
made and recorded, follow this general provision in some thirty sections, more, or less.
an
be doubted that under such statutes th
wner of real estate can convev in the manner prescribed, such pp^^" o^
portion of his esta te as he and his grantee may a^ree. subject only to
hose restrictions which the law imposes as required
public policy,
bm relieved from the technical doctrines which arose out of ancient
feudal tenures, and all the restrictive effect which they had upon alienations. Why prevent the owner in fee simple from agreeing withhis.
rantee (and setting forth that ag reement in his conveyance) as to the
une when, and the conditions upon which, th mstrume nt shall be prative to transfer the estate from, oneJLQ-ll 'ip~ntlipr
In substance our law now says to
party having such an interest in.
real estate as
mentioned in R. S. c. IZ, you may convey that interest
or any part thereof in the manner herein prescribed with such limitations as you see fit, pr ovided you violate no ru
of public po licy, and
what
you
do
on
record
that
so
aTTmay
see
how the owners hip
a^e
~

.

^ands.

In

of

of the statute of uses and of our own
statutes regulating conveyances of real estate in Wyman v. Brown, 50
Me. 139,
leading case upon the validity of conveyances under which
the grantee's right of possession was to accrue not upon delivery of
the deed but at some future day,) Walton, J., remarks
'fWe_am_al_so~|
opinion that efl'ect may be given to such deeds by for ce of our own
st atutes, independently of the statute of uses.
Our eeds" are not tram"ed to convey
use merely, relying upon the statute to annex the legal
title to the use. They purport to convey the land itself, and being duly
acknowledged and recorded, as our statutes require, operate more like
feoffments than like conveyances under the statute of uses."
In this
connection he quotes Oliver's Conveyancing, touching the operation and
properties of our ommon war ranty deed to the effect that in the transfer authorized by the statuteTiTthis mode, "th land itself
conv eyed
up on
except
livery
feoffment
that
of
seizin
with
dispensed
s^in
omplyingu aLtlLlh requisitiori _nf the statute, acknowle dgin anH r pcording,
''^ sub stituted instead of it."
■'
-—
And he concludes that deeds executed in accordance with the provisions of our statutes and deriving their validity therefrom may be upheld thereby, as well as under the statute of uses, notwithstanding th ev
^
urport to convev freeholds to commence at
future_ day.
In other words the mere technicalities of ancient law are dispen sed
w ith upon compliance w ith statute requirements._ Theacknowledgment and recording are accepted in place of livery of seizin. and~ insl
ompetent to fix such time in the future
the parties may agree pon
as the^ime when the estate of the grantee shall commence . No more
V. necessity for Hmiting one estate upon another, or for having an estatej
the effect

is

g

s
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\
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^
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pass immediately to the grantee in opposition to the expressed intention of the parties.
T he feoffment is to be r egarded as taking place, and the livery of
se izin as occur ring at the tmie hxed in tlie instrument, ^nd ^he ac k nowledgmentand recording are to be considered as giving the neces The queswhich vyas sought- in the ancient ceremonv.
s ary publicity
tions, did anything pass by the conveyance, if so, what, and when, are
to be determined by a fair construction of the language used, without
The instrument will be upheld ac reference to obsolete technicalities.
c ording to its terms, if those terms are definite and intelligible, and no
-^
n contravention of the requirements of sound public policy .
The defendant, while he does not controvert the doctrine of Wyman
V. Brown, insists that nothing passed by the deed of James Abbott to
was
his wife, because according to its terms
uncerta in whether

^'' (of some sort)

fWjuJ^

t^i

^

*^

a it

le

ft

i

^A-iKj^y^
^^^

would ever take effect as
conveyance, that not even a
claims,
which
passed when the deed
the plaintiff
contingent remainder
most,
to
mere executo ry
amounts at
was made and delivered, hat
contrary to public
greement, and any recognition of its validity
an attempt to evade the statutes regulating the makpolicy, because
ing and execution of wills, But the instrument was duly execut ed by
man capable of contracting, and having an
the defendant's testator,
absolute power of disposition over his homestead farm, subject only to
was duly reco rded so that all the
the rights of his existing creditors.
«.
world might know what disposition he had made of certain interest in
If operative at all, operated differ - //#t<ur^-^
and what was left in himself.
ambulatory, revocable. Whatever pass ed Ju%^ M\,tn»^
ntlv from
will. A will
irmtrnm
fr> the wife by th
ent became irrevocably hers .
\ufx^ *
We fail to perceive that any principle of public policy, or anything ■■
in the statute of wills calls upon us to restrict the power of the owner
of property unincumbered by debt, to make gifts of the same, and to t(r%£^ m^J>
qualify those gifts as he pleases, so far as the nature and extent of /U^vf^ft*^.
'
them are concerned.
^blic policy in this country has been supposed .^ '^^^
and tne alienatio n
ra ther to favor the facilitation of transt'ers ot titl
o _gstates. and the exercise of the m ost ample power over property by
*^^*^^ ^^''^^
The
consistent with goo3^ faith and fair dealing.
ts owner that
a

if

it

a

c

is

f

^

i

a

f

a

o t

t

a

i
t

is

CUh/x^

'%^

^Jj/j
^^
SuJUjJt^
\

^^**

^^^^^^

_

/

is

if

a

a

selfish principle may fairly be supposed to be, in all but exceptional
man's
distribution of
cases, strong enough to prevent too lavish
property by way of gift.
The learned counsel for defendant speaks of this instrument as "an
attempt to make an executory devise," "a mode of devising real estate."
the doctrine of Wyman v.
It
something more and different, and
gives to the grantee
contingent right n
Brown
to be maintained,'
devisee in the lifetime^
he property which (unlike the interest of
he testator) cannot be taken from her, and may, upon the performance
the condition make her the owner of the premises in fee simple, cording to its terms. It
the court give ettect to ttiis
argued that
will lead to uncertainty as
title to real estate,
-mode of transmitting

.
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to the rights of the respective parties, and to litigation between the
heirs of the grantor and grantee, that "it would tie up estates, embarrass titles, and impair the simplicity of our modes of conveyance,"
without producing any compensatory benefit.
Why these results
should follow (when the validity and effect of such conveyances has
once been determined) in any greater measure than they are liable to
follow any kind of family settlement is not apparent. What we do
is precisely this.
We uphold a conveyance in conformity with th e
agreement of the parties t herem expressed, that the tit le of the p^rante e
s hall accrue, not upon the delivery of the deed, but upon the happeni ngof a certain event ( the proof of which is commonly easy) at a future
time specified in the recorded conveyance. Wliy should harm com e of
i t any more than from a lease made to run from a future day certa in ?
In substance the grantor says to the grantee, I give you this conveyance made and executed in the manner prescribed by our statute, sothat you may have a n irrevocable assuranc e that if you outlive me the
property therein described shall be yours iQ_fee_simeki_from and after
my decease, in like manner as if you took the same by livery of seizin
on that day, under a feoffment from me, the statute provisions for a
recorded deed dispensing with that ceremon v- Doubtless this is all
contrary to the ancient doctrine, which is thus stated in Greenleaf's
Cruise, vol. IV, p. *48: "A feoffment cannot be made to commence
in f uturo, so that if a person makes a feoffment to commence on a future day, and delivers seizin immediately, the livery is void, and nothing more than an estate at will passes to the feoffee,"
What was the
foundation of this doctrine?
It is stated ibidem thus: "This doctrine
is founded on two grounds; first, because the object and design of
livery of seizin would fail if it were allowed to pass an estate which
was to commence in futuro; as it would, in that case, be no evidence
of the change of possession ; secondly, the freehold would be in abeyBut, given the
ance which is never allowed when it can be avoided."

of

re'cord^d conveyances for which our statutes provide, th e
of livery o f seizin becomes of no importance as an eviden ce
or the change of possessio n ; and we shall find our natural horror of a
freehold in abeyance (if It could be demonstrated that such a result
would follow from allowing a freehold to take eft'ect in futuro) greatly
mitigated by the circ u_nistance that here and now it is no longer necessarv "that the superior lord should know on whom to call for th e
military services due for the feud," and so, in any event, the defence of
File commonwealth will not be weakened; and by the further circumstance that "e very stranger who claims a right to anv particular land s.
may know against whom he ought to bring his praecipe for the rec overy of them.'Lbj a simple inspection of the public records, and proof of
s vg;tem

c eremony

actual possession .
The doctrine of Wyman v. Brown is a good illustration both of the
maxim, cessante ratione, cessat etiam lex, and of the changes wrought.
in the common law by statutory provisions.
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T he Virginia doctrine that a feoffment cannot be made to commen ce
in futuro was long ago done away with by statute .. Tate's Dig. p. 175.
While it does not form part of the decision in Wyman v. Brown, this
matter underwent a careful scrutiny, and, upon full consideration, the
court agreed that our statute system of registered conveyances brought
about the same result here.
We are at liberty, then, to give to the language used by the granto r
in a deed, its obvious meaning, without

invalidating

the deed,

to

say

t liat it shall operate as the parties inten ded, and carry an estate to commence in fiitnrn if t he y fio agree? without the necessity of resorting~t o

any subterfuges under which the est ate thus created to commence in
f uturo may b e recognized as existmy only by way of remainder or b.y
v irtue of some imputed covenant to stand seiz ed.
A single reading of this conveyance of James Abbott to his wife is
sufficient to satisfy one that it was no part of the intention or expectation of either, that the wife acquired thereby any interest in the homestead farm during the life of the grantor except as expressly therein
declared, to wit, a right to t he "use, income and control nf said premi se';
during her li f e," in case the husband deserted her (which he did not do) ,
and besides this, an irrevocable right to the same in fee simple, in case
s he survived h er husband, her estate to commence at his deceas e.
The language of the deed differs widely from that of any of the conveyances which have been sustained as passing an estate in remainder
to the grantee with a life-estate in the grantor reserved. If the object
of the draftsman had been to exclude the idea that the conveyance
should have any force until the time therein appointed, in other words,
to have it take effect as a feoffment made at the time fixed in futuro, to
convey, as of that date, an estate in fee simple and to have no other
operation, it is difficult to see how he could have made that object
plainer in words.
"This deed is not to take effect and operate as a conveyance until
my decease, and, in case I shall survive my said wife, this deed is not
* * * jf she shall survive me,
to be operative as a conveyance.
then, and in that event only, this deed shall be operative to convey to
Note also the language
my said wife said premises in fee simple."
of the habendum and covenants. A convevance thus fra.med cannot
g ive, the rights of a remainderman presently to the grantee, nor so o perate for thwith, as a conveyance as to convert tlie holdinp^ of the gr an -

from tiiat time forward into a mere tenancy for life^
Such language bears little resemblance to the stipulation in the deed
which was under consideration in Drown v. Smith, 52 Me. 142, "but
the said (grantee) is not to have or take possession till after my decease; and I do reserve full power and control over said farm during
my natural life."
It differs quite as much from the provision in the case of Wyman v.
Brown, to the effect that Mrs. Brown was "to have quiet possession^
Aig.Pbop. — 18
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and the entire income of the premises until her decease." Drown v.
Smith, however, is an authority which reheve's us on the question
whether stipulations which on the face of them are not consistent with
terms previously used importing a present conveyance, will avoid the
There is an apparent contradiction in saying, I convey this propdeed.
erty to you, but this is no conveyance until, &c., nor unless, &c. j3ut
the modern cases like Drown v. Smith, indicate that if the intent, t aking th e whole together, is clear and intelligible, the court will give eft egt
If a deed can be
to It notwithst a nding some apparent repugnan cv.
upheld where, as in Drown v. Smidi, the grantor reserves to himself
"full power and control over said farm during my (his) natural life,"
on the face of it including the power of disposition, we may give its
to convey an estate in fee
fair and just effect to one framed, as this
simple to the grantee, to commence at the decease of the grantor, provided the grantee outlives him and tlie true effect seems to be that of
feoffment under which the execution and record of the deed operate
in the same manner as livery of seizin made at the time of the grangives no right of action for waste com^mitted dur ing
tor's decease.
grantor's
life. While this grantor lived he could o an ything with
he
he homestead farm not inconsistent with the right which he had co nshe survived
from the me of his decease,
veyed to his wife to take
e.
n
forward
m
tee
simpl
the
ce
as
the
owner
mm.
If the testimony of Lapham and Palmer represents truly the acts of
otherwise w ell
which the plaintiff complains as waste, her suit, were
proof
of anything which amounts __to
ounded^ would fail for want of
waste according to the best considered decisions in this country . See
Drown v. Smith, ubi supra, and cases there cited.
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II

OF DEEDS

1.— SIGNING

SECTION

At common law s igning- was not essential to a ^ood deed . Blackstone seems to have been of the opinion that the Statute of Frauds
made signing necessary. 2 Bl. Comm. 306.
The general and better
view, however, has been that the Statute of Frauds did not, in its requirement of a signature, include instruments under seal. Avetine v.
Whisson, 4 M. & G. 801 ; Taunton v. Pepler, 6 Madd. 166. See also
Cooch V. Goodman, 2 Q. B. 580, 596; Cherry v. Henning, 4 Ex. 631.
The stat utes of the various states in this country quite uniformly r eq uire_that a deed effective as a conveyance shall be signed by the co nv ev'ing party or his agen t. The state statutes should be consulted on
this point.

SECTION 2.— SEALING
JACKSON

ex dem.

GOUCH v. WOOD.

(Supreme Court of New York, 1S15.

12

Johns.

73.)

This was an a ction of ejectment for lot No. 7, in the town of Locke,
in the county of Onondaga, and was tried before Mr. Justice Thompson, at the Cayuga circuit, in June, 1813.
The lessors of the plaintiff gave in evidence the exemplification of
a patent, dated the 13th of June, 1791, to John Day, for the lot in question. He then proved that Moses Couch was the identical person who
served, and was known in the New York line of the army by the name
of John Day, and that he was the same person to whom the patent was
It was also proved, that Moses Gouch, alias
granted by that name.
dictus John Day, was dead, and that the lessors of the plaintiff were
his heirs at law.
The defendant gave in evidence an instrument in writing, endorsed
on the original patent, dated the 19th of November, 1792, signed
his

without
any
"John X Day," but
"^
'
mark

seal, by which

he,

John Day, for the

consideration of ten pounds, paid to him by Benjamin Prescott, bargained, sold, remised, released and quit-claimed to the said Benjamin

(Part

2

Prescott, his heirs and assigns, all his right, title, claim, and interest,
of, in, and to, the premises granted and described in the patent, to have
and to hpld the same to the said Benjamin Prescott, and to his heirs
and assigns, to his and tlieir only proper use and benefit forever ; and
to this instrument the names of two witnesses were subscribed.
There never having been any seal to the writing thus endorsed on
the patent, it was objected, on the part of the plaintiff, that it amounted to no more than a parol contract, and was not sufficient to pass the
land. This point was reserved by the judge, and the defendant gave
in evidence sundry mesne conveyances from Benjamin Prescott to himself, all of which had been duly recorded : he also showed a possession
for seven or eight years. A verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court, on a case, as above stated.
Platt, J., delivered the opinion of tlie Court.
whether an estate in fee can be
The single question in this case
seal js^
deed;
that
than
otherwise
by
conveyed
is^to say, whether
essential to such conveyance.
freehold estate, known in the
The earliest mode of transferring
48,
English common law, was by livery of seisin only. Co. Litt. 49,
b.
But when the art of writing became common among our rude
ancestors, the deed of feoffment was introduced, in order to ascertain
with more precision the nature and extent of the estate granted, with
This deed, however, was of no
the various conditions and limitations.
validity, unless accompanied by the old ceremony of livery and seisin.
b,

a

Black. Com. 318.
The statute of uses (27 Hen. VIII) gave rise to the deed of bargain
and sale; and, soon afterwards, the conveyance by lease and release
was introduced, in order to avoid the necessity of enrolment, required
Black. Com. 343.) By virtue of the
by the statute of 27 Hen. VIII,
statute of uses, which we have adopted, (without the proviso in the
English statute requiring the enrolment of deeds,) the deed of bargain
and sale, now in use here,
equivalent to the deed of feoffment with
Black. Com. 339, 343,) and has, in practice, superlivery of seisin,
seded the lease and release.
freehold might be created
By the common law, estates less than
■or assigned, either by deed, by writing without seal, or by parol merely.
By the 29 Car. II, c.
(9th and 10th sections of our "act for the
was enacted, "that all leases, estates, interest
prevention of frauds,")
of freehold, or terms of years, or any uncertain interests in lands, &c.,
made or executed by livery and seisin only, or by parol, and not in
writing, and signed by the parties so making and creating the same,
exceptshall have the force and effect of leases or estates at will only
and,
"that
no
leases, estates,
ing leases for three years and less," &c.
or interests, either of freehold, or terms of years," &c. "in any lands,"
&c. "shall, at any time hereafter, be assigned, granted, or surrendered,
be by deed or note in writing signed by the party so assigning,
unless
granting, or surrendering the same," &c.
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;
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Now, it is contended on the part of the defendant, that the common
law mode of conveyancing has been so modified by this statute, as to
destroy the distinction between an estate of freehold, and an estate less
than a freehold, as it regards the mode of alienation ; and that either
may now be conveyed by "note in writing" without seal, as well as by
deed.

No direct decision appears to have been made on this point; but in
the case of Fry v. Philips, 5 Burr. 2827, and in the case of HoUiday v.
Marshall, 7 Johns. 211, it was decided, that a written assignment of a
lease for ninety-nine years was valid, though not sealed ; upon the express ground that it was the sale of a chattel-real, for which the statute
of frauds requires only a "note in writing" ; plainly recognizing the
distinction between a term for years, and a freehold estate, as to the
mode of conveyance.
.^
According to Sir William Blackstone, (2 Black. Com. 309, &c.,)lsealf
ing was not in general use among our Saxon ancestors. Their custom
was, for such as could write, to sign their names, and to affix the sign
of the cross; and those who could not write, made their mark in sign
of the cross, as is still continued to this day. The Normans used the
practice of sealing only, without writing their names ; and, at the conquest, they introduced into England waxen seals, instead of the former
English mode of writing their names and affixing the sign of the cross,
it being then usual for every freeman to have his distinct and particular seal. The neglect of signing, and resting upon the authenticity of
seals alone, continued for several ages, during which time it was held,
But in the
bj; all the English Courts, that seali ng alone was sufficient
process of time, the practice of using particular and appropriate seals,
was, in a great measure, disused ; and Sir William Blackstone, (2
Black. Com. 310,) seems to consider the statute of 29 Car. II, c. 3, (of
which the 9th and 10th sections of our statute of frauds are a
copy,) as reviving the ancient Saxon custom of signing, without dispensing with the seal as then in use, under the custom derived from
the Normans.
We have the
authori^ of that learned commentator, unequivocally
in favor of the opinion J that a seal is indispensable, in order to convey
an estate i n fee simple, lee tail, or for life. 2 Black. Com. 297, 312.
Such seems to have been the practical construction, ever since the
statute of Car.
in England, and under our statute of frauds in this
state ; and to decide now, that a seal is unnecessary to pass a fee, would
be to introduce a new rule of conveyancing, contrary to the received
opinion, and almost universal practice in our community, and dangerous in its retrospective operation.
Construing this statute with reference to the pre-existing common law, and the particular evil intended
to be remedied, Ijhink th e leg islature did not intend to dispense with a
seal, where it was before required, as in a conveyance of a freehold
estate; but the oSject" was to require such deeds to be signed also,
which the Cpurts had decided to be unnecessary.
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construe this statute as though the form of expression had been
estate of freehold shall be granted, unless it be by deed
signed by the party granting ; and no estate less than a freehold (excepting leases for tliree years, &c.) shall be granted or surrendered,
unless by deed, or note in writing signed by the grantor."
This venerable custom of sealing, is a relic of ancient wisdom, and is
not without its real use at this day. There is yet some degree of
solemnity in this form of conveyance. A seal attracts attention, and.
excites caution in illiterate persons, and thereby operates as a security_
against fraud.
If a man's freehold might be conveyed by a mere note in writing, he
might more easily be imposed on, by procuring his signature to such
a conveyance, when he really supposed he was signing a receipt, a
promissory note, or a mere letter.
The plaintiff is entitled to judgment. Judgment for the plaintiff.^

thus: "No

r.

for a

to the validity
of conveyances has been done away with by statute. As to this the
statutes of the various states should be consulted.
See also Stimson,
Am. St. Law, §§ 1564, 1565. These statutes vary in form and are
found under various heads, as a result of which there has been not a
little uncertainty and confusion.
See, for instance, Jones v. Morris,
61 Ala. 518; Rondot v. Rogers Tp., 99 Fed. 202, 39 C. C. A. 462;
Jerome v. Ortman, 66 Mich. 668, 33 N. W. 759.
As to what amounts to a sufficient sealing see Lightfoot and Butler's
Case, 2 Leon. 21; The Queen v. St. Paul, Covent Garden, 7 Q. B.
232 ; National Provincial Bank v. Jackson, ZZ Ch. D. 1 ; Warren v.
Lynch, 5 Johns. 239; Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. 472, 14 L. Ed. 228;
Bates v. Railroad Co., 10 Allen, (Mass.) 251 ; Pease v. Lawson, ZZ
Mo. 35; Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249, 35 N. E. 430; Lorah v.
Nissley, 156 Pa. 329, 27 Atl. 242.^

Quite generally

the necessity

seal as requisite

1 See Warren v. T.ynch, 5 Johns.
(N. Y.) 239 (ISIO), as to the origin, nature,
and use of seals. — Rep.
2 "The ground of this controversy lies in the
fact that the deed to Edwards
purports to be the deed of Agillon Price, only. The name of Lucy A. Price
does not appear in the body of it, nor is there anything in the body of the
deed to show that he was a married man.
It concludes, 'In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal,' et'c. The deed, however, is signed
by her and her husband, and acknowledged by her on the twenty-second of
July. 185.'}, and by him on the fourteenth of September, 1853. Tlie wife, as
will be seen, owned the property in her own right, and the fact that she
signed her name to the deed, and acknowledged it before a proper officer,
does not make it her gi*ant.
The party in whom the title is vested must
words to convey the estate. Signing, sealing, and acknowluse appropriate
edging a deed by the wife, in which her husband is the only grantor, vvill_
not convey her estate, Whiteley v. Stewart, 63 Rfo. 3G0 dSTB) ; Agricultural"
Bank v. Rice, 4 How. 225, 11 L. Ed. 049 (1840) ; City of Cincinnati v. New^-ll's
Heirs' Lessee, 7 Ohio St. 37 (1857). Whether it would be sufhcient to release
her dower in her husband's estate, we do not determine."
Bradley v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 91 Mo. 493, 4 S. W. 427 (1886), per Black, J.
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SECTION 3.— ATTESTATION
At common law attestation by witnesses was not necessary for any
In the United States not uncompurpose in connection with deeds.
monly the statutes require attestation for some purpose. In Ohio and
Connecticut attestation by two witnesses is necessary to make the deed
Langmede v.
valid as a conveyance, even as between the parties.
Weaver, 65 Ohio'St. 17, 60 N. E. 992; Winsted Bank v. Spencer, 26
Conn. 195. Generally, however, where attestation is called for by the
statute it is considered necessary only as a prerequisite to effective
recordinoj.

SECTION 4.— ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This, too, is wholl y a requirement o f statute, and generally speaking,
as in the case of altestation, is not essential to the validity of the conveyance. In Ohio and Arizona, however, it has been held essential to
Hout v. Hout, 20 Ohio St. 1 19; Lewis
the validity of the conveyance.
v. Herrera, 10 Ariz. 74, 85 Pac. 245, aff. 208 U. S. 309, 28 Sup. Ct.
412, 52 L. Ed. 506.
Quite commonly acknowledgment is made necessary to the validity of conveyances of certain special interests, as homeAside
steads, or conveyances by certain persons, as married women.
from these the requirement goes merely to the effectiveness of the
recording or to the matter of proof in offering the instrument in evidence.
On this and upon the matter of Attestation as well the statutes
and decisions thereunder should be consulted.

SECTION
STANTON

V.

5.— DELIVERY

CHAMBERLAIN.

(Court of Common Pleas,

In

1588.

Owen, 95.)

an action of debt upon a bond, upon non est factum pleaded, the
jury found, that tlie defendant sealed the bond, and cast it on the table,
and th^_plaintiff came and took up the bond, and carried it away without saying any thing; and if this shall amount to a delivery by the
defendant to the plaintiff, was the question. And it was resolved by
all the justices, that if the jury had found that he had sealed tlie bond,
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and cast it on the table towards the plaintiff, to the intent that the plain-_
tiff should take it as his deed, who took the^ond and went away, thathad been a good delivery; or that the plaintiff, after the sealing and
casting on the table, had taken it by the commandment or consent of
the defendant;
but because it is found that the defendant only sealed
and cast
on the table, and the plaintiff took
and went away with
this
not
sufficient delivery, for
be
that
to the
he sealed
may
intent to reserve
to himself until other things were agreed, and then
the plaintiff take
and go away with
without the defendant's consent, that will not make
the defendant's deed.
But
was said, that
found
might be accounted to be the defendant's deed, because
that he sealed
and cast
on the table, and tlie plaintiff took
&c.
and
not found that the defendant said any thing, and therefore because he did not say any thing,
will amount to his consent, Nam qui
tacet consentire videtur.
But to this
was answered, that
not
found that the defendant was present when the plaintiff took
and
the defendant had sealed, and cast the bond on the table when the
plaintiff was not there, and then the defendant went away, and then
the plaintiff came and took
not the deed of the__
away, then clearly
defendant.*

SLAYBACK.

Court of California,

18S3.

63

Cal. 493.)

it

a

f

*

*

*

4

a

j.

it
is

a

;

is

8

See Hughes v. Easten,
J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 572, 20 Am. Dec. 230 (1S30)
Cannon v. Cannon, 26 N. J. Eq. 316 (1875).
Only
portion of the opinion is printed.
*

I

,

^

I

Q

therefore,
presumed to have been delivered
duly executed,
you
find from the evidence that Mrs. Taggart actually signed and acknowledged the deeds in question, the law will presume that they were duly
delivered, and in order to defeat this presumption, the party disputing
the delivery must show, by preponderance of proof, that there was no
delivery."
This was error. A deed takes effect only from the time of its dedeed
void. No title will pass withlivery. Without delivery of

if

*
.-

J

'^

ff

a

The action was brought against Robert Taggart, minor, and against
O. M. Slayback, as administrator of the estate of Mary B. Taggart, and
as guardian of Robert Taggart, to quiet title to certain lands alleged
The plaintiff
^^ have been sold to the plaintiff by Mary B. Taggart.
alleged that some time subsequent to the execution and deliveny of the
deeds to him, by which the lands were conveyed, they were left at the
residence of Mrs. Taggart in
was
tin box, and that after her death
discovered that the deeds had been abstracted. The defendant denied
the execution and delivery.
The deeds were not recorded:
j^g judgment
must be reversed for erPkr Curiam.*
ror in the charge to the jury. The court below charged: "A grant,
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out delivery.
Dyson v. Bradshaw, 23 Cal. 528; Fitch v. Bunch, 30
Cal. 208; Barr v. Scliroeder, 32 Cal. 610. It i s for the party claiming,
iinde£a deed .tQ_£rove its delivery. Sometimes slight evidence will be
sufficient to support a finding of delivery, but no legal presu mption j)f
delivery ajrises . f rprn the mere fact that the instru ment is "s igned.".
The acknowledgment only proves that it was signed.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.

^

^

CURRY
(Supreme Court of Wisconsin,

V.

1898.

J^

.

COLBURN.

99

Wis.

319, 74 N. W.

778, 67 Am.

St.

Rep. 860.)

Bardeen, J.

The plaintiff brings this actio n in ejectmen t to recover
possession of a tract of land in the city of Marinette.
The answer is
a general denial, and a counterclaim substantially to the elYect that
both parties claim title from one Fairchild, and that the dee d under
which plaintiff claims title was never in fact delivered to him with
i ntent to pass titI e.~~A reply asserts the validity of plaintiff's deed, and
that defendants took title with notice of the plaintiff's rights.
The
chief g^uestion litigated on the trial was whether the deed from Fairchild to plaintiff had ever been delivered.
The court found that such
deed was handed by Fairchild to plaintiff merel y for examinationand
insp ection, and \v as_not,ddiyered with the intention of passing thetitle.
As conclusions of law, the court found that defendants were entitled
t° Jil^&ni?IlL^ismissin^_the_ complaint and canceling said deed.
There is ample evidence to support the conclusions arrived at by the
trial judge, and his findings of fact cannot be disturbed. The deed in
It was simply handed to
question was not dated or acknowledged.
plaintiff by Fairchild, at the former's request, to be taken to his lawyer for examination, and the parties were to meet later to complete
the bargain.
No particular fo rm is necessar y to cons titute_th e del ivery of the deed. , It is sufficient when the deed is executed, and the
minds of the parties to it meet, expressly or tacitly, in the purpose to
give it present eft'ect. Bogie v. Bogie, 35 Wis. 659. Like every other
contr act, there must b e_a_meetini;_of the minds of the contracting parties — the one to sell and convey, and the other to purchase and receive
— before the agreement is consummated. Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis.
The question of d elivery is largejyoHntention
243.
1 Devlin, Deeds,
262.
And
a
deed
never
until
it
delivered with
becomes
is
operative
§
the intent that it shall become effective as a conveyance.
Id. Counsel
for the plaintiff argue earnestly that, because the deed was handed by
Fairchild to the plaintiff, this constituted a full and complete delivery,
and that evidence was not admissible to show the actual condition
then existing.
No doubt, a great deal of discussion and unnecessary
refinement may be found in the books, bearing upon this question ; but
the main princip le must predominate, that, to constitute a valid de-
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Hvery of a deed, the grantor must part with his dominion overJt, with_
intent_Jo pass _ the title.
The ancient rule that a deed cannot be delivered in escrow to the
A delivery in escrow
grantee in no way conflicts with our conclusions.
Here the incontemplates complete loss of control over the deed.
complete deed was haiided to the grantee, to take to his lawyer for inspection. By the terms of their agreement of sale, a mortgage was to
be made, a party-wall contract was to be executed, and part of the
consideration to be paid. There was nothing in the circumstances to
show that Fairchild in any way intended to part with his dominion
over the deed. On the contrary, they all tend to establish the conclusion arrived at by the trial court.
That parol evidence is admissible
a
show
that
written
instrument
never been delivered so as_to
has
Jo
bind the parties thereto is established by the following cases : Gibbons

Ellis, 83 Wis. 434, 53 N. W. 701 ; Price v. Hudson^ 125 111. 284,
N. E. 817; Brackett v. Barney, 28 N. Y. 333; Jackson v. Roberts,
1 Wend. (N. Y.) 478; Reichart v. Wilhelm, 83 Iowa, 510, 50 N. W. 19.
In Price v. Hudson the court remark : "It is not competent to control
the effect of the deed by parol evidence, when it has once taken effect

V.

17

7^

by delivery, but it is always competent to show that the deed, although
in the grantee's hands, has never in fact been delivered, unless the
grantor, or those claiming through him, are estopped in some way from
assertmg the nondelivery of the deed."
Not to prolong this discussion, we conclude that the decision of
the trial judge upon the law finds ample support both upon principle
and authority.
By the: Court. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.^
"

The mies tiyn of rlelivery is a mixed question of la^ and fa ct, and it is
tuaniie delivery oi"a flPM may be uiiifle by acts alone, th'ai: is, by doand saying nothing; or by words alone, that is, by saying
in^ soiiietbiiig
something and doing nothing; or it may be delivered by both acts and words.
s

held

It must, however, be delivered by something answering to the one or the
other, or both, and with the intent thereby to give effect fo the deed.
Rountree v. Smith, 152 111. 49.3 [38 N. E. 6S0 (1804)].
In the case at bar the deed
was handed to Charles S. Owen by Mr. Lewis, and after it had been signed
and acknowledged by Mrs. Owen was placed by Owen in his private bo.x^, where
it remained until after his death. If these were the only facts which appeared
iu evidence bearing upon the question of delivery, it might well be held that
the deed had been delivered.
It appears, however, that the deed was made,
not with the intention that it should immediately take effect and pass the
title to said farm to Charles S. Owen, but that it should only take efteet in
case Chartes S. Owen survived
his wife, and in the event that his wife
should survive him it was never to take efiect but was to be destroyed.
A
upon its e.xec ution and delivery to tEe
deed must take effect immediately
gntntee Ar It VVlll.no! tAke'eiierT ai all.
U lisoll V. Wilson, fshl'lll. 5^ 'Hi
N. E. lOUT. 49 Am. St. Itep. i'td (l^\ib)\ ; Wilenou v. Handlon, 207 111. 104
We think it clear that the parties to this deed intend[e9 N. E. 892 (1904)].
ed it to oiterate as a will, and that the possession of the deed by Charles
S. Owen did not have the effect to vest the title to said farm in liim.
It is
urged, however, that the deed was delivered into the hands of Charles S.
Owpn, and it is said such delivery had the effect to invest him with the title
to the premises regardless of the intention of the parties, on the ground that
a deed cannot be transferred fi'om the possession of the grantor to the gran-
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BECKWITH.

1872.

30

Wis.

55, 11 Am. Rep. 546.)

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Waupaca County.
Action against defendants, together with the sheriff and former
sheriff of Waupaca county, to restrain said officers from executing
mortgaged premises sold under a judgment of forea_deed_gfj:ertain
closure to_the defendants, and to compel the defendants to convey
to respondent theii^ title acquired under such sale.
It appeared in evidence that the plaintiff, Tisher, who was in possession of the premises in dispute as a homestead under a patent from
the United States, liad partially execut ed bu t never delivered a deed
of the premises to his s on Charles H. Tisher. Tliis deed, which was
unstamped and bore no consideration or date, was placed by Tisher
in a trunk and locked up, the key being kept by his wife in a small
The son kept his papers in
box in another trunk which was locked.
Dethe same trunk in which the deed was placed, but had no key.
virtue
of
a
the
under
sale
fendants claimed
a
judgment
premises
by
of foreclosure of certain mortgages executed by the said Charles H.
Tisher. The court found as facts that the pretended deed of Tisher
to his son was never fully executed and delivered, but that it was
purloined from Tisher without his knowledge or consent, and that the
defendants had due notice of the plaintiff's claim to the premises, as
tee without vesting title In tlie grantee. We do not so understand the law.
While a deed tiiunot be delivered to the granree in escrow, nunieruus cases
have been decided by this court where deeds have been held nut to have
been delivered so as to pass title although the possession of the deed passed
froui the grantor to the grantee. In Rountree v. Snnth, supra, the deed
was delivered by the grantor to the grantee and recorded with the kr)()\vledge and consent of the grantor, and yet it was held that It was not delivered to the grantee so as to vest her with the title to the premises des'-rilied
in the deed. See, also, Bovee v. Hinde, 135 111. 137 [25 N. E. C94 (1890)] ; Hayes
Oliver
V. r.o.vlan, 141 111. 400 \:W N. K. 1041, :« Am. St. Re].. :',2G (IM).!)!;
Wilson v. Wilson, supra; HollenV. Oliver, 140 III. 542 [.% N. E. 935 (1894)1;
In the Wilson Case
185 111. 101 [57 N. E. 30 (1900)).
beck v. Hollenbeck,
the deed was placed in the hands of one of the grantees with the understanding if the grantor did not call for it it was to be placed of record after
his death. The court, on page 574 [of 158 111., on page 1008 of 41 N. E.I,
said : 'T he mere placing of the deed in the hands of one of the grante es
did not, of itself, necessarily constitute a delivery . In such a case t lie niquiry is, what was the intention of the parties at the time? and that intenmust govern.' And In Oliver v. Oliver, supra, on
tion, when asceitained,
page 547 [of 149 111., on page 956 of 36 N. E.], it was said: 'The fact that
take it into
a grantee in a deed may, after the execution of the instrument,
And in Hollenbeck v.
his hands does not, of itself, establish a delivery.'
Hollenbeck, supra, on page 103 [of 185 111., on page 37 of 57 N. E.]: 'The
Djere iilacini': of a deed -in the hands of the grantee does nut conclusively e sDeliver y
t ablish a delivery thereof, within the legal meainng or tuat word .
is'ji (luestiun oi' intent, and dcpeiMis upon whether the parties'at the tjin e
'^
Elliott v. Murray. 225 III.
meant it to he a delivery to t ;'K-e ^'itert- at onc e.'
fO'i, 8(rX'. E. ?t (1907), per Hand, J. iiee, also, Kavauaugh v. Kavanaugh,
Bank & Trust Co.,
260 111. 179, 103 N. E. 65 (1013); Elliott v. Merchants'
21 Cal. App. 536, 132 Pac. 280 (1913).
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well as his son's inability to convey. As a conclusion of law the court
found that Tisher was the owner in fee of the premises; that the
pretended deed to his son was null and void; that the mortgages
executed by the son were null and void, as well as the certificate
of sale issued to defendants under the foreclosure sale ; that the sheriffs should be enjoined from executing a deed on said certificate that
the defendants should be restrained from disposing of the certificate,
and that they should release to the plaintiff all claims to the premises in
question by virtue of said sale and certificate.
Judgment being entered in accordance with such findings defendants appealed,
Dixon, C. J. The fourth finding of fact by the court below is in
these words: "That the pretended deed from said plaintiflt and his
wife to Charles H. Tisher was never fully executed and was never
delivered, and that the same was purloined or stolen from said plaintiff without his knowledge, consent or acquiescence." If this finding
be correct and sustained by the evidence, it obviously

puts an end to all
claim of title to the land on the part of the defendants.
has beef
held by this court that the fraudulent procurement of a deed depositcdl
as an escrow from the depository by the grantee named therein, willl
not operate to pass the title, and a subsequent purchaser of
such]
grantee, for valuable consideration without notice, derives no title
thereby and will not be protected.
Everts v. Agnes and Swift, 4
Wis. 343, 65 Am. Dec. 314; Same v. Same, 6 Wis. 453. It is ess
tial to the validity of a deed that it should be delivered, and such de-j
Hyery to be valid must be voluntary^ that
made with the assent
and in pursuance of an intention on the part of the grantor to deliver
and
not so delivered
A deed purconveys no title.
loined or stolen from the grantor, or the possession of which was
fraudulently or wrongfully obtained from him without his knowledge, consent or acquiescence,
no more effectual to pass title
to the supposed grantee, than
were
total forgery, and an instrument of the latter kind had been spread upon the record.
The only question. which can ever arise to defeat the title of the sup=^
posed grantor in such cases,
whether he was guilty of any negli_gence in having made, signed and acknowledged the instrument, and
in suffering
to be kept or deposited in some place where he knew
the party named as grantee might,
so disposed, readily and without
trouble obtain such wrongful possession of
and so be enabled to deceive and defraud innocent third persons.
might possibly be that
case of that kind could be presented where the negligence of the
supposed grantor in this respect was so great, and his inattention and
carelessness to the rights of others so marked, that the law would
on that account estop him from setting up his title as against a bona
fide purchaser for value under such deed.
See Everts v. Agnes et al.,
Wis. 453.
There are some facts and circumstances in this case
strongly suggestive of such
defense, and were
not for the fact
found by the court that the deed_ was ne ver fully xecuted, and the
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further fact fully established in evidence that it was unstamped when
jput aw ay by the plaintiff in the trunk in the manner described by him-

a

a

a

a

4

J.,

self and the other witnesses, we might possibly have some hesitation
about affirming the judgment of the court below on this ground.
It appears from the plaintiff's own testimony that the trunk was
easily accessible to his son, the person named in the instrument as grantee, for he says that his son, who was acting as town clerk at the time,
kept his papers there, although he also testifies that the son had no
key to the trunk, but that his, plaintiff's, wife kept the key in a smaU^
box in another trunk belonging to her and which was locked.] A^eed
fully executed and which had been so kept or deposited would seem
to furnish some evidence, more or less strong, of negligence on the part
It would be unlike the case of a deed executed and
of the grantor.
deposited in escrow, which this court said was recognized as a- legitL:.
mate business transaction. ; But the finding is that the deed was not!
fully executed nor was it stamped, and the question is, whether it was \
negligence so to keep such an instrument^ and we are not prepared to I
say that it was. It occurs to us, as it probably did to the court below,J
that most men of ordinary care and circumspection would not have
regarded this as unsafe or imprudent or careless. An instrument complete in all its parts and lacking nothing to give it validity but delivery to the person named in it as grantee, might excite the cupidity of
such person to take wrongful possession of it when frequent opportunity for that purpose was afforded, but that an unfinished instrument,
one partially executed and not ready for delivery, would present the
same temptation would hardly suggest itself to the mind of any ordinarily prudent and cautious man. It would hardly occur to such a man
that such an instrument would be purloined or wrongfully taken, when
to give it any apparent validity in the hands of the supposed grantee
the crime of forgery^rnust also be committed.
It is for these reasons that this court is of opinion that the facts
proved were not sufficient to take the case out of the general rule of
law above stated, even taking the most liberal view of the facts in
favor of the defendants. There are cases, however, the tendency of
which would seem to be that the failure of the plaintiff to suspect and
treat his son as a knave, thief, or criminal, could not be attributed to
him as negligence.
See the able and well considered opinion of the
in Burson v. Huntington, 21 Mich. 415,
court by Christiancy,
Am.
Rep. 497, a case involving the same question with respect to the denegotiable pr omissory note and which, not having been
livery of
delivered by the maker but stolen or wrongfully taken and put in circulation by the payee, was held void in the hands of
bona fide holder
note
for value. The same case also makes
distinction between
or other instrument so obtained and one deposited in escrow and
afterwards fraudulently delivered by the depositors, holding that in
the latter case the maker would be bound as against an innocent holder
for value, on the ground of the trust or confidence reposed by him
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in the depository, and upon the principle that, when one of two inno;;_
cent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has enabled^
such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it. Upon the same
question also of negligence, see Wait v. Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425, 4 Am.
Rep. 395. It only remains, therefore, to be inquired whether the evidence given on the trial was such as to sustain the finding of the court
above quoted.
We are of opinion that the preponderance of testimony was deIf we omit from our consideration
cidedly in favor of the finding.
the
entirely
testimony of the plaintiff, which was clear and strong and
whose credibility and fairness we discover nothing to impeach, except
the mere fact of his interest, the finding was fully sustained by the
testimony of the witnesses, Quimby, Wooden and Mrs. Scheppe, who
corroborated the plaintiff" in almost every particular to which he testified.
Opposed to the testimony of these witnesses was only that of the
witness Hoxie, who testified merely to certain admissions and conduct
of the plaintiff calculated to induce the witness to believe that the
plaintiff had conveyed the land to his son. In this, Hoxie was directly
contradicted by the plaintiff, and there again the plaintiff was corroborated by the witness Wooden, who was present on the occasion spoken
of by Hoxie. In every view in which the testimony presents itself to
our minds, we are constrained to say that this finding of the court
below was correct, and consequently, that the judgment must be
affirmed.
By THE Court. Judgment affirmed ,*

PARROTT
(Supreme

Judicial Court of
22

v.

AVERY.

159 ^rass. 594, 35 N. E. 94,
Massachusetts. 1S9.3.
153, 38 Am. St. Rep. 465.)

L. R. A.

Writ of entry, to recover possession of a parcel of land in Great
Barrington. J'lea, nul disseisin. The case was submitted to the Supe-

rior Court, and, after judgment for the demandants, to this court, on
appeal, upon agreed facts, in substance as follows.
The tenant claimed title to the demanded premises by virtue of a
deed to him of the same from his grandfather,
one Miles Avery, deceased, dated, January 21, 1888, the consideration for which was expressed to be "love and affection," which was executed in the presence
of a witness, and which was recorded on January 31, 1893; and also
under the second clause of the will of Miles Avery, which devised to
6 See Gamer v. Risinger, 35 Tex. Civ, App. 378, 81 S. W. 343
(1904), where
the grantors prepared a deed and placed it in a drawer of the family organ,
where the grautore were accu.stonied
to keep tlieir valuahle papers. The
grantee, a stepdaughter of one of the grantors and a member of the household, took the deed without the knowledge of the grantors, and conveyed
the property to an innocent purchaser.
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the tenant, among other things, "my chest and its contents except the
bank-books."
The deed was duly executed by Miles Avery at or about the time
of its date, and is supposed to have been placed by him with other
valuable property in a certain chest owned by him, which was the
chest bequeathed to the tenant by the second clause of the will. The
will, which was dated May 25, 1889, was duly proved and allowed,
and the executor of the will, agreeably to its provisions, delivered the
chest and its contents, including the deed, which was found in the
chest, to the tenant, on January 28, 1893.
Miles Avery retained possession of the demanded premises, and
of the chest and its contents, up to the time of his death, which occurred on May 10, 1891.
The d emandants^ c laimed title to _the_ premises under the seventh
clause o f the will, which was as follows: "All the residue and remain^
der q my estate, both real and personal, not otherwise disposed of,
shall be equally d jvjdpd amon g all of ray grandchildren then living."
If the tenant had title to the demanded premises, judginent was to
be entered in his favor; otherwise, judgment was to be entered for
the demandants.
Allen, J.f 1. The agreed facts fail to shovy a deliv;ery of the deed
m t he grantor's lifetime.
The grantor retained control of the deed
and of the land. There was no prior bargain with the grantee, and no
indebtedness to him, nor relation of trust towards him. He had no
knowledge of the execution of the deed. The only consideration was
love and affecti on. The deed was not recorded during the grantor's
lifetime. There was no oral declaration by the grantor that he meant to
have it take effect at once. In short, there was nothing tending to show
a delivery of the deed except the bare fact that it was executed in the
presence of a witness. Tlie_question of delivery is a question of fact,
and d elivery in_the grantor's lifetime must be proved.
There must
have been an intention that it should operate as a present conveyance
of title. A finding of the delivery of the deed would not be warranted
on the agreed facts. Stevens v. Stevens, 150 Mass. 557, 23 N. E. 378;
Shurtleff v. Francis, 118 Mass. 154; Hawkes v. Pike, 105 Mass. 560,
7 Am. Rep. 554; Brabrook v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 104
Mass. 228, 232, 6 Am. Rep. 222 ; Chase v. Breed, 5 Gray, 440 ; Younge
V. Guilbeau, 3 Wall. 636, 641, 18 L. Ed. 262 ; 3 Washb. Real Prop.
(5th Ed.) 577 et seq. Ther e were no acts or declarations of the grantor
sufficient to show an intent to treat it as delivered, or circumstances
such as were f ouncT to He sufficient in Lowd v. Brigham, 154 Mass.
108, 113, 114, 26 N. E. 1004, and cases there cited, and in Regan v.
Howe, 121 Mass. 424. * * *

I

Judgment for demandants affirmed.'
tA

portion

7 See

Taylor

of the opinion is omitted.
v, Taylor (R. I.) 90 AtL

short time before her death, called her

746 (1014), in wliirh the erantor, a
son, the grantee, to her bedside, and
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TITLES

GARNONS

(Court of King's Bench,

1826.

5

v.

(Part

2

KNIGHT.

Barn.

& C. 671.)

an ejectment brought to recover possession of certain messuages and lands in the county of Flint.
The^ lessor of the plaintiff
claimed the property as mortgagee under a deed purporting to be ex-

This was

a

it

;

a

if.

At the trial before Garrow, B., at the
ecuted by W. Wynne, deceased.
summer assizes for the county of Stafford, 1825, the principal questio^i
turned on the validity of that deed ; and the following appeared to be
the facts of the case : Wynne was an attorney residing at Mold in
Flintshire, and had acted in that character for Gamons the lessor of
the plaintiff, who resided at a distance of about three miles from Mold,
Wynne's sister and niece lived in a house adjoining to his own at Mold.
On the 12th of April, 1820, about six o'clock in the evening, Wynne
called at his sister's house, his niece then being tlie only person at
home, and asked her to witness or sign some parchment. He produced
the parchment, 'placed it on the table, signed his name, and then said,
"I deliver this as my act and deed," putting his finger at the same time
on the seal ; the niece signed her name, and he took it away with him.
The deed remained on the table until he took it away. He did
not mention to his niece the contents of the deed, or the name:
of Mr. Garnons.
The niece had no authority from Mr. Garnons to
receive any thing for liim. It was proved by Miss Elizabeth Wynne,
the sister of Wynne, that in April, 1820, (but whether before or after
the execution of the deed as above mentioned did not distinctly appear,)
he brought her a brown paper parcel, and said, "Here, Bess, keep this ;
it belongs to Mr. Garnons." Nothing further passed at this time ; but
a few days after he came again, asked for the parcel, and she gave it
to him; he returned it back to her again on the 14th, 15th, or 16th of
April, saying, "Here, put this by." When she received it the second
time, it was less in bulk than before.
Wynne died in August, 1820.
After his funeral, she delivered this parcel to one Barker in the same
Barker, who was an
state in which she received it from her brother.
'intimate friend of Wynne, stated, that the latter in July, 1814, sent for
him, and told him that he had received upwards of £26,000. upon Mr.
Garnons' account; and after taking credit for sums he had paid, and
placed out for Mr. Garnons, he was still indebted to him in more than
£13,000.
He then asked the witness,
he, as his (Wynne's) friend,
would see Mr. Garnons to explain the circumstances.
The witness
consented, and Wynne then made
statement of his property
by
which
appeared that after payment of his debts, including the £13,000., he would have
surplus for himself and family of £8,000. at the
a

gave to him a box and the key thereto, sayin?, "Everything in that box is
yours."
Among the papers in the box was
deed bearing date twelve years
earlier, the delivery of which the court was called upon to determine.
In the
box were also the grantor's will and some insurance policies which belonged
to the grai^tee's sisters.
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least. He desired the witness to tell Garnons that, although he could
not pay him at that time, he would take care to make him perfectly
secure for all the monies due from him. Upon this being communicated to Garnons he desired Barker to assure Wynne, that he would
not then distress him, or expose his circumstances, but he expected that
he would provide him securities for the money he, Wynne, owed him.
This was communicated to Wynne, who expressed great gratitude to
Garnons, and said, he would take care to make him perfectly secure.
After the funeral of Wynne, his will was produced, and with it was a
paper in his own hand-writing, containing a statement of his property, and a list of various debts secured by mortgage or bond, and
among others, under the title "mortgage," there was stated to be a debt
Miss Wynne soon after delivered to the
to Mr. Garnons for £10,000.
witness, Barker, a brown paper parcel sealed, but not directed. Upon
this being opened, there was inclosed in it another white paper parcel
directed, in the hand-writing of Wynne, "Richard Garnons, Esq."
Within it was a mortgage deed, (the same that was witnessed by
Wynne's niece, as before stated,) from Wynne to Garnons for £10,000.
There was also within the white parcel, a paper folded in the form of
That
a letter directed in the hand-writing of Wynne to Mr. Garnons.
contained a statement of the account between Wynne and Garnons,
and £10,000., part of the balance due from Wynne to Garnons, was
stated to be secured upon Wynne's property.
The mortgage deed
found in the parcel was then delivered to Garnons.
It was a mortgage
of all Wynne's real estates.
It was contended on the part of the defendant that nothing passed
by the deed, inasmuch as there had been no sufficient delivery of it to
the mortgagee, or to any person on his behalf, to make it valid ; and,
secondly, because it was fraudulent and void against the creditors of
the grantor under the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5. The learned Judge overruled the objections, and the defendant then proved that Mr. Wynne,
in May, 1820, had delivered to him a bond and mortgage of his real
estates, to secure money due from Wynne to him ; and that by his will
he devised all his estates to the defendant. Knight, in trust to sell and
It was further proved, that about the 5th of April a
pay his debts.
skin of parchment with a £12. stamp was prepared by Wynne's order,
and for a few days he remained in his private room, with the door shut.
A clerk entered the room, and found him writing upon a parchment ;
he afterwards locked the door. There was no draft of the mortgage in
the office, and he never mentioned it. The whole of the deed was in
Wynne's own handwriting. He had three clerks, and deeds were in
tlie usual course of business executed in the office, and witnessed by himself and his clerks.
The learned Judge told the jury, that the first
question for their consideration was, whether the mortgage to the lessor of the plaintiff was duly executed by Wynne the deceased ; but that
if tliey thought it was originally well executed, the question for their
Aig.Pkop. — 19
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consideration would be, whether the dehvery to Mrs. Elizabeth Wynne
was a good delivery; and he told them he was of opinion, that if,
after it was formally executed, Mr. Wynne had delivered it to a friend
of Mr. Garnons, or to his banker for his use, such delivery would
have been sufficient to vest in Mr. Garnons the interest intended to be
conveyed to him under it; and the question for them to decide was,
whether the delivery to Miss Wynne was, under all the circumstances
of the case, a departing with the possession of the deed, and of the
for the benefit of Mr. Garnons, and to be
power and control over
delivered to him either in Mr. Wynne's Hfetime or after his death or
was delivered to Miss Wynne merely for safe custody as the
whether
If they
depository, and subject to his future control and disposition.
latter
for
the
purpose,
merely
delivered
was
were of opinion that
they should find for the defendant, otherwise for the plaintiff. A verdict having been found for the plaintiff, Campbell in last Michaelmas
new trial.
,

BaylEy, J.* There were ^^vo points in this case. One whether there
was an effectual delivery oFa mortgage deed, under which the lessor
of the plaintiff claimed,

so as to make the mortgage operate.

The oth-

;

it

it

a

it

;
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a
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a

er, whether such mortgage was or was not void against creditors or
subsequent mortgagee. Upon the first point the acts were shpjtlythese^
In July, 1814, Mr. Wynne, an attorney, who was seised in fee of the
friend to the lespremises in question, made communication through
client, that he (Wynne) had misapplied
sor of the plaintiff who was
above £10,000. of his (Garnons') money. Garnons answered, he relied
and expected that Wynne would provide him securities for his money
and Wynne said he would make him perfectly secure, and he should be
no loser. On the 12th of April, 1820, Wynne went to his sister's, who,
with her niece, lived next door to him, and produced the mortgage in
in the presence of the niece,
He then signed
question, ready sealed.
The niece,
act and deed."
"I
this
as
my
words
deliver
used
the
and
^
took
execution,
then
Mr.
away.
Wynne
and
the
desire,
attested
his
by
Mr.
name
nor
was
was,
Garnons'
The niece knew not what the deed
brown paper
In the same month of April he delivered
mentioned.
belongs to Mr.
parcel to his sister, saying, "Here, Bess, keep this
him
few days, and she gave
again in
Garnons." He came for

;

a

The argument of counsel and that portion of the opinion relating to
and
counsel's contention that the deed was void under St. 13 Eliz, cc.
are omitted.

5,

4

8

Y^

;

it
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it

on the 14th, 15th, or 16th of April, saying, "Here,
and he returned
wag,
then less in bulk than before, and contained the
put this by."
mortgage in question. Mr. W)mne died the 10th of August following,
and after his death the parcel was opened, and the mortgage found.
Mr. Garnons knew nothing of the mortgage until after was so found.
My Brother Garrow, who tried the cause, left two questions to the
jury; one, whether the mortgage was duly executed the other, whethand he explained to
er the delivery to tlie sister was
good delivery
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them, *hat if the delivery was a departing with the possession, and of
the power and control over the deed for the benefit of Mr. Garnons,
in order that it might be delivered to him either in Mr. Wynne's lifetime, or after his death, the delivery would be good ; but if it was delivered to the sister for safe custody only for Mr. Wynne, and to be
subject to his future control and disposition, it was not a good delivery,
and they ought to find for the defendant.
The jury found for the
plaintiff. Their opinion, therefore, was, that Mr. Wynne parted with
the possession and all power and control over the deed, and that the
sister held it for Mr. Garnons, free from the control and disposition
of the brother.
It was urged upon the argument, that there was no evidence to warrant this finding, and that the conclusion which the jury drew had no
Is this objection, however,
premises upon which it can be supported.
valid? Why did Mr. Wynne part with the possession to his sister, except to put it out of his own control ? Why did he say when he delivered the first parcel, "it belongs to Mr. Garnons," if he did not mean
her to understand, that it was to be held for Mr. Garnons' use? And
though the sister did return it to her brother when he asked for
would she not have been justified had she refused? Might she not
have said, "You told me
will part
belonged to Mr. Garnons, and
with
to no one but with his concurrence."
The finding, therefore, of
the jury,
this be
material point, appears to me well warranted by
the evidence, and then there will be two questions upon the first point
One, whether when
deed
duly signed and sealed, and formally delivered with apt words of delivery, but
retained by the party executthat retention will obstruct the operation of the deed the other^
ing
whether
third
delivery from such party be essential,
delivery to
such delivery puts the instrument out of the
person \fill be sufficient,
power and control of the party who executed
though such third person does not pass the deed to the person who
to be benefited by
until after the death of the party by whom
was executed.
Upon the first question, whether
deed will operate as
deed though
never parted with by the person who executed
there are many
will. In Uarlow v. Heneage, Prec. Chan. 211,
authorities to show that
deed purporting to convey an estate to
George Heneage executed
trustees, that they might receive the profits, and put them out for the
benefit of his two daughters, and gave bond to the same trustees conditioned to pay to them £1,000. at
certain day, in trust for his daughters but he kept both deed and bond in his own power, and received
the profits of the estate till he died
he noticed the bond by his will,
but the
and gave legacies to his daughters in full satisfaction of
daughters elected to have the benefit of the deed and bond, and filed
bill in equity accordingly.
was urged, that the deed and bond being
voluntary, and always kept by the father in his own hands, were to be
taken as
cautionary provision only. Lord Keeper Wright said, these
were the father's deeds, and he could not derogate from them and the
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parties having agreed to set the maintenance of the daughters against
the profits received by the father from the estate, he decreed upon the
bond only; but that decree was, that interest should be paid upon the
bond from the time when the condition made the money payable. In
Clavering v. Clavering, Prec. Chan. 235, 2 Vern. 473, 1 Bro. Pari. Cas.
122, Sir James Clavering settled an estate upon one son in 1684, and
in 1690 made a settlement of the same estate upon another son: he
never delivered out or published the settlement of 1684, but had it in
his own power, and it was found after his death amongst his waste
papers. A bill was filed under the settlement of 1690, for relief against
the settlement of 1684; but Lord Keeper Wright held, the relief could
not be granted, and observed, that though the settlement of 1684 was
always in the custody or power of Sir James, that did not give him a
power to resume the estate, and he dismissed the bill. In Lady Hudson's Case, cited by Lord Keeper Wright, a father, being displeased
with his son, executed a deed giving his wife £100. per annum in augmentation of her jointure; he kept tlie settlement in his own power,
and on being reconciled to his son, cancelled it. The wife found the
deed after his death, and on a trial at law, the deed being proved to
have been executed, was adjudged good, though cancelled, and the son
having filed a bill in equity to be relieved against tlie deed. Lord Somers
dismissed the bill. In Naldred v. Gilham, 1 Pr. Wms. 57'7, Mrs. Naldred in 1707 executed a deed, by which she covenanted to stand seised
to the use of herself, remainder to a child of three years old, a nephew,
in fee.
She kept this deed in her possession, and afterwards burnt it
and made a new settlement; a copy of this deed having been surreptitiously obtained before the deed was burnt, a bill was filed to establish
this copy, and to have the second settlement delivered up and Sir Joseph. Jekyl determined, with great clearness, for the plaintiff, and granted a perpetual injunction against the defendant, who claimed under
the second settlement.
It is true. Lord Chancellor Parker reversed
this decree ; but it was not on the ground that the deed was not well
executed, or that it was not binding because Mrs. Naldred had kept it
in her possession, but because it was plain that she intended to keep
the estate in her own power ; that sh$ designed that there should have
been a power of revocation in the settlement; that she thought while
she had the deed in her custody, she had also the estate at her command; that, in fact, she had been imposed upon, by the deed's being
made an absolute conveyance, which was unreasonable, when it ought
to have had a power of revocation, and because the plaintiff, if he had
any title, had a title at law, and had, therefore, no business in a court of
equity. Lord Parker's decision, therefore, is consistent with the posi-_^
tion that a deed. In general, may be valid, though it remains under the_
control of the party who executes
not at variance with
and so
clearly considered in Boughton v. Boughton,
Atkyns, 625. In that
case,
voluntary deed had been made, without power of revocation,
and the maker kept
as valid,
by him. Lord Hardwicke considered
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and acted upon it; and he distinguished it from Naldred v. Gilham,
which he said was not appHcable to every case, but depended upon particular circumstances; and he described Lord Macclesfield as having
stated, as the ground of his decree, that he would not establish a copyobtained, but would leave the party to his remedy at
surreptitiously
law, and that the keeping the deed (of which there were two parts) implied an intention of revoking, (or rather of reserving a power to revoke.) I Upon these authorities, it seems to me, that_vvhere an instrument is_formally sealed and delivered, and there is nothing to qualify
the delivery but the keeping the deed in the hands of the executing
party, nothing to show he did not intend it to operate immediately, that
it is a valid and effectual deed, and that delivery to the party who is
do not rely
to take by
or to any person for his use,^
not essential.
who
Roberts,
there
the
brother
on Doe v.
Barn.
A. 367, because
executed the deed, though he retained the title deeds, parted with the
deed which he executed.
But
this point were doubtful, can there be any question but that
third person, for the use of the party in whose favor
delivery to
made,
where the grantor parts with all control over the deed
deed
makes the deed effectual from tlie instant of such delivery?
The law
man will accept
will pr esume,
nothing appear to tlie contrary, that
what
for his^ benefit (11 East, 623, per Lord Ellenborough) and
there
the strongest ground here for presuming Mr. Garnons' assent,
because of his declaration that he relied and expected Mr. Wynne
would provide him security for his money, and Wynne had given an
answer importing that he would.
Shepherd, who
particularly strict
in requiring that the deed should pass from the possession of the grantor, (and more strict than the cases
have stated imply to be necesdown
that
to
the
sary,) lays
delivery
grantee will be sufficient, or dehe
has
or delivery to
livery to any one
authorized to receive
stranger for his use and on his behalf.
Roll.
Shep. 57. And
Abr. (K.) 24, pi.
Taw v. Bury, Dyer, 167
Anders.
and
Alford V. Lea, Leon.
Cro. Eliz. 54, and
Co. 27, are clear authorities, that, on
stranger for the use and on the bedelivery to
half of the grantee, the deed will operate instanter, and its operation
will not be postponed till
delivered over to or accepted by the grantee.
The passage in Rolle's Abridgment
this: "If
man make an
to B.,
obligation to L, and deliver
get the obligation, he shall
have action upon
for
shall be intended that B. took the deed for
him as his servant.
H. VI, 27." The point
put arguendo by Paston, Serjt. in
H. VI, who adds, "for
servant may do what
for
his master's advantage, what
to his disadvantage not."
In Taw v.
Bury an executor sued upon
bond. The defendant pleaded, that he
causes tlie bond to be written and sealed, and delivered
to Calmady
to deliver to the testator as defendant's deed that Calmady offered to
deliver
to testator as defendant's deed, and the testator refused to
as such wherefore Calmady left
accept
with testator as
sched-
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ule, and not as defendant's deed, and so non est factum.
On demurrer
on this and another ground, Sir Henry Brown and Dyer, Justices, held,
that, first by the delivery of it to Calmady, without speaking of it as
the defendant's deed, the deed was good, and was in law the deed of defendant before any delivery over to the testator, and then testator's refusal could not undo it as defendant's deed from the beginning, and
they gave judgment for the plaintiff, very much against the opinion
of the Chief Justice Sir Anthony Brown, but others of the King's
Bench, says Dyer, agreed to that judgment.
It was afterwards reversed, however, for a discontinuance in the pleadings. Sir A. Brown's
doubt might possibly be grounded on this, that the delivery to Calmady
was conditional, if the testator would accept it; and if so, it would not
invalidate the position, which alone is material here, that an unconditional delivery to a stranger for the benefit of the grantee will enure
immediately to the benefit of the grantee, and will make the deed a
And this is
perfect deed, without any concurrence by the grantee.
further proved by Alford v. Lea, 2 Leon. 110, Cro. Eliz. 54. That was
debt upon an arbitration bond ; the award directed, that before the feast
of Saint Peter both parties should release to each other all actions.
Defendant executed a release on the eve of the feast, and delivered it to
Prim to the use of the plaintiff, but the plaintiff did not know of it
until after the feast, and then he disagreed to
and whether this was
was urged that
performance of the condition was the question.
was not, for the release took no effect till agreement of the releasee.
release, and defendant could
It was answered,
was immediately
not plead non est factum, or countermand
and plaintiff might agree
when he pleased. And
was adjudged to be
to
good performance
condition,
of the
no place being appointed for delivering
and the defendant might not be able to find the plaintiff, and they relied on Taw's
confirmation, at
Case. This, therefore, was
distance of twentystill later period {33 Eliz.)
was
eight years, of Taw v. Bury and at
confirmed
in
the
Baker,
case
of
Butler
v.
Co.
26
again
great
Lord
Coke explains this point very satisfactorily. "If A. make an obligation
to C. to the use of B., this
to B., and deliver
the deed of A. presC. offer
to B., there B. may refuse
in pais, and thereently. But
by the obligation will lose its force (but, perhaps, in such case, A. in
an action brought on this obligation cannot plead non est factum, because
was once his deed,) and therewith agrees Hil.
Eliz. Tawe's
Case, S. P. Bro. Ab. Donee, pi. 29
Vin. 488. The same law of gift
of goods and chattels,
the deed be delivered to the use of the donee,
the goods and chattels are in the donee presently, before notice or
agreement; but the donee may make refusal in pais, and by that the
property and interest will be divested, and such disagreement need not
be in
court of record. Note, reader, by this resolution you will not
be led into error by certain opinions delivered by the way and without
premeditation, in
Ed. IV, &c., and other books obiter." Upon these
authorities we are of opinion that the delivery of this deed By lA^ynneT
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and_£utting it into the possession of his sister, made it a good and valid
deeT^aLJeast_irQiJl^the time it was put inta the sister's posses* * *
sion."

)V. L
(Supreme

FRYER

Court of Nebraska,

V.

FRYER.

77 Neb. 29S,
St. Rep. 850.)

1906.

W, /. ¥
109

N. W.

• h-^

175,

124

Am.

J

Albert, C.^° This is an a ppeal from a decree of foreclosure where- /0/7
".
by the lien of plaintiff's mortgage is o-iven priority over tlie respectiv e V/'^^^^**'^Tl
ju dgment liens of the two banks, defendants herein.
The mortgage
/^/ vZ^A^
is in the Torm of an a bsolute conveyance to the plaintiff by the de"""u
fendant, William I, Fryer, and his wife of c ertain real estate in the Oy>^*..^^iuI
city of Lincoln, was ji^rned and a.cknowlcdp^ed by the grantors on the ^Cjy
22d day of April, 1901, and was hi ed for record ^ n tlie 28th day of
ff^^^^^
"/T*'*^^**^
U
April, 1902, by William L. Fryer, who had retained it in his possession after it was signed and acknowledged, and af ter it was rprnrHe H^
w as forwarded to him at Denver. Colorado . _^vhere he had taken up
his abode. Pla intiff resides in the state of Iowa . On tlie 18th day
of December, 1902,' each of the defendant banks brought an action
against William I. Fryer, who was the fee owner, ami caused a wri t
of attachment to issue which was levied on the premises covered by
In each of these cases judgment was given in favor
t he mortgage .
of the plaintiff therein and an order entered for the sale of the premises for the satisfaction of the judgment.
In the pre sent suit the co ntest is be tween the plaintiff and the tw o banks as t o th e prigritx
their respective lienSj and is now narrowed down to the single question whether there had been a delivery of the mortgage to the plaintiff before the levy of attachments on the property.
The two iDanks
join in an appeal, and contend that, while the evidence shows the
mortgage was signed, acknowledged, and recorded some time before
their attachments were levied, it is insufficient to sustain a finding that
it was delivered to the plaintiff before that date.
Appellants' contention seems to be based on the fact that the plaintiff never saw the mortgage nor had actual manual possession of it
until after this suit had been pending for some time, and long after
the levy of the attachments.
But the authorities are uniform that actual manual deliv ery_is not^s.sential to give effect to a deed.. In Issitt
v. Dewey, 47 Neb. 196, 66 N. W. 288, it was held that, where the
grantor places his deed on record for the piirpose and w^th the intent of passing title to the grantee, actual manual delivery and formal
acceptance are not essential to the validity of the conveyance. In the
case at bar the evidence is conclusive that at the date of the mortgage

Jii

9 See Xenos v. Wickham, 13 C. B. N. S. .381 (1S62), 14 C. B. N.
S.
L. K. 2 H. L. 296 (1867) ; Bligbt v. Schenck, 10 Pa. 285, 51 Am. Dec.
10 A portion of the opinion is omitted.
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the mortgagor, William I. Fryer, was indebted to the plaintiff
on two notes, aggregating $5,000, for borrowed money, and that at
the time such indebtedness was contracted it was agreed between the
parties that William I. Fryer should convey tlie property in suit to
the plaintiff as security for the debt, and file the conveyance for record.
William I. Fryer testified on behalf of tlie plaintiff", and, while
portions of his testimony would indicate that he had no clear recollection of what he did with the instrument after it was forwarded to
him at Denver, toward the close of his testimony he testified positively
that it had been forwarded to the plaintiff before the date of a certain
payment made by him, which was made September 21, 1902, and almost three months before the attachments were levied.
It was after
of
this
search
and found the
learning
testimony that plaintiff made
instrument among his papers.
His statement, received in evidence
as a part of his testimony, accounting for his failure to discover it
earlier, is to the effect that it must have been received by another
member of his household and placed among his papers during his absence from home. The record further shows that at least two months
before the attachments were levied William I. Fryer had importuned
the plaintiff" to reconvey a portion of the mortgaged premises to the
latter's wife, and that plaintiff had refused to do so. The evidence,
we think, is amply sufficient to show that tlie instrument was placed
on record by William I. Fryer with the intent and for the purpose of
passing the title to the plaintiff, and to render evidence of an actual
manual delivery and formal acceptance unnecessary, under the rule
* * *
announced in Issitt v. Dewey, supra.
The decree of the district court seems amply sustained by the evidence, and we recommend its affirmance.
DuFFiE and Jackson, CC, concur.
By the Court.
For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion,
the decree of the district court is affirmed.^ ^
-/
deed

Moore v, Hazelton, 9 Allen (Mass.) 102 (1864), where an insolvent
being largely indebted to his ward's estate, upon the ward's coming of age, executed to the ward, in the presence of an attesting witness, an
assignment of a mortgage of realty in a sum less than that due to the ward.
This assignment was kept by the guardian until after the institution of proceedings in insolvency by him, more than a year afterwards, when it was
taken by the assignee in insolvency.
The ward, who knew nothing of the
assignment until after the insolvency, filed a bill in equity to compel the delivery of the assignment.
11 See

guardian,
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(Supreme Court of Ohio. lSo4.

8 Ohio

St. 377.)

and is in this court by agreement of
in
the notes of Judge Whitman, taken
parties, on the facts appearing
at the trial in the common pleas, and the deposition of Margaret Shannon. From the judge's notes, it appeared that the plaintiff first offered
a dee d fro m Owen Shannon to Ellen Shannon, for the land in conTEis^ deed, dated April 2, 1838, was left with the recorder
troversy.
of Perry county, April 6th, 1838, and was actually recorded^ April
JJth^l838, It was agreed that Owen Shannon was the common source
of title. The marriage of Ellen_ Shannp? to John Mitchell, January
Her death was also admitted. The posses7th, 1840, was admitted.
sion was admitted always to have been in Owen Shannon, or the defendant Ryan.
The defendant oft'ered in evidence a deed from Owen
wife,
to him, Ryan, dated July 27tli, 1847, recorded FebShannon and

The action is

one

of

ejectmenj^

ruary 14jth. 1850^
Owen Shannon, the grantor, testified in substance as follows : "Ellen Shannon was my daughter ; at the time of the deed to her, she
was in the east ; she knew nothing of it ; no consideration passed,
and she never had any knowledge of the conveyance ; she was born
in 1823 ; a year after the execution of the deed, she came to Ohio ;
she was married in about two years after the conveyance ; at this
time I was in possession ; I continued in possession until I contracted
to sell to one Kinney ; he took possession and made improvements ;
left, and gave up the contract ; then Patrick Haughran went in under
verbal contract with me, and made improvements ; he left ; I then
sold to Timothy Ryan, he paid me two hundred dollars ; Ryan never
moved on the place; my daughter lived a mile from the place after
her marriage; she died last spring or fall."
It was agreed that the taxes were always paid^by^ Shannon, till^the
sale to Ryan.

Henry Green testified that a short time before the last term of the
court, Mitchell had no knowledge of the deed to his wife ; Duffy told
him ; this was just about the time of the death of the wife.
Owen Shannon being recalled, testified that he sent the deed by mail,
from McConnellsville to Somerset, to be recorded ; it came back in
the same way ; he kept the original deed till it was lost.
The deposition of Margaret Shannon was in substance as follows :
"I am a sister of Ann Ryan, wife of the defendant, and also of Ellen
Mitchell, deceased, wife of John Mitchell. Ellen lived in New York
before- she came to Ohio; she was the last of father's family who
came ; he sent fifty dollars to bring her out ; had no knowledge of her
owning any land in Perry county previous to her death ; I was with
her off and on for two years before her death, she being sick ; she
had not enough of the necessaries of life ; she had nothing that was

■
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To the
deed.
not exist as
Swan's St. (New Ed.) p. 310,
Ohio, 74, 19 Am.
same effect are the authorities, Steele v. Lowry,
Ohio, 87, 31 Am. Dec. 432;
Dec. 581; Foster's Lessee v. Dugan,
Ohio,
Wend.
18;
Hammell,
19
Hammell v.
Jackson v. Perkins,
(N. Y.) 317; Gilbert v. N. Am. P. Ins. Co., 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 46, 35
Am. Dec. 543.
also clear that this presumption may be rebutted by proof. For
the statute makes the record prima facie evidence only, for tlie obvious reason that
may be the result of accident, mistake, or fraud.
no reason why
And being the act of mere ministerial officer, there
See the cases above cited and
should not be subject to explanation.
W. (Pa.) 32, 21 Am. Dec. 350, and JackPen.
also Chess v. Chess,
son V. Schoonmaker,
Johns. (N. Y.) 163.
was therefore proper for the defendant to introduce such rebut-
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nourishing, but did not complain, because she thought her husband
was poor; she and Mitchell, after they left McConnellsville, lived on
a farm owned by Mitchell and his father, until it was sold to P. Pagan ;
tliey then moved on to Caron's farm, where they lived about a year,
and until she died; that farm had cleared land, but they lived in a
small log cabin in the woods; during tliat time Carons and they fell
out, and she wanted to move on to an eighty acre tract adjoining father's farm; she told me that if Pagan would pay his notes according to promise, they would buy a nice little place, if only 40 or 80
acres; I am acquainted with the place in dispute; during the time
my sister lived in the neighborhood, Kinney lived on it ; next, Joseph
Perril, who occupied it at least during one crop ; after him was Patrickthink, more than one crop
Ryan then
Haughran, who raised on
now ocwho
Dew,
to
Dawson,
and
afterward
he rented
to
had
houses
and
had on
at the time of my sister's death, two
cupies
considerable of the land was cleared; never heard her
stable, and
would have afforded
or John Mitchell say anything about owning it;
more comfortable place to live in, than that where she died; Ellen
told
knew all about the sales and the renting of the place by father;
for
it:
of
how
father
it;
me
much
she asked
Ryan
her all about
got
betold her $200 Ellen had no property with which to purchase land
William,
fore her coming to Ohio, or previous to her marriage;
Michael, and Mary Ann, the plaintiffs in this action, were the only
children Ellen left."
Thurman, C.
The decision of this case depends upon the qiiesdeed from__
tion whether the recorded instrument, purporting to be
(Dwen Shannon and wife, to Ellen Shannon, was ever, in contemplation of law, delivered.
As the statute provides that copies from the records of deeds, duly
certified by the recorder, and under his official seal, "shall be received
in all courts and places within this State, as _prima^ Jacie evidence of
deed
very clear that the record of
the existence of such deeds,"
cansince, without delivery,
prima facie evidence of its delivery
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ting testimony; indeed, it was indispensable for him to do so, as the
burthen of proof that a recorded deed was not delivered, rests upon
the party attacking it.
He accordingly called Owen Shannon, the grantor, who testified as

follows :
"The grantee, Ellen Shannon, was my daughter; at time of deed
to her in 1838, 2d April, she was in the east; she knew nothing of
it; no consideration passed, and she never had any knowledge of the
conveyance; she was born in 1823; she was 15 years old when the
deed was executed ; she came to Ohio in a year afterward ; was married in about two years after the conveyance; at this time I was in
possession, and I continued in possession until I contracted to sell
the land to Kinney; he took possession, made improvements, left and
gave up his contract ; then Patrick Haughran went in under a verbal
contract with me, and made improvements;
he left; I then sold it to
Timothy Ryan, the defendant ; he paid me $200 ; agreed to ; that was
the consideration ; Ryan never moved on to the place ; Ryan agreed to
sell to Duffy ; the legal title is in Ryan, and. he is in possession by Duffy ; my daughter (Ellen) lived a mile from the place after her marriage ;
she died in January, or February, 1852 ; she never had any notice of
the conveyance ; I sent the deed by mail from McConnellsville to Somerset to be recorded ; it came back the same way ; I kept the deed
until it was lost."
Other testimony was given by the defendant, tending to prove that
the grantee, Ellen, knew of the control over the property exercised by
her father, and of his several contracts in relation to it; and that she
made no objection, nor asserted any claim;
but the same testimony
strongly tended to establish that she never had any knowledge of the
conveyance ; nor did her husband know of it until after her death, and
after the sale to Duffy. It was also agreed that Owen Shannon paid
the taxes upon the land until he sold to Ryan.
Upon this testimony,
the first question for our consideration is, with what intent did Owen
Shannon send the deed to the recorder to be recorded ? Did he thus
deliver it for the use of the grantee and to pass the title to her immediately, or had he some other intent?
That a delivery of a deed to a stranger for the use of the grantee,
may be a sufficient delivery, is well settled. 1 Shep. Touch, 57, 58;

Jackson v. Phipps, 12 Johns. N. Y. 421,
But it is said in the Touchstonej that if such a delivery be made
without a declaration of the use, it seems it is not sufficient. The reason of this is very obvious.
If the deed be delivered to the grantee,
tiie natjjraLpr esumption is that it is for his use, and no words are
necessary; But if it be handed to a stranger there is no s;ich natural
and hence, unless there be something besides the mere
presumption;
act of delivery to evidence the intent, it is impossible to say that the
grantor designed to part with the title. For the delivery may be by
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mistake, or for mere safekeeping, or for some other cause wholly independent of a purpose to transfer the estate.
But while it is thus apparent that the mere act of delivery to a
stranger is insufficient, it is equally clear that there is no precise form
of words necessary to declare tlie intent. Anything that shows that
For the real
tlie- delivery is for the use of the grantee is enough.
does the grantor by his act mean to part with his title and
question
as good as an expHcit
whatever satisfactorily manifests this design
when
man executes and
us
that
seem
to
Now
does
declaration.
with unqualified
recorder,
to the
acknowledges a deed and delivers
as was done in the present case, the reasonable
instruction to record
that
presumption, in the absence of any rebutting circumstance,
And this presumption
powhe means thereby to transfer his title.^^
erfully strengthened when, as in the case before us, the grantee
at
minor child of the grantor, and
great distance from him, so
that the deed cannot be delivered to her in person, and when too the
reasonable one, for
circumstances tend to show that
gift, and
aught that appears for the grantor to make.
argued, however, that there are circumstances in proof that
the
idea that Shannon, when he caused the deed to be recorded,
rebut
meant to part with his title and we are referred to his subsequent possession of the instrument, to his subsequent control of the property
and contracts to sell
and to the failure of the grantee, or her husband, to assert any claim to the land before the commencement of this
suit.
As to the last circumstance,
explained by the fact that the grannor did her husband
tee died without any knowledge of the deed
until just before this suit was commenced.
know anything about
No inference, therefore, can be drawn from their silence. What
any, should be given to tlie fact that the grantor never comweight,

§

*

*

*

a

a

a

12 "It is unnecessary to controvert
the proposition, however, that the record of a deed may be an evidential fact having more or less tendency, according to circumstances, to show that the deed had been delivered to the
grantee therein named or to some person for his use.
It may. under some
circumstances, be prima facie evidence of delivery.
But there is no sufficient \^'arrant in reason or precedent for declaring as a rule of law or presumption of fact, that the record of a deed is, imder all circumstances, prima
On the other hand, experience has shown it to
facie evidence of delivery.
be undoubtedly time that, under some circumstances, the record may have
delivery.
The case of Hill v.
no legitimate tendency whatever to prove
McNichol. SO Me. 220 [13 Atl. 883 (18S8)], is an apt illustration of this statement" Egan V. Horrigan, 96 Me. 46, 50. 51, 51 Atl. 246, 248 (1901).
"If the question were a new one, there would perhaps be nothing diffideed with the
cult or impracticable in the conception that the act of leaving
register for record by the grantor with the intent on his part thereby to vest
the title in the grantee should constitute the register the agent for delivery
of the grantee, and that upon the assent of the grantee tlie transaction should
But we think the law is otherwise in this
valid delivery.
take effect as
»
Barnes v. Barnes, 161 Mass. 3S1, 384, 37 N. E. 379, 380
state.
But see Rev. Laws 1902, Mass. c. 127, 5.
<1894).
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municated to either of them, the existence of the conveyance, is another
matter.
Much stress has sometimes been laid upon the fact of the grantor's
possess ion of a deed after an alleged delivery of it ; and it has been
said t hat such sjubsequent possession is a very pregnant circumstance
to show that t he supposed delivery was not absolute. That this may
often be the case is undeniable ; but where the deed has been recorded,
such subsequent possession is evidently entitled to much less consideration than where it has not. An unrecorded deed is the sole evidence of title, and it would be unsafe and altogether unusual to leave
it with the grantor after its delivery. But a recorded deed is not the
sole evidence. The statute makes the record also proof, and a copy
of it is admissible, even though the party offering it has the deed itself in, his possession.
Hence, with us, people have been proverbially
careless about their deeds after they, are recorded, and often, if not
generally, seem to attach more importance to the record than to the
Add to this that the grantor, Owen Shannon, was the father
original.
of the grantee, Ellen ; that she was a minor, and away from home
several hundred miles when the deed was recorded, and that she remained away for about a year, and it seems to us that but little, if
any importance ought to be attached to his subsequent possession of
He was her natural guardian, and there was nothing
the instrument.
strange in his having the custody of what belonged to her, even though
it was a deed in which he was the grantor.
Waiving the question, whether the subsequent acts of ownership, exercised by Owen Shannon, in respect to the land, and his failure to
communicate the existence of the deed to his daughter, are admissible
evidence to prove that it was not his design to transfer the title to
her when he caused the instrument to be recorded, we are inclined
to the opinion, after a consideration of tlie whole case, that the testiniony rather tends to prove a change of his mind subsequent to the
delivery^t o the re corder, than to establish that it was not then his purIf it had been his purpose when he made
gose to convey tih^ estate.
the delivery, to retain any control over the property, it is reasonable
to suppose he would have declared such purpose to some one; if not
to the recorder, at least to some member of his family, or to some
friend.
He was aware that by causing the deed to be recorded, he
would, prima facie, be divested of his title, and it is not very reasonable to suppose that he would make such a prima facie case against
himself, without taking some precaution to enable him to rebut
he did not mean fo do what his act purported.
witness, and testified. When
But this
not all. He was called as
he did so, he had the strongest motives to state that he did not mean,
by the execution and recording of tlie deed, to part with his title. For
he had subsequently conveyed the land to Ryan with warranty, and
he made that conveyance wilfully and corruptly, knowing that he
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had no title, he committed no less than a penitentiary offense. Yet he
uttered not one word to explain the intention witli which he sent the
deed to the recorder.
Nor did the defendant venture, so far as appears, to put a question to him touching his intent. Why this silence
of both witness and party? Why this failure to prove what the interest of both required to be proved?
Why this neglect to make a successful defense?
It -seems to us there is but one answer we are authorized to give to these questions, and that
that the question was
not asked, because the answer would have been unfavorable, and, for
the same reason, there was no unasked statement by the witness.
This
the ordinary presumption where
party fails to offer proof of what
he ought to prove,
exist.
almost incredible that, in the case
before us, the defendant would fail to ask, and the witness to state,
whether
was the intention to convey the land,
that intentipn had
not in fact existed. The very object for which the witness was called
was to prove that the deed was never delivered, but instead of asking
him directly for what purpose he caused
to be recorded, the defendant contents himself with proving circumstances from which he asks
the court to infer the purpose.
We suppose the truth to be, that the deed was sent to the recorder to
be recorded in order to vest the title in the grantee, and make the property hers but, that afterward, the grantor changed his mind, and coneluded not to give
to her. And,
altogether probable, assuming
the deed to be
gift, that he supposed he had right to revoke it. This
view reconciles his conduct perfectly, without imputing to him any
the only view that, upon the testiwrong motive at any time, and
mony, we feel at liberty to take.
And here would rernark, that very clear proof ought to be made,
to warrant
court in holding that
man who has executed and acdeed, and caused
to be recorded, did not mean thereby
knowledged
to part with his title.
If such deeds could be overthrown by slight
door would be opened to the grossest fraud.
testimony,
The testidoubtful case. It should
mony should, therefore, do more than make
establish clearly, that the dehvery for record was not for the use of
the grantee.
But
Owen Shannon did intend to part with
urged, that even
the title, yet the delivery was insufficient, because
was never accepted,
or assented to by the grantee; and
said that every sufficient delivery includes such assent or acceptance, for no one can be made
||- follows that the plaintiff
grantee without his consent. ^^
entitled to judgment.
13 The portion of the opinion relating to matter of acceptance, omitted hei-e.
Is printed infra, p. 383.
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48 Wash, 256, 93 Pac. 324, 125 Am.
St. Rep. 924.)
1008,

RuDKiN, J. F. Lanston died testate in Kitsap county in this state
on the 15th day of June, 1902. During his last illness and a few days
before his death, he c alled in one of his neighbors and directed him__ to
p repare a deed and will in order that he might execute them . A deed
g
was accordingly prepared purporting to convey the property now in C^t-t^^v,
controversy t o the three minors who are plaintiffs in this actio n. The
instrument was signed by the grantor in the presence of two wit nesses.
but was not acknowle dged because there was no officer present authorized by law to take the acknowledgment of deeds. The grantor stated
to those present th at he would appoint Mr. Tohnson as his executo r,
and would instruct him to have the deed acknowledged and pro perly
executed . The property described in the deed was of the value of
about $100 and was the only real property owned by the grantor.
At
the time of the execution of this deed and as part of the same transaction, Lanston executed a will making various small bequests which a re \Ju aJ(-/
'
""^
not material here. The following endorsement was made at the foot of
"
the will by direction of the testator :
Ed Johnson are hereby empo wer ed to appear for the notary publich to have inlaid deed execu ted."
What disposition was made of the will and deed after their execution
does not appear, but both instruments were delivered to the executor
some time after Lanston's death and were by him filed in the office o f
t he clerk of the superior court, the will under date of June 18th an d
t he deed on June 23d, 1902 . The deed was not filed for record in the
auditor's office vmtil February 1, 1906. At the time of the execution of
the deed and will, Lanston was the owner of the real property described in the deed and about $500 cash in bank. T he will was admitted to
p robate and Johnson appointed executor there of . On the 25th day, o f
N ovember, 1905^ the real property now in controversy was conveyed
to the defendants in this action by the executor of the will , pursuant
to an order of the superior court made and entered in the estate matter.
The p resent action was instituted by the grantees named in the ab ove
deed, through their guardian ad litem, to quiet their title as against th e
purchasers at the executor's sale , and from a ju dgment in favor of the
~~'
defendants, the present appeal is prosecute d[
Three questions have been presented for the consideration of this
court: (1) Was the Lanston deed ineffective for lack of a n_acknm vl"^
e dg ment on the part of the grantor; (2) was there a delivery of the
deed ; and, (3) are the defendants bo na fide purcha sers.
Firsts An u nacknowledged deed is good as between the parties in
this state . Such an instrument conveyed at least an equ it abl e title.
Devlin, Deeds (2d Ed.) § 465 ; Edson v. Knox, 8 Wash. 642, 36 Pac.

ay
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698; Carson V. Thompson, 10 Wash. 295, 38 Pac. 1116; Bloomingdale
V. Weil, 29 Wash. 611, 70 Pac. 94.
Second . Was there a d elivery of the deed ? "Actual manual delivery and change of possession are not required in order to constitute an
effectual deUvery. But whether there has been a vaHd delivery or not
must be decided by determining what was the intent ion of the gra ntor.
and by regarding the particular circumstances of the case . Where a
father had indicated in various ways that certain property should be
bestowed at his death upon his infant son, and for that purpose had
executed a deed, of which he, however, retained the possession, effect
was given to his intention, despite the fact that there had been no
manual delivery of the deed." 1 Devlin, Deeds (2d Ed.) § 269.
In Atwood V. Atwood, 15 Wash. 285, 46 Pac. 240, this court said:
"In coming to these conclusions we have not lost sight of the able argument and large array of authorities contained in the brief of appellant, to the effect .that the delivery of a deed does not necessarily require any formal act on the part of the grantor ; that it is often a question of intention ; that a deed may become operative while the manual
But in such cases, before th e
possession is retained by the grantor.
c ourt can find a delive ry, th e intention to consummate the transaction
so as to fully vest the title m the grantee must be clearlv shown^ and
neither the findings of fact by the referee nor by the superior court,
nor the evidence in the case, satisfies us that the grantor in the deed
under consideration ever did anything with the intention that by doing
it he had so delivered the deed as to make it presently operative."
What was lacking in the Atwood Case, viz., the intention to ronsiim mate the transaction so as to fullv vest the title in the grantee, was, in
The wil l
o ur opinion, clearly and u ripgniynrally <;hnwn in thic; raqp
and deed were e xecuted at the sar ne time and as part of the sam.e t ransThe real property was "omitted from the will, no doubt ad^ction.
visedly, and all the surrounding circumstances show conclusively that
t he grantor intended to convey his real property to these minors, that
the deed was executed for that purpose; and in our opinion the mer e
absence of an acknowledgment is not sufficient to defeat his express gd
i ntention s.
TliirrL Tlip respondents were not bona fide purchase rs, as that term^
is understood in the law! The rule of cave at emptor applies in all its
vigor to sales by administrators or executors in this state, and the purTowner v. Rodegeb,.
chaser acquires only the interest of the estate.
33 Wash. 153, 74 Pac. 50, 99 Am. St. Rep. 936, and cases cited.
We are therefore of opinion t hat the appellants have shown a clea r
title to the lands in controversy, as against the respondents, a nd th.e
judgment of the court below is accordingly j;eyersedj with directions to
enter judgment as prayed in the complaint.
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BURNETT.

(Supreme Court of Michigan,

1S79,

40 Mich.

361.)

Marston, J. The bill of complaint in tliis case was filed for the
pu rpose of foreclosing a mortgage alleged to have been e verntprl hy
de fendant and delivered to Calvin T. Burnett now deceased .
Calvin T. Burnett during his lifetime resided in Washtenaw county.
He was the o^yner of a tract of land in Livingston county, upon whic h
t he defendant and his sister were livin g. It is claimed on behalf of the
complainant that Calvin T., wishing to divide this tract between defendant and his sister, pursuant to an agreement previously made, had
a d eed of conveyan c e of the north half thereof to defendant an d one
o f the south half to nis sister prepared at Ann Arbor; that he and his
'
wife, the present complainant, t ook said deeds and visited their so n
a nd daughter where they resided upon said lands : that while there
and upon the 18th day of February, 1873, said deeds w ere properly
(jU^^h
'
executed, and that a t the same time two mort^^ age^. one from defendan t
and one from his sister to said Calvin, were by them respectively ex Tfe^ ii*.o-CZj
ecuted to secure certain notes^ those given by defendant being one for
This
$ 4,300, being the one in controversy, and another for $4,000.
second note under a separate agreement made at the same time was to
be considered as an advance to t h e defendant towards his share of h is
father's estate, and to be accounted for m a certain mann er.
It is also claimed that the deeds, mortgages and notes were at the
time of the execution thereof re tained by said Calvin T who was t o djLuLt ''»«■*-•
h ave the same recorded, but which was not done.
Calvin T. Burj2£tt^ §
-g^"
^
died FebruaoL -^th«-lBZ7. After his decease the deed to defendant
was offered him but he refused to accept the same, a nd the admini strat rix, on February 14th. 1877. caused the deed and mortgag e to he re-

Jt^

^

corded^

The defendant in his answer admits the execution of the notes and
mortgage ; th at $500 oi the note in controversy was for personal prop erty which he had purchased from his father ; that the deed execu ted
by his father to him of the land was not delivered nor intended to be :
that his father was to keep said deed, notes and rnortgage, and agreed
n ot to record the same, bu t would wait and see how def endant man a ged the property, and if not satistactory that the papers could be d es troyed .
The evidence is conflicting. Mrs. Burnett, the complainant, who was
present at the time the papers were executed says : "My husband was
to take care of the papers and put them on record at his own expense.
H e was to see that they were put on record . My husband took them
home with him."
She farther gives as a reason why they were not at
the time placed on record, was that they v\^ere to go home by way of
Howell and have them recorded, but the sleighing was going off and
Aig.Prop.— 20
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She farther testif?ed that her
they got home as quick as they could.
husband three years before his death and again one year before, toM
h er that if the papers were in his possession at the time of his death_,JjO-h ave them recorded, and handed over to the p ro per parties. Mrs. Burnett's daughter Mrs. Webster, who was present at the time the papers
were executed, gives the same version, t hat Calvin T. Burnett ^wa'^ ^"
t ake the papers, have them recorded, and then send the deeds t^jjhe
proper persons, the grante es.
The justice of the peace who took the acknowledgment and others
who were present and who on other occasions had conversations with
Calvin T. fully sustained the position set up in the answer of defendWhich under all circumstances is the more probable and correct
ant.
view? It is conceded that Calvin T. Burnett was a good and prompt
business man, while de fendant was somewhat addicted to th e use of
i ntoxicating liquors, and it is now said that it was on this account a nd
t o prevent the def endant from s quandering the property that thej leed
It is clear from the testimony of
a nd mortgage were not recorded .
Mrs. Burnett and her daughter that there was no formal delivery
not the slightest testimony in the
his deed to the efendant. There
case tending to show that he had at any time possession or control, of
is

so short

is

It

J.

/

/

,

It

.

d

h

e

r

T

a

is

is

s

a

ls

T

t

t

it

it

a

for never

a

period. All we have then from
the staternent
which we canfind that
sufficient delivery was made
made bv the grantor, admitting such a statement to have been mad e,
to
recorded and then send
hat he would retain this deed, have
Had this been done, perhaps no question would have
he grantee.
arisen. This, however, he did not do, but knowingly retained posseshis we think fal
sion of all the papers up to the time of his decease.
delivery
.
hort of showing
It said, however, that defendant took and remained in possession
of the real estate and made payments on the mortgage, and that he
thereby estopped from disputing the validity of the deed. Prior to the
execution of this deed defendant was in possession of this land, under
He continued in possession, and
three year's lease from his father.
the payments made were, we think, as now said by him, to have been
for the personal property which he purchased and in payment of rent
he retention of all these deeds. note s_a nd mortgag es
of the premises.
consistent ajid
bvC alvin T. Burnett and not placing them on cord
armonizes with the agreement as testified to by the justice and othg rs.
From an examination of the
an
IS inconsistent with the other view
evidence in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, we must
come to the cmiclusion that the deed was not delivered, and that the
agreement was in substance as set up by defendant in his answer.
follows, therefore that the decree of the court below must be affirmed
with costs.
,
^
Campbell, C. J., and Graves, J., concurred.
CooLEY,
appears tliat the intestate some years ago made an
arrangement under which he deeded land to George F. Burnett, his
the deed, though
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of which about one-half the estimated value was to be an advancement, and for the remainder the son was to give a ten*per cent, mortIt is probable from the evidence that the father planned this
gage.
arrangement alone, but it was carried out by the parties so far as the
execution of the papers was concerned, and the mortgage was executed
by the son with accompanying notes and delivered to the father. The
whether he dee was ever
only question concerning the transaction
.

delivered

it

is

it

it

is

a

a

is

it

it

it

it

a

I

It

does' not clearly appear that the deed was ever placed in the son's
hands, but
am not satisfied that at the time any of the parties supThe
remained incomplete and unconsummated.
transaction
the
posed
were
the
papers
where
the
distance from
place
father who lived at
executed, took the deed away with him when he returned home, and
His widow
was found unrecorded among his papers after his death.
upon rectestifies that he took
merely for the purpose of putting
ord, which he was to do at his own expense; and she says an accidental circumstance, which she explains, prevented his going to the
register's office on his return home.
The_.va.Lu£-QLthe land, has depreciated greatly since the transaction,
found not to be for the
took place, and on the death of the father
interest of the son and daughter to claim under the deeds made to them
by the father. And now the son being called upon to pay the mortgage he gave upon the land described in the deed to him, he refuses
to do so, and insists that the title was never conveyed to him, because
the deed was never formally delivered. The daughter makes no queswitness
tion that the transaction with herself was complete, and as
transaction
in the case she gives evidence which would make out
equally complete between her father and her brother, this defendant.
There are two facts in this case which to my mind are more conclusive than all the testimony of witnesses as to their understanding of
that
One
the purpose of the parties in executing such writings.
was greatly for her interest to take the same
the daughfer, although
position that the son takes here, did not understand she was at liberty
purto do so, but admits that the transaction was what on its face
that defendant for two years paid in full
ported to be. The other
the interest on his mortgage, thereby admitting its validity and obligaseems to me exceedingly unsafe to set aside the just intion. And
ferences from such unequivocal acts on such doubtful and contradictory evidence as we have concerning what took place when the papers
were executed.^*

a

14 A., the owner of lands, desiring to make provision
for his son, directed a
The deed when prepared was signed,
lawyer to prepare
deed of such lands.
sealed, acknowledged, and witnessed, and at request of A. recorded by the lawyer. After the lawyer had received the deed back from the recorder, A. told
him "to keep it until called for." The son, without ever learning of the deed,
died. Shortly thereafter A. called for the deed and tore his name oft. The
The son had been
Who is entitled thereto?
son's widow now claims the land.
*^'
living on the land with his father.

y

d

t

is,

son,

^
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tSupreme
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WHEELWRIGHT.

Massachusetts,

1807.

2 Mass.

447, 3 Am, Dec. 66.)

The petitioners set forth that the said Joseph is seised in fee simple of
four undivided ninth parts, and the other petitioners of two undivided
ninth parts, of thirty-one acres of salt-marsh lying in Wells, in common
with the said Aaron Wheelwright, and^ they pray that th eir respe ctive

it,

it

a

a

4,

it

J.,

parts may be set_oiiLtQ._the.m in severalty.
The respondent pleads in bar that Samuel Wheelwright, grandfather
of the respondent, on the 30th day of January, A. D. 1700, being seised
in fee of the premises, made his last will in writing, which was afterwards duly proved, and by which he devised the premises to his son,
Joseph Wheelwright, father of the respondent, in fee tail general, who
entered and was seised, and from whom the premises descended to
the respondent, as eldest son and heir in tail to his father, — and traverses the seisin in common with the petitioners, which they, in, their
replication, affirm, and tender an issue to the country, which is joined
by the respondent.
October term, A. D.
Upon trial of this issue before Thatcher,
1805, the respondent produced the last will of Samuel Wheelwright,
was admitted, for this trial, that the premises were devised
by which
in tail to Joseph, son of the testator, and father of the respondent, and
also of Joseph W., one of the petitioners, and of the husband of Mary
W., another of the petitioners, and grandfather of the remaining petitioners. It was also admitted that the respondent was the heir male of
Joseph, his father.
The petitioners produced, in support of their claim, two deeds of
the said Joseph, bearing date May
1795, one whereof purported to
be
conveyance of four ninth parts to the petitioner Joseph, and the
other a conveyance of two ninth parts to the remaining petitioners;
and they relied on these deeds to show that they were respectively
seised, in fee simple, of the several shares so conveyed. Upon producing these deeds by the petitioners, the respondent called for the evidence of their execution before they should be read. Nathaniel Wells,
witness, who testified that, in the year 1795,
Esq., was produced as
the petitioner Joseph requested him, by direction from his father, as
he said, to write those two deeds.
Having written them, on the 4th of
May, 1795, the father called upon him, and signed and sealed the two
deeds in presence of the witness and his brother, since deceased, and
delivered them for the use of the grantees, and that he and his brother
That
was the intent of the
subscribed their names as witnesses.
the
the
of
that
should
use
premises during his
the grantor
have
parties
life; and as some of the grantees were minors, and could not secure
the use to him, that tlie deeds were delivered as escrows, as he_ex^
to be delivered by him to the grantees 'upon the death of the
pressed
That the witness
j^rantor, which the witness has accordingly done.

'
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understood from the grantor that his intent, in executing the deeds,
was to preven t the en tail f rpni depriving the g£antees of the land conveyed^

a

is

a

is

a

is,

The counsel for the respondent objected to the reading of the deeds
to the jury upon this evidence, upon the ground that there was no
proof that the same, or either of them, was duly executed and delivered by the grantor in his lifetime to either of the grantees, or to any
person authorized by them, or either of them, to receive the same;
and that if they had been duly executed and delivered, they were not
made bona fide^ but merely and for the express_purpose of destroying
the entail of_said- lands.
lliejudge^oyerruled the objection, permitted the deeds to go in evidence, and directed the jury that they were sufficient and legal eviAfter a
dence to maintain the issue on the part of the petitioners.
verdict for the petitioners, the respondent's counsel filed exceptions to
the above opinion and direction of the judge, which were allowed and
signed pursuant to the statute, and at the last July term of the Court,
the question of the validity of those exceptions came on to be argued.
Parsons, C. J., (who stated the history of the cause, and proceeded.)
The right which the father of the respondent had to convey any of
the lands he held in tail must be derived from the statute of March
8, 1792.
By that statute it is made lawful for any person of full age,
seised in fee tail of any lands, by deed duly executed before two subscribing witnesses, acknowledged before the vSupreme Judicial Court,
Court of Common Pleas, or a justice of the peace, and registered in
the records of the county where the lands are, for a good or valuable
consideration, bona fide to convey such lands, or any part thereof, in
fee simple, to any person capable of taking and holding such estate;
and such deed, so made, executed, acknowledged, and registered, shall
bar all estates tail in such lands, and all remainders and reversions expectant thereon.
From inspecting the deeds produced in evidence in this cause, it
appears that two subscribing witnesses, to whose credibility no objection is made, have certified that they were signed, sealed, and delivered, in their presence.
And it further appears that the grantor, on
the same day, acknowledged that each instrument was his deed before
a justice of the peace.
One objection made by the respondent
that, admitting the deeds
to have been executed in the form and manner required by the statute
in this case, yet these conveyances are not bona fide, being made, not
for a valuable consideration, but for the purpose of depriving the heir
in tail of his inheritance.
The deeds purport to be for
valuable consideration in money, and for love and affection. to his issue, which
good consideration.
The statute also provides that the conveyance may -be on good consideration.
therefore very clear that
It
the statute intended that the tenant in tail might bar the heir in tail,
by deed conveying the land to his relatives, executed for
good al^
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This he might do by a common
though not a valuable consideration.
recovery ; and this method by deed is substituted by the statute in the
place of that common assurance, the effect of which is founded on legal
fictions. And it is certain that justice, or parental affection, will often
induce parents who hold their lands in tail to make provision for the
As the statute
younger branches of their family out of the entail.
has made the estate tail assets for the payment of the debts of the tenant, before and after his decease, a bona fide conveyance was required
by the statute, to prevent alienations to defraud creditors, and not to
protect the heir in tail. This objection cannot prevail.
The other objection is that, by the statute, the conveyance should
be completed, and the estate pass, in the lifetime of the tenant in tail,
and that the deed should be sealed, delivered, and acknowledged, by
him as his deed ; that, in the case at bar, the deeds were delivered by
the grantor to Judge Wells, not as his deeds, but as his writings or
escrows, to be delivered as his deeds by the judge to the grantees on
his, the grantor's death ; that they could have no effect until delivered
and, as the grantor was dead before the
by the judge accordingly;
second delivery, they were never his deeds, but are void.
The statute
This objection seemed to deserve much consideration.
of
the estate tail should be
certainly intended that the conveyance
executed in the lifetime of the tenant ; and therefore, if there be no
acknowledgment of the deed by him, the defect cannot be supplied by
the testimony of the subscribing witnesses after his death, as it may be
in conveyances of estates not entailed. The reason is, as common recoveries must be suffered in the lifetime of the tenant in tail, and at a
court holden at stated times, and the heir in tail has a chance that the
tenant may, after the commencement of the suit, die before the term,
so it was intended to leave him the chance of the tenant's dying before
acknowledgment, which, as the statute was first drawn, could be made
only in some court of record ; although, as it was amended, it may
now be made before a justice of the peace. There is therefore some
chance saved to him, but of much less consequence than it was before
the bill was amended.
The law, so far as it relates to the nature of this objection, is very
well settled. / If a grantor deliver any writing as his deed to a thirxT
person, to be delivered over by him to the grantee, on some future event,
it is the grantor's deed presently, and the third person is a trustee of
it for the grantee ; and if the grantee obtain the writing from the trustee before the event happen, it is the deed of the grantor, and he
cannot avoid it by a plea of non est factum, whether generally or spe^^
daily pleaded. This appears from Perk. 143, 144, and from the. case
of Bushell V. Pasmore, 6 Mod. 217, 218. But if the grantor make
a writing, and seal
and deliver
to
third person, as his writing
or escrow, to be by him delivered to the grantee, upon some future
event, as his, the grantor's deed, — and
be delivered to the grantee
not the grantor's deed until the second delivery;
accordingly, —
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of it before

the event hap-

pen, yet it is not the grantor's deed, and he may avoid it by pleading
This appears from Perk. 142, 137, 138.
non est factum.
It is generally true that a deed delivered as an escrow, to be deliv-
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future event, takes
on
ered over as the deed of the party making
its effect from the second delivery, and shall be considered as the deed
36, a.^_
of the party from that time. Perk. 143, 144. — Co. 35,
Whether the deeds in this case were delivered to Judge Wells as
writings to be delivered over as the grantor's deeds on his death, or
whether they were delivered as the deeds of the grantor to Judge
Wells, in trust for the grantees, to be delivered to them on the grantor's death,
question of fact, to be determined by the evidence.
This evidence results from the testimony of Judge Wells, and from the
inspection of the deeds. The deeds appear to have been signed, sealed,
and delivered, in the presence of two subscribing witnesses, and to
have been acknowledged as the deeds of the grantor before a justice
of the peace. The witness swears that the grantor did then sign, seal,
and deliver, them for the use of the grantees. Thus far there can be no
doubt. But the witness further testifies that, because the grantor was
to have the use of the premises during his life, and some of the grantees
being minors, the deeds were delivered tohim as escrow^ to be delivered
to the grantees upon the grantor's death. What the witness understood
He might consider them as escrows, benot explained.
by escrow
cause he was to have the custody of them until the grantor's death.
To aid his memory, he therefore refers us to the memorandum he
In that memoranmade, at the time, upon the wrapper of the deeds.
the
are
two
of
dum they
called the
grantor, naming him, to
deeds
the grantees, naming them, to be kept until the death of the gran'tor,
and then to be delivered to the grantees. Here they are not called the
The weight of the
writings, or escrows, but the deeds, of th« grantor.
evidence
not conclusive, in favor of the deeds
certainly very great,
having been delivered by the grantor, as his deeds, and deposited with
Judge Wells, in trust for the grantees. Upon this ground the deeds
were very properly admitted as -evidence, and the direction of the
judge was correct.
But
the deeds are to be considered as delivered to Judge Wells,
not as the deeds, but as the writings, of the grantor, we must not
thence conclude that they are void, ^l^lthoiigh generally an escrow
takes its effect from the second delivery, yet there are excepted cases,
considered the deed of the maker,
in which
takes its effect, and
founded on necessity, ut
The exception
from the first delivery.
writing, and
feme sole seal
res valeat.
Thus Perk. 139, 140. If
deliver
as an escrow, to be delivered over on condition, and she afterwards marry, and the writing be then delivered over on performothshall be her deed from the first delivery
ance of the condition,
erwise, her marriage would defeat it. In Brook's Reading, on the statA. delivers
another exception.
ute of limitations, p. 150, there
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deed, as an escrow, to J, S., to deliver over on condition performed,
before which A. becomes non compos mentis ; the condition is then performed, and the deed dehvered over; it is good, for it shall be A.'s
deed from the first delivery.
Another exception is in 3 Co. 35, b, 36, a.
a
lease
makes
Lessor
by deed, and delivers it as an escrow, to be delivered over on condition performed, before which lessor dies, and
after, it is delivered over on condition performed : the lease shall be
the deed of the lessor from the first delivery.
There is also a strong
exception in 5 Co. 85. If a man deliver a bond as an escrow, to be
delivered on condition performed, before which the obligor or obligee
dies, and the condition is after performed — here there could be no second delivery, yet is it the deed of the obligor from the first delivery,
although it was only inchoate ; but it shall be deemed consummate by
the performance of the condition.
/ Therefore, if the deeds in this case were delivered to Judge Wells
ks escrows, and by him delivered over on, the death of the grantor, they
(must take their effect, and be considered as the deeds of the grantor,
I from the first delivery,
he being dead at the second delivery.
And
the cases in 3 Co. 36, a, and 5 Co. 85, are in point.
It may here be
observed, that it is not to be presumed that it was the intention of the
grantor to deliver these deeds as escrows, to be after delivered as
his deeds, on the event of his death; when, from the nature of the
event, they could not be considered as his deeds from the second delivery. The presumption is violent that he considered Judge Wells as a
trustee of the grantees. But whether the deeds were delivered to him
as escrows, or in trust for the grantees, — in either case the verdict
must stand, and the first judgment be entered thereon, viz., that partition be made; and let a warrant issue to commissioners to make par-

tition."

RUGGLES

V.

(Supreme Court of New York, 1816.

This was

LAWSON.
13

Johns.

285, 7 Am. Dec. 375.)

tried before his honor the Chief Justice, at the Orange circuit, in September, 1814.
The plaintiff, in his petition, set forth, that he was seised, in fee,
as tenant in common, of an undivided moiety of the premises in question ; and that Daniel Lawson and others, defendants, as heirs at law
of Robert Thomson, Jun., deceased, were each seised of an equal and
undivided twentieth of the premises, and the widow of Robert Thomson was entitled to her dower in the one third of the said ten twentieths of the premises, of which the heirs of the said Robert Thomson
were so seised.
Several of the defendants put in pleas of confession,
and consented to the partition.
Robert Thomson and Nelson Thomson, two of the defendants, pleaded non tenent insimul, and gave noa suit in partition,

lo See Wells v. Wells, 132 Wis. 73, 111 N. W. 1111 (1907).
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tice, under the plea, that they would prove, at the trial, that they
were entitled, in their own right, to one half of the premises, and that
they claimed title to the same, by virtue of a conveyance to them,
dated the 15th of November, 1811, from their father, Robert Thomson,
(setting forth the deed at length.)
At the trial, it was admitted that the plaintiff was seised, in fee, of
an undivided moiety of the premises.
Robert and Nelson Thomson, two of the defendants, gave in eviThe
dence the deed set forth in the notice accompanying their plea.
deed was given for natural love and affection of the grantor to his two
sons, and for the further consideration of one dollar, and conveyed
an undivided moiety of the premises. David Mason, a witness, proved,
that, in June, 1814, the grantor, being sick, took from his chest the
deed in question, among other deeds to his children, which he delivered
to the witness, and, at the same time, directed him, in case he should
die before making his will, which he had requested the witness to
draw up for him, that he, the witness, would deliver the deeds to
his children, respectively ; the witness having retired, for a short time,
to prepare the will of the grantor, on his return, found him dead ;
and about a month after his decease, the witness delivered the deeds
to the grantees named therein.
A verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the
Court, on a case which was submitted to the Court without argument.
Per Curiam. The only question in this case relates to the effect
and operation of the deed from Robert Thomson, Jun., to his two
sons, Robert and Nelson.
This deed was duly executed by the grantor,
in his lifetime, and delivered to a third person, to be delivered to the
grantees, in case the grantor should die before having made and executed his will. The grantor did die without having made any will, and
the deed was, after his death, delivered to the grantees.
If this deed
is to be considered as an escrow, the estate, under the circumstances
stated in the case passed to the grantees, upon the delivery after the
death of the grantor.
It is a well-settled rule with respect to an escrow, that, if either of the parties die before the condition is performed, and, afterwards, the condition is performed, the deed is good,
and will take effect from the first delivery.
Shep. Touch. 59. It may,
however, be questionable whether this deed is to be viewed as an
escrow ; the grantees had nothing to do, on their part, in order to make
the deed absolute, which is usually the case where a deed is delivered
as an escrow.
The delivery here was, at all events, conditional, and
to become absolute, upon an event which has taken place; and, as in
the case of an escrow, the deed will take effect from the first delivThis principle is very fully laid down and illustrated in the cases
ery.
of Wheelwright v. Wheelwright, 2 Mass. 447, 3 Am. Dec. 66, and
Hatch V. Hatch, 9 Mass. 307, 6 Am. Dec. dl . The grantees in this
deed are, therefore, entitled to a moiety of the premises, and partition must be made accordingly.
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(Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1903.

the bill, answer and
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24

R. I.

Atl.

571, 54

378.)

The Only question presented for our decision by
proof in this case is w hether the deed under which

respondent claims title to the real estate described in tlie bill was s o
dep osited or le f t with the witness Charles P. Moies by the grantor, du ringh er lifetime, a s to constitute an absolute delivery thereof for the
u se and benefit of the grantee.
The material facts in the case are these: On May 9, 1899, MaryJohnson made and executed a q uitclaim dee d of the premises referred
to, to the r esponde nt , Marv A. Jo hnson, and le ft it with said Charles
P. Moies, with direction that in case anything happened to her (she
that in case she should die),
meaning thereby, as Moies understood
he sh ould then deliver the deed to her daughter, said M ary
Johnson. -He did not understand, however, from the instructions given him,
that the grantor intended by said acts to place the deed beyond her
ght
control, but, on the contrary, he understood that she retained the
so that she retained the right to
o recall the deed at any time, and
In
she saw^
ell and dispose of the~property thereafterwards
instructions
from
the
of
Moies
understanding,
short, the substance
given him, was hat the deed was left with him subject to the contr ol
o the grantor during her life, and that in case of her dp ^th, without
having
isposed of he property, he was to deliver the deed to_the
t.
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g rantee named therein
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The grantor continued to exercise dominion over said real estate
up to the time of her death, which occurred on the 13th day of November, 1901. She adv ertised
for sa le, and in other ways attempted
s,

,

;

a

and
she pa id the taxes colle cted the rent
to effect
sale thereof
pa id the int erest on the mortgage thereon, and generally treated the
After her death said deed was deestate as her absolute^ property.
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be record ed in
livered to the grantee by Moies, and by her caused
And the complainants now seek by
the registry of deeds in Pawtucket.
have said deed set aside and declared void and of no effe ct,
this bill
n the ground that no ^livery thereof was ever effected by th

e

y

is

if

.

9

&

is

^

is s

M^

d

t

e

c

it

gj^ntor.
In view of the facts aforesaid, we are of the opinion that said deed
was ineffectual to pass any title to the estate.
necessar that the de ed
In order to onvey title to real_esta te,
hereof shall be^ deiivere3^o th grantee or to some on for his us e.
And the ordinary test of delivery if: Did the grantor by his acts or
words, or both, in tend to dive st hims elf of the title to the estate denot, there
delivered.
But
If so, the deed
cribed in the eed_
See Am.
Eng. Ency. Law,
no delivery, and hence no title passes.
Brown v. Brown, 66 Me. 316. In^iXikJ^-Lo
vol.
(2d Ed.) 154-158;
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a delivery, the grantor must absolntplv n^^tt "^^'^^ the pos and control of the instrument.
Younge v. Guilbeau, 3 Wall.
636, 18 L. Ed. 262; Hawkes vTPike, 105 Mass. 562, 7 Am. Rep. 554.
That a deed may be effectual to convey title, although delivered to
a third person to hold until the grantor's death, and then to deliver
it to the grantee, there can be no doubt. But i n order to make suc h
k«-owc7
a deliverv valid, the deed must be left with the depositary without an y
reservation on the part of th e gra ntor, either express or implied, of ^y\Jb y\jLAJL^^
th e tight to recall it or otherwise to control its use.
Walter v. Way,
170 111. 96, 48 N. E. 421 ; Foster v. Mansfield, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 412,
37 Am. Dec. 154.
In other words, in order to make a delivery of a
deed valid when it is made to a third person for the benefit of the
grantee, s uch delivery must be an absolute one on the part of the gran tor; that is, he must divest hims elf of any right of future contro l
t hereof .
And if such control is retained by the grantor, no estate
c onstitute

session

J^

passes.

The law relating to delivery of a deed is well stated in Prutsman
Wis. 644, 1 1 Am. Rep. 592, as follows : "To constitute delivery good for any purpose, the grantor must divest himself of all
v. Baker, 30

To do this he must part w ith
power and dominion over the deed.
the possession of the deed and all right and autho rity to controMt,
ekher finally an d forever, as w here it is given over to th e gr antee him self, or to some person for him, which is called an absolute deliveiT i
or otherwise he must part with all present or temporary right of possession and control until the happening of some future event or the performance of some future condition, upon the happening or not hapof which, his right of
pening, or performance or non-performance
possession may return and his dominion and power over the deed be
restored; in which case the delivery is said to be contingent or conAn essential, characteristic, and indispensable feature -o f
ditional.
e very deliverv. whether absolute or conditional, is that therip must be
a parting^ with the possession, and of tTle power and contr nj^nver t he
Qeea Dv the grantor for the benefit of the grantee, at the time of de liverx:. Porter v. Woodhouse, 59 Conn. 568 [22 Atl. 299, 13 L. R. A.
64, 21 Am. St. Rep. 131] ; Baker v. Haskell, 47 N. H. 479 [93 Am.
Dec. 455]."
In the case at bar the evidence shows that while there yyas a partin g
a
^ </^
with the manual possession of the deed by the grantor, s he did no t -"T^ »
]_L/
p art with the control thereof j and hence a very essential element of
a*^ X*»> >*^
delivery was lacking.
aJ^-*-^ *
Her intended disposition of the property was evidently of a testamentary character. "In case she died," as Moies testifies, "she wanted
the property to go that way."
Bjit an instrument which is intended t o
o perate as a will, without being executed in accordance with the pro visions of the statute relating thereto ( Ggn^JLaws 1896, R. I. c. 203),
cannot be allowed to have the effect of a will. See Providence Insti-
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tution for Savings v. Carpenter, 18 R. I. 287, 27 Atl. 337, and Coulter
V. Shelmadine, 204 Pa. 120, 53 Atl. 638.
For the reasons above given, the d eed in question must be set a side
and declared null and void and of no eftecE Decree accordingly.^*

MOORE

v.

TROTT.

(Supreme Court of California, 1909. 156 Cal. 353, 104 Pac. 578, 134 Am. St.
Rep. 131.)

is an ac tion to quiet title to certain lands forThe plaintiff is
m erly the property of Patrick Moore, deceased .
Moore's widow and administratrix, and the defendant, Mrs. George
Trott, is the jerson named as grantee of said lands in two de eds which,
_i m>-tfer-tg!TtTv<fay of ]\Tay7l9Q6, were maile d by Moore to P. O. T iety
^'^"'^z en. cashier o f the bank at Santa Maria, un der cover with the fo llowi ng letter:
BivATTY, C.

J. This

y

"Arroyo Grande, ^lay

10th,

1905.

"Mr. P. O. Tietzen — Dear Sir and Friend: I am sending you some
deeds to lands that

I

have made to be delivered to the parties in case

of my not returning from the California Hospital Los Angeles where
I am going for to have an operation performed I also enclose you
1000 shares of Pinal stock to be turned over to Annie Gray for the
purpose of paying for her education at Berkley and would like very
much if you would take charge of it for her and see that she gets it
all right. T be deeds that I am sending you, vou will please lock th em
i n your safe and in case I should d ie to immediately hand themto
y^ i^f. Callerand v. Plot, 241 111. 120, 89 N. E. 266
C^n Belden v. Carter, 4 Day (Conn.) 66. 4 Am. Dec.

(1909).
1S5 (1S09), deeds were hand-

ed by ttie g-rantor to a tbird party with these instructions : "'l]ake_£h£ae_d£.eds,
"
a nd Iveep tbem ; if
never call for tliem. deliver over nne to Pamela, and the
other to Is'oDie, alter my death ; if call for them, deliver them up to nie?^ ^The

I

I

grantor died without having called tor the deeds.
The court held that there
had been a valid delivery.
Morse v. Slason, 13 Vt. 296 (lv<^41); Lippold v. Lippold, 112 Iowa, 134, S3 JSI. W. 809, 84 Am. St. Rep. 331 (1900) ; Henry v. Phillips, 105 Tex. 459, 151 S. W. 533 (1912), dictum, ace. But see Grillev v. Atkins,
78 Conn. 380, 62 Atl. 337, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 816, 112 Am. St. Rep. 152 (1905).
"In Shed v. Shed et al.. 3 N. H. 4 32 (1S26) where A. made an instrument purporting to convey to his two sous, B. and C, certain tracts of land, with a reservation of the use of the land to himself during his life, and delivered the
instrument to D. to be delivered to B. and C. as his deed, after his decease, in
ease he should not otherwise direct; and A. died without giving any further
directions, it was held that the instrument was to be considered as the deed
of A. from the hrst delivery, and that it might operate as a covenant by A. to
stand seised of the land to his own use during life, remainder to B. and C.
in fee. * * * T he decision in that case w ould a ppear to be in point for the
dj ^endant, but_ w£_ ao not nnd any ^thih- ciiHk^ i n iim' h\\'i'\ Renorts,~a nfl fmrmn^
o^two m otners. which go to that extent . On the other hand, there are many
alitnonties w'hich seem to us to establish a somewhat different rule." Cook
v. Brown, 34 N. H. 400, 472 (1857), per Eastman, J. The' court overniled Shed
V. Shed.
See Brown v. Brown, 66 Me. 316 (1876) ; Felt v. Felt, 155 Mich. 237,
N. W. 953 (1908), ace.

lis
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th g parties named telling them to put them
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31T
as soo n as pos-

sjble.

"The other Pinal receipt for stock I think is in your bank if so send
California Hospital and I will endorse and return to you
as security for my indebtedness to your bank. I am going to start today and I presume I will be there one or two days before they operate on me so if you mail that other certificate to me I will endorse
and return it to you. You will please keep to yourself the names of
it

to me to the

the parties named in those deeds until you deliver them.

After I

pass

in my checks and take flight for the other world from wdience none
return.

"Yours,

Pat Moore."
letter
Moore
went
to
after
this
Los Angeles
Immediately
mailing
where the contemplated operation was performed.
Towards the end
of May he was able to return to his home at Arroyo Grande and to
transact various business matters there and in San Luis Obispo, where
he went to attend the June session of the board of supervisors, of
which he was a member. B ut his health rapidly decline d and on
the _18th of Tune he died without ever having communicated to Tietz en
an y other instruction, oral or written, than those contained m his le tter
of May I Qth. On June 22d Tietzen delivered the two deeds in quesThe sole
tion to Mrs. Trott^ who filed them for record on the 23d.
question in the case is whe ther these deeds were so delivered _as to
p ass the title to the lands in controversy to the defendant, Mrs. Tro tt,
or whether they remained inoperative for want of del ivery.
It was found by the superior court "That at the tnne said Patrick
Moore delivered said deeds to the said P. O. Tietzen as herein found
he parted with all dominion over said deeds and each of them an d
reserved no right to recall or any wav control said deeds or either o f
"
Upon this and
That said deeds were delivered absolutely.
t hem.
in
favor of the defendother sufficient findings judgment was entered
ants, and plaintiff appeals from the order denying her motion for
a new trial, her principal contention being that the finding here quoted
is not sustained by the evidence.
It has been thoroughly established as the law of this state by a series of decisions commencing with Bury v. Young, 98 Cal. 446, 33 Pac.
338, 35 Am. St. Rep. 186, t hat a valid transfer of a fee simple estat e,
s ubject to a life estate in the grantor, may be effected by means of a
dee d_ delivered _bv the grantor to a third party with instructions t o
deliver it to the grantee at his, the grantor's death, provided alway s —
and th is is the esse ntial c ondition of the validity of such transfers that the d elivg|jjyg.^,a]^^' ; 0^u t g so that the deed is place d bevnnd the power
ot the grantorto _x£call or control it in any even t. The finding of
the superior court, it will be seen, fully supports its conclusion in favor
of the validity of this transfer to Mrs. Trott and it only remains to
inquire whether the evidence in the record sustains the finding.
Moore at the time of his death was over seventy-one years of age.

*
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His first wife had died childless and the plaintiff to whom he had been
His relation to the demarried about two years, was without issue.
f endant was that of an old and intimate friend of herself and her pa rents.
Annie Gray was a member of his own household, and the other
persons named as grantees of different portions of his lands in the
deeds placed with Tietzen were intimate and valu ed friends . Of his
long cherished design to make each of them a sharer in the estate he
might leave at his death there can be no doubt, and it is equally clear
from the evidence that he died in the belief that his purposes in this
regard were fully effected by the deeds he had executed and the instructions concerning them contained in his letter to Tietzen. 'jBut^TT"
is not enough that a man shall desire and intend th at a stranp ^er to h is
blood shall have and enjoy his r eal property after his de ath , for unl ess
he complies with the legal requisites of a validtransfer his wishes a nd
i ntentions are unavailing and bis purpose is defeated . If, like Patrick
Moore, he is unwilling to make a test ame nta_ry disEO,^on which, if
unrevoked, will pass the estate at his deathT he m ust deliver his de ed
a bsolutely and beyond his power to recall in any contingencv. t o a
c ustodian whose duty it will be to keep it as long as the grantor liv es,
and then to deliver it to the grantee . Were these deeds so delivered?
/If Patrick Moore on his return from Los Angeles had demanded their
/return could Tietzen have been justified in refusing to return them?

If he could not have refused, it matters not that no such demand was
Imade. T he test of an effective delivery i n su''h r^=p° ■= ^Iip Qhcnliitf>
'r elinquishment of the right of recall by the grantor in hit; instrnrtin ns
to the person cha rged with the duty of making the delive ry. The
transfer, or attempted transfer, of the estate being entirely gratuitous,
the person named as grantee has no right beyond that which is voluntarily conferred and the extent of that right is to be determined in
every case where specific instructions are given by what passes between
The agent is of course bound to
the grantor and his selected agent.
what
instructions
him
to
do
his
do— no more, no less, and when,
require
as in this case, his only instructions are in writing, the effect of the
"""
It Is in
transaction depends upon the true construction of the writing.
other words a pure question of law wheth er there was an absolute deH^rp|-Y nr rtqt^
I

What, then, is the proper construction of Moore's letter?

It

1
I
\

seems

very plain that Tietzen is authorized to deliver the deeds only "in case
of my not returning from the California Hospital where I am going
for an operation," and t he implication that if he does ^ retjj jn the deed s
a re to be at his disposal is clear . But counsel ior respondent contends
that a different intention is revealed by subsequent clauses of the letter. He relies greatly upon the direction to lock the deeds in Tietzen's

safe "and in case I should die to immediately hand them to the parties,"
We think that this, so far from being inconsistent with our construction of the first part of the letter, is only corroborative of itt I.fl
Moore's intention had been to part with the deed absolutely he would

etc.
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case I should die," for he was su re Y^^*''^ •
^/>^'
die
at some time. He w ould more naturally have said when I die . Al^^^^^^
Jio
It is apparent that he was not without some hope of obtaining relief
more or less permanent from the contemplated operation, and if he had
returned from Los Angeles believing himself restored to health and
had demanded a return of the deeds from Tietzen we can conceive
of no ground upon which the demand could have been resisted. The
concluding part of the letter to Tietzen, which counsel agree must be
read without any period after the words "until you deliver them," neither aids nor weakens our construction of the first part. The direction
to "keep to yourself the names of the parties named in those deeds
until you deliver them after I pass in my checks," etc., while they certainly do consist with the idea of that death which is certain to come
to every man, were entirely appropriate as referring exclusively to
death as the result of the operation about to be performed.
Aside from the letter to Tietzen which, as above stated, contained
the only instructions ever given him as to the disposition of the deeds,
it was shown by the testimony of numerous witnesses that Moore
wished the persons named as grantees in his deeds to have the property
therein described, and that his relations to those parties, and his condition and circumstances made them the reasonable and meritorious
moreover, no reason to^doubt that"
There
objects of his bounty.
in
died
that
his
deeds
the
hands of Tietzen would be suffihe
believing
defeated by the fact
cient to accomplish his purpose, but his purpose
that the delivery was not absolute. A technical but inflexible rule
aw governing the transfer of real property prevents his intention fr om
being carried niit.^^
Counsel for respondent urges with apparent seriousness the proposition that the deeds to Mrs. Trott having been found in her possession there
presumption of delivery to her at their date, which
not rebutted by the evidence in the case. We think this presumpnot only overthrown by the evidence, but that the specific findtion
ings of the court show that he only delivery was that made by Tietze n
a fter Moore's, death .
,
The or der of the superior coyt denying
reversed. ^^
new trial

/n ot have directed their delivery "in

\

*

*

a

17

A portion of the opinion, in which a number of

_

is

a

t

is

is

is

*

l

f

o

is

is,

\

eases are reviewed, is omit-

18 See s.

c,

//

'

ted.
162 Cal. 268, 122 Pac. 462 (1912).

^ <

I

a

445, 61 South. 807, Ann. Cas. 1915C, .381 (1913).
The owner of land made deed thereof and deposited same

nith

a

;

;

I

I

a

The owner of land, ill with consumption and believing herself on her deathbed, prepared
deed of said land and gave same to X., with instructions that, ^^
recover,
do not, you deliver to" the
and if
want them back again
"if
grantees. The grantor died six weeks later, and X. then turned the deed over
Williams v. Daubner, 103
to the grantees. Was there an effective delivery?
Seeley v, Curts, ISO Ala.
Wis. 521, 79 N. W. 74S, 74 Am. St. Rep. 902 (1899)
trust

com-

it

a

specified date, at which time
pany, with written instructions "to hold it until
to the grantor if she is then living, and in the event of her death
to return
in the meantime to deliver it to the grantees." The grautdr died prior to the

d,^^
^^ '
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FIRST NATIONAL BANK.

(Supreme Court of Nebraska,

1914.

97 Neb. 257, 149 N.

W.

777.)

ReBsE, C. J. This is an action brought by plaintiff, Ijenry Ovv ings,
against the First National Bank of Johnson, Nebraska, to recoveii-the
the proceeds of the sale of a tract of land, describe d
s um of $5,129.67,
,
i n the pleadi ngs but the description of which need not be "stated he re.
The land was formerly owned by Lizzie E. Schmidt, who was later
married to Henry Owings. They went to the state of Colorado, and
after their marriage there located in the city of Sterling, in that state.
Mrs. Owings' liealth_failed, and it became apparent that she was in
O n the 28th day of June. 19 11, Mrs. Owings
a precarious condition.
warranty
deed to her husband, conveying the land in quese xecuted a
tio n to him, and placed it in a trunk in the house, and kept it until th e
2d day of December, of the same vear . At that time it was apparent
that she could not recover, and that the date of her dissolution was
not far distant, her malady being consumption . She was confined to
her bed, and called for the deed to be brought to her. She then obtained pencil and paper and wrote the following instructions: "Sterling, Colorado, Dec. 2, 19U. I n case of my death, give this deed^ to
my husband. Henry Owings, to be recorded so my property is hi s.
I am in poor health and no hopes of -ever getting wel l . He is the onl y
She
Mrs. Lizzie Owings, Sterling, Colo."
p rovider I hav e_SQt.
husto
her
handed the deed and the above described memorandum
band, requ esting him t o place them in a local bank at Sterling, wh ich
January. 19jj ^ The seche_did^ Mrs. Owingrdied on the 7th day of
ond day after her death, plaintiff called at the bank and r eceived th e
d eed and memorandum of instructions, above copied, as wel l as some
money on deposit, and made preparations for returning to John son,
Nebraska, with tb^ rpm;iin<; nf his deceased wife . Prior to her decease, she, with her husband, had negotiated tlie sale of the land to
one J. George Hahn for the sum of $5,640, and o n the 11th day_p f
D ecember, 1911, with plaintiff, executed a warranty deed to the pur -

^'^^A
■^*^

i^i^.^y'^^

K

V >

Oi.
^^^
.

JjK'
•■^
t

\o^

<s^j^

Lil
'

which was deposited in the First National Bank of Johnso n,
Prior to this time, and on the 2d day of December, 1911,
i n this state.
a wr itten contract of sale was made with Hahn for the sale of th e
l and at the price of $5.640. $400 of which was paid in cash, the r emainder to be paid on the 1st day of March. 1912. or $2.500 to b e
t hen paid, and the remainder on time at the option of the purchase r.
c haser,

date specified, and tbe deed was given to the grantees. Was there an effective
delivery?
Long v. Ryan, 166 Cal. 442, 137 Pac. 29 (1913).
A husband prepared a deed of bis lauds to his wife, and at the same time the
wife prepared a deed of her lands to him. Both deeds were deposited with a
third party, with instructions not to return either deed except upon the written
order of both, and in case of death of either to deliver the deed of the deceased
to the survivor. The wife died first, and her deed was given to the husband.
Dunlap v. Marnell, 95 Neb. 535, 145 N. W. 1017
Was it an effective delivery?
-(1914).
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Instead of accepting the time option, Halin paid into the bank the
whole amount, and accepted the deed, with another one executed by
P^amiit

Mrs. Owings left no child, nor father, nor mother, surviving her,
but she had two brothers, Henry Schmidt and Charles J. Schmidt,
who dem anded one-half of the money in the bank as the heirs o f
Mrs. Owings. The bank refused to pay tlie money to either claimant,
when this action was brought against it by plaintiff for the whole
amount. The bank filed the statutory affidavit to the effect that it held
no claim on the money, but that it was demanded by the claimants,
The court ordered the brothers to inte rand asked to be protected.
vene and__set_Ji£their claims by a day fix ed by the courts whichth ev
dig . contending~tKarthe deed frorti Mrs. Owings to her husband did ,-^
riori:onvey any title to him for Avant of delivery, ^t hat the sale of the
l and to Hahn was of her property, and bv reason of their relationsh ip
t o her they were entitled to one-half of the fund under the provisions
oj the stat utes of d escent in this state. It appears that Henry Schmidt
held a note against his sister, Mrs. Owings, for the sum of $1,019.25,
growing out of the settlement and adjustment of an estate to which the land formerly belonged, and w hich note Mrs. Owings directe d
sh ould be paid at the time she handed the deed to plaintiff at Ster ling.
There is no question as to this sum of money, plaintiff having agreed
at the trial that Henry Schmidt should receive it out of the fund.
Th e cause w as tried to the court wjthout the intervention of a jur y.
when a finding'"a n3 j udgment was entered, giving tlie $1.019.25 to
Henry" Schm idt, and the re.s idue tojbe^ paid by the bank to p lajntiff.
Def endants. xolp^'vp^^er Sf appeal .
"The real, and indeed the only, question presented is : Was the de ed/
f rom Mrs. Owings to plaintiff so delivered to hirn as t o pass the tit] e ?
The negotiations for the sale to Hahn had so far progressed that the
contract of sale to the purchaser was signed on the day the deed was
handed to plaintiff for deposit in the Sterling bank, but the contract
an4 conveyance to Hahn were both signed by Mrs. and Mr. Owings.
Considerable testimony was taken at the trial showing what occurred
at the time the deed was sent to the Sterling bank, as well as declarations made to others by Mrs. Owings after the execution of the deed
and before the 2d day of December, the day it was sent to the bank.
The written memorandum was made by Mrs. Owings while on her
sickbed, and she never was "down town" after that date and prior to
her death.
She never made any effort to countermand those instructions, but, so far as is shown by the record, shfc was at all times thereafter entirely pleased with what she had done.
I^ad she been able to
go to the bank and deposit the deed with oral instructions as writt en.
Nph
t he case would fall within the rule of Roepke v. N ntymann, QS
nnflpr
gf'p
589, 1 46 N. W. 939, a nd we are up p^l^ ^''^
hfr yqr\\\ew
^^y^
i nstructions to the bank, they would not be of equal forc e. That case
Aig.Prop. — 21

'

a.
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and Brown v. Westerfield, 47 Neb. 399, 66 N. W. 439, 53 Am. St.
Rep. 532, are decisive of this one, and it is not necessary that the
law of those cases be further examined.
W e are satisfied therewith, and that the judgment of the di strict
court is right and it is affirmed.^"

STONE

V.

DUVALL.

(Supreme Court of Illinois,

1S75.

77 111. 475.)

Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Monroe county; tlie Hon.
Amos Watts, Judge, presiding.
This was a bilUn_chancei:^, filed by Washington Duvall and Mary
Duvall, his wife, against G eorge Stone, Julia Stone, Pearly Stone and
Bissell Davis, heirs at ja\v c}i j^riry ■^tcuie,_d£ge ased. and ^W^^i^ffl
S tone, h"usbanrl cff Mary ,Stnne, tn set aside a (jeed mad e-Jiy th£. XQmplainants to. said Marv Stone . The material facts of the case are set
in the opinion of the court.
{^^^j*^^^ P 1^a^^,JIU/'^ ^irtv(-^
:l^orth
Walker, J. The evidence shows^tnat de fencmnts in error had
each been previouslv marx jed, Washington having a daughter by that
former marriage, who was married to William Stone ; Mary had a
son by her previous marriage, named Allen Agnew. They each owned
a small amount of real estate when married, an d discord a fterwards
having arisen between them, it was agreed that they should respectively
r elinquish or convev their claim tqjsach other's property, so that the
s urvivor would have no interest in the real estate of the other — to
cut ofif the claim of dower by the wife in the property of the husband,
and the right of curtesy of the husband in the property of the wife,
and to prevent their' step children from claiming any interest in the
property of their step parents.
In consummating this arrangement, defendants in error went to a
justice of the peace, who, under their directions, preparedjle^s which
B y one of these deeds the land
they e xecuted and acknowle dged.
owned by the husband was conveyed in fee to his daughter, Mrs. Mary
By the other, the wife's real estate was conveyed to Allen
Stone.
Agnew. T he justice was directe d to ha ve the deeds recorded, a nd
t o hold them until the death of the parties, a nd then deliver them to
the r espective grantees ! subsequently Mrs. Stone died, leaving"Trer
husband, and tlie other defendants, her minor children, surviving her.
In Loomis

178 Mich. 221, 144 N. W. .'i52 (101.3). the grantor, after
instructed the scrivener to retain i)ossessi(ni thereof, ".and
that if anj'thing occurred to her, happened to her, to deliver this deed to" the
grantee.
After the grantor's death the scrivener turned the deed over to the
grantee.
The sc rivener testified thnt. if the grnn tnr had call ed for the d eed
during h g"- 'if'^tMll^i ^^ '"'"'llrl [I'-'^i'^^i'ly lin ve snrrendered it to lier. The court
held there had heen an effective delivery, an iimuediate estate having vested in
the gran tee, s uhj ect to a l ife estate in the g;rautor. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 19
—
w. D. ad, i2b i^.'w. 307Ti^oj:
19

signing

v. Looiuis,

the deed,
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The deeds were recorded , as required, by the justice of the peace, and
held untilliTter Mrs. Stone's death, when Duvall called and took the
I t appears that Stone, with hi s
deed executed to her from the justice.
' 9Sx*^
wife, was in possession of t he property conveyed to his wife wh en "^
^(X^
the deeds were made, and he so continued in possession until after the
^C^^'\^^^
~
~~
~
~
s uit was broug ht"
Complainants claim that the deed to Mrs. Stone was not made in
pursuance of their intentions, and contrary to their directions ; that
the de ed was never delivered to the grantee, or to any one for her , \(J>
^d \\\ej^'^VeA tn have it.^e,t a^si de an d c ancelled, and tlie prps grty
On a hearrestored t o Duvall. as it was before the deed was made.
ing, the co urt below granted tlie relief sought, and defendants bring
t he record to this court on error, and ask a reversal.
The evidence of the justice of the peace seems to be rather incjefinite
as to what the expressed purpose of the parties was when he drew
however, positive that he was directed to prepare
the deeds.
He
deeds to convey the land.
He proposed to fix the matter by agreement, will or otherwise, but Duvall declined, saying his wife desired
He, when asked the direct question w hether the purpose w as
deeds.
wife's property to her son, nd
not to convey Duvall' interest in
nyinterest she held m Duvall property to Mrs. Stone, an whether
Duvall did not so inform him, says he believes hat was the meanin g,
He also says that
but that he could not swear to the exact words.
informed by Mrs. Duvall . He nowhere says
he was afterwards
that
was understood or intimated that the parties intended or said
conveyance
By
they desired to retain any interest in the property.
in fee, they undeniably would accomplish the purpose of preventing
strange,
such claims as effectually as by any other mode and
such was the intention, that they did not say that was their only pura

d

if

is

;

it

a

•

it

s

o

t

s

a

s

h
is

is,

l^^^

pose.

Duvall told Stone that he intended to convey the property to his
wife, as Stone states in his sworn answer.
The deed having been

T

a

,

;

if

l

t

is

it

a

it

a

a

T

is

it

a

a

subsequently made in accordance with this declaration, and in pursudifferent purpose from
ance to the advice received from the attorney,
court
that expressed in the deed should be clearly proved, before
aside.
he deed itself, in prop er
of chancery would interfere to set
for m and duly executed,
strong evidence of the grantor's intention .
anc to overcome it. the evidence should be clear and convincing .
woman
Here we find
man largely advanced in life, the father of
seems,
having
family of children, and of limited means, and, as
fea rful that his wife would, at his death, hold dower in his propert y,
not out of
de termined to secure the property to his daughter, and
conveyance to
he usua cou rse of human action for him to make
her. He inquir ed
he sa id he would and finally did so
he__ could
Duvall,
himself,
testified,
it.
and he does not state the purconvey
pose of the conveyance, nor the instructions he gave to the justice of
the peace.
He does not say that the deed did not carry out his pur-
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He is silent as to the execution of the deed,
He does not say there was a mist ake.
justice.

is

if

it

a

a

it

t

t

t
o

it

a

a is

is

It

it

It

it,

tl

it

a

it

if

b

it

ju

'

is,

or what he said to the
.
1^ that the justice did not do precisely what he desired
_.
however, said there was no consideration paid for the propIt
erty. He acknowledges, in his deed, that tliere was, and he, and all
others, fail to disprove the acknowledgment of the fact in the deed.
The
stice says he knew nothing of any consideration bein^ paid,
was. Even
ut that does not negative the stat ement in the deed that
was necessary to prove
pecuniary consideration to sustain the
We
was pa id.
ie deed, uncontradicted, proves that
deed, still,
will not stop to inquire whether natural love and affection, although
or whether, on his
not expressed in the deed, would not-sustain
own theory of the case, the getting of the property free from his wife's
dower would not be sufficient.
manifest that complainants intended to convey some intere st
not
in, and title to th ese premises to Mrs. Stone, but what interest
life
was to be
fee subject to
sfiown by~the evidence. Whether
Nor do
estate in the grantor, or some other estate, does not appear.
was. To cancel the deed would be
counsel suggest what estate
permit Du vall to change his mind, and to defea his act deliberately
dQne_att eF consul ation and advice taken, and done m accordance with
his previously expressed purpose to convey to Mrs. Stone. It would
be clearly wrong to abrogate the deed, unless
clearly appeared that
an estate less than a fee, and such an estate as terminated with her
life, or previous thereto, was intended to be conveyed, but was not by
reason of
mistake.
It was not, to Mrs.
urged that the deed was never delivered.
Stone, as she was probably not aware of its existence for
considerable time afterwards,
ever came to her knowledge.
Was the de -

It

?

S

d

it

it

i
t

f

o

i

t

1

very to the justice of he peace, with directions to record and hojd
Duvall, a delivery
until the death
was manifestly not an absolute dehvery.
The fact that he was directed to hold the deed, and
not deliver
till the death of Duvall, renders
absolutely certain
that the grantor did not intend that the deed should take effect until
The deed di
that time. This removes all doubt on that question.
rights or
immediate
n ot, therefore, oper a'te to give Mrs.
tone any
If she acquired any right,
was that the
interest in the premises.
title should only vest in her at her father's death.
Kent, Ch. J., in the case
Was this, then,
delivery as an escrow?
Am. Dec. 415, says: 'jA
248,
of Jackson v. Catlin,
Johns. (N. Y.)
conditional, th at
delivery
escrow
the
as
an
when
delivered
dee
person
keep
until something
third
to
w hen
deli vered to
of no force untij the condition be fu
and
the grantee
done
fill ed.''
Sheppard, in his Touchstone, p. 58, gives substantially the
sTriie definition, except he does not limit the performance of the act
to the grantee, which seems to us to be the more accurate rule. Now
this deed was to be delivered on the death of Duvall. That was the exis

3
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is

it
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is
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is
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press condition upon which it was placed in the hands of the justice,
and, a ccording to the authority of the case of Jackson v. Catlin, sup ra,
it was deliver ed as an escrow, an d rniild not tak e fqll e ffect until th e
t hing happened that was conditional to its deliver y; and Duvall not
having died, the de ed has not yet vested the title in full, and can no t
until that event shall occur.
Sheppard lays it down as the law, that "T he delivery is good^ Jor it
is s aid, in this case, that if either of tlie parties to the deed die before ,
and the conditions be after performed ,
tiie" conditions be performed
t hat the deed is good ; for there was traditio inchoata in the lifetime
of the parties ; and postea consummata existens, by the performance
of tjie conditions, it taketh its effect by the first delivery, without any ^6iMK-# -^^
new or second delivery ; and the second delivery is but the execution « -^ diiJt*^^^
But in such a case, the de and consummation of tlie first delivery."
^r
-^
l ivery only relates back to the first delivery so as to carry out the inHSl
tk^Cl^
It would not give the /^XuJL<ii-c»r^ '
t ention of the grantor, and to vest the title.
"
S o in this case, the \J — -^
grantee a right to intervening rents and profits.
d eed is an escrow, that will not take effect until DuvalFs death, when
i t may be deliv ered to the heirs of the grantee, and it will be held to
^
h ave taken ettect so as to nave vested such a title in the mother as to lA^A. -^^^^VCA
p ass the fee to them. Until that time, Duvall will be entitled t o th e use
of the property as though he had a life estate, and the children of
Mrs. Stone the remainder.
It, then, follows that the c ourt below erred in rendering the decree ,
a nd it is reversed.
Decree reversed.^"
^
//a^ZZ^ f' CZ^n^-^-i

STONEHILL

v.

(Court of Appeals of New York, 1911.

HASTINGS.
202 N.

Y.

115, 94 N.

E.

1068.)

HiscocK, J. This action was brought by the appellants as residu ary legatees and representing a deceased residuary legatee of one Margretta Todd to set aside a deed and what has been denominated a life

/p."Itgrantor
is the

well-established rule, in this state that the deliven'' of a de ed
to a third narty, to be by him delivered to the grantee after t lie
in
It con veys the fee, a nd o perates as a conveyance
g rantor 's dea th, is valid.
'^
pra?sent"i,"flibu gh the e njoyment i s postponed until the grantor s aeath.
Meech
v.'"\\^'ider,''i:i(> Mich, iil), 31, 89 ^'. W. 55(i, bb? (iyOL!).
See Loomis V. Loomis,
supra, note 19.
"A gr antor's deposit; of his deed with a third party, to be held by such third
party until the grantor's death and then delivered to the grantee therein named,
the grantor reserving no dominion or control over the deed during his lifetime,
const itutes_,a valid delivery and vests an immediate estate in the grantee, subjecr Tp_a life estate in the g^rantor [ citing many cases]." Jviaxweli v. Harper,
sFWaslT. "851, ;iod, yy Pac. 7o6, Vbs (1909). To same general effect are Rowley
"All the cases cited
V. Bowyer, 75 N. J. Eq. 80, 84, 71 Atl. 398, 400 (1908).
Nolan
hold that title passes either at or as of the date of the first delivery."
v. Otney, 75 Kan. 311, 89 Pac. 690, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 317 (1907), where the grantee was to support the grantor during his life.

T5y
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of c ertain real estate situate in the city of New York kno wn as th e
Von Hoffman Apartment House. The d eed ran to a daughter, Ros alie
Tousey, subject to the life leas e. It was delivered by the grantor to_ a
t hird person to be by him after her death delivered to the grant ee^
which was done and this appeal is concerned with the judgment disSuch attack
missing the complaint in so far as it attacks said deed.
does not present here any question of fraud or undue influence, but
lease

~>

,

in volves the question whether the deed was valid and effective und er
of its delivery .
The important findings on which the judgment dismissing the complaint is based and certain significant refusals to find are, in substance,

t he circumstances

as

follows

:

Some time before her death, Margretta Todd, being the owner of
the premises in question, e xecuted a deed of the same to her daught er
Rosalie in consideration of natural love and affection, and deli vered
t he same to one Lockwood . "with instructions to hold the same (ku-in g
* * * ^Lud upon or after the death of
t he lifetime of the grantor
the said Margretta Todd, to d eliver the said deed o f the sa id premi ses
In accordance with these mstructions, comt o her said daug^hter ."
munioated to him at the time of the execution of said deed, Lockwood
"di d hold the said deed during the lifetime of said Margretta Todd and
after her death deli vered the same to the said Rosalie To usey who
d uly accepte d the said deed." The court refused to find that said deed
was deposited with Lockwood by the grantor as her agent, or that she
at all times retained control of the aforesaid deed (and lease) and exercised over the said instruments the power to recall them.
During
the lifetime of the grantor, Lockwood informed the grantee tbat her
mother "had executed and delivered to him a deed conveying the said
premises to the said Rosalie Tousey to be delivered to her after the
death of her said mother."
O ctober 31, 1905, three days after th e
death o f the grantor, Lockwood caused to be recorded in the prope r
office tTie deed in question, and notified one Hasting^s, as attorney fo r
t he grantee, of such recording . The grantee at the time was traveling
abroad, and after she returned to New York early in December she
assumed the direction and management of said premises, expending
various sums in re-decoration, repairs, etc., and she made, or caused
to be made, a demand upon the Lin coln Trust Company, which ha d
ta ken possession ot the property under circumstances hereafter to be
r eferred to. that the management and control of the premises be, relinn iiished to her "as the said property belonged to her under a deed
executed" as hereinbefore stated, and t hereafter possession was sur r endered to her, which she retained until her death, when her titl e
p assed to others who are defendants here.
I fail to see any break in this chain of findings which prevents them
from being sufficient in connection with other more formal ones to
draw after them the conclusions of law and judgment which have been
made to the effect tha t said deed vested in the grantee a title wh ich
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w as valid and effective as against the attempt of the appellants to s ev.
~
'
i t aside .
It is urged, however, as against the force of the findings above summarized that other findings were made which are so inconsistent therewith as to lead to a different judgment than that which was rendered.
Some of these findings are designated in the decision as findings of
fact and some of them which are described as conclusions of law are
nevertheless asserted by the appellants to be findings of fact. They are
in substance as follows :
T hat at the time of her death and for many years prior thereto M argr etta Todd was the oivner in fee simple of the property in questio n ;
that she "retained the act ive and undisputed con trol, p ossession, m anagement a nd ownership of thf^ g^irl prpmkpQ Hnwn to tjif dnt^ o^ ^""^
that on divers occasions subsequent to the execution of the
deatl^;"
said deed to her daughter said Margretta Todd "had shown much love
*
* * ^j^^^had expressed an in and affection for her said daughter
te ntion

of

ex ecuting a deed

of

the said premises to the said Rosalie

To u-

se}^" (stated as conclusions of law) that the deed was a valid conveyance "to take effect on the death of said Margretta Todd ;" that after

of

Lockwood made a valid delivery
of the deed of said premises to Rosalie Tousey and the said deed was
duly accepted by her "and the fee simple of said premises vested in
Rosalie Tousey from the time of the death of said Margretta Toddon
the 2Sth day of October, 1905, nnd_th^ snid Roprilip Tnngpy |ip ^nd is
ent itled, I'H the. rp ^}\^ anr] profit" thrrpfrnm xom said 28tli day of Q ctoberjJ905."
'On tliesfe so-called findings of fact the appellants build up the argument tha t in order to be effective the deed delivered to Lockwo od
I
^ithermust have taken effect presen tly when delivered to him or e lse
t akerT etlect when delivered to the grantee after the death of tli e
^^""^tii-np f.f itc A(A\y ery to Lock e^rantor must have related back to
wood ; that on either theory the grantor could not retain ownership of I
the premises down to the time of her death, and, therefore, the findings 1
the death

the said grantor

the said

j

\

/

\

have been last quoted are in conflict with both theories and
the ronr1ii':;inn that the A eeA wnc in<^Piq(-]^r to take effect no t
a s a presen t ronve\'-an ce but n ^i n t''^tnmrntnr3' ji.ispositio£ i-"
I'he hrst^!r\v^r*Tothis argument is that the findings which appellants rely upon and which they claim to be in conflict with those first
quoted from, if they are in any conflict, involve statements of law rather than of fact. I suppose that the question as of what time tHeTTtleN
would pass from grantor to grantee and at what date the fee simple \
would vest in the latter upon performance of the various acts set forth i
~^
in the findings naturally must b e one of law .
In the second place, I do not think there is anything in the findings
or conclusions as a whole which is intended tO' be or really is at variance with the judgment which was rendered or which destroys the
deed as a valid conveyance.
Take as an illustration the findings that
which

"rn mpel

|

J

1

328

DERIVATIVE

TITLES

(Part

2

the deed was to take effect on the death of the grantor and that the
* * *
"fee simple of said premises vested in Rosahe Tousey
from the time of the death of said Margretta Todd," and that at the
time of her death said grantor was the owner in fee simple of the
property, and interpreted in the light of their surroundings they are
substantially accurate. The conclusion that tlie title vested in the grantee from the time of the death of her grantor was part of a conclusion
of law made for the purpose of fixing the time from which the grantee
should receive the rents and profits, and I do not understand that there
is any dispute tliat she was properly limited in her right to these to the
period after her grantor's death. The other conclusions that the deed
was to take effect upon tlie death of the grantor and that the latter
died seized of the premises are in accordance with the fact of the final
delivery of the deed and the law as established by well-considered
cases.

Hathaway v. Payne,

34

N.

Y.

92,

113, considered

a deed

like

the

present one, which was delivered by the grantor to a third party to be
delivered to the grantee after the former's death. Chief Judge Denio
wrote for a majority of the court as follows : "They (the authorities)
do * * * prove that a deed may be delivered to a third person, as
this was, with instructions to be finally delivered to the grantee after
In such a case, the weight of authority is ,
the death of the grantor.
that no title passes until the final delivery, and that then, and the reafter, the title IS, by relation, deemed to have vested as of the time o f
t he first delivery to the third person . If it were an original question, I
should suppose that such a transaction was of a testamentary character.
* * * But the cases establish the rule as I have stated, and they
should not now be disturbe d."
The same doctrine was laid down in Rosseau v. Bleau, 131 N. Y.
It was there held that an
177, 30 N. E. 52, 27 Am. St. Rep. 578.
action might not be maintained by the representatives of a deceased
person to set aside as fraudulent against creditors a deed not delivered
until after the latter's death for the reason that such a deed did not
become operative during life and that, therefore, tlie grantor died so
seized that the liens of creditors attached under the statutes relating to
real estate of deceased persons.
In this connection appellants' counsel especially relies on the cases of
Rochester Sav. Bank v. Bailey, 34 Misc. Rep. 247, 69 N. Y. Supp. 163,
affirmed, 70 App. Div. 622, 75 N. Y. S'upp. 1131 ; Burnham v. Burnham, 58 Misc. Rep. 385, 111 N. Y. Supp. 252, affirmed, 132 App. Div.
937, 116 N. Y. Supp. 1132; Id., 199 N. Y. 592, 93 N. E. 1117.
In each of these cases it expressly appeared that the grantor retained control of the deed, a condition which not only does not affirmatively appear in this case, but which is negatived by an express refusal
to find to that effect.
It is further urged that as evidenced by certain findings, the daughter elected to reject the deed. These findings are to the effect that on
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learning of the death of her mother she cabled to certain representatives
to look after her interests, and that those representatives, although
knowing of the so-called lease and deed and also of the will, instituted proceedings to have the Lincoln Trust Company appointed temporary administrator and to have it take possession of all of the estate
of the decedent, including the real estate in question, which it did. _I
dc Lnot think under the circumstances that this amounted to any bindin g
e lection to reject the deed . The directions given by the daughter were
necessarily g eneral a nd i ncomplete and in my opinion did not fairly confer upon her representatives the authority to reject the deed. Immedir
at^elyupon her return she elected to accept the deed and take title

tmdfr iL^
Under the circumstances I think
with costs. Judgment affirmed.

SMILEY

V.

(Supreme Court of Indiana, 18S8.

the

/

jud gment should

be affir med
»

SMILEY.
114

Ind.

E.

258, 16 N.

585.)

was married four times. By his first
f our-fr tnkl ren. Joseph
Jonathan H., James
he
had
n
n.
In 1870 he
childre
and Elizabeth.
By his^econePmfe
married his third wi(^-Mary.
On the 26th day of September, 1873,
On that day he an
he i>£came the ownfer of the land in controversy.
fe^ife executed five deeds^ one to his daughter. Elizabeth, one to hi
on Jonathan H., one to Joseph and Jonathan, one to Toseph. and on
to he heirs of Tames Smiley . At that time James Smiley was living
Thes
and had four children, Jacob M., Sarah, William and Elizabeth.
by
part,
the
land
owned
but not all, of
dee ds embraced
Jacob Smile y
iiL.1 873! On the 25th day of May, 1875, he executedj^ .yq\L by which
he devised to. his wife, Mary, during her life or widowhood, part of the
Item 5th of his will reads as follows: "I
land — that in section 11.

Ja cob

Smiley

he had

e

t

s

e

s

h

d

o

J..

Elliott^.

wife, Ca^^Ptne,

S

T.

Jo

E

e

t

b

f

o

h

few days after the execution of the will, Jacob Smiley placed the
ni ijey, and directed him to retain
ands
dee^s in tiie
seph
Smiley,
should die, then to deliver them .
he,
them untiraJte'r
|aco
On the^'54th da}nyf"September, 1875, tlie third wife, Mary, died . On
the 6th day of the following November, Jacob Smiley, on being adyise
S'miley was no yalid, exerirU.
d_that the deed to the heirs of James
da deed _tflJais_children, (^arah, Ja cob M., WilHam and lizabeth, Vnd
placed them inthe^hands'^ of Joseph~7V Smiley, and'Vrepeated the'in-

T^^^

^V
"

>v»^v^

*^

j(

»

J-

A

I

I

s

;

r\

p

I

have heretofore executed deeds to all my real estate, not above named,
wish them
to my children and grandchildren for the lands which
the
and
n\v
Lnre
the
a
id
dee
ds,
in
the
have,
rrij
hands of. m y
each to
my
said execu tor
which deeds
wish
exe cutor hereinafter named
at m y^ death to deliver to the parties severally named therein, and to
In the 6th item of the will, Joseph
whom said deeds are executed.
Smiley was nominated executor,

Q/^
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structions formerly given him. On the same4ay he executed t his codi cil tohis willj "Whereas, my beloved wife^eparted this life on the
24th day of September, 1875, I now wish the propertv bequeathed t o
h er in my will equally divided among all my chij dren."
On the 18th
day of December, 1875, Jac ob Smi ley married the appellee, Agnes
Smiley. On the 15th day of March, li5//, he died, leavmg no~children
O n that day Joseph T. Smiley delivered the d^eds
by his last marriage.
pl aced in his hands to the respective grantees therein named. _ Ho
c onsideration was paid by any of the grantee s.
The appellee was advised prior to her marriage that the only estate which Jacob Smiley
owned, or in which she would have any claim, was two parcels in section eleven.
The j udgment of the court gave the plaintiff an estate for life in "a ll
the land, as well that part described in the deeds placed in the han ds
o f Joseph J. Smiley as that of which no conveyance was ma de.
The question whe ther th p pppfUpp \ % entitled to a life-estate_ ia the
, land embraced in the deeds placed in the hands of Joseph
1. Smil ev.
took
effec
t.
took
effect at
those
deeds
If
depends upon the time
they
the time of their conditional delivery to him, then, it is clear, she has
no interest in the lands, because her husband was not seized of them
The case, therefore, turns upon the
at any time during coverture.
effec t of that conditional delivery . If that delivery was sufficient to
vest title in the grantees as of that date, then the appellee can have no
claim in the land as against them.
In deciding this question we attach importance to the fact that the
appellee was advised before marriage what land Jacob Smiley owned
She was, at least, put
and in which she would acquire an interest.
she
is not in a situation
failed
make
if
to
inquiry
and
she
upon inquiry,
Doubtless,
marriage is a valid conto aver that she had no notice.
sideration, and if Mrs. Smiley had not been informed as to what lands
her husband owned, a dift'erent question would confront us. We do
not, however, decide that the deeds would not have been valid even if
she had not been put upon inquiry, for that is not now necessary. We
d o decide that, as she had notice prior to marriage what land he r
husban d then owned, she can not successfully assert her marital righ ts
i n the land embraced in the deeds placed in the hands of . Joseph J .
Smiley.

"

There was here a cojiilijioj ^l.ilelivejx. f qr the deeds were place d in
th e hands of Joseph J. Smiley with explicit instructions to deliver th.£ tP
to the grantees upon the happening of a designated event, that of th e
in this particular the case differs from that of
d eath of the grantor,
It differs, also, from that case in anInd.
317.
99'
Loveless,
V.
Jones
other particular, and that is this : The party who here assails the deed s
had notice that the grantor did n ot own the lands einbraced in th em.
Tills case is, m all material respects, like Owen v. Williams, 114 Ind.
179, 15 N. E. 678, and the principle there asserted applies to it with
Hockett
great force. Our conclusion is well sustained by authority.
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70 Ind. 227; Crooks v. Crooks, 34 Ohio St. 610; Hatch v.
Hatch, 9 Mass. 307, 6 Am. Dec. 67 ; Stephens v. Rinehart, 72 Pa. 434;
Morse v. Slason, 13 Vt. 296; Tooley v. Dibble, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 641.
The trial court erred in its conclusions of law upon the facts stated
in the finding.
Tlie appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as to all of the
appellants except William Smiley, and, upon the admissions made in
the answer to this motion, the appeal must be dismissed as to all the
appellants, except the one named.
I t is, therefore, adjuds^ed that, as to all the appellants except William
Smiley, the appeal is dismisse d, and that, as to him, the judgment is
reversed, with instructions to restate the conclusions of law, and enter
judgment in his favor.^^

V. Jones,

RATHMELL
(Supreme Court of Ohio, 1890.

v.

SHIREY.

60 Ohio St. 1S7, 53 N.

E.

1098.)

j

*
circuit court upon appeal from the court
-j 'g
of common pleas. The pl aintiff in error prayed for a decree of th e ^'*^*-««'''**"fi^
c ourt setting aside a deed for one hundred acres of land made by hi s
rdjLx^^^r''*
t estator tojthe defendant , J[^i^omas^_g^l]2men
, in trust for the d
efendant^'"'^
W illiam C. Shirey and others, and an order for its sale for the payment
of debts of his testator, alleging in his petition and amendments thereto
tiie ins ufficiency of the assets of the testator to pay his debts ; that

The

cause was tried in the

the instrument

in question was signed by the testator contemporaneously with the execution of his will and upon no consideration except
that expressed, to-wit, l ove and affection for his son William and on e
dollar: that said instrument was not then, nor ever in the lifetime o f
t he testator delivered to said tr u stee^ but was delivered as an escrow
t o one Zeno C. Payne to be bv him placed on record and delivered o
sa id trustee after the de a th of sajd testator, the testator remaining in
possession and control of the premises and paying taxes thereon until
his death, a portion of his debts being contracted after the signing of
said instrument and c redit being extended to him on account of hi s
a ppar^ nr^ owiier ship of said premises, and that said deed delivered to
said trustee after the death of the plaintiff's testator was fraudulently
The an made and that it hinders, delays and defrauds his creditors.
s wer admitted jlie insufficiency of the assets of the testator's estate to
pay his d ebts. On' denial by the defendants of the plaintiff's allegations
as to the fraudulent character and effect of tlie instrument the cause
was tried in die circuit court where upon request the conclusions of
fact and law were separately stated as follows :
On the fourth day of December, 1891, Lewis Shirey, then in full

J

v.- Kitch, 8 Phila. 554 (1871), ace, the deed there beirrg~«ft,.gscrow.
v. Ladd, 14 Vt. 185 (1842), where the widow was held entitle
dower, the grantor having been deemed to have died seised.
21

Vorheis

See Ladd
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ife, was seized of 160 acres of land in Hamilton township, Fra nklin
county. Ohio, upon 60 acres of which there was
mortgage incumbrance of $1,500; that on said December
1891, said Shirey executed
/a rust deed toThomas Rathmell for the remaining 100 acres ther eof
or the use of his son, William C. Shirey, for life,.remamder to the ch ildren of William C. Shirey That on the same day he ex ecuted his_w ill
disposing of 60 acres, the remainder of his land the ame being charg ed with the mortgage incumbrance aforesaid to his daughter, Marg aret
Thompson,^ lliat at the time of the execution of said deed, to-wit De1891, he delivered the same to one Zeno C. Payne, his attorcember
made
the following indorsement thereon in said Shirey's preswho
ney,
"
ence, to-wit:
Deposited with me in escrow to be placed on record
he death of the grantor and delivered to the grantee herein named.
At the time of said endorsement said Shirey instructed
Z. C. Payne
said Payne
place this deed on record at the time of his death nd
eliver the same to the grantee therein named. That at the time of the
execution of said deed and will in addition to the m ortgage incumbrance of $1,500, Shirey was indebted to divers persons in the sum of
500, which, in addition to the $1,500 mortgage incumbrance, remained
unpaid at the time of his death, which occurred in February in 1895.
hirey remained in possession and co ntr ol of said realty, and pai the
taxes ther eon during hi life time, and contracted subseque ntly to
executiot Tof said deed other debts to the amount of about S1.j25. said
incTeHtedness of $1,32d remaining unpaid at the time of his death.
hirey died February, in 1895,
avi ng defendant, Crissie Shirey,
w idow, and said son and daughter surviving him . Said trust deed wa
immediately upon Shirey's death, placed on record in the recorder's
office of Franklin county, Ohio, and th en handed to Thomas Rathm ell,
he grantee therein named, who,_ immediately upon Shirey's death n
n execution of the trust created by said trust deed, entered into n
ook possession as such trustee of said 100 acres of land, nd
now
and has been continuously since the death of said Lewis Shirey in possession thereof.
hat said 60 acres of land devised to Margar et
Thomp'^on by qairl wijf have been sold by laintiff nd the proceeds of
aid sale are not more than sufficient to pay said mortgage indeb tpflnf'c;g
$1,500, with interest, widow's dower in said 60 acres and costs of
sale.
No provision for the w idow was m ade either in the deedjii trust
dperTthe grantor,
^t tTTeTTiiiT'Trr the pypn^^
thq
nrjri
A^ jll^
Shirey, did not retain property clearly and beyond doubt sufficient to
which indebtednes about $700
pay his existing indebtedness; and
and remains_ unpaid, and that umesT^gaf^T OO
eingj-insecured debts)
acreso land or some part the reof, be sold, the general creditors of sai
Lewis Shirey will receive notK mgoiithe clairn. as cost of administration, costs of last sickness and funeraland the mortgage indebtedness
of $1,500, with interest, and widow's dower and allowance, having
consumed the proceeds of said 60 acres of land and all the personal
estate of said Lewis Shirey.
That aid Lewis Shirey injthe_£ 2^££iition
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of s aid deed acted in perfect good faith and without any intention al
fraud, ''fhat said Lewis Shirey when contracting said debts subsequent to the execution of said trust deed was guilty of no misrepresentations whatever, c redit having been extended to him without an y
i nquiry or investigati on by the persons so lend mg him credit as t o
how much land or property he then owned , said creditors having knowledge that said Shirey was in the possession and control of 160 acres of
land and without knowledge that he had made said trust deed. Upon the foregoing facts the court finds the law to be as follows, to-wit :
First — T hat said tr ust deed passed the title to said grantee, Thom as
Rathmell, trustee, as ot tlie'^te of its first delivery, to-wit. Decem ber
4, 1891, subject to the dower estate of Crissie Shirey.
Second — There was no intentional fraud in the execution and del ivery of said deed, and that the same is valid as to the debts ot .Lewis
^C^Z^
£^COt<4Zi.^u^
S hirey created after nprember 4, 1RQ1.

Third — That said conveyance

/

t^
a^ ^mJ^
is void as against the debts existing at

of its execution .
Fourth — That plai ntiff is entitled to sell

t he time

so much of said 100 acres
o f land as may be necessary to pay the outstanding debts of Le wis
S hirey existing December 4. 1891. with the accrued interest there on.
To each and all of which findings of fact so made by the court as aforesaid, and each and every conclusion of law thereon the plaintiff excepts.
A bill of exceptions was taken embodying all of the evidence, and this
petition in error pr ays for the reversal of the judgment of the cir cuit
court because its findings of fact are not supported by the evidence and
b ecause its conclusions of law were not justified by the fqcts found .
Shauck, J. The case presented permits us to assume, without deciding, that in view of the facts found by the circuit court t here was
s uch a delivery of the deed as w ould give it effect as against the heir s
at law of the grantors, and that as to them the deed would, by relatio n,
t ake effect at the date when the instrument was delivered as an escrow .
We have to determine whether it was effective to pass the' title to the
grantee discharged_of d ebts of tli e granj or^contracted between Decem\^^'' ber, 1891, when the instrument was delivered as an escrow and Febru^^^^--'Tii) /
ary, 1895, when upon his death it was delivered to the grantee, as was ^^ ^\yi/0^
held by the circuit court.
^^^^'^
I
Del ivery being essential to the efficacy of a deed, it is obvi ous tha t
t he title does not actually pass u ntil that whi ch was an escrow become s
a deed by virtue of its delivery as such, or at least, untilthe satis facti on of the conditions prescribed for its fi nal delivery. Accordingly the
g eneral rule is that the title does no t pass until the second delivery, or
u rftfrthe conditions prescribed therefor are satisfied . Itwould not be
practicable to cite all the cases in which the general rule is so stated.
Many of them are collected by Mr. Devlin in a note to section 328 of
his work on deeds.
To this rule there is a well-recognized exception.
The rule and the exception are thus stated by Chancellor Kent:' 22^""
orally an escrow takes eft'ect from the second delivery and is to be con-

^

yit^ e*^jiju^ .

^
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the deed of the party from that time: but this geppt-f^l riil p
d oes not apply when justi ce requires a resort to fiction . The relation
back to the first delivery, so as to give the deed effect from that time,
is al lowed in cases of necessity, to avoid injury to the operation of the
d eed from events happening- between the first and second d^ jj^ery.
*
JJut if the fiction be not required for any such purpose, it is
not admitted and the deed operates according to the truth of the case,
from the second delivery.
It is a general principle of law t hat in a ll
c ases where it becomes necessary for the purposes of justice that t he
t rue time when any legal proceeding took place should be ascertained .
t he fiction of law introduced for the sake of justice is not to pre vail
"
a gainst the f^ft.
4 Com. 454.
Whatever terms may be employed in stating the exception, the_xd.ati on back to the first delivery is always to acco mplish, and nev er to de f eat, justice. ^ Bearing in mind the purpose of this exception and the
fact that the deed before us was without any subs tan tial j:onsideration,
it is q uite apparent that the conclusion of the circuit courTthat the
relation back should be allowedjto cut ofi^ the claims of those who gav e
credit to the testator between the first and second deliveries, and with out knowledge of the instrument, is erroneous.
That conclusion derives no support from Crooks v. Crooks, 34 Ohio St. 610, or Ball v.
Foreman, Z7 Ohio St. 132, where the title was held to pass as of the
date of the first delivery for purposes clearly within the exception as
s idered as

■above stated.

The jud gment of the circuit court will be so modified as to order the
plaintiff in error to sell so much of the land in co ntroversy as may be
necessary for the payment of all the debts of the testator . Judgn\ent
accordingly.^^

WHYDDON'S CASE.
(Court

of Comiuou Pleas,

1596.

Cro. Eliz. 520.)

Annuity. The defendant saith, that he d elivered the deed of annui ty
plaintiff as an escrow , to be his deed upon a certain condition to

t o the

be performed,

otherwise not

:

and that the condition was not yet perand, without argument, adjudged

The plaintiff demurred;

formed.
Brown

v. x\usten, 35 Barb. 3-11 (1861), contra.
v. Donovan, 46 App. Uiv. 225, 61 N. Y. Supp. 542 (1899), 1G6 N. Y.
626, GO N. P]. 1119 (1901), the grantor, after making a deed and putting same
into the custody of a third party, to be delivered to the grantee at death of
grantor, made a will purporting to devise the same property to another.
Was
22

In Eanken

the

will

effective as to that property?

A woman made a deed of certain lands to her son, and left the deed with a
third party to be handed to the grantee on her death. Later she made a mortgage of the same lands to secure a loan.
After the mother's death the mortgagee sought to foreclose the mortgage.
The trial court excluded the evidence
offered by the son to prove the execution of the deed to him and that the mortgagee had notice of said deed.
Was the court right V See Wittenbroek v. Cass,
110 Cal. 1, 42 Pac. 300 (1S95).
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of a deed cannot be averred to he to
Vide 19 Hen. VIII, pi. 8, 29 Hen.

and Morice's Case, Dyer, 34, b, 35, a, in margin.

^l^'iiu^.XT

HAWKSLAND

v.

GATCHEL.

(Court of Queen's Bench, 1601.

Cro. Eliz. S35.)

De bt upon an oblia"at ion. The defend ant pleads that he delive red
that obligation to the plaint iff, as an escrow to be his deed, if he perfo rmed s uch a condition , viz., to permit him to enjoy such corn; and
al ledgeth, that the con dition was not performed, and so not his deed.
And hereupon the plaintiff' demurs. Clerk, for the plaintiff, argued,
that one cannot deliver a deed to the party himself, to be an escrow;
and to that purpose cited the 19 Hen. VIII, pi, 43 Edw. II, pi, 28,
where it is said, that this condition cannot be averred upon the delivery
to the party himself, in avoidance of the deed, without shewing a deed
thereof.
Gawdy. There is not any difference, where it is delivered to the
party himself as an escrow, and where to a stranger; and the case of
19 Hen. VIII, is so; because the deed was delivered to the party himself first, as his deed upon condition, &c., in which case the deed is absolute, and takes eft'ect as his deed upon the first delivery ; and it canBut when it is first delivered as- an
not be avoided by the condition.
e scrow, although it be to the party himself, it is clear that it is not his
"
d eed until it be performed
And so is 29 Hen. Vill, Dyer, 34, in Morris and Leigh's Case.
Poi'HAM accord. ; for if, upon the delivery, the words spoken by
the obligor purport that it shall not be his deed, it is clear it is not : as
where one causeth an obligation to be written and sealed in my name,
and brings it unto me, and prays that I would deliver it as my deed,
"
and I say, Do you such a thing, and take it as my deed^ otherwise no t ;"
i t is clear, that it is not my deed until the thing be performed . So if
the obligor saith, "Take it to you, I will not deliver it as my deed;"
Wherefore in the principal case, when the obligait is not his deed.
tion is delivered as an escrow, by express words, it is not possible that
it should be his deed, for the words are not sufficient to make it so
But if it be once delivered as hi s
until the condition be performed.
dee d, it rannnt afterwards be defeated by a condition, if the condition
be not in writing ; bu t here the condition is precedent, so as it was n ot
his deed until it were performed, and therefore a conditional deliv ery
may be averred without writing . Wherefore, &c.
,
Fenner to the same intent: for although dift'erence hath been taken,
that a deed shall not be delivered to the party himself as an escrow,
but to a stranger; and the reason hath been alleged, because when it is
delivered to the party himself, there cannot be a second delivery,

7^
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whereupon the writing should take his effect as a deed ; that seemeth
to be no difference : for when it is deHv ered to the party as an escro w,
t he words are not suf^ent to make it to be his deed, until the con diWherefore, &c.
t ion be performed.
And of that opinion was ClExch. Wherefore it was a djudged fo r
tlie defendant.
Vide Cro. Eliz. 520, Whyddon's Case.

WILLIAMS
(Court

of Coinuion Pleas,

V.

GREEN.
Cro. Eliz. SS4.)

1G02.

Debt upon a bill. The defendant pleads, t hat the said bill was de livto the p laintiff as a schedule, upon condition, that if tlie plaint iff
d elivered unto the defendant an horse upon such a rlay^ tViat y\-]f>n \f
s hould be his dee d, otherwise no t : and that the plaintiff had not delivered the said horse unto him ; and so non est factum. — And it was thereupon demurred : and resolved by the whole Court to be no plea ; for. a
de ed cannot be delivered to the party himself as an escrow, because the n
a bare averment without any writing would make void every dee d.
Wherefore it was adjudged for the plaintiff. See Whyddon's Case,
e red

Cro. Eliz.

520.

LONDON FREEHOLD
(Chancery
d
,

LEASEHOLD PROPERTY CO.
SUFFIELD.

&

Division.

v.

[1S97] 2 Ch. 60S.)

an ac tion by the plaintiffs, who were mortgagors, agai nst
mortgagees, to set aside a mortgage deed for~ i9000.. and arose
out of the frauds of one Llewellyn Malcolm Wynne, a solicitor, who
had since absconded.
The facts, so far as it is necessary to state them for the purposes of
the present report, were as follows. Lle wellvn IMalcolm Wynne w as a
soli citor carrying on business in London in partnership with his broth e r. Campbell Mountague
Edward Wynne, under the firm of "Wynne

This was

t he

& Son."
L. M. Wynne was on e of the four trustees "of the marriage settle ment of Sir Frederick Leopold Arthur^and the firm acted as solici tors
t o the trust
He was also the managing director of the plaint iffs, the
London Freehold and Leasehold Property Company, Limited, incorporated in 1883. I n ]May, 1886, W yr me & Son, who carried on busin ess
as bankers as well as solicitors,

ol

were appointed managers and banke rs

the company at a commission . \Vynne & Son were also '^n]^^ritnr<;
to the company; Wynne & Son's office was the office of the company,

and Wynne & Son's conveyancing; clerk. Tyler, was the secretary to
t he compan y.
The company's accounts were kept by L. M. Wynne,

/

'
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whose duty it was, as acting banker and manager, to pay the company's
money received by him or his firm into the bank of "Wynne & Son."
C hild & Co. were Wynne & Son's bankers, and in May, 1892. Wynn e
& Son, as the soUcitors to the trustees of Arthur's settlement, receive d
a sum of £9000., part of the trust funds, and paid it intn Child's hank
to the credit of their own account, pending reinvestment . It appeared
that one of the trustees, Mr. Somerset, knew that Wynne & Son had
the money in their hands for reinvestment.
Earl y in 1893 the directors of the plaintiff companv, acting on L. M .
Wynne's advice, proposed to take steps for g'raduallv paying off certain
'
mortgages on pro pe rties of the company, bearing interest at 5 per

cent, by

^m of £9000.. at a lower rate of intere st. The mode
all the details of the arrangements for the pursumand
oi raising tlm
pose they left to Wynne, in whom the directors placed complete confiraising-a^

dence, he telling the board that he had clients who would lend the
money. I n June, 1893, a mortgage was p repared by counsel on \\[ynne
& Son's instructions, for £90 00.,~to the Arthur trustees upon the security o f c ertain leasehold properties of the companv consisting of a
block of warehouses calle d "Victoria Warehouses," and two houses in
Bury Street, London, being' properties comprised in the existing mortgages.

Worley and Ryder, t wo of the company's d iinfor me d^ by Wynne & Son that a meeting of the boar d
would be held on the 22d. A meeting of the directors was accordingly
held on June 22, 1893. An agenda paper for the meeting was prepared
by Tyler, and thi s_paper stated that part of the business would be_ to
The directors present
s eal the £9000. mortgage, and another mortgag e.
on the 22d were Wynne, Worley. and Ryder. Tyler, the secretary, was
also present. The mortgage for £9000., engrossed for execution, but
with date (except the year) and days for payment left in blank, was
pr oduced and discussed, and a statement of the properties compris ed
Th e
i n the mortgages which were to be paid off was also produced.
mortgage reserved mterest at 5Vj. per cent., reducible to 4^ on pun ct ual paymen t.
After explanations by Wynne, it was "resolved that
the seal be affixed to the mortgage for £9000. on Victoria Warehouses
and Bury Street," and to the other mortgage, and both mortgages wer e
t hereupon sealed with the company's seal .
Both Worley and Ryder
Tyler also signed it as secsigned the i9000. mortgage as directors.
retary. No cash then passed, and the directors were well aware of th at
fact : nor, as a matter of fact, did the £9000. expressed to be advanced
On June

19, Messrs.

re ctors, were

to the comp an y ever find its way into the company's coffers at al l.
the mortgage were not filled up at the meeting, but the
da te of. the mortgage, December 29, 1893. was subsequently filled irL by
the law s tati oner when it was sent to be stamped . The blanks left f or
t he day s, of payment we re never filled in.
The document thus sealed
was then given to or left with Wynne, who, on June 28, 1893, wrote to
Aig.Prop.— 22

The blanks in

Js^if>^
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Colonel Lloyd, one of the Arthur
advanced on that security.

On March
a djudicated

2, 1895.
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trustees, that the £9000.

2

had been

L. M. Wvnne absconded, and on March 9 he w as
t.
On the 16th his brother was also adjudicat ed

bankrupt, and on tlie same day a trustee was appointed in the bankrup tcies of t he property of the firm and of the separate property of jU _M.
Wynne. After the failure of the firm the mortgage of December 29,
1893, was found jn a "temporary box" belonging to them in which they
k ept miscellaneous deeds likely to be wanted for temporary purpo ses
or for sta mjjjng. The mortgage h ad not been_e nt£i£dJn the company's
register of mortgages, n or was it re^ jalgJ^d in the Middlesex Registry
gave judgment in the
until May 22, 1897 , the day after Kekewich,
view to such registime,
with
and
same
!AI)0ut
the
action.
present
tration, one of the Arthur trustees executed the mortgage.
Son's affairs aftef
The result of inquiries instituted into Wynne
1893, they had 'transferred £9 000.
their failure hewed that on June
from their account with the trustees of Arthur's settlement to the cred
of the plaintiff company the following credit entry, headed "The London Freehold and Leasehold Property Company Mortgage Account"
Son's ledger: "By transferred from Sir F.
being found in Wynne
L. Arthur's settlement trustees, amount, advanced on mortgage at 4^2
per cent., £9000." As already stated, the £9000. never found its w ay
ever applied in discharge
n cash to the conipany at all, nor was
mortga ges, the entry, therefore, being, as the company qii-
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it
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it
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&

a

J.,
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tlTe_existino-

a

&
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s

nd fmndnlent . It appeared that Tyler, the clerk to
tended, fictitiou
Son and secretary to the company, had access to the ledger
Wynne
but he, and Worley and Ryder also, in giving their evidence in the present action, said they knew nothing about any of the entries in Wynne
Son's books, and never saw or knew of the particular entry in ques-

tion.

plaintiff compan

brough

it

&

a

;

if

a

t

g

t

he

t

21, 18 96,

y

this action aga inst
and the
1^. M. Wvnne).
he defendants, the Arthur trustees (includin
trustee in bankruptcy, claiming a declaration that the mortgage of
valid and effectual security and was not
December 29, 1893, was not
and so far as
binding on the plaintiffs, and that the same might,
of the titlecancelled
and
delivery-up
be
set
aside
be
necessary,
might
deeds relating to the mortgage; and injunction against enforcing the
security; and, in case the Court should be of opinion that the mortdeclaration that the plaintiffs were entigage was valid and effectual,
tled to prove for the £9000. as money had and received by L. M.
Wynne as their solicitor, either against the joint estate' of the firm of
Son, or against the separate estate of L. M. Wynne, as they
Wynne
Defences were
might elect; and all necessary accounts and inquiries.
appeared, had
delivered by all the defendants except Wynne, who,
by an order made by North, J., on April 25, 1896 — that is, since the
issue of the writ — been discharged from the trusts of the Arthur set-

On March

tlement.
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The action came on for trial with witnesses before Kekewich,
on May 20, 1897.
The witnesses examined were Messrs. Worley and Ryder, two of the
directors of the plaintiff company, Mr. Tyler, the late secretary of the
company, Mr. C. M. E. Wynne, and Mr. Dalgleish, an accountant who
had been auditor of the company, and was its present secretary, having
been appointed to that offxe
place of Tyler shortly after Wynne
The effect of their evidence sufficiently appears, for
Son's failure.
the purpose of this report, from the judgments of Kekewich, J., and the
Court of Appeal.
Oct. 30. The judgment of the Court (LindlEy, M. R., and Lord
Luni.ovv and Chitty, L. JJ.) was delivered by
Li.vdlKy, M. R.^* This
decian appeal by the plaintiffs from
Kekewich,
sion of
J., refusing to set aside mortgage executed by them
for securing £9000. to Lord Suffield and others, who were the trustees
of settlement called Arthur's settlement.
[His Lordship then reviewed the facts of the case to the effect
above stated, obs erving that the relation of Wynne
Son to the plai n-

company was an all-miportant element in the case
that as bankers
and managers they kept the company's accounts,
being their duty
as managers to pay the company's money received by them as manth at, moreover,
agers into their bank
would be
accordance with
he ordinary course of business for
banker, w'ho had to pay mon£.
for one customer to another, to effect such payment by book entries
that is. by debiting one customer and crediting another in their respective accounts,
not being necessary that any cash should actually pa ss
from the one customer to the other
also that
was clear from the
evidence that the dir ectors of the plaintiff company left all the acSon, and never tr oubl ed themselves about
ounts to Wynne
ny
books except the minute-books and the compa ny's pass-book \vit
Snn
and that the plamtitts had tailed to prove that the
Wynne
credit entry of June
1893, was fictitious and fraudulent.
His Lordafter
ship,
referring to the evidence as to the preparation of the mortgage, its production at the meeting of the company's directors on June
22, 1893, and its sealing with the company's seal, proceeded
lie document thus sealed was given to or left with Wynne
in what capacity
no means clear. Worley, Ryder, and Tyler have
all given evidence as to what took place when the £9000. mortgage
co ntended bv counsel for the plaintiffs that th (tA<i.Ajlf^^ C4^
was sealed, and
perfected dee
mortgage was merely an escro w, nd never became
our opinion, clear
We are unable to come to this conclusion^
/v** rt\}'v^^*^
is.
that the deed was sealed and delivered by the company, acting through
perfect instrument
e., as
deed,
its directors and secretary, as
Oju^JaJ^^
'
might
T7
be used
pn npand that
was so executed in order that
erative deed for the purpose nf rarrying nnf the rnnte mplated arrange- ''^^'^a^
v
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A portion of the opinion is omitted.
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ment by which the several existing mortgages bearing interest at 5 per
cent, might be replaced by one mortgage bearing interest at 41/2 per
cent.
The mortgage was for £9000. and interest at 51/4 per cent., rea.
ear
On the face of it. it
ducible to 4I/2 on punctual payment.
mortgage for the money and interest; the subsisting mortgages are
The minute authorizing the seahng of
not mentioned or referred
nothing
any
about
conditional delivery, nor anythi ng
the deed says
sliewinc that the document was to operate as an escrow . Worley,
Ryder, and Tyler all agree that the deed was executed in order to enwas wanted to pay off the other
able Wynne to get the i9000., as
for
which
was
to be substituted, and Worley
existing mortgages
the
right to demand £9000. from
says, in order to give the company
that neither Worley, Ryder, nor Tyler
The real truth
the lenders.
had any distinct idea how the contemplated arrangement was to be carried out. They left the whole matter to Wynne, and entrusted him
to carrv
out as best he could: but that th deed was executed as
This conclusion
eed and was not an escrow is. in our opinion, clear.
fortified by other evidence. [This evidence his Lordship adverted
the history of the impeached deed.
Such
to in detail.]
Having now stated the material facts of the case, we pass to the
law applicable to them. The plaintiff company seek to set aside the
9000. mortgage on the following groundsTnamely— first on the legal
deed, but was on
ground that the mortgage never was executed as
econdly , on th
n escrow.;
equitable ground that the mortgage es
or
n ever gave and that the company never got the consideration
w hich the mortgage was given. As regards the invalidity of the mortdeed,
urged that, although sealed, the mortgage was
gage as
handed to Wynne, not as one of the mortgagees nor as solicitor to
the mortgagees, but as solicitor to the plaintiff company, to be deliver ed
when the
the mortgagees or to be kept by him as their solicitor on
company
plaintiff
or was
reached
the
or
at
least
som
of
9000..
ad
pplied in paying oif the other mortgages which the company
ranged
agamst
jliis
the plai nar
to pay ofif. Kekeja gch, T.. decid
poinf
tiff Qo mpany. We take the same view. We are not prepared to go
so far as to say that, as Wynne was himself one of the mortgagees
and
could not in point of law be an escrow
party to the deed,
for
in his hands.
Counsel
the defendants contended that the mere
fact that Wynne was himselT one oTthe rnoFfgagees was fatal to the
deed being an escrow.
They contended that to be an escrow the deed
in short,
must be delivered to some person not
party taking under
In support of this contention reliance was placed on
to
stranger.
Co. Litt. 36 a; Sheppard's Touchstone (7th Ed.) pp. 58, 59; 2* and

p

e

a

1.

:

a

a

f t

a

a

delivery of
deed as an escrow is said to be where one cloth ma ke
stranger until certain conditions be erseaTa aeeci, and U{jllV(^i*' It unto
'grmea, 'andThen to be diellVgl'ed to bim to whom the deed is made, to take fdelivery is
deed, and such
man may deliver
ect as 'his deed . And so
That the form of
good.
But in this case two cautions must be heeded
24^Xr he
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No doubt the language used in the
authorities referred to and reproduced in other works on real propBut the lanerty and conveyancing is in favour of this contention.
520.

g uage is very general, and we are not at all satisfied that the law is so
r igid as to compel the Court to decide that where there are severa l
grantees and one of them is als^ solicitor of the grantor and of the
o ther grantees, and the deed is delivered to him, evidence is not admissible to shew the character in which and the terms upon which t he
d eed was so delivered . To exclude such evidence appears to us unreasonable ; and we do not think we are compelled by authority to
exclude it. We hold such evidence to be adniis<;ih1p, ?\nd jn cjp doing
w e believe we ar e acting in accordance with modern authorities, be -

g inning with Murray v.
Watkins v. Nash, L,, R.
which we have already
mortgage was executed
s uch to Wynne in order
to which we have before
* * *
proper.^"*

Earl of Stair, 2 B . & C. 82, and ending with
20 Eq. 262.
Upon the evidence, however, to
referred,

we come to the conclusion that the
as a complete deed, and that it was given a s
to enable him to carry nut the arrangements
alluded

;

jjid

to carry them out as he thoug ht

y

Jr

w ords used in the delivery of a deed in this manner be apt and prop er. 2.
I^at
t lie deed be deliverea to one that is a stranger to it. and not to the party him*
^
self to whom it is made :
So it must be delivered to a stranger; for If
seal my deed and deliver it to the party himself to whom it is -made as an
.
_
escrow upon certain conditions, &e., in this case, let the form of the words be
cCcZ^^**
whai it will, the delivery is absolute, and the deed shall take effect as his deed
'--y
«^' 4''X^«--C*<
presenny, and the luirty is not bound to perform the conditions ; for, in traditionibus cliartarum, non quod dictum, sed quod factum est, Inspicitur. But
^^,*.c..-s„#i^
in the first cases before, where the deed is delivered to a stranger, and apt
words are used in the delivery thereof, it is of no more force, until the conditions be performed, than if I had made it, and laid, it by me, and not delivered
it at all ; and therefore in that case, albeit the party get it into his hands
before the conditions be performed, yet he can make no use of it at all, neither
will it do him any good. B^t when the conditions m-p nprfm-pied. and the de ed
I s delivered over, then the deed shall take as uiueh e ff^ft 'T'^ '^ ^*"Wfff delivere d
-^
iinmediately to tlie party to whom it is made,
of God or u-,an can
.ind no act
H inder or prevent this effect then, if the nartv thnt dntl i mnkp it be not atlE e
time of iii.niving tliereoi:' disabled to make it . He therefore, that is trusted with
the keeping and delivering of such a writing, ought not to deliver it before the
conditions be performed ; and when the conditions be performed, he ought not
to keep it, but to deliver it to the party.
For it may be made a question, whether the deed be perfect, before he hath delivered it over to the party according to the authority given him. gowbeit it seems the delivery is good. forJ t
i s said in this case, that if either ofTli e narties to the deed die hefo rp thp fionditions be performed, and the conditions be after nfirformed. that thp d^^ri 7s
good ; for there was traditio inchoata in the lifetime of the parties ; et postea
consummata existens by the performance of the conditions, it tak^tb i^g pffpr'iby the first deliver.y. without any new or second delivery: and th f^ sp<^nri riplivery is but the execution
and consummation of ' the first delivery ." Shep.
'
Touch. 5S, 59.
2 5 But see Price v. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co., .34 111. 13 (1864), where a
d ^ed was left with the solicitor of a corporation, the grantee, to be held ^y him
until the performance of a conditioiL

I
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Complainant filed a bill for divorce, also pra^n ng
t o have set aside a deed of certain lands made by complainant running
t o the defendant, and t o compel the conveyance by defendant to co mpl ainant of certain other lands, title to which was taken in defenda nt's
The
name, the consideration price having been paid by complainant.
and
defendbelow
in
the
court
on
all
points
complainant prevailed
ant appealed. The p-r onnd for the divorce alle,i]:ed was extreme cruej ty.
The circuit judge, who saw the witnesses and noted their api)earance
upon the stand, w^as of the opinion that the case of extreme cruelty
was made out. We are not disposed, upon the record made, to disturb
the circuit judge's finding upon this question.
Up on the qu estion of the right to set aside the deed execui £d-hy
c omplainant and placed in defendants hands, we encounter what.j ye
The equities of
d eem a legal obstacle to granting the relief praye d.
the case are undoubtedly very strongly with complainant, and if the

MoxTCOMERY,

J.

rules of law would admit, we should unhesitatingly grant the relief
T he property involved represents substantiallv all the ea rnprayed.
i ngs of the complainant for a lifetime, and the insistance by the defen dant upon her legal rights which will result in turning complainant ou t

almost penniless, is most unconscionable and inequitable,.. We have
struggled to find authority for relieving complainant in the case, but upon a full consideration and a re-examination of the question determined
by this court in Dyer v. Skadan, 128 xMich. 348, 87 N. W. 211, 92 Am.
St. Rep. 461, we are unable to find such authority.
Complainant's testimony is that he prepared, ^signs d,. and acknow le dged the deeds in que stion, and retained them in his possession fo r
1890, when about
se veral year s, but tliat Tn the month of August,
to take a raihvay trip to the G. A. R. encampment, which he deemed
hazardous on account of a strike of the employees of the road he
would travel over, he, before leaving home, handed the deeds to th e
defendant wMth instructions that if anything of a fatal nature shou ld
that he returned_J n
be^fall him, she should have the deeds recorded;
found that the defendant had
s afety , a nd several years thereafter
The
c aused the deeds to _be recorded during his absence on this tr ip.
defendant denies that there was any condition annexed to the delivery
of the deeds to her, but a sserts that complainant handed her the deeds
teJling her to record the m, and instructing her in what office to h ave
But assuming complainant's version to be correct, the
t hem recorded.
transaction cons tituted a delivery of the deeds to the grantee withou t
a ny express reservation of the right to recall them, and with inten t
t hat in a ce rtai n contingency they should be efiective. without any fur ther act on the part of the complainant.
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Skadan reviews the authorities and follows
the rule laid down by this court in Dawson v. Hall, 2 Mich. 390, that
a^delivery of a deed by a grantor to a granteeMn escrow or^upon con ditionMs effectual to pass title presently . This question has arisen and
Many cases
is considered and discussed in a vast number of cases.
may be found in which the manual custody of a deed had been entrusted to the grantee temporarily and evidence was admitted to show that
Uut these cases when examined and anano delivery was intended.
lyzed are found to be, we think, cases in which there was no intent
that the deed should take effect ultimately without any further act on
the grantor's part if the condition upon which it was delivered should
See a discussion of this subject in Gilbert v. Insurbe performed.
ance Co., 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 43, 35 Arh. Dec. 543, in which case it
was held that leaving the deed in the hands of the grantee to be by
him transmitted to a third person to hold in escrow until the happening of a certain event is not a delivery to the grantee so as to vest
title in him. But in that case it is manifest that nothing but the bare
possession of the deed was vested in the grantee, and it was not to be
The deed could not presently
retained except by a breach of faith.
lake effect in the hands of the grantee, nor could it take effect without
In the present cas e.
an intervening act by the grantor or his agent.
ti o act of the grantor was required whi ch was not performed . ^ It s
true the condi tion which it is attempted to annex to the delivery ha s
not been tulhlled, but had the d eath oc curred, no other act of th e
grantor was essential to the passing ot title ! The case of Gilbert v.
Insurance Co., it should be stated, was later distinguished and its doctrine questioned by so able a jurist as Judge Selden in Braman v.
Bingham, 26 N. Y. 491, in which it was sought to avoid delivery of a
deed on the ground that it was deposited with the granted with instructions to leave it with one of the clerks of the register's office,
and it was contended that these facts showed that there was no delivery with intent that title should pass. It was held, however, that
it was immaterial whether these facts were properly pleaded ; that
if the answer, in addition to what it contained, had embraced these facts,
it would not, in the opinion of the court, have presented a defense.
Referring to Gilbert v. Insurance Co., it was said :
"In that case, the grantee had deposited the deed with the third person in pursuance of the arrangement, the condition had not been perThe case
formed, and the grantee made no claim under the deed.
an
retained
still
presented merely the question, whether the grantor
insurable interest in the premises described in the deed, the nominal
grantee testifying to the terms in which the deed was delivered to him.
Limited to its peculiar circumstances, no fault can be found with the
decision ; but if the grantee had retained. the deed, claiming that its delivery to him was absolute, and in a contest between him and the
grantor parol proof of a conditional delivery had been offered, I think
If I am wrong in this concluthe result would have been different.

The
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sion, the case discloses an avenue for the overthrow of titles, by parol
proof, which was supposed to be closed by the rule to which it would
* * * If a delivery to the grantee
seem to form an exception.
can be made subject to one parol condition, I see no ground of prinThe deed having b een
ciple which can exclude any parol condition.
d elivered to the grantee. I think the parol evidence that tb ^ Hpliypr.^
was
conditional was properlv excluded ."
'
See, also, Foley v. Cowgill, 5 Blackf . (Ind.) 18, 32 Am. Dec. 49;
Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229, 55 Am. Dec. 330.
But if we assume it to be correct to hold that a deed may be delivered to a grantee as a mere agent or bailee of the grantor to transmit
such deed to a third person to hold in escrow, it does not aid the comNor do we know of any authority which goes
plainant in this case.
to the extent of holding that a deed d ejivered to a grante e with an
intention on the part of the grantor that it shall be subject to a future
condition, but with no express provision for recal l by the grantor and
requiring for its vahdity no additional act on the part of the grantor
or any third person, can be defeated by parol proof of such condi-

d

i

4-i/-\-p 26

^

^

5f;

The de cree must be modified as indicated by this opinion. But th e
want of equity and good conscience in defendant's attitude in this case i s
so marked that we are disposed to exercise our discretion and with hold any award of costs .^^

LEE
(Supreme

V.

Court of Iowa,

RICHMOND.

1894.

90

Iowa,

695, 57 N. W.

613.)

Robinson, J. The defendants. William Richmond and George W,
Fulton, f or some years carried on a commercial business at Counc il
Bluffs under t he name of the Boston Tea Company. . James T. Lee, a
son of the plaintiff, was employed by them as clerk for about three

years. In July, 1888, and w hile he was so employed, the defendan ts
c aused him to be a rreste d on a preliminary info rmation which charge d
him with the crime ^F e mbezzlement.
While he was under arrest,
and before the examination was held, he had an interview with Richmond, in which he admitted that he was guilty of th e offense cha rge d,
b ut expressed a Hp'^irp tn 5;p.ttl^ the matter, and . agreed lo" "teTegraph
.

y^2^/The balance of the opinion reviewing many cases is omitted.
C-'-^ee accord, Fisher v. Fisher, 23 Cal. App. 3 10, 137 Pac. 1094 (1913), under
statute.

•

a

27 Cf. Alabama
Coal & Coke Co. v. Gulf Coal & Coke Co., 165 Ala. 304. 51
South. 570 (1910), where A. made a deed to B. and handed the deed to X., a
land purchasing agent of B., to be held, however, in escrow until the payment
of the purchase price by B. Held no delivery to B.
See Blewitt v. Boorum, 142 N. Y. 357, 37 N. E. 119, 40 Am. St. Rep. 600 (1S94),
where the court limits the doctrine of the principal case to instruments affecting realty and instruments requiring a seal for validity, intimating, however,
that the latter should not come within the rule.
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father, who resided at Keokuk, to come to Council Bluffs . On
the next day, Saturday, July 14, he learned that his father could not
On Sunday, the defen dcome, and informed Richmond of the fact.
a ^jts visited him at his home, and spent several hoiirs there . On the
same day, Richmond, James T. Lee, and his wife started for the home
An interview was there
of the plaintiff, where they arrived Monday.
had, at which the plaintiff and his wife, the son and his wife, and Richnlond were present during all or a part of the time. I t resulted in t he
e xecution by the plaintiff and his wife to Richmond of a deed for thr ee
l ots in the town ot Atlantic for the specified consideration of two tho uThe de ed was given to Richmon d, and w as record_e d
sand dollars.
T he plaintiff asks that
in the office of the recorder of Cass county.
relie f. The distric t
and
canceled,
be
for
equitable
the deed
general
c ourt decreed the deed to be void, and that the title to the lots was
vested in the plaintiff.
The plaintiff' alleges that the deed was executed in consequence of
the representations of Richmond, for himself and Fulton, that James
T. Lee had embezzled a large sum of money; and they had filed an
information against him, in which he was charged with the embezzlernent of money and goods to the value of five thousand dollars ; that
the embezzlement had been confessed by him ; that the defendants
were his friends, and th at for the sum of three thousand (;lnllar.s the y
would Hi.smi?^^ the information, and restore him to his employme nt.
t q hig

and he would hav e no further trouble; that, if the sum of thy ge
thousand dollars was not paid at once, the prosecution would be carrie d
on, and he would be sent to the penitentiary . The plaintiff further
claims that at that time he and his wife, who is the mother of James
T. Lee, we re old a n d feeble; that he was sick; that both were much
disturbed and frightened by what was said to them, and not knowing
the facts, and having no knowledge of such matters, they believed what
Richmond said to them ; t hat, when the deed was executed, Richmoni l
a greed to submit it to Fulton, and, if it was not satisfactory to him .
t o return it to plaintiff^ but that, if it was satisfactory, the rriminni
prosecution of his son would be dropped and eruled . Some of these
claims are denied by the defendants, but the preponderance of the evidence shows the following facts : Until James T. Lee and wife and
Richmond arrived at the house of the plaintiff, he did not know of the
charges against his son. He was then ab out seventy years of ag e, had
been i n poor heal th for several years, and was confined to the house.
He was s ubject to at tacks of n ervousnes s, and had been suffering from
Rich mond told him that the amount of the em one for several days.
bezzlerrjent was si y thou sand dollars, but the defendants would dro p
t he prosecution for three tho n'^^^nH dollars: that the preliminary hearing was set for the next day, and would be prosecuted, unless a settlement was effected. T he son was present, but did not deny the charge
of embezzle ment which Richmond mad e- The father and mother were
much frightened, and desiring to protect their son, and avoid the scan-

*

,
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dal of a criminal prosecution, finally consented to give the deed in qu est ion, if it woul d end the prosecution , and, with notes of the defendants to the amount of about nine hundred dollars, which the son held
and proposed to surrender, would effect a complete settlement of the
The deed was delivered under an agreement
matter in controversy.
to that effect, and on condition that, if it was not satisfactory to Fulton, it was to be returned to the plaintiff. The notes held by the son
were surrendered to the defendants, but the prosecution of the_ son_
was not stopped, although after the cas e re ached the district cou rt,
and after an indictment h;^d_bee" returned, it was dismissed on moti on
o f the county .attorney for want of sufficient evidence to convict . The
deed was retained by the defendants, but they insisted that the plaintiff should give his promissory notes for the sum of one thousand
dollars, which were sent to him repeatedly for his signature.
I t is said that, if the claims of the plaintiff be.wpll fnimrj e d. he co nveyed his propertv for the purpose of compromising a criminal pi iDSecution and that, as that object wa s illegal, the law will leave all partie s
where it finds then- L We should hesitate long before
tho
refusing
plaintiff relief on that ground, in view of the weakness of
his body and mind, the threats made, and the fear he was under
when the deed was given. Meech v. Lee, 82 Mich, 274, 46 N. W. 397.
But we prefer to place our conclusion upon the ground that the cond it ion on which the deed was given to Richmond was never complie d
with, and that the de ed was n ot in law delivered, and, therefore, has
no t taken effect as a conveyance. We refer to the condition that the
(Jeed and the notes surrendered by the son should be received in full
Consettlement of the claims made against the son by the defendants.
of
were
that
some
of
the
the
provisions
ceding
agreement
illegal, yet
t he dee d was not to be regarded as delivered, unless the settlemen t
a ttempted was approved by Fulton, and, as it was not approved b v
him, there was never, in law, any delivery, and the deed is withou t
effect. Steel v. Miller. 40 Iowa. 406: Berkshire v. Peterson. 83 Iowa,
198. 48 N. W. 1035; Head v.. Thompson, 17 Iowa, 267, 42 N. W. 188;
Deere v. Nelson, 73 Iowa, 187, 34 N. W. 809. JThe JacUhaLsome j)ortions of tjie agreei;nent were illegal would not operate to annul the conditions and make the delivery complete.
§ince th e deed ysi7{% never
t o tile transaction

delivered, nothing can b e cl aimed under it . The decree of the district court is in harmony with our conclusions, and is affirmed.-^

28 See. also. Ilaviland v. Haviland, 130 Iowa, 611, 105 N. W. 354,
(N. S.) 281 (1905).
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Everts made a d eed of the premi ses in controversy and deposited
same with Zettler witli instruct ions to deHver it to Agnes, the grante e,
u pon Agnes making certain notes and mortgages.
Without having
p erformed the c ondition Agnes secured possession of the deed aiiH
a fter having same recorded conveyed the premises by deed to Swift .
The action was by Everts against Agnes and Swift to set asid e and

r

,

,

;

is

It

,

l

;

FJ^

cancel these conveyances. Swi ft claimed to have taken as a bona fide
p urchaser for value . The trial court dismissed the bill as to Swif t,
and required Agnes specifically to perform his part of the contract
with Everts or show cause, etc. Complainant appealed.-*
By the Court, Smith, J. It is hardly possible to dispose of this case
without recapitulating some, and perhaps most of the material allegations and facts involved therein; yet with the statement of the case
which will precede the conclusions to which we have here arrived, and
which will fully appear in the report of the case, it is only necessary to
recur to them incidentally as the discussion of the principles involved,
and of the points argued, shall seem to require.
On the 31st day of May, A. D. 1851, a written memorandu m, very
informal and incomplete, was entered into between the complainant
Everts, and the defendant Every Agnes, for the sale of the premises
described in the complainant's bill of complaint.
Whether or not that
written memorandum would be sufficiently definite and certain to authorize or enable a court of equity to decree a specific performance
It is, however, wort hy
thereof is not absolutely necessary to inquire.
o f remark, that from that memorandum alone, it would be difficult to
It is sufficient for the
s ettle definitely the rights of the parties therejo .
verl;s no
purposes of this case to say, ^jiat it conveyed no title by
thereby
any
n
in the
title
at
most
an
interest
es
obtain
Ag
equitable
djd
and, upon the performance of thf rnnfHtinn<; or stipulations therein
contained, on his part to be performed and that he had, and could have
had, no legal rights conveyed by Everts in conformity with the memorandum or otherwise, whatever his equitable rights may have been.
apparent th at the defen dant Swift did not purchase any equitable
r^ht or title assuch, which Agnes may have had by virtue ot the co ntract
but whatever he did purchase, was such interest, title or estate
as Agnes had in the premises, by virtue of his record or paper title
under the deed of Everts to Agnes made and recorded as set forth in
tne pleadings^

It

29

is

not necessary, therefore, to inquire what would have been the
equitable rights of the defendant Swift, had the interest of Agnes derived by virtue of tlie written memorandum or contract before menTlds statement is substituted for the one in the report.
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tioned, been assigned to him, and had he been the purchaser under the
same, and had reHed thereon in his answer.
But he, Swift, deri ves
his title solely from the deed of A!S!"nes to him, conveyed through the
deed jj fJEve rts to Agnes, without anv knowledge or considerationj) f.
or reliance upon the written contract or memorandum before jne nt iohed . and bases no claim thereon.
So far, therefore, as Swift
is concerned, he st ands precisely in the same condition
as he
Avould have done, had no written contract
ever existed between tb &
parties. Everts and Ag n q s. It is tAie that S'wift admits in his answer
the said agreement, and avers that in pursuance thereof. Everts executed a deed conveying the title, but he sets up no claim under this alleged
deed, nor any equitable considerations growing out of the original contract. He claims bv virtue of his deed from Apies and t he deed of
Everts to Agnes . On them, and them alone does he base his rights jjid
i nterests, and by them are thev to^ be adjudicated .
For the purposes of this case, it is wholly immaterial whether the
defendant Agnes was in a position entitling him to demand a conveyance from Everts or not. Were we to express an opinion upon that
subject, perhaps it would not go far to aid either of the defendants.
The conveyances under which Agnes pretends to claim are voluntary,
in contradistinction to those decreed to be executed upon a bill for
The deed or deeds, therefore, executed by
specific performance.
Everts to Agnes, must be considered precisely the same as though no
previous contract or memorandum had existed, so far as their operative
effect upon the defendant Swift is concerned.
We regard the making and delivery of the two deeds as but one continuous act, having its consummation in the deposit of the last deed
with Zettler. We-do , not think., as is claimed by the counsel for tlie
defendant, that any title passed by the first deed.
It was rather an
attempt to convey the premises, which was abandoned for anotE ir,
and as was supposed, better and more perfect fom i. The rights of
the parties, whatever they are, must therefore depend upon the efi:'ect
of the last deed, and their respective relations to it.
We think JLlxere can be no doubt that the fraudulent means u sed
by Agnes to get possession of the deed from Zettler, the deposita ry.
a re such as ..eff ectually preclude him from deriving any benefit from
The
it__Th^. testimony .on, .this. -branch of., jLbe case is satisfactory.
deed was left with Zettler as an escro w, .. w.ith ...ins tructions not to
be delivered until certain securities should be given by Agnes.
Until
the performance of the condition, it was, and must remain, a mere
scroll in writing, of no more efficacy than any other written scroll ; b^t
when, upon the performance of the condition, it is delivered to th e
g rantee or his agen t, it t hen becomes a deed to all intents and purposes,
a nd the title passes irom the date of the delivery!
The deli very to be
valid, must be with tlie assent ot the grantor.
These are familiar principles and do not require the citation of authorities to sustain them.
If the g'-^nlf^ nKfgjp p-^gsession of the escrow without performance_of
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condition, he obtains no title thereby, because there has been no
delivery with the assent of the grantor^ which assent is dependent
upon compliance with the condition,. The assent of the latter is withThe obtaining of it by fraud,
held until the condition is performed.
l arcen y, or any means short of performance of the condition, is against
the assent of the grantor; and as th is assent is essential to delivery,
a jid a delivery is essential to the validity of the deed, it is difficult to
perceive how Agnes ever obtained any title whatever to the premise s,
and of course, equally difficult to perceive how he could convey any,
by any conveyance which he might execute to another. The recording
t he

o f an escrow does not make it a deed.
deed to be recorded,

the

Suppose Zettler had procured

Swift had purchased of Agnes on

and

the
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it-

faith of the record title, without any delivery of the deed to Agnes, will
How
it be claimed that Swift in such case would have obtained title?
is the case made better by the wrongful possession of the escrow by
Agnes, obtained without the consent of Everts, and hence without any
delivery to him? It is true, all this might be done and Swift, the purIt is also true, that either
chaser, be quite innocent of any wrong.
Everts or Swift must sufifer by the fraud of Agnes, the latter being
But which has the prior of superior
unable to make reparation.
Ev erts asks that he shall not be divested of his estate witj iequity?
out his consent . Swift asks not only that Ey erts mnv he thus divested .
It
but that he, himself, may be invc ^tprl with
quite apparent that
original
title, with whic
erior
him
had
sup
equity
with
who
the
the
he has never voluntarily parted . Swift has his remedy upon the covenants of his deed from Agnes. But were the equities equally balanced,
hat the leoal title never passed fro m
the legal title must prevail.
verts, w^e think
clear, both from reason and authority .
Blk. Com.
——
Kent, Comm. 459;
Greenlfs. Cruise, Title, Deed, 45, 46;
Am. Dec. 415 Same v. McJackson v. Catlin,
Johns. (N. Y.) 248,
Kee,
Johns. (N. Y.) 429, 431; Frost v. Beekman,
Johns. Ch. (N.
Rowland,
22
Am. Dec. 557
666,
v.
Wend.
296
Y.)
(N.
Y.)
Jackson
Mason, 60, Fed. Cas. No. 2,438
Carr v. Hoxie,
Jackson v. Sheldon,
22 Me. 569; Robins v. Bellas,
Watts (Pa.) 359;
Story's Eq. Juris.
Pick.
Am. Dec. 406
Brewer,
v.
13
184,
Somes
par. 75, 76
(Mass.)
Worcester v. Eaton, 11 Mass. 375.
pntitlpH tr> pr otertinn as
ut
bona
contended that Swift
point of some difficulty.
de purchaser without notice . This has been
We have not been rei'erred to, nor have we been able to find an authority directly in point. We are aware that courts of equity go to great
valuable consideration
bona fide purchaser for
lengths to protect
without notice. The plaintiff cannot set up the fraud of his grantee in
subsequent bona fide
procuring
conveyance, to defeat the title of
But such, and all the cases referred to, differ from the
purchaser.
case at bar, in the important fact that in all of them the conveyance
was perfected by the voluntary act, and with the assent of the grantor.
He made the sale. He executed and delivered the deed, or caused the
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same to be done.
All these acts were perfectly voluntary on his part,
and no matter what fraudulent representations may have induced him
to do these acts, an innocent third person shall not be made to bear his
misfortune, or suffer for his credulity.
Cases of this kind are numerous, and the principle on which they all depend is an equitable one.
But they all depend, nevertheless, upon the fact, that the party voluntarily parted with his property and executed and delivered the evidences of its alienation.
Not so, however, in the case of a forged or
stolen deed.
The reason is obvious. In the latter case, there is no
There is nn Hplivpry
a ssent of the alleged grantor.
it IS erroneous to suppose that Everts delivered the deed to
Zettler for Agnes, and thus made Zettler his agent, and is therefore bound by his acts.
If the depositary of an escrow can be
considered the agent of the depositor at all (which we very much
doubt), he is only such within the scope of his authority.
He is
as much the agent of the grantee as of the grantor.
He hold s
t he scroll for both, to be delivered on performance
of the condition .
He is as much bound to deliver the deed on pertormance of the condition, as he is to withhold it until performance.
The act of deljver v
c annot be considered the act of the grantor until the condition be com plied with.
Without such compliance, there is no assent to the delivery. Toobtain the deed or scroll from the depositary without such
compliance is as much against the assent of the grantor, as it would be
to take it from the desk or drawer where the grantor has deposited
without his knowledge or consent.
would seem, therefore, that thg re
great and fundamental distinction between the case where
raudulent re presentations,
induced to execu te an delive
pe rs on
deposit ary
nd one where the deed ox .scroll
obtained trom
b
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without the know edge or consent of the depositor, or rnmp|iani-p w ith
dep ends.
the
the deliver
*^— cond itions on,, which
fll - —^*— — ^'
B^
.
would seem that where
deed deposited as an ascrow
obtained
without performance of the conditions, by operating upon the fears or
credulity of the depositary, or by fraudulent collusion with him, or by
other undue means,
be ^rs
closer analogy in i)rinciple to the case of
or
stolen
than
fraud practiced direct deed,
does to that of
^orged
by
grantor,
.
means of which he
induced to deliver
^upon the
In
subsequent bona fide pu rhe latter case, the legal tit[e passes, and
haser
protected . In the former, no title passes whatever, and
not protected. In the one class of cases, there
subsequent purchaser
the voluntary assent of the grantor; in the other, there
no assent
at all.
If this reasoning be correct, he better opinion would seem to e.
hat the fraudulent procurement of
deed deposited as an escrow
the deed^ would not ope rrom the Hppn^itnry hy the txrant ee named
ate to pass the title, and that
subsequent purchaser for a valuab
considera tion wit hout notice, would derive no title and would not be
protected.
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Bu t it is contended by the counsel for tlie complainant, that the def endant Swift does not show himself, by his answer, to be a bona fide
purchaser.
If this be so, we are relieved from the necessity of decidother question. The answer of Swift alleges, "that he
the
ing directly
paid to Agnes without fraud, a good and valuable consideration according to a contract then made between them, and took from Agnes and
his wife a conveyance in the usual form of a warranty deed," etc. 'fhe
a nswer nowhere alleges what the consideration was, how rnuch, if any t hinof. was paid, or when paid, though it does state, upon information
and belief, that from June, 1851, "the complainant was never heard to
set up his claims until after said Swift had obtained and recorded his
deed and paid the consideration, all of which occurred on or about the
8th day of October, A. D. 1851."
T o entitle a party to the protection which a court of equity extends
t o a subseciuent bona fide purchaser, he must n^' ke a full statement of
a ll the facts and circumstances of his case, so that the court may be
able to do perfect equity between the parties.
It is not ^suBident
to allege that he has purchased for a valuable consideration without notice, but t he consideration
must h-Ave hpen- nr tually pa id
before notic e. And if a part of the consideration only, has been paid
before notice, he will be protected only pro tanto. Hence it is nece ss ary that the actual consideration
be stated, and the amount actua lly
The mere averment that he is a purchaser for a valuable considpaicL
eration, and that the consideration is paid, is not sufficient, and no in st ance, it is believed, can be found where such a statement in an an s wer has been held
sufficient^ Story's Eq. par. 64 et seq., and cases
there cited ;
Tudor Eq. Ca. 77; Story's Eq. PI. §§ 28, 806,
Whit^ and
852 et

seq.^*"

d,^.-S7^

30 iipp/Cc, G Wis. 45.*? nS57) ; Dixon v. Bank, 102 Ga. 401, 31 S. E. 96, 66 Am.
St. Pau< liK! (1^97): Jncksoii v. Lynn, 94 Iowa, 151. 02 X. W. 704, 5S Am. St.
Rep.^s() (lyn')) : llarkrender v. Clayton. 50 Miss. lis-A, :n Am. Rpp. PAIO (1S79) ;
Smitli V. South Royalton Hank, .''.2 Vt. .'141, 70 Am. Dee. 179 (lSo9), ace,
.
See. also. Wood v. French. .'iO Okl. CS.'j, 130 Pac. 734 (19i:?).
v^"\ ybet li er t l"^ gl-pntep nfipipd in n fj eed delivered as an pscfoAv. who h as
it on ree nid. can convey a pood title to n bo na
\^n>iif,'fu!ty"'T)T47 lill(''' '<• =i^ |"it
in-rphitiim t-n ^|Y|ucll the authorities
ai'e in eo nfi jle purcliaser. is a on yr'tilin
In I'.lijiht V. Schenek, 10 Pa. 2N5. .51 Am. Dec. 47S (1,S49) the court held,
tlict.
irrfr*full and well-reasoned opinion, t hat the title of a liona fide nnichiiser enn lil
n ot lie defeated hv |)ro()f that one of The deeds llifougii which he claimed tit le
w'as a wrdULcfnlly otifained and a wrongfully re( crded escrow . The court rested
it's decision on the fact that the custodian of an escrow is the a.wnt of the
grantor as well as the srantee. and i f one of two innocent nersons must suife r
hv the wrouL^ful act of the ageiit^ lie who enndoys an unfaitliful atj:ent. and
nuts it in his iwwer to do the act, nmst hear tlie loss: that the apent has the
power to deliver the deed, and, if he delivers it contrary to his instructions,
he will be answerable to his prin'^ipal, and it is, therefore, reasonable that the
^
^
latter, and not the iiniocent purchaser should bear the h^ss. In Everts v. Ag- C^L^^
fiyOjf^
But in the latp es. 4 Wis. H4.3, 05 Am. Dec. 314 (1S55). the contrary was held .
fl^
9
"—tr
*^V***'
tei- case the court appears to have acted in Ignorance of the decision in the
former case, and in ignorance of tlie ecpiitahle doctnne upon which it rests, alCL^i/*^
"^T^
This, as i t
though the former decision was made six years before the latter.
s eems to us, was an unfortunate oversi'Jiht: for the former dec ision is snpnortsatisfactory, we cajiuut re0^ by reasoning so strong, and, as it tseems to us, so
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COLVIN.

55 Ohio

St. 274, 45 N. E. 527.)

a

it

a

iii_

]\TiNSHALL, J.^^ There can be no question but that James E. Colvin
Avaived his Hen as a vendor by taking a mortgage on the granted^^g^"^"
ises and other lands of the grantee, to secure the purchase money.
Such is the settled law of this state. The court's conclusion of law as
to this is correct, and not now questioned by the defendant in error.
So that th_e_qnly^^ue^tion here presented,_is_as_to whether it erred in
its second conclusion, that, upon the facts found, tlie mortgage^jof
James E. Colvin, being subsequent in point of time, is superior jn
equity to the Schurtz mor tgage . Priority is claimed on the ground
that at the time the SchurTz mortgage was taken, Jame s E. Colvin he ld
t he legal title to his interest inthe premises, subject, ho wever, to a
legal obligation to convey to James Colvin as purchaser, on his paying the 'purchase money or securing it to be paid . If the facts found
will bear this simple construction, then there can be no question as
to the correctness of the court's conclusion of law thereon.
In such
case the legal title of James E. Colvin would have been notice to the
world of his rights in the property; and no one could have acquired
an interest in it superior to his by mortgage or otherwise.
The question, however, is whether the facts as found will bear this
construction as between James E. Colvin and the Schurtzs.
l ames B Colvin had by a verbal agreement made in 1884, sold his interest in
the premises to James ColviUj^ who went into possession under~ITre
agreement and was
possession at the time the Schurtz loan was
made. Some time before the making of the Schurtz mortgage, James
E. Colvin with his co-tenant, Silas H. Colvin, executed
deed for the
Colvin,
the
and
in
the
hands q|^
purchaser,
placed
land__toJames
th ird person, H oward Colvin, to be delivered when the purchase money
was paid or secured by mortgage^
Afterward, for the purpose of
loan of money on the land, Howard
enabling James Colvin to obtain

a

*

it

it

■

*

it

sist the conviction that if the attention of the court had been called to it, and
tlie 'principles on wliich
rests,
different conclusion would have' been^l'Mcfithat, would
ed_; and the subsequent decisions, v^-hich have followed the lead of
*
have no existence.
Escrows are deceptive instrument!^ They are
not what they purport to be. They purport to be instniments which have been
delivered, when in fact they have not been delivered.
They clothe the grantees
with apparent titles which are not real titles.^ Such deeds are capable of being
used to enable the grantees to obtain credit which otherwise they could not
And
obtain.
Thej. are capable of being used to deceive innocent purchasers.
the makers of such instruments can not fail to foresee that they are ITaljle to
And when the maker of such an instrument has voluntarily parted
be so used.
into the care. and keeping "of a pgtwith_the possession of it, and delivered
seems to us that he ought to be responsible for tli^
son of'his own selection,
use that may in fact be made of it^, and that in no other way. can the public b£
protected aLiainst the intolerable evil oFEaviug otu- public records encumbe^d
Hubbard v. Greeley, 84 Me. 340,
with sucii false and deceptive instruments."
""^
790, 17 L. R. A. 511 (1S92).
Atl.
^24
31 The statement of facts is omitted.

'
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delivered the deed to him tliat he might obtain a description of the
The facts found bear
premises and exhibit it as evidence of his tit_le.
this construction and none otlier. It is true that from the facts found
it was not to be regarded as dehvered. But the law has always attached much importance to an overt act. It_contrayenes its spirit_to
allow that an act may be done-Aykfar-an intention contr ary t o Ae-act
itselL And whifst, as between parties, the intention may be shown,
it"seLSom permits this to be done, where to do so ^P^l^by^""^ ^ fraud

on innocent third persons. Here, whilst James C^mnwks in posses-*
sion of the land and of a deed to it by James E. Colvin, of whom
he had purchase^ the 'Schurtzs, on the faith of these appearances,
loaned him $6,500^and took a mortgage on the land to secure its^^^aymen't; and, as the court expressly finds, without any knowledge tha'
the deed had ever been held as an escrow by any one, and that i t wa s
taken in good faith without any knowledge that James E. Colvin_Jiad
or claimed any interest in or lien on the land.
It would seem on the plainest principles of justice, that under these
circumstances James E. Colvin, as against the owner of the Schurtz
mortgage, should not be heard to say that the deed had not in fact
been delivered at the time the mortgage was made, and that his equity
trusted Howard with th e deed to be deli vere d
is superior to it.
He^
wh e n the conditions had been j^erforrned^ Howar d violated Jiis^ trust.
He delivered it to the grantee that the latter might obtain a loan o n
The loan was so
the land "by exhi bi tjng it as evidence of his titlg .
obtained of persons who had no knowledge of the facts and were entirely innocent of any fraud in the matter. Who then should suffer
the loss ? It may be regarded as one of the settled maxims of the law,
that whereone of jwo innocent_pera£LQS,.must jjif| er from the wrongful act of another, he m ust bea r the loss who placed it in the p ower
Or, more tersely,
^^
t he wron. q .
^li^ £ersori as_ hjs_agent to^ commit
he who trusts most ought to suffer most.
And it would seem, that
the rights of the parties in this case should be governed by this principle, unless there is some rigid exception established by the decisions, which forbids its application where a deed is delivered in escrow.
Before considering this question, it may be well to note t hat n o
importan ce can be a ttached to the fact that the deed, on_the faith of
A deed on^ewhic h the loan was made, Tiad not yet been recorded^
'-^^^
^^^^
or
whether recorded
^iy5.''Y-£5§§£s_t^^^^^°
noi^ It takes^fect on deliv ervThe object of recording a deed is to give notice
to third persons, not to perfect it as a muniment of title. Where no t
recorded it will be treated as a, fraud against third^j)ersons^ dealing
with the land without notice of rts existence. Hence, the first deed,
if delivered, having been duly executed, passed the title to James
Colvin.
Recording it would have_added nothing to its effect as_j
deed; and the failure to record it in no way influenced the conduct
of any of the parties to the suit.
Aig.Prop.— 23
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There are some cases which seem to hold that, where a deed is delivered as an escrow to a third person to be dehvered on the perftn'mance of certain conditions, no title passes if delivered without the
c onditions being performed : and that this is so as agamst an innocent
purchaser from the vendee. Everts v. Agnes, 6 Wis. 463, is such a
case.
The argument there is that no title passes by deed without
delivery; that where a deed is delivered by one who holds it as an
escrow, contrary to the vendor's instructions, there is no delivery, and
consequently an innocent purchaser acquires no title. To tlie objection that if this be true .there is no safety for purchasers, the court
This seems to
said that if it be not true, there is none for vendors.
A vendor may
be a misconception of the real situation of the parties.
He may either retain the deed until the vendee pays
protect himself.
the money or select a faithful person to hold and deliver it according
to his instructions.
If he selects an unfaithful person, he should suffer
the loss from a wrongful delivery, rather than an innocent purchaser
without knowledge of the facts. In purchasing land, no one, in the
absence of anything that might awaken suspicion, is required, by any
rule of diligence to inquire of a person with whom he deals, whether
his deed had been duly delivered.
Where a deed is found in the gra nhands,
Wash. Real
t ee's
a delivery and acceptance is always presumed.
Property (5th Ed.) 312, pi. 31. The fact that under any other rule
"no purchaser is safe," had a controlling influence with the court in
Blight v. Schenck, 10 Pa. 285, 292, 51 Am. Dec. 478, In this case the
question was whether a deed had been delivered, the defendant being
an innocent purchaser from the vendee of the plaintiff. In discussing
the case the court used this language : "Here Curtis, who, it is alleged,
delivered the deed contrary to his instructions, was the agent of the
I f a man employs an incom petent or unf aithful agent, Jie
grantor.
i s the cause of the loss so far as an i nnocent purchaser is con cern ed,
and he ou ght to bear it^ except as against the party who may be
equally negligent in omitting to inform himself of the extent of the
authority or may commit a wrong by acting knowingly contrary thereto," And the case was disposed of on this principle.
The case on which most reliance is placed by the defendant in error, is that of Ogden v. Ogden, 4 Ohio St. 182. The facts are someIt seems to have grown out of an agreement for
what complicated.
an exchange of lots between two of the parties, each being the equitable owner of his lot.
The deed for the lot of one of them, David
Ogden, was to be delivered by the legal owner to the other on his performing certain conditions, and was delivered to a third person to be
It was delivered
delivered on the performance of the conditions.
without the conditions being performed; and was then mortgaged by
the grantee to the defendants, Watson and Stroh, who claimed to be
innocent purchasers for value. But it was charged in the bill that they
took their mortgages with notice and to cheat and defraud the complainant; and it does not distinctly appear whether this was true or
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not. From the reasoning of the court it would seem that the deed
had been obtained from the party holding it in some surreptitious
planner.
It is first conceded "that if Dav id reposed c onfidence in Gil*v/ *
bert. and he violated that contidence" and delivered the deed, and los s ^ (yf^^^ , S
is t o fall on either D avid or the mortgag e es, that David should"~sus
Instances are then
tain_that_loss, and_j^t_Jiiejmioceni mortgagees/
—
innocent
purchaser
an
given in which the rule would be otherwise
who had
one
from
from the bailee of a horse, or of stolen property, or
room
no
There is
either stolen or surreptitiously obtained his deed.
for doubt in either of these cases. But the court then observes that,
"I f the owner of land makes a deed purporting to convey his land to
a ny one, and such person by fraud or otherwise procures the owner
to deliver the deed to him, a bona fide purchaser from such Iraudul enf
gra ntee without notice of the fraud, might acquire title^_to_theJi3Jid."
This, we think, is equally clear ; but, unless the deed in the case had
obtained, or the mortgagees were guilty
been stolen or surreptitiously
then,
on
the reasoning of the court, the decree
fraud
of the
charged,
If the case is to be understood as
should have been in their favor.
holding differently, then it is not in accord with the later decision in
Resor v. Railroad Company, 17 Ohio St. 139, Here the owner of
a tract of land contracted to sell it to the company, but refused to deliver the deed until paid. An agreement was then made by which the
deed was placed in the hands of the president, but it was not to be
considered delivered until payment had been complied with, and the
The president wrongfully placed the
company went into possession.
deed on record, and the company then mortgaged its entire property
to secure an issue of bonds. The court held the bond-owners to be
innocent purchasers, and that the plaintiff was estopped from setting
up his claim as against them. It might be claimed that the delivery
and that a deed cannot
by Resor was to the purchaser, tlie company;
be deliv er ed as an escrow to the vendee. The latter statement is true.
But as a matter of fact i'Twas delivered to the president of the company and not to the company itself. There is no reason why the president could not have held it as an escrow, and under the agreement,
must be regarded as having so held it. Railroad Co. v. Iliff, 13 Ohio
St. 235 ; Watkins v. Nash, L. R. 20 Eq. 262 ; Insurance Co. v. C-ole,
4 Fla. 359. The plaintiff trusted the president to hold tlie deed, and
it was his wrongful act that disappointed him.
The supreme court of Indiana in a well-considered case. Quick v.
Milligan, 108 Ind. 419, 9 N, E, 392, 58 Am, Rep. 49, t he facts of
wl ^ich are very similar to the case before us, held that where a dee d / .
^
i s delivered to a th ird_j)erson_to be delivered the grantee, who is
J^^,^
^^
al ready in possession of the land ,. on payment of the purchase mone y,
andis delivere d without tfie cond it ion being performed that the vend or
is estopped as a gainst an innocent purc haser to set up his title. See,
aTso^'and to the same effect, the following cases: Bailey v. Crim, 9

'uj
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Biss. 95, Fed. Cas. No. 734 ; Haven v. Kramer, 41 Iowa, 382 ; Blight
V. Schenck, 10 Pa. 285.^^
It^isjthe^^eneral, if not universal, jaile of the c ourts, to p rotect the
innocent purclmseF~oFprope7ty Tor value, against such vices in th e
title of their vendors^ as result from fraud practiced by them in^For in all such cases the party compraTfung is
quirlng tb.e proi^erty.
been
guilty of some negligence in his dealings, or to
found to have
have trusted some agent who has disappointed his confidence and is
more to blame for the consequences than the innocent purchaser, so
He nce, it is, tha t
that his equity is inferior to that of such purchaser.
the innocent purchaser for value from a fraudulent g rantee, is always
the wronged grant pr.
projected in his__title as against the_eciuity_of
In Hoffman v. Strohecker, 7 Watts (Pa.) 86, 32 .\m. Dec. 740, where
a sale has been made under execution upon a satisfied judgment, the

.

-l.s

satisfaction not appearing of record, an innocent purchaser of the
person who purchased at the sale was protected in his title, although
the purchaser at the sale had knowledge of the facts, and acquired no
A similar holding had been made by the same court in Price
title.
v. Junkin, 4 Watts (Pa.) 85, 28 Am. Dec. 685, and in Fetterman v.
Murphy, 4 Watts (Pa.) 424, 28 Am. Dec. 729. In the case of Price
"
V. Junkin it is said An innocent purchaser o f the legal title, witho ut
noti ce of tr ust or fraud i s pecu liarly protected in equity, andchan^ry
n ever lends its aid to enforce a claim for th e land againsTEIm?^
Most of the casescited and rehed on by the defendant are not in
point. W^erethe grantee wrongfull y procur es the holder oi_s._de§^d
as an escrow to dehver it to him, h e acq uires no title, or at Jea^..a
voidable onej but this is a very different case from where a third
person without notice, afterward and while the grantee is in possession, deals with him in good faith as owner.
Again, it may be conceded that the delivery of a deed by one who simply holds it as a
depositary, transfers no title; but if he holds it as an escrow, with
power to deliver it on certain conditions, a delivery, though wrongful,
is not in excess of his authority for, in such case, the act is within his
authority and binds the principal as against an innocent party. And
s o a deed held in escrow, delivered after the death of the principal,
passes no title.
It will readily appear, from reasons already given,
Her e
that such cases are without application to the case under review.
i t will be conceded that as_ between the g rantorand_the_gr antee th e
t o his inlatter took no title, because deliverej _J)y Howardcontrary
that,
found,
he had
the
fact
as
relies
on
But
the
plaintiff
.
struction
no knowledge that the deed had ever been held as an escrow and, in
good faith, loaned his money and took a mortgage on the land to secure it; and that the defendant is therefore estopped from setting
up his legal title as against him.
82 See,

also, Mays v. Shields, 117 Ga. 814, 45 S. E. 68 (1903).
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But it is claimed that, as the plaintiff relies on an estoppel, he should
have pleaded it. This rule, however, only applies where the party
In this case he had none until the
has had an opportunity to do so.
The defendant, in his answer and
evidence had been introduced.
cross-petition, set up tliat the deed from him had been placed in escrow
and wrongfully delivered to the grantee and that the plaintiff had
knowledge of the facts. The plaintiff then averred his want of any
knowledge or belief as to the facts stated by the defendant and denied
them. T he court, however, found that the deed had been delivere d
t o Howard Colvin to be held as an escrow and was by him wrongfully
d elivered to the grantee : bu t also found that the plaintiff was ignora nt
of the facts, and an innoc ent piirrh a<;pr fn r vnlne -yvithout notice . The
object of pleading is to inform the opposite party of the facts upon
which the pleader relies as the ground of his claim or defense. And
h ere, when the plaintiff denied knowledge of the facts as ple aded by
the defendant, he fairly advised the defendant that he relied on an esto ppel, on the ground of want of notice^ should the facts as pleaded
b e made to appear in the evidence ; for, that he was a purchaser for
value appear ed fro m his petition, which was taken as true as it wa s
not controverted . Hence the claim of the plaintiff could in no way
surprise the defendantunlfiss he was ignorant of the law. The first
o pportunity the p lainnrtn^ to ple ad an estoppel as against fam es
E. Colvin, was when the facts were fully made to appear in ev idence ;
a nd he is not therefore precluded from doing so on the fact s as found
\>v the court.
Judgment revers ed

\j'

_and judgment

T1-i><^AMPBELL

(Supreme Court of Wisconsin,

V.

1877.

on the facts

THOMAS,
42 Wis.

for_plaint iif in er-

-^l^

^s.

^zA^LI^..^*^

437, 24 Am. Rep. 427.)

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Racine County.
The case, stated most favorably to the plaintiff, is briefly as follows: The plaintjff and__Thpmas^entered_jnto,,a:paroJ_agreen^^
t he sale b y the latter to the formeiLilf certain^ land,. at_ a , stipulated
price, to be secured and paid as JiereinaXtei men^ioned^ In accordance
with such parol agreement, the plaintiff paid Thomas a small sum o n
account of the purchase money, and the latter signedi^-Se aled a n d duly
acknowledged a deed of the premises to the plaintiff (which was in th e
usual term of a warranty,. deed ) , and delivered the same to Judge
33,where the custodian has. improperly

handed the deed. oygT-tO the grajatoe

.J;fee granTOr^may
have same caaceled. Anderson v. Goodwin, 125 Ga. 663, 54
S. E. 679 (19{X;); Bales v. Roberts, 1S9 IMo. 49. 87 S. W. 914 (1905).
And the
registration of such a deed may be enjoined.
Matteson v. Smith, 61 Neb. 761,
86 N. W. 472 (1901).
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^ Hand, his codefendant, w ith dir ections to delive r it to the plaintiff if
'^ijt^ H
th e latter should^ tw o days later, deposit wlthHand his notes for a
^ "^^
y^ ihA ' c ertain sum (part of the price of the land) , and a mortgage executed

ft

le

t

T

e

it
is

t

e

t

a

e

t

e

t

c

J.

la

is

a

a

a

is

it

is

it,

a

if

a

a

is

a

a

is

a

8.

§

is

it

;

l

is

N

him on the same land to secure the paymen t ot such note s, and
the same tim e pay to Hand, for the use of Thomas, the balance g f
he asfreed price.
These proceedings were all in accordance with
plaintiff deposit ed
time,, the
such verbal agreement. At the appointed
, ^
. ^
wi th Hand the notes, mortgage and money as agreed, a nd demanded
t he deed of the land ; bu t , acting in obedience to instructio ns froj ji
Thomas. Hand refused to deliver the deed... At the same time, Thomas
tendered to the plaintiff the money which the latter paid him when
the verbal agreement was made, and, on the refusal of tlie plaintiff
to receive
the same with .Tudge Hand for the plainti ff.
his action was brought to compel Tudge Hand to deli ver to he
intiff the deed thus deposited with him by Thomas.
The circuit
court gave judgment for the plaintiff, that the defendant Hand deliver such deed to him, and that Thomas pay the costs of the action.
From this judgment Thomas appealed.
[The court concl uded that the judgment should be re versed. A
petition for rehearing having been granted, the case was reargued, and
tlie following opinion handed down.]
Lyon,
sThe ontrolH ng question in his case is, whether
valid exec use ntial to th plain tiff's ng Ht ot action that her was
to ry contract between the parties~?oF the purchase and sale of he
and described in the deed of he defe ndant deposited with Judg
Hjnd. If this question be answered m the affirmative, the plaintiff
cannot recover
for
certain that no ijiote or memorandum of
the alleged agreement under which the plaintiff claims, expressing
the consideration thereof, was reduced to writing and subscribed by
the defendant.
Rev. St. 1858, c. 106,
The learned counsel for the plaintiff has met this question squarely,
and, in his elaborate and most able arguments on the motion for
rehearing and on tlie rehearing of the cause, has maintained the proposition that "it
not true that
person must be under
previous
binding executory contract to convey the lands described in tlie deed
to the grantee, in order to place
third
deed thereof, delivered to
person on condition for the grantee, beyond the control of the grantor."
class of cases in which this proposition
Undoubtedly there
true. These are the cases where the deed has been delivered by the
third person wnth instructions to deliver the same to
grantor to
future certain event — as the death
the grantee on the happening of
of the grantor or some other person, — and such conditional delivery
case,
the grantor reserves
assented to by the grantee. In such
no control over the deed, he cannot after such delivery recall
but
event,
the
the grantee
entitled to
of
the
upon
happening
although
there
no valid executory contract to support it. The reason of this
is, that the first delivery of tlie deed passes to the grantee the title to
by

at

it,

4^-
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the land, and thus relieves him of the obligation to make title through
any contract other than tliat expressed in the deed itself.
B ut byatl^of the authorities a deed so deposited with a th ird persqnjLo ^be delivered to the grantee on the happening of some event \'~f;;fu{
in the~future which may or may not happen, does not pass title to
t he lantj* described in it to the grantee until such event occurs, and
t hen

/^\^k.

J

onlY_from that time, or perhaps from the actual delivery of the
after tlie event has occurred. There may be ex^

d eed to the grantee

ceptional cases, as where a man delivers his deed in escrow and dies f^j^^JpLcxi
In such cases, it ,y- O^xa*.
b efore the conditions of the deposit are fulfille d.
has been said that from necessity after the conditions are fulfilled the
deed must take effect by relation as of the time of the first delivery.
This, h owever, is not one of the exceptional cases: an d it must b
e.^ .
^^
\
c onceded, we think, that the deposit of the deed with Judge Hand by
plaintiff
the defendant with the assent of the
did not transfer title to A>w jL-j^ei-^
the plaintiff.
^5^ ^ ^
Because such deposit did not divest the plaintiff of his title to the
l^
land, there is no executed contract for sale ; and hence, it seems almost too plain to be questioned or doubted that, b efore the pla intiff
c an obtain the delivery of the deed and the title to the lan d^jafter
t he defen H^ipt Vias r ecalled the deed and repudiated thewhole tjjnsact ion, he miisL-SllQ^ that the defendant has made a valid and bi nding
agreement t o.^dl and convey the land. And such an agreement can
be evidenced only by a written n o te or memorandum thereof , expressing the consideration and subscribed by the defendant.
In many of the cases cited, there was no valid executory contract
for the sale of the land, but the grantor permitted the deed to be
delivered by the depositary to the grantee upon performance of the
tlie final delivery to
Undoubtedly,
parol conditions of the deposit.
in
the
title
the grantee in such cases operated to pass
; as it would
the present case had the defendant seen fit to allow his void parol
In other cases cited, there was
agreement to be thus consummated.
a compliance with the statute of frauds.
Everts v. Agnes, 4 Wis. 343,
65 Am. Dec. 314, is one of them. B ut we have not discovered a sin -

^

it has been held that one who has deposited a deed
o f land wi th a thi rd perso n with directions to deliver it to the granted
ojLiiiS^^PP^'^^S of. a given event, but who has made no valid ex ecu- fisjsfi, /\JL^
t ory contr act to convey the land, may not- revoke the directions to tli e i
«
i
depositar y and recall the deeci at any ti me before the conditio ns o f 7\A^^yJ-^^
Aaj^
the depo sit have been complied wuh ; provid ed those conditions are
(Xa^
,
'
tha the title does not pass at once to tlx grantee upon delivery

oTlhedeed

\^jJJii-

iV-f-

e

t

s^c
h

g le case in which

depositary...
t/rv^**AA-«|V
Tlie case of Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243 Brandeis v. Neustadtl,
CfiJttJu^ M^
13 Wis. 142, and Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644, 11 Am. Rep. 592,
as well as that of Thomas v. Sowards, 25 Wis. 631, contain much ^*'V^'wv4
doctrine in perfect accord .with the views here expressed. The latter >g^jCt/Civtir
of these cases, as w^as observed in the first opinion filed herein, is-j-,
V>,j

^

f^

M

;

to the
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direct authority that in this case the plaintiff must show a vaHd executory agreement for the sale and purchase of the land, or fail in
the action. And here it should be observed that the language of the
opinion in Thomas v. Sowards which was commented on at some
length in the former opinion in this case, was manifestly employed
with reference, to the facts in that case, without any intention to lay
In that view,
down a general rule of law applicable to other cases.
So far as those comments are
the language seems unexceptionable.
concerned, I am still inclined to the opinion that the views there adth at the executory_contract may
be j)royed b^Jhe deed (if it is stated therein) is, however, jiilLjQpen
in this court for argument and decision in a proper case^
Our conclusion is, that this case was correctly decided in the first
The judgment of the circuit court must therefore be r^ instance.
v ersed, a nd the c ause rem an ded witli the dire ction to that c ourt^ to
*
^t^ L<y^
dismis_s_the comp laint.^
(^>u<i^.>^
(Ve6^...v-<^
*
-^
3 4 The conciirrincr opinion of rHh, C. J., is omitted.
^5
J
^
?,0
Utah,
569, 65 Pac.
Fitcli V. Bunch,
Caj. 208 Q866) : Clark v. Caujphell, 23
496, 54 L. R. A. 5(58, 90 Am. St. Rep. 710 (1901) ; Davis v. Brigham, 56 Or.
vanced

a-re

correct.

The proposition

^\

See, too, Anderson v. Mes41, 107 Pac. 961, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1340 (1910), ace.
senger, 158 Fed. 250, 85 C. C. A. 468 (1907) ; Brown v. Allbright, 110 Arli. 394,
101 S. W. 1030, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 692 (1913),
"Th£. yies^ , referre djto_jlhat exnre.ssed in Camnhe ll v. Thomas! h as no consi derations o f polic y or convenience in its favor, and its liecessary result i s coiisid era5Ty~fo^dgr n\C t trom the practical utility nf ihP fiocrrine o t Condition al
in the fact that the
(Mi^^^ One onjection to such a view would seem to lie
docmne of co nditiona l delivery is not peculiar to conveyances of land, but is
r ecognized also incoT ruectiou^yifli- contracts under seal and also bills and "notes,

it' there can be no conditional delivery of a conveyance in the absence 'o5 a
contract of sale, that is, a contract to execute a conveyance, it would seem a
reasonable inference that there can be no conditional delivery of a contract

under seal or a promissory note unless there is a contract to execute such an
instrument.
There is _o o mere reason for requiring an auxili ary contract n
tha nnt^ pnsp |]^an in tbr
Y. t it h[\< never been su'^gestiKi, so rar as
e a eL>;iilii:Miial
deliveiT of a conlracFunner
t^Fwi-iter knows, that t lr
se;Vl 01- n iimnissMry note only when there is a legally valid contract "to execute
the ro!itr;Kt or iiufe. Another consideration adver.se to the view referred to
lies in the fact that, while the doctrine of deliveiT in escrow was recognized
at least as early as the first half of the fifteenth century (see Y. B. 13 Hen,
IV. 8; Y. B. 8 Hen, VI, 26; Y. B. 10 Hen. VI. 25\ a purely executory contract, not under seal, was not then enforceable either in the common law
That being the case, the requirements of
courts, or, it appears, in chancery.
an extraneous contract in order to make the delivery in escrow effective would,
in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries, have necessitated a contract under seal,
and it seems hardly probable that such a delivery of an obligation or conveyance under seal was always accompanied by another obligation under seal calling for its execution. T he subject of deli veiy in.escrQW.Js. tmated with ^ongjfip rnhlP fullness in nt Innst *^^'^ "T ^"" ^'rii^i- book.sjCFerkins, Conveyancing,
TyS-Il44
Sheppard's Touchstone, 58, 59), anil tiierg is not the slightest sugpit.h pr as to thCJaefiessJit^ .of-sudi an auxiliary contvart.
It is, to say
o-Pfitirrr
\r\
lie least, so mewhat extraordinary that an integral element in doctrine daTmg
rom the commencement of the rifteenth century should have ixmiuiai'il to Jje
California court in .th(; latter half of the nineleenth^^' U. T.
iscovered by
Tiffany, "Conditional Delivery of Deeds," 14 Col, Law Rev. 389, 399-400.
a
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SANGAMON RIVER DRAINAGE DIST.

(Supreme Court of Illinois,

1906.

219 111. 454, 76 N.

E.

701.)

Cartwright,

C. J.^° This is an a^gealfrgn^jjil^j^gr^of the county
of McLean" county qngnizing^ the Sanga,mon River drainage district, m said_county, and cmifirmi no; an assessment of benefits agains t
The proceedappellant'.s lands hy tlie commissioners of said^district.
commenced
a
for
was
the
by fiHng
petition
organization of the dising
trict under what is commonly known as the "Levee Act." 2 Starr &
C. Ann. St. 1896, p. 1500, c. 42, par. 29. Commissjoners wereappointcour.t

ed by the court, and they examined the lands proposed to be drained,
and over and upon which the work was proposed to be constructed, and

madea reports

by section 9 of the act (paragraph Z7), recof the district. . Appellant fi led objections
ommending
"
to Jthe report, and his objections were overruled.
It is first contended that the court erred in overruling the objections
and in not dismissing the petition, for the reason that it was riot signed
b y a majority of the adult owners of the land within the district an d
vmo represented one-third in area of the lands to be reclaimed or be nefited.
The petition was signed in the summer of 1903, and the hearing
was in the fall of that year, and Ma rk Banks, one of the signers, was
counted by the court as _the owner of 160 acres of land. He had previouslysigned and acknowledged a deed of the land to Harrison Frink
and Sheridan J. Frink, and hnr^^lpjgs jl ^ed the. deed in the First National
ofElbomington, t o be delivered on payment of the purchase price
Hanl^
on or before February 15, 1904. and in case of such payment he was to
The deed placed in
deliver possession on or before March 1, 1904.
escrow conveyed nothing until the conditions for its delivery were performed on FLliniary 15, 19 04, w hen it was delivered to the gran tees.
"
Leiter v. Pike, 127 111. 287, 20 N. E. 23. The title did not pass out of
Mark Banks until the deed took eflFect and the grantees became the
owner of the land, and he was properly counted as an o\vner. * * *
The judgm ent is rev ersed, and the caus ^ reman ded. Reversed and
remandedJ^"
as required

the organization

85 A portion of the opinion is omitted.
se^uppose the gi'nntee in an escrow deed, after performance of the condi'^tlons, in order to save the propertj' from tax sale^, I^ays the taxes which were
assessed against the'property
after the deposit or the deed wifli fBe third party but before the performance of the condition.
Has he anv remedy against
the grantor?
Mohr v. Joslin, 162 Iowa, 3-1, 142 N. W. 981 (1913).
As_ to the, depo sit of a dee d in escrow workinga^'chajige in. interest I n th e
prgpert^ insured?' and so avoidlns an insurance policy on the property described in the*"deeiarsee Pomerov v. .l':tna Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 214, 120 Pac. 344, 38 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 142, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 170 (1912).
See. also. Furaess v. Williams, 11 111. 230 (1849) ; Hoyt v. McLagan, 87 Iowa,
746, 55 N. W. 18 (1893).
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FARLEY

V.

2

PALMER.

(Supreme Court of Ohio, 1870.

By the Court.

(Part

20

Ohio St.

223.)

ghmtiff, seeksJto_reyerse Jhejiidsnient
of his*written gontract^^made
with Palmer and wife for the .purchase of her land. At
the time of making the contract a deed was executed by Palmer and
ife and placed in the hands of a third person^ and by the terms ofjhe
ontract this deed was to be delivered to Farley upon his paying jhe
Upon Farley's refusal to pay the money
stipulated purchase-money.
and receive the deed at the time-agreed upon, Palmer and wife brqiight
their action for a specific execution. And now it is contended that Farley was not bound by the contract, on the alleged ground that as Mrs.
Palmer, being a married w oman, was not bound, there was no mutuWe think otherwise.
ality of obligation.
Mrs^ Palmer was_bound.
She had no power to revoke the deed^ The person holding the deed
) was the agent of both parties, and his delivery, according to the terms
of the contract, without her consent, or even after her death, woiild
have been good . Indeed, the authorities show, that upon fulfilment of
[
^the condition by Farley the title would have vested in him, jpsq^ facto,
further delivery.
The contract was executed on the part of
; without
—
Palmer
the
title
had
'TMrs.
passed from her — su bject on l y to the p .erformance of the condition on the part of Fa rley .
Motion overruled.^^
J^*
of

Farley,

the

the court below, decreeing the'specmc execution

r

•4^^"^^^^

HALL
(Supreme

V.

HARRIS.

Court of North Carolina,

40 N.

1848.

C. 303.)

Cause removed from the Court of Equity of Montgomery County,

Spring Term, 1848.
The facts in this case are fully stated in a case between the same
parties, Hall v. Harris, 38 N. C. 289, and so much of them as is necessary to the understanding of the decision now made is set forth in the
opinion of the Court here delivered.
Pearson, J. When_this case was before this Court at June Term

at the

1844, it was decided, that an execution does not bind equitable interests
and rights of redemption from its teste, as in ordinary cases^ but from
37

What

if

the grantor

flies before the condition

V. Althouse, 71 Kan. G04, SI Pac. 172 (1905);
Pac-. ti!>0, 1) L. R. A. (\. S.) 317 (1907).

Nolan

if?

performed^

v. Otney, 75

See Guild
311, 89

Kan.

Whnt if the depositary refuses to deliver the deed to the grantee after tlie
See Tonihler v. 'Sumiiter. 97 Ark. 480, ^S-Fs.
conditions Jiave been performed?
Knopf v. Hansen, 37 Minn. 215. .33 N. W. 7.S1 (1887); Hujrhes
W. Oiw (1911);
40 Kan. 232, 16 Pac. 629 (188S), where the retention of the deed
V. Thistlewood.
by the depositary was by direction of the jri-antor; Rej;an v. Howe, 121 Mass.
424 (1877), where the grantor had procured the deed from the depositary on
the statement that he intended to hand it to the grantee.
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the time of "execution ser ved; and it was declared tliat_tlie plaintiff
wouMbe entitled to a decree, provided the deed, under which_he
claimed, took effect before the execution, under whi ch th e ^deiendant
Harris claimed, was issued. 38 N. C. 289.
We are satisfied, that the view then taken of the case was correct.
Th e rights of the parties depend upon that single question.
The execution issued_.on_the 7th o^f_ March, 1 840 . The plaintiff alThe facts
leges that the deed took effect on the 2d of March, 1840.
are, that on the 2d of March the plaintiff and the defendant Morgan,
made an agreement, by which the plaintiff' was to give ]\Iorgan $725^
for the land, to be paid, a part in cash, and the balance in notes and
S£.ecific articles^ as soon as the plaintitt was able^ which he expected
would be in a few days^ and Morgan was to make a deed to the plaintiff, and hand it to Col. Hardy Morgan,^ to be by him handed to the
'
plaintiff, when he paid the price. Accordingly on that day the plaintiff Vw»-*-*-<-<
paid to Morgan a wagon and some leather, which was taken atjthe /j^^^,^;;^-,^
price of $57.50 and Morgan signed and sealed the deed, and handed jt^ t-n'^ ^x.
y
to Col. Morgan to be handed to the plaintiff', when he paid the balance ^f
of the pri_ce. The deed was witnessed by Col. Morgan and one Sanders, and is dated on the 2d of March. Afterwards^n the tenth of ,
March, the plaintiff paid to Morgan the balance of the $725, witliTlie ***^''*^ /
.
excejnion of $152, for which Morgan accepted his note, and the deed ^A^ i^.
was then handed to the plaintiff by Col. Morgan.
I'he question upon these facts is, whether the deed takes effect from /
the 2d or from the 10th of March_?^ We are of opinion, that it takes *
effect from the 2d, at which time, according to the agreement, it was
signed, sealed, and delivered to Col. Morgan, to be delivered to the
plaintiff, when he should pay the price. Ihe effect of the agreement
was to give the plaintiff' the equitable estate in the land, and to give
Morgan a right to the price. The purpose, for whiclTthe^deed^was nu^^y^O-^n.
instead 0^^6111^ delivered directly tojl)Q.Ar
deljv^ered.4o_S_illinJ-P^son,
jT Q'
plaint iff, wasm erely tosccure the paynTcnt of tjie j^rice.
When that *^ d"-*^
was paid, tiVeplalntiff had a right to the deed. The purpose, for which
X*"*^'''^
it was put into the hands of a third person, being accomplished, the
plaintiff then held it in the same manner, as he would have held
had been delivered to him in the first instance. This was the intention, and we can see no good reason why the parties should not be allowed to effect their end in this way.
true, the plainiiff_wasjT ot ab solutel¥...bQiind to pay the balarice
of the price. Perhaps, he had
in his power to avail himself of the
statute of frauds, and
would seem from the testimony, that, at one
time, he contemplated doing so, on account of some doubt as to the
title; bjjHj£Xomplied_w]thjlie condition and paid the pric^ His rights
annot be affected
the fact] that he mig ht lla^'c avojded_it.
If the
vendor had died, after the delivery to the third person, and before the
payment, the vendee upon making the payment, would have been entitled to the deed
nd
must have taken effect from the first delivery
;
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otherwise, it could not take effect at all. The intention was, that it
should be the deed of the vendor from the time it was delivered to the
If this inthird person^ j)rovided the condition was complied with.
tention is bona fide and not a contrivance to interfere with the right of
creditors, of which there is no allegation in this case, it must be allowed
to take effect.
A distinction is taken in the old books, between a case, when a pahanded to
third person, with these
being signed and sealed,
words "take this paper and hand
to A. B. as my deed, upon condition" &c., and
case where these words are used, take "this deed and
takes effect
hand
to A. B. upon condition," &c. In the latter case
held, in most cases, not to take efpresently while in the former,
fect, until the second delivery.
Touchstone, 58, 59.
made, would seem too
The distinction, upon which this "diversity"
mere play upon words. ^^ Thgjanice for practical purposes, to be
'*'fjJi^ ention of the arties, whether one set of words be used or th other
V''^
in the hand of
a eed presently, but to lodge
thi rd
to make
.
If
not
e
rson,
as
tor
the
of
some
act
was
performance
security
'jTjuA
to be
deed presently, provided the condition be afterwards performed,
himself, and the agency of the third person
the maker would hold
Ind eed the id ea, that the third person
a-mere
would be useless.
deed,
particular words be used, "esagent to deliver the paper as
crow" for instance, even by the old cases, has many exceptions, and
allowed, in such cases, to take effect. ,_As
*^—
the deed
the maker dies,
in
above
or
non
the case
becomes
ment
or, being
as
put
yHju"^*^
(:)^ii^os
the vendor should create any incumbrance,
sole, majyjjjgs; or
^^^JLX^'i^viiQ.
lease in all such cases, when the jgaper was handed to
^__J.J--<^ as by making
^^^"^
to be delivered as
h
ird
ajh
e
person
deed upon condition &c,,
^/i^
in
from
the
first
to
take
effect
order
to
dehvery,
effectuate
tlie
ij^c>**'^'*'t_JllQw£d
V'*'^^ intention of the parties.
In^otlier words, when
can make no difference, the deed takes effect from the second delivery, but
does make
^^^
difference, then the deed takes effect from the first delivery.
►^
This
the
abov-C,
question.
asulojhe
yields
The_]ast,.exceptiQix.,cited
t^^^^^h jU^^^^'^^^y
lease, iakes^inihe
X'^^/.r elation of the deed, in cases of "escrow" to avoid
the same, whether the incumbr;^jice,
case tinder consideration; for
to be avoided, proceeds from the act of the party, or from the eft'e^ct
of an execution, as the object
to make the deed effectual an^^to
State v. Pool, 27 N. C. 105.
qarr^out.,the intention^
But, in truth, the distinction cannot be acted upon —
merely verbal, and whether one set of words would be used, or the other, would
be the result of mere accident. The law does not depend upon the accidental use of mere words "trusted to the slippery memory of witnesses." It depends upon the act, that
paper, signed and sealed,
It must be confessed, (and
put out of the possession of the maker.
with reverence
say it,) that many of the dicta to be found in the old
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books, in reference to deeds, are too "subtle and cunning" for practical
use, and have either been passed over in silence, or wholly explained
a way.
We are satisfied from principle and from a consideration of the
authorities, that when a paper is si^ied._and_iealedjajQd handed to a
third person to be handed to another upon a condition, which is afterwards complied with, the paper becomes a deed by the act of parting
with the possession, and takes effect presentlv; without reference..io
the precise words used, unless it clean ^^ppears to. be the intention.
that it should not then become a deed^^and this intention would be defeated by treating it as a deed from that time, as, if, no fraud being
suggested, tjie paper is handed to the tliird person, before the parties
have .concluded the bargain and fixed upon the terms ; which cannot
well be supposed ever to be the case ; for i p ordinary transactions, th e
p reparatio n of deeds of conv eyance, wh i ch is attended with trouble
an jjexpe nsg^ usually come§. after the_agreeiiieiit t.Q_s_ell.
There must be a de cree for the plaintiff , witli costs against the de'^'~
fendant Harris.
Per Curiam. Decree accordingly. 39

f-^{f^-^-^

MAY

V.

EMERSON.

(Supreme Court of Oregon, 1908. 52 Or. 262, 96 Pac. 454, 1065, 16 Ann.
Cas. 1129.)

This is an actipa qf. ejecimenf, commenced on October 23, 1907, to
recover the possession of lots 35 and 36, in block 11, Stewart's second
addition to Baker City. The answer admits that defendant is in possession, and alleges that he is the owner of the lots in fee simple ; an3
as a second defense alleges possession under a contract of purchase,
as disclosed in the stipulation of facts, which includes the following:
That on February 24, 1906. defendant purchasedjhe lots from Dugan
and wife, the price to be paid in monthly installments, continuing oy^r
a period of more than a year ; that a deed was executed by Dugan ^d
wife, and deposited in escrow with AI. S. Hughes, to whom payrnents
39 Whitfield v. Harris, 48 Jliss. 710
(1873) ; Dettmer v. Behrens, 106 Iowa,
585, 76 N. W. 853, 68 Am. St. Rep. 326 (1898), ace.
In Vorheis v. Kitcli, 8 Phila. (Fa.) 554 (1871), the wafe of the grantor who
had become such between the depositing of the deed in escTow and the per-

foi-mance of the condition was held not entitled to dower.
In Lewis v. Prather, 21 S. W. 538, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 749 (1893), it was held
that a deed made by the grantor after the deposit of the escrow deed but before the performance of the condition to a purchaser who knew of the escrow
deed was ineffective as against the first grantee upon the performance of the
condition.
Leiter v. Pike, 127 111. 287, 20 N. E. 23 (1889), ace. See Cannon v.
Handley, 72 Cal. 122, 13 Pac. 315 (1887) ; Conneau v. Geis, 73 Cal . 176. 14 Pac.
580, 2 Am. St. Rep. 785 (1887) ; McDonald v. Huff, 77~ CaI^_2t9;T!5Pac.
499
^'^
(1888).
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were to be made, and was to be delivered by Hughes when the payments were compl etedj that defendant was to have possessio n from the
date of the purch ase; that on April 12, 1906, after the purchase and
before the delivery of the escrow deed, plaintill^Jn an action of debt
against
Dugan and wife, attached the said lots, which action resulted
''"^'^^J^
A^ ^""^ I in judgment against them on April 25, 1906j that an execution sale of
JjlI*^^\ said lots was had on June 12, 1906, and confirmation thereof was haa
^jff^u^Gn June 22, 1906, and a sheriff's d eed issued to the plaintiff o n Jun e
27, 1907; that plainti
at the time of the attachment, had knovy ledge
of the contract of sale and escrow deed, and on July 15, 1906, notified
the defendant of said judgment and execution sale, and demanded that
payment of the purchase price be made tn birn that defendant paid all
the installments of the said purchase price to Hughes, according to the
agreement, and received the deed from him on or about September 14,
1907.
From these facts the rial court found that plaintiff acquire
tlie title to the propert
free from any equity of the defendant, an
y
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accordingly, and the defendant appeals.
The ffrsFlnatter for
(after stating the facts as above).
consideration
the effect of plaintiff's judgment lien and exec ution sal
upon defendant's prior possession, under his purchase and escrow
deed from Dugan and wife^defendant contending that when the conditions under which the escrow deed was deposited with Hughes were
fulfilled, the deed related back to, or took effect from, the date of
such deposit, and thus cut off the lien of plaintiff's judgment.
The sale
Dugan to the defendant, and the deposit of the deed with Hughes,
created
the defendant an equitable interest in the property, such
that, upon full payment of the purchase price according to the escrow
agreement, the title would vest at once in the grantee, but pending the
completion of the purchase by the full payment of the price, th legal
title to the property remained in the vendor and was therefore subject to attachment, or the lien of
judgment against the ven^r to
the extent of his interest therein.
Such lien, obtained with notice of the
escrow agreement,
subject to the equity of the vendee.
The delivery
of the deed to the vendee being essential to pass the title, the escrow
agreement only becomes effectual for that purpose upon the fulfillment
of its conditions. The_g eneral rule
that the tit passes to the vendee
from the econd delivery;j_
Devlin, Deeds, par. 328
Prutsman v.
Baker, 30 Wis. 644, 11 Am. Rep. 592. There are exceptions to this
rule, as stated in
Kent's Commentaries, 454. "Generally an escrow
ta kes eff'e ct from the second delivery, and
to be considered as the
eed of he party from that time; but this, general rule does not apply
when just ice requires
resort to fiction. _^The relation back to the first
delivery, so as to give the deed effect from that time,
allowed, in
cases of necessity, to avoid injury to the operation of the deed from
*
events happening between the first and second delivery.
But
not admitted,
fjthe fiction be not re^quired for any such purpose,
nd
deed operates^ according to the truth of the case, fr om th

Eakin,
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"

second del ivery.
Rathmell v. Shirey, 60 Ohio St. 187, 197, 53 N.
E. 1093, 1099; Devlin, Deeds, par. 328. In Prutsman v. Baker, 30
Wis. 644, 11 Am. Rep. 592, it is said: "This relation back to the firjt
delivery is permitted, however, only in cases of necessity, and where
no injustice will be done, to avoid injury to the operation of the
deed from events happening between the first and second delivccy;
as if the grantor, being a feme sole, should marry, or whether a feme
sole or not, should die or be attainted, after the first and before the
second delivery, and so become incapable of making a deed at the time
of second delivery, the deed will be considered as taking effect from
the first delivery, in order to accomplish the intent of the grantor,
which., would otherwise be defeated by the intervening incapacity.
But subject only to this fiction of relation, in cases like those above
supposed and others of the kind, and which is only allowed to prevail in furtherance of justice, and where no injury will arise to the
rights of third parties, the instniment has no effect as a jdeed,._and_no
titl e pass es until the second delivery ; and it has accordingly been held
th at, if i n the meantime the c>taie shrnild be levied upon by a creditor
o f the g rantor, he would hold by virtue of such levy, in preferenc e to
Washburn, Real Prop. § 2181 ; Rathmell v.
t he gran tee in ihc dcedj_"
187,
53 N. E. 1098; Jackson v. Rowland, 6 Wend.
Shirey, 60 Ohio St.
667, 22 Am. Dec. 557.
2.>T he second delivery cannot tak e effe ct by relation when the
Fantor is able t o make, and the g rantee able to receive, such second

(P^

J)

Jackson v. Rowland, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 667, 22
Dec. 557. It is held in Whitfield v. Harris, 48 Miss. 710, that this
fiction of relation will apply to ward off the intervening liens of creditors; and Chinn v. Butts, 3 Dana (Ky.) 547, holds to the same effect.
But the weight of authority is the other way. 11 Am. & Eng. Enc.
^.^
Law (2d Ed.) 348, says: "B ut it seems to be the prevailing rule tha t. \
C
in the interval of time between the first and second delivery, title r e- / \Y^'^'^'^^
'
mams in the grantor, subject to the claims of his creditors, and that
,
(^
t his doctrine of relation cannot be applied for the purpose of de- VCr^*^
feating such intervening^ claims."
This text is supported by the authorities above cited, and also by Wolcott v. Johns, 7 Colo. App. 360,
44 Pac. 675; Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. 185, 26 N. W. 426, 60 Am. Rep.
291T >ioyt v. McLagan, 87 Iowa, 746, 55 N. W. 18.
,
3y/4t^is beyon d controversy that the title remains in the vendormptil
S:he actual delive ry of the deed .
The vendor still has not only the
legal title, but also an interest in the property as security for the payment of the purchase price ; and this interest should be and is available to a creditor through the lien of his judgment, which lays hold
of such legal title, and thereafter payments made to the vendor by the
vendee are at his peril: Tomlinson v. Blackburn, 37 N. C. 509.
the p.urchase price is fully paid, although the deed is not actually deIi\ered, the vendor having but the nak^ ^ leyal title , the judgment creditor can acquire no more: Stannis v. Nicholson, 2 Or. 332; Riddle v.
delivery

abs olutelyl

Am.

/\)

J
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Miller, 19 Or. 468, 23 Pac. 807; Riddle's Appeal (Pa.) 7 Atl. 232; Uhl
May, 5 Neb. 157; Elwell v. Hitchcock, 41 Kan. 130, 21 Pac. 109.

V.

Reversed.*"

/ .,

•

(fJ

'■

SCOTT.

(Supreme Court of Kansas,

STONE.

V.

1906.

72

'
.

Kan.

545, 84 Pac.

117.)

This was an action to recover damages for a breach
of the covenants of a warranty deed. TTTe transaction was evidenced
by a contract of sale^^ dated April 8, 1902, which specified the subseGraves,

J.

40 See

Lord's Oregon Laws,
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quent steps to be taken by each party in completing the conveyance.
The defendant s in error were grantors , and the p laintiff in erro
gra ntee.
The contr act of sale, together with $1000 cash paid by the grantee
upon the purchase-price of the land, was placed in escrow with n
El Dorado bank to await the performance of the subsequent requirewas stipulated that the grantors should furments of each party.
nish an abstract of itle and execute
warranty deed to the land, and
ugus
place them in the bank with the cont ract, there to remain until
1902, when the grantee should pay the remainder of the purchaseThese conditioiis
money and receive the deed and aljstract of title.
were performed by each party, and the deed and abstract of title we re
duly delivered to the grantee as stipulated.
At the date of the contract of sale the land was in the possession
of tenants. The cultivated portion was occupied by one Arnall, and
the pasture-lands by one Pirtle.
Arnall paid his rent to the grantee,
and Pirtle paid to the grantoci. The grantee began this action^to reamages as
co ver
substitute for the Pirtle rent.
The case was tried to
jury. The controversy on the trial was
whether,
should be for ent crecovery could be had at all,
cruing_from the date of the contract of sale, or from the dat whe
the grantee actually received the deed, to November
1902, when
the Pirtle lease expi red,. The case was presented to the jury upon both
theories, and the amount returned in the verdict indicated that
was
court,
intended to cover the longer period.
motion for a
The
on
new trial, decided that the finding sli^ould have been for the short er
the plaintiff would
period, and thereupon offered to deny the motion
accept an amount stated, being the value of the rent after August
1902;
not, the court indicated that
would grant
new trial.
The plaintiff declined the offer and the motion was allowed.
new trial
We might let the case rest here, but, as
necessary
and the legal questions involved are controlling, we deem
best to
decide them now, and thereby save the parties the delay and exThe trial court erred.jn holdpense of further litigation in this court.
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ing that the grantee could recover rent only from the date he actuajl^
received the deed — August 2, 1902. Where land is sold by a transaction involving a contract_of saje containing stipulations for the subsequent performance of specified acts by each of the parties, pendi_ng
the contract is placed in escrow, and afterward
vifhich performance
in compliance with such escrow the grantor executes and delivers his
deed, to be also held in escrow with the contract and delivered to the
grantee when payment has been made by him as stipulated, ^nd all the
^
provisions of the escrow are performed and the deed delivered to the j).A,<,A,«^»wf
grantee accordingly, such delivery completes the conveyance, and t he r ^ g -^ .
deed relates back to the date of the contract of sale and is not limited
^OlZ^t^a^
to the date when actual delivery is made to the grantee.
This doctrine of relation is of ancient origin, and has always been
applied, both at law and in equity, to meet the requirements of justice,
to protect purchasers, and to effectuate the intent of the parties to
2 Greenl. Cruise on Real Prop.
18 Vin. Abr. 286-293;
contracts.
•
24 A. & E. Encycl. of L. 275 ; Welch v. Button et al., 79 111.
441
465 ; Young v. Guy, 87 N. Y. 457; Sutherland v. Goodnow et al., 108
NelHs v. Lathrop, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 121,'
111. 528, 48 Am. Rep. 560;
34 Am. Dec. 285 ; Thompson v. Spencer, 50 Cal. 532 ; Cummings v.
Newell, 86 Minn. 130, 90 N. W. 311 ; Davis v. Clark, 58 Kan. 100, 48
Pac. 563.
It has been held that whether by this rule of relation the operation
of the deed will be carried back to the date of the contract of sale, to
the execution of the deed, or only to its actual delivery to the grantee,
wjU depend upon the inteiit.ollhe .parties as shown by the transaction.
1 Devlin, Deeds "(2d' Kd.) § 262.
But whatever test may be applied to
It is necessary to protect J:he
this case, the result will be the same.
grantee in, the enjoyment of the property which he has bought^-iuid
paid for, and it is necessary to carry out the manifest intention of_the
parties that this deed should relate back to the date of the contract of
sale..

The grantors purchased the land in controversy less than a week
The grantee paid interest on Jthe gur- ^Vl^^-a^^-^-***
before the sale in question.
chase-price from the date of the contract. A vendor, in the absence ^ f J)
'^^^ ^
express stipulations therefor, cannot receive interest on the purchase^ ^^
pri ce and the rents a]so. 29'A.^& E. Encycl. of L. 708; Siemers y . Jl^'*-*^"-^
Hu1^t728 Tex. Civ. App. 44, 65 S. W. 62, 66 S. W. 115. The grantors
knew when they executed the contract of sale, and on May 6, 1902,
when they placed their deed with full covenants of warranty in escrow,
to be delivered August 1, 1902, that tenants were on the land, but no
reservation or suggestion was made that they expected the rent. Jj; /P «a*a>w
must be presumed that they intended to convey by their deed ever y V/v,*^**^
it,

r ight which its covenants covered .
Placing a deed in escrow practically withdraws the land from the
market, and renders the grantor powerless to convey or encumber
Aig.Peop. — 24
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After the grantee had paid the pu rso far as the vendee is concerned.
chase-money in full, as agreed, including interest thereon from the
date of the contract of sale, it would be manifestly unjust to deprive
Weconhim of the rent conveyed by the covenants of his deed.
clude that under the facts and circumstances shown in this case the
plaintiff is entitled to receive rents from the date of the contract_of
April 8, 1902,
The order of the court granting a new tr ial^ is affirmed, with direction that on the further trial the views herein expressed be fol-

sale,

lowed.

All

the

Justices concurrmg.**

BAKER
(Supreme Court of Kansas,

Smith, J.

On

V.

SNAVELY.

1011.

84 Kan.

170, 114 Pac.

370.)

William Weisiger was the r ecord ownj f. of the lots^in
the 6th day of November, 1901, one Clarence Ford ob-

question;^
tained a tax deed

thereto was conveyed_^to
John Baker, who subsequently, and on the 5th day of October, 1.905,
brought this action in the district court of Finney county to quiet Jiis
Service was
title to the lots against Weisiger and wife and others.
November,
On
21st
of
1905,
the
made by publication.
judgment:
day
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff quieting his ti tle.
On March 3, 1906, Weisiger and wife filed their motion and affidavit
to open the judgment, and also filed an answer to the petition of Baker,
in which they made a general denial of ,the allegationsof. the petition,
and, for a second defense, alleged that tlie tax deed upon which the
plaintiff based his title was null and void. O n April 21^ 1906, t he nioto the lots, and his right

tion to open the judgment was allowed.
September 22, 1906, the Weisigers filed a motion to make S. C.
Thompson a party defendant, which motion was sustained November
30, 1906, and summons served on Thompson on December 2, 1906.
Permission was also given the Weisigers, on November 30, 1906, to
file an amended answer and cross-petition, in which, in addition to the
allegations of the former answer, they alleged that defendant Thom pson j)urchased the property in controversy, X)n or about Jh£..31 st dayjif
MaVch, 1906, from Noah B. MatkinSj to whom the plaintiff, John
Baker, on the same day had conveyed the property; that both transfers were made with the full knowledge of -the interest of the ^Vei>igers in the property, and were made for the purpose of defrauding thepi
out of their interest therein, and that such transfers were null and_void

^against

-J

them.

41 Cf. Oliver v. Mowat, PA U. C. Q. B. 472 (1874), where the grantor, between
the time the deed was handed to the depositaiy and the performance of the

condition,

■^1

was allowed to distrain for rent
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of court and with the consent of tlie
in which he admitted that he
answer
filed
an
WeisigerS, Thompson
claimed an interest in the property, and made a general denial to the
allegations of the cross-petition, alleging, in substance, that he purchased the premises from Noah B. Matkins on the 10th of January,
1906; that Matkins executed a warranty deed conveying the premises
to him ; that at that time he was actually occupying the premises, and
has ever since continued in the possession thereof ; that he purchased
the property in good faith, after taking legal advice that the title to the
premises was in Noah B. Matkins, and after being advised by counsel
that the title to the property had been quieted in the action of John
Baker against Mary H. Suavely et al. ; that he made a payment on the
property, and took it subject to a mortgage for $1650, which he had
since paid off and discharged ; that at the time of the purchase he had
no notice of any claims by defendant William Weisiger, and bought
the property in good faith ; that the tax deed in question was recorded
On August

23, 1907, by leave

in the office of the register of deeds, of Finney county on the 7th of
November, 1901, that five years had expired after the recording of the
deed prior to any pleading filed by defendant Weisiger against lliis
defendant; and that tlie action, as to him, was barred by .the five-year
statute oTlimitation.
Trial was had before Charles E. Lobdell, judge pro tern., and the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law were made :

"Findings

of Fact.

"(1) That the defendant, Weisiger, is the owner of the fee_or patent
title to the property in controversy, unless such title is extinguishedjjy
the tax deed to Baker or by the judgment heretofore rendered i n th is
case and subsequent conveyances which are claime d to have b een ac cepted in good faith and in faith of such judgni^nt.
"(2) That on November 21, 1905, the plaintiff, John Baker, obtained
judgment in this court and in this cause quieting title in him to the
land in controversy against the defendants, Weisi ge rs.
"(3) That on November 28, 1905, John Baker executed a sufficient
deed of general warr anty to the property in controversy to Noah B.
Matkins and placed the same in esc row for future delivery with G. L.

Miller.

"(4) That on March 3, 1906, the defendants, William Weisiger and
wife, file^, in., this court their motion, in proper fo rm, to open up the
ju dgmen t thereinbefore ronde redjn favor of Baker as recitedjn finding No. 2.
"(^JTliat thereafter, and on April 21, 1906, by the consideration of
this court such decree and judgment was fully set aside and ope ned u£^

"^

That on March 31, 1906, the
Miller,
delivered to M atkin s.
by

deed

from Baker to Matkins was,
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"(7) That on February 19, 1906, Noah B. Matkins, a single man,
executed a sufficient warranty deed to the property in controversy to
the defendant S. C. Thompson, which deed was placed in escrow with
G7 L. Miller, as was the deed from Baker to Alatkms.
"(8) That on tlie same date that the deed from Baker to Matkins
was deHvered by Miller the d eed from Matkins to Thompson was by
Miller delivered to T hompson .
^^"That^TEompson took possession of the property in controversy
on January 6, 1906, and has been conti nuously in possession since that
tim
' g.

"(10) T hat the title of Baker at the Jime of_his_l udgment res ted
upon the tax deed intro duced in eviden ce.
"XTl) That a part of the consideration for the tax deed on which
Baker's title rested was what was known as 'c urrent university ta x/
levied for the year 1896.
"(12) That tlie so-called redemption notice for the lots in controversy, published by the county treasurer of Finney county, contained
in the amount stated as necessary to the redemption of said lots the
s um of thirty-five cents as costs for^ a dvertising-, and include d-it. for
each of the tjiree years embrac ed in the noticejiecessary to red eem, ^ nd
t hat the treasurer's fee of twenty-fi ve cents was als o inclu ded in t he
notice for each

"Conclusions of Law.

^

vnidahip and should be set aside
"(1) That the tax deed to Baker J§.
because of the facts stated in findings 11 and 12.
"(2) That the cre ation of the e scraaLjadth reference _to th e deed s
fro m Baker to Matkins and Matk iTic; tn Thnmp'^nn wa^; nnt in ^,w
delivery of the deed s.
"(3) That the delivery of such deeds, which actually took place on
to reliev e ThonipMarch 31, 1906, caiijaotbemad^Jo. relate _back_s^
which
son and^Iatkina^Qi the.effe£EjQiJh5.nQti££jiii2pen.up4^
motion was filed before the escrow was terminated.
"(4) That at the time of the delivery of their deeds to them Matkins
and Thompson had jconstructive notice, ^yhich was binding upon^tlTjem,
of the motion tlien filed and pending in this cause to open up and vacate the judgment, and that neither of them was a purchaser in good
faith and inJaith af such jiidgm^niJ'
The contention of the appellees is that the deed from Baker and
wife to Matkins did not become a conveyance of the property until tlie
actual delivery thereof on the 31st of March, 1906, that the deed from
Matkins to Thompson did not become an actual conveyance until the
same date, and that Thompson had constructive notice of the pendency
of the action before the deed was delivered to him.
Upon the other hand, the ^appdl^it contends that both th e_ dee d
from Baker to Matkins and the deed from Matkins to him were_executed long before the motion to reopen Jhe judgment was fil ed, on

Ch. 2)

EXECUTION OF DEEDS

373

March 3, 1906.; that the considerations therefore were paid in part
at the time of the execution of the contracts, and the remainder in full
when the deeds were dehvered, on March 31, 1906; that they were in
escrow wi^Miller frprn the time of their execution until their actual
deUveix and that when the actual delivery was made, on March_31j
1906, the delivery dated back to the time of the original contracts and
\ri^
partial payments. These adverse contentions constitute the only substantial question_ in the case.
.
Whether a deed executed and placed in escrow relates back to the
time of the contract and execution thereof, so as to vest the grantee ^Ojug[,^„X-*.<r^
with the full title from that time, or whether it becomes such convey^_ 7•
ance only upon the full performance of the conditions, seems to de- ^f^"'^
pe nd upon whic h of Jhe two theories will proniote^ justice under all
/v*-o-^ «
the circumstan ces of the individual case.
"This doctrine of relation (from the time of the second delivery to
the time of the delivery in escrow) is of ancient origin, and ha s always
be en applied, both
Jaw a.n,d-m. .equily»Jj3 mj^gt thejieauirenieiit^.^
ju stice, to protect _£urchasers, and to eitectuateAe intent of th£_paxties
'^
tfTcontracts.
"T^cott v." Stone". 72T;;anT 5457 548, 84 Pac. 117, 118, citnumerous
cases.
ing
The syllabus in that case states the rule strongly, without exception,
and holds that, under the circumstances of that case, the delivery dated
The same doctrine was upback to the time of making the contract.
held in Davis v. Clark, 58 Kan. 100, 48 Pac. 563. In each of those
c ases justice clea rly reg^U2red_ that t he co nveyance be h eld as of t he
date of the delivery in escrow and not as of the date_of the second del ivery.
In a case similar to this. Hill v. Miller, 84 Kan. 196, 198, 113 Pac.
1043, as between the rights of a purchaser from a tax-deed holder and
the holder of the patent title, who had brought an action to set aside a
decree quieting the title, it was said :
"At all events he (the purchaser) was not protected by the statute
unless lie bou_ght and paid for the land prior to January 18, 19QS,_tiie
late when the proceeding wa&.l>£g-un to spt R'iide the dea:££,^i]if;ting

^

the court in this case in regard to any payment made' by the appellant prior to the delivery of the deed from the
party holding it in escrow, which was twenty-eight days after the filing

No finding is made by

Nor does the appellant disof the motion to set aside the judgment.
close in his evidence how much he paid toward the purchase price, at
or prior to the time of the execution of the deed. The evidence is that
he made a payment.
According to the evidence, he purchased seventeen lots for $3500, nearly $206 per lot, and assumed the payment of a
mortgage for $1650, which he afterward paid, leaving $1850, upon
which "a payment" was made at the time of purchase, and the remainder March 31, 1906. The three lots involved in this action would, at
the price, amount to about $618, leaving over $1200, less such payment
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of which he does not disclose,
to protect himself against any failure of title. He was bound to take
notice, at the^tipis Jie actually received his deed and made final payment, of the proceeding to vacate the judgment quieting the title, and,
as he has failed to show that he was unable to protect himself from any
loss, if the title to the lots should eventually be shown to be in the
appellees, there is no reason for holding that the second delivery of tlie
deed related back to the time it was delivered in escrow.
On the other hand, the invalidity of the tax deed is not contested,
and the appellees' equities in the case are very strong. We think the
court correctly decided the case.
We have not considered various
other assignments of error, as it seems to be conceded that ifie case
must turn upon this one question. The ju dgment is affirm ecL*^
as he may have made, and the amount
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was recorded in July, 1805.
the question was between Corl and the pe rsons to whom he sold, the deecfought to relate pacK, so as to give effect to bis
ntermediary grants, and prevent him from defeatin^g thein. 'j'his is the amo n
of 'the doctrine in Jacksoii v. Bull.'l Johns. Cas. {.V. Y.) 81 (1790).
ut here is
loss, and we ought not to re sort
struggle bet ween innocent persons, to avoid
to Hction to heln one against tlie other. Tlie transaction must be left to Test
upon Its simple and naked truth." Frost v. Beekiuah,
Jobxis. Ch. (KTY.) 288
(fST?j:
See Ames, Cases on Trusts (2d Ed.) 287-289.
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*2..B^kman made a deed of certain premises lo CorKgnd delivered same to
esteilo as an esc row^ to ljej]en\eretl_9v*^t-tQ ("or l iijiopMip l;itrei-s execiiflDn
of a iiiortgajre on the premises to Beekniiin and the deposit of tlie sniiie^th
Westerlo.
Corl made a deed of the hiiid.s to Frost. Corl then executed tlie
mortfia^'e to lieekmaii, and upon delivering same to Westerlo received the deed
to tlie premises,
rs'either Heekman nor Frost had any actual notice.
Ht'ekmaa
having advertised the i>iemlses for sale under the provisions ofTTie niortgajie,
Frost sued to eujoiu such action. The opiuion of Mr. Chancellor Keut iu part
Is as follows:
"This case has led to the discnission of several important questions. (1) The
first in order is, whether the deed from Heekman to Coil was duly delivered,
and at what time, so as to pass the estate. The deed must he taken to have
been duly delivered from the time it was handed to Corl hy Westerlo, with
*
*
♦
Every deed takes effect
whom it had been deposited as an escrow.
f rom the delivery] and the reasonable infereneg from th e fi^fiisMctioii. is to tuuslcier the deed as operarnig onl.T-fl'Ohi the liTue of the | )eiforiiiaine uf the cougition. and the actual delivery to tne grantee^
This is the Veneral rule, as stated by rerkins (sect. l.'iS,) and u is only to be controverted when justice reipiires
In Kutler and Haker's case, W Co. 85, b, :i(i, a (151U), it was
a resort to fiction.
resolved, and the law had. indeed, been so understood loim before. (Hro. tit.
Non est Factum, pi. 5,) t hat a d cn-d delivered as an escrow, aiid afterwards
t o the g rantee, shall relate back to tlie tirsi drli\<'i-y, \\\w\\ that iclalinn is iiec^sary lU glvy ertect ro the deed, as if the gt-antor, liein.i; a feme sole,„.aiii)ulJ
n yarry, or ii tl ie i;raiitoi-, whether a feme sole or not, sliouUl die betweeij^the
first and s e cond delivery; but that, in other eases, as wliere it would avoid a
lease, it SllilU not have ITiat relation, but shall onerate according to the trut h
of the case from the second deliver^v. The fiction of carrying the deed back
by reianon is resorted to from necessity, to prevent injury, and to uphold the
deed ; or, as it is exi)ressed in the case from Coke, 'in such case for necessity,
and ut res raagis valeat quam pereat, to this intent, by fiction of law, it shall
^^ ^ f^t'ed ab initio, and yet in truth it was not his deed until the second
delivery.'
In that case it was likewise resolved that, as to collateral acts, there
ji the present case, there is no necess ity
should be no such relation at all.
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LEACII.

(Courts of Common rieas, King's Bench, House of Lords, 1C91.

2 Vent.

198.)

In an ej ectment by Thomas Thompson against Sir Simon Leach and
divers other defendants, upon the demise of Charles Leach, of the
manor of Bulkworthy, and divers messuages, lands and tenements.
Upon not guilty pleaded, a special verdict was found to this effect,
That Ni cholas Leach was seised in fee of the s aid m anors , lands and
tenements in' th e declaration ; and by his last will in writing, bearing
date the 9th day of December, in the 19th year of the reign of the late
King Charles the Second, de vised the p re mises to his brother Simon
Leach for life, remainder to the first son of the body of the said Simon ,
andjthe heirs males of the body of such first son , and in like manner
to the second, third son. Sec. and for want of issue of the said Simon
Leach, the remainder_to Sir Simon Leach a nd th e heirs males of hi s
body; and for default of such issue, to the right heirs of Nicholas the
testator for ever ; and that the said Nicholas died seised of the premises, and after his decease the said Simon Leach entred and becam e
s eised for life, with remainders over, as aforesaid;^ and being so seise d
made a deed, bearing date the 23d of August, in the 25th year of th e
King Charles, sealed an d delivered t o the use of the
rei^n of the said
said Sir Simon Leach (but he was not present) which deed the verdict
sets forth in haec verba ; and b y it he granted and surrende re d to th e
s aid Sir Simon Leach, his heirs and assigns, the said manor and prem i ses, the reversion, and reversions , remainder and remainders of the
same ; to have and to hold the same to the said Sir Simon Leach and
his heirs, to the use of him and his heirs: and the y find that the sai d
Leach, lessor of the plaintiff, the first son of the said Si r
S i monXea cTTwas bor n the first of November, in the 25th~year of th^
reign of tbp c;at d Kin g Charles, and not b efore ; and that Simon Leach,
from the time of his sealing the deed to the 25th of May, in the 30th
year of the said King Charles, c ontinued possessed of the premise s.
and that then, and not before. Sir Simon Leach accepted a nd agree d
and that aftertp the said surrender, and entred into the premises;
wards the said Simon Leach, brother of the said Nicholas the testator,
died, a nd the sai d Charles Leach his son, after his decease entred aiQ
the premises, ancTBemised them to the plaintiff, who by virtue thereo f
entred and became p ossessed, and s o continued till the s aid Sir Sjm on
Leach and the ^other defendants, by his co mmand, elected him . But
whether upon the whole matter, the said Simon Leach did surrender
the said manor and premises to the said Sir Simon Leach, before the
said Charles Leach was born ; and if he did not surrender before the
birth of the said Charles Leach, then they find the defendants guilty;
and if he did surrender them before the birth, then they find for the
defendants.
C harles
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And PoLLExFEN, Chief Justice, PowELL and RokEby, w ere o f
opinion that here was no surrender till such time as Sir SimonJ_,each
had notice of the deed of surrender^ and agreed to it , and so the remainder was vested in Charles the son ; and it was not defeated bjjhe
agreement of Sir Simon, after his birth, to the surrender.
But V'extris differed, and his argument was as followeth:
Upon this record the case is no more than thus; Simon L each, tenant for life, remainder to his first son, remainder in tail to Sir Simon
Simon Leach before the birth of that son , by deed, sealed_and
Leach.
deliver ed to the use of _Sir Simon, (^but v^ti his ab sence and without hi^
noting) surrenders his estate to Sir Simon, and co ntinues the possession unti l after the birth of his son; and then Sir Smion Leach agrees
to the surrender, whether this surrender shall be taken as a good and
effectual surrender before tlie son born?
There are two points which have been spoken to in this case at the
Bar.
Firstj whether by the sealin g of th e

deed of surrender the estaje
passed to Sir Simon Leach ? for then the contingent remainder could not vest in the after-born son, there being no estate left
in Simon Leach his father to support it?
Secondly, whether after the assent of Sir Simon Leach, tho' it wer e
given af to r the birth of the son, dot h not so r elate as to make it a su rren_d£r jrom_the sealing of the deed, an^ thereby defeat t he remaind er
which befor e suc h assent was vested^ in the son_?
I think these points include all that is material in the case, and I
shall speak to the second point, because I would rid it out of the case.
For as to that point I conceive, that if it b e adm itte d, that the estat e for
li fe continue d in Simon_Leach till 'tFe^ssent"or Sir Simon, thatj he
remainder being vested in Charles the seconcTscE^elore such asse nt,
th ere can be no relation that shall devest it.
I do not go upon the general rule, that relations shall not do wrong
to strangers.
'Tis true, relations are fictions in law, which are always
accompanied with equity.
But 'tis as true, that there _is_sometimesJoss and damage to third
p ersons consequent upon thernj jDUt then 'ti s wh at tlie law ca.]Is__^mnum absque"mjuriaj_ which is a known and stated difference in the law,
But I think there needs nothing
as my. brother Pemberton urged it.
of that to be considered in this point
But the reason which I go upon
that the relation here letit j>e
n ever so strong, cannot hurt or distu rb the rejnainder m Char les Lea.ch
in this case; for that the remainde
in hi m by jtiL Le-aa tecedent an
surrenxier. to which the assent of Sir Sim on
paramou nt to the deed
plainly over-reaches the relation .
Leach re. Iates,, so that
If an estate in remainder, or otherwise, ariseth to one upon continfine or feoffment to uses, when the
power reserved upon
gency or
estate
once raised or vested
relates to the fine or feoffment, as
were immediately limited thereupon,
Co., 133, 156. So this remain-
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tier when vested in Charles, he is in immediately by the will, and out
deves ted byjmy act done since, as
the surrender is.
I will put one case, I think full to this matter, and so dismiss this

of danger of his remai nder being

a

a

is

e

^

a

|

:

if

I

1

b.

is

it)

point.
It cannot be denied, but that there is as strong a relation upon a disagreement to an estate, as upon an agreement, where the estate was
conveyed without the notice of him that afterwards agrees or disagrees; if the husband discontinues the wife's estate, and then the
discontinuee conveyes the estate back to the wife in the absence of the
husband, who (as soon as he knows of
disagrees to the estate, this
shall not take away the remitter which the law wrought upon the first
And so
Litt. cap. Remitter.
taking the estate from the discontinuee.
in of
title parThe true reason is, because she
Co.
Inst. 356
amount to the conveyance to which the disagreement relates, tho' that
indeed was the foundation of the remitter, which by the disagreement
take to be
stronger case
might seem to be avoided. This therefore
so that
than that at the Bar
there weTe"no surfehder before the
birth of Char les the son, there ca n be none after by any constructi on
ofla\v: for that wnnlH he in vo idance of an estate settled by titl
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anteced ent to such .surrender^ whereas relations are to avoid mesne
acts and
believe there can be no case put upon relations that go any
should be otherwise.
further, and
would be against all reason
am of opinion, that upon the making
But as to the first point.
the deed__of sur render, the freehold and estate of Simon Leach did
immediately ves in Sir Simon^^ before he had notice, or gave any ex was
surrender before Charles was bor n,
and so
press consent
and then the contingent remainder could never vest in him, there being
no particular estate to support it.
particular sort of conveyance that works by th
A urrender
think can make
plainhas been agreed, and
comm on law . And
immediately
(upo
the
law
do
at
common
that
co
appear,
nveyances
outp
part)
devest the estate
the exec ution of them on' the s^rantor's
though
such
party
to
whom
put
it
in
the
conveyance
him^_ ^n(l
made^^
in his absence, or without his notice, till some disagreement to such
for shall
estate appears .
speak of conveyances at the common law
or of
Uses,
the
of
that
work
Statute
of
upon
conveyances
say nothing
as
like,
the
or
conveyances by custom, as surrenders of copyholds,
being guided by the particular penning of statutes, and by custom and
usage, and matters altogether foreign to the case in question.
deed
n conveyances that are by the common law, sometimgg
suffi ient (and in surrenders sometimes words without
deed) withou
further act
further circumstance or ceremony; and sometimes
requisi^ to give them effect, as ivery of seisin, attornm nt, and someand as well in those
times entry of the part^as in case of exchanges
deed only, as those which require some furconveyances that require
ther act to perfect them, so soon as they are executed on the grantor's
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part, they immediately pass the estate. I n case of a deed of feoffi-n ent
to divers persons, and livery made to one f' eoffee in the absence of t he
rest, the estat^e vests in them all till dis sent, 2 Leon. 23, Mutton's Case.
An"d so 223,~an estate made to a fem e covert by livery, vests injier
beforeaiw agreement of'the h usbancl,T ro. 1 inst. 356a. So of a grant
of a reversion after attornment of the lessee, passeth the freehold by
the deed, Co. 1 Inst. 49a; Litt. sect. 66. I n case of a lease, the leasee
h ath right immediately to have the tenements by force of th e lease.
'
So in the case of limitation of remainders and of devises, (which tho a
conveyance introduced bv the statute, yet operates accordrng to th e
common law) the freehold passeth to the devisee before notice or asI do not cite authorities, which are plentiful enough in these
sent^
matters, because they that have argued for the plaintiff have in a manner agreed, t hat in conveyances at the common law, generally the e state
p asseth to the partv. till he devests it bv some disa gr eement .
But 'tis objected, that in case of surrenders, an express assent of the
surrendree is a circumstance requisite ; as attornment to a grant of a
reversion, livery to a feoffment, or execution by entry, in case of an
exchange.
To which I answer, t hat an assent i? not only a circumstance, bu t
for they are contracts , actus contra
't is essential to all conveyances;
necessarily
suppose
the assent of all partie s : but this is
actum, which
not at all to be compared with such collateral acts or circumstances,
that by the positive law are made the effectual parts of a conveyance;
as attornment, livery, or the like ; for the as'^ent nf the pnrty thaj_takes.
i s implied jn all conveyances, and this is by intendment of law, which is
as stron^as the expression of the party, till the contrary appear s;
stabit p'sumptio donee probetur in contranum.
But to make this thing clear, my Lord Coke in his first Institutes,

fol. 50, where he gives instances of conveyances that work without
livery, or further circumstance or ceremony, puts the cases of lease
and release, confirmation, devise and surrenders, amongst the rest;
w hereas if an express assent of the surrendree were a circumstance t o
make it effectual sure he would have mentioned it. and not marshal l'd
i t with such conveyances, as I have shewn before n eed no such assen t,
nor anv thing further than a deed .

of exchanges has been put
at law, that doth not work immediately
The

case

as an instance

of

a conveyance

but that can't be compared to
the case in question, but stands upon its particular reasons ; for there
must be a mutual express consent, because in exchanges there must be
a reciprocal grant, as appears by Littleton.
Having, I hope, made out (and much more might have been added,
but that I find it has been agreed) t hat conveyances work immediat ely
u pon the execution of them on the part of him that makes them. I
wilLnow endeavor to shew the reasons, why they do so^ immediately
ve st the estate in the party without any express consent ; an d to shew
that these reasons do hold as strongly in case of surrenders, as of any
;
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other conveyances at law; and they consider the inconveniences and
ill consequences that have been objected, would ensue, if surrenders
should operate without an express consent ; and to shew, that the same
are to be objected as to all other conveyances, and t hat very odd c onseq uences and inconveniences would follow, if surrenders shou ld no t
operate without an express consent of the surrendr ee ; and then shall
endeavour to answer the arguments that have been made on the other
side, from the putting of cases of surrenders in the books, which are
generally mentioned to be with mutual assent, and from the manner
of pleading of surrenders.
^^
The reas ons why conveyances do deves t the estate out of the granto r (j\ju^.^t..fry^
before aay expres s assent or perhaps notice of the grantee, I concei ve
"

t o be these th ree :

Fjrst^ because there is a strong intendm ent of law, that for a man to
ta ke an estate it is for his benefit, and no man can be supposed to be
Wiiere an act
u nwilling to that which is for his advantaee . 1 Rep. 44.

J

^

(^

a man's benefit an_agreemern is implied, till there be a di sagreement. This does not only hold in conveyances, but in the gift
of goo^s, 3 Co. 26. A grant of goods vests the property in the grantee
is done

for
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before notice. So of things in action ; a bond is sealed and delivered
to a man's use, who dies before notice, his executors may bring an
action. Dyer, 167. An e state n iadejlg^a fem e co vert vests injierjimm edia tely, tij^i the husband disa grees . So in my Lord Hobart, 204, in
Swain and Holman's Case. No w is there not the same presumptio n
a nd a ppearance o f be nefit to him in reversion in case of a su rrender ?
Is it not a palpable advantage to him to determine the parVicuTar estate,
and to reduce his estate into possession?
And therefore, why should
not his assent be implied, as well as in other conveyances?
^^-^
second reason
would seem incongruous and
ecause
Se cond
absuTcT, TTTa! when
conveyance
compleatly executed on the grantor'
the estate should continue in hirn .
The
part, yet notwithstandinfi
words of my Lord Coke
Inst. 227a.) are, that
cannot stand with
freehold should remain in
man against his own
any reason, that
when
there
livery
person able to take it.
here n eeds only
capaciwill
to
take
intended.
should
not
seem
as unWhy
*Xl2J^'l^J^'s
reasonable, that the estate should remain in Simon Leach, against his
surrender,
deed, and some own deed of surrender?
or in case of
deed, are as effectual as a livery in case of
times w ords without
feoff ment.
it,

it

a t

I

is

a

,

I

take
Thirdly the third and principal reason, as
why the law
will not suffer the operation of
conveyance to be in suspence, and to
expect the agreement of the party to whom 'twas made,
Jo prevent
he uncertainty of the freehold.
This take to be the great reason why
freehold cannot be granted in futuro, because that
would be very

it

a

it

a

hard and inconvenient that
man should be driven to bring his praecipe
or real action first against the grantor, and after he had proceeded in
considerable time,
should abate by the transferring the freehold
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to a stranger, by reason of his agreement to some conveyance made before the writ brought; for otherwise there is nothing in the nature of
the thing against conveying a freehold in futuro; for a rent de novo
may be so granted ; because that being newly created, there can be no
precedent right to bring any real action for it. Palmer, 29, 30.
Now in this case, suppose a praecipe had been brought against Simon
Leach, this should have proceeded, and he could not have pleaded in
abatement till Sir Simon Leach had assented ; and after a long progress
in the suit he might have pleaded, that Sir Simon Leach assented puis
darrein continuance, and defeated all. S o that the same inconveni ence,
astothe bringing of real actions, holds in surrenders, as in other co nv eyances.
And to shew that it is not a slight matter, but what the law much
considers, and is very careful to have the freehold fixed, and will never
suffer it to be in abeyance, or under such imcertainty, as a stranger that
demands right should not know where to fix his action.
A multitude of cases might be cited ; but I will cite only a case put 1
Hen. VL 2 a, because it seems something of a singular nature, lord
and villain, mortgagor and mortgagee, may be both made tenants.
But it will be said here, tliat if a praecipe had been brought against
Sir Simon Leach, might not he have pleaded this disagreement, and so
abated the writ by nontenure ?
'Tis true ; but that inconvenience had been no more than in all other
cases, a plea of non-tenure; and it must have abated immediately; for
he could not have abated it by any dissent after he had answered to
the writ. Whereas I have shewn it in tlie other case, it may be after
a long progress in the suit.
Again, it's very improbable that he should dissent; whereas on the
other side, an assent is the likeliest thing in the world ; so tlie mischief
to the demandant is not near so great, nor the hundredth part so probable.

Now I come to consider those inconveniences that have been urged
that would ensue, if a surrender should work immediately.
It has been said, that a tenant for life might make such deed of surrender, and continue in possession, and suffer a recovery; and this
might destroy a great many recoveries, and overthrow marriage-settlements, and defeat charges and securities upon his estate after such
deed of surrender.
T hese, and a great man y more such lik e mischiefs, may be .instanced
in surrender s 1 b ut they hold no less in any other conveyance s^^whereby
a man may (as hath been shewed before) devest himself of the estate,
and yet con tinue the possession ; and in this case the assent of the surrendree, tho' he doth not enter, would (as it is urged of all hands) vest
the estate in him, Hutton, 95 ; Br. tit. Surrender, 50 ; tho' he cannot
have trespass before entry, and that assent might be kept as private,
and let in all the mischiefs before mentioned as if no such assent were
necessary.
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to the inconveniences

objected
/
on that side.
No w let us^ ee__what inconveniences and odd consequences would
f ollow, in case a sm render could not operate till the express assent of
t he surrendree. t herTno surrender could be to an infant at least, when
under the age of discretion ; for if it be a necessary circumstance, it
cannot be dispensed with no more than livery or attornment.
So tho"
an infant of a year old is capable to take an estate, because for his
benefit he could not take a particular estate, upon which he had a reversion immediately expectant, because it must enure by surrender.
I f there be jointenants in re version, a surrender to one of them enures
to both. 1 Inst. 192 ^_214 a. so the re, as to one moiety, it operates wi tho ut assent or notice .
Suppose tenant for life should make livery upon a g rant of his e state
to him in reversio n and two others, and the livery is made to the other
two in the absence, and without the notice of him in reversion, should
th e livery not wo rk immediately f or a third pa rt of the estate? andjf^it
do th, it must enure as a surrender for a third part . So Ts Bro. tit.
Surrender, and 3 Co. 76.
If tenant for life should by lease and release convey the lands held
by him for life, together with other lands to him in reversion who
knows nothing of the sealing of the deed ; should this pass the other
lands presently, and the lands held for life not till after an express
assent, because as to those lands it must work as a surrender ? Plainly
an express assent is not necessary.
For if the grantee enters, this is

,

^

sufSr.ipnt.

I come in the last place to answer those arguments that have been
made from the manner of putting the case of surrenders in the books,
and the form of pleading surrenders.
Co. 1 Inst. ZZ7 b.
First, a surrender is a vielding up of th e estate, which dro wns by yLixy^/yjLtr^
rnutual agreement between them.
Tenant for life, by agreement of . n ^y *■
him in reversion, surrenders to him ; he hath a freehold before he en- OiMf^*-'*^'^^
ters. And so Perkins, in putting the case of a surrender, mentions an
agreement ; and divers other books have been cited to the same purpose.
To all which I answer :
*
No doubt but an agreement is n ecessary. But the question
wheth -^
-'^
>*^*^
er an agreement
not intended w here
deed of surrender
made in
the absence of him in the rever sion whether the law shall not suppose
C-^t-c-f *
an assent, till
disagree ment appears:
Indeed,
he were present, he must agree or disagree immediately
and so 'tis in all other conveyances. The cases put in Perkins, sect. 607,
608, 609, are all of surrenders made to the lessor in person
for thus
he puts them
the lessee comes to the lessor, and the lessee saith to the
lessor,
surrender, saith he,
the lessor doth not agree, 'tis void;
car
ne poit surrender
certain ly
luy maugre son dents. And that
so in surrend ers, an d^ll othfr rnriY(^vances.;.i.o£.a^m an cannoL
estate"put mto him mspight of hij
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cannot find any of the books cited that come to this point, th at
whereV_d eed o i surrender is executed^ without the notice of him in reve rsionT^at it s lialLpass hoTHing till he con sents l_so that It cannot ^e
said, that there is any express authority in the case.
Now, as to the form of pleading of a surrender, it has been objected,
that a surrender is always pleaded with acceptance ; and many cases
have been cited of such pleadings, Rastal's Entries, 176, 177 ; Fitzh. tit.
Barre, 262, which are cases in actions of debt for rent, and the defendant in bar pleads, that he surrendered before the rent grew due,
and shews, that the plaintiff accepted the surrender; so in waste
brought, a surrender pleaded with the agreement of the plaintiff.
These and the like cases have been very materially, and I think fully
answered at the Bar by my Brother Pemberton ; that those actions being in disaffirmance of the surrender, and implying a disagreement,
the defendant had no way to bar and avoid such disagreement, but by
shewing an express agreement before.
The case of Peto and Pemberton in 3 Cro. 101, that has been so often
cited, is of the same sort : in a replevin the avowry was for a rentcharge; in bar of which 'tis pleaded, that the plaintiff demised the land
out of which the rent issued, to the avowant.
The avowant replies,
that he surrendered dimissionem praed. to which the plaintiff agreed.
This is the same with pleading in bar to an action of debt for rent;
but when the action is in pursuance of tlie surrender, then it is not
pleaded.
So is Rast. Entries, 136. T he lessee brou ght an action of covenant
~
a gainst the lessor, for entering upon him, and ousting 6t
him.^ The
defendant pleads a surrender in bar, and that witho ut any agreement
or_jLcceptance^

In Fitzherbert, tit. Debt, 149, where the case is in an action of debt
for rent, the defendant pleaded in bar, that he surrendered, by force
of which the plaintiff became seised : there is no mention of plead-

is,

a

is^

ing any agreement, notwithstanding
that the action was in disaffirmance of the surrender.
Therefore as to the argument which has been drawn against tlie form
of pleading, I say, that if an agreement be necessary to be pleaded:
then, I say.
First, that 'tis answered by an implied assent, as well as an express
I would put the case f^uppose a lessee for life should make
assent.
a lease for years, reserving rent; and in debt for the rent the lessee
should plead, that the pl aintiff befo re the rent grew due surrendered
to him in reversion, and he acce pted i t, and iss ue is upon the acceptance; and at the trial it is proved, that the plaintiff had executed a
deed of surrender (as in this case) to him in reversion in his absence;
would not t his _turn th e Prg_9f_upon the plaintiff ,_ thaliie in r eversion
d isagreed to this su rrender? for sure l ynhis ag ree ment
prim facie
presuroed^-and then the rule
stabit prsesumptio donee probetur in
contrariuin.
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say it appears by the cases cited that it is not always plead1 have shewn beand it would be
fore, i. e. to conclude the party from disagreeing;
in
reason,
that an agreement (admitting an express
very hard to prove
assent to be necessary) must be pleaded; for if it were a necessary
circumstance to the conveyance, why then 'tis implied in pleading
sursumreddidit ; for it cannot be a surrender without it.
In pleading of a feoffment it is enough to say feoffavit, for that
implies livery ; for it cannot be a feoffment without it.
Now why should not sursumreddidit imply all necessary requisites,
as well as feoffavit? and therefore I do not see that any great argument can be drawn from the pleading.
For,
1. It is not always to be pleaded.
2. It cannot be made out to be necessary so to plead it: f^T j^ ^'^s ent be a necessary requisite, the n 't is miplied by saying sursunire .d didit, as livery is in feoffavit : and then to add the w ords of e xpres s
c onsent is as superfluous, as to shew livery after saving feoft'av it.

Again,

ed and when pleaded 'tis upon a special reason, as

And again, if it v>^ere always necessary, it is sufficiently answered
by an assent intended in law : for presumptions of law stand as strong
till the^ontrary appears, as an express dec larat ion of the party.
A writ of error was brought in tlie~King's Bench upon this
NoTTv.
judgment and it was there affirmed by the unanimous consent of the
whole Court.

Memorand.
Anno quarto Willielmi & Mariae: this case was
brought by writ of error into the House of Lords, a nd the judgme nt
w as there rgYersgdjipon the reasons m t he aforesaid argument .*^
43 See Standing
[190:{| 2 Ch. AOL

v.

Bowring, L. R.

31 Ch. D. 2S2 (1S85) ;

Mallott

v.

Wilson,

true, that judges have said, with more solemnity than I think the occa/sion wjirraiitiHl. that no one cnu linve an testate thrust ui.oii liim againstJijs
vvUl, and that, eniis.M|uciit ly a dclivci-y of a dct'd to a st i-a.u.L-'or, for the us(> of
the graiiteo, is of no crfcct, until assented to iiy the l atter . How uuieh weTiHit
this ar.yunient is entitled to, may be judi^ed of Ij.v the fact that estates are every
day thrust u|ion people by last will and testament;
and it would certainly
sound somewhat novel to say that the de\ises were of no effect until assented
to hy the devisees.
/ather should die testate, devisiui^ an estate to liis
dau^diter,
and the latter snouTTTaTterwa rd die witliout a knowiedjie' of_jQie
will, it would ha Idly he contended tiiat the devise heeanje void for want pf Mf ceptance, and tliat the heiis of the devisee nnist lose rhe e state . Neither will
it be detned that eciuitahle estates are every day thrust upon people liy deeds,
or assijiuments, made in ti'ust foi- their benefit, nor will it be said thatsuch
be neticiarie s take nothing' until they ass^yj.
Add to these the esiati's tliat are
tlu-ust upon i)eople by the statute of des-cent, and we bej:in to estimate the value
of the argument, that a man sliall not he made a property holder against liis
■will, and tliat courts slionid he astute to shield him from such a wrong.
It is
certainly true, as a genej aJ rtde. th at acceptance, by the Ljrantee, i s necessar y
to constitute a good delivery, for a man may refuse even a 'sWl^ Kut that such
acce]»tance need not lie manual is e(]ually ti'ue, and it is also certain that suuplejyissent to the conveyance, given even befoi-e its (-xi-eution, is a sulliciji]jt
acceptance. Thus, where a vendee had fully paid for the land and was entitled
t6"a conveyance, and liis vendor, witliout his knowle<lge, executed tiie deed and
delivered it to a stranger, not of the vendee's ai)pointraent, for tlie use of the
latter, it was held that the delivery was sufficient, and the deed tools effect
/—■•*Tt~i.s

Ifji

J,

--^-«-^

DERIVATIVE

w
^
•"pT

WELCH

V.

SACKETT.

(Supreme Court of Wisconsin,

*

(Part 2

TITLES

1860.

12

Wis.

243.)

*

*

fhe question which was considered by
and upon which the counsel bestowed the most
attention, citing nearly all the English and American authorities, calls
for the determination, in a ca se where a mortgag e of_person al pro pcredito r is executed in th e absence and without
^l^ty fr^pi a '^'"1^^'^^^
th e knowledge of the latter , and delivered to a stranger for hi FUs e,
of the time at which the title to tlie property mortgaged vests iri^the
far

ixoN, C. J.**

the most important,

immediately, although the vendee was wholly ignorant of what*' was dQpe,
do
ChurcTi V. <;ilnian, 15 TTeiKl. fN. Y.) G56 T^D Am. DVeV S2 (1836)].
afents^
gojoT'
for t he iiublic lands are held to take effect as soon us issued, though th ey m ay
never ctJiue to the grantee's liauds, and were issued without any specific appl iI'.ut the cases go still further, and, upon the soundest rea•-cation. J'or thenj.
-/sous, hold that where a grant is plainly beneficial to the grantee, his acceptIjaiKv of it is to be presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary. It is ar^"giied, liowever, that this is only a rule of evidence, and that where the proofs
show that the grantee has never had any knowledge of the conveyance the
presiunption is rebutted.
this ai'gument were limited to cases in which an
acceptance of the grant would impose some obligation upon the grantee, I am
not prepared to say that I would object to it, although the obligation mighty
'
fall far short of the value of the grant. But where the grant is a pureT.
aualifie± -gift. I ■thinly th^ true rule is tbat the presumption of acceptance can
be rebutted only by proof of dissent ; and it matters not that the grantee never
knew of tlu' conveyance, for as his assent is presumed from its beneficial cliaracter, the presumption can be overthrown only by proof that he did know^f
and rejecte d it. If this is not so, how can a deed be made to an infant
Is it the law, that if a father
such tender years as to be incapable of assent?
make a deed or gift to his infant child, and deliver it to the recorder to be
recorded for the use of the child, and to vest the estate in it, the deed is of no
effect until the child grow to years of intelligence and give its consent? Max
the estate, in the meantime, be taken for the subsequently contracted debts
of the father, or will the statute of limitations begin to run in favor of a trespasser, upon the idea that the title remains in the adult? Or, will the conveyance entirely fail, if either grantor or grantee die before the latter assent?
In such a case, the acceptance of the grante e
do not so understand the law.
is a p resiunp tion o f law, nminCT t4i4aa,^the b enefic ial nature 6t 't!l( ? "gr ant, an d
And tor lliy Bum's ryUl^on
n ot a m ere presCTniptToh oTa^Q^-ai^tual^^cgglirr a^^^
be disproved by any
thai: the'lffw'm^es"the"presuniptionrTr^es" 'not aliow^
I am fully aware thatTBSSeTte'U'S may seem opthing short of actu al dissent.
posed to many decided cases) but they are fully sustained by others that stand,
in our judgment, upon a more solid foundation of reason. The strict ness__pf
the. ancient doctrine, in respect t o the delivery of deeds, has i^radnally worn
a ^-ay. until a.doctrine'md re consistent w ith reason antl the habits of the pres'
Snider Y."^ackenour, 37 N. C. SCO [SS^^im. I5ec.
e nt genera'tion now" pr evails'.
685 (1842)1 ; J^UingtCH v.'(Jurrie, 40 N. C. 21 (1847) Church v. Gilman, 15 Wend.
(N. Y.) 656 [30 Am. Dec. 82 (1836)] ; Tate v. Tate, 21 N. C. 26 (1834) ; Morrow
It remains to be considered, whether the
V. Alexander, 24 N. C. 392 (1842).
deed in question was of that beneficial nature to the grantee, as to give rise to
the presimiption of which I have spoken. Upon its face it purports to be for
Prima facie, therefore, it was
a pecuniary consideration paid to the grantor.
But the proof satisfies us that the grantor
neither a gift nor advancement.
he intendnever received, or expected any pecuniary consideration for it.
I have
ed that his daughter should have the land, he intended it as a gift.
already said that upon the testimony we feel bound to say that he did intend
to convey it to her, and we must therefore consider the deed as a gift. Ap-

If

/

I

If

**

The statement of facts and portions of the opinion are omitted.
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mortgagee, as between himand another cxedit or of the mortgagqrjvho
by attachment^betweenjtlie time of the deacc^uiredTan^TnterestTmit.
and
livery to_the stranger
thf time whenjhe mortgagee act ually re
ceived n otice of and accept ed it . Whilst it must be admitted that there
irsome conflict in the adjudications upon this subject, still both natural
reason and the weight of authority tend to the same conclusion, which
is, \t hat the title in such case only vests from the time there is an ac
think
On principle
c eptan ce in fact on the part of the mortgagee.
it may be laid down as an indubitable proposition in such case, j that the
ti tle does not vest in fact until the mortgagee has actually assented to
and consequently, that until such assent it remain s
the conveyance;
i n. the mortgagor.
While all the courts acknowledge the correctness
of principles which lead unerringly to this result, and clearly and positively exclude any other, it is somewhat strange that any should have
been found to adopt a conclusion directly opposed to it. All agree that
i t is necessary to the validitv of everv deed or c onveya nce, that ther e
be a grantee who is not only willing, but who doe s Jnjact acce pt it. It
is a contract, a parting with property on the part of the grantor, and
Like every other contract, there
a n acceptance of it by the grante e.
must be a m eeting of the minds of the contracting p_arties^.ll]e on^
t o sell and convey, and the other to purchase and re ceive , bef ore th e
If there be anything in legal principles,
agreement is consummated^.
or m common sense, it is an u npardonable absurdity to say, that a
c ontract can be co mpleted in th e absence and utter ignorance of one
o f the contracting parties j_^ that he can or does, under such circumstances, assent to, or agree to become bound by it. The idea that a
contract could be thus made, and that title to property could pass into
a party without his knowledge or consent, and out of him without
any motion or act of his signifying his willingness, but merely by his
refusal to receive it at all, h ad its origin at a period in the history o f

J

instead of being governed in
by
ady
ation
of
the clear an d rational prini ts conclusions
a ste
applic
c iples of the law to plain matter of f act^ and by arguments to be drawn
therefrom, was too frequently influencecLby a mysterious and fanciful logic, that depended for its support upon artfully devised fic tions
and falsehoods, vvhich for the most part were as reiuignant to reason
of jusJLi^g.
as they we re unnecessary to the proper administration
I
The discovery that such things could be done, is, believe, attributa-

the common law, when the legal mind,

plying, then, t he pripciples we have recognized, the titlp vested in Ellen Shan She was seized of
n on when Owen" Shannon causpd the deed to be recorde d.
it during her intermarriasre with the lessor of the plaintiff, there was issue of
the marriage, and she died before the commencement of this suit. According
to the decision in Borland's Lessee v. Marshall, 2 Ohio St. 308 (1853), t_he le sror of the plaintiff hern me tennnt by the curtesy, evenifjth..e lands w ere ad ^rseiy held dniiii- the cov(M-tnre^ It fnllowaJlint Hip plainti fF is entitlejL ^
See, also. Derry Bank v. Webster,
judgn i'eiit. " Mitchell v. Kyaii. suiirn, p. 2r)7.
44'?r"rTr!J64 (1862), where the deed contained a provision placing a burden upon the grantee.
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2 Vent.

as exhibited

2

in the case

198, decided about the year 1690;

at

least several courts and judges since that^time, with many compliments,
have agreed in giving him the credit of having proved something on
/this subject which none oi_ them could understand. The substance
( of his proposition is, that a ^eed of lands made to a party, without his
J knowledge or consent, and placed in the hands of a third person for
\ his use, is a medium for the transmission of the title to the grantee,
and takes effect so as to vest it in him, the instant the deed is parted
with by tlie grantor, and if the grantee, upon receiving knowledge of
such rejection has the effect of revesting the title in the
rejects
Inasmuch as this
the only attempt
grantor by
species of remitter.
at sustaining
by argument to be found in the books, the more recent
cases having, without
discussion, gone off almost entirely on the
strength of the authorities,
propose to examine some of tlie positions
assumed by him, upon which his argument mainly depends, and from
think, its fallacy and the incorrectness of his conclusions will
which,
be clearly made to appear.
He admits, what
universally conced ed
to be an indispen sable element of ever}^ grant, namely, that
shouj
be accepted by the grantee, and says, "that an assent
not only a
circumstance, but
ess ential
all conveyance
for they are contracts, actus contra actum, which necessarily suppose the assent of all
but avoids the difficulty into which the admission of this
parties
well settled principle brings him, by saying, "that because there
for hi
st rong intendment of law, that for a man to take an estate
gnefit, and no man can be supposed to bejinwilling to that whio
"
for his advantage, therefore the law will presume that the grantee
has accepted
conveyance before
knowledge of its execution and
delivery has come to him. Upon the foundation of this hypot hesis,
misnamed by him
presumption of law, tlie falsity and unreasonableness of which are so self-evident that reasoning can hardly make them
Assent or
plainer, he proceeds to the erection of his superstructure.
deed or other
acceptance on the part of the grantee or other party to
instrument, by means of which the title to property, whether real or
in any other
to be transferred to him, or by which he
personal,
fact, the truth of which
manner to become bound,
to be established by competent evidence, before such deed or other instrument can be
may be
adjudged to have
legal existence. Like every other fact,
established by direct evidence, or its existence may be inferred or preBut
sumed from other facts already in proof.
deny that the exto be inferred or presumed from the existence
istence of one fact
of others, when the connection between the former and the latter
such that according to the course of nature
plainly appears that the
deny that the existence of any
former cannot exist. In other words,
fact may be shown by proving others which conclusively show its nonexistence, or that the legitimate mode of establishing the truth of a
matter
by indubitably proving its falsehood.
Justice does not reis
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The learned jusquire, nor does the law tolerate such an absurdity.
tice says, that where a deed is executed by the grantor and delivered
to a stranger for the use of the grantee, without the previous advice,
direction or authority of the grantee, and without his knowledge, the
delivthe moment
law will presume that the grantee assents to
mind—
that
the
intelligent
of
A
act
ssent
an
ered to the stranger.
power in man by which he conceives, reasons and judges, and of which
cannot act
primary, invariable and most familiar law that
with reference to external objects, until, through the medium of the
Hence, with senses,
impressed with or knows their existence.
ut such impression or knowledge, there can be no assent, no actu
to pre in opposition to the facts,
ontra actum, and to presume
;
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imposs ible which the law, the rules and precepts
ume that which
of which are m conformity with the unchanging truths of nature, will
never do.
"
"
presumption . says Mr. Starkie. "may be defined tn he .^n infernce as to the existence of one fact, from the existence of some othe
xperience of their connection.
To
previou
fact founded upon
constitute such
previous
presumption,
necessary that there be
experience of the connection between the known and inferred facts,
established,
of such
nature that as soon as the existence of the one
admitted or assumed, the inference as to the existence of the other immediately arises, independently of any reasoning upon the subject."
Pr esnmptinns thus defined, he sa ys ar either legal and arti fici
n atural, and may be div id ed into three classes .
1st.
egal presum p-_
tions m ade by the aw itself^ or presumptions of mere law! 2d. Legal
jjjry, ..pr._presumptions of law and fact. 3d.
presumptions made
Mere na tural presumpti ons, or presumptions of mere fact. The definition which he so clearly and accurately gives, although applied by him
to all presumptions,
perhaps more strictly applicable to the latter
class.
The assent to deed or other instrument by the grantee or other
matter of mere fact,
obvious that to the latter class
party, being
also would belong
case
presumption in relation to such assent, in
where such presumption could properly be indulged. But, whether the
presumption be assigned to the one or the other of these classes, the
position of the learned justice
equally untenable; for in no instanc e,
n ot even the most artificial and arbitrary,
does the law indulge in
resumptions which
re_ directl j_c ontradicted by the farts on which
hey are
The known facts, though often insufficient of
redicated.
their own natural force and efficacy, to generate in the mind a conviction or belief of those which are inferred, are always, to say the
least, not inconsistent with or opposed to them. If for example we
take the case instanced by Mr. Starkie, of the presumption of the satisfaction of
bond after the lapse of twenty years, without payment
of interest or other acknowledgment of its existence, while
single
day less than the twenty years has elapsed, such presumption does
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No natnot arise, we find it to be extremely arbitrary and technical.
should
operate
the
last
of
day
ural reason can be given why the lapse
while
the
to produce in our minds a conviction or belief of payment,
lapse of all the days and years preceding it does not so operate. Such
But as from common experience of the affairs of
is not its effect.
men, there arises in the mind, after the lapse of many years without
payment of interest or other acknowledgment, a^ strong probability tha t
debt has been satisfied, and as the law loves certamty and industria^
ously avoids doubts, it has from these motives arbi trarily fixed a per iod
of time at the expiration ni which this probability shall ripen into and
t ake effect as a presumption nf law, and at which the rights and position of the parties in reference to such debt, flowing from the mere
lapse of time, unaccompanied by other circumstances, shall become
This presumption, which is in so many redetermined and certain.
spects artificial, is in no respect inconsistent with the fact from which
it is said to arise. On the contrary, though not conclusively sustained,
it is strongly corroborated by the fact; si nce experience teaches t hat
it is very improbable that the holder of the bond would, unless it were
sa tisfied. per mit_such a space of time to elapse w ithout receiving th e
intere^ or ob taining from the maker some other eviden ce of its non p ayment. The same is true of that most purely artificial presumption,
that a bond or other specialty was executed upon a good consideration,
which is so peremptory and absolute in its nature that it cannot be
rebutted by evidence; whilst the consideration of another instrument,
e xecuted and delivered under precisely the same circumstances, and in
t he sam e words, but not under seal^ may be freely inquired into__a n d
i mpeached ; yet there the conclusion that it was made upon a good
consideration is entirely consistent with the facts from which it is
drawn ; for tli gre is much reason for supposing that without a g ood
Without
consideration, it _wou ld not ha,ve been s ealed and delivered.
multiplying illustrations, I think it will be found that i n no insta nce
(un less the present case is to form an exception) do es the law infe r
the existence of fa cts in clear and d irect op p osition to those u pon
w hich the inference rests . It does not do so here. Reason rebels
and neither justice nor equity demands it. The only resu
against
con of dropping the absurd ity will be that, as n the present cas e, in
arties, the title to th proper ty
test between two equally m eritorious

will accept that which

for his

,

s

the law presumes that he

is

the contrary,

jf

is

it

r

c

a

onveyance was so ught to be mad e, will be adjudged to be
in him whom eason des ignates as the true owny.
The mistake of the learned justice consisted in his carrying the pre^i^^
^
presumes that a person has
sumption of law so far as to say that
an impossibility^
consented to that of which he knows nothing, which
instead of saying, what was more truly said by the more logical and
cautious courts and judges of his time, and by Lord Ellenborough, in .
nothing appear jo
Stirling v. Vaughn, 11 East, 623, namely, that,

of deeds

benefit, when he is informed

of

it,
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which assent, in tlie absence o£ in-

eciuilies, will have i^latimWxi^ to the time.of_iiefcjr
and
make his title goo^a^^m th at da te. After
his
use,
livery
sort, he proceeds to say, "that ve ry odd con of
this
brief argument
surrcnder> slio uld be in seq uences and inco nveniences would fuUow,
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"
and that mo st
ffectual till an~express consent of the surren deree,
and conveyancing in England would endisa_strous~effects upon estates
said that
sue, unless her courts adopted and upheld his absurilily.
greater. This saying was
one error surely gives rise to another and
never more aptly and forcibly illustrated, than by the fantastic feats
which the learned justice makes the common law, the sober common
sense of~ages, perform by way of getting the title back again in the
grantor in case the grantee refuses to accept the conveyance. He says
has got into him withthat after, by this kind of one-sided contract,
remains with him without his consent until he
out his knowledge,
absolutely rejects and spurns the offer, and that then, by some magical power of the law, such rejection, without deed or other writing,
becomes an instrument of conveyance, by which the legal title to land
not, against the
to one who has
conveyed from one who has
express wishes of the latter and in despite of his own deed, the highest and most solemn act known to the law, by which he could rid him
not surprising that the learned and logical Chief Jusself of it. It
Watts
S. (Pa.) 329, while comtice Gibson, in Read v. Robinson,
menting upon what he calls "the masterly argument of Justice Ventris,
to comprehencijiow
in Thompson v. Leach," says, that "t he diffic ulty
the remitter can take^effect without _displacin^ intermediate interests
in despair of ever
springing from the rejected deed;" and then, as
mind by saying,
from
his
the
he
dismisses
subject
comprehending
All agree that.
"but the authorities conclusively prove that
may."
neither th grant or nor the stranger w ho consents to receive and hold
the deed, can,
the ir acjs, bind the gra ntee, and that the latter may,
altog ether . If the title vests in
on receiving notice 6T^, epudiate
must, of course, vest according to the terms
the grantee at once,
of the conveyance, and in the case of an absolute conveyance, he would
have an absolute title. If, after delivery to the_stranger^_and_befjQre
notice to the grantee,
creditorjof the latter should, fiisten upoj.l_iIie
property by execution or attachment, no reason can be given wh
follows, as
could not hold it. If
the property of the grantee,
of course, that the creditor would have this right, and that he would
at once acquire
lien to the extent of Kis demand.
Suppose, after
this
done, that the grantee, on receiving notice, refuses to accept the
Does th refusal unbi nd
conveyance, what becomes of the property?
an
get the prop ert^_fj;: £e from the seizure of the cred itors, and rem
he title at once back tojthe grantor
Dr does the intendment of Justice Ventris step in, in behalf of the creditor as well, and say, because
the grant
presumed beneficial to the grantee, and he might, at some
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that therefore he shall be deemed to have
future period, accept
before the seizure, and at a time when he was utterly igaccepted
and thus enable the creditor to witlihpld the property from
norant of
would happen that although_ jvas
the grantor, by which means
neither bought nor sold, the grantor would, without consideration, lose
on the same terms?
and_the grantee enjoy the full benefit of
Knowing of no rational or satisfactory answers which can be given
to these and various similar questions which will readily suggest themleave them to be replied to by those who mainselves to the reader,
tain that the title to property, real or personal, m ay, without w ords
written or spoken, or other act of transfer, be thus mysteriousl y_passe
deny that
and re£assed between parties by contract.
ni^^jj___be.
hat
does not pass in^ fact untij the
seems to me very plain,
grantee has actually consen ted to receive it; and, as of ourse, th at
unable, without such con sent, to vesl
remains wi_lli_the_grantor, who
consistent with the doctrine
iTin the gra ntee . No other conclusion
necescontract, and that the assent of the grantee
that
grant
The justice assumed the question in controvalidity.
sary to give
versy by saying that the execution and delivery of the deed to the
stranger passed the title out of the grantor, and then he was under the
necessity of resorting to these further absurdities, in order to account
not
slight matter, but what the law
for it; for he says, "that
much considers, and
very careful to have the freehold fixed," and
stranger that demands right should
not "under such uncertainty, as
he had considered that the opfix
his
action."
not know where to
did not take eflfect until
eration of the deed was suspended, or that
the grantee had assented, he would have been saved the trouble of
drawing so largely on his imagination to show where the title was, and
matter of no sma
was thereafter to be controlled.
how
mnmpn anH nf just pride to the bench of England, that Ju stice Ven -

by

t.

is

L

s

udgment pronounced in both superior courts was reversg.d . Thus
y^ "'we have on. the one side the legal learning, and almost tne unanimous
"TjLt opinion of the courts, and on the other the judgment of reversal of
the House of Lords, the great majority of whom knew very ittle,
and cared less, about the correct settlement of legal principles.
the

l

y(Jl^

■ "^

i/Ct-

j

xl^ /^^

it

w

rU'<y^

;

it

."

i_t

i

t

tris, at the time he wrote his wonderful argument, dis se nted, and that
he other members of the Court of Common Pleas, viz .^ ^olle2ci.en,
Chief Justice, and Powell and Rokeby, Associates, were of opini on
n the case, "that there was no surrender till such time as the su rrenderee hadn otice of the deed of surrender and had agreed to
and that the case was afterand tliat
was so adjudged by that court
wards taken by writ of error to the King's Bench, of which Lord Holt
was at the time Chief Justice, and the judgment of the Common Pleas
the unanimous consent of the whole cou rt."
"wa there affirmed
It w as afterwards brought by error into the House of ^nrHs, where.
said, upon the reasons contamed in Justice Ventris' argumen
^^
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The argument is of a piece with that kind of reasoning once employed to prove that titles to estates were "in abeyance," "in nubibus,"
and "in gremio legis," the folly of which is so thoroughly exposed and
exploded by the severe and searching logic of Mr. Fearne, in his adIt
mirable treatise on Remainders.
See pages 360 to 364, inclusive.
was held, in case of a lease to one person for life, remainder to the
right heirs of another still living, that no estate remained in the
grantor ; and because there was no heir, for the reason that no one
can be heir during the life of his ancestor, but only after his death,
and because the tenant took only a life estate, the remainder was said
These
to be in abeyance, in the clouds, or in the bosom of the law.
opinions were founded upon the very same assumption as tliat of Justice Ventris, namely : That the remainder passed out of the donor
at the time of livery, and consequently that no estate remained in him
tliereaf ter ; and because the title must always be somewhere, the advocates of the doctrine sent it to the clouds ; "though," says Mr.
Fearne, "by some sort of compromise between common sense and the
supposition of an estate passing out of a man, when there is no person in rerum natura, no object beside hard and hardly intelligible
words, for the reception of it at the time of the livery, they are compelled to admit such a species of interest to remain in the grantor,
as upon the determination of the estate before the contingent remainder can take place, entitles the grantor, or his heirs, to enter and reassume the estate."
The questions are so closely allied, and the substrata of the two
follies are so exactly alike, that Mr. Fearne's reasoning is fully in
A nd it is certainly refreshing, after a perplexing and vain
point.
e ffort to understand that which never was and never will be intelligible ,
to take up a n auth or, who,_like Mr. Fearne, treats the su bject upon
the pri nciples of c o mrnon sens e. He intimates a conviction, that instead of the titles to estates being in the clouds, th ere is a much stron ger probability of caput inter nubilia condit, of the head of the inve ntor
of the fiction havi ng been buried or hidden in them! He says: "I"cannolTbut "thmk it ^ more arduous undertaking, to account for the
operation of a feoffment or conveyance, in annihilating an estate of inheritance, or transferring it to the clouds, and afterwards regenerating or recalling it at the beck of some contingent event, than to reconcile to the principles as well of common law as of common sense, a
s uspension of the complete, a bsolute o peration of such feoffment or
conveyance, in regard to the inheritance, till the intended channel for
The s ame is
the reception of such inheritance comes into existence,"
thg
us e of the
t rue of the del i.very of a deed to a third perspn f or
It is far mor e
grantee, without his knowledge or previous direction.
c ompatible with common law and common sense, to say that its op emtmn is suspendedL un til the ha ppenin g^of the event indispensable in
to its validity, namely an acceptance by the grantee, than jo
the_JaAV
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make the law perform the wonderful exploits of vesting and recalling
the title contrary to its best settled and soundest principles.
am o f
i n the
interest
theref
or
took
no
opinjon
et_thjit_^the
defendant^in_error
by
in
virtue of their iTT^rtgages^ until after the plamtiff
goods
quest ion
in e rror h ad seized them uponjgrocess of attachment, and consequent ly,
tha t they cannot maintain their ac tion.
Aluch was said in this case about the manner in which the mortThere can be no doubt that so far as the mortgages were delivered.
was
concerned,
the
gagor
delivery was good. They were placed by
him in the hands of a stranger, to be by him delivered to the mortgagees, and thus passed beyond his reach and control, unless the mortgagees, within a reasonable time after notice, should refuse their assent.
This made the delivery, as to the mortgagor, valid and binding,
which is all I understand the author of the Touchstone to mean, when
he says that a deed "may be delivered to any stranger for and in behalf and to the use of him to whom it is made." B \;t a deliverv bv
th e donor to a third person,, loxjlie use of tlie donee, and an acce ptance
by the latter, a re two very different things. By the former, the donor
signifies his willingness to part with the property, whilst by the latter
the donee makes known his assent to receiving
and both. m ust concur be fore^^thejitle^^^JTange
or affected.
was formerly, and may
perhaps by some be still supposeHTthat there can be no delivery without at the same time an acceptance; that they are correlative, inseparable parts of the same transaction, and must both occur at the same
instant of time
and hence, in part, the fiction of relation, by which
in case of
stranger, the slibsequent acdelivery by the grantor to
ceptance by the grantee was carried back in legal contemplation to the
time when the grantor gave the deed to the stranger, in order to save
the logic of the law and to preserve "the eternal fitness of things."
seems to me that every case in which
has been adjudged that there
stranger, aii(J"Biat as ubsequ nt ratifica tion by
nay^b e'a delivery to
ettectual for the purposes n^ie grantee w ill m aTcie~tfie instrument
tend ed, talsihes this notion and proves that in every sucircase th ere
may be, what there
in
ct, a delivery by the grantor at one time
third pa rty, and an acceptance by the grantee from such tli ird
subs equent and dilter ent time.
the common sense
Such
part}[ ^t
of the transaction! and
is better and more rationally disposed of
without than with the aid of the fiction. But
the fiction must be
employed then the maxim, in fictione legis semper subsistit equitas, apwill not be allowed to operate when
plies, and
infringes or vioonly resorted to in furtherance_ p£
It
lates the rights of strangers.
injury.
In this case the plaintiff in error
ustice and to prevent
a stranger to the mortgages.
He represents the rights and interests
of the creditors of the mortgagor, who in good faith sued out and
levied their attachments upon the goods, thereby lawfully acquiring
lien upon them
and
cannot be said to be in urtherance of justi ce.
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to^p ostpone thejr demands thus legally secured, to those ofjhe mo rtg age cre ditors, which_are in no sense more equi^ble or jus t. The
struggle is between inn ocenf person s, to prevent loss, and the fiction
o u ght not to be resorte d to_fQr_the purpose of helping on e as ag ain s t
t he other.
The transaction must be left to stand upon its siiii^le and
* *
'*

"^dJ^Diiib—

The judgm ent of the circuit court is reverse d, and

a new

trial

awarded.*^

Hibberd v. Smith, 67 Ca l. 547. 4 Pac. 47.3, 8 Pac. 46, 56 Am. Rep. 726 (1885) ;
Hulick V. Scovil, 4 Oilman, 1.59 (1847) ; Woodbury v. Fisher, 20 Ind. 387. 83 Am.
Day v. Griffith, 15 Iowa, 104 (1863); Bell v. Farmers' Bank,
Dec. 325 (3863);
11 Bush (Ky.) .34, 21 Ani. Rep. 205 (1S75) ; Parmelee v. Simpson, 5 Wall. 81, 18
L. Ed. 542 (1866), ace. See Watson v. Hillraan, 57 INIich. 607, 24 N. W. 663
Meigs v. Dexter, 172 MjIss. 217, 52 N. E. 75 (1898). Buffum v. Green.
(1885);
5 N. H. 71. 20 Am. Dec. 562 (1829) ; Wilt v. Franklin, 1 Bin. (Pa.) 502, 2 Am.
Dec. 474 (1809) ; Merrills v. Swift, 18 Conn. 257, 46 Am. Dec. 315 (1847), contra.
See Jones v. Swayze, 42 N. J. Law, 279 (1880).
45
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III

CHAPTER
THE PROPERTY

(Part

CONVEYED

SECTION 1— BOUNDARIES

-

^^\

HARRIS

V.

WOODARD.

(Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1902.

130 N. C. 5S0, 41 S.

E.

790.)

Action by J. W. Harris and others against the Woodard & Goodridge Company, heard by Judge Walter H. Neal and a jury, at FebruFrom
ary Term, 1902, of the Superior Court of Granville County.
a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed.
Clark, J. The pl aintiffs, holders of a second mortgage, seek to
e njoin sale under a prior mortgage executed by the mortgagor to clef endants. because the d escrip^on in the latter is too vague an d indeHnitej o pass title to the defendants . Said description is as follows : "A
certain piece or tract of land, grist mill and all fixtures thereunto,
and one store-house, 28 by 100 feet long, lying and being in Brassfield township, Granville County, N. C, and adjoining the lands of
Anderson Breedlove, J. C. Usry and Dora Harris, said lot to contain
Th ere are forty acres in the tract on which the stor e
three acres."
T here is nothing to segregate this thr ee
a nd grist mill are lo cated.
acres o ut of the forty, nothi ng to indicate a hegi nning , nor whe re
or in what direcfion the lilies^j to be run-^nothing whatever beyond
the inference — for it is not expressly stated that the grist mill and
store-house are to be lo cated som ewhere upon tlie said three acres when
■

a

is

h

is

t

a

a

J.,

laid off.
in Massey v. Belisle, 24 N. C. 170, '^vAs was said by Gaston,
ery deed of conveyance must set forth
subject-matter, either cercertainty by recurrence
reduced
to
of
being
ain in itself or capable
no
Here there
refers."
to something extrinsic to whic the deed
either definite in itself or capable of being
subject-matter which
certainty by recurrence to something to which the deed
reduced to
refers.
No beginning point, nor directions are given, nor distanc es,
and there
riothing._which authorizes anyone to lav off the lines
any particular three acres out of the forty in the tract, which tra ct
name
The reference to them renders
bounde
by the_partie
d.

s

d

i

s

is

jf

J

1

The word, of course, is not used here in its narrow, technical sense of a
right, but in its broader, more popular sense of the external object over which
rights are exercised.

^^
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the forty-acre tract certain, but is no aid in rendering it possible to
This is not like the "twenty-nine
select three acres out of said tract.
acres to be cut off of the north end" of a tract which was bounded
by straight, well-defined lines, and whose selection required merely
a knowledge of surveying, as in Stewart v. Salmonds, 74 N. C. 518, nor
a similar description in Webb v. Cummings, 127 N. C. 41, V7 S. E. 154.
The statute, Laws 1891, chap. 465, applies only where there is a
description which can be aided by parol, but not when, as in this case,
there is no description.
Hemphill v. Annis, 119 N. C. 514, 26 S. E.
152; Lowe v. Harris, 112 N. C. 472, 17 S. E. 539, 22 L. R. A. 379.
In Lowe v. Harris there were the words "his land," which the minority
of the Court insisted could be helped out by parol evidence, but her e
th ere is only an uncertain, in d efinite, undefin ed and undefin able three
acres out of a tract of forty, and the Court properly h eld that thisjvas
to o indefinite to be a conveyance of any three acres, and the mortgage
•
was, therefore, void as to the land.
_
ry
-vrtr*-^
No error.2
Wmt^-Ca^^-^

LEGO
(Supreme Court of Wisconsin,

V.

1891.

MEDLEY.
79

Wis.

211, 48 N.

W.

375, 24 Am. St.

Rep. 706.)

Taylor, J.

The questions arising in this case grow out of
closure action brouglit by the plaintiff and appellant against

a

fore -

the respondent and the other persons named to foreclose a mortgage, ^hg
mortgage sought to be foreclosed was given to the appellant by Richard
P. Medley, dated October 16. 1888. to s e cure the payment of .^500 and

The property mortgaged was described in. the
mortgage as the W. % of the S. W. 14 of section 9, township 30 N., of
range 6 W., in Chippewa county. Wis. None of the defendants in the
ac don appeared in th e c ase or defended the action, ex c ept the responden t
Rose Medley. She answered that she was the mother of the mortgagor,
Richard P. Medley, and that on the 9th day of April, 1884, she was the
o wner in fee-simp le of the W, 1/;. o f the S. W. I/4 of said section 9, the
property described in said mortgage, and on said 9th day of April, 1884,
f or love and affection for her said son , she conveyed to him, by an ordinary warranty deed^ so much of said W. 1/2 of said section 9 as i s
gescribed in said deed, and no more. The following is the description
contained in said deed from her to her said son, viz. : "The west half
the interest thereon .

Cathey v. Buchanan Lumber Co., 151 N. C. 592, 66 S. E. 580 (1909) ; King
Ruckman, 20 N. J. Eq. 316 (1SG9) ; Le Franc v. Ricbmond, 5 Sawy. 601, Fed.
Cas. No. 8,209 (1864), ace.
In Gaston v. Weir, .84 Ala. 193, 4 South. 258 (1887), the description in question was "forty-seven and one-fourth acres of the west part of the north half
of the northwest fourth of section 1." It was held that the land could be located. See, also, Tiernev v. Brown, 65 Miss. 563, 5 South. 104, 7 Am. St. Rep.
679 (1888) ; Osteen v. Wynn, 131 Ga. 209, 62 S. E. 37, 127 Am. St. Kep. 212;
2

V.

(1908).
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of the southwest quarter of section nine (9), township thirty (30),
range six (6), except one acre from the southeast corner of the southwest quarter of the southwest quarter of said section, town, and
range, together with the buildings thereon."'
This deed was duly recorded in the proper register's office on th e
1 0th of April, 1884.
She also set forth in her answer that at the time
of an d ever since the execution of said deed to her said son she was,
and since has been, in the actual possession of said acre of land, and
the buildings thereon, and is stiU Jn the possession of the_sarne_^ and
she further alleges in her complaint that the acre of land, with the
buildings thereon, excepted in her said deed, and which she has always
"
Beginning at the
occupied and still occupies, is bounded as follows:
b oundary line of the highway which runs along the south side of sai d
s outhwest quarter of the southwest quarter of section nine (9^ afp resaid, on the hne of division between the southwest quarter of the southwest quarter, and the southeast quarter of southwest quarter, of section nine (9) aforesaid ; thence west along the boundary line of said
thence north, at right
highway seventeen rods and three quarters;
angles to the boundary line of said highway, nine rods ; thence east
to the boundary line between the southwest quarter of the southwest
quarter and the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of section
nine (9) aforesaid, seventeen rods and three quarters;
thence south,
the
line
between
the
southwest
of
the southalong
quarter
boundary
west quarter, and the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter, of
section nine (9) aforesaid, to the place of beginning; th at said acre o f
la nd so measured belongs to this defendant, and that sh e is the owne r
t hereof, and in the actual possession of same, and has been at all
times since the making of said deed to the defendant Richard P. Medley, an d of the dwelling-house a nd build ings situated th er£Qn. and \x as
in such possession at_the time o^jii^aking of Jli_e mort^^e_of_th^^
tiff herein , and that, the said Richard P. Medley had no right or title
in or to said land or buildings, and no power or authority to sell or
mortgage same; th at th ejlaintiff in this action has no r i_ght or pow er
o r permiss ion to sej][_or conyex.^iii.J.and and premis es, or to exer c ise any ri ghts of ownership m_QrJ:p same."
There was n o demurr er to
the answer.
On the trial the plaintiff offered in ev idence his note and mortga ge,
and made the computations of the amount due thereon, and in addition
to such evidence he did in open court "release all claims whatever to
one acre from the southeast corner of the southwest quarter of the
southwest quarter of section nine (9), town thirty (30), range six (6),
in Chippewa county, Wisconsin, and the buildings thereon, and consents that whatever judgment is rendered in the actions shall so declare," and rested his case; and thereupon Rose Medley was called
The plaintiff then objected to any
as a witness in her own behalf.
evidence under the answer of defendant Rose Medley, upon the
And
ground that the same does not constitute any defense whatever.
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the counsel for the plaintiff then said: "I want to say that, meaning
to release one acre in the corner square and bounded by four equal
sides." The court overruled the objection to the evidence offered, and
Thecourt, under
the defendant gave her testimony in the action.
ob jections on the part of the plaintiff, permitted th e defe nd ant t o show
t hat one acre, in the soutTieast
cor ner of tlie eighty acres described
in her dee d to her son, in t]ie^fqrm_of_9^^quare_wiiE iaur. equal sides,
w ou ld not include her dw el ling-ho use .

After hearing

the evidence, the court made the

fact and conclusions

of law

:

The

following findings of

1st, 2nd and 3rd findings

to the mortgage, and the amount due thereon.

The court then

relate
makes

following findings :
"(4) Th at the said defendant Richard P. Medle y derived_h[s title
to . the mortgaged premr ses__from_^def_endant
Rose Me dley, undgr..a
dee d executed bv said Rose Medley several years prjnr tr^ th e_(^y er n ti nn
of said mortgage, and al so recor ded in the office of the register of deeds,
Chippewa county, Wis., prior to the ex ecuti on of said mort gage ; that
in said conveyance said lands are described as follows : 'The west half
of the southwest quarter of section nine (9), town thirty (30), range
six (6), except one acre from the southeast corner of the soutliwest
q uarter of the southwest quar ter of said section, town, and range, to '
g ether with the buildings thereon ; that at the the time of the making of said conveyance there was a dwelling-house, and some outthe

:

s

si

;

ll

t

t

t

b

is,

buildings used in connection therewith, located near the southeast corner, and the said Rose Medley was in the 'actual possession of said
tract of land, and residing in said dwelling-house;
th at during all t he
time after the making of said conveyance, up to the present, said
Rose Medley has continued to reside in said dwelling-house, and used
said outbuildings in connection therewith.
"(5) That at the time of making of said conveyance to Richard P.
Medley there was, and ever sinceh as been, a strip o f land two rods
wide off from the south side of said describiedlJand,_£Qnstitutog_part
of the public highw^ay, and tliat said land, as used and occupied by said
Rose Medley, was bounded on the south side by said highway.
"(6) That a s quare acre laid off from the southeast corner of said
land would not includet he said dwellin^-honse. ; and that an oblong
square acre lai^ otf from said corner, having fo r its southern boundary
the center of said , high way^^^ would include s aid dwelling-house, b ut
would not include all the other buildings referred to as used in connection therewith ; but^n__acresolaM off f roni_said corner, ^exc ludin g
th e highwav. th?vt
,akmg for__Uie_corQ£i„Jiie^4)oint where he eas
oundarv of said land intersects with the highway, would .incl ude _a
of said buildings
xteen rod long on the south
said acre would be
boundary, and te n rods wide on the east boundary."
And as conclusions of law the court finds as follows
"(1) That said conveyance from Rose Medley to Richard P. Medley sh ould be rQnstr iTpf1_ y;ith reference to the circ umstanre?^ atten d-
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ing the transaction, the situa tion of the parties, state of the_property,
the locat iorT^r said dw elHng-house, and other building s, and the existenceo f_tFe hig'hwa y; and, having regard for these circumstances, the
court holds that it was the ev ident intention o f the parties, by the lan g uage used in said conveyance, that the acre excepted sh ould be la id
o ff from the southeast corner of said west half of the south west nnarter in said section nine (9). excluding the highway, so as to^include_said
dwe lling-house a nd said outbui lding s^ used inconnectiontherewith as
the same were located at the time of the execution of said conveyance,
f rom. the_testunony,_ is
which^ said acre^ as__near as^can_bejietermijied
at
a
where
the east boundary
point
boun decT as follows : Beginning
line of the southwest quarter of the southwest quarter of section nine
(9), town thirty (30), range six (6), intersects with the highway on the
south side of said land; thence west along the said highway sixteen
rods ; thence, at right angles, north ten rods, to the said east boundary line of said land ; thence at right angles south to the place of beginning.

"(2) Th at plaintiff is entitled to judgrnent as prayed_for in the_copiplaint, except that said judgme nt should provide only for a salej of
the west half of the southwest quarter of said section nine (9), exc epting one a cre irom the southeast corne r thereof, described as afor esajd."

The plaintiff excepted to the conclusions of law, but took no exceptions to the findings of fact. T he learned counsel for the appellan t
a ssigns two errors :
(F'irst^hat it was. error to permit the defendant
any evidence under her ans wer, on the
to
introduce
Rose Medley
ground that it does not state facts constituting a defense to the plaintiff's action, or to any part thereof ; tsecon3^>h at the court erred in
p ermitting parol _f'^'idpnf^_to^ id in constTuTng the deed given by th e
He also assigns as error the allowance of
s aid defendan t tgjj er son .
respondent.
costs to the
The fi rst objection, that the answer does not constitute a defpnsp^ o
t he plaintiff's action, or any part t hereof^a nnot be sustained unde r
the rule established by this court in Wi ckes v. Lake, 25 Wis. 71 ; Roche
V. Knight, 21 Wis. 324; Newton v. Marshall, 62 Wis. 8, 17, 21 N. W.
These cases hold that when the plaintiff, in a foreclosure action,
803.
makes any person defendant, alleging "that he claims to have some interest or lien upon the mortgaged premises or some part thereof, which
lien, if any, has accrued subsequently to the time of said mortgage,"
suc h defendant may by his answer set up a paramo unLxlaim to the
mortgaged premises, or'to some'par't thereof, and that such right m ay
be~tried~and adj udged in the foreclosure action . This rule is certamly the~correct rule, and the only way the plaintiff can avoid the trial
of the right of the defendant so brought into court by him, as to his
paramount title, is to discontinue his case as to such defendant so that
he may not be prejudiced by the judgment to be entered in the foreclosure action. See Hekla F. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 56 Wis. 133, 136,
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to discontinue his action as

setting up her paramounjUtle^ he cannot now object to the trial of her right . He in fact
admitted her right, and offered to take judgment recognizmg her right
to the acre excepted in her deed, but insisted_thatthe^ excepted acre
should^ejn tlie. form of a square. He therefore waived his objecti on
to her asserting a right paramount to his mortgage, and insisted in
binding her to take the excepted acre in the shape which he claimed
was^ven to her by the law under her deed .
The learned counsel also insist that the court erred in permitting
respondent to introduce parol evidence of the situation of her buildings in the southeast corner of said west half of the southwest quarter, mentioned in her deed to her son, for the purpose of locating
the acre of land so excepted from her deed; the claim being that the
except ion in th e deed is the exception of an acre in the southeast corner
in t he form of a squa re, and that paj;^evjdence is inadmissible tQ.show
The rule conthat any o ther form was intended by the parties.
tended for by the learned counsel is undoubtedly the correct rule when
there is nothing else in the deed which calls for a different form. But
th e rule doe s not apply to q £as£_khen the ex ception is of a certain
quantity of la nd, and the e xception, fro m the tract describe d in th e
It is not deconveyance, refers to other objects than mere locality.
nied by the learned counsel that, if the exlreption" Had been of one
acre in the southeast corner of the tract conveyed, including the grantor's dwelling-house situated thereon, that evidence would not be admissible to show that one acre in a square form would not cover the
dwelling-house, and that in such case the bounds of the acre should
be so located as to include the dwelling-house, if this could be done,
and still locate the acre on the southeast corner of the tract conveyed.
Th e surroundings and the objects on the ground would control t he
sh ape of the ac re, which, in the absence of such surrou ndi ngs and
o bjects call ed for in_the ^[^ed^ j:he law wouM conslrue _to„rriean„a
s quare ac re.
In such case there is no mistake in the description, which,
if corrected at all, must be corrected in an action brought for that
It is a mere question of the location of the tract excepted
purpose.
i n the conveya nce.
But the learned counsel insists that an acre in a square form wall
cover all the material calls for boundary mentioned in the deed, because the evidence shows that an acre, in a square form, will include
some of the buildings of the defendant situate in the southeast corner
of the land described in the deed. That fact we do not think meets
the call for the buildings evidently intended by the parties to the deed.
Su ch acre would not include the defendant's dwelling-house, wh ich
was evi de ntly far the most valuable building situate on the southeas t
corner of the land described in the. HppH ; an d that fact, with the,
other evidence introduced, raises a fair presumption that t^^^ hm'Mto the respondent_after

she had filed her answer
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in matters of dcscriiition."
The rule above stated was recognized
and approved by this court in the opinion of the late learned Chief
Justice Ryan in the case of Lyman v. Babcock, 40 Wis. 512. See, also,
Ganson v. Madigan, 15 Wis. 144, 82 Am. Dec. 659; Prentiss v. Brewer,
17 Wis. 635, 86 Am. Dec. 730; RockweU v. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 21 Wis.
548
and Sawyer v. Dodge Co. Mut. Ins. Co., ZJ Wis. 503. This rule
vidence w as
peculiarly applicable to the case at bar. Th parol
oft'e red to__sh ow what the intention of the Barties_waS-as to the land exdoes _not c^nti;a;^
cepted from the de ed rom tBernpthe . to the so n.
diet the langiaage ysedin jhe.iieedjjL)Ut
ends to explain its m ean ing
intended_by the £arties_at the^ time^ The fact that the respondent
IivecI7 at the time the conveyance to her son was made, in the southeast
corner of the eighty acres described in the deed, that she had no other
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ing, of all others, was^theone intended_by the parties as one of the
ouildings_which they intended the excepted acre should includ e.
It is true that the description of the excepted acre in the conveyance
from the mother to the son is not as particular and specific as it should
have been, but, under the evidence showing that at the time the conveyance was made the grantor owned an adjoining eighty acres, and
and outhouses were situate on the eighty
that her dwelling-house
acres conveyed to her son, that these houses constituted her home at
the time, and that after the execution of the deed she remained in the
occupation of her dwelling and outhouses as she had' done before
claiming to own the same, strong1y_t£nd-tQ._show that _such__d well inghouse_and other buildings were situate on the acre excepted in-llie
co nveyanc e to her son ; and as an acre of land can be laid off in the
southeast corner of the tract described in the conveyance in a convenient and useful form, so as to include the buildings, it seems to us th at
the court properly directed that it sEoulHjBe~so laid oft' and bound ed.
Thevvords m the'H^e"s'crTptibn are g eneral, and n ot specifi c, and, in the
absence of anything indicating a dift'erent boundary, the law wou ld
dete rmine th at the acre should be a square; but^ when there is anything Jnth^ description wWcTi' would not be complied with by making the acre a square, then the question as to what was TntencTed by
the parlies by the words used is to be determined by the surrounding
circ umstances. In such case there is a latent ambiguity on the face
of the deed when applied to the facts existing at the time the conveyance was executed, and the intent of the parties in such case becomes
a question of fact, and not one^o f lawT^nSe^eterniJned a l one by ^jjie
mere words used in^the con veyance .
The rule applicable to this case is well stated in Dunn v. English,
In that case the court say: "Thejconstruction
. 23 N. J. Law, 126, 128.
of the grant must, be favorable, and asn ear the min d an d
j^fltiL g" "
the parties as the rules
law will adm^ and to asc ertain hisjn tentio n
parol evidence may be resorted to, not to cont ^dic
m arv the word of
the grant, but to show from the situation and condition of the subj ectmattcr wliat meaning the arties attached to .the words use d..especia
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home, and owned a farm adjoining, explains what was intended by the
use of the words in the deed, "together with the buildings thereon,"
and it overcomes^the general presumption that, witlioutanyexplanation, an acre, in the southeast corner of the_Xaild_c(m\^ey^ed, jnust be
construed to_rriean a square acre. We think there was no error in
permitting the introduction of the parol evidence allowed on the
trial. ^
By the Court. The jndp^ment ^f the, circuit court
affirm ed.

MOREHEAD
(Supreme Court of North Carolina,

Montgomery,

v.
1900.

HALL.
126 N. C. 21.3, 3.5 S.

E.

428.)
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The portion of the opinion relating to the matter of costs is omitted.
Aig.Pkop.— 26
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This
an ction for the recovery of tlie nssessionjof a tract of l^nd. On the trial the plaintiff introduced a chain
of paper-title, beginning with
enthall, dated October
gr ant to John
30, 1765, and concl uding with
deed from- Joseph A. Perry to
ohn
M. Morehead, the plaintiffs being his heirs-at-la w. dated July 17,
1856, and testimony gomg to show that the locus in quo was covered
by the descriptions in the conveyances, and th at David B. Hall, one
the defendants, was in possession of the
nd at and before the co mmencement of the actio n.
There was no objection entered to any of the evidence, and at its
conclusion, as stated in the case on appeal, "the defendants jointly demurred to the evidence, and moved to dismiss the action under the
Act of 1897." The motion was allowed, and the plaintiffs appealed.
In each of the muniments of title, the whole of the land described in
the complaint was conveyed, except that in one of the deeds, the
one from Mary Bell and others, the heirs-at-law of David Bell, to H.
G. Cutler, the land was described as "a certain piece of land in he
ojk of Newp ort.-Oii..the nort side of the Southwest branch, adjo inbein
others,
ing he lands of William C. Wallace, deceased, an
one-h alf of
tract of land gi\-en by Ma lachi Bell, Sr.,_to ^his son Davi
Bell, as will m ore f.iLUy appear by reference to the will
Malachi ell
to D avid Bell con taining 200 acr es more or less."
The counsel of the defendants contended here, as to the construction of that deed, first, that nothing was conveyed therein because of
particular portion of the 200-acr
description of
to tally de fectiv
tract, w hich was attempted to be conveyed
and second, that even
one-half undivided
conceding tHat^tHere was conveyed in the deed
interest in the 200-acre tract, yet the plaintiff's could recover n^ part of
th lan
for the reason hat they did not show on the trial who we re
the owners of the other half of the tract in order that
judgme nt
plaintiffs
rendered
for them, and the
as tenants in common
mjght
-
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We think that the contention in neither of its forms can be sustained. We are without a decision on the first point in our Reports,
nor have we been able, after a dihgent research, to find much in the
Reports of the courts of other States, and so we are left t o ad^pta
construction of the deed, as best_we may, from the lightof reason.
We are ot the^opmion that there was conveyed in the deed~a one~^'half

*.*-''

XA'^

(

nl^iM'
I

-j^'

\£f
^

undivided interest in the 200 acres. Some confusion, it is true, has
ariien out of the use of the words "a certain piece of land," but there
was no a ttempt to describe that "certain piece" by metes arid bounds,
or by any other definite description . If such an attempt, that is, an
attempt to convey a specific number of acres, by survey or by metes
and bounds, had been made, and the boundaries and description had
been fatally defective, then nothing would have been conveyed, for
such an attempted description would have shown in its own terms
that an undivided interest had not been attenjpted to be conveyed.
The deed on its face conveys only a part, one-half of a well-descriiied
tract, and makes_np pretense to describe th e par ticular part conveye d,
we see no reason why the deed should not be construed as con -

That view is supIvey mg a one-half undivided interest in the land.
,,\ Iported by the opinion in Grogan v7 Vache, 45 J! lal. 610 . But in Gibbs
Ifi^ V. Swift, 12 Gush. (Mass.) 393; Jackson v. Livingston, 7 Wend. (N.
Y.) 136, and L. I. Railroad Co. v. Conklin, 29 N. Y. 572," a contrary
doctrine is held, that is, tliat even if there 'was an attemptto convey
a g iven part of a larger tract of land, ancTthe deed„should fail to locate the quantity by a sufficient dp<;rriptinn^ ypt^ u pon thp dpHvpry- -nf
th ejdeed, t he_£r antee wo uld become tlie owner, tenant m common \yith
We adopt the other construction because we think it
hjs__ grantor.
the more reasonable, and more m conformity with the trej Td_of_our
d ecisions on the que stions xiI_boundar y and descriptio n.
Either con* * *
struction, however, is against the defendants' contention."
New trial.
^>i-0^ ,
^JU^<i-^J:-*^ ^^>^

HOBAN

V.

(Supreme Court of Michigan, 1S94.

/j
f\

a $t
If

»

/ iy^'

^

^

CABLE.
102

Mich.

^^^^-^^

f^^

206, 60 N.

W.

'

466.)

Montgomery, J.^ This is an action of ejectment. The trial was had
before a jury, and a ve rdict rendered for the plaint iff. The defendant
The assignments of error are numerous, but have been
brings error.
carefully grouped by the appellant's counsel, so that the questions may
be dealt with under a few heads. The diagram on the following page
will furnish an aid to an understanding of the points involved.
The record contains the substance of all the testimony, from which
it appears that pl aintiff derived title from the jieirsj)j^ I^une„McLeod,
to whom a conveyan ce was made by Eliza R. ^lcLeod^in 186 2. Eli^a
So also in Cullen v. Sprigg, 83 Cal. 56, 23 Pac. 222 (1S90).
The balance of the opinion relating to other points is omitted.
® Portions of the opinion relating to other matters are omitted.
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R. McLeod being then in possession, and the apparent owner. The
d e f endant claims title by adverse possession, and also claims that -by
a subsequent conveyance to him by Eliza R. McLeod of lot No. _2 93
t he title passed t o him , and in this connection contends that the deed
to Laurie IMcLeod contained no suffi cient description of any property, and that the record of the deed was, therefore, no notice to hi m
of any right in Laurie McLeod. * * *
As the deed to Laurie McLeod was first recorded, and as defendant
claims it in fact read when executed, the description of the land was
as

follows:
"Beginning on Market street, between

the lot hereby intended to be
conveyed and a lot confirmed by the government of the United States
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See Newbold v. Condon, 104 Md. 100, 64 Atl. 356 (1906)
Whitaker v. Posteu,
120 Tenu. 207, 110 S. W. 1019 (190S)
Peoria Gas
Electric Co. v. Dunbar,
234 111. 502, S5 N. E. 229 (190S)
Nicolin v. Sclmeiderhau, 37 Minn. 63, 33 N.
Mellor v. Walmesley, [19041
W. 33 (1SS7I
Cb. 525.
A deed contained tbe following calls: "Beginning on the southeast bank of

Toe river, two rods below the mill house, and runs west, north, east, and south.
to the beginning, so as to include the mill and site and two acres of land, it
being and Deluding the land sold as the excess of the homestead of A. Wisemuu." The laud contaiuediii_t e>-calls given did not include the sawmill, nor
h

i

•^
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to Ambrose R. Davenport; tlience north, 62 degrees 15 minutes west,
158.96 feet; thence south, 31 degrees west, 60 feet; thence south, 62
degrees 15 minutes west, 158.96 feet, to Market street; thence along
said street north, 27 .''^degrees 55 minutes east, to the place of begin"
• e. '^■-'
ning."
Was this a s uffici ent descriptiont_ OjLjguist_the deedJb-e-ireated_as a
nullity ? The starting point is definite. The first hne, to point "b,"
But, if
is also certain, as. is the line between points "b" and "c."
instrument,
in
the
the direction of the next line is followed as given
the terminus is at "e," and tlie line named in the succeeding portion
of the description would end at "f." But the course giv en after reaching point "c" is not the only means of identification ad opHdT" ThaCline
is_described as_tenninating at Market street. If we exclude the words
indicative of the direction of the line, and carry the line in the most
direct course to Market street, we have not only a line answering to
the other terms of the deed, but one which, with its extension, incloses
something, which is, by the terms of the deed, "a. lot intended to be
conveyed ," and which, to answer the terms of the portion of the description relating to the starting point, must lie next to "a lot confirmed
by the government of the United States to Ambrose R. Davenport."
To_niakethis clearer, the deed contains the statement that f rom the
te rminus of the third llnenamed in the description the boundary shall
extend alon g_Market~street_to the place of beginning.
We think the
intent of the grantor is clear, and that the deed is not a nulli ty fo r
wa nt of a sufficient description_;_ _See Anderson v. Baughman, '7 Mich.
69774 Am. Dec. 699 ; CoopeTvrBigly, 13 Mich. 463 ; D wight v. Tyler,
49 Mich. 614, 14 N. W. 567.
A number of defendant's points depend upon this, and
becomes
unnecessary to treat in detail some of his assignments of error. . The
eed be. irg -^^^Ij^j to co n vey the
od^ the reco iul-was notice to subsent
purchasers.
que
One of the conveyances under which plaintiff claims contained a
description as follows:
"A lot 60. feet wide on Market street and 28.90 feet dee p, being the
no rth end ofjot 293 ia_tliejdllag£-xif ^laddnac."
This
claimed to be insufficient, but we tUink there
no mistakm
th
land intended to _b£. rnnvpye
We think no error to the prejudice of defendant was committed.
The jud gment will
affirmed, wi th costs, and the case remanded.'^
d
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WHITEHEAD
(Supreme Court of Missouri, 1891.

V.

405

RAGAN.
106 Mo. 2.31, 17 S.

W.

.307.)

The contest in this case is over jhe location of the
divis ion line between lots 1 and 4 of Kritzer and Ragan's subdivisio n
of a pa rt of the east half of the northwest quarter of section 21. to:y vn-

MacfarlanE, J.

ship 49, range 33.
About the year 1870 defendant, Mary Ragan, and one Virginia
Kritzer, b eing the owners of the whole tract, had it subdivided int o
A plat of the s ubdiYi.sion was made
s eyen lots numbered from 1 t o 7.
and recorded. The dimensions of each lot and the area were marked
on the plat. Lot 1 is designated on the plat as a parallelogram, eleven
and thirteen hundredths chains north and south, five and thirty-four
hundredths chains east and west, containing five and ninety-four hundredths acres. T his lot lay in the northwest corner of the tract . Lot 4
lay south oi and adjoining lot 1, but extending six and sixty-six hunThe north and south line on the west
dredths chains further east.
on
the plat was eight and seventeen hundredths
side of lot 4 as marked
chains, and the lot contained twelve and ninety-two hundredths acres.
On the first day of September, 1870, defen(iant_conveyed, by guitclaim deed, to. Virginia Kritze r, all her interest in lots 1, 5 and 6, reclting in the deed that lot 1 contained five and ninety-four hundred ths
a cres, "as will appear by reference to the recorded plat of said sub
to
hus
band
Kritzer
and
conveyed
division." March 17, 1885, Vir ginia
l ot 1 under the follow ing
Larkin and Blackmar, bvyii^^rjai^ty^^dgfid*
d escription:
"Lot number 1 in Kritzer and Ragan's subdivision ^ fjLhe
ea st half of the northwest quarter of sec ti on Zi, township jg^range 33,
containing five and ninety-four hundredths acres more or less, incj uding thirty feet roadway ."
April 22, 1886, Larki n and Blackmar conveyed, by w arranty de ed,
"lofT in Kritzer and Ragan's subdivision in
t o plaintiff Whitehead,
east half of the northwest quarter, section 21, township 49, range 35, in
When he purchased he was not shown
Jackson county, Missouri."
was
referred to the plat for quantity, courses
lot,
the
but
the corners of

/, ^X ^-

L^f"

'' ^'^
^

f
\

and distances.
At the tim e of plaintiff's purchase, lots 1 and 4 were included in o ne
i nflnsn rel_ Soon thereafter defendant built an east and west fence, as
she claimed, on the north line of lot 4 for the purpose of a separate inclosure of that lot. Pl aintiff claims that this fence is about thirty-£ ve ^^U-^^i^ g^
f eet too far north and included that quantity of lot 1. to recover whi ch ^ ___^ ^ ^
a^€U,r^
t his suit is prosecuted.
gristmill, nor the mill site. B^ut if the first call, "west." were -to be read
wouldlncItTaeTEe-sawmill. ,arlstmill {ind mill sHS The
com-t'held "west' should he read as "east.' Wiseman v. Green, 127 N. C. 288,
See also Scates v. Henderson, 44 S. C. 548, 22 S. E. 724
37 S. E. 272 (1900).
(1895) ; Rushton V. Ilallett, 8 Utah, 277, 30 Pac. 1014 (1892),

t he

"^a^t," the'descnpI'ioD

■I
\

■B

JU^^

TJ^
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a ccurate mp^gnrpmpfl t of the north and south line of plaintiff's
commencing at detendant's fence, shows ^l] j^pr^^^p■^tinned shorthun dredths feet as compare^ wijh
apre of th irtv-four and fifty-eight
lot as_ shown on~The j)lat. All the foregoing
Hi e "wholeJ length^oQ^^
facts were shown by plaintiff, and are not disputed.
Defendant offered evidence which tended to prove that, w hen the
sub division was made, stones were planted to mark the four corners q f^
1ot Ij^th at, after she conveyed her i nterest in lot 1 to Kritzer in 1870»
the line between the stones planted for the southwest and soutlieast
corners of lo t 1 w as adopted by them as the true division line between
l ots 1 and4. and was s o recogni zed and use d until plaintiff purchased
J Qt 1 ; that the north an^south TThes of the subdivision on the west side
were fifty-one feet shorter than was shown by the plat; and that tlae
division fence was on the line so marked, held and' recognized.
The circuit court, upon this evidence, directed ? vprHirt fjnr-plaintiff, ^ Iru &Jiolding that the co urses and distances, indicated _up^n__the
' pf
at. ^hpu/cj[ pre vail jvvprjjie lines act ually s"urveyed and rnr npr«; f^sjaJ j-

lot

1,

h^lTedr^

^

I. When an authentic plat of a subdivided tract of land is referred
to in a deed conveying a subdivision of such tract, th e plat itself, in
legal construc tion, bec omes as much a part of the deed as if it had
been fulJj r'"^'"''poratedln it. Dolde v. Vodicka, 49 Mo. 100; 2 Devlin
on Deeds, § 1022.
II. While the deeds, under which plaintiff claims title to lot 1 in the
subdivision, must be construed as describing the land conveyed as being
of the full length shown by the plat, it does not follow that the particulars of the description contained in the plat are conclusive of the corT he plat is only in^en^^d to bp ^ reprprectness of such description.
It -is in.
s entation of the actual survey as made upon theland itse lf.
the nature o f a certified copy of an instrument which will be controlle d
ISo it is held, "where there are no express calls that
by the orig inal.
determine a line with certainty, evidence aliunde is admissible to show
where the line was actually run to which the deed refers, or to which
it must have reference ; and its location so fixed, by extrinsic evidence,
will control the courses and distances named in the deed or in the
The right to prove the true line of the survey to which the
survey.
refers,
and which it follows, does not depend upon the rules apdeed
* * * It is not a
plicable to ambiguities in written instruments.
but a question oi_ £a.ct." Kronenberger v.
q uestion of ccmstru(;:tion
^ffner, 44 Mo. 185 So in Dolde v. Vodicka, 49 Mo. 98, the court
says: "Had this (lot) been so staked out in the original survey, there
would be no difficulty, fo.r the division of the lines of the lots would
then have been actually located, and the location must govern."
I t is a well-settled rule of construction that kga aLU .an d fi^ed mon urnents will control though they conflict with the co ur ses and distan ces
Myers v. St. Louis. 82 Mo.. 373; Orrick v.
c alled for in the deed.
Bower, 29 Mo. 210; Gray v. Temple, 35 Mo. 494; 3 Wash. Real Prop.
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(4th Ed.) 405. While natural monuments are regarded of higher value
in determining boundaries than artificial ones, the latter will also con"
trol courses and distances.
The order of applyi ng descriptions of
second, to artificial mark
rst,
b oundaries
to natural objects
third to courses and distances given in the dee d."
Wash. Keal Prop.
(4tl7^(l.)""405.
the line between lots

s

s
u

it d,

4

1

f

I

and
was located, upon the land whe n
b
divided,
and
and
can
now
be ascertained and determine
urveyed
that line will constitute the true division line between the lots though

C

Qnfl'C t^Yif4-litJ,;iS.dp'^^^'Pti"" p^iv^" J" the i^lat.
Where the boundary line was actually located was

r

,

(

T'*^

V.

(Supreme Court of New Hampshire,

1820.

N. H. 197.)
d

w rit of entrv. in which the demandant counte upon his
withi
n twenty years and upon
disseisin by he tenant.
own^seisin
The^ause was tried here at April term, 1819, upon the ge neral iss ue,
when
verd ict was takei i_XQrJli£_d£mtmdant. subject to the opinion of
the court, upon the following facts.
1806, conveyed to the demandant
deed dated March
tenan^.
"Being the westerly
a tract o l^nH jescribed in the deed as follows
lot
No.
and
part of
contaJnin^^SOacres, beginning at the north-west
corner on Boscawen line; then south by Lerned's land to Contoocook
river to poplar tree, thence by said river to stake nd stones thence
parallel line with the side line of said lot to
stake
northwardly
:

8,

,

a

a

a

a

a

2,

r l^v

f

^

h^

T

a

t

a

a

This was

^^>C^^'

MORRILL.
2

LERNED

J

t

it

a

T

a

the evidence tending to prove

a

question for the
conflict between the calls in the
deeds and plat, and the survey as located on the land.
he court co mmit ted error in directing
verdict for plaintiff and in efusing to su b--^~m the issue of fac to the jury .
Reversed and remanded. All concur.*

jury,

fr

a

See in accord Cit.v of Decatur v. Niedenneyer, 16S 111. 68, 48 N.
V. Seattle, 30 Wash. 687, 71 Pae. 201 (1003).

Olson

E.

72 (1897)

;
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on Boscawen line, thence on said Boscawen line to the
nd stone
The stakes and stones mentioned in the dee
bound first mentioned."
w ere not erected at the time of making the deed
but about eightee n
months afterguards, the parties went upon the premises with
surveyor and chain-men to run out and locate the land, and they erected
the stakes and stones at the north-east and south-east corners of the
in th e,
premises. The parties first measured the whole lot, divided
then
asnr
ten
acres
half
and
ed
off
from
the
east
middle, anrl
adjo inmf^
ng the west half, and set up stakes and stones at the north-e ast and
nd run the Ime
om
south-easj^^prnprt;
f)f thp bnr) sn mensured
one stake and ^tgpes tn the other and set up stakes and stones at every
he tenant immediately cleared his land up to the line and built
ally.

v/^
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The demandant also built

on the line.
side of ih at
line till 1817. It was proved that the tenant said the demandant bought
ten acres more than half the lot.
In the fall oi 1817 , t he defendan t
s urveyed the lot and finding t ha t the demandant lia(L i iinrp tlian ejpjijy
acres, r emoved the fence, and yyent into possession of all but ei^htv
a cres_, and this action is brought to recover the land, of which the ten.^nt thus took possession.
Pp;r Curiam. The question presented to us in this case for decision,
has long been settled, and must now be considered as entirely at rest.
AA/Kpt
^ land Vf^^A^eenj^rmvfypclhiLui ^^ anH_ HTP^ descri plioiLoi Jjie la n d
indTe_dee^!_has_refejrerice to monument^not actually in exi^tence^
tTiet ime, but to be erected by the parties at a subsequent period : ■\vhgn
t he pai tics liav e-xmce-L een upon the land and deliberate ly prprtprj" tl^
monuments, they will be as much bound bv them, as if they^had-b£en
a fence upon it.

ajnd

the parties occupied and improved

the land on each

before the deed was made. In this case, there was a reference
in the deed to monuments not actually existing at the time, but the
parties soon after went upon the land with a surveyor, run it out, erected monuments, and built their fences accordingly; and this is not all.
respectivelv pccupied the land according to the line thus estab T^ev
lished, for nearly ten year s. And there is now no evidence in this case
of any mistake or misapprehension in establishing the line. There_is
n o^ pretence that the tenant
ould lawfully remov^__moi uiments tli us
_c
deliberately ere cted_an d so lo ng^ ac quiesced i n.
His claim to the demanded premises, for ought that appears in this
case, is without any foundation whatever, and t here must be judgmen t
^"
f or the demandant."
^jui^. ^^ < ■»*'*
)
e rected

f

h/appjL4jL<
Y-

,^ ,, ^ , . ,-

.

BURKHOLDER

^

V.

MARKLEY.

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

ISSl.

9S Pa. 37.)

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster county; of May

Term,

No. 74.
vi et armi s, q uare clau sum f regit, by Jacob Markley against
M. J. Burkholder, for enter ing on tlie^aTntiff s la nd aijdigarinzjlewn
a fence. Plea not guilty, and liberum tenementum.
""On tHe trial, before Livingston, P. J., the following facts appeared :
The plaintiff and the defendantwere owners o f adjoin ing tracts of
land, file locati on of the divisio n line betw een which \yas the su bject o f
th is dispule ! "Both clamied~IifTe
by niesne jconve^iauces from vSamuel
Mbyen The descriptions in all the deeds, under which both parties
claimed contained, inter alia, the following courses "STid distances :
"Thence by other land of said Samuel Moyer, north, seventy-five de1881,

T respass

grees west, three perches and four-tenths,

to a post, thence

by the same

9 Makepeace v. Bancroft, 12 Mass. 469 (1815), ace.
Cf. Cleavelaud
Cush. (Mass.) 76 (1849) ; Miles v. Barrows, 122 Mass. 579 (1S77).

v. Flagg, 4

L^c

(L{_
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north nineteen degrees east, tzventy-tJir.ce perches and five-tenths, to a
stone in said road," etc. The part in italics i' ^ the division line in dispute.
T his was a straig^ht line, upon or near to which a fence was
erected prior to the time of the conveyances from Moyer, and which
had remained standing until a portion of it was torn down by the defendant. It wasjiotj however, alleged in the narr. to be a line fence.
Upo n a recent survev of the Burkholder tract, it was found that the
l ine aTTTescn bed in the deeds runs through the corner of a shed aiiiL£; se d to a hotel buildmg- on the land of Rurkhnld er, both of which build
i ngs had been erected

by Moj^ ^er.
to prove by Isaac

Gingrich, his predecessor
of the defendant's
from
Moyer
immediate
in title and the
grantee
het^/ppn
rha'^p
pur
theagreement
l]ipi self and Mov er
of
tract, t hat by
thp
trart
purchased bv him, ^^nd
t he hoteTand shed wp'rp"vv]-|n11y npnn
'
t he boundary line in question was fixed uj} on the gro und by Mo\-cr and
hjmself from twelve to eighteen inches outside the said shed, so tha t
the water falling from the roof of the shed would fall upon Gingrich's
then run hv
(n|p^efendant's) land; t hat the end of the said line. ^,^
not
a stone ;
ttli^iir'
h^^urvevor on the p|-round, was marked h yastak e and
deeds,
djljers from
a nd that the line, as subsequentlv described i n the
that line as so tixed and marked on the ground . Objected to; obiection sustained and offer rejected; exception.
The defendant also offered in evidence the deposition of Samuel
Moyer and the court, upon objection, ruled out the portions of it which
corroborated the facts stated in the above offer.
J-o,
Verdid :. guilty ; d amages assess ed a^$25, and judgment thereon.
"'"'V'
"
The defend ant took thi'^ y/rit nf prfnr^ assio-nin°^ for error the rejection
oj said offer , and of the portions of the deposition.
Trunkey, J. Sa muel Moyer , by deed dated April 10th, 1865, con v eyed part of a tr actj)f iand^ to Isaac Gingrkh^jylT ose title has been
vested in Burkholder . On the lOtli of May following, Moyer conveyA
ed anoth er part"o£said tracjto David ^ber, wjiich part is now vested /
in Mark ley.^ The~line betw'een tli'ese parcels, being the one in dispute, I
/V^-**-/^
is described in the deeds as ru nning f rom a po st north nineteen deThe defendant offered

Jfi^

g^;ees_ea^Jweiit^rtl\ree_£grpiLes.And fiyert^
Both parties agree that this is a straight line. They also agree that a
shed, built before Moyer conveyed, is still standing where it did at the
Markley .cla ims .that, the Hjne, ascertained
time of the conveyances.
fr om the courses and disiances jet put in the deeds, passes thro^h
that^shed_so that a portion of it is on his land . Burkholder claims that
a fter Moyer had orally agreed to sell to Gingrich, and before he mad e
t fie deed to him, t here was an actual survey, that the line ran from a
p ost direct to a stake, not jess than twelve nor more than eighteen
inrhe.s from the .shed, and thnt the land was sold and bought by T he
parties with reference to said line,. If Durkholder s cl ann be tru e, then ,
so far as tlie courses and distances in the deeds show" a line differmg

dUjJf-((lSi
^ ^
OjPji^^^,^
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The lines run and marked on the ground are th e true survey^ and
when they can be found wi ll control the calls for a natural or oth er
fixed boundary ; and also constitute the boundariesln]lhe ^rant^wSEre
they dlTFEflrom those produced b^_the_cgurses and distances st ated in
t he patent. This weli-settled rule in cases oi lands granted by the comBlasdell v. Bissell, 6 Pa.
monwealth, applies to grants by individuals.
258; Craft v. Yeaney, 66 Pa. 210. In Craft v. Yeaney the testimony
"
of the original grantor was received, the court below saying, while i t
is true the deed cannot be change d, or construed, or affected by pa rol,
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it
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is a

a

is.

a

prove oiitside the deed that the calls in the deed re
it
_,competent to
line or boundary called for in the deed is jn
not on the ground, or that
different place from that contracted for by the parties, or that what
not at the place sold
caTTed tjie eastern line of warrant No. 4019
and Ijougli to." Ag^d that was held .not_tp^b^.£i]:£^r.
deed was for fifty acres of land, the quantity intended by
Where
both parties, described by existing lines on three sides, and called for
south "line to be run so far south from the north line, and parallel
com pej^nUto
was hel
therewith, as to include fifty acres of land,"
by
parties
south
line was__a
as
h
e
the
agreed
th
line
ove
that
pr
upon
description
the
from
the
on
thoUg
by
hTt di ffered
fe nce,
jg^produced
THe"~gTantee objected to the deed because she did not know
acres would run to the fence, but the grantor assured her

t

he deed.

a

it

by

T

a

is

d

y

It

;

is

it

t
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e

it

e

a

I

it,

that fifty
and
that fifty acres would reach the fence, that the deed embraced
her
whet
consequence
of
no
to
be
said
she accepted the deed.
^was
was
maki
that
he
misrepresentation^Jj^y
th grantor was aware
ng
did what she woumiot h"ave~done and was_iniured.
the grante
Grant, Cas. 277. That decision rests on h_e pr infiartle v. Vosbury,
a line on theground. fixed by the parties as the one sold and
there
stated in the deed,
bought to. controT^aTT^raTstances
,^,^:^wherever
fraud or ~mislakg . The cases enforcing and illustrating the applicawould be idle to cite additional.
tion of this principle are numerous
line, w hich was-asreed
ma
frequently occur that the location of
In such case_ .the
u pon, cannot be
ete^rnnned for w ant of evidence.
the calls, cour ses
he lines produced
sett led by the deed.
lo cation
deed,
correct,
there be prooj
unless
as
IrT
the
are
taken
nd distances
grantor
grantee ^^g^d
and
oTa different line on the ground, which the
ghtly. jceggivgd,
the trial of this case consi derable evidence was
parties
time
at
the
of
line
fixed
ing
the
the sale, an
owt
to
sh
liat
tend
evideri(;:£_iQr
and
material
.
Other j)ertinent
its lo cation on the ground
judgme
nt must be
the
the ^ame purpose was^^rejec ted. and for th
eversed. ~We"are of opinion that all of the offers of testimony, set
forth in the several assignments of error, should have been admitted.
Judgment reversed, and venire facias de novo awarded.^"
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Baxter v. Wilson, 95 N. O. 137
Emery v. Fowler, 38 Me. 99 (1854)
v. Parsons, 70 Conn. 295, 39 Atl. 179 (189S).
:

10 See

(1886)

Kashman
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EATON.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

1885.

E.

139 Mass. 217, 29 N.

6(50.)
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Writ of E ntry to reco ver a loLPLllQdJn„the_dt)L.QLWcuxester^
Trial in the Superior Court, without a jury, bePlea, nul disseisin.
bill of exceptions, in substance as folwho allowed
fore Blodgett,
lows
triangular tract on the northerly ^de^ of
The land in dispute was
copy pjwhjgJL
Dix Street, marked on a plan used at the trial,
appeared that all
rinted in the margin, as "Demanded Premise s."
ortherly
Wachuset
e
tween
n
of
Dix
Stree
and
the land lying next
Street
on
the
west
treet on the east and Gouldincr
was_formerly ownby Henry Gou lding, and was divided into lots and sold by jiis- exwas at the corner of Dix Street and WaThe enants'
ecut ors.
ch usett Street, and tne denj ^ndant's lot was part of the lot next westerly^ and
T£ question was'as to the westerly boundarv of the tenant
ot and the easterly boundary of the demandant's lot, under the follov
ng deeds
On February 20, 1869, ouldin^'s executors conveyed the corner lot
Blackmer and Kellev . (under whom the tenants derive their title,)
"
A. certain lot of land situated in the cit
by the following description
westerly
side of Wachusett Street and northerly
of Worcester, on the
begin
ide of Dix Street, bounded and described as follows, to wit
ning at the southeasterly corner of the lot conveyed, and at the inter-

8,

l

."

si

a

t

a

by

;

section of, said streets thence running northerly by Wachusett Street
one hundred and thirty-four feet, to land of the heirs of Henry Goulding; thence running westerly by land of the heirs of said Goulding,
therly by land of said heirs aL rigl'
ri_£ht
sixty feet; th ence running souitherly
twenty-fiye feet to Di
n g les to said Dix Street one hundred and twenty
easterly bv Dix Street
vty-one feet more or
(^t^pT^iT^pr./^ nip nincr
rontainingr
777
feet more or less
ess to the first-mentioned bound
1869, said executors conyeyed the residue of the land
On October
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.Strept tn nne Kiri?T. by a deed
1n( and Gouldino^
foUowinig
description
:
"Lot of land on the northcontained the
erly side ot Uix SFreet, bounded as follows : beginning at the southeasterly corner of the lot at a corner of land of Kelley and Bla^kjQi er
ind running westerly on Dix Street one hundred and eightv^^^ to a
new street about to be made : thence turning and runnnig northerly on
said new street one hundred and twelve and a half feet, to land belonging to the estate of the late Henry Goulding; thence turning and running easterly on said Goulding estate one hundred and eighty feet, to
land of Kelley and Blackmer ; thence turning and running southerly on
land of said Kelley and Blackmer one hundred and twenty-five feet,

h(^^w,g^rij_hp

tprmnt«^'

•which

to tlie place of beginning on said Dix Street.
It was agree d that the r[^\v afreet referr ed fn \vas Gjg^ldinp^ Stree t.
and \he co rn er of~Goulding Street and Dix Street was a known and
.

fix"e3rbound .

On May 8, 1871, King conveyed to the dernandant a pnrt of said Lnf.
f ortv-five feet wide on T)ix Str-eet. hounded as Follows T "Beginning at
corner thereof at corner of land of Kelley and Blackthe~sbiftheasterly
point
mer, and at^ a
one hundred and eighty feet distant from the ea^ te.rlv line of Goulding Street , thence northerly on land of Kelley and
\ Blackmer one hundred and twenty-five feet, to land of the estate of
Henry Goulding; thence westerly on said land of Goulding forty-five
I

m^Jm

[^^

feet ; thence southerly and parallel with the first-described line one Ixu nI dred and twenty-five feet more or less, to said Dix Street ;^hence e agt^
feet, to the place of beginning ."
(^r] y on Dix Street forty-five
The corner of Dix Street and Wachusett Street was a known and
fixed bound, and the northerljj line of Dix Street was a known and
^xed line.
If the thij^^m^described in th e deed of the executo_r s. to Blackrn er
and Kelley is drawn at rio^ht an.jg les to Dix Stree t, it strikes a
Dix Street eighty feet and fifty-two one-hundredths of a foot from
ic/hT ^^^O^'JU
Wachusett Street, and o ne hundred and sixty-one feet and ninetv-fou r
Imj y^Aa^**-*'"^
ij^f^ one-hundredths of a foot from Goulding Street. I n such ca se, the ten\
ants' line on Dix_S treet is ighty feet_and fif ty-two one-hu nclr'e^thg^of
^
foot in lengt and
shown by the westerly dotted line and theirjot
^^</r^
contains 9101 squarefeet.
the th iij^jyi^ ^escribed in said deed o_^l ackmer an
Kelley__is
feet
east erly
as
to
strike
Dix
one
hundred
and
dra wn so
eighty
Street
rom Gouldi ng Street, the tenants' line on Dix Street
sixty fee and
7770 square fee
ha
in lengt
and their lot co nt ains exact
The demandant ofifered evidence tending to show that, before the
several lots were sold by the executors of Henry Goulding, they prewas
stiplan of them, which was produced at the trial and
pared
pxerntnrg;
that
but
the
were
sold
fied
one of the
Jots
bv^said plan,
th ere were no nio numents at the corn rs of he^c^^— ^^^Iien-t he deed
w ere given ?m3pere was no e~i(lei-|rp that Blackmer and Kellev saw
tlie plan beiore they took their deecL Said plan showed the tenants' lot.
,
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to have a lin e of only sixty feet and a half on DIx Street^ and showed
t hat the westerly line did not make a right angle wi th Dix Stre et.
The demandant also offered evidence tending to show that, in the
year 1876. he erected a fence between his said lot and the tenan1„ '^Mnt
(KeJley, who had bought I!lacl<mer's interest, then being; the mvner. of
the te_n ants' l ot,)_ a nd by Kellcy's consent it was placed on the line a 9>-y ,
fi ^.^^^
c laimed bv the demandant, and remained there several v^^s, and un til ^^
"^
r emoved bv the tenants a short time before this suit was brnno-ht
The demandant asked the judge to rule that it was a question of fact,
on all the evidence, whet her th e tenants' westerly line w as to be drawn
at right angles to D ix Street, and a sked a finding in fact that it was to
v/
^
b e drawn at an ang le to said Dix Street, so as to strike said street sixty [(jtf^/^^^
a nd a half feet from Wachusett S tree t. The judge ruled, as matter_o f q
^ m ^j^
law.that the said line was to be drawn a ^angh^ngle to Dix Street ,/y^
without, regard to the evidence outside of tn^^ea?; ana lound for the ^^ >t«*'-*'*'^
tenants. The de mandant alleged exceptioii_s C^^-y^^^*-^ /^^
W. Allen,
The courses of the lines on Wachusett Street and
Dix Street are fixed on the land, and fix the angle contained by them.
on the_land to fix the course of the second or of the
Th.£££US_.pothing
hird ne^fqrjt does not appear that the line of the land of the heir
of Henry Gou lding mentioned
fixed. The description in the deed
gives the length of the first, second, and third lines, which there
nothing to control, and the angle contained by the third and fourth lines.
There
go difficultv in locating this description upon the land, and
makes the length of the fourth line eightv feet and fifty-two one undredths of
foot, and the contents of the lot 9101 scuare feet . The
description iii The deed gives the length of the fourth line as "si.xtyone feet more or less," and the con tents of the lot as "7770 feet more or
*
less."
hjs disc repancy of one third in the length of the front line of
/i.*-*-*^
he lot, and one fifth in its content-^^ could not have been intended,
5<<a>c^
though the length and dimensions are only approxiniat^ely given, a.nd /^^aM a^^Cu^^
hqt thf-rejs_a. mis{:ake^^ither in the angle given, or in the
t__is obvious
fngth of the fourth line.
We do not regard the statement of tlie quantity of the land as very
material. It
the computation of the contents of the figure described
in the deed, but which cannot be produced on the land. The fact th at
give exactly the quantity of land mentioned when the other partic uars of the description are applied to the land, the third line must inter -
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be six tv
otherwise sufficientlv
apparent, that no such discrepancy in the length was intended . Xhe re
w as a mis take itlier m the_imgl£^iven or in the length of the fourt
lin e- they cann ot both be applied to tli£-land. though either of them
""^
"^
mayl>e. and the question
which must be rejected .
The question to be determined
in the languageV^J___,/
theiiitentiori_shown
of the deed, in the light of the situation of TITe land and the circumstances of the transaction, and sometimes with the aid of declarations
eet and
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The rule,
and conduct of the parties in relation to the subject-matter.
t hat monuments, in a description in a deed, control courses and dis d ances, is founded on the consideration that that construction is mo re
likely to express the inte ntio n of the parties.. The intention to run a
line to a fbced^bject is more oDvious, and the parties are less likely to
be mistaken in regard to it than in running a given distance or by a givBut, where tjie^circum stances show tha t the controlling inen course.
tention was otherwise, the rule is not applied. Davis v. Rainsford, 17
Mass7 207; Parks v. Loomis, 6 Gray, 467; Murdock v. Chapman, 9
Gray, 156. So far as the question is as to the relative effect to be given
to a course and a distance, neither has in itself any advantage over the
other as showing a governing intent. Whether the one in a given_ £ase
shall outweigh th e other, as showing the inte nt ion of the parties, mus t
depe nd upon th e circum stances existing at the tim e.
The angle formed byTDix Street and Wachusett Street is an acute
angle ; the lot was a corner lot, the front on Dix Street. In laying it
out, it would be natural either to have the third line in the description
parallel to Wachusett Street, or at a right angle with Dix Street. The
The deed shows that
latter is for the advantage of the purchasers.
Not only is the third
the parties had that, and not the other, in mind.
et,
but it ap ^ars.-t£ at
lin e not_said to Jbe_parallel with Wachusett Stre
it "wasnot intended to be. I'he parties understood that the angle at
the corner of the streets was an acute angle, and that making the other
angle on Dix Street a right angle, would require the line on that street
to be longer than the rear line, and they said that the angle should
be a right angle, and therefore that the line should be longer.
It wa s
n ot merely giving a course to the tliird line, but it was expresslv fixing
the shape of the lot . The length of the fourth hne was left indefinite,
and to be determined by the angle which was fixed. It is true that th e
ven angle requires
longer line than was supposed but the angle
nd the shape of the lot, and not the length of the line, appear to ha ve
een the controlling considerations.
See Noble v. Googins, 99 Mass.
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contended by the plaintiff, that
case of latent ambiguity,
which may be explained by parol evidence. If the difference were between
given course of the third Hne and measurement of the fourth,
case, but neither
given. The course of th
might present such
run,
but
was to intersect Dix Street at
right-an hird line was not
gle th fourth lin was not measured, but its length was^stimated^nd
ap parently estimated as the dista nce bet ween the point where th third
ne must 'meet Dix Street to form a right angle with it_and__th.e first
the
e.
would
orner. A mistake was made in the estmiate
distanc
Th"
the description of
seem that the anglewa^oTnalerTM^~particuTar
could not be mad
the lot, that he expressed intention in regard to
doubtful by
mjs ake in the estimate of the length of the fourth jine,
not necessary to decide this. As,
but
which was determined by
the case stood at the trial, and upon the evidence-JifiEered, the cou^t
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^^\\f^ ^f 1,1^, t1-|^ third line \^^^ fn V»p ^ t a right
(r^./fiA4^
Street,
angle with Dix
without reg^nrd to th(^ evidence outside the deed . ,
p
^-"^^ '— <nz«v
The plaintiff relied upon evidence that the executors of Goulding,
before the lot was sold, made
a iv
^n of this and other lots, by whicli
half in Icnglh, and
appeared th at the fou rth line was sixty feet and
hat the an g^le^jormed^
the third line and Dix Street was an obtuse '\j/yi.c/^Jt Vatiangle . This plan
not referred to in the deed^ and was not seen by the
The only effect of this evidence would be to show that tlie
purchasers.
grantors knew that the lot described in the deed did not correspond
with the one on the plan, and did not inform tlie grantees.
Eight_months after he conve yance to Blackmer and Kelley;, the excutors co nveyed to one King the adjoining lot on Dix Street, extending westerly to
way to be laid out, called Goulding street, bounding
easterly on the land of Blackmer and Kelley and the line on Dix Street,
and the rear lines being each one hundred and eighty feet in length.
This evidence may tend to show that the executors intended that the
third line of the Blackmer and Kelley lot should be parallel with Goulding Street, but such intention was not known to Blackmer and Kelley,
and was not expressed or indicated in the deed to them.
The ema ndant also relied
pon evidence that King afte rwards onveyed to
he demandant alot adjoining Bla kmer and Kelley. jjescribed as becorner of their lan on Dix Stree^ ne hund re and eig hty
ginning at
eet from Goulding rreet..and that several years after, and seven years
after tlie conveyance to Blackmer and Kelley, and after Kelley had acquired Blackmer's interest, the demandant put up
fence between his
lot and Kelley's, and, with Kelley's consent, put
on the line now
claimed by the demandant, where
remained for several years.
We do not see that any of this evidence
competent to control the
construction indicated by the deed itself.
not sufficient to show
a. practical construction of the deed by the parties to
nor an adrnis p rop.eiiv ruled

l
e

<

d.

E

s

d

e

a

a

7

a

sion bv the tenants' grantor which can bind the tenants, nor
mutua
boundary
accordingly.
as
to
the
and
See
Liveragreement
occupation
Allen, 494; Miles v. Barrows, 122 Mass. 579;
pool Wharf v. i^'rescott,
Lovejoy v. Lovett, 124 Mass. 270. Whether evidence of the construction of the deed by the acts of the parties by locating the third line on
the land, or fixing the point of its intersection with Dix Street by
monument or otherwise, would present
question for the jury, we
need not consider, because th
evidence offered was not suffiGient_ j:o
acts, nn
upon th
h'° nn^'^t'^n
how_such
^resented^was one of law
thp rlpprl
of
nstruction
Q^
A majority of the court are of opinion that the ruling excepted to
was correct.
xceptions overrule
^^u *-> *fni t, ^yC^^Ux-f^CJi/y^ .
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BENSON.

Jndicinl Court of Massachusetts,

F ejition, filed
i stration

V.

(Part

1912.

213 Mass. 128, 100 N. E, Go.)

Land Court on September

8, 1910,

for

the reg-

j;o certain land on East Quincy Street itl_ ^JorLh

the Land Court the case was heard by Davis, J. T he only issue
at Vie tri al was the position of the_sQ uther ly li ne of the petiti o ner's lan d
as sfhmn on_ the sl<etch on tlie. nexL^page.
In 19^0 one Sylvester A. Kemp owned land which included the locus
nd landShnmediately east and south of it shown on the plan as land
o*f the resptsmdent, and conveyed to one Josiah Tinney the locus and
"Situate
the^lot east ofot by a deed with the following description:
nearv, the North village of North Adams, bounded and described as
follows, to wit : Coh^Q^n cing on the sq uth _side of Ea st Qu incy Stree t,
at the ^22ijlL^i^^ -^"^ ^^^^^^^°" with Me_c hanic Stre et (ito w
"^n^r^^llXi^
Summit Avenue), so_calledjNthence^soutli 12 degrees west on th e we st
side of a xQntemplated street, sj^rod^ tp_ a s take, and stones ; thence
wester]^ejght'rad^^ail|L of J. MS|Uanedv ; thence northerl y on l ana s
and M rs. Porter'^seven'rods to East Quh icy Stree t;
q^^^^^^TTa^dy
theiice east erly on t he south side of said sheet, about eig ht a nd ,opefgurth rpdSj to the p lace of begin ni,^g."
The same premises were conveyed by f our m esne con veyances to
on £ Sam uel Vadner, who r eceived them in 1885, all tlie_degiis_£pntajning,jlie~&aine description as that given above .
In 1887 Kemp conveyed to the respondent land south of that previously described, by a deed containing the following description : "^eginning_on the west side of Summ it Avenue, at the so ut heast corne r
of land of Samuel Vadner, running westerly on the south line of said
Vadner's land, ei^ht rods to land of Charles Tower (formerly of L-MCanedy) ; thence s outherly on said Tower's land, sixty feet; t hence _
easterly eight rods to Summit Avenue , thence northerly on the wes t
sMe of Summit Avenue, sixty_feet to the place of beginning ."
On June 1, 1890, Vadner conveyed to the respondent the lot east of
the locus by a deed with the following description : *'CgnmTe ncing _a t
th e northe ast, cornerjjf la n ds of s a id Benson, on the west side of Sum mit Avenue; th encg run ning northe rly o n the west line_ of. SuQlHHt
Avenue, about six rods to East Quincy Street ; thence we sterly on
E ast Quincy StreetT sixty feet to stake an dstpnes: thence southerly on
Ijne paralle l wit h the first men tioned line, about =i?^ rn'^'=, t^ i?i"d of ^fiid
grantee; thenceeasterly o n land of said JJcnso n^ sixty feet to pla^£ . of

In

be ginmngj .'

Vadner co nyeyed the lo c us^^to the petitioner by a deed con the following description:
"Eegmnmg on the gnntVi <;ir1p nf
'
East Quincy Street, so called, at a point ot its intersection witJL i^^e-

In

1894

t aining

•chanic

Street (now

Summit

Avenue),

so called;

thence south twelve
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degrees west, o n the wes^ side of a_conte mplated street, six rods to
stake and stone's^ t hencewesterly eighFro^s , to land jormerlx owned
land of Mrs. Por^bAJ^JSlTCanedy : thence northerl y on said land and
on the sout h
easterly
ence
th
ter,> seven rods to said East Quincy Street:
—
27
AiiS.rKOP.
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side of said street, about eight and one- fo urth rods to place of begi nning , except what 1 have sold pfij^taining'tojJti is lot ^f^ lani d to Fred E .
Bensonrof^'|ap^^;^oil'^]Ai lam ^ wi^ degH Tdated Jun eTstT 1890."
"In ISyTTneither^East Quincy Street nor Summit Avenue was a public street. Kemp had opened East Quincy Street as a private way.
After 1£79 bo th^ streets _ffi£r e public st reets, East Quincy Street being
two rods wide. The bill of exceptions states : "T he point of in tersection nf V.^'^f Q m'nry St reet, and Mechanic Street, or Summit Avenue,
in ulXx_lBZQ,^wa s agreed to a s the point m arked on th e annexed sKetc h ,
at, the northeast corner of the lot at the intersectio n of ^^'^^ Qninry
Stree t and Mechanir St^p pt__anH ha s never been changed and is the
point of intersection of the south line of East Quincy Street and west
line of Summit Avenue, as laid out by the City of North Adams, in

J

1879."

The westerly boundar y line of the locus was fixed by a stone wa ll
wli ich wasj jara Tlel to S ummit Avenu e.
The petitioner conte nded that the so utherly line of East Quin cy
Street as laid out by North Adams^wa? in a Hiff^xen Llocation fromj jie
southerly Jin£_ of East Qumcy Street as it was understood tn he hpfn re
t hat time.
The resp ondent contended that that line had not been
changed. Both parties offered evidence in support of their contentions.
The judge ruled as follows, subject to an exception by the respondent : "The desc ription in the petitioner's deed cannot as a phys ical
If the wes tmatte r be Htera lly applied in al l its details to the ground.
erly end of the southerly line be taken fi*^ rnntpnrlpfj for by the re s ponden t at a point on the Canedv la ^rl Hi'^tant pyart ly seven rods frg pj
the southerly line of East Qui ncy Street, then the southerly line will
exceed eight rods in length. If on the other hand the westerly end of
said southerly line be taken at a point on the Canedy land distant exactly eight rods from its point of departure, on the westerly line of
Summit Avenue, then the westerly line on land of Canedy and Porter
will exceed seven rods in length. * * * I rule that the deed is a m-

bigiimisJ'

-g^'

Subject to an exception by the respondent, the judge admitted in
evidence, "so far as it tended to show the location of East Quincy
Street," a deed by Kemp to one Frost dated in 1872. According to the
description in the deed, the north line of East Quincy Street extended
over the east side of Summit Avenue and ran south 79 degrees east,
and the street was three rods wide through the land of Porter.
Subject to a further exce ptionby the respon dent, the judge allow ed
Tinne yTcalled^y the p etitioner, to testlty^^ "that atl he time he bo^h t
hisHa nd, previou slxld£Scribed, from K emp and b ef ore the deed wa s
drawn, he went on the ground with Kemp ; tliat they began at the northeast corner of the lot he was to buy, at the corner of Summit Avenue
and East Quincy Street, and measured south on Surrtmit Avenue, six
rods ; that from there they tu rned a right angle, b ecause Kem p stated
he wanted 'to measure at right angles so thai all the lots would come
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squar e,' and measured e ight rods to the old stone wall on.Canedy land;
t hat they then measured_ .dQ\yn the line of Canedy iand-sevea rods and
stopped there, in nrHp]-, Kpmp c;nir1 to leave roo m for a st reet, Kemp
stating he mi^ht throw the street to the north or to the south, and
t hat he would deed by the st reet so that

if

the street went to the north

Tmney would be the gainer ; that the measurements stopped about one
rod" short of the nearest wheel track, a nd tliat two or three days late r
the deed was drawn, ex ecute d_and^ deli vered ."
the respondent alleged exThe jud^efoun4^_forthe_pet^^

ceptions.

BralEy, J.

The petiti oner by

conveyanc es and the respondent by direc t grant d erive title to their respective lands which are contiguous on the south from a common grantor Sylvester A. Kemp, and
a s the duly recorded deed from him to Tosep h Ti nne y nndpr whnm
th e petitioner claims, an tedates his deed to the re spondent , it follows
upon comparison of the descriptions, that wh en the position o f the d ispu ted southerly line of the petitioner's lot has been ascertained the
northerly line of the respondent's lot also will have been defined, an d
the controversy determined.
It is a familiar rule in the construction of deeds, that, where the land
conveyed is described by courses and distances and also by monuments
which are certain or capable of being made certain, t he monuments
govern, and the measurements if they do not correspond must yield.
Howe V. Bass, 2 Mass. 380, 3 Am. Dec. 59 ; Pernam v. Wead, 6 Mass.
131 ; Mann v. Dunham, 5 Gray, 511, 514; George v. Wood, 7 Allen, 14;
Morse v. Rogers, 118 Mass. 572, 578; Percival v. Chase, 182 Mass.
In its application natural or permanent object s,
371, 65 N. E. 800.
r
rivers
and the sh ore of the sea , nr hig hways o r
s uch as streams o
lands,
or artihcial land marks or si gns such as fences, wall s, a
other
Ime, a building^ or a stake an d stones, are to be treated as mon uments
SStorer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 4 Am. Dec. 155 ; King
or boundaries.
V. King, 7 Mass. 496; Flagg v. Thurston, 13 Pick. 145; Whitman v.
Boston & Maine Railroad, 3 Allen, 133; Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass.
160; Boston v. Richardson, 13 Allen, 146; Needham v. Judson, 101
Mass. 155; Pernam v. Wead, 6 Mass. 131 ; Smith v. Smith, 110 Mass.
302; Charlestown v. Tufts, 111 Mass. 348; Frost v. Angier, 127 Mass.
212.
And their identity may be established by extrinsic evidence.
White V. Bliss, 8 Gush, 510, 512. The only exception recognized i s.
mesne

where, by strict adherence to monuments, the construction is plain ly
i nconsistent with the imgn^gjj^ oTThe parties as expressed by all the
Davi^^^ainsford.
17 Mass. 207: Murdock v.
terms o f the grant.
Chapman, 9 Gray, 156; George v. Wood, 7 Allen, 14.
T he petitioner had the burden of proving himself entitled to regisBigelow Carpet
t ration of the premises as described in the application.
542,
938.
Mass.
95
N.
209
E.
Co. v. Wiggin,
On the face of the deed no uncertainty as to the distances or the location of the monuments or boundaries is disclosed, yet upon applying

_
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the description to the land it be came apparent that the southeriy lin e
m ust run at a njs^ht an^ e westerjy frorn^ the sta kes and stones in th e
west side of Summit Avenue "to land formerly owned by J. M.^C anedj^ o r the call for a distance of eight rods cannot be satisfied . But
if, as claimed by the respondent, this line should run from the stake
and stones to the Canedy land, the abuttal or boundary on the west, at
a point distant seven rods from the south side of East Ouincy Street,
the boundary on the north, it would exceed eight rods, and the ar ea
of jhe petitioner's land called for by his deed w oul d fall correspon di ngly short, as is clearly shown by the first sketch or plan forming part ,
of the exce ption-s .
The parties agreed that, as marked on the plan, the starting point of
the lot was the northeast corner at the intersection of East Ouincy
Street with Summit Avenue, w hich never had been changed , ^nd jjie
r espondent's exception to the admission of the d e_e_d of K emp to Pat tie
D . Frost would seem to havebecome injtnaterial.
It was , howeyer,

a d mitted !
St the date of the deed to Frost East Quincy
Street, although a private way opened by the grantor was a boundary
common to the land conveyed to her as well as to the tract, a part of
which was later deeded to the respondent, an d grants of adjacent pre mi ses even between strangers are admissible where the location of t he
I gnd for which registration is sought is in disput e. Sparhawk v. Bullard, 1 Mete. 95, 100; Devine v. Wyman, 131 Mass. 7Z.
The northerly boundary and point of beginning being certain, the
easterly boundary was the west side of the avenue, measuring six
The termini and length of the first course
rods to a stake and stones.
were thus fixed, and th e_ stak e and stones from which the seco nd or
iTo fursoutherly co u rse sta rts l ocat es andjcont rols the. easterlY_end.
ther description is given, and the pres umption is that this cour se , wh ateverJlijeJuterior an gle m ay be, ran straig ht to the land on the west, although it_coiild^not b e (Reflected by parol evidence to ajpoint north of
t he Caned y land . Allen v. Kingsbury, 16 Pick. 235; Jenks v. Morgan,
Henshaw v. Mul6 Gray, 448; Hovey v. Sawyer, 5 Allen, 554, 555.
ens, 121 Mass. 143. The a ngle ofdeparture however is not given., a nd,
party is not irregular, but when
eac
a s the southe rl y line cla imed
materi al
landmark
from
to landmark,
projected extended directly
westerly
course
iscrepancy in the measu rem ent of the third or
wou ld
taken
A latent amb igu ity, as th
caused wh hever po siti on
been developed which could be removed only
udge properly ruled,

e

.

is

j

a

h
d

e

ic

b d

a

h

jjy

properly

;

;

;

1

by proof of extrin sic facts . Frost v. Spaulding, 19 Pick. 445, 31 Am.
DecTl 5U Stone v."Clark, Mete. 378, 35 Am. Dec. 370; Stevenson v.
Erskine, 99 Mass. 367; Miles v. Barrows, 122 Mass. 579; Graves v.
Broughton, 185 Mass. 174, 69 N. E. 1083 "Haskell v. Friend, 196 Mass.
Weeks v. Brooks, 205 Mass. 458, 462, 463, 92 N.
198, 81 N. E. 962
E. 45. Compare Hall v. Eaton, 139 Mass. 217, 29 N. E. 660.
It appears from the chain of title that Kemp, when the owner of the
entire tract shown by the plan, first conveyed the portion lying north -
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erly of the respondent's land to Joseph Tinney, and the declarations, of
Kemp to Tinnev made while measuring the land , and contemporaneous with the giving of the deed, "that from there/' meanin g the st ake
and stones, "thev turned a right angle because Kemp stated he wanted
t o measure at right angles so th at all the lots would come sq uare, and
measured eight rods to the old stone wall on the Canedy land," was
c learly admissible.
Abbott v. Walker, 204' Mass. 71, 7Z, 90 N. E. 405,
814;
Blake v. Everett, 1 Allen, 248; Davis v. Sher26 L. R. A. (N. S.)
man, 7 Gray, 291.
The su bsequent_ conyeyance _£OsggiP_to the resp ondent also shows a rectan gular lot, and thedescription is co nfirmatoj-y of the grantor's previou sly e xpr esseid purpose in fixing t he s hape
o f the lots, that the respondent's northerlv line should run at a right . .
4jji-^"^'
angle with the westerly sid e ot Summit Avenue, and not_at an acute ^
respond ent cont ends.
^HK'^.S- ^.^ th£^
The adverse finding of fact of which the respondent complains, that
the southerly line should be established as contended for by the petitioner, having been warranted by the evidence, is conclusive, and the
d ecision that the petitio ner had theji^i^to have tusjitle ^onfiimed^ and
reg^istered as described in the application shows,, no error of law .
American Malting Co. v. Souther Brewing Co., 194 Alass. 89, 8Q N. E.
526 ; Rev. Laws, c. 128, § Z7,
^
^^
^^/^^
X^ --^"-^-t^
Exc eptions overruled.
(jfictit^^<r*'-^'h^ Cl.^.'C^r^^u~e^

/

SIZER

v.

DEVEREUX.

(Supreme Court of New York, 1853.

'

^

16 Barb. 160.)

This action was br ought to recover an undivided fourteenth part o f
much of the larfd (j-nvered bv the Devereux block in the city o f
"
original lines of Hotel street . On the trial, at
L[tic^ as lies within the
the Oneida circuit, in October, 1851, before Justice Gridley, the defendant's counsel, at the close of the testimony on both sides, move d
f or a nonsuit . The justice granted it ; remarking, among other things,
that as it appeared by the map referred to in the description of the
lands conveyed by the origmal deeds of 94 and 95, t hat those lots lay
upon the easterly line of Hotel street, a conveyance of the lots bv th e
d escription and reference contained in the deed, gave to the grantee th e
land lyingbetween the lots and the middle of the street . The plaintiffs
excepted, and on a bill of exceptions, moved for a new trial.
Gridley, J. Mrs. Sizer, one of the plaintiff s, is one of the heirs
at law of John Mappa, deceased ; and s he seeks to recover in this a cti on, for her share as such, the one-fourteenth part of a piece of lan d
c overed by a part of the building known as the Devereux block : and
being a part of Hotel street, in the city of Utica. The defend ant owns
the premises si tuated on both sides of the street opposite tKe piece o f
land i n question ! The plaintiff, however, insists that her ancestor never
so
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with the legal titl e to the site of the street; and that she, as his
heir, is entitled to recover in this action her interest in it. Several questions were discussed on the argument, which we do not propose to
examine. The case, we think, may be disposed of, without reference
to them.
Hotel street , in the city of Utica, was laid out as a public highway,
and recorded in the office of the town clerk of the town of Whitestown,
on the sixth day of April, 1801.
Previous to the laying out of this
highway, the proprietors of the tract had procured a survey to be made,
and a map to be constructed, by Calvin Guiteau, and filed with the cler k
of the court in which a space was laid off, for Hotel street ; _ and lo ts
were laid out upon it ; from which map sales were made to purchaser s,
and the lots were described in the deeds bv reference to that map an d
survey . The premises in question consisted of parts of village lots 94
and 95, as designated on the map ; and w ere respectivelv described a s
f ollows, in two deeds executed by the original proprietors, which tit le
has descended through several mesne conveyances to the defendant. _a s
was admitted on the trial . The deed conveying lot 94, bears date on
the twenty-eighth day of April, 1803, in which the premises conveyed
"
are described in the following manner :
All that certain piece or pa rcel of land situate, lying and being in the village of Utica, county of
Oneida, and state of New York^ known and distinguished bv a surv ey
made thereof by Calvin Guiteau, in the year one thousand seven hun dred and ninety-eight, and on a map of said land filed in the clerk's
office of t he county, by lot 94 . Beginning at the S. E. corner of No. 93,
and runs from thence north fifty-three degrees and fourteen minutes,
W. fifty-seven feet. Thence S. 36 degrees 15 minutes, W. sixty feet.
Thence south fifty- three degrees fifteen seconds, East twenty-nine feet,
to tlie Genesee road. Then No. sixty degrees East along the side of the
same, to the place of beginning."
Lot No. 95 was conveyed by defid.
bearing date September 24th, 1802. in which the premises were described as "All that certain lot or piece of ground situated in the village of
Utica, and county of Oneida, known by a survey made thereof by
Calvin Guiteau, in the year one tliousand seven hundred and ninetyeight, by lot No. 95. Beginning at the S. E. comer of 94, runs thence
north 53 degrees 45 minutes W. twenty-nine feet ; thence S. thirty-six
degrees 15 minutes west, sixty- four feet, to the Genesee road; thence
along the side of the same N. sixty degrees E. to the place of beginIt will be observed that though Genesee street is named in
ning."
these deeds, and the boundary of the la ndf^ rlp'^rrihpH k gtat^d t^ ^""
along the side of the Genesee r oad, ypt Hntpl qtrppt i<; not naryipd \v
either of tjiern ; but the boundary of the lots is described as running
a certain course for a certain distance, referring to the survey and map
on file; which, on inspection, g hj2\v these lot^ bounded on the space laj d
out as Hotel street j , which descriptions are, by the »;ptt1pH rnnstpirtinn.q.
rnnmnor,' 'j^
t o be read_as tho ugh the boundar y -b?id .been df"ifribfd ^°
Hotel street, and'aTong thesaid street," on the given courses, and f^
'p arted

\>^,^^^^,^/^'^
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tl^e given distances . This is a significant distinction, and as we shall
see by and by, is quite decisive of the rights of the parties in this cause.
We are to inquire what is the legal construction of deeds whicti de - _
s cribe the boundaries, adjacent to Hotel street, bv cour s es and distances
.
merely. Does such a description convey the land to the center of Hotel
street, or does it convey the land only up to the eastern side of it? ,
We believe the uniform construction of words, such as are employed
in this description ,ig, that the convevance extends to the center of th e
high way. Such words as are used to describe the premises on the side
next Hotel street, not only have never been construed to limit the grant
to the side of the street, b ut have been uniformlv regarded bv the courts
as a conveyance to the center of the street . The general rule on this
subject IS laid down in Kent's Commentaries, (3 vol. 432,) in these
words : "T he law with respect to public highways and to fresh wate r
r ivers, ij the same. The ow ners of the land on each side go to the cen(I2--^Z"^^
t er of the road."
The language oTthe court in Jackson v. Hathaway,
15 John. 454, 8 Am. Dec. 263, and the same is re-affirmed in the court
for the correction of errors, in Child v. Starr, 4 Hill, 369, is as follows :
"Where a farm is bounded along a highway, or upon a highway, or is
described as running to a highway, there is reason to intend that the
Ch. Kent says, (supra,)
parties meant the middle of the highway."
•'T he ijjea of an intention in a grantor to withhold his interest in .a
r oad to the mid^31e of it. after parting with all his right to the adj oining land, IS never to.be presumed : it would be contrarv to univers al
^^
p ractice.
2^
JSlgygrtl^l ess ^ grant mav be so worded as to exclude th e
highwav fro m the terms of the convevance. And it was held in Child
V. Starr, 4Hnr, "359, and 5 Denio, 600, th at where land is describe d
'^^^-'•«''
a s running to the side of a road, or to the bank of a river, and then
v.
-^-♦^^-^
fhp
roarl or bank the road or bank is excluded by the /^^<^ -'^^a long th^ ■^iHp of
t erms of the grant . We see, therefore, that when premises are de- ,^^/^,^
y»'-^
road,"
includes
road,
scribed as running "to a
and along a
the grant
the road to the center ; whereas, if the boundary were t o the sid e of
c'J^^ o jr the road, and al ong the_.s.id e of the road, the road is excluded, by the
1^ cx^ . /t^
terms of the conveyance. T he description of the lots in question, on
th ^ side of Genesee street, running to the side of the street, and along
t he side of the street, conveys no part of that street.
That was a turn- — 4^1 ^^ C-lr-»-^
road;
and
the
own
and
pike
proprietors did not
had no right to
The
convey it; and hence the significant phraseology of the deed.
act was not so, however, with respect to Hotel street.
The proprietor
wned the soil of that street, and they adopt
description which by th
stablished construction, of the words carries the grantee to the center
that streetjy The boundary on the side of Hotel street
equivalent
to
description in words of premises running "t Hotel stree and
al ong Hotel stree t." It
fixed by courses and distances, without namcase as this, the very point
ing Hotel street at all. And in just such
was decided by the supreme court of Connecticut, in the case of
Champlin v. Pendleton, 13 Conn. 23, 25, 27. The question was, whetha
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There
another view of this question that leads to the same conclusion and
The deequally conclusive in favor of the defendant.
scription refers to the map made by Calvin Guiteau and on file in the
office of the clerk of the county.
in evidence, and exhibit
hat map
th premises in question as lying adjacent to Hotel street This map
therefore
by legal intendment,
description of the premises as
bounded on Hotel street, and demands
construction precisely the
same as though the description was so written out in words.
This
stated and illustrated in the case of Varick v. Smith,
principle
Paige, 550, 553, where the premises, which consisted of two separate
pieces of land, were described, the one as "lot No.
laid down and
delineated on
map filed, &c., as adjacent and extending to the Osand the other as "blocks No. 78, 90, 99, 103 of the village
wego river
of West Oswego as the same have been surveyed and designated on the
map of the said village filed in the office of the secretary of state." The
jj/ice chancellor, in his opinion, in discussing this point, uses the following language: "A n exemplified copy of the said map has been give n
n evidence, which exhibits"^ these blocks as adjoining the n^^pf •^^^^i<'
consider as equivalent to
description that, in terms bounds th^ m
on the river?
This position of the vice chancellor was denied by the
counsel of the defendant, on the argument of the appeal. But the chancellor affirmed the doctrine asserted by the vice chancellor, and said
refers for its location to the map of the town"The patent for No.
ship of Hannibal, filed in the surveyor general's office, and upon that
bounded generally on the Oswego or Onondaga rivers.
map the lot
the same, therefore, as
This
the patent had in terms bounded the
land granted by the river, without restriction or limitation, which
would legally have carried the grant to the center of the stream."
*'The patent for the blocks in West Oswego also refers in tlie same
a

a

is,

a

7

9

is

1i

;"

a

i

i

if

is

is

7

:

^

I

^

-

e

s

is

T

is

is

^

g

t

it
is

i

it

a

a

t

s

it,

er a line not described as running on a street, but which was proved
on the trial to run on a street, in fact, was to be construed as carrying
the grant to the middle of such street, and the court held that it should
be so construed.
The court, after saying t hat the general principle wa s,
t hat a description which carried the boundary "to a street, and along a
proceeded to lay dow n
s treet," embraced the street, to the center of
he doctrine that where it turns out in the evidence that the course
street
a nd distances given in
deed do, in fact, carry the boundary to
along
street,
expressed
and
itis the same in law as though were
that
n word s.
Applying that principle to the case at bar, we see that the courses
and distances given in the deeds do. in fact, carry tlie boundary to Hoin law
el street, and along Hotel street. It follows therefore that
the same as though the boundary were described to run "to Hotel
street, and along Hotel street," in words.
The consequence is, that by
th settled construction of the words and phrases used in describin
he premises adjacent to Hotel street, the grant
carried to th center
nf that <;frpef
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manner, to a map on file in the office of the secretary of state, which
This case
map bounds these blocks on the river, without restriction."
i s therefore a direct and conclusive authority in favor of the principl e
on which the question in this case turns .
Yhere is only one objection to this result, which remains to be considered ; and that is the fact th at the distance given in the deeds woul d
o nly carry the grant to the side of Hotel street, instead of carrving. it
t o the center . This objection, it will be seen, is founded on the idea
that whenever it appears by the express words of the grant, or by a
j^
map which exhibits the premises as running to the road, the road itself
is excluded.
This we have already seen to be an error. The road
fOm—^Jj oO
st reet is in the n atui^g^ of a monument, and overrides and controls the .
^_
^
^
courses and distances ; and by a fixed and settled construction premise s Z**"*^**-^
d escribed as running to a road are carried by the conveyance itself to *« C. W-<rvu«u»
t he center of the highway.
The case of Herring v. Fisher, 3 N. Y.
Super. Ct. 344, 348, illustrates and answers the objection founded on
both these grounds.
The deed in that case stated the premises as beginning at a certain road and running along the road. Oakley, Ch. J.,
aftei* laying down the general rule to which we have adverted, proceeds
to remark that "if the deed of lot No. 9 had in express terms declared
the boundary to begin at the side of the road, still by virtue of the following words 'running along the road,' the line must be held to run
T he plaintiff, however, co nte nds tha t
along the center of the road.
th ere are two circumstances that tend to indicate an intention to ex clude the road. It refers to the map ; and by the map the road is laid
down col ored red , and the land appears to run up to the road and not
to the center of it ; and secondly, that t he distanc e given of the line of
the premises running to the road, would exclude the road. But as to
the latter circumstance it is of little moment. The distances can neve r
b e safely relied on as affording the means of correctly Inrating i-h p
l andj and they are resorted to only when other means fail, as courses
and monuments.
But the propriety of this rule is strongly illustrated
in the present instance. Two of the lines of lot No. 9 are incorrectly
"As to the map we do not consider it can affect the construcgiven,"
tion of the deed. It is not usual, when a map is made of a farm boundTh e
ed by a road, to include any part of the road within the lines.
pr incipal object of th e map is to show the extent of the be neficial own ,JL
occupanc y.
e rship of the propriet or,_ _and of his right to exclusive
W hen a map has a road forming one of the sides of a farm, jp judg
ment of law it includes one-half the road, thoup-h the line marked o n
A map in this respect is like a
the map would seem to exclude^ it.
deed."
v. McSee also the same principle put forth in Hammond
Lachlan, 3 N. Y. Super. Ct. 323. This seems to dispose of the objections we have been considering.
T here are other questions — as, whether ejectment, being a possessory action, will lie for part of a street, and
also the questions arising on the dedication of the road to the public,.
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and the implied exclusion of all right of the plaintiff to take possession
if he should recover it. But we do not deem it necessary to discuss these questions.

of it

New trial

/

denied.^*

/

BANGOR HOUSE PROPRIETARY
(Supremo

T respass for
t herefrom

In

Judicial Court of

tapping

IMaine, 1S51.

the plaintiff's aqueduct

v.

BROWN.

33 Me. 309.)

and drawing wa ter

.

of a tract of land, in the city of Bangor,
to dr aw a plan of it and to de signate streets and

1829, the proprietors

caused one Bradley

buildingJiils_thereon.
deeds.
S ojan

after

They then recorded

the plan was made, one

the plan in the registry

of

of said streets, now called Cent re
but it has not been kept in repa if,

st reet, was built by said proprieto r s,
aiid o nly one part of it is used asa stree t.
The lot No. 17, bounded southerly on Centre street, "as laid down in
said plan," was conveyed in 1832, by the proprietors to Elliott Valentine. A part of N o. 17, and bounded on the street, is now owned by hg
defendant under that conveyance, and his dwelling house sta nds upon jt.
A portion of Centre street, remote from tlie defendant's house, and

J

11 See Com'rs for Land Tax v. Railway Co., [1913] A. C. .Sf54, 379. where the
land conveyed was designated as colored pink on a map, the said colored portion extending only to the side of the highway.
"Under the rule established by this court, as well as of other courts cited
below, th .e important fact in the conveyance which raises t he presumption of an
i ntent to convey the bed of a navigable stream, or the street or highway, in
front of the land conveyed, is that the side of the street or BTglvvViry76r t he
fbp binds
i-Iip sidp
l5ank of the navigable stream, is in fact the bounda ry pn
cff
d'escrlbed in the deed next to such street or stream, or that S4ich si «Jp of tlie
s treet or bank of the stream is included within the boundaries mentioned in th e
deed on the side next thereto, although the line of the tract as describeOn
the deed may extend beyond the side of thp strppt. or hnnk of the river inti)
The fac-t that the line of the tract of land conveyed as
the street or river.
described in the deed is a straight line from point to point, by course and distance, on the side next the river or street, and that no mention is made of th e
r iver or street, does not, of itself, overcome the presumption of an in tent to
cmiveF To tlie center of the river or street, if such line be in fact substantiall y
cpincident_with the side of the street or th e bank o£ the river, and exten ds
" TVnrpvnss v'Cnlirfhs: 65 Wis. 599, 610, 27 N. W.
tcTor into such river or gtrppf;
per Taylor, J. The case involved the boundary
Rep.
(1S86),'
t)42
^(K), 5B Ain.
on a stream, the description by metes and bounds extending to the stream,
but not mentioning it. Railway Co. v. Piatt, 53 Ohio St. 254, 41 N. E. 243, 29
L. R. A. 52 (1895), acc
As to boundaries on railroad rights of way, see Center Bridge Co. v. Wheeler,
86 Conn. 585, 86 Atl. 11 (1913) ; Maynard v. Weeks, 41 Vt. 617 (1868).
As to boundaries on canals, see Goodyear v. Shanahan, 43 Conn. 204 (1875) ;
Lawson v. Mowry. 52 Wis. 219, 9 N. W. 280 (1881).
As to boundaries on natural ponds, see School Trustees v. Schroll, 120 111.
509, 12 N. E. 243, 60 Am. Rep. 575 (1887) ; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 11
See, also, Lowell v. Robinson. 16 Me.
Sup. Ct. 808, 8.38, 35 L. Ed. 428 (1891).
357, 33 Am. Dec. 671 (1839), where the pond was formed by a mill dam. Cf.
Boardman v. Scott, 102 Ga. 404, 30 S. E. 982, 51 L. R. A. 178 a897).
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that portion only, has been laid out and accepted by the city, as a public street.
In 1834. the plaintiffs laid an aqueduct running along in Centr e
rpllar r>f tji^ir
s treet, at the depth of six feet below thp piirfapPj tr. *^f^
hotelj
The evidence pr oved that the defendant cut the aqueduct pipe. Iving
within the northern half of the street, and in front of his own hous e.
The defendant contended, that as his premises were bounded upon
righ
and gave him
the street, his title extended to the centre of
tap, and even to remove the aqueduct. The Judge ruled that the de-
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fense was not made out, and the defendant excepted —
SheplEy, C.
An aqueduct, owned by the plaintiffs appears to
street, formerly called Centre street, in front of
have passed through
than the centre of th
the defendant's dwelling house, n earer to
treet^ and about six feet below the surface of the earth.
A lot of land numbered seventeen,
part of which constitutes the
defendant's house lot, was conveyed by the owners to Elliott Valentine,
on September 28, 1832, bounded "southerly on Centre street, there
laid down on
plan drawn by
measuring 120 feet," "as the same
he title of the defendant
Zebulon Bradley, in December, 1829."
erived from Valentine .
The owners of land, including this lot, caused Bradley to draw
plan
building lots an
designate upon
thereof in December, 1829, and
hey soon afterwards caused Centre street to be prepared fo
ti-eets.
use as
street or way .
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As the law has been established in this State, when land conveyed
extends to the centre of the highway
where
bounded on
highway,
pla n.
street or way existing only by designation on
bounded on
does not extend to the centre of suc
or as marked upon the earth,
wa
The occasion of such difference in effect may be ascertained. The
to be surveyed and designated as
owner of land, who has caused
containing lots and streets, may not be able to dispose of the lots as he
anticipated, and he may appropriate the land to other uses or he may
change the arrangement of his lots and streets to promote his own interest, or the public convenience in case the streets should become highlot bounded on such
wa
ways. He does not by the conveyance of
intimation
hold out any
to the purchaser, that he
entitled to the se
of highwav to be kept in repair, not at his own, but at the public xpense, for the common use of all. While he does by an implied covenant assure to him the use of such designated way in the condition in
which
repurchase
may be found, or made at his own expense. By
of that title, the former owner would be entitled to close up such way,
release of the right of way.
as he would also by obtaining
here
no indication in such cases of an intention on the part
he grantor to dispose of any more of his estate dian
included by
he description, with
right of way for its convenient use
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expected to be pe rmanent, the intention to have it ext e nd to the centre of it is inferre d,
(among other reasons noticed by this Court in former cases,) from
tlie consideration that the vendor does not convey or assure to the venee a right of way, the law affording him in common with others a
nore permanent and safe public way, to be kept in repair at he
^ public expense.
The vendor not being burdened by an implied co ve nant, that the vendee shall have a right of way, has no occasion to re tain the fee of the highway for that purpose. Hence arises one motive
inducing him to convey all the rights, which he can convey to land

When

a

lot con v eyed is bounded on

a highway

i

.^_,^^
yl>**^-«

j^,^ fl
iK^>'.

J.

.

covered by the highway.
■
In argument for the defendant it is insisted, that Centre streets at
t he time of the conveyance had become a highway by dedication oiJ :he
o wners of the land.
It might be sufficient to observe, that such a position does not appear to have been presented at the trial, for decision by the jury or
for instruction by the Court.
Without insisting upon this, the testimony presented in the bill of
exceptions does not sustain the position.
If an owner of land should cause it to be surveyed into lots and
streets, and a plan thereof to be made, and should also cause the
streets to be made convenient for use, and continue to keep the land
enclosed as his own property, it would not be contended, that a dedication of it to the public could be inferred from these acts.
Xjiere
rnust be some act of the owner, from which it can be clearly inferred .
that he intended to surrender it for public use, and not for the use o f
certain persons only . The simple facts, that a person pursued such a
course respecting his land, and that he opened a way for the use of a
purchaser of a lot, w ould not, alone considered, authorize an infe rence that it was dedicated to the public for common use. . There shou ld
be some evidence, that it was generally used with his knowledge, a s
such a conclusio n.
p ublic convenience might require, to authorize
adopt such streets
to
and
owner
accept
Nor could the
compel the public
they
had been commoj ily
as highways.
There should be evidence that
u sed to authorize an inference, that they had been accepted as publ ic
ways.__

In this

case, there is not only no evidence that Centre

street at the

time of the conveyance of the defendant's lot to Valentine had

been

used as a public way, but there is evidence, that it was not kept in re pair^ and that part of it only is used as a stre et.
Exceptions overruled, and judgm ent on the \&v6.\zt.^*( .^^ fi£4AA>*Xt^j
12 Hopkinson v. McKni?ht, 31 N. J. Law, 422 (1S66) ; Robinson v. Jilyers, 67 Pa.
d (1871) ; Plumer v. Johnston, 63 ]\Iich. 165, 173, 29 N. W. 6S7 (18S6), dictum,
Johnson v. Arnold, 91 Ga. 659, 18 S. E. 370 (1893) ; Stark & Wales v.
ace.
Coffin, 105 Mass. 328 (1870) ; Bissell v. New York Cent. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 61
(1861) ; Jarstadt v. Morgan, 48 Wis. 245, 4 N. W. 27 (1879) ; Paine v. Consumr
ers Forwarding & Storage Co., 71 Fed, 626, 19 O. C. A. 99 (1895), contra.
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WEST END TRUST CO.

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

1909.

224 Pa. 554, 73

Atl.

971, 24

L. R. A.

[N. S.] 539.)

Ca se stated in ejectment to determine title to the bed of an alley in

t he' ninth ward of the city of Philadelphia.
The following plan shows the situation of

3ouTH

Pe.Hn

the

Before Audenried,
alley:

J.

Scxii'^RE-

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Err or assigned was in entering judgment for defendants on the

case

s tate4,

Potter, J. This was an amicable action of ejectment, brought to
re coy^.r possession of a strip of ground, three feet in width and eighty
f eet in depth^ situa ted on the west side of Broad street, fifty-nine fee t
south of its intersection with South Penn square, in the city of Philadelphia. The parties agreed upon a case stated, which disclosed the
following facts : On Ap ril 21, 1832, Robert A. Cald cleugh conveyed to
various grantees, fiye lots of ground .situated on South Penn square
west of Broad street, each twenty feet in width, the corner lot and th e
t hree lots nearest to it being fifty-nine feet in depth and the wester nsixty-two feet deep. Each of the first four lots was described
most lot
in the deeds as e xtending "to a three feet wide alley laid out and
o pened by the said Robert A. Caldcleugh for the accommodation o f
t his_ and other lots adjoining thereto and leading westward from th e
s aid Broad street to the depth of eighty feet ."
Each of the five deeds
contained a gr ant of "the free use and privilege of the said three fee t
wide alley as and for a passageway and water course in common with
'
.t he owners and occupiers of the said adjoining lots/

^a-^'f

^
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From the date of the deeds each of the owners of the lots continued
to have, use and enjoy the free and uninterrupted use and privilege of
t he allev as and for a passageway and watei^ course in rnmmnn yyith
t he owners and occupiers

four lots .
Robert O'Neill" acquired title to

of

the other

the premOn November 11, 1846,
h
n Tune
the
me buum
south
and
aiiu
o ii
u
on
26.
1848.
the
me
ises
iu
adjoining
aiiey
alley
aajommg
Caldcleug
/M''^^J^
the soil of the alley in. fee, subject to t he uses an d
con^^cHoQ^Nein
On August 9,
p molegesg^nte^o the owners of the lots adjoining.
^
onveyed
premises
south of the
o
ne
the
Wickersham
to
1849. O'Neill c
//*/
*
alley "together with the fr ee and common use andprivilege of the
y
aforesaid three feet wide alley as and for a passageway and water
^.^A**'^
into and from Broad street at all times forever."
course
^^^/4^
S ubsequently, bv various conveyances, three of the lots next t he
-^Z
co rner ongmally granted by Caldcleugh became vested in the We st
End Trust Company and t hp nthp-r two lots, as well as the premise s
south of the alley, granted by O'Neill to Wickersham. became vestf d
in the Girard Tru st Company . Both companies made use of the soil
of the alley in connection v/ith buildings erected on their respective
premises, and o n October 6, 1905, they entered into an agreemen t
."Xf^ with each other.^'that the said alley be and the same is hereby ab anThe plaintiits are the heirs at law of Robert
\^J\J(^* ^»f doned and vacated ."
r*0'Neill, grantee of Caldcleugh by the deed of June 26, 1848, and the
defendants are the West End Trust Company and the Girard Trust

'/^

I

yi^

(^

f^

*Jl

^j[ji/^

Company,

Up on

I

h

f

pf

if

f

is

a

Atl. 1096]."
why, thfi same rule should not apply to land
We_can see no reason
The doctrine was
vvhichis conveyed as bounded by
private way.
[61
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the facts stated, the court below held that each of the grantee
fjfp sinrnj
Caldcleugh,
under the four deeds of April 21. 1832. took,
>^,^^ "^
ground in dispute as lay immediately in the rea
much
of
i
tle
to
so
the
^^ ^^^^
v''^. ^
the lot he bought, subject to an easement m the owners of the other
ts^ and that Caldcleugh parted with all his interest at that time, and
"^/f^"^
V^
n
title to the soil of the alley passed by the deed of Caldcleugh to
yNeill on Tune 26. 1848 . Judgment was entered on the case stated
^
^-^
ior the defendants, and the plaintiffs have appealed.
•^
public highway, the grantees of
the alley in question had been
^f^
'^
land bounded thereby would without doubt have taken the fee to the
•^
the grantor owned such fee, and had used
center of the highway,
no language in his deed indicating an intention to retain the fee in
In one of our latest cases bearing on this question, Wilthe highway.
lock V. Beaver Valley R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 590, 595, 72 Atl. 237, 238,
lots in the present case had
our Brother Elkin said: "I the plan,
been laid out by an individual in precisely the same manner as the co m•
monwealth had done, and lots had been sold with streets as boun dries, the title to the fee to the center o.f the streets wo uld ave passed
the rule of our cases. from Paul v. Carver,
to the purchaser.
This
26 Pa. 223 [69 Am. Dec. 413], to Neely v. Philadelphia, 212 Pa. 551

^
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substantially adopted by this court, in Ellis v. Academy of Music, 120
Pa. 608, 623, 15 Atl. 494, 496 (6 Am. St. Rep. 739), where it was
said : "Nor did the court err in charging that parties who are entitled
to a free use of an alley, have the same right in it that the public has
in its highways, and that if the way in this case were vacated, the soil
would belong to the plaintiff and defendant as tenants in common.
By the several grants to these parties, their properties were not only
bounded on the alley in controversy, but it was made appurtenant to
Nothing, therefore, was left in the owner, and i f ^i^**^25^i
those properties.
The
t he fee did not ve st in these grantees, it is hard to tell where it is.
case is very much like that of Holmes v. Bellingham, reported in 7
The direction com C. B. (N. S.) 329, in which Cockburn, C.
says
judge
told the iurv that there was
ained of is. that the learned
p resumption in the case of
private wav or occupation road betwee n
that
soil
of
the road belongs usque ad medium to
the
properties,
vyo
That proposihe owners of the adjoining property on either side
shall presently mention,
tion, subject to the qualification which
and which
take
was necessarily involved in what afterwards fell
correct one . The same
in my opinion,
from the learned judge,
the foundation of
principle which applies to public road, and which
the doctrine, seems to me to apply with equal force to the case of
private road.' As the doctrine here stated seems to be reasonable and
seems to
sound, we cannot understand why we should not adopt it.
e arlpiittpH thaf. were the alley public, its vacation would vest in each
the parties the unincumbered one-half of the fee in severalty, and
private way, where, just as in the cas
why this should not apply to
was made appurtenant to the severa
public way, by the grant
"
The reference above to the plainroperties, we cannot understand.
tiff and defendant as being ^nants in common^of the soil in the alley
in case
was vacated, was^ prpbably
slip of the pen^s later in the
stated that vacation would vest in each of the parties oneopinion
half of the fee in severalty.
In Rice v. Clear Spring Coal Co., 186 Pa. 49, 40 Atl. 149, the rule
"
When the boun dwhich was approved by this court was thus stated
^t-^ti^:?^
ry given in deed has physical extent, as road, street, or other mo neument having width, courts will so interpret the language of the
apparent
contrary
intent,
any
of
as to carry
s^cription, in the absence

of

e

is

a

a

Q

t

t

a

t

And in
he fee of the land to the center line of such monument."
Schmoele v. Betz, 212 Pa. 32, 61 Atl. 525, 108 Am. St. Rep. 845, a
case which involved the use of
private alley, the doctrine was again
cited with approval, that, in case of vacation, he rule which appl ies
to be applied as between parties entitled to the us
public highway
private alley."

;

;

2

:

9

13 See Fisher v. Smith,
Grav, 441 (18.57); McKenzie v. Gleason, 184
Freeman v. Sayre, 48
452, 69 N. E. 1076, 100 Am. St. Eep. 566 (1904)
Law, o7, Atl. 650 (1886) Stockwell v. Fitzgerald, 70 Vt. 468, 41 Atl. 504
Wiess v. (Joodhue, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 142, 102 S. W. 793 (1907),
(semble)

Mass.
N. J.
(1895)

hold-
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In some of our cases, the language used appears to sustain the contention of appellants, that there is a distinction between a call for a.
public highway as a boundary, and a private street or alley, so designated. But yye think upon examination that these decisions were np t
intended to go further, than to hold that where l ^rid i^; rnnvpyprl-^a^
bounded by an unopened street, the grantee takes the fee only to the
Thus in Cole v.
s ide line of the street, with an easement over its be d.
199 Pa. 464, 49 Atl.* 308, the deed called for a street
Philadelphia,
which was unopened, and it was held that the call for an unopene d
only conveyed the title to the side of the stree t
s treet as a boundary
In Clymer v. Roberts, 220 Pa. 162, 69
a nd not to the middle thereof .
Atl. 548, the deed called for "the middle line of Howard street fifty
feet wide ; thence along the middle line of said Howard street." Howard street was at the time an unopened street, but it was held that the
purpose of making the boundary to be the middle line of the street was
to vest the fee in the grantee as far as the center line, notwithstanding the fact that the street was at the time unopened. In Robinson v.
Myers, 67 Pa. 9, where the rule with regard to unopened streets seems
to have been first laid down, this distinction is expressly made.
Justice Williams, after stating the doctrine of Paul v. Carver, 26 Pa. 223,
67 Am. Dec. 413, and Cox v. Freedley, 23 Pa. 124, 75 Am. Dec. 584,
■said, with reference to the case then before him:
"But in this case
there was no alley or street by which the lots were bounded.
The
recorded plan which is to be taken as a part of the defendant's title
shows that the ground in question is a lot, and not a street. • And it
is admitted that no alley was ever laid out over the lot, or ever used
There is then no ground or
by the public or by private individuals.
reason for the application of the rule laid down in Paul v. Carver, to
this case." The case of Van O'Linda v. Lothrop, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.)
292, 32 Am. Dec. 261, cited in Robinson v. Myers, and also by Justice Mercur in Spackman v. Steidel, 88 Pa. 453, relied on by appellants,
was also a question of an unopened street. IMorton, J., said (21 Pick.
296, 32 Am. Dec. 261) : "The street did not then exist in actual use, but
The decision there seems to have gone upon the
only in contemplation."
same rule applips whprp hn^^ndary is upon a private wav as in the cases i nvbiYmg public ways . In Gould v. Wagner, 19(5 Mass. LJ70, 82 N. E. lO (lyU'O, tne
lot was described as situated "on" a way five feet wT.de; despite the fact that
the way was on the margin of the grantor's land, only half of it passed under
Two justices, however, dissented on the ground that the entire way
the deed.
should have passed. See Albert v. Thomas, 7.3 Md. 181, 20 Atl. 912 (1890).
As to what will be sufficient to overcome the presumption that at least half
of the wav shall pass, see Stearns v. 'Mulien. 4 Gray (IMass.) 151 (18.55); Codman v. Evans, 1 Allen CMass.) 443 (1861) ; Crocker v. Cotting, 166 Mass. 183, 44
N. E. 214, 33 L. R. A. 245 (1896) ; Mott v. Mott, 68 N. Y. 246 (1877).
T hat in case of boundaries unon private w^avs the same rule as i" the case
o f pjiblic ways is not applicable, see Seery v. WaterbuiT. 82 Conn. 567, 74 Atl.
908, 25 LrR. A. (N. S.) 681, IS Ann. Cas. 73 (1900) ; Ames v. Hilton, 70 Me. 30
(1879) ; Winslow v. Reed, 89 Me. 67, 35 Atl. 1017 (1896).
See also Taylor v. Armstrong, 24 Ark. 102 (1863) ; In re Robbins, 34 Minn. 99,.
24 N. W. 856, 57 Am. Rep. 40 (1885) ; Ilealey v. Babbitt, 14 R. I. 533 (1884).
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ground that the deeds showed an intention by the grantor to exckide
the fee of the street from the grant.
I n the present case the lang;-uage of the deeds frorii Caldcleugh, a<; se t

f orth in

shows that at the time of the conveyances the
was alreadv "laid out and opened by the said Robert A. Cald ■
ckugh ; and it further appears from the case stated that after the conveyances were made t he owners of the lots continued the use of the JiJ^Ji*-u yO*'-*'^
a lley, and it was not abandoned or va cated until October 6, 190.S, a. pe^^^ yS "
r iod of over seventy-three vears . So that the facts of this case distinguish it clearly from Robinson v. Myers, supra, and the subsequent
When Justice Mercases relating to unopened streets and highways.
cur, in delivering the opinion of this court, in Spackman v. Steidel,
"
Where the street called for a boundary is not a pub 88 Pa. 453, said :
l ic highway, nor dedicated to public use the grantee does not take titl e
but by implication acquires an easement
i n fee to the center of
right of way only over the lands/ and then cites the cases which we
have above referred to (Van O'Linda v. Lothrop, and Robinson v.
apparent that he had in mind cases where the
Myers), we think
street that was unopened, as the two cases which he
deed called for
cites had re ference to such unopened street s.
The authorities are uniformly to the effect that he question .o
whether the grant includes the fee to the bed of the highway,
one of intention . The grantor in the present case did not expressly
■except fronTTiis conveyances the fee of the alley in the rear of the lots
hardly reasonable to suppose that he intended to
conveyed, and
strip
"^
eserve a
at the end of the four lots, three feet wide and eighty
hp
wa<;
which,
ing
so long as
feet lon.s^._ which
to easements
ctnbjprt
laimed by the grantees . _would prevent him from making any beneficia
u se of the fee in the strip, We think
apparent that Caldcleugh in
1832 intended to art with his entire interest in the property, and that
the alley was aid out and opened as stated in his deeds "for the accommodation of this and other lots adjoining thereto."
It will be recalled that the westernmost lot. No.
was described as being sixtytwo feet in depth, and that Caldcleugh did not reserve the three feet at
•
the rear of that lot.
he had intended to reserve to himself the fe
^^^^
the alley, he would naturally have reserved the same space in th
KO X4m*««v-«^«^
ear of lot No, . But he evidently conveyed that lot to its full depth
•/
^^^ t^j^k.^^^
because,
was at the head of the alley, access could be had theret .....y.
.^
T".,
\i^
without any such reservation . Neither the language of the deeds nor
^ . ^«l5
,
the situation of the ground, nor the circumstances connected with the*"'tc2JU
conveyances, indicate any intention on the part of Caldcleugh to retain
the fee to the bed of the alley, when he made the conveyances in
the case stated,

a lley

is

*

T

o

it

s

a

r

j

i
n

e

I
f

e

5,

l

p

it
is

l

c

r

ti

is

i

s

t

f

a

it

'

r

o

it,

—^

^

The assimments of error, are overruled.
AIG.PK0P.-I-28
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a,nd the
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COARSE SALT CO. v. NIAGARA, LOCKPORT
ONTARIO POWER CO.

(Court of Appeals of New York, 1913.

207 N.

Y.

500, 101 N.

E.

2

&

456.)

HiscocK, J.

This action was br ought as one of ejectment to compel the appellant to remove wires used for conducting high power electric currents and strung above the boundaries of a highway, as show n
upon a map which will be referred to . The facts which define the controversy are as follows :

^

In

qi^

1902 the st ate issued to the respond ep f- Iptters patent wherebv

it
granted and conveved to it certain lands theretofore r^^Tr^ti tnting part
of the Onondaga Salt Springs Reservation a nd amongst which was one
No. 1 7
j^/ti^ "parcel, alone involved in this action, described as "S ubdivision
(o f_Farm Lots 4.S and 46) containing 13 42-100 acres/' as said subd ivision was laid down on a rnap of the farm lots in question made b y
one Greene, deputy surveyor m August, 1849, and during said mont h
Said map showed said
filed in the office of the secretary of stat e.
subdivision 17 as abutting at its southerly boundary on a road fou r
r ods wide, and which road in turn had for its southerlv boundary th e
»
ttO
L/iT
blue line of the enlaro^ed E rie canal the n in process of constructio n,
the distance from this blue line to the base line of the canal as finally
constructed and used being upwards of thirty feet. F pr some tim e
/
3u^/^
grant in question said road apparently was not used bv th e
/
.->
^^r* b efore the
in
the
public
portion bounding subdivision 17 aforesaid, but at le ast
J?
s ome part of it seems to havp bppri nrrn pied by a storehouse belong np- to the respondent .
The letters patent and the map to which ref^//^/^^^
erence has been made ga ve the area o f subdivision 17 and other parcels
then being conveyed and s uch statement of such area is satisfied w itho ut incorporating
in the grant any portion of the hi.jyhway.
Under
these circumstances the question has arisen w hether the respond ent
"^ accjuired title to all or to part of said highway as subdivision 17 abut ted
• on the
and this question by consent was disposed of by the trial
same^
court as a question of law, it holding that the respondent acquired t itle
to the bed of the entire highway.
'^^^ g eneral rule is that a conveyance by reference to a map which
^^Jc_
shows the premises being conveyed as abutting upon a highway, as
Y^^^fCi*
\
between the grantor and grantee, conveys to the latter title to the fee
( (Ra^-*^
V of the highway
tojhejcentgr Ijjlg thereof. T his is the rule as r^mm^ t
t he state as well as a gainst a private grantor, and it applies even
t hough at the time of the conveyance the highway as shovyr^ upon th e
map has not been accepted and used bv the public as such, and aJtho^iorh
t he grant by its terms or by reference to a map gives an area of the
premises being conveyed which is satisfied without resort to the lan d
i ncluded in the hjo^hwav.
Bissell v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 61 ;
Matter of Ladue, 118 N. Y. 213, 23 N. E. 465 ; Trowbridge v. Ehrich,
191 N. Y. 361, 84 N. E. 297;
Paige v. Schenectady Ry. Co., 178 N.

y^^..

/i

(
I
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N. E. 213; Van Winkle v. Van Winkle, 184 N. Y.
193, 204, 77 N. E. ZZ.
I see no reason for attempting to build up an exception to this gen102, 111, 70

eral rule upon the facts presented in this case, but t hink that the re sp ondent's title extended to the center of the highway opposite said
s ubdivision 17. as shown upon the map.
The respondent, however, is not satisfied with this but insists tha t
u nder its grant it took titje to the fee of the entire highwav. and thus

^*:i^±2!^_^
c^^*'^ ^f"*^
lyJ^cJU "A«-4^
was
*-^
y^^rx.,*,*'

far been held .
The theory upon which it bases this contention is that the state
n ot the owner of or interested in land on the <;pnthpr1y gide ni thi^;
^
hi ghway in such manner as would justify the presumption that it i n'<==Z
tended to retain title to the fee of such southe rly half nf g^^irl hjpj^- C^,,^^ ***■ ^^
way. The cases especially relied on in support of this theory are those
of Haberman v. Baker, 128 N. Y. 253, 28 N. E. 370, 13 L. R. A. 611,
and Johnson v. Grenell, 188 N. Y. 407, 81 N. E. 161, 13 L. R. A. _(N.
S.) 551. Each of these cases involved the principle so far as applicai t has so

ble to this discussion th at where a highway has been constructed u pon the margin of the grantor's land his subsequent grant of the abut ting land should be deemed to include the fee in the whole roadbed be c ause it will not be assumed that he intended to retain the fee to p neh alf of the roadbed under such circu mstances.
In the Grenell Case the grantor being the owner of an island in the
St. Lawrence river constructed on its shore a road extending to the
waters of the river, and thereafter made a conveyance of land abutting on said roadway, and it was said by Judge Gray in writing for the
court that "th ere is no sufficient reason appnrent to infer an intentio n
by the grantor, when parting with her title to the only land adjoinin g
Manit he road, to reserve any interest in \\\e. fee of the road itselT!
an
inducement
of
the
lot
was
facts,
to the purchaser
festly, from the
its being shown, and stated, to lie upon the shore of the island and
the enjoyment of the riparian advantages conferred a distinct value.
T he ordinary presumption is that, in the absence of contradictory
t erms, the grantor does not intend to retai n Jhe fee of the soil in th e
jFeet.;^

I

18"8

nTy.

410. 81

N. E.

161.' 13

lTr.

A. (N. S.)

551.

do not regard the facts presented in those cases as so parallel with
here as to compel or justify the adoption of the re-

the ones arising

T he state is the owner of the canal and a s
spondent's contention.
already stated between the base line of the canal and the blue line whic h
b ounds the highway on the south there is a strip of land of consid erable width~
Under these circumstances it does not follow as a conclusion of law that when the state made its conveyance to respondent
it had no interest in retaining the fee to the southerly half of the road- ^^j-^^^^.^^^^ ^
i^*''*'^
way or that such retention would secure a useless and barren right. ^On
.^ ,
tl ie contrary, it seems to me that the ownership of this extra strip oi^ Mc/^^^^"*^ f, ^^^
t ^iirtv-three feet adjoining the canal lands may be a right of much *-< '^^^
value and convenience. Thus again I feel that we should follow the /t^Zi***-* -^

DERIVATIVE

436

TITLES

(Part

2

general rule prevailing In the case of grants of land abutting on highways and that no sufficient reason exists for awarding^ to responde nt
t he title to the fee of the entire roadway instead of one-half there of.
These views lead to the conclusion that the judgment appealed from
should be so modified as to determine that re spondent acquire d title
t ^ the northerly half of the highway onwhich its said premises aS ut
according: to saidGreene map , Jand that it h ave ejectment against
appellant as to said premise s, and as modified affirmed, without costs
to either party on this appeal.
CuLLEN, C. J., and Gray, Willard Bartlett, Cuddeback, and
HoGAN, JJ., concur.
Mili^SR, J., not sitting.

Judgment

accordingl-^.^*

CHICAGO

& E.

I. R. CO. v. WILLARD.

(Supreme Court of Illinois, 1910.

245 111. 391, 92 N.

E.

271.)

Hand, J. This was an action of ejectment b rought by the appellant in the circuit court of Williamson county against the appellees
t o re£ g ver a strip of land described as commencing at the north-wes t
quarter of se cc orner of the south-west quarter of the north-west
t ion 19 , township 8. raj ige 3 _east, running thence sout h 275 feet, thence
east 16 feet, thence north 275 feet, thence west lo teet tcTllie place of
beginning, in Williamson county, Illinois; The p-e neral issue was file d,
and upon a trial, at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the jury, under
the direction of the court, r eturned a verdict in favor of the defend ants, upon which verdict the court rendered judgment, and the rec ord has been brought to t his court by appe al^ for review .
"The parties claimed t itle from a common sourc e. It appears from
the record that on April 24, 1894, Felix G. Henderso n ^Yifi ^^^ ^^^'^i^^iin fee of the south-west quarter of the north-west quarter of said
section 19; t hat the Chicag o, Pad ucah and Memphis Railroad Com p any had located its right of way ac ross said tract of landj that on
that day Henderson c onveyed a lOQ-foot strip across said tra ct , and the
forty -acre tract lying immediately south of said tract, to said railroad
c ompany by the following description : "I hereby sell and convey to
the said Chicago, Paducah and Memphis Railroad Company a strip
1 00 feet wide across m y la nd, to-w it : Where the hne of said railroad
is now surveyed and located on the west side of the S.W.N.W.qr. and
the N.W.S.W.qr. Sec. 19, Town 8, South, Range 3, East of the third
Banks v. Ogden, 2 Wall. 57, 17 L. Ed. SIS (1S64) ; SclioU v. Eniericli,
Pa. Super. Ct. 404 (190S).
A., the owner of lands boimded on the east by a river with a highway running along the river bank, the east side of the highway being the west water
line of the river, made a deed of a portion of said lands to B., describing the
part conveyed as being "bounded on the east by the highway."
By accretion a
considerable tract of valuable land has been formed on the east side of the
highway.
The new land is claimed both by A. and B. To whom does it belong?
14 See

36
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public road as it now runs, being; 50 feet on each sid e
as now located ;" that on the west line of section 19 there was
located a highway 40 feet wide; t hat 20 feet of said highway wa s
u pon the Henderson land ; that the west line of the right of way strip

P.M.,

s ubject to

of line

by Henderson to the railroad company was situated 16 fee t
f rom the section line ; that in 1897 the Chicago, Paducah and Memphis
Railroad Company co nveyed all its property, including the right o f
w^y purchased from Henderson, to the appellant : that on March 23,
c onveyed

of land 9D feet wide and 78 8
strip in controversy ^ and other lands on th e
\vest, and the old 40-foot highway on the section line was abandoned and a new highway 50 feet wide and parallel to and 40 feet
west of the sectio n line was laid out in lieu of the old highway ; tha t
i n 1905 ^Felix G. jienderson conveyed to A. L. Willard the 16-foo t
s trip in co ntrovers:
^ and Green Hindman is in possession of the same
as the tenant of VVillar<j[^.
It is the contention of the appellant that the title to said 16- foo t
strip lying between the section line and the west line of appellant's
right of way pa ssed by the deed from Henderson to *the Chicag o,
P aducah and Memphis R? iWq^(\ r.nmpany antj frnm that railroad com
pany to the appellant, subject to the right of the public to use the san^e
as a highway, and that the appellant is the owner in fee of said strip ,
a nd that the highwa y hav ing been abandoned, it is entitlpd tn ihe, possession of said prem ise^s . The appellees contend that the deed from
llenderson to the Chicago, Paducah and Memphis Railroad Company
o nly conveyed a 100-foot strip, and that the title to said 16-foot str ip
r emained in Henderson until it y/^as transferred by him to Willar d,
^nd that the appell ant has no interest in said strip^ and that Willar d,
w fully in possessi on of the same .
is. enant,
has repeatedly been announced as the law of this State, that where
the fee to the center of
in the adjoining
public street or highway
,
owner, the fee to the center of the street or highway will
ass to
pon
highway
a gra ntee of the prem ises abutt ng u
unless A^^^^lfx
the street or
there are words in the deed which limit the operation of the deed to th
margin of the street or highway.
Hamilton v. Chicago, Burlington
Ouincy R. Co., 124 111. 2J57TrN. E. 854 Thomsen v. McCormick, 136
111. 135, 26 N. E. 373;
Henderson v. Hatterman, 146 111. 555, 34 N.
E. 1041; Clark v. McCormick, 174 111. 164, 51 N. E. 215; Davenport
Rock Island Bridge Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 188 111. 472, 59 N. E. 497
Huff V. Hastings Express Co., 195 111. 257, 63 N. E. 105 Eisendrath
Co. V. City of Chicago, 192 111. 320, 61 N. E. 419; Brewster ^Cahill, 199 111. 309, 65 N. E. 233. The question therefore in this cas
^^
wasj he gran limited to the 100- foot strip in the deed from Hende r-v>l>^
son to the Chicag o, Paducah and Memphis Railroad Company
We
think an examination of the deed shows th^t^^twas^ The deed does
not in terms describe the premises conveyed as abutting upon the
On the contrary,
highway.
conveys "a strip 100 feet wide across
1897,

the appellant pur chased a strip
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of the trial court will

LOW
r^npreme

Jiidicial Court of

V.

be affirmed

.

appellees .
The judgment
firmed.
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a

is,

At
"50 feet on each side of line as now located."
my land," that
the time the deed was executed the railroad company was limited to
he west hne of the 100-foot strip
right of way strip 100 feet wide.
w as 16 ft. east of the section line, and the east four leet of the 40 oot highway was thereby conveyed to the railroad company by ie
We thifik
Henderson deed.
probable the words "subject to public
now runs," were inserted in the deed to cover the part of the
road as
The grantor n
highway which was included in the 100-foot strip.
railroad
manifestly
company^
to
the
convey
intended
to
he deed
more,
land,
of
way pu rfor right
and'no
strip 100 feet wide across his
The strip conveyed was not described as being on, upon or
poses.
along the highway, hut the west margin of the strip was four feet in
he highway . We therefore conclude that the title to said 16-foot strip
remained in Henderson until he conveyed the same to Willard, and
itself to said prem that, he appellant having failed to show title
verdict fo
ises, the court properlv instructed th^ jury tn retur n
Judgment af-

TIBBETTS.

Maine, ISSl.

72 Me. 92, 39 Am. Rep. 303.)
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respass for hauling certain loads of stone upon th
On Report.
within the limits of town way and the plaintiff claimed ^^_^^
ocus which
The question presented, called for th construct ion/?
to own the fee.
of deed from the plaintiff to the defendant, dated June 26, 1857. The^--^
description
given in the opinion.
At the trial, the presiding justice was of the opinion that the fee
n onsuit was .oni^red "which
to be set
was in the defendant, and
aside,
such construction of the deed was erroneous."
Barrows,
The question
w^hether the fee in the locus (vA^hich
length,
by forty-four feet in width, bein^
strip about twelve rods in
duly located street in the village of Spring Vale, runnjn
section of
lot formerly owned by th
blong the bank of Mousam river, cutting
largest
part of
leaving
and
the
on the sid
very
unequally,
pjamtiff
farthest from the river, and
little irregularly shaped land betwe en
aintiff, or in the defendant .
in the
treet and river)
After the street was built, plainti conveyed his lot to de fendant, ecribing firs t_the_ more important pa rt, as '^ uate in the villag of
beginning on the north easterly side of the
S£ring__Vale
new road leading from the Province Mills Bridge to the cotton mill,
and at the southerly corner of the lot as now fenced belonging to school
^nd running (course given) by said
district number one,
stake," and thence around the rear of the lot, "to
road
to
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a lso the land now owned by said

Mo usam riv er."

Low between s aid

is,

roa.d_and
T he well settled doctrine in this State
that
on
highway, carries the fee in the highway
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grant of land bou nd/^
to the centre of .
/C^Z^*"^*"
he grantor owns to the centre, unless the terms of the conveyan ce
(X^j,^
^
learly and distinctly exclude
so as to control the ordinary presump tjon. Oxton y. Groves, 68 Me. 372, 28 Am. Rep. 75. Here the prin-^
bounded by the road as
cipal piece
monument or abuttal. So
the land lying opposite "between the road and the river."
Is there enough
the language used, to exclude the street froin/^
the conveyance?
The mere mention in the description of
fixe c^-^^
point on the side of the road as the place of beginning or end
ne or more of the lot lines, does not seeiTK to be of itself sufficie nt.
Ciottle y. Young, 59 Me7 105, 109; Johnson y. Anderson, 18 Me. 76;
nor will similar language, with reference to monuments standing on
or near the bank of
stream, in lines beginning or ending at such
stream, prevent the grantee from holding ad medium filum aquae:
Pike y. Monroe, 36 Me. 309, 58 Am. Dec. 751; Robinson v. White,
42 Me. 210, 218; Cold Spring Iron Works v. Tolland,
Cush. (Mass.)
The case of Sibley y. Holden, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 249, 20 Am.
495, 496.
Dec. 521, cited by plaintiff, was commented on by this court, in Bucknani y. Bucknam, 12 Me. 465, and that of Tyler v. Hammond, 11 Pick.
and the apparent
(Mass.) 193, in Johnson y. Anderson, 18 Me. 78
force of these decisions
somewhat restricted and explained, by the
learned court which pronounced them, in Newhall y, Ireson,
Cush.
y.
Bowers,
Gray (Mass.)
(Mass.) 598, 54 Am. Dec. 790, and Phillips
24; although
apparent from the last case and from Smith v. Slocomb,
Gray (Mass.) 36, 69 Am. Dec. 274, that the Massachusetts
court lays less stress upon the ordinary presumption, and requires less
distinctness in the terms of the deed to obviate
than we have
done in the cases above cited from the 18th, 59th, and 68th of our own
reports. See also, Perkins' note to Sibley y. Holden, in the second edition of Pickering's Reports, vol. 10,
251.
e■line of
H ad the plaintiff run his first line "by the north easterly '=^'^d
"
said road/ instead of by said road
and conveyed the land "lying
between the southwesterly side line of said road and Mousam river,"
instead of that "lying between said road and Mousam river,"
different question would have been presented.
n the absence of the very ew y^ord
which were necessary to make
lain an intention on the part of the plaintiff to eser\^e the fee in th
^
and covered by the street to himself we think the ordinary presum pion and construction must prevai

^\

\

'

:

16 In Sibley v. Holden, 10 Pick.
(]Mass.) 249. 20 Am. Dec. .521 (1830), referred
to above, tbe court said
"From this description, we are all of opinion, that
the line must begin on the side of the road, and at that point exclude the road;
/^^
then the question is, w hether when the description returns to the road aga jpy

^
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(Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, 1877.
Am, Eep. 229.)

CTj

(Part

39 N.

J. Law,

469, 23

In Error to the Supreme Court.

This was an action of ejectment for a small strip of land, bein g one '^ h alf of what had been a public street, in front of a lot of land whi ch
t he plaintiS had conveyed to a certain person, and which lot had come .
The plaintiff's deed
b}^ divers mesne conveyances, to the defendan ts.
conveyed the premises by the following description, viz :
i
"All that certain lot or parcel of land, situate, lying and being in
the township of Bergen, .in the county of Hudson and state of New
I
Beginning at a stak standing
! ^J^ersey, butted and bounded as follows :
e^
* *
at the junction of tlie easterly line of Rowland street with the northerly line of Johnson street, as laid down on the map of said Salter's
premises, and running thence (1) along the northerly line of Johnson
- street south, twenty-three degrees forty minutes, east, fifty (50) feet,
to a stake; thence (2) norths sixty six degrees east, one hundred (100)
feet, to a stake, thence (3) norths twenty-three degrees and forty minutes west, fifty (50) feet, to a stake in the said easterly line of Rowland
street; thence (4) along the same south, sixty-six degrees west, one

r
*

r

hundred (100) feet, to the beginning."
A fter Rowland street had been used for some time, it beca me usel ess, in consequence of another street having been opened, and the defendants had proceeded, thereupon, to take in and enclose to the middle line of the street in front of the lot above describe d.
At the trial in the Hudson Circuit, the court instructed the jury that
the defendant's deed covered the land in the street which was in dispute, and there was a verdict accordingly. 7^*-u^t*/ Je^ CttJ^ "
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Bdasley, C. J. This case, as it stands before this court, presents,
\ in a distinct form, the question whether in a conveyance of land s
\ w hich, in point of fact, abut upon a street or highway, anything sho rt
<^
,
orevprp< ;<; wnrHg pf pyrin sign will prevent the title from extending jo
t he rnedium filum of such street or highway, the grantor, at the dat e

/
/

/

j

i t shall

If

be taken to mean the side or the center of the road .
constmed to be
the center, then the remaining line would neither be by the side of the road
nor the center, but by a diagonal line from a point in the center to a point on
the side. This would not only be obscure and inconsistent with any supposed
intent of the parties, but repugnant to the last clause in the description, which
point in this lif i f is fiv-p ^n
is, 'by said road to the place of beginning.'
A^ one
by the description to the side of the road, we nrp s.ntisfipri that, bv ^ lust an d
necessary construction, the other point must be taken to he at the side of fhp
roaa, and th erer ore that the soil or the road was not include d.'' Cf., howeverflVIcK^Zirv. Gleason, 1S4 Mass. 452, 69 N. E. 1076, 100 Am. St. Rep. 560
(1904).
See

In re Parkway, 209 N. Y. 344, 103 N. E. 508 (1913), where the beginning
point was "at the northwesterly corner of Walnut street and Second avenue."
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of such street or highway to tha t

extent .

This is a subject with respect to which the views of judges are much
at variance. T he general opinio n a ppears to he that there is so stron g
^, ^^ iT
a presumption of an intention to convey the soil of the highway wh en
Y(^^*^
upon
^
granted
it. that v,g)i'^Ji]ali^^i^cat he premises
actually border
(S^-*--**-*-*'
V
Under the
t ions of a contrary purPOse

/If,

^^aT^pj-egn^^

•

a

is

a

it

it

16 See,

also, Cox v. Freedley, 33 Pa. 124, 75 Am. Dec. 5S4 (1859),

d

s

is

I

is, it

e

y^

Ud. •

Q^-Kt^

Q
"
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e

c

e
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operation of such a test, the present deed would not embrace the land
in dispute, for the descriptive words cannot be extended from their
intrinsic force, so as to have so wide a reach.' The jvvordg. here used
wil l not, if interpreted in their familiar sense, and^standing by them se lves, admit of being^ taken as deHneatory _o£ _any part of the stree t.
The only point for consideration, therefore, is whether, when the terms
used have this restrictive force, tliey are to lose that force in the presence of the great presumption to the contrary, which is inherent in the
position of affairs where a lot thus located is granted.
There are, undoubtedly, decisions which tend very strongly to this
point, and others which apparently reach it. The leading cases are
carefully collected, and the general subject judiciously handled in the
notes of Mr. Wallace, appended to the case of Dovaston v. Payne, 2
Smith's Lead. Cas. (7th Ed.) 160. In this series stands prominently
the case of Paul v. Carver, decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 26 Pa. 223, 67 Am. Dec. 413.^^ In that instance, the description
carried the lot conveyed by so many feet to a designated street ;
"thence southeasterly along the northerly side of said street," and the
street thus referred to was afterwards vacated, and it was held that
half of it passed with the lot that was thus bounded by its northerly
side.
This result was justified on the broad ground " tliat the p ara mount irit^gy
the parties, as disclosed from the whole scope of th
^(
onveyance, and the nature of the property granted, should be th
A number ot decisions, bearing
similar aspect,
ontrolling rule
are cited in this opinion, which also displays, with much clearness, the
The commentator, with reference to
impolicy of the opposite view.
this case, and other decisions, thus sums up the result: "The rule,
therefore, which the Pennsylvania courts regard as the true one, and
which, perhaps, on the whole
the wisest one, would seem to be tha
n othing short of an intention expressed in ipsis verbis, to 'exclude' th
soil of the highway, can exclude it."
And this doctrine, although
cannot be said to be sustained by the
think, the one that ought to be adoptgreatest number of decisions,
ed in this state.
In our practice in the conveyance of lots bounded by
treets, the prevailing belief is, that the street to its centre
conveye
with the lot. Among the mass of the people
undoubtedly supposed
that the street belongs, as an appurtenance, to the contiguous property,
and that the title to the latter carries with
title to the former.
This
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belief is so natural that it would not be easily eradicated. As a general
I^ractice, it would seem preposterous to sever the ownership to these
several particles of property.
Under ordinary circumstances, the
tl ^ead of land c on stituting the street is of great value to the contiguou s
lots, and it is ot n o value separated from thenT It would rarely occur
that the vendee ot a city lot would be willing to take it separated in
ownership from the street, and it would as rarely occur that a vendor
would desire to make such severance. In my own experience, I have
never known such an intention to exist, and it is safe to say that whenever it does exist, the conditions of the case are peculiar.
A nd it is the very general notion that these two parcels of proper ty
are inseparably united, and pass as a whole by force o-f an ordinar y
conveyance, that accounts for the absence of any settled formula in
general use for the description of city lots in a transfer of their title.
Upon an examination of such conveyances, it would, I am satisfied, be
disclosed that the utmost laxity in this respect prevails. The proper ty
c onveyed is indiscriminately
described as going to the street and run n ing along
or as going to one side of such street and thence runni ng
a lon such side . Such discriminations are not int entional, the purpose
being to convey all the interest hat the seller has in the property and
in its belongings, and the mode of accomplishing this purpose
not
have said, being regarded
the subject of attention, the street lot, as
as
mere adjunct of the property sold, and worthless for any other
Tjiis being undeniablv the practice and general understandin g.
use.
to give
close and literal meaning to the descriptive terms employ ed
n such inst ances would serve no useful
urpose, but its tenden cy
vexatio us
would be to defeat the object in view, and to call into life
itigation.
The particular words should, in such transactions, be controlled and limited by the m anifest intention which
unmistakably displayed in the nature of the affair and the situation of the parties.
When the conditions of the case are altered, as
the vendor should,
in
given case, have an apparent interest to reserve to himself the parcel of street in question,
different rule of interpretation might become
the abutting street referred to in
So
conveyance should
proper.
in
and
be such only
should be contingent on the will of
contemplation,
the vendor, the rule now adopted might not, and probably would not,
But where the street
be applicable.
an ex isti ng highway, or has be en
edicated as such by the vendor, or in case, by the eftectof his co n\'^yance, he imposes on himself the obligation to devote the street to
he public use, the rule then becomes the criterion by which the sens
to be ascertained
of the deed
The only case in our books that
deem entirely_apposite to the presthat of Hinchman et al. v. Paterson Horse Railroad
ent inquiry,
Co., 17 N.
Eq. 75, 86 Am. Dec. 252. The extreme fitness of this decision, as an authority at this time, does not appear upon reading the
have looked at the original papers on file, and have
report of it; but
found that in some of the deeds in that proceeding, the descriptions of
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the boundaries of the lots are not distinguishable from the one now
Those lots were described as beginning at a fixedj
under our view.
point on a designated side of the street, and thence along such designated side, &c., as in the present instance. The descriptive words, therefore, were clear, and if they were not overruled by the predominant
presumption of intent arising out of the nature of the act done, it was
impossible to hold that any part of the street passed to the vendee.
But Chancellor Green did hold that the parcel in the street passed,
saying: "It is objected, by the defendant's answer, that the complainant's titles do not extend to the middle of the street, because the lots,
But the esta bas described, are bounded by the sides of the streets.
lis hed inference of law is. that a conveyance of land, bounded on a
p ublic highway, carries with it the fee to the centre of the road, as part

of the grant."
do not know how this decision is to be sanctioned, except upon the
ground already marked out. I regard the case as directly in point, a nd
i t is unnecessary to sav that it is of the highest authority .
T he result to which I have come is. therefore, that this conveyan ce
e mbraces the parcel of land in the street, for the reason that there are
n o express words of exclusion of such parcel .
and[ parcel

\

I

consequence is, the juagment of the court below should be ~"
affirmed. w ith costs.^''
.
^'I'lie

^A/^itit^*^

<|^^v

d'*^

v. Squiers, 22 Vt. 4S4 (1850), contra. Redfielri, .T.. dissenting.
"Coiuinir. then, to the ca«e in hand, I find nothing to exdude the bed of the
stream, except the va}:ue words, 'h? etrinniiig at n noint in tlie easterly bank o f
t lie I'assaic,' and the furtlier words, 't o tlie easterly line of the Passaic river
and thence along the easterly line of the~l';issaic river the several courses the reof.' etq. These words are no^in ore indicat ive of an intention to excluile the
t7rrnJg~t h e
st ream than were the corres nondT iig word s 1(1 billter v. Juilil^. To ^■V
s treet.
In both "the easterly line' is declared in terms to be the boundary. Hut,
looking at the surrounding circumstance^ 1 find no more reason for giving
them an exclusive effect in the one t-ase than in the other."
Simmons v. City
of I'aterson, 84 N. J. E(i. 28. 2i), 94 Atl. 421. 424 (1915). But see Whittier v.
Montpelier Ice Co. (Vt.) 90 Atl. 878 (191<J), contra.
"The defendants contend that the clause in the deed from Baldwin to Reeves
and from Reeves to the plaintiff, "thence northeasterly on the river shore,' limits and restricts the grant to the hank or shore of tlie river. In Woodman v .
S pencer. 54 N. H. 507 (1874) this question was considered in respect to lan d
bounded bv a highway, ana it was there held that thp pyprpssjnns 'on the hi ghway' and 'by the side of the nigmvay' were identical in meaning and effe ct ;
and this view is fully sustained by IJovaston v. I'aine, i; sm. L. C. (H. & W.
Motley v. Sargent, 119 Mas.s. 281
217, 2!W, '2.84. '285, 2:17, 2.88 (179.-j)
is'otes) 21.
O'Connell v. Bryant, 121 Mass.
Peck v. Denniston, 121 Mass. 17 (ls7f.)
(1875)
presumed understanding of the parties that the
he rule is
557 (1877).
narrow strip of land under
stream or other highway
rantor does not retain
ppnnse the title Of it left in him would generally be of little use, except roF
purpose of annoyance and litigation
Sleeper v. Laconia, 60 N. H. 201, 49
BrouStarr v. Child, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 149 (188S). ace.
Am. Rep. 311 (1880).
In the Court for the Correction of Errors, Starr v. Cliild
son, J., dissenting.
Uill, 809 (1842).
vote of 11 to 10.
was revei-sed by
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(Court of Appeals of New York, 190S.

EHRICH.
191 N.

Y.

361, S4 N.

E.

297.)

Haight, J. This action was br ous^ht to determine the title to a
T riangular piece of land lying at the intersection of Westcheste r
and Stebbins avenues, bounded on the west by Stebbins avenue, on
the southeast by Westchester avenue, which intersects Stebbins avenue
diagonally, and on the north by the southerly line of three lots owned
by the defendants Ehric h, Spaeth and the H udson Realtv_ Xompanv.
'The p roperty in question was formerly owned by the plaintiff and wa s
In the year
'l ocated in the twenty-third ward of the city of New York .
1882 she caused a map o f her property to be made and Jiled in the
office of the register, showing the location of the streets existing and
proposed, with which her property was bounded and intersected. Tl^is
map corresponded with a prior map filed in 1878 by the park commi ss ioners of the city sh owing the proposed location of streets in that part
of the city, which the commission designed to have opened as streets
of the city a nd upon which Don^an street, as mapped, intersected We stc hester avenue and extended ma straight line to Stebbins avenue, cov'
enrip the trian crnlar parcel in dispute. Thereafter and in the year 1882
^
the plaintiff conveyed to Bertha Eck a parcel of land designated, on the
map filed by her in the office of the register No. 892, as l ot number on e
i n block 513 on said map and particularly described as follows.:
Beginning at a point where the northerly line of One Hundred and SixtyThird street intersects the easterly line of Stebbins avenue ; running
thence easterly along the northerly line of One Hundred and SixtyThird street 30 feet; thence northerly and parallel with Stebbins
avenue 128.71 feet; thence westerly and parallel with One Hundred
and Sixty-Third street 30 feet and thence southerly and along the
easterly line of Sfebbins avenue 128.71 feet to the point or place of beO ne Hundred and Sixty-Third street had not been opened
ginning.
t
o
Stebbins avenue . Had it been, its lines would nearly hav e
through
corresponded with those ^ven upon the m ap filed by the park commiss ioners as Dongan stre et, which was followed Dy the plaintiff in th e
rnap hied by hen
We, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff, in her
reference to One Hundred and Sixty-Third street had reference to the
n ortherly line of the street as given upon the map filed by her. The
d ^^£jidajat Ehrich, through subsequent mesne conveyances f rom Bertha
Eck, ha s be come the owner of the lands so deeded to . _hei\
The trial court has found that the defendant Ehrich has become the
owner in fee of that portion of the premises described as Dongan
street in front of those specifically described in the deed. We readily
concede the correctness of the contention that where an owner of real
estate files a map of his premises in the office of the register, upon
which is laid out streets and avenues, either existing or proposed, and
deeds with reference to such streets and avenues, running to such
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streets and along such streets it will be construed to have been the intention of the grantor to convey to the center of such streets or avenues.
But this case is distinguishable.
The plaintiff has been careful
to commence her ^description of the jjroperty conveyed at the intersection of the northerly li^ie of One Hundred and Sixty-Third street with
the easterly line of Stebbins avenue. T he commencing point, ther ef ore, is at the external line of the street and continues e a'^fpfl y alaa o-

Had she commenced at the intersectlie northerlv line of the street.
the
tion of
two streets and thence ran along the street it would have
been apparent that she intended to convey to the center

of

the street,

\

,

but as we have seen, s he_has placed the boundary at the northerly line .
m^Tm^^^!(,j^^^^^
*
t luis ind ica ting a n
tion not to include the fee of the proposed
^^;»^
inden
A^Aa**^
street.
It is true that she has executed this deed in accordance with the Vi*^
provisions of the map filed by her, upon which she designated this •t^i. ^ yL'^-*' *^
space as a street and by reason thereof the grantee acquired an ease*w«^ *
ment in it of light, air and access, but not the fe e.
ff'^''**^*^
T he trial court, in determining that the grantee acquired the fee as
well as the easement in the street, relies upon the cases of Matter Q.f "i ^* ^ P Cjbt^
% •
Ladue. 118 N. V. 213. 23 N. E. 465. and Hennessv v. Murdock. 137
N. Y. 317, ZZ N. E. 330, but in neither of those case's were the boundaAa^U*^--*^^
ries given of the property conveyed limited to the exterior lines of the C^ ■*■»■* /^v-^r*
street, and that is the distinguishing feature between those cases and
this. I t is said that she had no reason for reserv i ng the fee to thi s ^b^^^
particular parcel, It is qu ite apparent to us that she had a reaso n ; a
map had been filed by^ the officers of the citv. bv which it was p ro posed j-4xA /'t-*«'«»*»<'^
to take this identical parcel for the purposes of a street : when so taken
she would be entitled to compensation from the citv for the valu e
thereof . She, therefore, in executing this deed saw fit to limit the fee
conveyed to the exterior boundary of the street, but by conveying the
land with reference to the street she necessarily included the easements
of light, air and access.
On the 12th day of October, 1886, the plaintiff conveved to Mathew
Farrell another parcel of land embraced in the map filed by her as lot s
"
*
numbers 3, 4 and 5 of block 513. b eginning at a point formed by the
intersection of the northerly side of Westchester avenue with the westerly side of Rogers place ; running thence along the westerly side of
Rogers place 33.82 feet ; thence westerly and at right angles to Rogers
place 176 feet; thence southerly and parallel with Stebbins avenue
128.71 feet; thence easterly at right angles to Stebbins avenue 40 feet
and thence northerly along the northerly side of Westchester avenue
166.93 feet to the point of beginning.
The third course, .running
s outherly and parallel with Stebbins avenue 128.71 feet, in fact carried
the line to t he street ma rked u pon her map, and thence easterly at rig ht
angl es, to Stebbins a venue 40 teet^ in fact carried the l ine along such
stre^t^ This was equivalent to a designation of the street in the running of the line, as. tp and along the same . Van Winkle v. Van Winkle,
184 N. Y. 193, 204, 77/N. E. 2>Z ; Hennessy v. Murdock, 137 N. Y. 317,
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N. E. 330; Sizer v. Devereux, 16 Barb. 160; Champlin v.
Pendleton, 13 Conn. 23, It will be observed that, by the description
given in this deed, the exterior lines of the streets are also followed ;
b ut bv a subsequent clause she states that the convevance is to inclu de
all the right, title and interest which she has to that portion of West cnester avenue and Rogers place "Ivi np;- in front of and adjacent to
said lo ts to the center of sa id avenue and place, as laid down on sa id
'
map, tnus indicating a n intent to convev to the center of the streets .
Again, on the 23d day of August, in the year 1890, the plaintiff conveyed t o Tames G. Patten and William H. Sutcliff another parcel of
land described upon the map filed by her as lot number 2 in block ^ 13,
beginning at a p oint on the northerlv side of Westchester avenue, distant 30 feet easterly from the corner formed by the intersection of said
northerly side of Westchester avenue with the easterly side of Stebbins avenue ; running thence northerly parallel with said Stebbins avenue 128.71 feet; thence easterly and at right angles with said Stebbins
avenue 30 feet; thence southerly and again parallel with Stebbins avenue 128.71 feet to said northerly side of Westchester avenue, and
thence westerly along said northerly side of Westchester avenue 30
feet to the place of beginning.
I n this deed she has designated tJi e
avenue, whic h
s ^eet which. she marked upon her map as Westchester
i n her first deed she called One Hundred and Sixtv-Third street.
By
a subseq uerit clause of h er deed she provides that it includes all of her
right, t ide and interest^^ . in and to that portion of Westchester avenue lying in front of a nd a djacent to said lots to. the center of said
avenue," thus indicating an in tent to convev a fee to the cente r of Jhe
avenue.. The defendant Spaeth, by subsequent mesne convevances. h as
acquired the title of Patten and Sutcliff and the defendant, the Hudson
RealtyjCompany, has. acquired the title of Farrell.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the judgment appealed from should
be m odified in so far as lot number 1 is concerned, owned bv the defen dan t Ehrich, s o as to limit his t itle in the la nds in controversv, to
t he easements of li.ght^ a i r and access, with the right to have such lan ds
kept open and used as a street, and that as so modified, the judgment
should be affirmed as to him and the other respondents, with costs to
the respondents Spaeth and the Hudson Realty Company, but withou t
costs to either party as to the respondent Ehrich.
CuLLEN, Ch.
and Gray, Vann, W^erner, Willard Bartle:tt
and Chase, JJ., concur.
Judgment accordingly.
323, 33
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Court of Massachusetts,

18S5.

/

^^v^
139 Mass. 63, 29

N:

/

k

47^,

52 Am. Rep. 700.)

of land in North Adams

^^

■

'^

'^^^^

Plea, nul
Trial in the Superior Court, before Gardner, J., who didisseisin.
rected a ver dict for the demand ant, and reported the case for the determination of this court. The facts appear in the opinion.
Field, J. Thp dem^udeA premi'^P'; are a__s1jip tvyn yods wide on the , ,,^
H^ic*-'''***'*'**'
westerly end of the lot described in the demandant's deed . The decon1866,
,
mandant derives title from R euben Whitman who in May,
veyed the premises t o Thomas H. Lidfo rd by a description as follows :
•
"Commencing on the road at the southeast corner of the land that I
gave D. H. Raymond a bond to convey; thence west 22 deg. 30 min. 1-Ia.aA**^**^ j '^
N. ten rods; thence south 22 degrees 30 minutes west four rods; ^-^^^^^^j^^
' ^^ —
thence east 22 degrees 30 minutes S. ten rods ; thence soutTi" on the (j
The descriptions in the inesne con- yt^yC^ ^*»*-r
road to the place of beginning."
T he road was four rods wide ,
veyances are substantially the same.
the fee o f
n
executed
his deed
owned
Reube
Whit
man
when
he
and
11■■■■■■II
iiwi»I la^i——^iWWi—^—
^^^i.—— ■II I !■ I—.— —i— 1,11
^W—^i^——
<^11 >i*——■^■w—
nveyed the land to the centre line of the
co
The
deed
therefore
i_t.
Peck v. Denniston, 121 Mass. 17; O'Connell v. Bryant, 121
highway.
Mass. 557.
The tenants contended, that, by the construction of the deed, the
side lines of the demanded premises extended ten rods from the centre
line of the highway, or e i.ght rods from the westerly side of the high- [/^^^^^ ^"^"^
way; or, if this were not the true construction, that there was an -fg-z^^^^
a^rimguitv in the description ; and they offered "John Lidford, father
of said Thomas H. Lidford, as a witness to prove that at the time of
the execution of the above-mentioned deed from Reuben Whitman to
Thomas H. Lidford, the said witness was present; and t hat said W hitman measured on the west line .of the road above mentioned westerl y
rods, and fixed a monument :Ht ^^""^nnrthA,vpst corner of the lo t;
e
i^ht
thence soutlifrly four rods to the southwest corner, and fixed a monu -

W rit of entry

to recover a parcel

.

^

ment: thence southerly eight rods to the west side of the highway ;
thejice on the highway to the pla ce of beginning; that his son Thomas
H. Lidford and himself built a fe nce ^rrn^< th<^ yrect pnH nf said lot
from corner to corner, as indicated by the monuments thus erected, at
the time of said deed to Lidford, w hich f^nce remained until after the
demandant went into possession under his deed; that the land inchide d
within said measurement was all that Thomas H. Lidford purchased
as he understood it at the time , except that he was told by Whitman
e
t hat his grant really extended to the centre of the highway, which
The c ourt excluded this testimo ny.
was told was four rods wide."

%

Ji "^
^i^''*-V^'^
/^

ruled "that there was n o ambiguity in t"h'e deeds offered by the
plaintiff; that the monument called for 'on the road' was by the side
of the road, and not the centre of the road;" and directed the jury
arid

(jXP^^*^

^

•

'^

^

j
*
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T his

is a ruling that, by th e
qn.struction of the deed, the lines extended ten rods from the westerl y
t^ y^>-vtr»«^c
1/
sjde of the road.
^1^1^^
In Peck V. Denniston, ubi supra, Chief Justice Gray says : "The
>v^^'*-^ ^^^f)
risettletj that a boimdary on a way, public or
jrZ< /VO"**"^ general rule is w
owned by the gran tor,
v ate, includes the soil to the centre of the way,
monumen
a nd that the way, thus referred to and understood, is
wnich controls courses and distances, unless the deed by explicit sta teNewdifferent construction.
ment or necessary implication requires
hall V. Ireson,
Cush. 595, [54 Am. Dec. 790]; Fisher v. Smith,
Gray, 441; Boston v. Richardson, 13 Allen, 146; White v. Godfrey,
97 Mass. 472; Motley v. Sargent, 119 Mass. 231."
N ot one of these cas es, however, considers the construction to be
mea spoint of departure for
deed in which
highway
given to

t o render

for the demandant

a verdict

.
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In Newhall v. Ireson, ubi supra, the line was "running northerly
seven poles to the county road, and from thence upon the road twentytwo poles to the first-mentioned bound."
The seven rods terminated
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on the north at an old wall, which formerly constituted the southerly
boundary of the road. The court held that the line ran to tlie centre
of the road, although this was more than seven rods.
The rule
stated in Motley v. Sargent, ubi supra, as follows
"It
up on
eneral rule of construction that where there
boundary
/^^L^-^^s
^
a fixed monument which has width, as
way, stream, or wall, even
^^•^•^^•^y'
h
e
run
measurements
to
of
the title to the land cot^the
side
only
jtj.jL'^^
be
indicated
veyed passes to Qie line, which would
by the
~
~~~~
' middle^
"^
the monument."
M
...
the terminus ad
The rule
then well established when the road
little authority when
the terminus
quem, but there
quo, and
no monument at the other end of the line.
tliere
A majority of the court
of opinion, that
common metho
of measurement in the country, where the boundary
stream or
way, to measure from the bank of the stream or the side of the way;
and hjt there
reasonable presumption that the measurements
were made in this way, unless sometliing appears affirmatively in^ ^e
^ed to show that they began at the centre line of the stream or Vv^ay .
The ruling of the court, in the construction of the deed, was therefore
rima facie correct, as there was no monument to determine the other
ut this presumption can be controlled by evidence
end of the line.
hat the parties at the time of the convevance established monument
of the boundaries.
Without determining whether, in this case, there
can be said to be
latent ambiguity in the deed, (see Hoar v. Goulding, 116 Mass. 132), or merely an indefiniteness in the description, we
lyu re of opinion that the acts of the parties contemporaneous with the
'
delivery of the deed in fixing the monuments, and the subsequent fenc .
ing of the lot and the occupation in accordance therewith, are admissi-
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b le in evidence upon the cons tracliO B to be g^iven to the deed . Blaney
V. Rice, 20 Pick. 62r32"Am7Decr204 ; Stewart v. Patrick, 68 N. Y.
450; Hamm v. San Francisco (C. C.) 17 Fed. 119.

—^<^.

New trial.

/-

SECTION 2.— EXCEPTIONS AND RESERVATIONS

DORRELL

v.

COLLINS.

(Court of Queen's Bench, 1582.

Cro. Eliz. 6.)

Ejectione firmas. Upon not guilty, the jury found that the master
and scholars of the college of Sinkford were seised in the time of
Hen. 8 of the manor of Hodley , of which the place, &c. is parcel, and
(except the manor of H odky., -in
l et all their lands in Lambehurst
Kent, and Sussex) to T. S. for years : and they further find, that the
master and scholars h ad no other lands in Lambehurst than the said
manor.
The question was, if the manor passeth by the lease ? And
all the Court held, that it being found they had no other land than the
manor, t he exception is void, because it goeth to the whole thin o* ♦ * i»
demised ; otherwise of an exception of part

^

^U*-^'

WHITAKER

v.

BROWN.

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

1S63.

46

Pa.

197.)

Error to

the District Court of Allegheny county.
This was an a ction of trespass vi et armis , by Anthony Whitaker
against William H. Brown, to recover damages for breaking and entering the plaintiff's close, and for digging , mining, a nd carrving aw av
thirty-nine thousand six hundred and twentyfive bushels of bituminou s
coal, and converting and disposing of the same to his own use .
After the plaintiff had offered all his evidence, the defendant's counsel m oved the court to enter a peremptory nonsuit under the Act o f
Assembly, which was done, and this was the error assigned her e.
The facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the

court.

Woodward, J.

Irwin and wif e
conve yed by war ranty deed, six and a hal f acresjof land in Alleghe ny
On the

14th

of March

1853, Boyle

18 The remainder of the ease is omitted.
Cf. Foster v. Rank, 109 Pa. 291, 58 Am. Rep. 720 (1SS5) ; Adams v. Warner,
23 Vt. 395 (1851).
A conveyance is made of a tract of land, describing same "excepting one acre
with the buildings thereon." What would be the result thereof?

Aig.Prop.—

^
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to ATlthony Whitaker in fee, "he, the said Boyle Invin, saving
nevertheless for his own use, the coal contained in th e
s aid piece or parcel of land, together with tree ingress and egress b v
Boyle Irwin is
wagonroad to haul the coal therefrom as wanted ."
dead, and his rights in the coal, if descendible, are vested in his heir s,
the defend ant justifies his entry to take coals .
It is argued that the above clause of the deed constituted a strict
and tprhniral rpsprvafinn^ whirh, having n o words of perpetui ty, died
with Irwin, and t^"'^r'^f''"'f th?t \\'1iitnl'pr now has a several and exOn the Other
cl usive title to all the rnnl in the land conveyed to him.
an exceptio n,
hand, the argument
that
was iiot
rese rv'ati^n bi
nd therefore that no title to the coalpassed to Whitaker by the deed.
resery ahe question is. whether the words of the deed constituted
lon or an exception .
reservation, yet so fa
Although they were apt words to constitute
operate
they affect the coal, they must
as an exception, because th
coal was
at the date of the deed
corporeal her.£ditamgut, in^^^ss
part of the land itself, and therefore not the subject ofa reservat ion.
Says Lord Coke, "note
diversity between an exception (which
ever of part of the thing granted and of
re sthing in esse) and
esse,
rvation, which
always of
newly
created,
not
in
thinof
but
reserved out of the land or tenement demised
And his criticism
IIT
as follows: "Reserve cometh of the Latin
upon the word reserve
word reserve
that
to provide for store, as when
man departeth
with his land, he reserveth or provideth for himself
rent for his
own livelihood.
And sometimes
iiath the force of saving or exThomas's Coke Litt., star page 412.
And so in Shcpcepting."
"
reservation
pard's Touchstone we read that
clause of
def
whereby the feoffor, donor, lessor, grantor. &:c.. doth reserve som
new thing to himself out of that which he granted before. . This
oth
part of the thing grant ed,
differ from an exception which
ever
and of
thing in esse at the time bu this
of
thing newly created,
or reserved out of
thing demised that was not in esse before,
so that this doth always reserve tliat which was not before, or
abridge the tenor of that which was before.^® If one gr?^nt land yield horse, sours,
rose, or any such things, tlii
ng for rent money, corn,
reservation
the reservation be of the grass, or of
good
J)ut
the vesture of the land, or of
common or otlie^jrofit to be taken
c ounty,
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Emerson v. RIooney, 50 N. IT. 315 (1S70), which determ ined the extent
the iiliiintiff's ri^lit to t;ike water thruUKh ;in ;iT|iiHiiii(r nolli
wt^il uii ili
Tlie pliiintiff had duii
defeiulaiit
land
well on the land Avhicb later came
to the defendant, and liail laid an aqnednct from the well to certain Imildiiigs
conveyance had been made by plaintilf to the defendant's
on.otiier lands.
prede<vssor of all "rijrht. title, and interest in and unto {lie acjiieduct well, and
tlie
aquednct leadinj; therefrom, to the places liefore mentioned, pxct^ptin
ranch taken and carried to Dudley Barker's shed. .nj^Mvealily to Ins deed fro m
A. I). 184.']. and ilTso all my ri;;ht of usina all necessary
me dated November
o, the
w'^Ter~at my taKe-onis. viz..' etc.
was held that plalutilt's right: ~
*"
water was not limited to his lifetime.
!i

je

19 See

a

r

•

A

!

s

f

o

t

t

I

1),

.

b

V*^^--"^

is

."

r

a

e

is

a

a

is

,

e

a

e

a
s

r

a

a

a

it

is,

a nd reserving

Ch. 3)

of

THE PROPERTY CONVEYED

451

r eservations are void ."

Touchstone, p.
reservations,
but capable
80, et seq.
the meaning
as
of support as exceptions. In the case of The Earl of Cardigan v.
B.
C. 197, the words of the deed were "except and alArmitage,
ways reserved," and they were applied, among other things, to all the
coals in the land granted, together with right of way to take them.
tr eated
an exception of the coals which were pa rt
Bayle,
this^s
the thing granted, part of the land, and in esse at the time, and
ecause they were neve i^out of the grantor, would have remained
to him and his heirs, even without the word heirs, which happened
in that instance to be added. In respect to tlie right of way, he quoted
the rule from the Touchstone, that when anything
excepted, all
things that are depending on
and necessary for obtaining
are excepted also.
This case
direct authority for
very much in point — indeed
the ruling below, and
has been recognised and followed in subsequent cases.
Fancy v. Scott,
Man.
Ryl. 335 Douglass v. Lock,
Nev.
Man. 826.
In cur own case of Shoenberger v. Lyon,
Watts
(Pa.) 184,
he words "excepting and reserving" were construed an exception, bu
were set aside on the prmciple that every saving in
deed as lar'ge as
he grant,
void .
Thus
appears, upon sufficient authority, that words of reservation
nay operate by way of exception and to have any effect, must do so
when the subject Of the reservation
not something newly created,
thing corpora te
as
rent or other interest strictly incorporeal, but
and m esse when the grant
made . That the coal in question was
land
not to be doubted, since the case of Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa.
475, 72 Am. Dec. 760.
As such,
would have passed under Irwin's
deed to Whitaker, had
not been excepted out of the grant. At the
date of the deed, Irwin held
in fee simple, and because
did not
in fee.
The word
pass by the conveyance, he continued to hold
heirs was not necessary in the reservation, for an estate of inl-|pp'taru: p.
existed already in Irwin, and, unimpaired bv the conveyance,
de o ut
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to his heirs at his death . And so also the right pf_way, exannexed
to the estate in the coal, was saved by the exceptio n.
pressly
to
the heirs.
and descended
The law would have given
the parties had not expressly reserved it.
But what was the extent of the coal reservation
an undoubted
rule that an exception in
deed
to be construed most strongly
And upon
against the grantor, and most favourably to theg^rantee.
tliis principle
claimed, that
was only
special and temporary
use of the coal that was reserved to Irwin himself,
right to use the
coal during his life, but which ceased at his death.
We cannot so
read the clause.
"T he coal contained in said piece or parcel of land "
was the subject
th reservation.
If that means less than the whole,
how much less? what proportion of the coal was reserved?
Words
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not larger than these were construed to mean the whole of a coal ri ght
in Caldwell v. Fulton, and we confess we should not know by what
rule to restrict these words if we felt called upon to impose a restriction where the parties imposed none.
Do tlie words "for his own
use" amount to a restriction?
Sometimes the use is limited in point
of duration, as while the grantee is tenant of a particular messuage,
or so long as he manufactures a specific producl;ion ; but here it is as
" For his ow n
general and absolute as so few words could make it.
use," means, in such a reservation, the same dominion and proprietor ship over the coal that he would have had if he had made no deed for
tie land. He held it for his own use in all the forms that it was ca
pable of being used at the date of his deed — he held it just as absolutel y
after his deed was delivered
'The judgment is affirmed.^^"

{^fiu,J2^

KISTER
(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

U^ \*jlJU

55

d^HA^

v.

^>»^>v<u^

REESER.
1881.

98 Pa. 1, 42 Am. Rep. 608.)

IVegpass .flu are claiisum f regit, by Isaac Kister against George Reeser et al.
On the trial, before Fisher, P. J., the following facts appeared :
By indenture dated September 30th, 1865, William Reeser and wi fe
granted and conveved to Henry H. Drorbaugh and his heirs a tract o f
land containing about nineteen acres^ part of a la rger tract of land
owned by the said William Reeser in fee.
This deed contained the
following clause : "The said William Reeser doth_reserve a road ten
feet wide along the line of Joseph Burger, to be shut at each end by
a bar or gate."
Burger's land formed one of the boundaries of the
tract granted.
By indenture dated November 13th, 1867, Drorbaugh and wife
granted and conveyed the said tract to Isaac F ra zer and his he irs.
This deed contained the following recital : "This being the same tract
of land tliat William Reeser deeded to Henry H. Drorbaugh by deed
dated the thirtieth day of September A. D. one thousand eight hundred
and sixty-five, w herein said William Reeser re serves a road ten f eet
i n width along thelmeof Joseph Burger's lan d, t o be shut at each end
with a bar or gate/ *
By indenture dated December 9th, 1867, Frazer and wife granted
and conveyed the same tract to Isaac Kister an d 1^;§ heirs . This deed
also contai ned the last-mentioned reci tal.
2 In Fancy v. Scott, 2 Mann. & R. 335 (1828), there was a declaration
in
trespass for breaking and entering the plaintiff's close, spoiling the grass, and
digging peat and turf. The defendant in his plea, set up that he had lea sed
th e said close to the plaintiff resendng all pits, quarries, and mines, etc^ To
In sustaining the demurrer Bajley, J., said,
this plea there was a demurrer.
"The pleas are clearly bad. A landlord cnnnof. r(;^aerve a component part of tli e
land demised or granted , as he iias done here ."
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William Reeser died in March, 1872. Prior to his death the said
William Reeser, by indenture dated March 3d, 1872, g ranted and con v eyed to his son, George Reeser. Sr .. one of the defendants, another
portion of the said large tract of land. T his deed contains no ment ion
,
of the privilege of the said' road reserved by the said William Rees er
.
i n his deed to Drorbaug h.
George Reeser, Sr., however, claims under /» '*< •'^'^'©^'^'^
the said reservation the use of a ten-feet-wide way over tlie land of.
(X(k^UU>.0UA
Isaac Kister along the line of Joseph Burger.
In April, 1880, Isaac Kister pl aced a permanent fence at each en d
o f the line of reservation mentioned in the deed of William Reeser to
Drorbaugh . A short time afterwards George Reeser, Sr., and the
other defendants, b roke down the said fences, entered upon Kister 's

land, and drove a wagon across the same.
Igaac Kister brought this suit.

For this alleged trespass

'

'

\2^
The plaintiff requested the Court to charge, substantially, that the **-^L4« X^H^
O
right to a road reserved by William Reeser in his deed to Drorbaugh
not jT a ying 'beepres erved to the hei r s and assigns of ^Villi^im Reeser .
ceaseTan H determined' on the deathT^ William Ree-^er in ATarc|i^ 187^ . C^rfjt^^ g€c^
the trespass commit
4n^! ^thaTTuch reservation was no justificationiif
=-^- (JjC^i.a-aX
defendant.,
ted by the
TheCourt declined so to charge.
O'^
The defendants submitted, inter alia, the following point :
2. That under the legal effect of the reservation in said deed from
^ #/c«».rf^d^
William Reeser to Drorbaugh, the portion of land ten feet wide along
•
the line of Joseph Burger, for the use of a road, i s excepted out of the ^Crvt-^CtC^uc-en
grant, and remained as it was before for tlie purposes of a road ; that
the evident purpose of said reservation was to furnish egress and rer
gress from the other lands of the gj^rantor to and from the public rQ gd
l eading to Goldsboro', and the defendant, being the owner of those
other lands, had a legal right to pass in and out to said public road, over

iTTl*

the said land reserved in said deed, and committed no trespass in doing so.

Answer. Under the reservation in the deed of William Reeser and
wife to Henry H. Drorbaugh for nineteen acres and thirty-five perches,
dated September 30th, 1865, the defendant had a legal right to pass
over the road reserved Jn said deed, and did not commit a trespa^
by entering as he did the premises of the plaintiff.
The Court further instructed the jury th at the plaintiff was not en titled to recover, and directed them to find for the defendants V erdict accordingly for the defendants, and judgment thereon. The
plaintiff took this writ of error, assigning for error the answers to
points as above, and the instruction to find for the defendants.
Trunkey, J. William Reeser, by deed dated September 30th, 1865,
conveyed to Drorbaugh part of a tract of land which he then owned,
and Drorbaugh's title has been vested in the plaintiff.
The deed contains this clause: "The said William Reeser doth reserve a road ten
feet wide along the line of Joseph Burger, to be shut at each end with
a bar or gate.''
Prior to the conveyance there was neither a public
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nor private road over the land . The owner in fee of land may travel
over it when and where he pleases, and it would be vain to speak of
his right of way within his lines. W illiam Reeser died in 1872. The
court properly treated the question as one of law ; for, aside from the
conceded facts, there was no evidence to affect the construction of the
If tha^laus^^r^xceptio n of lan d
deed or clause of reservation.
to
ten fee t wi de, next to Burner's ime^n^pIamtir^va^To^CTtitled
recover! But if it is a re servation of a way over said land , the def en di'he land was granted in fee and a road reants we re tresj^sers.
served next Burger's line. This was to be shut at each end, and, subject to the grantor's use for a road, the grantee could enjoy it for all
The word road has never been defined to mean land ; it
purposes.
is difficult to find a definition which does not include the sense of way,
though the latter word is more generic, referring to many things beRoad is generallv applied to highway, street, or lan e,
sides roads.
o ften to a pathway, or private way, yet strictly it means only one pa rIts sense in this deed is very clear. Taking the
t icular kind of way.
entire clause, with reference to the grant, it means the ^gse^v ^tion o f
a way.
This is as plain as if the word way were in place "of™ oad.
Lawyer and layman alike would understand the word road in this
clause in the same sense as it is used in the statutes providing for grant
of "private roads." A private road, obtained bv proceedin^'-s under
t hose statutes, is a rnere wav. the owner of the vy ny hnvin,o- no interest
i n the land .

A

way is an inc orporeal hereditame nt of a real nature, entirely different from a common highway; it is "tine right of going over
another man's ground." Where land is granted and the right of wa y
r eserved, that right becomes a new thin g, derived from d ie land : and
although, before the deed, the grantor had the right of way over the
land whenever he chose to exercise
yet when he conveyed the land
from
the right of the grantee in
the reservation was
thing separated
A reserv atio n the creation of
State v. Wilson, 42 Me.
the land
thinr.-Qr
jght or interest which had no prior existence as such
thing granted. It
distinguished from an exception in that
art of
new right or interest. An e^xcgg]j
always of part of th
of
nf
the
whole
nf
th*
A reservation
hing granted,
part_oxrepted.
which
affects.
may be of lrigh or_interest in the particular part
These terms are often used in the same sense, the technical distinction
hough ^pt words of reservation be u<^p<\ thev
being disregarded.
such was the design of the partie s.
w
be construed as an exception,
deed in fee of land was made, the grantor "saving and
Thus, when
reserving, nevertheless, for his own use the coal contained in the said
piece or parcel of land, together with free ingress and egress by wagonwas held that the saving
road to haul the coal therefrom as wanted,"
clause operated as an exception of the coal. The coal was land and the
from the grant.
reservation of that part of the land excepted
the
made, and differed
was
was
existed
when
grant
thing corporate,
p rivate
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from something newly created, as a rent or other interest strictly incorporeal : Whitaker v. Brown, 46 Pa. 197. H,ere. the saving claus e
cr eated the way over part of the land granted , a right strictly- incor exception of part of the land contained in th e
R Qreal, and is not an

Ji^

grant.
ve nire facias de novo awarded.^*

judgment reverse d, and

...^fU^

.- ^

(Supreme Court of Vermont,

Watson, J.

'^

DEE

V.

KING.

1905.

77

Vt. 230, 50 Atl. 830,

When tliis

^Vui JtyjCcA-^ZC^n^' ^

case was here before

{7Z

GS

L. R. A.

Vt. olh,

50

SCO.)

Atl.

1109,) the decree was reversed pro forma and the cause re manded f or
ac^ditional findino-s of fact by the special master , as to the time whe n.
with re_ference to March 16. 1882. [^ared Dee asked and obtained per mission of the defendant to c^ross his ^hree-acre piece of land o n the

of the Central Vermont Railroad. On tlie hearing before the
master for this purpose, the orator introduced no further evidence.
The defendant testified in his own behalf, and from his testimony the
fact is found t hat Tared Dee first asked and obtained of the defendant
fn rrnss that land in January. 1882 . The orator seasonably
pp^f-missinn
objected and excepted to the defendant's testifying to any conversation
had between him and Jared Dee on this point, because Jared Dee was
east side

dead.

The defiendant was called and used as a witness by the orator at the
first hearing, upon the question, among other things, whether Tare
d^t-^^^ i^ <^^^
•
Dee passed through and over the three-acre piece, his habit and custom
!•
/)
.yA-*.4.**»-*'<-*-4^
jn so doing, to what extent, under what circumstances, and for what
to
purpose. The orator made the defendant a general witness upon that
question, and he thereby waived the statutory incompetency of the
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21 " It is to be observed that a
cannot, in strictness, be roade th e
rjprht of y a y
subject either of exception or reiser v atlo'n.
It is neither parcel of tlie tiling
granted, nor is it issuinj; out of the thing granted; the former being essential
to an exeeiJtiou, and the latter to a reservation.
A riglit of way reserved (using
that woid in a somewhat popular sense) to a lessor, as in the present case,
is. in strictness of law, an easement newly created by wnv of grant from tlie
g;rantee or lessee, in the same manner as a right of snoiting or tisliing. which
Itouglas
Lock,
has been lately much considered in the cases of Doe (iein.
It is not,
M.
W. 03 (1.S40).
A.
]<:. 70.T (1835), and Wickham y. Hawker,
indeed, stated in this case that the lease was executed by the lessee, which
would be essential in order to establish the easement claimed by the lessors
grant from tlie lessee; but we presume that in fact the
as in the nature of
deed was, according to the ordinary practice, executed by both parties, lessee
Railway Co. y. Walker,
A.
E. (.\. S.) 940, 'Jo7 (1S42),
as well as lessors."
Ch. G05.
per Tindal, C. J. But Cf. May v. Belleville, [IDOo]
has been held that, even though the statute has made uitnecessary the ns^
"
rigut m ree re(niires
eservation o
the \v ord "heirs to create
tee simple,
y. McCee, OS Md. 380,
IvarnnilU
Karnniiier
It:^^ (l!)U4)
TRoss
ntoss
v.
381)? b(> Atl. IT^S
(1!>04)
^^magic vvprd.
113 I'ac. 3S (1011),
^^rotz.ls Iowa, 352 (1S(J5) Euhnke v. Aubert, 58 Or.
contra.
Uf. Lathrop v. Eisner, 93 Mich. 599, 53 N. W. 701 (1802).

L-i.
^\1-^-mLC-■V't^tJ-
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defendant as a witness. Paine v. McDowell, 71 Vt. 28, 41 Atl. 1042 ;
Ainsworth v. Stone, 73 Vt. 101, 50 Atl. 805, — and he could not afterwards complain because the defendant gave testimony in his own behalf more fully upon the same subject matter.
Ta red Dee having obtained permission of the defendant to cross the
three-acre pie ce within fifteen years next after March 16. 1867^ the
orator can haveno prescriptive way over it. A right of way over this
land is neither^sef forth nor claimed by the orator in his bill; yet in
one aspect of the case whether he has such a way is material.
over the defendan t's
The only right of wav claim ed
^]|j,m^jy
land so far as appears by the bill, i s ov er the one-half acre piece on th e
\ve st side of the Central Vermont Railroad, as r eserved b y Jared Dee
in his deed October 7, 1862, conveying that land to William W. Pettingill. In that deed immediately following the description of the land
conveyed is the clause "r eserving the privilege of a pass. from the hi ghway past the house to. the railroad in. my usual place of crossin g."

^r

^

are only a resen^ation of a
person al pr i vileg e to Jared Dee which could not pass to his heirs or
assigns because n o words of inherita nce or assignment were used in
c onnection therewith; while the orator contends that the clause has
the force of a n exception, and that the servient estate thereby created
passed to the subsequent owners of the dominant estate without such
words of limitation being used. Much depends upon the construction
Lord Coke say s
given in this regard, in the disposition. of the case.
t hat "reserving" som_etimes has the force of saving or excepting, "so
as sometime it serveth to reserve a new thing, viz. a rent, and someCo. LitL
time to except part of the thing in esse that is granted."
143, a. S heppard says that "a reservation is a clause of a deed where by

The defendant contends that

the feoffor,

these words

do n or, lessor, grantor, etc., doth reserve some new thing to

a

*

*

*

a

a

yt,

is

a

a

a

is

e

tji

himself out of that which he granted before . And this doth, most com* * * This part of
monly, and properly, succeed the tenendum,
the deed doth differ from an exception, which is ever of part of
thing
thing in esse at the time, but this
of
thing granted, and of
in
not
esse
thing demised that was
newly created or reserved out of
before, so that this clause doth always reserve that which was not before, or abridge the tenure of that which was before."
Shepp. Touch.
80.
Again the same author says, that an exception clause most commonly and properly succeeds the setting down of the things granted;
that the thingjexcepted
exempted and does .not pass by the grant.
Page 77 . The same principles were largely laid down by this Court in
Roberts v. Robertson, 53 Vt. 690, 38 Am. Rep. 710. There the deed
specific description of the land congiven by the plaintiff contained
clause "reserving lots
Under
veyed, and
32^ 33^" etc.
this clause the plaintiff claimed title to the two lots above named. The
court, after stating the offices of an exception and of
reservation the
same as above, said these terms, as used in deeds, are often treated as
synonymous and that woxds creatinjs;' an exception are to have that
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effect, although the. word reservation is used . It was held that the
clause should be construed as an exception.
In England it has been held t hat a ri g^ht of way cannot in strictnes s i^^i^^^JsL.
'
b e made the subject of either an exception or a reservation ; for it is
^?^^|V^
neither parcel of the thing granted, an essential to an exception, nor is
^ .
Doe -*''^^'^tP''^*_
it issuing out of the thing granted, an essential to a reservation.
v. Lock, 2 Ad. & E. 705 ; Durham, etc., R. R. Co. v. Walker, 2 Q. B. •U/4-«^»>u'^
B ut ther e , as in this country, quasi easements are recognized in
945.
l aw, such as a visible and reasonably necessary drain or way used by
the owner of land over one portion of it to the convenient eniovment o f
another portion , and there has never been any separate ownership of
the quasi dominant and the quasi servient tenements. As such easement, a drain is classed as continuous, because it may be used continuously without the intervention of man ; and a right of way as noncontinuous because to its use the act of man is essential at each time of
In Barnes v. Loach (1879) 4 Q. B. D. 494, it was said reenjoyment.
such
easements of an apparent and continuous character, that
garding
the
owner
if
aliens the quasi dominant part to one person and the
quasi servient to another, the respective alienees, in the absence of express stipulation, will take the land burdened or benefited, as the case
may be, by the qualities which the previous owner had a right to attach
to them. And in Brown v. Alabaster (1888) Z7 Ch. D. 490, it was said
th at although a right of way by an artificially formed path over on e A(t#<* "^
p art of the owner's land for the benefit of the other portion, could no t
JL^^^^^^X*
be brought within the definition of a continuous easement, it might_ be
governed by the same rules as are apparent and continuous easeme nts.
"Cases involving quasi easements~have
been beTore this Court.
In
Harwood v. Benton & Jones, 32 Vt. 724, the owner of a water privilege,
dam, and mill, also owned land surrounding and bordering upon the
mill pond and mill, which he subjected to the use and convenience of
the mill privilege and mills.
A part of these adjacent lands thus subjected was conveyed without any stipulation in the deed that any servient condition attached thereto. The condition of the estate had been
continuous, was obvious, and of a character showing that it was designed to continue as it had been.
The Court said this was a palpable and
impressed condition, made upon the property by the voluntary act of
the owner.
It was held that, without any stipulation in the deed upon
that subject, the law was that the grantee took the land purchased
by him, in that impressed condition, with a continuance of the servitude
of that parcel to the convenience and beneficial use of the mill. It w as
th ere laid down as an umquestioned proposition that "upon tlie se ver3^*2
ance of a heritage, a grant will be implied of all those cont i nuous and
appare nt easements which have in fact been used by the owner durin g
t he umty , though they have had no legal existence as easements ;"_apd
that tlie doctrine was equally -\vell settled that the law will imply a re.s ^iion of like easements in favor of the part of the inheritance retain
ei^^^
ed by the grantor.
In Goodall v. Godfrey, 53 Vt. 219, 38 Am. Rep.
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defined way in use for the obvious convenience of the
whole building"' was in question, consequent on a division of the property among the representatives of the deceased owner, and the same
principles of law were applied. And in Willey, Admx., v. Thwing, 68
Vt, 128, 34 Atl. 428. applying the same doctrines, a right of way was
upheld under an implied reservation.
In this country it is commonly held that a wav may be the subject o f
a reservation, and in many cases courts of high standing have hel d
t hat it mav properly be the subject of an e xcepti on in a gran t.
While
it is true that an owner of land cannot have an easement in his own estate in fee, he may as before seen have a quasi easement over one portion in the character of a visible, travelled way reasonably necessary
to the convenient enjoyment of another portion, a nd when such a w ay
e xists, there would seem to be no substantial legal reason why it m ay
not be treated as a thin jg in being , and as a part of the estate included
in the descri])tion of the grant be made an exception in a deed of the
land over which the way
when such appears to havp hepn 2Li!l!-1"'
ion of the parties. I'hat this
the principle upon which
clause rean
from
exception appears
way
Chappell v.
construed as
serving
H. R. R. Co., 62 Conn. 195, 24 Atl. 997, 17 L. R. A.
N. Y., N. H.
420, which
more particularly referred to later. There the Court
"T hen too the right to cross was, in
said
certain sense,
ri^
was
part of the
xisting in the grantors at the date of the deed.
ull dominion over the strip about to be conveyed by the de^fl nnd n ntright to be, in effect, conferred upon them by the grantee s.
was
out
of
the
something which the 'reservation' in effect excepted'
opera"„^rrr:=^.T:
tion of the grant."
The distinction between
reservation and an exception of
way
best understood by an examination of cases involving clauses very similar to the one here under consideration, yet so unlike as to re(|uire cHfferent constructions in this regard. In Ashcroft v. Eastern R. R. Co.,
126 Mass. 196, 30 Am. Rep. 672, the clause was "reserving to myself
the right of passing and re-passing, and repairing my aqueduct logs
* to be built and kept in repair
forever, through
culvert
which culvert shall cross the railroad at right
by said company;
wa held that the provision that the grantee shou ld
angles," etc.
uild and keep
repair the culvert was an essential part of the gran
and clearly _i ndicated that the intention of the parties was to confe
ujjon the grantor a. new right not before vested in him, which, there ore, cmild not be the subject of an exception . In Clatlin v. Boston
Albany CCo., 157 Mass. 489. Z2 N. E. 659, 20 L. R. A. 638. the clause
was '"reserving to ourselves the right of
passage way to be constructed and kept
There was no evidence of an
repair by ourselves."
was held to be
reservation and not
existing way across the land.
an exception.22
In Chappell v. N. Y., N. H.
H. R. R. Co. before
a
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22 But see Railey v. Affawam Nat. Bank. 100 lMas5?. 20. 76 N. E.
L. R.
449.
A. (X. S.) 'JS, 1\2 Am. St. K^p. 296 (1906), where there was involved the con-
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cited, John W. and Benjamin F. Brown, in 1851, owned a piece of land
in New London fronting on the river Thames and lying between that
river and Bank street. On the river front was a wharf and docks.
Between the wharf and Bank street was about one and one-half acres
of land used by the Browns in carrying on a coal and wharfage busiThe wharf was valuable. In that year the Browns conveyed,
ness.
for railroad purposes, a strip of this land, twenty-five feet wide, running through the land and separating the wharf from the land lying
westerly of the strip conveyed, and rendering it inaccessible except by
This right of crossing was indispensable to the
crossing the strip.
Browns and all who might thereafter own the premises then owned by
The deed thus conveying this strip contained the clause 'VAiid (,^2 C&%>%^%>^.
them.
w ,e reserve to ourselves the priviles^e of crossing and re-crossing saicl
p iece of land des cri bed, or any part thereof within said bound s."
an existing on e
Thevv;ay at the tini e of the date of the deed was
pl ainly ^sible, necessary, and in almost constant use . _The clause was
In Bridger v. Pierson, 45 N. Y. 601, the
co nstrued to be an exception.
defendant convevTcnancTto the plaintiff and immediately following the
description the deed contained the clause "reserving always a right of
way as now used on the west side of the above described premises
* * from the public highway to a piece of land now owned by"
*
R. It was held to be an exce^ion. In White v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R.
Co., 156 Mass. 181, 30 N. E. 612, the action was tort for the obstruction of a private way claimed by the plaintiff over the location of the
defendant's railroad, under a clause in a deed which read "reserving
This way
the passway at grade over said railroad where now made."
had existed as a defined roadway or cart track, and had been used in
passing to and from a highway to and from parts of tlie lot north of
the tracks before the railroad was located, and before the deed referred to was given. The clause was held to be an exception. These
are but a few of the many decisions in different jurisdictions which
might be referred to upon this question, but more are unnecessary.
T he language of the clause under consideration cannot be said to b e
We therefore look at the sur rounding circum stances
unequivocal .
existing when the deed containing it was made, the shuation of the
/;
and in the ligh t
parties, and the subject matter of the instrument;
j^ •yf't hereof . the clause should be construed according to the intent of the ^^^"y^ -^
"
parties. At tlie time of making this deed Jared Dee was the owner of 'li/t^tcyCf lU
" A pa sof the follov^irifr provision in a deed from INfoore to TTenry:
te n
two
houses
the
a^ewciy
in
between
k
and
for
common
open
e
it
use
is
to
be
s
i
feet ill widtn, Hye T^et or said passageway to be furnisht^d bv said Llenry an d
five feet bv me fro n^ land Iving east of the h^nd here convey ed." There w^tsiio
p assaijeway in^'existence
at tlie time of the deed . Henry later conveyed the
same land 'to ttie defendant, who in turn conveyed it by deed with full covenants for title to the plaintiff. T ^e case arose upon a claim for damages fo r
br each of the covenan t against in cuinliralic es. U iT^j^Jjii ntiff was allowed to jiec ovei~. despite the "Tact that JNToo re had diiHlTefore the deed to the piamTlg .
See, also. Ch 'iids v. BoslOn & M. K. U., iiia xUass. 'Jl, UO N. E. 957, 48 U R. A.
stmctinn

(N. S.) 378 (1912).
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land on the opposite side of the railroad, consisting of a three-acre
piece of tillage land, and a hill lot adjoining it on the north, chiefly
valuable for its sugar works, for its pasturage, and as a wood and timber lot. The last named lot is traversed its entire length from north
to south and about a third of its width from west 'to east by a considerable hill, more or less ledgy and making it ex tremelv inconvenient to
c ross from the grantor's own land north of the Fairbanks land. , bu t
easily reached by the now disputed right of way arross the one-ha lf
acre p iece, and over the three-acre piece of tillage land. The greater
portion of Jared Dee's sugar orchard, timber, and wood was on top
and east of this hill. There was no wav to or out of the hill lot exce pt
oyer the hill on Tared Dee's own land west of the Fairbanks land, or
out through the three-acre piece and the one-half acre piece onto the
p ublic highway leading westerly to Jared Dee's hous e. For more than
ten 3'ears next prior to the time when Jared Dee gave the deed to
Pettingill, the D ees had passed over the one-half acre piece and
t hrough the three-acre piece almost exclusively for all purposes whejir
ever they went to or from the hill lot , wh ether with team , on foo t, or
in any other-mRn4^€4^. except when they got wood on the west side of
the lot they went from the highway across the Fairbanks farm west of
the railroad, thence over the railroad at the "middle crossing" onto
the hill lot. And on rare occasions they used still another route fu rt her north wholly over Dee's land . It appears from the deed itself
that in crossing the one-half acre piece they had a particular place of
travelling then known to both the grantor and the grantee, for the
"
words used in the deed in describing it are from the highway past th e
house to the railroad in my usual place of crossing ." Thus showing
the intentioi^ of the parties to be t hat the grantor should retain th e
r ight to pass through this land over a visible, travelled way then i n
existence, and that no new way was thereby being created for his bene -

fit

in the light of the foregoing circumstancconstrued,
not as a reserv ation, but as an ex cepes, the clause must be
tiP-"' When given this construction, technical wor3s of limitation are
not applicable, for the part excepted remained in the grantor as of his
former title, because not granted. Cardigan v. Armitage, 2 Barn. &
C. 197; Chappell v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., before cited; Winthrop V. Fairbanks, 41 Me. 307. We think the parties intended that by
t his provision the grantor should permanently retam from the gra nt
f or the benefit of his land east of the railroad, the wav over the on ehalf_acre piece, which he had been accustomed to use in crossing tha t
l andTto and Jrom the land first name"d
The way, thus retained became
an easemen t over the half-acre piece of land and an appurtenant to the
other land ; and witli the latter it w ould pass by descen t or assignm ent.
Subsequent to conveying the one-half acre lot to Pettingill, Jared
Dee sold and conveyed the three-acre piece, which t hrough mesne conClearly under

v(
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^
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the law and

vejyanc es has become the property

of tlie defendan

t.

But this cannot
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affect the easement as an appurtenant to the hill lot ; for a right of w ay
a ppurtenant to land attaches to every part of it. even though it may g o
into the possession of several person s. Lansing v. Wiswall, 5 Denio
(N. Y.) 213 ; Underwood v. Carney, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 285.
The master finds that if upon the facts reported the orator has a
right of way or a right to cross over defendant's land to the hill lot,
then the orator has suffered damage by reason of the acts of the defendant complained of in the bill, to the amount of sixty-five dollars.
The o rator can recover only such damages as he ha<; siiffered by acts
of the defendant in obstructing the way across the one-half acre piece ,
consideri ng fhe. fact that the orator had no ris^ht of wav^ver or rig ht
t o cros st he defendant's three-acre piec e. Upon this basis the damages
have not been assessed.
The report should therefore be recommitted
for that purpose, and upon such damages being reported, a decree
should be rendered that the inju nction be made perpetu al, and that the
defendant pay to the orator the damages found with costs in this Court.
The costs in the court below should be there determined.
The d ecree dismissing the bill with costs to the defendant is r eversed and cause remanded with mandate.^^

SMITH'S EX'R
(Supreme Court of Vermont, 1912.

v.

JONES.
86

Vt.

258, 84

Atl.

866.)

C ase for obstructing a private wa y. Plea, the general issue. Trial
'
by court on an agreed statement of facts at the September Term, 1911,
Franklin County, Waterman, J., presiding, j udgrnent for the plaintiff'.
The d efendant except ed. The opinion states the case.
MuNSON, J. The plaintiff sues as executor of Francis Smith to recover da mages for the obstruction of a private way which crosses th e
d efendant's land, called the Pratt farm, to a wood lot immediately ad i oising'. which belongs to Smith's estate and is in the possession o f
t h^ executor . In 1867 Smith, then the owner of both parcels, conveyed the farm to a grantor of the defendant by a deed which contained
" Reserving
the right at reasonable times and in
the following clause:
a reasonable way to cross said land below the road to my wood lo t."
There is no similar clause in the succeeding deeds, but each of these
contains a reference to the deed immediately preceding. Since the conveyance of Francis Smith the o wners of the wood lot have had_ no
o ther means of reaching it than the claimed right of way . The par>?^
ties submit the question whether t his easement ceased with the life o f /
^
F rancis Smith, or inures to the benefit of his heir s and estate.
L^"""^
There is nothing in the agreed statement to show that at the date

J

23 See Smith v. Furbish, 68 N. H. 123, 44 Atl. 398, 47 L. R. A. 226 (1894) ;
York Haven Water & Power Co. v. York Haven Paper Co., 201 Fed. 270, 119

C. C. A. 508 (1912).
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Francis Smith

deed there was a defined and visible way across
farm to his wood lot. S o the way mentioned in the dee d
must^ b g taken to be a new way, not in being previous to the pyfrnti nn
of the deed . I_fjhere had been an existing road, the provision in question could be construed as an exception, and thus accomplish a retention of a right of way. Dee v. King, 77 Vt. 230, 59 Atl. 839, 68 L.
R. A. 860. T he terms "reservation" and "exception" are often use d
a s synonymous when the thing to be secured tn thp grantor is a part of
t he granted premises, and when so used they are to be construed a c2 Wash. Real Prop. *645.
If given their technical meancordinglying, an e xcept ion is something withheld from a grant which otherwise
would pass as~a~part of
while
reservation
some newly created
Ashcroft
right which the grantee impliedly conveys to the grantor.
v. Eastern R. R. Co., 126 Mass. 196, 30 Am. Rep. 672; Bailey v. Agawam Nat. Bank, 190 Mass. 20, 76 N. E. 449,
L. R. A. (N. S.) 98,
112 Am. St. Rep. 296.
The extreme technicality of the latter conception
would be easier and ne arer the trut to say that
apparent.
an interest which the grantor creates and 'excepts orj rgeservation
Then the interest classed as
serves from his gra nt.
reservation
would remain in the grantor, and an easement in fee would arise without the use of the word "heirs."
still the rule of the common law that an easement in fee ca jiinheritaj ic
reservation without wdr'ds
npt be created bv~way of
has been held that term<; pf reseryation may be construed as
But
this
onstituting an exception whe
necessary to effe£ tua te_tli
be
the
to
considered that the parties
seems
parties"""^
Pi'IPQse„ o_f_
use
the
term
sense
different
from
its technical meaning, and
may
that heir intent,
ascertainable from the subject of the grairL and
he surroundmg circumstances, should control rather than th
legal
1'he primary and natural meaning of the word is inmplication.
consistent with the effect given
in the law of this subject. To reserve
to keep in reserve, to retain, to keep back, not to deliver or make
over. Its meaning in law, as given by Webster's New International,
"to withhold from the operation of
grant or agreement." Unles
save
ated, this inconsistent techthe rule of construction above
forced implication
nical meaning of
word in common use and
therefrom will determine whether an easement, essential to the use and
value of an estate, shall end with the life of tlie then owner or go
with the estate
perpetuity.
After Smith conveyed the Pratt farm his wood lot was entirely su rof other s. There
ounded by the '^'^x^<^'^'\
nothing to indicate that he
had any personal interest in securing a' right of way distinct from
his interest as owner of the lot. His interest as owner required that
he secure
right of way available after his death . . The value of he
ot to Smith as its then owner, irrespective of use, depended upon the
In ordinary circumstances
perpetuity of the_ means of reaching
there
no ground for supposing that
grantor intends to limit
the
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period of his life, and thereby
materially lessen the value of his land as property in the market or as
The purpose of reserving^ a ri°;ht of way to th at
an asset of his estate.
p art of the property retained by the grantor is manifest to the grante e,
even though there is no definite and visible way impressed upon th e
^ojj ; and the purpose is one that points directly to a n intentio n on the
part of the grantor to reserve a right co-extensive in duration with
ins estate in the land. The p urpose a nd nnder standinsf of the part ies
i n creating an easement of this nature are so nearly universal, th at
those using terms of reservation may properly be held to have intende d
an easement in fee, when there are no circumstances or restrictiv e
words indicating" a contrary intention .

of this nature to

right-

the uncertain

Judgment affirmed.

^_

IIAVERIIILL SAVINGS BANK
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massacluisctts,

1903.

v.

GRIFFIN.

1S4 Mass. 419, G8 N.

E.

S39.)

Bill

in equity, filed August 17, 1901, t o restrain the defendant from
u s'ing and maintainin<y a drain from certain l:ind on t he east side of
Auburn Street, in Haverhill, owned by the defendant, through land
o n the_.south side of Sixth Avenue in that city owned by the plain
tiff, and praying that the plaintiff be authorized to close the portion

drain upon its land.
decree gr anting the reli ef
made
In the Superior Court Stevens,
ai)peaLe
At the rec|uest of the deand the def endant
rayed ^
fendant the judge reported the material facts found by him, in accord22>.
ance with R. L. c. 159,
The defendant
the ownThe report was in substance as follows
north by
bill,
the
o
unded
on
the
hers
in
as
land
described
the
er of
plaintiff
bill.
Both
the
also described
parcels of
the land of the
one Algern on
land were owned on and before November, 1883,
/^^^
filing
The land
of the bil
P. Nichols, who had died before the
a

d.
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b
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The land owned by the
1885.
in common form dated November
warran
Warren
one
Hoyt
by Nichols, by
plaintiff was conveyed to
lainn this deed the
deed in common form dated July 12, 1886.
ff's lai]d was described as bounded on the south by land of Carolin
Griffn about one hundred and seven feet more or less, and containe
following clause
And reserving to the lot next southerly own ed
th
private sewer now on sa id
enter
drain into
right
to^
by Griffin th
through
mortg age given by
l^ild*!' )The plaintiff acquired its title
The m ortgag
I:ioyt-^:o the plaintiff and foreclosed by the plaintiff.
di not
ntain any words relating to the draj n. After the conveyance
drain was constructed by her from the lot owned
to the defendant,
her
into
and
through the Nichols land, afterwards conveyed to
by
^
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This drain connected with the sewer on Hoyt's land, and from
of 1885 was in continuous use draining the defendant's

the aucumn

lot.

from Nichols to Hov t containing the clause above quoted
follows,
omitting the portion after the habendum clause which
was as
contained the ordinary covenants of a warranty deed :
"Know all men by these presents that I, Algernon P. Nichols, of
Haverhill in the County of Essex and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, i n consideration of two thousand dollars paid by Warren Hoyt .
of said Haverhill, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do her eb y give., grant bargain sell and convey unto the said Warren yinyt a
certain parcel of land in said Haverhill on the southerly side of Sixth
street and bounded on the North by said St. one hundred and ten feet
more or less, on the east by land of the Children's Aid Society, about
one hundred feet more or less, on the south by land land of Caroline
Griffin about one hundred and seven feet more or less, and on the West
by Auburn street about one hundred feet. Saving and reservino- nev ertheless to myself and my heirs and assi^gns forever for the use o f
s aid Children's
Aid Society a right to pass and repass upon and oven a
strip of land four feet (4 it.) wide and seventy-five feet long , extending_southerly from Sixth St. and next to land of said Societ y, so
as to make a passage way for the exclusive benefit — the adjoining
estates twelve feet wide including the eight feet in width which I re■
served for such use in my deed to said Society, and reserving to. t he
l ot next .s jQ Utherlv owned by Griffin the right to enter a d rain into a
The

deed

sewer now on said lanch
To have and to hold the granted
privileg
es a nd appurtenances the reto belonging
premises with all the
t o the said Hoyt and his heirs and assigns to the ir own use and be-

private

BralEy, J. At the time the defendant obtained title to her land the
drain was not in existence and the deed under which she holds is silen t
a s to an y r ight to lay and maintain such a drain through the land^ f
t he plainHll ^ Neither does it appear that this alleged right whereby
the defendant would be entitled to connect her premises with the
public sewer, can be said to arise by implication.
See in this connection Bumstead v. Cook, 169 Mass. 410, 48 N. E. 767, 61 Am. St. Rep.
293.

The

falls within the w ell recognized General rule that wher e
is not set out in the instrument under, which the parl v
claiming the privilege holds title, i t must be sho^^fn to be actually in
pvi^pnrf f)pd f:r'""'"'tpd with the estate conveyed in order to pass^ as
a ppurtenant by implication . Philbrick v. Ewing, 97 Mass. 133 ; Bass
V. Edwards, 126 Mass. 445, 449.
case

a n_ easement

In order therefore to maintain her claim

she is necessarily

obliged

to rely on the clause in the deed to the plaintiff's grantor which is in
these words, "and reserving to the lot next southerly owned by Griffin

the right to enter a drain into a private sewer now on said land," and
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ri ghts of the parties must be determined on the construction to be
g iven to this clause.
At the date of this deed so far as the facts appear by the record
no such right had been p^ranted to or prescriptive! v acquired bv the
defendant, and wliich mig^ht be prpservpd for her use by the languag e
t^sed , on the ground that thereby an exception was created and hence
the easement claimed was excepted from the grant.
But ^they mu st
b p^ ron.'^triipd as an attempt to vest in the grantor a new interest o r
r ight that did not before exist and therefore constitute a reservatio n
r ather than an excep tion. Wood v. Boyd, 145 Mass. 176, 13 Tvl. E.
476; White v. New~Yo?k & New England Railroad, 156 Mass. 181,
30 N. E. 612.
the

As

defendant was not a party but a stranger to the deed she
rights under the reservation which enured solelv to t he
grantor, and for this reason s he did not acquire an easement under it.
IVlurphy V. Lee, 144 Mass. 371, 3^4,11 N. E. 550.
It follows that the decree entered in the Superior Court was right
and should be affirmed. D ecree affirmed.^
_:\
the

c ould g ain no

24

Cf. Lipsky v. Heller, 199 Mass. 310, 85 N. E. 453 (190S) ; Martin v. Cook,
267. 60 N. W. 679 (1894) ; Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 40

102 Mich.

N. Y.

Wall,

(1869) ; Bartlett v. Barrow^s, 22
126 N. C. 405, 35 S. E. 811 (1900).

191

Aig.Pbop.— 30

E. I.

642, 49

Atl.

31 (1901) ;

Wall

v.
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CHAPTER IV
CREATION OF EASEMENTS BY IMPLICATION

COPPY
(1406.

Y. B.

11

I. DE B.
Hen, VII, 25, pi.

»

V.

G.)

it

it,

William Coppy brought an action on the case ag ainst J. de B., and
counted that according to the custom of London, w h.ere there were
t wo tenements adjoining, and one had a gutter running over the ten ebe on his own
nient of the other, the other cannot stop
though
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The or(1i pn|-Y w'nY fif fr^'vt'rT p-^ ements and [jrofits of ronrse is Irv grn nt.
"^'"^f^nininun hiw, mt^Miif liu !i gM
Tiie prul »sealed iiistrmueiit.
yhicll. accordin
leuis tif diHkulty tliat arise in connection wirli such express grants are in i;eneral the same prulileais that arise in conveyances hy deed y;enerall\'. and are
sntticieiitly treated inider otlier lieads. IIq wpvpi- '" H't^ martcr of tiie suttlcie ncy
o tlie words in the ?;rant to serve to create de novo un easementThere ariae u ec nsio!i;inv (pit'ijtions of snecial dirnciiLJ v.
••W'itli tlie appurtenances'' does not serve to create an easement de novo, even
prior to the conveywhere the easement claimed had
de facto existenc-e
Wliailey v. Thompson.
ance.
Hos.
P. 371 (IT'-IO); Gayetty v. Hetlnme.
]\Fass. 4!>.
Am. Dec. ISS (1.SJ7); I'arsons v. .Johnson. PS X. Y. K\2.. 2:'> Am. Uep.
"
Compare James v. riant,
141) (1S77).
A.
V.. 1V,\ (lN:!(i).
Tliere are, nwand, if you w ill
ev^M-. ani.-mnrds for tlie nurnose t>f i)assinj suc
an ea.sement
oiTTy insertJ Ji i^ words 'or thereNvTrii
ll^ed and Ull.loye d. the riyht would pass."
HiiyTeiv. I'... in i^arlow v. Kliodes.
TTus was said with
(J. & M. 4:!9, 448 (18:'.:{T
refe rence to
i^isj <'=^^^j)|'^iit-w jijch once had been a real easement but which
by unity of ownership of domiuaut: and servi^ut
ad hecii extiug^uished as iiUL
enenu'iits.
"Whcu the owner of piece of land has
risht of way over adjacent land,
so that lie may maintain at any time an action for an olstruction. if afterwards
by inheritan<e or purchase both pieces of land come to one and the same owner, the ri.i^ht fs necessarily at an end, the enjoyment thenc\>forth being the mere
exercise of
later |)eriod. th
riuiht of property on his own land.
ut if. at
M^rtir^i aifinii t'nll into the ownership and pos.scssion of different person.s^
'icTTii the conyeyajiC£_aL-the land to whicli tlie wav was formerly att:;uheJ.
wini all ^\i' VS| eft;-, ust^nJ or enioyed therewijj i.'
he words are toum] •tog.^t
her^
he effect of the se \voros i><ro revive tlie right! tliat formerly existed, and whicii
bnt only suspended . But since
as been not extint-Miished.
does not api)ear
right over one of these pieces
here that at any antecedent time there existed
of land, attached to the other piece of land, the ffect of tb^^sp w mw]..^ (-jii^imfright of wav tliat never before existe d." Kelly, C. K., in
make or revive
Langlev v. Hammond, L. R.
Ex. 161, IfiS (1868).
Until the cases of Watts
y. Kelson, I.. R.
Ch. App. 166 (1S70), and Kay v. Oxley, L. R. 10 Q. B. 360
-seems to have been considered
hat general words of the sort re ferred
(187.5).
o would operate to create an easement only where riiere had once been
tru
easement wiiicli. though extin guished in law by uiuty of ownei-ship, had beea
cTTntinue (Tii
de' tact(7eT>^ehi^ht in connection with the use of the (piasi doi u(Joddard, Easements (Beniant teiTenreiit up to the time of its coiivevance.
In Kay y. Oxley. Blackburn, J., after reviewing some of the
nett's I'^d.) lU.'i.
earlier cases limiting the doctrine as above stated, states what would seem to
be the proper view: "It cannot make any difference in law, whetiier the right
was originally created
pt way was only de facto used and enjoyed, or whether
befoi-e the unity of possession, and then ceased to exist as a matter of right,
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land ; and counted how he had a tenement and the defendant another
tenement adjoining.
"
We say that since the time of memor y
Rede [for the defendant] :
tenements,
and enfeoffed t he ^ilaint jtif of the
one A. was seised of both
o ne and defendant of tiie othe r."
Wood [tor'ilie plaintiff] : "This is not a good plea, f or the defen da nt seeks to defeat the custom by reason of an unity of possession since
t he time of memory ; and that he cannot do in this case, for such a
custom, that one shall have a gutter running in another man's land is
a c ustom solemnly binding the land , and this is not extinct by unity oi
possess ion^: as if the lord purchase lands held in gavelkind, [still] both
sons of the lord shall inherit, just the same as if the land had remained
in the possession of the tenant, because [the custom of J gavelkind is
solemnly binding on the land."
"Jf a man purchase land of which he has the rent,
TowxsiiEND.
the rent is gone by the unity of possession, because a man cannot have
a rent from himself; b ut if a man has a tenement from which a gutte r
r uns into the tenement of another, although he purchase the other ten ement, the gutter remains, and [s as necessary as it was before ."
Kede: "He who was the owner of the two tenements might have destroyed the gutter; and that if he had done so, and then made several
feoffments of the two tenements, the gutter could not have revived."
Davero: "Jf that were so, you might have pleaded such destruction
specially, and it would have raised a good issue."
Towxshexd: "Amend your plea, for we will not argue with ycu
any longer/'
Whereupon Rede pleaded new matter.

ROBBIXS

V.

UjLMf^

BARXESr

lobart,
(Court of Coraruon rieas, IGlCr' Ilobart

^

1.11.)

Rohhins brought a q uod permit tat against Barnes, prosternere quandam domum, &c., and counts, t hat he was seised of an ancient hous e
and yard ; and whereas in the east part of the said house there is, and
time out of mind hath been, a window of such length and brea dth ; the
defen^gjjt hath erected a certain house ot such length and breadth
u pon his own freehold so near the said east part of the said hous e,
tl iat it overhangs the same and stoppeth his ligh t, &c The defendant
pleads, that one Richard Allen was seised of tlie plaintift''s house and
so that i n the one case it would be created as a right de novo, i n the ot her
D ie rely revived ,
mit it uinKes a jireat uirrei-eiK-e. as iiiarter ot evidence on the
I t \v;is tiie re
question, wliether the way was used and enjoyed as appurtenant."
h eld tluit the ri^bt to use a way wliich had had no existence ]u-ior to any unitv
of'oWnersbi]!. hut which tlie grantee of tlie quasi dominant tenement, as lessi ;e
t hercdr. Had heen using in connection with his occupiincy. [mssed as an ease -

uieut under general words of the character under consideration

;.

Z
»

J^U

t^jkM^^^\
^^^'y

'

*
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yard, and was also seised of a certain house, standing in the place
where the said house of the defendant now standeth, which did overhang the house of the now plaintiff, in tarn amplis modo and forma,
as the said now house of the said defendant doth.
A nd he. saith. that
h e pulled down that house, because it was ruinous, and built this hou se
i n the place of it._ The plaintiff maintains his count and traverseth,
that the old house superpendebat, &:c., in tarn amplis modo & forma
prout, &c. And the j ury found for the plaint iff. And now it was said
in arrest of judgment, that this was an unperfect issue; f or there oug ht
no more of the new house to be prostrated, than did indeed overhan g
more than the former house did , which was granted by the Court, if
i t had been wisely pleaded .
For it was agreed by the Court, that
though one of these houses had been built overhanging the otlier
wrongfully before they came both into one hand ; y et after when the v
c ame both into the hand of Allen, that wrong now was purged : so tha t
i f the houses came afterwards into several handsr yet neither par tv
c ould com plain nf a ^yrnn g before : SO that in this case it was plain,
tliat the plaintiff could have no cause of acti on, but for the i ncrea se
of the overhangmg. Yet because he had not expressed and distinctly
limited that in his plea, but took issue generally as before, which was
found against him, the Court must now give judgment according to the
complaint as true, because they can take no other knowledge; f or th e
j ury hath not found that the former house overhanged so much, a n d
n ot the rest; yet out of their discretion thev gave the plaintiff judgme nt

f or tlie whole , and execution for damages and costs presently ; but
staid execution, as to the abating of the house till it might be viewed
what was overhanging de novo; because the Court was informed, that
in truth it was but a small matter. If I have an ancient house and
lights, and I purchase the next house or ground, where yet no nuisance
is done to my former house ; now it is clear, that my privilege, against
that I have purchased, ceaseth ; for I may use mine own as I will.
Now then suppose I would lease my former house, I may build upon
the latter, or if I lease my latter, he may build against me, as it may
seem.
y^

yfw^

f\/^""^a/

But note, there is a great difference between interests and profits, as
rents, commons, &c., and bare easements, such as are lights, air, gutters, stillicidia and the like; for t hough while thev are in one hanj l
they may be stopped, or foredone. because a man cannot be said tn
wrong himself , y et if they be divided. t;hinjy«; gi that nature (still j n
being) do revive, because they are of no less use of themselves in- jQne
hand tb aa-kudiyefs, being equally (rebus stantibus in •the same use and
occupation) necessary for the several houses to which they belong, ^t
clearly, if even such th ings be foredone or altered, while they are m
one hand^and s^ being the Houses be again divided, tliey cann ot be
restoreTByTaw, but must be taken as they were at the time of the conveyance.
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FLETCHER.

(Court of King's Bench, 1663.

1

Lev. 122.)

Ca s,e was brought for stopping of his lights . The case was, a man
erected a hou se on his owia jands, and after sells the ho use to one, and
thelands adjoining to another, who by putting piles of timber on the
land, obstru cted the lights of the house; and it was resolved, that al»
though it be a new messuage, yet n o person who claims the land by^~ .
p urchase under th e builder, can obstruct the lights any more than the ixV-C-*'^**'^
b uilder himself c ould, who cannot derogate from his own grant, by

TwYSDEN and Wyndham,

Hyde being

Justices,

absent,

and ivEL-

of t he
YNGE doubting. For
Kelynge
house. And
said. Suppose the land had been sold first, and
the house after, the vendee of the land might stop tlie lights ; Twysdex
to the contrary said, Whether the land be sold first or afterward, the
vendee of the land cannot stop the lights of the house in the hands of
the vendor or his assignees ; and cited a case to be so adjudged ; bjit_all
a greed, that a stranger having lands adjoining to a messuage new ly
erected, may stop the lights, for the building of any man on his land s,
cannot liinder his neighbour from doing what he will with his ow n
lands ; other wise if the messuage be ancient, so that he has gained a
And afterwards in Mich. 16 Car.
rig ht in the lights by prescription.
II, B. R. a like judgment was given between the same parties, for
erecting a building on another part of the lands purchased, whereby
the lights of another new messuage were obstructed.
the lights are a necessary and essential part

PINNINGTON
(Court of Exchequer,

V.

GALLAND.

1853.

9 Exch.

1.)

This was a n action on the case for the disturbance of a right of way ,
which came on to be tried before Coleridge, J., at Nottingham Summer Assizes, 1852, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff, dam* *
ages 40s., subject to the following special case : ^ *
Martin, B. This is a special case, which was argued before us
during the last Term ; and t he question is, whether the plaintiff, as oc- /'"^Yi
c upier of two closes called the Rye Holme rlo^^es^ i q entitle d to a ri^ht/ ^
)
of wa y over certain lands of the defendant.
*^-^
The material circumstances are these: In the year 1839 a property
Two of them
consisting of fi ve close s belonge d to a Mr. Dickinson.
were the Rye Holme closes, and they wer e^ separated by two ^ fjthe
others fr om the only available highway, the Town-street of Suttp nupon-Trent. From the year 1823 the road over which the plaintiff
/lA^J^f

V

2

A portion of the statement of facts is omitted.

*^ dJTk

C^^J^
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now claims the right of way was t hat which was used bv Mr. Dick inFrom a
s on's tenant for the occupation of the Rve Holme close s.
p lan, which forms part of the case, the road apj^ears to be t he shor tfrom the highway to the closes ; and it
e st and most direct access
having been used for so many years by the tenant who occupied the
entire property, we tliink we may safely conclude that i t wa's. and is,
the most convenient road.
In 1839 the property was sold by IMr. Dickinson in three lots. A
I\ Ir_. Moss purchased the Rve Holme closes, a Mr. Newboult purchased
one of the other closes, and a Mr. Dearie purchased t he remai nder
of the property, which includes that now belonging to the defendan t,
a
and
nd ov
over which the way in question goe s. The deeds of conveyance
to the three purchasers, although bearing different dates, were all ex ec uted on the same day, the 8th of April. 1840. and it cannot now b e
Jl.
»
in what order of priority they were execute d. No speci al
ascertained
^ ^^
-^jXA*^^--* .'^g rant or reservation of any particular way is contained in any of them ;
1^"^
to Mr. Moss, whose tenant the plaintiff is, there
^^f^iii^ but in the conveyance
the usual words, "t o g;ether with (inter alia) all way s,
is
comprised
/l**^
^
{ y)ads, paths, passages, rights, easements, advantages, and appurtenan cQ
to the said closes belonging or in any way app ertaini es whatsoever
qI/^^^*''^^
'
i
ing7
Mr. Dearie executed the deed of conveyance to him.
I ^
For several years after the execution of the conveyances the occupier
of the Rye Holme closes co ndnued tn w^^ \\\e road in question ; b ut
Dearie part o f
i n 1843 the deifudant. who had purchased fronL iMr
tlie land conveyed tlnus by Mr. Dickinson^ ^nd nver whirh the wn.y
i n question goes, disputed the plaintiff's right to use it._ Attempts
were made for arrangement, whTcH^taiTed, and we are now required
to decide the point ; and vve are of opinion that the plaintiff, as_g c/}
IL-'^^'^
c upier of the Rye Holme closes, is entitled to the right of way claimed .
' •/ -A^^^
*^ impossible to ascertain the priority of the execution of the two
conveyajices (that to the third purchaser may be put out of considera^UtI
bound to show
+
tion), and the plaintiff having to establish his right,
entitled to
J^that, whichever was tlie first executed, he nevertheless
is

I

is

-^t

jwJ^^ ^

of way.
Fjrst, assume that the conveyance to Mr. Moss was execute ben this case there would clearly be the right
fa
orethatjo Mr. Dearie.
case
the very
put by Mr. Serjt. Williams in his note
of way.
man, ha vv,
Ricroft,
Wms. Saund. Z2l, viz., "wh ere
to Pom fret
d

I

1

a

is

It

f

P^

I

the right

think, good law.

y

e

h

it

it

is

,"

t

JJ/VOU^

r

te

a

a

close surrounded with his land, gra nts the close to another in
over thp granwa
fe g, tor iite, "or for years, the grantee shall have
ca nnot have -^ny
e's land, as mcident to thegrant, fo without
the
be
most direct and
and
"the
would
grant
way
the
benefi from
assume
the one in quesconvenient, which we think we may properly
founded upon the legal maxim,
tion in the present case to be. This
"Ouando aliquis aliquid concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res
be clearly bad Latin, is, we
concessa uti non potest," which, though
ing
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Secondly, as sume that the conveyance to Mr. Dearie was execu ted
In this case the Rye Holme closes were for a short period
the first.
of time the property of Mr, Dickinson, after the property in the land
conveyed to Mr. Dearie had passed out of him. There is no doubt,
apparently, a greater diflkulty in holding the right of way to exist in
this case than in the other ; but, a ccording to the same very great au t hority, the law is the same, for the note proceeds thus : "So it i s
w hen he grants the land and reserves the close to himself ;" aiTcThe
cites several authorities which luliy bear him out: Clarke v. Cogge,
Cro. Jac. 170; Staple v. Heydon, 6 Mod. 1 ; Chichester v. Lethbridge,
VVilles, 72, note.
It no doubt seems extraordinary that a man sho uld
h ave a right which certainly derogates from his own grant ; but the
law is distinctly laid down to be so, and probably for the reason given
in Dutton v. Taylor, 2 Lutw. 148, that it was for the public good, as
otherwise the close surrounded would not be capable of cultivation.
A ccording to this law, therefore, the right of way woul d a^'''nie to
Mr. Dickinson upon the execution of the conveyance to ^Ir. ^^pal• le■
a nd it would clearly pass to Mr. Moss under his conveyance, for }p
would be a way appurtenant to the Rye Holme rinses, and would pa ss
''
u nder the woras^aiTways to the closes belonging or appertainin g.
and, indeed, probably without them.
The plaintiff has vested in him,
as Mr. Moss's tenant, all his rights of way; and, for the above reason, we think that h e is entitled to the judgment of the Cour t.
There is a statement in the case respecting another road described
in the plan as from C to D, which tlie defendant contends was the
plaintiff's proper way. But it is perfectly clear, that, whatever may
be the rights of the occupiers or owners of the two closes further to
the east, called Maples and Catlifife closes, and which were sold and
conveyed by Mr. Dickinson before the sales to Mr. Moss and Mr.
Dearie, Mr. Moss or the plaintiff his tenant, upon the statement i n
t he present case, has no right to t he useof it ; and, except by one
nr ntlipf nf ihf roads, tlie case states that the plaintiff could not ge t
t o the Rye Holme closes without being a trespasser upon land otlie r
^ I r. Dickinson s,
t han
~
Judgment for tlie pla intiff.*
3 See D.ivies v. Sear, L. R. 7 Eq. 427 (ISfinK where at the time of conveyance it was not necessary to use the {iranted land as means of acci'ss to retained land, Imt it wns apparent from circuinstauces and a I iiildiii<; i»laii. know n
t? tllP y^'^'^'tpp, that certain buildiug ouerations. wlieu com ^neteu. woaia cut otf
all yttier nmnn.s of access.
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V.

(Court of Exchequer,
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CARTER.
1857.

1

Hurl.

& N. 910.)

stated, that b efore and at the time of commi tting
the grievances, &c., the jTJaintiff was lawfully poss esse d of a messu age
a nd premises with th e appurtenances , situate in St. Anne Street, Liverpool, and by reason thereof was en titled to a drain or sewer, and. passage for water, leading from the said messuage and premises, i n,
through, and under certain adjoining land at Liverpool aforesaid,
through which the rain and water from the plaintiff's said messuage
and premises of right had flowed, and s till of ri ght o^^r^t to flow, a way
from the plaintiff's said messuage and premises : Yet the r|pfpnr );^nt
wrongfully stopped up the said drain and se wer, whereby divers larg e
quantities of rain and water which of right ought to have flowed, a nd
otherwise would have flowed, through the sa me drain, sewer, and pa ss age for water, were prevented from flowing .from the plaintiff's sai d
messuage and premises^ and flooded, soaked into, and injured_ Uie

The declaration

s^ame^^x^

T^*^-

First, riotJ[iii|ty.

Secondly, that the plaintiff was noj^^mti;;,
tled_to_thg^said^ai n, sew er, and passage for water; nor did the rain
and water from the plamtiff's said messuage and premises of right
flow, nor ought to flow, away from the plaintiff's said messuage and
premises through the said drain, sewer, and passage for water as alIssues thereon.
leged.
At the trial, before Bramwell, B., at the last Lancashire Summer Assizes, it ap peared that the plaintiff and defendant were owners of adj oining houses situated in St. Anne Street, Liverpool . These hollse s
,h ad been formerly que house, and had belonged to a person of the
In Ju ly,
jname of Williams, who converted them into two houses.
1 853, Williams conveyed the defendant's
house to him i n fee.
Thi s
c onveyance c ontained r^ reservation of any easement.
In September,
1853, Williams conveyed the plaintiff's house to him in fee.
At the
time of these conveyances a jlrain or sewer ran under the plain tiff's
ll^u se and thence under the defe ndant's house and discharged itsel f
into th e common sewer in St. Anne btre et" Water from tlie eaves of
the deiendant's house fell on the plaintiff's house, and from thence
flowed down a spout into the drain on the plaintiff's premises, and so
into the common sewer. T he defendant blocked up the drain whe re
it entered his house, and in consequence, whenever it rained, the pla int iff's house was flooded . The defendant stated that he was not aware
of the drain at the time of the conveyance to him. It was proved th at
the plaintiff might c onstruct a _ drain directly from his own house into
the common sewer at a c ost of a bout £6 .
It was submitted on the part of the defendant, that the plaintiff had
no right to the use of the drain under the defendant's house. The
Pleas.
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learned Judge directed a ve rdict for the plainti ff, reserving leave to
the defendant to move to enter a verdict for him.
Watson, B. This was an action for stopping a drain that ran under both the plaintiff's and defendant's houses, taking the water from
The cause was tried at Liverpool, before Baron Bramwell,
both.
when a verdict was entered for the plaintiff, and a motion was made
to enter a verdict for defendant in pursuance of leave reserved at
the trial.
The plaintiff's and defendant's houses a djoined each other. They
had for merly been one hous e, and were co nverted into two houses by
Subsequently the defendant's house
the owner of the whole property.
was conveyed to him, and after that conveyance the plaintiff took a
conveyance of his house. At_th e time of the respective conveyance s
th ^ drain ran under the pl amti ff's house and then under the defen dWater
ant's house, and_dis charged itself into th e common sewe r.
from the eaves ofthe defendant's house fell on the plaintiff's house,
and then ran into the drain on plaintiff's premises, and thence through
The plaintiff's house was drained
the drain into the common sewer.
was
that b v the expenditure of £6.,
It
this
drain.
proved
through
drain
the
drain
and
directly from his own land
the plaintiff might stop
I t was not proved that the defendant. _a t
into the common sewer.
the time of his purchase, knew of the position of the drain s.
Under these circumstances we are of opinion, upon reason and
upon authority, t hat the plaintiff is entitled to our judgment. We think
that the owners of the plaintiff's house are, by implied gran t, entitled
to have the use of this drain for the purpose of conveying the water
from his house, as it was used at the time of the defendant's purchase.
It seems in accord ance with reason, that where the owner of two or
more adjoining houses sells and conveys one of the houses to a pur chaser, tnat such house in his hands should be entitled to the benefi t
oi all the drains from his house, and subject to all the drains then
necessarily used for the enjoyment of the adjoining house, and tha t
^"^smuch as he purchases th e
^iSteHL-^tiK^^^"'£^^^^MiQA-.-^-§> '^^"n'
housesuchasit is. ifthatwere not so! the inconveniences and nuisances in towns would be very great. Where the owner of several adjoining houses conveyed them separately, it would enable the vendee
of any one house to stop up the system of drainage made for the benefit and necessary occupation of the whole. The authorities are strong
In Nicholas v. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121, it was
on this subject.
"
held by all the Court that, ij^one erects a house and builds a con duit thereto in another part of his land, a nd conveys water by pipes to
his house, and afterwards sells the house with the appurtenances, excepting the land, or sells the land to another, reserving to himself the
house, the conduit and pipes pass with the house, be cause it is ne cessa ry and q u asi appendant thereto^ and he shall have liberty by law to
dig in the land for am e nding th e pipes or making them new a s the
case requires^
{So ii a lessee for years of a house and land erect a con-
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duit upon the land, and after the term the lessor occupies them together for a time, and afterwards sells the house with the appurtenances,
to one, and the land to another, the vendee shall have the conduit and
the pipes, and liberty to amend them."
Shury v. Pigott, Popham, 166,
s. c. 3 liulst. 339, and the case of Coppy v. I. de B., 11 Hen. VII, 25,
pi. 6, support this view of the case, that where a gutter exists at th e
t ime of the unity of seisin of adjoinincr houses it remains when IJiey
a re aliened by separate conveyances, as an easement of nejz^ss ity.
It was contended, on the part of the defendant, that this pipe was
not of necessity, as the plaintiff might have obtained another outlet for
the drainage of his house at the expense of £6. We think that the
a mount to be expended in the alteration of the drainage, or in the c ons tructing a new system of drainage, is not to be taken into consider at jon, for the meaning of the word "necessity"
in the cases above cite d
in
and
Pinnington v. Galland, 9 Exch. 1, is to be understood t he neces ity
s
at the time of the conveyance , and as matters then stood with out
alteration : and whether or not at the time of the conveyance there
was any other outlet for the drainage water, and matters as they then
stood, .must be looked at for the necessity of the drainage.
It was urged that there could be no implied agreement unless the
easement was apparent and continuous.
The defendant stated he was
not aware of this drain at the time of the conveyance to himl 5ut it
is cl ear that he must have known or ougT mo have known that s ome
drainage then existed, an d if he had incjuired he would have known
of this drain; therefore it cannot be said that such a drain could not
have been supposed to have existed ; and we agree with the observation of Mr. Gale (Gale on Easements, p. bZ, 2d Ed.) th at by "appar ent
si gns" must be understood not only those which must necessarily b e
seen, but those which may be seen or known on a careful inspection by
a person ordinarily conversant with the subjec t.
We think that it was the defendant's own fault that he did not ascertain what easements the owner of the adjoining house exercised
at the time of his purchase;
and therefore we think the rule must
be discharged.
Rule discharged.

POLDEN

V.

BASTARD.

(Court of Queen's Bench, 1SG3.

4 Best & S. 238.)

The declaration stated th at the defend ant br oke and entered th e
of the plain tiff, sit uate at &c., and tnere broke_Q pen a do or nnd

c lose

cut dowri a nd desFroye d a w^ooden fence, and too k and carried away
lar ge quantities of water belongmg t o the plaintiff.
Pirst plea, except as to cutting down and destroying the wooden
fence, th at before the committing of the acts complained of, and befo re
the plaintiff had any estate or interest of or in the close in which &c..
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in fee, as well of and in the close in
w hich &c., and of a pump and well therein, as of and in a certain dwelling house, outhouse and garden, and, being so seised, duly made and
published her last will and testament Sec. ; and by the said will devised
t o Clementina Polden, and her heirs and assigns for ever, the hous e,
o uthouse and garden, together with a way on foot from the house, out house and land unto, into, through, and over the close of the plainti,f f
t o the pump and well, for the purpose of the said Clementina
Po lfnr
he r
d en. her heirs and assigns, having, taking and fetching-^
7\x\i\
and them to have, take, and fetch, water from the pump and well , and
so back agam frcm the pump and well in, through, over and along the
close of the plaintiff unto and into the house, outhouse and garden
of Rachel Polden Bonnel, at all times of the year &c. ; and RacliS l
Polden Bonnel being so seised afterwards died without revoking h er
will ; and thereupon Clementina Polden became seised in fee of the
house, outhouse and garden, with th e appurtenance s, tog ether \\\\\\ the
ri ght and easem ent b y the will given and devised to her ; and Clementina I'olden, being so seised, by deed, du ly bargai ned , sold, gr anted y^^^^ Jo-OO-an d assigned to the defendant the house, ou thouse and garden, w ith >q
^
uril
the aio pm]tenances^ together with the right antTeasement, and she ceased \J''''^'^'^*^>
to have any estate or interest therein, and the defendant became and -Y ^^g ^ Aasv^^ J.
was seised in fee of and in the house, outhouse and garden, with the
appurtenances, and the right and easement, a nd at the times of th e
c ojnmitting the acts complained of co nt inued so seised, and one Jam es
Dennis was in occupation thereot, a s tenant thereof , together wnth the
right and easement to the defendant, the reversion of the same be lo nging to the defendan t; and the trespasses complained of, to which
t his plea is pleaded, were a use and exercise by the defendant of the Ljx-»*yC^ >iA>t
w ay^right, a n d easement, the said water being water in the pump and .
/%
^
well.
The plea proceeded to justify the breaking of the door in the'*'^ *^'*^'
use and exercise of the right and easement of having, taking, and CjJL
*^ I^C.A-<
and
for
well,
water
from
the
and
the
the protection of
pump
fetching
defendant's reversionary right.
The re were other pleas iustify inp- nn thp p-m unds respective1y_ pf
ajrescnptive rig h t of way, of a right of way for twenty years, a n d
seised

,^

^orty years, on foot through the close of the
well, for the purpose of having, tnkinfy an d
and
the
mp
plaintiri:'~to
pu

of

a

rigliT of way tor

^vateF theref romT Also pleas justifying the trespass to the
fence, because it obstructed the defendant's right to light and air.
Issues were joinedon all the pleas.
On the trial, before Williams, J., at the Dorsetshire Summer Assizes
in 1862, it appeared that, on the 26th May, 1834, Rachel Polden Bonnel, being the owner in fee of three cottages, made her will, by which
"
she devised as follows:
I give to my. nephew R. B. Polden. all that
/}
my freehold cottage and garden at Charlton Marshall, now occupied by j'^M. ^ct/W<^
W. Wills, to him and his heirs and assigns for ever. To my nephew I
W. Polden" (the plamtiff) "I give the house I now live in, with the out- |
1 etching

III

DERIVATIVE

476

TITLES

(Part

2

1

d

.

d

a

it

a

;

it

,

e

d cj

;_

;

a

it,

house and garden and orchard, in my own occupation, to him and his
Also the sum of ilO. I give to mv ni ece
heirs and assigns forever.
Cl ementina Polden the house and outhouse and g-arden as now in the
o ccupation o f T homas Answood,. junior, to her and her heirs and as sig ns for~ever .^ The house in the occupation of the devisor had a
shed at the back of an outwhich stood under
pump belonging to
there was no
house belonging to the house occupied by Answood
he ocfe nce between his house and the land on which the shed stood
th
vear
to
of
as
from
for
two
tenant
thatli
ouse
year
years
^ied
evisor by apa_rol letting and was accustomed with her knowledge to
for his use
there was no
go to the pump and draw water from
river within 15
other pump or well on his premises, but there was
y ards and
road to . The evisor died in 1848 and in Septeml oer.
e849, Clementina Polden^ who survived her, conveyed the cottage

I

e

e e

p

(

i

t

e

a

pl

a

t

e

a

b

a

visedJtoJjgi^ojthe^jdeffiniiaiiXit^^
The jury found
verdict for the defendant on the pleas as to the
verdict to
rig[ht_Jfl..Iight andair^_and the learned Judge dir ected
en tered fo rth
defendant on he pleas as to the enjoyment of th
leave to move to enter
verdict for th
, pump and~well, reserving
aintiff for 40s on those pleas .
rul accordn A In the following Michaelmas Term, Collier obt ained
ngly. on the ground that the right to the use ot the pump did no
jj^ V-*"^^
ass under the will of Ra chel Po lden Bonnel to Clementina Polde n
g-'^XJt,
u nder whom

defendant claimed .
V^WiGHTMAN,
am of opinion that this rule should be made abMj\Kingdon has been unable to furnish us with any ase
solute.
w hich goes to the extent ot saying that sucn words as are used in^ his
devise create an easement . Pyer v. Carter,
PI.
N. 916,
open to
the distinction that the easement there was continuous.
If the will
had contained words shewing that the cottage was intended to be devised "as usually enjoyed before,"
might have been contended that
the right to use the pump, which had been enjoyed by the tenant of
the cottage for two years, would pass, though not properly an easeBut there are no such words th devise
the
ment.
simply of
house and outh use a nd garden as now in the occupation of Thoma
he circumstances ot the present case stiew that he pump
Answbo(|/^
was not used byliim in the^xercise of
as an easement.
right to se
Crompton,
also think tliat my brother Williams was right in
holding that an easement was r^ot ^created by the terms of this de vise. The distinction between easements which are in their nature
continuous and apparent, such as drains, &c., and other easements,
such as ordinary rights of way, and that in question here,
well pointhe form er
ed out in Gale on Easements (3d Ed., by Willes) pp. 76, 77
*'
appurtenant
^ass with the devise or conveyance of
house as
there to,
a nd will pass without general jw ords
but that does not apply to
things not continuous in their nature, — in order to pass them there
must be the creation de novo of
new easement.
adhere to what
the
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am reported to have said in Worthington v. Gimson, 29 L. J. O. B.
Jur. N. S. 1053, 1054, which was approved by this Court
in, Pearson v. Spencer, 1 B. & S. 571, 583. This is not a continuo us
e asement,
nor an easement belonging to the cotta^j^e but a mere en fnr
twn years bv the tenant of the privilege of using th e
j Q^men^
Pjinip.
If this had been an old easement attached to the cottage it
would pass by the words "appertaining or belonging;" but to crea te
a new easement which did not exist before the will must have devised
"
It is said that the
.
t he cottage "with the pump therewith enjoyed.
Answood"
are
in
the
of
Thomas
equivalent
words "as now
occupation
to that ; but I am of o^pitn on tha t t hey are not.
Blackburn, J. I am of the same opinion. S o long as the defen da nt's cottage and the plaintiff'.g; p^arden with the pump in it belong ed
•
t o the devisor, who was seised in fee, there could be no easement.
When the two cottages were severed, whether by will or grant of the
owner, an ea sement might exist, but. there must be wo rH;^ in the will |V0 X^^"^'^'^
or grant to create it. If this had been a continuous easement, as a flow ^/it^^iJi, Ju-U
'
the prinof water to the cottage, or a drain carrying water from
ciple which has been called the principle of disposition of the owner -^^^-'^''^^ !-•*«%«
of two tenements would apply. But this right of wav to go to and Vxrw \y4' JSUU
ump
no su ch continuous easement as wDuld pass u on ij-. u. m^^"^
eturn fromj
necessary to shew words sufficient
and therefore
hat principle
^
>
the devisor to create this easement de novo,
to express an ntention
/*'<^'^*-^|'''M
to the cottage devised. There are no such words
there JtyjbiAj&^ Aj^
and annex
oi ^ly
devise of the cottage itself "as now in the occupation of . „.«.
>fc^
Thomas Answood;" and he had enjoyed merely
license to go to the
pump.
^fM^^i^c^^^^^t^J^-^ '^*-«^
Rule absolute.*
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farm rliviflprl jf:
n Pearson v. Spencer,
B. & S. 761 (1863) an owner of
respectively.
^The
by tjifs wfl] ipto "two portions aevising them to A. and
por tion of B. was landlocked . The devisor, during his li'^e
nc used
wav in
a certain aireetion over tne property devised to A. in order to reach tlie por-.
tlon devised to B. It w as claimed hy B. that he acQuired ;v Irnnlicnt ion an easement of way over the land of A. in the devisor's accustomed line of travel. TRie
court held that, such an ea.sement had heen acquired, no as a wav of nece sity. :^p^ this was a particular way, but n the basis of the general impli£ation.
Ei-le, C. J., said: "It falls under that class of implied grants'~where there is
no necessity for the right claimed, but wh ere the tenement is so construct ed
a necessary dependence, in order to its enjoyme nt
a that parts of it
' involve
There are
in when devised, upon the adjoining tenemen
in the state
rights VFhiclT are' implied, and we think that the farm devised to the party
ould not be enjo^red without dependenc
under whom the defendant claims
on the plaintiff's and of a righ of way over it In he customa ry manfler."
house
b. D.12 (1886),
"Hi P'Om V.-MyLl-op(jhraU'TraTrt\'ay (Jompanles,
front and back block and A. was lessee of three rooms on
was divided into
the first floor in the back block. The le ase did not expressly grant any mode
of ^cess . Access to the rooms demised to A. was gained from the street by
pass^g^rough
hall or vestibule, and then up some stairs. The front blo ck
nd A. claimed compensation .
w as taken under eminent domai n pr^cppflipgp,
tnat A. was entitled to compensation, ir ror no other reaso n,
TI:; ec ourt"B el
ormterTgrence witn iiis easement through the hall, thoughrstrictiv speakin g,
Bowen, L. J., said
^'K'ow, it seems to me, that
was" not a wav of nei'&fesitv.
tlie access to the demised premises falls distinctly within the class of rights
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v.

(Court of Appeal in Chancery,

2

(Part

BURROWS.
1S70.

r^

R.

12 Ch, D. 31.)

L. J."

The material facts of this case are short and simof November, 1875, a per son of the nam e
o f_ Samuel Tetley was the owner of certain property in Derby, which
i ncluded a piece of vacant land having a frontage to the street, and
a silk manufactor y and ce rtain workshopj _at^ the rear of and abutting
upon that vacant land, having in one of the workshops certain windo ws
Owning this property, Tetley was
w hich opened upon that land .
and appears to have put
minded to sell
up in several lots for sale
lots,
respect
including
n
of
and
some
of
the
auction
lot which
by
w as afterwards sold to the defendant, the sale by auction was aborT ve.
However, an ag reement wa made at the auction to sell one of the lo ts
TiTiCSiGER,
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1876, with these general words,

li

of January,

a

t

o

nd that lot was conveyed to him upon the
"t ogether with
wers,
dr
w
tters,
ains,
ences, se
gu
valls,
ghts, water ays, pa ssages,
ourses," and the other general words, "e aseme nts and appurtenan ces
whatsoever to the said piece of land and hereditaments belonging
in anywise appertainjm ;." The conveyance contains n^jjesgrvaUon in
express terms
any right to the grantor in respect of liis other
n
the 18t of February,
contract was made bv which Tet ley
land.
gfer
tdant the silk manufactory and the work ontracted to sfH to the
opening upon the land previously sq
^op which had the windows
This action arises from
nd conveyed to the plaintiff's husban
claim on the part of the defendant to have as of right the light enin another way,
ter into those windows, or, to put
prevent th
lajntiff from obstructing these windows by building on her land. Upon the matter coming before the Vice-Chancellor, he held that no right
in respect of the windows was reserved, either impliedly or expressly,
under the conveyance of January, 1876; and, consec|uently, that_ tlie
efen dant , as privy in est ate with the grantor of the land whu
vas the subject of the conveyance, was entitled to no right of light
hrough those window
in other words, he decided that the plaintiff was ntitled to build upon her land, although the result of hat
am of opinion, both upon
uilding might be to obstruct these ligh ts.
principle and upon authority, that the Vice-Chancellor decided rig htly.
We have had considerable number of cases cited to us, and out of
the plaintiff's

6th day

5

u

a

a

o

alluded to in Wheeldon v. Burrows (1870), 12 Ch. D, ."il. Rv the p;rn nt- of nart
f^a tenement it is nuw w ell kno wn tliat there will pa ss to the grantee all
Mmsp fyiitnnnoiis-fliul npjiMi'^iil wi.;^nents over TTie fitH^l' Hart or rne teneme nt,
■
ol tne part granted and have been uitiierwl ^ich are necessary to tlie enjoyment
~~
~
^"^
to iise<l rnerewirn .""
right of way
And see Brown v. Alabaster, L. R. 37 Ch. D, 400 flSS7). where
through
walled-in passagewa.y, with gates oi»ening into the same from the
pquasi dominant estate, was rl ^nined to have been created by implied grant
on conveyance of the nuasi dominant esta te.
The statement of facts is omitted.
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them T think that two propositions may be stated as what I may call the
g eneral rules g overnino; cases of this kind.
The first of these rules
is, that on t he grant by the owner of a tenement of pa rt of th at
tenement as it is then used and enjoyed, there will pass to "t lie
grantee all those continuous and an narent |^^yUJ P"'ts C bv which, of
course, I mean quasi easements), or, in other words, all those easc ;
ments which are nec essary to the reasonab lp- pninY'''"i^'''<^ <^^ tli£--p4^-ie rty granted, and which h ave be en and are at the time of the grant
u sed by the owners of the entirety for the benefit of the part grante d .
The second proposition is that, i f the grantor intends to reserve an y'
ri ght over the tenement granted, it is his duty to reserve it ex]:)ress lv
Those are the general rules governing cases of this
i n the grant.
kind, but the second of those rules is subject to certain exceptions.
One of those exceptions is the well-known exception which attac hes
to cases of what are called \\ ^^ia^^^fjece^it^ and I do not dispute
for a moment that there may be, and probably are, certain other exceptions, to which 1 shall refer before I close my observations upon

>i^/u-A

this case.
Both of the general rules which I have mentioned are founded upon
a maxim which is as well established by authority as it is consonant
^
»—
to reason and common sense, viz.. [t hat a grantor shall not derog ate V-*--*-*—
f rom his grant. '. It has been argued before us that there is no distinction between what has been called an implied grant and what
is attempted to be established under the name of an implied reservation ; and t hat such a distinction between the implied grant an d
the i mplied reservation is a mere modern invention , and one wliich runs
confrary, not only to the general practice upon which land has been
bought and sold for a considerable time, but also to authorities which
So far, however,
are said to be clear and distinct upon the matter.
from that distinction being one which was laid down for the first time
by and wbich is to be attributed to Lord Westbury in Suffield v. Brown,
4 D. J. & S. 185, i t appears to me that it has existed almost as jLr
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back as we ca n t race the law upon the subjec t; and I think it right,
as the case is one of considerable importance, not merely as regards
the parties, but as regards vendors and purchasers of land generally,
that I should go with some little particularity into what I may term
the leading cases upon the subject.
The first case to which I refer is Palmer v. Fletcher, 1 Lev. 122,
where the first proposition which I have stated as a general rule was
*
laid down or decided. The other proposition was mooted, but there
was a difference of opinion amongst the members of the Court upon
was not decided.
and
[His Lordship then read the report.]
man wishes. to
appears therefore that upon_the^j3roposition hat
erogate from his grant or to reserve any right to himself he shoul
differ ence of opinion in the
here was
state so in the grant itself,
Court, and th at po int was not decided.
Nicholas v. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac.
The next case of importance

/4^</</>2Z
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attention to the
Now if that determiwords "necessary et quasi appendant thereto."]
nation is held to mean that in all cases this doctrine of implied reservation stands upon exactly the same footing as the doctrine of implied
grant, I think it will be found that over and over again that has been
overruled.
But it is clear, as I have already suggested, that to th e
se cond rule under which a man is prevented from derogating f rom
h is grant there are certain exception sT one of those being in reg ard
t o easem en ts which have been called of necessity; and if Nicholas v.
Chamberlain only decides that point it appears to me to be quite right.
That Nicholas v. Chamberlain was not meant to decide more than
what I have suggested is, I think, shewn by the next case, Tenant v.
Goldwin, 2 Ld. Raym. 1089, 1093. There Lord Holt, in delivering the
judgment of tlie Court, deals. with that very point which had been
mooted in Palmer v. Fletcher, 1 Lev. 122. ; and he says, "As to the
case of Palmer v. Fletcher, i f. indeed, the builder of the house sells th e
house with the lights and appurtenances, he cannot build u pon th e
r emamder of the ground so near as to stop the lights of the hous e;
But
he had sold
and as he c annot do
so neither can his vende e.
the vacant piece of ground, and kept the house without reserving the
benefit of the lights, the vendee might build against his house. But in
the other case, where he sells the house, the vacant piece of ground
think
will be found that,
by that grant charged with the lights."
H.
N. 916, there has been
putting aside the case of Pyer v. Carter,
no distinct decision which in any way affects the principle laid down
in those clear and distinct terms by Lord Holt.
will refer
The next case to which
Swansborough v. Coventry,
been
both
branches of the argument
305,
which
has
cited
on
Bing.
case of
sale by
addressed to us by Sir Henry Jackson. That was
auction of different lots to different persons at the same time, and
case
was argued (and
particularly direct attention to this) that such
the land in respect of
must stand upon exactly the same footing as
which the easement was claimed had been conveyed first consequently
the case would be one in which
grant of the easement would be implied. Now observe what that admits, and the argument so dealt with
ad mits that priority in time of the conv eyance
upon that footing.
had not been admaterial point for consideration, be cause,
was
mitted, then the Court might have gone to the general question, not
whether the conveyances were at the same time, not whether one
few minutes, or few days, or by few years,
preceded the other by
121."

[His IvOrdship then read
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The case is reported in Cro. Jac. 121 (1606), as follows "Trespass.
It was
held by the court upon demurrer, T hat if one erect a house, and build
con duit thereto in another part of his land, and convey water by pipes toThe
ipuse. ana after warg_ sell the house with the app u rtenances, pyr>p[>ting the la nS.
"
Of sell the Jaiid to~anolher, reserving to nuuseif the hous e, the^conduit and
iposjass with tiie bou se because it Is necessary, et quasi appendant thereto
and lie shau have berty by law to dig in the land for mending the pipes._o
^
making them new, as the case may require,'' etc;
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but whether upon the severance of the property there was this (if I
may use the expression) continuous and apparent easement in respect
of which a reservation might be claimed, or an impHcation of a grant
Lord Chief Justice Tindal deals with the matter, as it
might be made.
.
appears to me, upon the supposition tliat the general maxim is thatUi"
^
/ m an who conveys property cannot derogate from his grant by reserv - ^X^f-M-*-!: rW<
/ i ng[ to himself impliedly any con tinu ous apparent easements; he says (j
(Id. 309), "It is well established by the decided cases that where^ ie
sa me person possesses a house, having the actual use a nd enjoyment of
\^ ^J0 §a^(^alIX^
ce rtain lights, andaJso po ssesses t he adjoining land and sells the hous e
^^
^
to "another person, although the lights be new he cannot, nor canan y VJ^-'*-'"^-^
one who claims under him, build upon the adjoining land so as to o bthe enjoyment of those light s. The principle is laid
down by Twysden and Wyndham, JJ., in the case of Palmer v. Fletcher, 1 Lev. 122, 'th at no man shall derogate from his own gra nt.' The
same law was adhered to in the case of Cox v. Matthews, 1 Ventr. 237,
by Chief Justice Holt in Rosewell v. Pryor, 6 Mod. 116, and lastly, in
the later case of Compton v. Richards, 1 Price, 27. And in the presen t
st ruct or interrupt

plaintiff

defendant being sales bv the
s ame vendor and ta kin g place at one and the same time, we think th e
rights of the parties are brought within the application of this gene ral
r ule of law ." It appears to me, therefore, that this is a decision which
fortifies the previous decision of Lord Holt.
I now come to ^yer v. Carter, 1 TJ .Rr N. Q1(S , which seer n <; t" hfpa k
t he hitherto unb roken current of authority upon this po int, and there
can be no doubt thatSir Henry Jackson is justified in saying that if that
case is right this appeal ought to be allowed.
That was a case of a
somewhat special character.
A house was conveyed to the defendant
by a person who was the owner of that house, and also of the house
which was subsequently conveyed to the plaintiff; and there had been
during the unity of the ownership the enjoyment of the easement of a
spout which extended from the defendant's premises over the plaintiff's
premises, and by which water was conveyed on to the latter. But it is
material to observe that the water when it came on to what were subsequently the plaintiff's premises was conveyed into a drain on the
plaintiff's premises, which drain passed through the defendant's premises, and in that way went out into the common sewer.
Subsequently
the house over whichvthis easement existed was conveyed to the plaintiff, and upon an obstruction of the drains in the defendant's house,
which, be it observed, immediately caused a flooding of the plaintiff's
house by the very water coming from the defendant's house the plaintiff brought his action, and it was held there that the plaintiff was enti->^
tied to maintain his action, a nd that upon the original conveya nce to>4>*i^
^
t he defendant there was a res ervation to the grantor of the right to
carry iway t his water which~came trom the defendant's premises b y
t he medium of the drain which also went through his premis es.
Aig.Pkop. — 31
cas e, the

j

sales

to the

and

the

*•
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Though those circumstances were special in their character, tliere is no
doubt that the principles laid down by the Co urt of Exchequ er were
as wide as possibly could be. T hat Court laid down that there was no
di stinction between implied reservation and implied grant; and this,
as it appears to me, broke the hitherto unbroken current of authority
upon this subject.
Now, although it is possible that tlie actual decision in Pyer v. Carter, 1 H. & N. 916, was not exactly overruled, the principles there laid
down were clearly and distinctly overruled by the same Court in
White v. Bass, 7 H. & N. 722, the facts of which case were these:
A man was the owner of certain land and of a certain house which had
windows through which the light, not as an easement but as a matter
of enjoyment had come for some timiC. He let the land (reserving the
house) to trustees, subject to certain covenants by which they were to
build in a particular manner upon the land, and if those covenants had
been complied with, and they had built in the specific manner, there
would have been no obstruction to the lights of the house which the
grantor or the lessor reserved. Therefore, if we were entitled in these
cases to go back to matters which existed before the time of the conveyance, we should have found here, as clearly as could be shown, an
intimation on the part of the lessor that if building was to be -permitted on the adjoining land, it was only to be permitted under such conditions as would prevent the lights of the house being obstructed.
But
that being originally the position of matters it was fpllowed by a conveyance of the reversion in the land to the trustees, and subsequently
to that conveyance tlie house was conveyed to another person, and
buildings having been put upon the land occupied by the trustees contrary to the terms of the original covenant, and of such a kind as obstructed the lights of the house, an action was brought by the person
to whom the house was conveyed. In that action it was decided that
the defendant held his land unfettered by the original covenant, and
unfettered by any implied reservation, and that he was entitled to build
in such a way as he thought proper on his land, although the effect of
what he did might be to obstruct the lights of the plaintiff. In giving
judgment Lord Chief Baron Pollock says this (7 H. & N. 730) : ''My
brother Petersdorff "has cited no authority for the precise matter which
he has urged before us, and I think that in construing a conveya nce
o f land we must collect what th e parties intended from the langu age
t hey have used. It seems to me that we cannot look into the lease of
the 2d of October, 1855, for it is merged in the f ee, a conveyance o f
t he reversion having been made to the lessees, and we must look to th at
rnriArpyanrpa lnnp in order to ascertain the rights of the parties.
In
that conveyance there is no covenant by the^ purchasers not to build o n
t he land so as to nhstrnrt the light and air coming to the wirnjowq of
the plaintiff's house, nor indeed any limitation of the right to use the
Now, no case^an be more clear and distinct upon. the point
land."
which we have to decide to-day, and the case is admitted by Sir Henry
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be such, but he suggested that we ought to overrule it as
being an exception to the general current of authority.
So far from
that being the case, Pyer v. Carter, 1 H. & N. 916, appears to me to
have been the exception, and not White v. Bass, 7 H. & N. 722.
The latter case was followed by Suffield v. Brown, 4 D. J. & S. 185.
A good deal has been said about that case; and the principles upon
which this Court ought to act in dealing with decisions of Courts of coordinate authority have been also discussed.
I think I may say for
myself (and I believe I am expressing the views of the other members
of the Court) that we ought not to lay down as an absolute rule that
decisions of Lord Chancellors, at all events sitting alone, are to be
taken as decisions of the Court of Appeal, and absolutely binding on
this Court so as to prevent us from even looking into the grounds or
considering the case which was before the particular Lord Chancellor.
But no doubt the greatest weight ought to be given to such decisions,
and unless they are shewn to be manifestly wrong or manifestly contrary to the general current of authority on the point decided, it appears
to me that we ought not to take upon ourselves to overrule them.
That being so, let us look a little more narrowly into that case. First,
we have to see what was decided — and by that I do not mean what was
absolutely necessary to be decided, but what really the Lord Chancellor took upon himself to decide, and, although he might have decided
the case upon other grounds, put as his ratio decidendi.
Upon that
point there can be no doubt. We have only to read the close of his
judgment to see that he put it entirely upon this principle, which I
have stated as the second of the general rules applicable to cases of this
kind, that a man cannot derogate from his own grant, and that as a
general rule no implication can be made of a reservation of an easement to the grantor, although there may be an implication of a grant
to the grantee.
The Lord Chancellor closes his judgment by saying
(having dealt witli some of the authorities as to continuous and apparent easements) : "But this is irrelevant to my decision, which is
founded on the pl ain and simple rule that the grantor, or any p erson
cl aiming under him, shall not derogate from the absolute sale an d
grant whirji he ha-^ m^c] e_" Although, therefore, it is perfectly true
tliat, looking to the special circumstances of that case, it might have
been decided upon those special circumstances so as even to admit the
proposition for which Sir Henry Jackson contends, it is equally clear
that the Lord Chancellor did not so decide the case, but decided it upon
If we were to stop here, it
a distinct negative of that proposition.
seems to me that, looking to the fact that this was not a case in which
this point in question was mooted for the first time, but that the point
had been mooted and decided as early as the third year of the reign
of Queen Anne, we should not be justified in doing anything but follow the principles enunciated by Lord Westbury.
But Suffield V. Brown, 4 D. J. & S. 185, has been confirmed by an
equally high authority, for in Crossley & Sons v. Lightowler, Law
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Rep. 2 Ch. 478, Lord Chelmsford as Lord Chancellor had to deal with
a similar question, and he there says: "Lord Westbury, however, in
the case of Suffield v. Brown, refused to accept the case of P^^ v.
Carter, 1 H. & N. 916, as an authority, and said.V tt seems to be m or?
(
re asonable and jus t to hold that if the grantor irftends to< reserve any
w,
'
right over the property ^g^ranted it is his dutv to r eserve it. expressly
IJbJt^^
Vj"
-\ i n the grant rather than to limit and cut down the operation of a plain
/yv^
{\/^
I grant (wh ich is not pretended to b e^ otherwise than in conform]t y_with 1
/ th e contract between the parties) bvthe fiction of an implied reserv a- V
I tion?
Tentirely agree with this view. It appears to me to be an im- 1
"v*^^
material circumstance that the easement should be apparent and con\'
tinuous, for non constat that the grantor does not intend to relinquish
it unless he shews the contrary by expressly reserving it. The argu ment of the defendants would make, in every case of this kind, a ji '■
i mplied reservation by law ; and yet the law will not reserve anythi ng \
'
out of a grant in _£aY Our of a ^antor except in case o f iiece^^sityJ
. \
Now the only case in the Court of Appeal which is suggested as being contrary to this high authority of two Lord Chancellors, is Watts
v. Kelson, Law Rep. 6 Ch. 166, 174, and no doubt there are observations of Lord Justice Mellish to the efifect that the order of conveyance
in point of date is immaterial, that Pyer v. Carter, 1 H. & N. 916, is
good sen^e and good lav/, and that most of the Common Law Judges
But, putting
have not approved of Lord Westbury's observations.
was
the
for
moment
that
this
a
mere
dictum
of
aside
the
Lord
(Oj^
Justice
VP^ ^ during the argument, I must observe that this is not exactly so, as in^
^ .
Whifp V Rnqq^ 7 H . ^r \.\ . J7?. the TnHo-p<; nf thp Cnnrt of Exche quer
^jiF^^
f^^J, ,
h ad distinctly, jii,jD£§aijds_the.r'"^'^^^^n IT "f ^Y ^^ v- Carter, overrul ed
^
that case.
No doubt, also. Lord Justice James says, "I am satisfied
f^^ with the decision in Pyer v. Carter." But in the considered judgment
^^jHT
of tlie Court, when if it had been intended to say that Suffield v.
'.^^^
^^^
Brown, 4 D. J. & S. 185, was not law, one would have thought there
would have been something distinct upon the point, there is not one
word to the effect of that which had been said by the Lords Justices
during the argument. All that is said about it is this, Lord Justice
Mellish, who delivered the judgment, after referring to Nicholas v.
Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121, said, "This case has always been cited with
approval, and is identical not only in principle but in its actual facts
with the case now before us. It was expressly approved of by Lord
^ Westbury in Suffield v. Brown, 4 D, J, & S. 185, where, though he objected to the deQJsion in Pyer v. Carter, 1 H. & N. 916, in which it was
b p|r] th^ ^- a ria{j t to an cxistcut continuous apparent easement was im ^»^^
pjiedly res erved in the co nveyance by the owner of two houses in he
^jJ^
allej o^ed serviej ii:.iiQii^_es.^vet he seems to agree that the right to such
jLy^^
an easement would pass
implied grant where the domijiant tenem ent
what the Court of Appealhad to decide
and that
conveyed first
in Watts v. Kelson, Law Rep.
Ch. 166. Therefore Watts v. Kelson
no authority to justify us in overruling Suffield v. Brown, still less
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by the case of Crossley
Sons
Thus, then, as
appears to me,
stand the principal authorities on the general rules of law which
stated at the commencement of this judgment.
Other cases which have been cited during tte- argument illustrate the
have already
exceptions to the second of those general rules. As
an undoubted exception in cases where the easement
said, th ere
way of necessity . Thus in Pinnington v. Galland,
called
w hat
12, which was
case for disturbance of
Ex.
right of way, there
closes,
Closes,
two of them called the Holme
were five
which were separated by the others from the only available highway, and which were
conveyed subsequently in point of time to the conveyance of the remaining closes through which this way de facto ran. In deciding that
the way still existed, Baron Martin appears to me to have put the case
am referring. He says this
entirely upon the exception to which
"Secondly, assume that the conveyance to Mr. Dearie was executed
the first. In this case the Rye Holme closes were for
short period of
time the property of Mr. Dickinson after the property in the land conno doubt apparveyed to Mr. Dearie had passed out of him. There
in
the
of
in this case
to
exist
ently
greater difficulty
right
holding
way
*
than in the other but according to the same very great authority the
•
/^
^
law
the same, for the note
Wms. Saund. 323. n., proceeds thus: (|*4v***>~V^'*'
when he grants the land and reserves the close to himself
'S
and he cites several authorities which fully bear him out: Clark v. 'V*'^^'^'^
Mod.
Cogge, Cro. Jac. 170; Staple v. Heydon.
Chichester v.
sppms
mnn
n
n
dnnhtWilles,
72, n.
Lethbridge,
extr^nrdi nnry tVinf
hould have
right which certainly derogates from his own grant but
distinctly laid down to be so, and probably for the reason
he law
was or the public good
given in Dutton v. Taylor, Lutw. 1487, that
otherwise the close surrounded would not bec apable of cultivatign
Now those last words clearly shew that the whole foundation of the
Ex.
12, was that
judgment in the case of Pinnington v. Galland,
way of necessit y, and
the way claimed in the case was
equally
clear, as
seems to me, that Baron Martin and the Court whose judgment he delivered in no way disputed the general maxims to which
have referred.
The ase of Dav ies_v^ ear Law^ep.
Eq. 427 ...431.
There
als appears to me to have been dec ided onjthe^same^asis.
builder, had got a lease of land for the purpose of building upon
rnan,
in such
that land, and he proposed to build upon
way as that
through an archway, which was, at all events, standing to such an exwas intended to be used for
tent as to shew that
passage — that
through that archway should be the only means of communication
That being the position
with certain stables which were to be erected.
of tilings,
portion of the land was sold to third person, and the question arose whether
was open to that person to build upon his land in
The Massuch a way as to obstruct this one only way into the stable.
not.
was
And
that
ter of the Rolls (Lord Romilly) held
why? He
supported as
for overruling
Ch.
Lightowler, Law Rep.

V.
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founded his opinion upon the basis of this exception to which I am referring. He says: "The question is, whether the defendant has a
right to shut up the archway, and to intercept all access to Erskine
Mews through this passage.
This de pends upon whether th is easem ent is reserved by impilication on the assignment of the house to' th e
defendant: and this depends upon whether the easement is apparent ,
and also is a way o f necessity."
These cases in no way support the proposition for which the appellant in this case contends ; but, on the contrary, s upport the propositi ons
t hat in the case of a grant vou may imply a grant of such continu ous
eaa nd apparent easements or such easements as are necessary to tlie
s onable enjoyment of the property conveyed, "and have in , fact been enj oyed during the unity of ownership, but that, with the exception whic h
I have referred to of (easements of necessitv.^vou cannot imply a sim il ar reservation in favour of the grantor of land .
Upon the question whether tliere is any other exception, I must refer
both to Pyer v. Carter, 1 H. & N. 916, and to Richards v. Rose, 9 Ex.
218, and, although it is quite unnecessary for us to decide the point, it
seems to me that there is a possible way iri which these cases can be
supported without in any way departing from the general maxims upon
which we base our judgment in tliis case. I have already pointed to
the special circumstances in Pyer v. Carter, and I cannot see that there
is anything unreasonable in supposing that in such a case, where the
defendant under his grant is to take tliis easement, which had been enjoyed during the unity of ownership, of pouring his water upon the
grantor's land, he should also be held to take it subject to the reciprocal
and mutual easement by which that very same water was carried into
the drain on that land and then back through the land of the person
from whose land the water came. It seems to me to be consis_t £iiL^vith
r eason and c ommo n sense that th e se reciprocal easements should be im plied; and, although it is not necessary to decide the point, it seems
to me worthy of consideration in any after case, if the question whether
Pyer v. Carter is right or wrong comes for discussion, to consider that
Richards v. Rose, although not identically open to exactly the
point.
same reasoning as would apply to Pyer v. Carter, still appears to me to
Two houses had existed for some
be open to analogous reasoning.
there anything unreasonable —is
Is
time, each supporting the other.
there not, on the contrary, something very reasonable — to suppose in
that case that the man who takes a grant of the house first and takes
it with the right of support from that adjoining house, should also
give to that adjoining house a reciprocal right of support from his own?
One other-point remains, and that I shall dispose of in a very few
words. It is said that, even supposing the maxims which I have stated
to be correct, this case is an exception which comes within the rule
laid down in Swansborough v. Coventry, 9 Bing. 305, and Compton v.
Richards, 1 Price, 27, namely, that, although the land and houses were
not in fact conveyed at the same time, they were conveyances made as

j
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part and parcel of one intended sale by auction. It seems to me that
that proposition cannot be supported for one moment. We start here
w ith an absolute conveyance in January, 1876 . What right have we to
lo ok back to any previous contract or to any previous arrangem ent ^>-:p»
b etween the parties ? If it had been the case of an ordinary contract, ^--i-^
and there had been parol negotiations, it is well-established law that
you cannot look to those parol negotiations in order to put any construction upon the document which the parties entered into for the
purpose of avoiding any dispute as to what might be their intentions in
the bargain made between them. The same rule of law applies, and
even more strongly in the case of a conveyance, which alone must regulate the rights of tlie parties. In the cases which have been cited the
conveyances were founded upon transactions which in Equity were
equivalent to conveyances between the parties at the time when tlie
transactions were entered into, and those transactions were entered
into at the same moment of time and as part and parcel of one transv.
action. Th ere mav be. and there is. according to Swansborough
oventry.
exception
9 Ring. 305. another
C
to the rule which I h ave menby
h
but
ere
sale
auction
was
abortive
as regards the defe ndthe
;
tioned
There was a con veyance in January of the plaintiff's
a nt's prope rty.
property wit hout any reservatio n, and there' was no contract of pur chase o n the part of the defen dant until more _tl'ian a month afte r that
TtTdieveTTamexpressing the view of
c onveyance had been com plete!
the other members of the Court when I say that it appears to the Court
that un der such circumstances there is no exception to the general ru le.
For these reasons, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.
James, L. J. The Lord Justice has been kind enough to express
the judgment of the Court. I only want to say something in addition,
that in the case of Nicholas y. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121, the C ourt
see ms to ha ve really proceeded on the ground that it was not an in c orporeal ea sPTTipnf^ hnt fhnt the whole of the conduit through whic h
t he water r an wa'^ ^ corporeal part of the hous e, just as in any old city
there are cellars projecting under other houses. They thought it w as
n ot merely the right to the pnssngp of \v7\\er , but th at the conduit its elf
passed as part of the hpuse. just like a flue passing through ano ther
man's house. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
BaggalIvAY, L. J., concurred.

PHILLIPS
(Cliancery

Division,

y.

1S91.

LOW[1S92] 1 Ch.

47^227^

The plainti£E-^Ar thur Phillips was the owner in fee o f a messua ge
known as Me adowcrof t^t Catford, in the county of Kent, and the
plaintiff Buck was the lessee thereof.
The defend§, nt5; were tht;^ rvwners in fee of the land lying to thf^ north
o^and adjoining" Meadowcroft. and had obstructed the light and a ir

DERIVATIVE

488

^ Ti

TITLES

(Part

2

comi ng thereto by erecting a buildin.£^ and placing hoardings on the
land close to the messuage.
Th e messuage anH InnH fo rmerly both, belonged to one T- J- Stai nton,
w ho died possessed thereof in the year 1R7? | hp having previously built
the messuage as a washhouse, stables, billiard room, and observatory,
and i t was the ac cess of ight and air to a door and windows in such

l

niessijage which the_defeii dants ha d nbstriicted.
At the time the messuage was built and down to the time of the
death of J. J. Stainton the only building standing on the land to the
north of the messuage was a cot tage ca lled JLaurel Ijudger-surrounded
by a garden occupied by one G. T. Williams, and no t interfering in any
way with any light or air coming to the messuage.
. J.
Stain tori_inade his w411 dated the 30 th of June, 1875, and th ereby devised to G. T. WiTT iams the cottage called Laurel Lodg e. ^together
wi th the Jand th ereto a djoming up to the boundary of Meadow croft.
a nd devi s ed all th e residue of hi^ freehold p ro perty to trustees up on
trust for sale.
The plai nt iff EJyllips became entitled to Meadowcroft under an exercise of the trust for sale contained in the said will . T be defendan ts
p urchased L nuu ^l Lod^e and tlip ndioining land from G. T . V Villiams.
The plaintiff Buck resided in one part of Meadowcrot't, and carried
on business as a coachbuilder on the other part thereof.
In August, 1890, the defendants com menced to build a lodge on t he
n orth side of Meadowcroft within a few inches thereof which almo st
e ntirely obstructed the light and air coming to the door and wind^w^
i n sucn messuage.
Complaints were made by the plaintiffs to the defendants that they
were n ot entitled to build the lodge , and the defendants insisting that
they had such right, the writ in this action was issued on the 26th of
January, 1891, and on the 29th of January th e defendants commenc ed
to erect, and shortly afterwards completed a hoarding painted black
within six inches of most of the windows and openmgs in Meadow -

J.

c roft,

A motion was made in this a ction for an injunction to restrain the
obstruction to the access of light and air as aforesaid, whereupon the
defendants undertook without prejudice to remove the hoarding and
the motion was ordered to stand till the trial.
T he plain
aimed that the defendants might be restrained fro m
tiffs__cl

of light and air coming_ to
be ordered to remove the building
already erected by tliem, or to pay to the plaintiffs damages for obstructing and interfering with the access of such light and air.
The action now came on for trial.
ChiTty, J. N othing turns on the particular language of the wilL —
that is admitted. The circumstance that th e devise of the defend ants'
te nement is__ £:^ress ed to be made free of incumbranc es^ that it is a
specific devise in form, and that the plaintiff's' tenement is comprised
o t^structing

or interfering with the

M eadowcroft, and that they might

access
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in a residuary devise of messuages, are all immaterial, and rightly admitted to be so. T he term "incumbrance" does not affect the question
of light ; and a devise of land, though in form residuary, is spec ific.
Lancefield v. Iggulden, Law Rep. 10 Ch. 136.
The question, then, may be stated in this simple form : A man being
se ised in fee in possession of a house with windows, and of an adjoining fieldoveT~wHinrtITeTTght required for the windows passes, devises
d oes the right to the lig ht
the house to one and the field to another;
o ver the field pass to the devisee of the hous e, o r is the devisee of th e
f ield entitled to block up the windows ?
If the owner of the house and field by deed for v^lue grants the
ennr*>jux/ a^
house but retains the field, it is se ttled law that a right to the light r equ ired for the enjoyment of the house passes to the grantee? Why? /
/-^y^TA
. ,
The reason stated in Palmer v. Fletcher, 1 Lev. 122, the leading case
^
on the subject, is that "the lights are a necessary an d es sential part of ^-*-*'^^*
In other words, what is conveyed is not a mere brick or
t he house ."
stone building with apertures called windows, but a house with windows enjoying light. This is the broad, substantial reason which comWorked o ut
mends itself at once to the common sense of mankind.
so niewhat more technically, the conveyance operates as an implied
grant of the light . Blocking up the windows by the grantor is regarded as an attempt on his part to derogate from his grant — a form oi
expression which assumes that the right to light has passed to the
The implication does not necessarily arise upon a mere
grantee.
perusal of the deed itself.
Generally the situation and ownership of
the adjoining field is not disclosed; b ut the implication of grant arise s yjJ^^,^*^ >LAj
- • —^'
pr^ma facie so soon as the facts are ascertained that the light required «
'^^
passed
grantor
f or the windows
over the field, and that the
was own er

J-J

oi

the field at the time

of

On

these facts being known,

j

and
in the absence of any other special circumstances, t he law imputes o
the parties an intention that the easement of light should pass with t he
h ouse bv virtue of the gr ant As I have recently stated with more fulness my opinion in regard to the subject of the implied grant in the
case of Bcddington v. Atlee, 35 Ch. D. 317, I refrain from repeating
what I there said. When all the surrounding circumstances which may
legitimately be inquired into are made known, the result may be different — the prima facie implication or inference may be wholly displaced or considerably modified, as was held in the case of the Birmingham, Dudley and District Banking Company v. Ross, 38 Ch. D. 295.
Where the implication arises, the easement which passes is an easement
created de novo.
The pri nciple of the decision in Palmer v. Fletcher, 1 Lev. 122, applies where the h ou se and the land are sold and co nveyed t o two differ the gran t.

gra ntees _contempora n eously, as stated by the late Master of the
Rolls (Sir O. Jessel), in his judgments in Rigby v. ' Bennett, 21 Ch. D.
'
559, 567, and Allen v. Taylor, 16 Ch. D. 355.
It was argued for the defendants that the principle applies only
e nt

^^**^'^V^

'

'
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where the conveyance is by deed for valuable consideration.
No authority was cited in support of this contention, which appears to me to
be absolutely without foundation.
The implied grant does not arise
from the consideration for the grant, but from the grant and the surrounding circumstances, whether the intention of both the grantor and
grantee under a voluntary deed is regarded, or the intention of the
grantor alone is regarded, the result is the same. The intention to b e
i mputed is that a house with lights shall p ass.
This argument as to a voluntary conveyance was a step towards the
d efendant's main. contention , t hat the principle does not apply to a wil l.
^^yy J,
No authoritv for this con ten. ." In mv opinion, it does apply to a wil l.
'iT''^'
,,^^^0sjA'%n ti
a rt was cite d.
defendants'
on
the
All
the reasoning on the subp
^n
i.^%jf iK'iH^'' ject appears to me to apply to a will w here the intention of the testa tor
•
alone is regarded. A will operates as a simultaneous conveyance o f
t he house and the field to the two devise es!
The question is covered,
or all but covered by two authorities cited for the plaintiffs. In Barnes
V. Loach, 4 Q. B. D. 494, it was decided that the easement of light
passed witli the house without express words, the ground of the decision as stated in the judgment of the Court being, t hat if the own er
of an estate bag hppn in the habit of using qu asi easem ents of an apparent and continuous character over the one part for the benefit o f
t he other part of his property and aliens the quasi dominant part to one
person, and the qu asi servient to anothe r,Jhe respective alienees, m the
absence of express stipulation, t ake the land burdened or b enefited as
the case may be, by the qualities which the previous owner ha d a righ t
t oattach to them. . Pearson v. Spencer. 1 B. & S. 571 : 3 B. & S. 761.
was a case of a will. The t estator had unity of possession of an esta te
which he divided by his will into two farms, devising one to the pla int iff and the other tp the person under whom the defendant claim e d .
I The way claimed by the defendant was the sole approach which had
been used by the testator for the house and farm devised to the person
through whom he claimed. It was decided that this way passed to the
devisee of the defendant's farm, although there were no express words
of gift of the way. In delivering the judgment of the Court of Queen's
Bench, Blackburn, J., after referring to the distinction between continuous and discontinuous easements, stated that Pheysey v. Vicary,
16 M. & W. 484, was an authority that the rule in this respect applied
In delivering the judgment of the
as well to a will as to a deed.
Exchequer Chamber, Erie, J., stated that the judgment of the Court
below was upheld on the construction and effect of the will taken in
•connection with the mode in which the premises were enjoyed at the
time of the will. He said that the case fell under that class of implied

/

right claimed, but where _the
t enement is so const ru cted as that part of it in volv es a necessary de pende nce, in order to its enjoyment in the state it was when devise d.
upon the adjoining tenement. Upon the facts of that case, the Courts
held that the way passed under the will. The ground of this decision

grg^s where

the re is no necessity

for

the
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applies to the present case. The house devised to the i>ersons through
whom the plaintiffs claim contained windows so constructed as to involve a n ecessary dependence , in order to its enjoyment of light^ up o.n
Light is an apparent continuous easemen t.
t he adjoining tenement.
Gale on Easements (4th Ed.J p. 22. The case of Polden v. Bastard,
Law Rep. L Q. B. 156, which related merely to the easement or quasi
easement of a way which is a discontinuous easement, is not in point.
It was part of the argument for the defendants, that the basis of the
doctrine laid down in Palmer v. Fletcher, 1 Lev. 122, and developed by
subsequent authorities, was contract, or implied contract on the part
of the person retaining or taking the field that he would not obstruct
the lights, and th at where there was no contract, the doctrine wa s ina pplicable ^a nd consequently that as there was no contract between a
testator and his devisees, there was no ground for applying the doctrin e
to the case of a will. In support of this contention, certain expressions
of the Lord Justices in their judgments in the case of the Birmingham,
Dudley and District Banking Company v. Ross, 38 Qi. D. 295, were
cited. It is unnecessary to deal with them at length. It is sufficient to
say, that i n^mv opinion the Lords Justices did not intend to alter, the
l aw as to implied grants, and that my decision in this case is not affecte.d
b y anything which fell from them ; a nd further, assuming that whe re
th ere is a deed between parties, the doctrine ought to be explaine d

rf*/^

C^v^Zfc*^

t heoretically as resting on contract as its basis.
I see no difficulty in
applying by analogy, in the case of a will, a n obligation, o r conditio n,
or duty (whichever may be the right term) on the part of the devi see,
or imposed on him by the testator, not to obstruct the access of lig h t
to the house devised to anothe r.
I prefer, however, to rest my judgment on the broad principles already statedj

RAY
(Chancery

Pr ipr

V.

HAZELDINE.

Division.

[1904] 2 Ch.

l^^Jw

>j

'

^At^^^K^^f^^"^

to the date of the indenture next hereinafter me iytloned. tne
defenda nt was the owner in fee simple of two adjacent nouses in
Cheadle Hulme, Cheshire . By an indenture dated October 18, 1895,
the defendant co nveyed one of these houses to the plaintiff's husban d
in fee simple, and this house was subsequently conveyed by him to th e

Milner's Safe Co. v. Great Northern & City R. Co., [1907] 1 Ch. 208 ; GorFisheries Co. v. Tolman, 210 Mass. 402, 97 N. E. 54, 38 L. R. A. (N.
So, also, in Mason v. Horton, 67 Vt. 26G, 31 Atl. 291, 48
S.) 882 (1912), ace.
Am. St. Rep. 817 (1894); Johnson v. Gould, GO W. Va.-84, 53 S. E. 798 (1906),
where the severance was brought about by partition among heirs of the common
7

ton-Pew

owner.

In Maynard v. Esher, 17 Pa. 222 (1851), the properties were sold separately
at the same public sale. It appeared that the deed of the quasi servient tenement had been made just prior to the deed of the quasi dominant tenement.
An instruction to the jury tliat under such circumstances the conveyances
should be deemed as made simultaneously was held erroneous.
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P:laintiff . In the western wall of the house retained by the defendant
there were t wo windows overlooki ng a yard forming part of the pla intiff's premises! Nei ther of the windo ws was an ancient light, nor was
any right to light in respect of either of the windows reserved in favour
of the defendant by the indenture of October 18, 1895.
The plai ntiff recen tly c ommenced to erec t a wall in her yard close
t o these windows, so as completely to bloc k the access of light thereto ;
but the defendant knocked down th e wall from his own premises,
and
'
i t was again erected and knocked clown ,.
The plaintiff brought this action for a declaration tliat she was entitled to build on her premises so as to obstruct the light to the two windows in question, and for a n injunction to restrain the defendant from
throwing down the wall, and for damage s!
. The defendant pleaded that the access of light to these two windows
was ab solutely necessary fo r the enjoyment and use for habitation if
t he part of his house which was lighted by these windows.
O f these
two windows on e lighted a pan try and the other lighted a landing
im mediately over the pan try. The evidence shewed that the landing
could be lighted by making a s kylight in tlie r oof, and that the pantry
could be li ghted by making a window i nto the sc ullery which adjoined
the pantry, thus obtaining a borrowed light through the scullery ; but
it was admitted in cross-examination by the plaintiff's surveyor that
the blocking up of the existing window would re n d er the pantry usele s s

j

as_ajDantr}^.

Kkkewich, J.

If

of land desires to reserve any right in
the nature of an easement for the benefit of his adjacent land which he
is not parting with, he must do it by ex press words in the deed of conveyance. That is settled law, and expresses the result of the decision
in Wheeldon v. Burrows, 12 Ch. D. 31, where the Court of Appeal
affirmed the decision of Bacon, V. C. That is the general rule, but the
One of them is the well-known
rule is su bject to^ certai'i pyrf^^tion'^
exception of an e asement of nec essity — that is to say, where the enjoyment of the alleged right over the adjoining land is necessary to the
property which is not conveyed, then the Court will consider the easement as impliedly reserved, t hough it has not been reversed bv expre ss
S uch easement, or right in the character of an easement, may
^yords.
In a large
be a ri ght to the access of light to a particular wi ndow.
majority of cases a window which lights a room is deemed necessary
to the lighting of that room and is, on the whole, essential to the comfortable enjoyment of tliat room, but it does not follow that the right
to access of light to that window is an easement of necessity. Where
are you to draw the line? Supposing the blocking up of tlie window
largely interferes with the comfort and enjoyment of the room, is the
grantee of the adjacent land entitled to block it up, or does the exception
stand ? It seems to me that the line to be drawn is pointed out by Stirin Union Lighterage Co. v. London Graving Dock Co.,
ling, L.
Ch.
His Lordship makes
distinction between an
557, 572.
[1902]
a

2

J.,

a vendor
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of necessity an d an easement necessary to the reasonable en oyment of property . After referring to the two rules laid down in
Wheeldon v. Burrows, 12 Ch. D. 31, 49, and the exceptions thereto he
says : "The appellants did not dispute that there is no express reseryation in the conyeyance to the plaintiffs, but they contended that the
easement claimed by the defendants is an 'easement of necessity' withNow, in the passages
,in the recognised exception to the second rule.
cited the expressions 'ways of necessity' and 'easements of necessity'
are used in contrast with the other expressions, 'easements which are
necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted,' and
'easements * * * necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the
property conyeyed,' and the word 'necessity' in the former expressions
has plainly a narrower meaning than the word 'necessary' in the latter.
I n my opi nion an easement of necessity, such as is referred to. mea ns
an easement without which the property retained cannot be used at
all, an^noLimfe. ia£i:g|y rieces sa o: to the reason able, enjoyment of tha t
property." Then, after pointing out that the lights in Wheeldon y.
Burrow57l2 Ch. D. 31, 49, were reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the workshop, he says : "So here it may be that the tierrods
which pass through the plaintiffs' property are reasonably necessary
to the enjoyment of the defendants' dock in its present condition ; but
the dock is capable of use without them, and I think that there cannot
be implied any reservation in respect of them."
That seems to me to
draw the distinction between what is absolutely necessary and what is
reasonably required for the enjoyment of the land and building as it
stands. I n my judgment this is a window to which the access of lig ht
cannot be reseryed by implication upon the ground that the light is
necessary to the pantry . It cannot be that there is any necessity by
reason of its being used as a pantry, since it can be used for other purIt cannot be said that a special use of light attaches to it as a
poses.
pantry, and to say, as the defendant does, that access of light to that
window is reseryed to him by necessity is giying to the wor4 "necessity" a meaning which it does not properly bear in this connection.
[His Lordship m ade a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to
build
on her heredi taments in such a ■■
mann 'er as to ob stru ct the lights
r^
:
.
of the two wmdows m question .]^

*

ea sement
j

'

8 As to the creation of the easement of lisrht and air by implication in the
I JtC
United States, see Kennedy v. Burnap, I2 n_rnl. 4.-^^ 52 Pac. 843, 40 L. R. A. '
476 (1898) ; Keating v. Springer, 146 111. 481, ?A N. E. 805, 22 L. R. A. 544, 37
Am. St. Rep. 175 (1893) ; Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204, 15 Am. Rep. 80 (1874) ;
Mullen V. Strieker, 19 Ohio St. 135, 2 Am. Rep. 379 (1869), conclyding that such
easement caiuiot be so created. Janes v. Jenkins, 31 Md. 1, 6 Am. Rep. 300
(1871) ; Greer v. Van Meter, 54 N. J. Eq. 270, 33 Ati. 794 (1896), contra.
" As to light and air, I am fx'ee to say that I do
not believe the rule, as a ppirpimm fmipps.
^ sound one, which holds that under
Tjlied" to our situatlAl^ and
any circimistances this ripht can by implication be burdened upo n ^w afl^oinmg estate, as to preveht the MVht^i' tlKJI'^Of I'J'OllI building upon or improving

il

I

would reverse the rule and hold that h fi who claims rhnt
as he pleases.
t en, twenty or thirty feet adjoining him (which in cities may be y pry yfllnnhlpt
shall remain vacant and unimproved,

should found such claim upon an express

^*^ /
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4

Gray

297, 64 Am, Dec. 76.)

Action of t ort for trespassing on a close to which the plaintiff clai mof warranty from William Sherman . The defendant justified under a way of necessity at tached to adjoining land,
belonging, at the time of said deed, to Sherman, fro m whom the defendant also derived title. At the trial in the court of common pleas,
it appeared that Sherman, at the time of the first deed, retained no
But Pero ther way to his remaining lot except over the land g^ranted.
under
a
not
that
the
could
way of
justify
defendant
kins, J., ruled
The
necessity over land which he had conveyed by deed of warranty.
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant alleged exed title under a deed

ceptions.

Thomas, J. I f A. conveys land to B., to which B. can have acces s
nly
by passing over other land of A., a way of necessity passes by t he
o
grant. If A. conveys land to B., leaving other land of A. to which he
can have access only by passing over the land granted, a wayof_necessi ty is reserved ii L-lIie-g-pa4rt^ These points are settled, as well in the
cases cited for the plaintiff, as those cited for the defendant.
Is the rule affected by the fact that the grantor conveyed by deed
of warranty ? We think not. I f the way were expressly reserved i n
t he deed, the c ovenants must apply to the premises granted, that isTan
estate with a right of way reserved or carved out of the fee.~r ri the
present case, the law does for the parties the same thing, and t he cov en ants apply to an estate^
this way ot
tnis
ne
[ate^witn
^^th
o^ necessity reserved .
Exceptions sustains
grant or covenant."
Dillon, C. J., in Morrison v. Marquardt, 24 Iowa, 35, 60,
ti2 Am. Dee. 444 (1S6S) .
In Rennyson's Appeal, 94 Pa. 147, 39 Am. Rep. 777 (ISSO), t he court said that
t he easement of light and air would not arise by implication unless there was
u""real necessity. " See, too, Kohinson y. Clapp, 05 Conn, 366, 32 Atl. 939, 29
L. R. A. 582 (1S95) ; Doyle y. Lord, 64 N, Y, 432, 21 Am. Rep. 629 (1876),
In Manning y, N, J, Short Line R. R. Co,, SO N, J, Law, 349, 78 Atl. 200, 32
L. R. A. (N. S.) 155 (1910), the pl aintiff in n nroceeding for an award in con d emnation nroceeding s whereby the defendant had taken a strip of land for
purposes of a right of way, cl aimed the award should include compensatio n
f or lateral support for the right of way burdened artificially by the railroa d
f or railroad puriwses, it being contended that upon the acquisition of the right
of way the company acquired by implication an easement of such lateral support.
9 "I t is not the necessity which creates the right of wnv. bnt
^jj^^jflflJso necessity will justify an^^^^
enBry^upon .
struction of the. acts of the parties!
a no?B?T^nHfTff^ ii""a man cab' be supposed to hold land without any right of
access to it, a grant of it would not convey to the grantee any right to pass
over the adjoining land, howeyer necessary it might be to the enjoyment of the
thing granted.
He w ould acquire nothing more th an his grantor he ld. The
necessities of the parties would ada notnnig to It, uuuon y, Tayler, 2 Lutw,
1487,
But the t rue principle is, that nothing will pass, as incident t.O' tbf> gra nt.
e xcept it be necessary to the enioy Tupni- of flip prin cipal thing grante d.
fTf^nce
r>t n r-i^^P s urrounded
by the grantor's land, is entitled only to a
«-[)P prrnntpc
ceuyeni ent way over the grantor's land, and will haye no right to i>a.ss oyer Jj b
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CHILD.
95 Miss. 585, 48 South. 897.)

Child,
Dabney, appellant, was c omplainant in the court below .
appellee, was defendant there. From a decree in defendant's favor the
complainant appealed to the supreme court. The facts are sufficiently
stated in the opinion of the court.
Mayeis, J., delivered the opinion of the court
The
-Lilt complamSTcmu^^case
^^w
iiiplamOTt in fltis case executed to Child a warrantv deed to l,
o ne acre of land in section 6, township 15. range 5 E .. in Warren i^
/"IM^C^xa^
county, and the d eed con tains no reservat ion of a ny easemen t whatwherever lie pleases. He may select a suitable route for his way, but in doing
be mu st regard the interest a nd cpnvenience of the owner of t he laiid, and
when he has done it, he will be coutiued to the same way ana may not change
its course according to his wishes or caprice. Russell v. Jackson (1824) 2 Pick.
(Mass.) 574; Jones v. Percival (1827) 5 Pick. (Mass.) 485 [16 Am. Dec. 415].
Al though generally a man can acquire, as incident to a grant, on ly onp rJL^ht
of way to the same close, v et the same nrincinie of necessity which raises the
implication of one may extend it to two or more.
Where a man should grant
a tract of land surroupded by his own, so divided into parts by an impassable
mountain, river or other barrier, as that there could be no passing from one
part to the other, he would by necessary implication convey a right of way to
each separate part, because without this some portion of the thing granted
P. ut these implications
of grants ar e
would be entirely useless to the grantee.
l ooked upon with jealousy and construed with strict ness. It is only the necessity of the ca.se which will carry one way ; and certainly the necessity must
be not less strong to carry two.
It is not pretended that the bluff across the
defendants' land is impassable;
but only tbat it is 'exceedingly difhcult to
pass it, and that it would be much more convenient to the defendants to pass' over
Here is no such necessity as will raise an implication of
the plaintiff's land.
a grant of different ways from dilferent parts of the defendant's lot. Conv enience, even great convenience is not suthcient.
If the defendants, when they
purchased, had desired a separate way for this small section of their lot, they
should have stipulated for it and had it expressly inserted in their deed." Morton, J., in Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 104, 105, 35 Am. Dec. 302 (1834).
In Pettingill v. Porter, 8 Allen (Mass.) 1, 85 Am. Dec. 671 (1864), there had
been an instiniction as follows: "The deed under which the plaintiff claimed
conveyed whatever was necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the estate
granted, and in the power of the grantor to convey ; t hat it was not enoug h
fr y thp pliiinfifT <-»»piT»vc> thni tl ip wny claimed would be convenient and beue ti cial. but she must also prove that no other way could be conveniently
maa e
from the highway to her intestntp's linupe, without unreasonable Itib or and
expense ; that unreasonable labor and expense means excessive and disproportionate to the value of the property purchased ; and that it was a ques tion
f or the jui'y. on all the evidence, whether such new" way could be made wi thout such unreasonable labor and exnenseT " Held a correct instructi om To
same effect is Crotty v. New River & Pocahontas Oonsol. Coal Co., 72 W. Va.
68, 78 S. E. 233, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 156 (1913).
In Hildreth v. Googins, 91 Me. 227, 39 Atl. 550 (1898), where in order to get
to the land as incident to which the way of necessity was claimed it was necessary to go either over other lands of the grantor or over a portion of the ocean,
it was held, t here being no evidence offered as to the unnvailnhilitY nf the ocean
as a hLghway^ang means or access, that there w^as no w^ay of necessit.v oy^ r
t he grantor s otner lands
~ . See, also, Staples v. Cornwall, 99 N. Y. isupp. 1009

it

(1906):

As to w'ays of necessity where there are other possible means of access, see,
generally, Corea v. Higuera, 153 Cal. 451, 95 Pac. 882, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1018
(1908).

'■^—

/^^

iia^. ^i

/

^

«^..
DERIVATIVE

TITLES

(Part

2

ever. The o bject of this suit is to have the court declare that when t his
c onveyance was made there was an implied reser v ation in the deed th at
complainant should have a right of way to his own premises ov er the
land conveyed ^ on tlie idea that it is a wav of necessity.
The complainant has not brought himself within that rule of law
which would warrant the court in declaring that there was any way of
necessity reserved by implication in the deed, since t he bill itself show s
t hat the way sought to be established is no more than a way of con a nd in no sense one of necessity, sin ce Child has already
given him another way by which he has free access to and from his
One of the charges in the bill is that complainant is alpremises.
lowed "to pass to and from his land over land belonging to Child
north of the one acre, but that this is by sufferance of said Child, and
which, it avers, the complainant has no right to, but enjoys merely
at defendant's will, and alleges that he has a right of way over the
strip, which Child denies, and refuses to allow him to cross for this
purpose, and that he seeks herein to have this court decree him this
right." I t is thus seen that the complainant already has a wa y_,of
necessity open to him, over which he may go to the ve ry land in ques ti on, and there can exist no rig-ht to claim another and ditferent w ay
as a way of necessity, even though the route now used may be at he
sufferance of Child. If the appellant desires a private and permanent
right of way. Code 1906, § 4411, provides an adequate remedy whereby
. he may have a private way laid out.
In 11 Cyc. p. 1171, a clear statement of the law in regard to implied
reservations in deeds is made, supported by a great many authorities,
It is there said: " If th e
and we quote the statement with approval.
g rantor intends to reserve any right over the tenement granted, it is
To say that a grantor
his duty to reserve it expressly in the grant.
reserves to himself in entirety that which may be beneficial to him,
but which may be most injurious to his grantee, is quite contrary to
the principle upon, which an implied grant depends, which is that a
•' grantor shall not derogate from or render less effectual his grant, or
-J»
render that which he has granted less beneficial to his grantee. Ac • j^Jr" c ordinglv.
where there is a grant of land, with full covenants of w arranty, without express reservation of easements^ the best-considere d
jf^- c ases hold that there can be no reservation by implication, unless the
easement is strictly one of necessity ; for the operation of a plain
*jky
\a
^
grant, not pretended to be otherwise than in conformity with the contract between the parties, o ught not to be li mited and cut down by th e
^^ Hti/\'
fi ction of an implied reservatio n.
We do not think that the case of Pleas v. Thomas, 75 Miss. 495,
^A*^
In the
22 South. 820, is at all in point under the facts of this case.
case just referred to the way claimed was one of necessity, well marked
out, and had been in use for a considerable space of time. Not so
here. The way is not one of necessitv . and it is not shown that it was
ever in use as a right of way. The court said in Pleas v. Thomas:

venience,

i

s.-^
r^jjr
^

' ^

jy^\

Ct-ut

^

yOw-tfkXv.*^ ./VX/|-C-nyvr»-fcMS^
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case are not doubtful,

but their
and delicate."
We repeat the
appell ant has shown any such
that there is an implied res erdeed of conveyance , when no
necessity exist s. /Implied reservations, as against the express covenants of a deed, are n ot favored by the courts, and are to be limited to
ways of s trict necessit y. /The fact that the land was practically given
to Child by Dabney irfno way alters the principle.^"
application to peculiar facts is difficult
same here ; but we do not think that
f acts as would authorize us to declare
vation of a way gf necessity in the

SEIBERT
(Supreme Court of rennsylvania,

V.

LEVAN.

18-48.

8 Pa. 383, 49 Am. Dec. 525.)

In error from the Common Pleas of Berks county.
The facts of this case are fully set forth in the charge of the court
below; and, as no other exceptions were argued in this court, either
upon the argument in 1847, or upon the reargument in 1848, but those
taken to the charge, it will be sufficient to present the case to the profession, as it was presented to this court by the court below. Upon the
trial there, Jones, P. J., charged the jury as follows :
"This is an a ction on the case.for obstr ucting a certain race throug h
w hich the water flowed to the plaintiff's clover -mill.
"In 1830, George D. B. Keim was seised of a tract of la nd in this
county through which flowed a stream of water, formed by the confluence of springs arising on the land, and of a stream of water flowing
into it from land situated above it. The str eam thus formed, flow ed
i n its natural rliannel , tlr miip-h the lower part of the meadow on Keim's
'

land, into the tract below, and w as used by him at the proper season
the year for the purpose of irrigating the meadow, by means of a
o^
ditch on the highe r part nf the, men now, nnd so much of it as was
not consumed, flowed back again into the natural channel, by wh ich
i t entered the farm adjoining below, the property of John Esterly .
10 Land was lenspfl nnri together therewith a right of way over other lan ds
of the lessor. Under its powers of eminent domain a railroad comi)anj' erected
an embankment across the lessee's right of way in such manner as to make impossible the further use of said way. T he lessee had no other means of acc ess

nnlpss lip bad

^

ri ght to pass

nvt^v

tliP nthpr lnT]:ds of his lessor in some oth er

Did he have such rig ht? See Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston
E. Corp., 202 Mass. 585~ 89 N. E. 118 (1900).
A strip of land cuffing across the grantor's farm was conveyed in fee to a
railroad company, with no rcservijfion. except, as a part of the consideration.

lUie,.
& P.

t nat the grantee should make a good crossing or roadwa y.
Gas was later
covered on the part of the farm separated from the grantor's house by
railroad. Tl; e grantor claimed tbe right to put in a pipe line leading from
^^ells througnThe right of way to the house.
The com pany objecte d, on
ground t hat pueh rigbt was not included in the reservation,
is there
ground upon which the right so to locate the pipe line may be supported?
Uhl V. Ohio River R. Co., 47 W. Va. 59, 34 S. E. 934 (1899).

Aig.Prop.—
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"

By his deed of the 23d ]\Iarch, 1830, T ohn Esterly conveyed to
Keim, in fee, the said farm adjoining him below, containing about t w o
hundred acres . Keim, having thus become the o wner of both farm s, in
A the same year er ected on the lower farm a mill for cleaning clove rseed, &c., and for the purpose of supplving this mill with water, co nyc>t^^L, ^"y^^^**^
s tructed a long ditch or race, principallv on the upper f an n. with a
^
A^ ^^^8-t/»»«^ pond or dani near the mill (w hich pond was also on the upper farm),
'
through which the water of the stream before mentioned was conducted out of its natural channel for the purposes of the mill at
^such times as it was thought necessary to put the mill in operation.
"On the 31st December, 1841, Keim co nve ved that trac L-QJ 1?md,
C

^^>C^'

j:i^

w<)
?/(»A«3^

"'

o n which the race and dam were, to Messrs. IMuhfehburg & Schwa rtz,
whose deed was recorded on the 9th April followin g. On the 6th August, 1842, Keim mortgaged th at tract of land on which" the mill wa s,
to Jacob Bechtel and" others. O n the 22d October, 1842, Muhlenberg &
Schwartz, entered into articles of agreement with the defenda nts,
a cting as the agents of their mothe r ; whereby they covenanted :o
c onvey to her a certain portion of the tract purchased by them of Keim ,
o n which portion were the race and dam in question ; and, in pursuance
of those articles, they executed their deed- to her on the 29th April,
1843.
By virtue of a l evari _f aaas^ on a judgment confessed by Keim
upo n the sc ire facias issued on the mortg age given bv him to Becht el
an d others, that tract still held by Keim, and on whirh wa«; the ml ]]
w^as sold by the sheriff to the plaintiff,
who received the sheriff's deed
therefor, on 5th November, 1844.
''
In neither of those deeds to Muhlenberg & Schwartz, or jrom
them, is a;^y mention whatever made of this race and dam : noris
t here ^ny reservation to Keim_and his heirs or assigns of any right
whatever to have the water flow through that race to the mill, or to
enter upon the land now of the Levans, f or the purpose of repairi ng-,
cl eaning, or doing anything else to this race and dam. B y the first of
those deeds, the land p assed absolutely, a nd ivit hoiU any restriction or
reservation w hatever in favour of Keim, to his grantees, who acquired the most en tire and perfect dominion over iL the largest and
Whatever may have been
most comprehensive known to our lazt's.
between Keim and his immediate
the relations and understanding
grantees, zvith regard to this land, M rs. Levan, in purchasing of the m,
zvas not required to go further than their recorded deed in fee: w hich
was equally notice to Keim's mortgagees of the lower tract, and to the
purchasers from Keim's grantees of the upper tract, of the extent of
Thai deed reserving no right to this ra ce — >
the rights of these last.
no right to have the waters Uoiv through it to the mill — no such righ t
remained in Keim. or in those claiming under him, by any subscouen t
conve yance or encumbrance of thnf. Imv pr trnrt Mrs. Levan took the
upper tract from Muhlenberg. & Sclm'arta, as their deed conz'eyed it
to them, as fully and as amply, as free and as exempt from all reservations in favour of the owner of the lozver tract, as they had held it:

J
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and consequently s he had a right to £11 up that race, or divert its 7v aters, at her own mere will and pleasur e; and for the doing of this, no
action can he maintained against her, or those claiming under her.
"The plaintiff has submitted to us six points, agreeably to which,
we gj:e requested to charge you. We will take them up in their order :
"lyAt is tr ue that the rights of the plaintiff, who purchased at sh erhe
"-tffs sale, under the mortgage by Keim to Bechtel and others, are
same as those of Keim , on the 6th of August, 1842, which was the
Whatever right, title, or interest, Keim had in
date of the mortgage.
the lower tract on that day, was bound by this mortgage, which became
the measure of the right, title, and interest of the sheriff's vendee,
under pr?)ceedings upon it. If Keim had then a right to the flow of
v ^ater through that race, as appurtenant to the mill, or by virtue, of
any previous reservation or grant, such right would, we take
have
een bound by the mortgage and would have passed to the she riff's
vendee of the mortgaged premises. But, efore that da y, Keim had
conveyed the upper tract, on which were the race and dam, in fee,
wit hout any eservation
such right, and on that day he had no such
right that he could bind by ino rTQUqe. he Had no nqlit to the fiowincf
orTqlit to enter upon that upper tract to
the water in that race;
clean or repair the race, or for any purpose whatever, save only by
the
Muhlenberg and Schwartz.
s}tff^rance
not pntitlprl tp recover under the sheriff's dee
y2y^\iQ
aintiff
an
that whether the defendants did or did not give notice, as th ey
The right in this case does not in any manner depend upon the
allege
fact of the defendants having given notice at the sheriff's sale, that
they-ei^imed this race.
/[Z.yllo' ^^vtr necessary and inciden to this mill, this race rnay be,
and notwithstanding
was occupied EyThe servants or tenants of Keim,
and by the plaintiff, for fifteen years before suit brought, still,
K eim conveyed away the land, on which
in fee, when he had
all right to the easemen
o-ht to do so. and made ^o reserypfi^n -^f
under hi m.
here^claimed was lost by him and by those claiming
and sheriff's deed given in evidence,
not conmortgage
3^^/The
vf^ tXie race in controversy as incident and appurtenant to the mill. If
Keim had mortgaged the lower tract on which the mill is, before he
But
conveyed the upper tract in fee, that might alter the case.
cou ld not have claimed incidents or appurtenances to his own land,
n land by him onveyed to another in fee, without having reserve
the m in his deed tn that other .
"The cases of ways of necessity, cited from Cro. Jac. 170, and
Lutwyche, 1487, held to exist in favour of grantors, are of doubtful
The necessity here
self-created, and such
authority.
necessity
could not be, in the words of Sergeant Williams, either in law or reason any justification
of
trespass committed on another's lands
Pomf ret v. Pycraf
Wms. Saund. 323, n.
and
could not afford
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justification for a trespass, supposing Seibert to be a defendant here,
of course it can aftord him no foundation for a right to recover, being
a

a phrifTtiff.

and Schwart z's consent to Keim and his tenan ts
y^5^^J<iuh\enherg
iT gmg the danTahd
race atter his deed to them and up to the date of
h b mortgage to Bechtel and others, a s Keim had nrcnpip H anH nc(pH
to Muhlenberg and Schwartz, does not entitle th e
to
recover.
They might have permitted this use or not, as
plai ntiff
they pleased ; it might have been even an ad verse use^^but wheth er
permissive or adver se, it can give no right as against the JL e^ans.
ITiey are not bound bv the me re permission , express or implied, of
Muhlenberg and Schwartz, nor are they bound by any adverse use
short of twentv20ne_y£ars,— The moment the Levans came in they had
a right to do with this land, whereon the race and dam are, what they

i t before his deed

pleasp4v
y^'^6>xWe_ca nnot say, that, un der all the circumstances in thij^case. t he
law will imply a reservation ot the right to the race by Kei m when hv^
conveyed to Muhlenberg and Schwart z. We cannot distinguish this
And having
case in principle from CoUam v. Hocker, 1 Rawle, 108.
that as a rule laid down to us by the highest tribunal in. the state, it is
our and your duty to conform implicitly to its authority.
'"
Your verdict should he for the defenda n ts."
Verdict and judg ment for defenda nts, whereupon this writ of error
was sued out, and in this court those parts of the charge printed in
italics, as well as the afiswers to the second and subsequent points of
the plaintiff, were assigned for error.
Gibson, C. J.
Ve have before us a case in which the propri etor
o f two adjoining tracts of land, through which ran a water-course to
h is mill on the lower one, part of which was the natural bed of a sma ll
stream, a nd part of it a trench from a neighbouring creek, conveyed
tlie jipper tract expressly;^ without reserving the water-right,'^ to a part y
w ho has obstructed the trench and cut off the supply o f water from__ tbe
c reek .
Such a watercourse is a nalogous to a way o f necessity, which
is n ot extinguished by unity of seisin, the only difference being that in
the latter the right has not been created during the unity, but existed
antecedently to it. But the time, not of creating the right, but of pa rtin g with the land to which it was at t ached, is the material circumsta nce.
When the owner of a way sells the land through which it leads to a
market, or a ville, or a church, he retains the way without an express
reservation of it.; and why? Because, as appears in Jordan v. Atwood, Owen, 121, and the several cases collected in Woolrych on Ways,
71, the law p resum es he wQilld not have parted with a part of the pro pe rty to t he ruin of the rest of it; and the presum ption is practically
founded in ju'^tire ^fid truth.
Is not a water-course as necessary to a
mill as a way is to a ville or a church?
Yet when the land is sold, th e
easement is retained on the principle of implied reservati9n^ A right

\
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of wa y and a rjo -ht of water-course ^be iiig alike subject to the gene ral
l aw of easements, are not distinguishable from each other in any esBut we are not driven to analogies from association,
s ential particular.
however intimate; for it will be seen that there are several decisions,
in cases of water-right, directly on the point before us.
The three principal ones adduced on the part of the defendant are
Burr v. Mills, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 292; Preble v. Reed, 17 Me. (5 Shep.)
In the first of them,
175 ; and Hayes v. Bowman, 1 Rand. (Va.) 420.
a small part of the tract above, which was sold by the owner of the
mill, was covered by the pool of the dam; and in an action for the
damage, Mr. Justice Cowen, delivering the opinion of the court, said :

'''^

"It

can make no difference that there was then a dam built which
flowed this land. If a man convey land which is covered with his rm jlH
pond, without any reservation , he loses his right to flow it . There is |
n o room for inT pli_e_d rese rvation . A man makes a lane across one farm
to another, which he is accustomed to use as a way; he then conveys
tlie former, without (expressly) reserving a right of way ; it is clearly
cannot, after he has absolutely conveyed away his lan d,
gone, /

^man

y AAAJA^

u^

stilTretain the use of it for any purpose,^ without an express res_^rv aThe flowing, or the way, is but a mode of use; and a grantor -^'''Mp'*-*''*'^*~W
Vt ion .
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might as well claim to plough and crop his land." An argument, by an
analogy, to a right of water-course from a right of way, which, we
have seen, may be retained without being expressly reserved, is merely
a petitio principii ; and the doctrine of the entire paragraph, being as
applicable to natural as to artificial water-courses, would justify the
filling up of a natural pond, used as a reservoir; which is surely not
the law. Nor does the claim of a water-course of necessity bear any
resemblance- to a claim to plough and crop another's land, which would
He admitted that the
merely be an idle and extravagant pretension.
land would have remained subject to the easement, had the owner of it
retained it and sold the mill ; for which distinction, he cited Nicholas
V. Chamberlain,
Cro. Jac. 121 ; which clearly proves the particular
as well as the
position, but as clearly disproves his conclusion from
for
whole doctrine predicated by him
was held by all the court,
"t hat
conduit thereto in another pac
one erects
house and builds
land,
by
pipes
and conveys water
his
to the house, and afterwar ds
house,
ells the
with the appurtenances, or sells the land to anoth er,
reserving to
himself the house, the conduit and pipes pass with the
ouse." A the reservation of the house
not an express reservation
of the pipes,
must
an implied on
and as we have seen that a
vendee may set up an implied grant of
thing lying out of the limits
of his conveyance, on the ground of necessity, w.e may infer tha a
set up an implied reservation
ve ndor may, on he same gr oun
omething wi thin them.
It not by force of the word appurtenances that water-course, like
mill, but by force of the
the present, would pass by the grant of
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p rinciple that the grant of a thing includes all the means in the gr antor's power to attain it ; for the means shall pass inclusive without the
words "cum pertinentiis," or words equivalent to them : Touchstone,
89. T he grant of the means, therefore, is an implied one , for it is certainly not expressed ; and th ere is no imaginable reason why th ere
s hould not be an implied reservati on where the land is sold and the m ill
B ut to return to the defendant's cases. The second of
is retained.
them, Preble v. Reed, is a decision of the same stamp, in which the
same doctrine is asserted without a reason or an authority given for
excepting an instruction reported to have been given on a supposed
state of facts in Hathorn v. Stinson, 10 Me.
Fairf.) 224, 25 Am.
was said, to have met the approbation of the
Dec. 228, which seems,
In the third of them, Hayes v. Bowman,
whole court.
was barely
man
who
his
land
from the
that
had
of
divided
part
held
granted
river, and expressly to the middle of the stream, had not
rest of
by
dam from shore to shore for the better enjoyment of
right to erect
his mill-seat; but the court did not determine what would have been
the law of the case had
dam been erected before the land was sold.
The decision
sound one, but
does not touch the point before us.
The preceding cases make up the sum of what has been adduced as
authority for the defendant; and we will now turn to the authorities
on the part of the plaintiff. Besides Nicholas v. Chamberlain, which
full to the point, we have Sury v. Pigott, Palmer, 444, more fully
reported in Popham, 166, and more intelligibly stated in Nov, 184. It
A., seised of Whiteacre,
seems from the last, that the case was this
house, curtilage,and hop-yard through which ran a stream to
with
pond in the curtilage for watering cattle, enfeoffed P., oi the hop-yard
above, and leased tlie house and curtilage to S.
P. stopped the stream
and S. brought an action on the case for it; and the court held that
he right of water-course had not been extinguished bv the, unity o
seism. Yet there, as here, the defendant obtained title to the ground
above by the earlier grant.
was said by Dodderidge, that
"a
mill and water-course over his land, sells
man having
portion"" of
in such case, by necessi ty^
he land over which the water-course runs
emaine th to the vendor, and the vendee cannot st op
he water-course
had been adjudged accordit;!! and Crew, Chiet Justice, said that
in the King's Bench.
The
ingly in Day and Drake's Case,
Jac.
opinion of Chief Justice Popham in Lady Brown's case was also cited
was held that
one "hath
stream of water which
by him, in which
runneth in
leaden pipe, and he buys the land where the pipe
and
he cuts the pipe and destroys
the water-course
extinct because he
thereby declares his intention and purpose that he does not wish to
the inference from which
that
he had
enjoy them together";
sold the land without cutting the pipes, the easement would have remained, and he instanc ed the ca se of
dve-house with water runnin
to
in which
was held that
purchase and subsequent sale of the
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of

the dye-ho use,

l and on which the water was current, by the owner

d id not extinp^uish the easement.
These are ancient cases, but they seem to have been deeply considerIt is admitt ed
ed, and founded in the soundest ma>:ims of tlie laws.
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th at the owner of adjoining tracts traversed by a natural water-cour se,
i s as much entitled to the use of the water, having sold the upper on e
a s if he had not owned i t.
The vendee would be entitled to a reasonable use of
when
had served his purpose, to its forreturning
mer channel, so as to make
enter the tract below at the point where
entered
at the time of the sale
and what difference could there be,
whether the channel to lead
to that point were made by water or
There
no particular charm in
by the hand of man
gully cut by
natural agents. While the grantor was lord of the whole, he might
assign
permanent channel to the stream, and as regards himself or
those to claim under him, impress
with any character he should see
There
no peculiar sanctity in the natural bed of a stream,
proper.
which
Had
perpetually changing its course from accidental causes.
the connexion with the natural water-course leading from the springs
to the mill, been made by
flood tearing its way through the bank of
the creek,
would not have been pretended that the grantee, having
purchased with the fact before his eyes, would have been at liberty to
would have been entitled to no consideration as a
destroy it. But that
shown by the undoubted right he would
dispensation of Providence,
have to mend
breach made after his purchase. It
true the rule
that water shall flow ubi currere solebat et consuevit
but that regards
the duty of returning
and not the nature of the channel. It was
said by Dodderidge, in Sury v. Pigott, that as water descends
alcurrent,
et aut invenit aut facit viam
and he asked, "Shall suc
ways
a thing be extinguished which hath its being from creation ?"
And
"
thing natural, and therefore by un ity
Crew said. A water-course
shall not be discharged," but that these things were said of the element without reference to the nature of its channel,
evident from
Nicholas v. Chamberlain, and Lady Brown's case, in which the easement was not lost though the water was conveyed through leaden pipes.
The sum of the matter in regard to disposition by the act of an owner
of two tenements,
thus condensed in Gale and Whatley's Law
of Easements, 52 "It
true that, st rictly speaking, a man cann ot
ubject one part of his property to another
an easement for no
man can have an easement in his own property but he obtains the same
object by the exercise of another right, tjte general right of proper ty;
but he has not the less thereby altered the quality of the two parts of
his heritage
and if, after the annexation of peculiar qualities, he ien
ne part of his heritage,
seems but reasonable,
the alterations thu
made are palpable and manifest, that
purchaser should take the lan
urthened or benefited, as the case may be, by the qualities whichj ii£
previous owner had undoubtedly the right to attach to
Th'^-^a^e^
ment in the case at bar was palpable and permanent; and the defend-)
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ant was not at liberty to disturb it. As the exceptions to evidence have
not been separately argued, it is unnecessary to examine them in detail.
Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded.^^
Rogers and Coulter, JJ., dissented.
,

IMITCHELL

V.

(Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1879.

SEIPEL.
53 Md. 251, 36 Am. Rep. 404.)

-

Miller,

was brought in December, 1878, by the
to recover damages for clo sing and obs tructing an alley between two houses then separately owned by^tj ^e
r espective parties . The case presents an important and interesting
question respecting the law of easements.
The facts necessary to be stated, and about which there Is no dispute
are these : In the year 1839, D aniel Collins became the owner under a
l ease for ninety-nine years renewable forever of a lot of ground in the
City of Baltimor e, front ing thirty feet on West street, and extending
back eighty ieet to Gould lane, a public alley twenty leet wide. Th e
l ot was then v acant, but soon after his purchase Collins erected thereo n
two brick houses trontmgu on West ■street. These houses were built
about the same time, the first having a front of fifteen feet, and
the second a front in the lower story of twelve feet and six
inches, and in the upper stories of fifteen feet, thus l eaving a n
al ley of two feet and six inches between them:, covered by the
joists which supported the second floor of the second house. These
joists projected over the alley and into the adjoining wall of the first
house. The alley thus covered was open to the street, and exten ded
b ack between the houses about thirty fe et.
At its inner terminus tw o
which opened respectively into the rear premises
gates_jixi£_plac£d,
and yards of each house, and it was used by the occupants of each _as
a common passageway to and from the street.
Each house had, as
from
and
the end of the
usual, a front door opening upon the street,
alley a fence was built which extended back to Gould lane, and divided
the lot into two parts, giving to each a width of fifteen feet. During
his life. Collins continued the owner of the w^hole property and occu pied one of the houses . After his death his widow became the owner
under his will, and so continued until the year 1865, when by an order

This action
J.^^
a ppellee a g ainst the appell ant

I4f JU..»<

t Street

Ill (1SS6)

(hut cf. Povi-ers v. Heffernan,
Am. St. Rep. 109 (1908) ;
Jelinek, 69 Neb. 110. 95 N. W. 2S, 111 Am. St. Rep. 533 (190:1);
Kelly v. Dunning, 43 N. J. Eq. 62, 10
Co.. 24 N. H. 489 (1852);
Lampnian v. Milks. 21 N. Y. .505 (1860), overruled by Wells
N. Y. 430, 30 N. E. 978 (1892) ; Harwood v. Benton, 32 Vt 724
Howley v. Chaffee, 8S Vt. 4t;8. 93 Atl. 120 (1915), repudiating
illctuni in Ilarwood Case ; Bennett v. Booth, 70 W. Va. 264, 73 S. E. 909, 39 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 618 (1912), accord.
12 The statement of facts and a portion of the opinion are omitted.
11

Cihak

V.

Klokr.

233 111. 597, 84
Znamauacek v.
Dunklee v. Ry.
Atl. 276 (1887);
132
V. (Jarbutt,
(1860), but see

X. E.
L. R. A. (N.

117 111. 643, 7

N. E. 661.

16

?;.) 523, 122
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of the Orphan's Court, and in pursuance of a power contained in the
will, the ex ecutor of Collins sold and conveyed the entire property to
G eorge T. Waters.
While the un ity of posses sion thus continued, it is very clear no ea se-

ment in respect to this alley existed. A party cannot have an easement
in his own land, inasmuch as all the uses of an easement are fully comOliver v. Hook, 47 Md.
prehended in his general right of ownership.
on t he Rth of Tune.
severed
B ut this unity of ownership was
308.
day
owner,
sold and conveyed the
who on that
1865, bv Waters the
second house and lot to George W. Chandler, from who' T^ ^-^t^,flpfpnrlP-Ugh several mesne conveyances derived his title to the same .
ant^ thr
This conveyance was an absolute and u nqualified grant , de scribing th e

eLr'f^
^^^

C^^^^'J
3?^ -^^«^t/-

property by metes and bounds, which included the whole of this all ev.
and contamed n ^^serT^j^jyj^ of the right to use the same for the bene
Waters retained
fit of the hnnsT'anrHn^^^ed hv the grpntnr
^(pd*^^^^-^
ownership of the first house and lot until the 29th of July, 1868, when
• ^z /
he s old and conveyed the same to the plaintiff by a similar g-rnnt. which jA^r^-^-t^ ^
— ^v-*,-*.-*-*^
e mbraced no part of the alley . The defendant obtained his title to the
from
.
mesne
stated
conveyances
before
lot,
by
second house and
(as
^
October,
and
1874,
shortly {/^t^ ^>* <^^^
Chandler, the first grantee thereof,) in
plaintiff
from using th e
before this suit was brought, p revented the
a lley, by placing upon it buildings and other obstructions . There is no
pretence that the plaintiff had acquired a prescriptive right to use the
alley, nor is the case complicated by any easements of drainage or
sewerage. There are no pi pe.-^ nr dra ins, either underground or otherwise, from one house to the other, and thence to a common outlet, nor
The proof shows
does the surface drainage pass through the alley.
that the natural flow of surface water, and that from the hydrants on
both premises is in the opposite direction, towards and to Gould lane, t/uf^ A CAyvy
way . Without
The alley_ was therefore simply ^

^y

f ^j\

JSSSu m^^^'^^ "^-^ffi^^^

a

p

i

it

:

is

it,

doubt it was open and a pparent , and was made and designed by Collins, \kA^\j AXJt;^*
for the comm on use an d benefi t_aLl)nth houses, and was in fact so
y
used by the occupants of both, until obstructed by the defendant, but
it is equally cl ear that Collins and those who succeeded him in the .ownand re-arranged the pr
e rship of both could have closed
^riises.^
pleasure. _ The real question in the case then
l^oes the la\ attach
to the unqualified grant in 1865, from Waters to Chandler, of tNe second house and lot, by metes and bounds, which include the whole of
for the be nefit of the
this alley, an m.plied reservation of the use of
this point, our
or?
Upon
grant
retained
the
r
emises
by
hou^e_and
number of
of
the
an
examination
have
led
us
to
large
investigations
others,
upon no
and
as
counsel,
as well
authorities cited by
many
contrariety of judicial opinions and
question have we found so great
*

*

d

e

a

In short, after

a

if

*

not of actual decisions.
careful examination of the numerous authorities
in this country to which our attention has been called, w have foun
but one prominent decision by
Court of last resort, in which the docdicta,
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t rine of implied r^asrvation in a case analogous to the one be fore us
has been sustaine d, where the facts were such as fairly to present the
That is the case of Se ibert v. Leva n. 8
question for determination.
Pa. 383, 49 Am. Dec. 525, in which the opinion of the Court sustaining
the doctrine was delivered by Gibson, Ch. J., in his usual forcible and
vigorous style. Two, however, of the five Judges dissented, and in the
course of his opinion the Chief Justice was obliged to set aside the
opposing authorities of Burr v. Mills, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 292, and
Preble v. Reed, 17 Me. 175. A gainst this case may be placed tlie d gcis ipn in Carbrev
v. Willis. 7 Allen CMass.^ 364. 83 Am. Dec. 688,
tlie
facts
also
presented tlie question,) in which it was said
(where
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
"B ut where there
a gra nt
land by inetes and bounds without express reservation, and with ful
covenants of warranty against encumbrances, we think there
no
ust reason for holding that there can be any reservation by implic astrictly one of necessity. Where the easeon, unless the easement

t

is

is

i

it

it

if

e

a

g

is

ment
only one of existing u se and reat convenien ce, but for which
substitute can be furnished by reaso nable labor and expense, th grantor m ay certainly cut himself off from
by his deed,
such
he
ntention Q f_tli£_parties.
And
difficult to see how such an inten-
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tion could be more clearly and distinctly intimated than by such
deed
and warranty."
n
in
the same State. (Rand all v.
subsequent case
McLaughlin, 10 Allen [IMass.l 366.) notice
taken of the fact that he
H.
N. 916] had then recently be en
uthority of Pyer v. Carter
w diolly denied by the Chancellor of Englan
in the opinion given in
Suffield V. Brown
De G.,
S. 185], which, says the Court, "contains an elaborate review of the whole doctrine, resulting in conclusions
substantially like those to which we came in Carbrey v. Willis."
But the decision of our predecessors in McTavish v. Carroll,
Md.
352, 61 Am. Dec. 353, has been pressed upon our attention by the
appellee's counsel. That was
case peculiar in its facts and circumstances. A father who owned
large tract of land on which there was
mill, mill-dam, race and roadway for repairing
conveyed by
voluntary deed of gift, the portion on which the dam, race and road
were situated, to his daughter without reserv'ation, and subsequently
like deed, conveyed the portion on which the mill was located to
by
his son, and in both deeds reserved
Hfe estate to himself.
The Cou rt
eld that the grantee of the portion on which the mill was situated, wa
ntitled to the use of the dam, race and road upon the principle of leg
necess ity, but also adverted to the fact as distinguishing that case from
the authorities there cited, that the two deeds gave the grantees the
right of possession at the same time, viz. upon the death of the grantor, he having reserved to himself
life estate in both parcels of land.
There was in fact, therefore, n antecedence of title of one grantee to
he oth^ r^ and in view of the authorities to which we have referred, the
decision of that case might well have been rested on that point alone.
But
was in other respects materially dift"erent from tlie present case,
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and cannot control its decision.
Neither in that case nor in that of
Oliver v. Hook, 47 Md. 301, were the views of Gale on Easements,
adopted further than in reference to implied grants, and in the latter
case, it was h eld upon abundant authority, that even the doctrine of
i mplied grants had no application to the case of an ordinary, open a nd
unenclosed way, not being at the time of the grant an existing ea semen t.
Finding then no binding decision of this Court, and no decided preponderance of authority in this country, to prevent us from following
the law as it has recently been settled by the decisions in England, and
being satisfied the distinction so clearly drawn in those decisions between what has been called an implied gran t, and what has been
attempted to be established under the name of a n implied reservatio n,
is no t only founded in reason, but has existed almost as far back as the
l aw upon the subject can be traced, we shall aPDly it to the case be-

fore

It

us.

rernains then to ascertain whether this alley is a way of necessity ,
s o as to fall within the exception to the second proposition stat ed in
Wheeldon v. Burrows. Among the cases coming under this exception,
reference may be made to Pinnington v. Galland, 9 Excheq. 1, and
Davies v. Sear, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 427. In those cases the ways in question were ways of necessity, and the decisions went upon that ground.
B ut we are all clearly of opinion this allev is not such a way . We
adopt as entirely applicable to the present case, what was said in Dodd
v. Burchell, 1 Hurl. & Colt, 11-3, by Wilde, B., viz., "It appears at the
time of the grant in respect of which the right of way is claimed, there
was a way from the house into the garden, and that way now exists.
But it is said the way now claimed is more convenient than the other.
Then comes the question whether the plaintiff can claim it as a way of
necessity, on account of its great superiority over the other way. It
s eems to me that it would be most dangerous to hold, that where a dee d
i s silent as to any reservation of a way, the one that is more convenien t
t o use than another way, must exist as a way of necessj tx.. Ther e is
n o foundation whatever for such a doctrine ." When the deed of 1865
from Waters to Chandler was executed, access to the yard and kitchen
of the house retained by the grantor could be had, no t only thro ugh
th e front door of the house, b ut from Gould lane in the rear. Such
public lanes or alleys are to be found in almost every part of the City
of Baltimore, and w ere made for the very purpose of afford iiig_a£cess
t o yards and kitchens which could not otherwise be reached sav e
t hrough the front doors of the houses. Most of the dwellings in that
city have such alleys in the rear, and no entrance from the front except a door which opens into a hall or front room. It is true the proof
shows there was a brick stable on the plaintiff's lot fronting on Gould
lane, but it was built by the plaintiff himself, and not until after the
year 1872. I f this obstructed access from Gould lane, it was the plain t ift"'s own fault.

He certainly could not by his own

act,

without

co n-
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sent and against the rights of the defendant, convert this alley from a
way of convenience to a way of necessity . Whether it is a way of
necessity or not, must depend upon the state of things existing at the
date of the deed of 1865, and not with reference to the changes subsequently made by the plaintiff on his own premises. At that time the
a lley was, as it is now, useful and convenient, but it was not what th e
way of necessity .
w regards as
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But has been further argued, there ought to be an implied reservation of this alley, because that part of the house granted by the deed
of 1865, which
above the alley,
supported by the wall of the house
that ihe lley
retained by the grantor.
The ontention on this point
and this support afforded the granted house make
case of recipr ocal
But we do not see how the fact, that there may be an imeasements
plied grant of this easement or right of support, can be held to take
from the grantee the ground used for the alley, which was expressly
he two are not necessarily ^r
granted to him without reservation.
nseparably connected . The case
not like that of Richards v. Rose,
block of houses on
Excheq., 218, where
plot of ground were so
built together by the same owner as necessarily to require mutual supIn that case
was held that there was, either by
port.
presumed
grant or by a presumed reservation,
right to such rhutual support,
so that the owner who sells one of the houses as against himself grants
such right, and on his own part also reserves the right, and consequentthe same mutual dependence, of one house upon its neighbor's still
remains. This furnishes another instance of an easement of necessity
within the exception to the general rule forbidding implied reservaIt does not come
tions. The present case, however,
quite different.
touch the cases or the law of party walls,
up to that case, nor does
nor even that of an alley situated and constructed in the manner described in the case of Dowling v. Hennings, 20 Md. 179, 83 Am. Dec.
545.
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It follows that there was error in granting the instruction given by
the Court, and for this he judgment must be reverse
The Court,
however, was clearly right in excluding, at the instance of the defendant, th agreement, under se al, between Chandler and Waters, of the
8th of June, 1865, which professes to gra nt the common use of this
and was not embodied in
alley. That instrument was never recorde
or referred to by the deed of the same date.
It an have no effect n
. in
etermining the construction or operation of that deed, nor can
rights
the
It,
affect
the
of
to
this
it.
wise
su
parties
therefore,
ny
plainly appears, from the record before us, hat the plaintiff" has n o
round of action, on account of the obstruction complained of, and
the duty of this Court not to award
he nce becom
new tria
""Judgment reversed, and new trial refused.
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OF BALTIMORE CITY.

(Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1911. 117 Md. 53, 82 Atl. 1051, Ann. Cas.
1914A, 84.)

Urner,

The aroell pg corporation is the owner of a six-sto ry
i ndustrial building- in Baltimore Ci ty, fro nting on the south side o f
F ayette street and abutting in the rear on an alley known as Bank
lane. On July 27th, 1908, the company l eased to the appe ll ants a wareroom on the first floor of the building together with a pa rt of t he
basement ly ing immediately north of the alley and south of a designated wall.
The le ase was for a term of two year s. Sometime during
the first year the tenants, in consideration of a reduction in the rent,
surrendered to the landlord the north half, approximately, of the baseJ.^^

ment area covered by the lease, and th e new division line was in dicated by a wire screen partition then constructed . On February 11th,
1910, the parties executed a new agreement for the leasing to the appellants of tlie room and cellar space they then occupied for the term
of five years, beginning September 1st, 1910, wi th an option to the
In each of the leases it w as
l essee to renew for successive term s.
s tipulated that the premises should be used only as a barber shop an d
establishmen t and for cert ain incidental pu rposes, and there
was a co venant that the landlord should supply all hot and cold v/at er and all electric curren t and heat reasonably required by the ten ants in the prosecution of their busine ss. The section of basement
leased to the appellants appears to have been mainly u st^d by th-r^m
f or access to a toilet and for the storage of empty boxe s. In the basement retained by the landlord, and partially under the wareroom tenanted by the appellants, is located the st eam and electric pl ant by which
There
the appellee's building is supphed with heat, light and power.
are nu merous lessees who are dependent upon this serv ice. The entire second floor is occupied by a business college, and the floors
above by various manufacturing industries, while the first floor accommodates several business enterprises in addition to that conducted

b athing

by the appellants.
At the rear of the basement leased to the appellants is a doorw ay
five feet wide opening into Bank lane. It is equipped with outer d oors
of iron, with in ner doors of glas s, and with inte rmediate, doors of w ire
screen . Until a short time before the filing of the present bill this
doorway had been u sed continuously by the employees of^the appelk e
i n going to and from the steam and electric plant a nd in moving suppnes and repairs, and the iron and glass doors^ had been kept open in
There were
order to aid ventilation and reduce the temperature.
and screen
the
w^all
openings provided for the same purposes through
partition located between the plant and the rear portion of the basement. It appears without dispute that the temperature of the base13

A portion of the opinion is omitted.
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ment, with the Bank lane doors open, is usually about one hun dred
a nd eight degrees in winte r and sometimes as high as one Iru ndred
a nd forty-five degrees in summer , and that when these doors are closed,
at any season of the year, the thermometer rises ab out forty degr ees.
This is shown by the evidence to be considerably above the temperature at which the men can remain at work and the machinery be operated with safety. The t estimony is that when the heat reaches one
h undred and fortv-five or one hundred and fiftv degrees there is dan ger that the wiring and insulation on the electric generators will ^be
destroved. This would necessarily cause a stoppage of the plant and
of all the machinery which it supplies with power and would require
It is pr oven also that in the eve nt
heavy expenditures for repairs.
o f a sudden discharge of steam, which may result from the burstin g
of a pipe or the blowing out of a gasket, the only way of escape for
t lie employees in the basement would be through the door open ing
on Bank lane . There is a narrow passage leading by the boiler and
fire pit to a stairway in the front of the building, but an accident of
the character described, which has already once occurred, would cut
ofif this means of exit.
The c onditions we have indicated were existing and apparent w hen
t he appellants entered into possession under their first leas e.
They
knew that the employees in charge of tlie steam and electric plant
were dail y using and d epending upon the alley doorway for ingress
and egress.
They must have been aware also that the system of ventilation which the appellees had provided for the basement of their
building co uld not be effective if the door in question were kep tclosed.
They m.ade no objection for nearly three years to the use of the doorway by the appellees for the purposes we have mentioned, and it was
n ot until aft er this Inng pe riod of acquiescence that tliey locked^the
door and asserted that its exclusive control belonged to them unde r
t heir lease.
They assumed this attitude for the first time early in
]\Iarch, 1911, and when they then closed and fastened the door the
temperature of the basement rose to about one hundred and forty degrees, and according to the testimony of the engineer in charge "it
absolutely got dangerous to run the machines, and it was dan&er ous
n ot only to the machines but to the help, and you simply suffocated n
t here, and if anything were to happen you were caught like rats i n
a trap and couldn't get out ."
After this condition had existed for
about two weeks the City Inspector of Buildings notified both the appellants and appellees "t o keep free and open the rear exits of th e
heating plant in the bpilding, as it appears they are now locked a nd
bolted . It is a men ace to the me n operating the plant and must be
This was followed a few days later by the presdone immediately."
ent b ill for an injunction to restrain the appellants from keeping_jlie
doorway closed A preliminary writ was granted, and upon final hearing the injunction was made perpetual.
In support of their position the appellants rely upon the fact that

i

^

^^^.f^
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under which they hold contains no express re.serv^ _g to th
appellee of any right to fhe use of the; doorway now in dispute and
and^tt/**^
they invoke the well settled principle hat easemen by implied reservation will not be sustained excep in cases of strict necess ity. Jay v.
Michael, 92 Md. 210, 48 Atl. 61
Burns v. Gallaglii7r62 Md. 472;
Mitchell V. Seipel, 53 Md. 269, 36 Am. Rep. 404.
insisted that
the conditions shown by the record are not such as to make the present
T he contention
case an exception to the general rule.
that the us
the appellee of the doorw ay in cont roversy
not necessary, w ithpossible that other
n the meaning of the rule staTed because
means of access and ventilation may be provided through other portions of the basement. The evidence, however, does not support this
shown by the proof tliat no adequate provision could
theory. It
made in substitution for the use of the opening into the alley withou
njuriously encroaching upon the rights of other tenants in possess ion
of adjacent sub-divisions of the basement under prior leases.
When
the appellants acquired their leasehold interest, the doorway on Bank
lane was the nly way under the control of the appellees by whic
a
draft of air could be obtained for the area occupied
the steam and
lectric plant an
which a safe exit could be secured for the en gin eer and fireman . This doorway was then, and thereafter continued
to be, in actual nd nec essary use or these vitally important purposes.
Under such circumstances
lear that
reservation to the appellee
the right to such user must have been understood and intendedJ jy
In tlie decisions we have cited
was
oth the parties to the lease.
would
held that:QTt
only in cases of strictest necessity, and where
not be reasonable to suppose that the parties intended the contrary,
In the case
that the principle of mplied reservatio n can be invoked."
would be altogether unreasonable to suppose that there
before us
was any intention on the part of the lessor company or of the lessees
that the former should surrender the only available means of insuring the safety of the employees in charge of the plant in the basement
and of obtaining the ventilation required for its satisfactory operation.
n our judgment, under the conditions presented in this case, the u se
of the rear doorway in connection with the steam and electric pla nt
*
must be held to be one of strict nd absdute necessity .
Decree affirmed, with costs.
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FULLER.

(Supreme Court of MieMgan, 1911. 165 I^.Iicli. 162, ir>0 N. W. 621, 33 L. R. A.
[N. S.] 459, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 853.)
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Complainant and defendants were, espectively, owners of adjo inUpon comng^ lots fa cing Burdick street, in the city of Kalamazoo.
feet
230
lot,
wide
and
about
deep, exwhich
was
22
feet
plainant's
threefor
many years
tending to Farmer's alley, there had stood
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story brick block, running east from Burdick street about 90 feet.
T o the east and in tlie rear of said brick building, a one-story b uildThe sewage_jrom
i ng extended eastward to the alley, about 130 feet.
t he brick block was conducted under the one-story building to a latera l
s ewer in Farmer's afley !
The roof drainage of the block was carried
onto the roof of the one-story building and thence to the alley. Def endants desired to erect a theater, and, their own lot not affordi ng
suthcient'area for their purpose, negotiated with complainant for tli e
purchase of tlie rear or easterly 130 feet of her lot. On November
parcel w ith full covenants aga inst
9, 1908, a w arranty deed of sa
incumbrances was exe cuted by complainant to defendants for the consideration of $5,000.
This deed contains the following agreement:
"It
understood and agreed between the parties hereto, as
part
of the consideration of this deed, that the second parties are to build
wall on tlie west side of the land above conveyed, about 16 inches
thick and about 40 feet in height, and that the party of the first part
to own said wall jointly with the second parties, and
to be
used as
The center of the said wall to be on tlie west
party wall.
line of the land above conveyed,"
De fendants, after said purchase was complefedj proceeded to tea
down the one-story building which stood on the lot conveye
and
proposed
ommenced excavation for the basement under the
theate r.
In excavating, the sewer rom complainant's block was uncovered, and
as defendants desired to make
asement nine feet deep, w hich was
three or four feet deeper than the sewer, the se wer was cut, and th
In the negotiations complainant did not adxcavation proceede
vise defendants of the existence of the sewer, and he record does n ot
how that they or either of them knew
was the re.
After the sewer was cut, complainant filed her bill of complaint,
m andatory injunction compelling defendants to res to.re
praying for
permanent inor
he sewer connection and roof drain-pipe, an
from
unction restraining defendants
breaking or interfering with ie
sewer and from interferin with the passage of tlie roof drainage ov er
A preliminary mandatory injunction was granted ex parte
said lo
his injunctio n was
which the court refused, on motion, to vacate.
gr anted on January
The cause came on to be heard on the
1909.
merits October 17, 1909. In 'the meantime, efendants had comple ted
he theater building and, n obedience to the mandate of the coy rt,
ha
taken care of the complainant's sewage and roof drainage,
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ii

is

is
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onsiderable expense . Upon final hearing, tlie preliminary injunction
The dec ree further provides tliat the expen se
was made permanent.
o maintenance and repairs of the sewerage connection and tlie sto rm
ipe shall be borne equally by the partie s. From this decree defendants appeal.
Brooke,
(after stating the facts). The sole question for deteran iiplied reservatio n of an
here
w hether or not there
^/'^mination
Va sement over the land sold by complainant to defendants.
said
/^"^
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that in reaching the conclusion he did, the learned circuit judge relied upon the case of Smith v. Dresselhouse, 152 Mich. 451, 116 N.
W. 387. An examination of the facts in that case will at once demonstrate that it differs vitally and fundamentally from the case here considered. There the owner of two adjoining tenements, located upon
either side of a river, upon each of which stood a mill, sold one of
the tenements to the complainant in that case, and, as appurtenant to
The owner and his
the tenement conveyed, sold the water rights.
grantees continued to operate the mill on the other side of the river,
using the water for that purpose. Complainant filed his bill to enjoin
the use of the water. This court held tliat, as to the water, complainant was a tenant in common with the owner of the adjoining tenement
on the opposite bank of the stream. Mr. Justice Ostrander, in stating the general rule, there said :
"I t is a general rule of the law of easements that where the own er
o f two tenements sells one of them, the purchaser takes the portio n
sold with all the benefits and burdens which appear at the time of the
s ale to belong to it as between it and tHe property which the vendo r
retains."
The matter under consideration was a grant, no t a reservatio n, and
in discussing the effect of the grant he further said:
"We should not expect that a grant of the land on one side of the
river only, the grantor retaining the land and mill on the other side,
and using the water there appurtenant, conveyed an exclusive right
to the entire water power. The terms of the grant to complainant are
The land is described by metes
express and seem to be unambiguous.
and bounds. One boundary is the center of the main channel of the
river. The mill tract and the mill are within the boundaries.
It is the
mill privilege and water power 'there situate,' i. e., appurtenant to the
land conveyed, which is deeded, with the right to flow lands and to
"
*use and make usd of the water power there situated.'
Assuming, therefore, that tlie rule was correctly stated, the case was
determined, not by any application of the rule, but by a construction
of the terms of the grant. Nor is it applicable to tlie case under conHere, the sewer was under ground. It was not apparent,
sideration.
and defendants are not shown to have had any knowledge of its existence under the land purchased by them.
But, if they had such
knowledge, that fact would not be controlling, because complaina nt
knew that tlie use to which this property was to be devoted wou ld
unco ver the sewer and, as it existe d, destroy it.
Even if it could be said that a grantor under any circumstances could
by implication reserve the right to continue an underground sewer in
the premises granted, which we do not determine, it would not aid
Here, it is sought by implication to reserve the right t o
complainant.
h ave the existing sewer destroyed and rebuilt in th e air througkJihe
b asement of the tenement to be erected upon the demis ed lands.
SimAig.Pbop.— 33
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ply to state such a proposition v^ould seem to be a sufficien t answer.
The rule apphcable to implied reservations of easements is stated in
14 Cyc, p. 1171, as follows:
"As regards i mplied reservation s of easements, the matter stands on
If the
principle in a position very different from implied grants.
g rantor intends to reserve any right over the tenement granted, it is h is

duty to reserve it expresslv in tlie grant . To say that a grantor reserves to himself in entirety that which may be beneficial to him, but
which may be most injurious to his grantee, is quite contrary to the
pr inciple upon which an implied grant depends, which is that a gra ntor
s hall not derogate from or render less effectual his grant or rende r
t hat which he has granted less beneficial to his grantee . (^Accordingly,
here there is a gra nt of land w ith full covenants of warrant y wjthexpress reservation of easements, the best considered cases hold
t
hat
there can be no reservation by implication, unless the easement is
f^^""^"^jA^*^^
trictly one of necessity. " "S
^ ^^^
^ ^s
^ ^^^sesare cited from many jurisdictions in support of this statement
of principle, and we think it is in accord with the weight of mode rn
/■-I
. jy .
a uthority .
The great weight of authority touching the question, with
~fA/9^*^^l
*^^
'
reference
to
subterranean drainage, is to the effect that, if tlie ow ner
^,
f
o
the
land
under
which there is such a drain conveys a part of it^ mth
ff^i
\
f "l^ covenants of warranty without reference to the drain, no easem ent
ixr***^ "T^£>^'
CAt^'^
is reserv ed.
[
The grantor and his privies, under such circumstances, are estopped
!/«'
to claim any interest in the premises so granted.
To permit suc h a
c laim would be to allow the grantor to derogate from the terms o f
his grant which, by every applicable principle, is forbidden . The authorities upon the subject are collected and discussed in 10 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 42. See, also, 14 Cyc. p. 1169, and cases
there cited, and Farnham on Waters & Water Rights, vol. 3, pp. 2454,
2455.

In

of Covell v. Bright, 157 Mich. 419, 122 N. W.
upon principle much resembles the case at bar, we said:
"T o entitle the complainant to a decree, the burden was upon him
t o establish tha t the servitude was appa rent, cont ijiuous, and strictly
n ecess^rx.to the enjoyment of nis lands citing cases.
the recent case

101, which

In New Jersey, a different doctrine for a long time obtained, based
upon the ruling in the celebrated case of Pyer v. Carter, 1 Hurlst. &
N. 916, and those cases which followed the rule there laid down. _Pys.r
v . Carter has u- frequently been severely cri tic ised, and wa^; finally disThe case of Toothe v. Bryce, 50 N. J.
tinctlx--QY£rrule_d_iii_Eiigland.
Eq. 589, 25 Atl. 182, contains a review of the English and American
cases, questions the soundness of the doctrine announced by that court
in its earlier decisions, and s eems to recognize the distinction betwee n
a n implied p^rant of an easement and an jmplied reservation.
While it is apparent from the record that it will be somewhat ex-
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pensive to dis pose of the sewage fr om complainant's building otherwise
'jf^B*. '^
than over deiendants' land, i t by no means appears that it is imp os7^1/^^^^'^
s ible to do so.
Th ere is not made out, therefore, a case of strict nec es-

sjty,
The

'

^j(

.

Either complainant at some, perhaps considerable, expense to herself, must take care of her own sewage
and storm waters, or the defendants who purchased and paid for a
tenement warranted to be free from all incumbrances, must take that
tenement charged in perpetuity with an incumbrance of a very serious
case presents this alternative

:

character and one which is liable, through the breaking or stoppage
of the drain, to cause serious annoyance and damage.
W hy should defendants be compelled to accept this burden ? Why
should they be charged in perpetuity with the duty of defraying one- •
half of the expense of maintaining complainant's sewer as well as the
cost of its original construction?
So far as the record discloses, they
have done no act which was not fully warranted by the terms of the
Th ev have sought to make use of the granted te negrant to them.
ment in a lawful manner and in a manner and for a purpose know n'
bv cnmplninant b efore the sa le.
Touching the disposition of the storm waters, it is clear that, by
the sale of the one-story building upon which it had theretofore been
carried to the alley, with the knowledge t hat said building was to be
immediately demolished, com plainant must have known that su ch
drainage would be interrupted.
The very terms of her written contract show this, because s he stipulated for the erection of a brick wall
This wall was to
betw een the premises granted and those retained.
It is obvious that she
be 16 inches thick and about 40 feet in height.
could not have contemplated the carrying of her roof waters over that
wall.
At that moment it was apparent that some new arrangement
must be made to care for this water. D^efendants did not contract to
b uild a new drain and carry it across their own property to the alley .
nor did they agree to construct a new sewer, and we know of no_E rinc iple of equity which would compel th.em to do so .
The decree of the court below is reversed , and the bill of complain t
dismissed,
is
an d, inasmuch as the record discloses that defendants have
expended certain sums of money in obedience to the mandate of the
court in caring for complainant's sewage and water, t he record wi ll
be remandpH fnr t hf> pnrpn<;p nf aqr ertaining the exact f^mnnnf of f^nrh
e xpenditure which, when ascertained, shall be decreed to be a debt du e
f rom complainant to defendants for the collection of which execution

C^^^'

\{jJiA, A^

^ aK

0^ JU\i^,^\A£iu{_^

^

'

it

a

I J.

J.,

OsTRANDER, C.
JJ., 'yCM
and H^OKERfM^xv^Y^BSiCSid^T^
concurred with Brooke,
Bird, J." (dissenting).
am of the opinion tliat the trial court
readied
right conclusion upon the law and facts in this case and that
migh\ to be- affirmed by this court.
In the case of Smith v. Dresselhouse, 152 Mich. 451, 116 N. W. 387,

,
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Mr. Justice Ostrander, discussing the doctrine of implied reservation s,
quoted, with approval, the following general rule of easements :
*
'I t is a general rule of the law of easements that where the owner
o f two tenements sells one of them, the purchaser takes the portion so ld
witli all the benefits and burdens which appear at the time of the sa le
t o belong to it as between it and the propertv which the vendor retains.
Seymour v. Lewis, 13 N. J. Eq. 439, 78 Am. Dec. 108. Kvery grant
of a thing naturally imports a grant of it as it actually exists. United
States V. Appleton, 1 Sumn. 502, Fed. Cas. No. 14,463."
Mr. Justice Selden, in speaking of this rule, said:
"T his is not a rule for the benefit of purchasers onlv . but is entirel y
reciprocal.
Hence, if. instead of a benefit conferred, a burden has be en
irnposed upon the portion sold, the purchaser. provideH the marks^ of
t his burden are open and visible, takes the property with the servitu de

it." Lampman v. Milks, 21 N. Y. 505.
we are to take the foregoing rule as our guide in determining this
case, I am very firm in the conviction that defendants took the deed of
the premises burdened with the sewer. In arriving at this conclusion,
the distinction made by Mr. Justice Brooke, in his opinion, between implied grants and i mplied reserva tions, has not been overlooked.
Alt hough there is a difiference of opmion in the cases as to the degree of
necessity required to create them, the better rule seems to be, andj lie
one supported by the weight of authority is, that a reasonable necessit y
is sufiicient to raise an impliedgi^nt : whereas, a strict necessity is n eeessary to raise an implied reservation^ This court has adopted the
strict necessity rule i^Tovell v. Ei-igritV157 Mich. 419, 122 N. W. 101.
T he question therefore arises whether the rirrnmstances of this ca se
a re such as to bring it within the rule of strict necessity.
A study of
the record has persuaded me that they do. To establish her case it
was n ecessary for complainant to show that the easement claimed aas
apparent, continuous, an d s trictly necessary .
ujpon

If

j

"^

.''

t

^

vVas the easement apparent
Apparent easements" have been defined to be hose the existence of which appears from the constru cion or condition of one of the tenements so as to be capable of bei ng
Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p.
\s een or known on inspection . 10 Am.
To this class of easements belongs the ed of
405.
running stre am.
an verhanging roof
carrying
drain,
pipe for
wate r,
sewer .
Fetters v. Humphreys, 18 N.
Eq. 262. And the mere fact that
drain or aqueduct, as the case may be,
concea led fr om casual vision,
from being "apparent" in the sense in which that
do es not preven
used in that connection. Larsen v. Peterson, 53 N.
word
Eq. 88,

r

a

a

o

a

b

is

a

J.

,

a

it

t

1094.

If

he had no actual knowledge,
that fac
He had owned for
side with the premises in questhere was
sewer which served

f

o

know that the sewer extended

a

Atl.

Defendant testified that he did not
through the premises conveyed to him.
he djd have constructive knowledge
upwards of 25 years premises side by
tion, with like improvements.
He knew

t.

30

J.

is

v

r)

.

o

^IxyytA.'t'vS'K

&

I

t

'^'''^"'*''**^
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complainant's premises because he had the front portion of them under
lease nearly two years before he purchased the rear portion, and at the
time there were five water-closets in the portion he had under lease.
He knew that the sewer from his own premises was discharged into the
Farmer's alley sewer, and must have known that there was no other
sewer into which it could be discharged and, if he did, it would not be
unreasonable to assume that he knew the same thing was true of complainant's premises. On one occasion, prior to his purchase, a portio n
of the floor in the rear part was taken up, which disclosed the sewe r,
and defendant was present at that time. Defendant had, before purchasing the property, talked and planned with complainant's husband
about building a theater where he has since erected one, and, in doing
so, un doubtedly considered the question of plumbing among other que st ions of construction and arrangement . A knowledge of these facts
was sufflcient in the law to p ut defendant upon inqui ry and to charg e
him with notice tha t the sewer traversed that portion of the premises
purchased by him.
The sewer had been in existence for
Is the easement continuous?
^ 20 years, w as of a pe rmanent nature, w as i n use at the time, and was
s usceptiSTe of being used and enjoyed without making an entry on def endant's premises, except for the purpose of repair . These facts
would clearly bring it within the definition of a "continuous easement."
Larsen v. Peterson, supra.
I s the easement strictlv necessary to the enjoyment of complainant's
'♦.^y
^
Y premises? The se wer in Farmer's alley is the only one ay pil^blp fnr
•****» . her use. The city engineer testified that one might be constructed to
\.
De Visser alley, but that it wo uld be impracticable fo r the reason that,
l^^
-^
where it would discharge into that sewer, it would be only 18 inches
The topography of that part of the city is such that no
underground.
other sewer can be constructed which will serve these premises without
a p rohibitive expense. A cesspool was suggested by complainant; but
the city authorities would not permit it.
She th en made an efiiort to
b yy the right of her neig[-hbor on the north to go through the parti tion
wall and connect with his sewer^ which also discharges into the FarWe
mer's alley sewer; b ut to this her neighbor would not cons ent.
have then a situation where co mplainant must be permitted to use the
s ewer which has served her premises for 20 years, if her building is to
h ave any sewer service . If this situation, which nature has so fashioned that the sewage can be directed only in the direction of Farmer's
alley, does not bring it within the rule of strict necessity, it would, inI f greater exigency than here exis ts
deed, be difficult to suggest one.
i s^required before the strict necessity ru le can apply, there would be
li ttle use for the existence of the rule, as its use would be so infreq uent

-J

a^o render it useless.
In my opinion, the trial court found his way to
concurred

I

a very equitable adbe affirmed.

think his decree should

with Bird,

J.

Moors,

the entire matter, and

J.,

justment of
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125 Mass.
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to 69 on said street, inclusive th at the chimney in question, at the ime
lie block was buil was la ced between the houses numbered 63 aj id
upon the premises of No. 65. for the use of both houses,
65^ but whollv
and was constructed with connection
or tove-holes or each house;
that on July 12, 1844, the
hayers conveyed by simultaneous
cL|^ds
which contained covenants against all incumh]; ^ps made or suft'er ed
by them) ie premises No. 63 to QHver Lewis, and the premises No._6
Martin Lewis, both deeds describing the premises by metes and
bounds that by mes ne conveyances the
(^i iff) became, on Mar ch
b/Jpthe owner of the premises No. 63 that on November 14, 1874,
the chimney in question was orn down by the ^efgndant, (to wh om
he house No. 65 was conveyed on October
by the heirs of
187
Martin Lewis
and was never rebuilt
and that the defendant prevented the plaintiff' from rebuilding, and refused to allow him to rebuild it. In none of the deeds or mesne conveyances above ceferj ed
was any specific mention made of any ri^ht to use the chimHeyJ n
in each the premises were, ror^veved with "all rio-hts
questio_n _^t hou
asements, privileges and appurtenances to
belonging. "
^he said land

lt

e

;

a

a

e

a

e

is

,

a

The plaintiff' claimed no right to use the chimney by prescription.
For the purpose of showing that
right to use the chimney passed
by the deed from the Thayers to Oliver Lewis, by implication
as an
appurtenance to the house on the premises so conveyed, the plaintiff
introduced
vidence tending to show that, at the time Oliver Lew
became the owner of th
pr emises No. 63,
suitable chimney, wh ich
would be
substitute for th chimney in question, could not be bui
reasonable j:ost and expense but this
wholly upon his premises at

a

As bearmg upon this question,
was contradicted by the defendant.
evidence was introduced by both parties to show what would be the
cost and expense of building such
chimney at the tirhe of the trial and
at the time when the chimney was torn down.
For the purpose of showing that the right to use the chimney in
question had not been lost or extinguished, the plaintiff introduced ev dence to prove that the chimney and the houses of himself and the
defendant were in good condition up to the time when the chimney was

i

««<

:

f

o

el

a

t

a

ijj

Tort for tearing down, re fuainf^ ^^ ^f^^^uld- Siud preventing the ainiff from rebuilding,
chimney, in which the plaintiff claimed an ea sement. Writ dated March 16, 1875. Trial in the Superior Court, before Pitman, J., who allowed
bill of exceptions in substance as follows:
The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to prove that previously
to July 12, 1844, John E. Thay£j:_and Nathani
Thaver biii lt_aj2lork
five wooden houses on land owned by them on Meridian Street. Ea st
Boston that these houses were then or afterwards numbered from 61
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torn down : that they had not been destroyed by the elements or mere
lapse of time; and that they were not in such a condition that they
needed to be rebuilt from the bottom; and the defendant introduced
evidence to prove the contrary, and that the plaintiff could have built a
suitable chimney upon his own estate as a substitute for the one torn
down at a very small cost, especially soon after the chimney had been
torn down.
The plai ntiff asked the judge to rule as follow s: " If the plain tiff
ac quired a right to use tlie chimney in quesLiOn-^nder the deed from
th e Thayers to Oliver Lewis, such right so acquired was not lost or
terminated until both the chimney and the houses of the plaintiff a nd
defendant were destroyed by the elements or mere lapse of time, o r
w ere in such a condition that they had to be rebuilt from the bot tom."
The j udge refused so to rule ; but instructed .the jury that if such a
right was acquired by the plaintiff through the deed from the Thayers
to OHver Lewis, yet if the chimney at the time it was torn down was
unsafe and needed to be rebuilt from the bottom, the defendant had
a right to tear it down, and the plaintiff could not recover.
No instructions were given as to whether or not the condition of the houses
of the plaintiff and defendant, or either of them, had anything to do
with the duration of the alleged easement, or right to use the chimney
in question, and the instructions given were objected to only on the
ground of that omission. The jury were fully instructed on the other
questions of law in the case; and, among other things, were instruc ted »
t hat no servitude, as claimed, could be created by implication of l aw l-M*'*'***'''*^
u nless there was a reasonable necessity therefor : a nd that if the pla in-^f^t^^ "jf^
v
ti ff,' with reasonable labor and expense, could have built a sui table
c himney on his own estate, he rniild nnf rlnim ^, right to use that u pon
t he defendant's premigpc;
The jury were further instructed to answer the following questions,
and that if the second question was answered in the afifirmatiye they
need not answer the third question, but should return a verdict for the
"1. Did the houses now occupied by the parties respecdefendant:
tively exist upon the estates at the time of the deeds from the Messrs.
Thayer? 2. C ould the pininfiff at a rpa^^nnahlp cost have built a sui ta^iC-^
b le chimney upon his own estat e, as a substitute for the one he claime d
*^
t o use on the estate of the defendant ? 3. Was the chimney in question
so defective and unsafe as to require the defendant to take it down?"
The jury answered the first and second questions in the affirmative;
^
and returned a v erdict for the defendan t. The plaintiff alleged exT^Ol 4-*^
ceptions.
SouLE, J. The deed of the Thayers, under which the plaintiff
claims, was made and delivered when they were owners of the premIt makes no mention of any rights in the chimises of the defendant.
ney on the adjoining premises. Their deed of the defendant's premises,
given at the same time, contains covenants against incumbrances made
or suffered by the grantors, and of warranty against all persons claini-

^
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ing under them. Each deed describes the lot of land conveyed by metes
and bounds, without mentioning any buildings.
The grantors having
built the houses and the chimney, and being owners of both parcels,
these covenants are as strong an expression of intention to convey the
defendant's premises free of the easement claimed by the plaintiff as
covenants of general warranty would have been. The words, "and all
rights, easements, privileges and appurtenances to the said land belonging," in the deed of the plaintiff's premises, are of no effect to carry
the easement in question, because no easement existed, while the fee of
Ammidown v. Granite
oth parcels was held by the same owners.
Bank, 8 Allen, 285. Moreover, the title conveyed by that deed is not
older than the title conveyed by the deed of the defendant's premises,
which covenants against any incumbrance created by the grantors. __If,
th erefore, an easement .to use the chimney was created in favor o f the
p remises, of the plaintiff, it was created by implication, as being abso l utely necessary to the enjoyment of the estate .

p^

We are aware that it has been held in some English cases, that a deed
of premises carries the right to continue to enjoy, as easements, all
privileges or conveniences i n and upon adjoining lands of the grantor,
which were apparent, a nd had been used by the grantor in connection
with the premises before the conveyance ; t hat the conveyance is a con "
A leading case to this eff'ect is
veyance of the premises "as they are.
Pyer v. Carter. 1 H. & N. 916. Similar doctrine has been held in New
York. Lampman v. Milks, 21 N. Y. 505. We do not regard this as a
correct view of the law.
I t is a well established and familiar rule that deeds are to he rn nstrued as meaning what the language employed in them imports, ^ nd
t hat extrinsic evidence may not be adduced to contradict or affecL iliem.
nd it would seem that nothing could be clearer in its meaning than a
deed of a lot of land, described by metes and bounds, with covenants
of warranty against incumbrances. T he great exception to the applicat ion of this rule to the construction of deeds is in the case of
^Y^ ^iJ^
necessity, where, by a fiction of law, there is an implied reserva tion or
grant to meet a special emergency, on grounds of public policy, as it has
been said, in order that no land should be left inaccessible for purThis fiction has been extended to cases of easeposes of cultivation.
ments of a different character, where the fact has been established that
the easement was necessary to the enjoyment of the estate in favor of
which it was claimed, /y^^j^^t^^
I n this Commonwealth, grams by implication are limited to c ases of
Carbrey v. Willis, 7 Allen, 364, 83 Am. Dec. 688, and
stricj^ ng( ^^ity.
cases cited; Randall v. McLaughlin, 10 Allen, 366.
The case of Pyer
v. Carter was denied by Lord Chancellor Westbury in Suffieli v.
Brown, 4 De G., J, & S. 185, w hich has_been since recognized as contai ning~the correct d octrine.- Crossley v. Lightowler, L. R. 2 Ch. 478;
Watts V. Kelsol^TLTRTa Ch. 166.
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case seems to have been tried in the
s umption by both parties that the obstacles,
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Superior Court oti the

if any, to

a s-

the erection of

a chimney on t he plaintiff's premis es, were the same when the Thay ers
co nveyed as when the chimney m question was taken dow n, and the
question to the jury, and the instructions, appear to have been framed

in accordance with that assumption, and without any objection or sugWe cannot, therefore, consider
gestion to the contrary by the plaintiff.
the objection now made, for the first time, that the question of necessity was to be detennined by the state of things existing when the conveyance was made by the Thayers,
In this view of the case, it . appears that the jury found that the u se
o f the chimney was not npreg;sarv to the enjoyment of the premise s
This being so, no easement in ting (^j^jrpnpv wa^.
owned by the plaintiff.
in
the deed to the detendanFs o-ranto?- . and the
reserved by implication
defend ant, in destroying the chimney, merely exercised a right of own~~

ership^
It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider the question raised by the reOn the facts
fusal to give the instruction asked for by the plaintiff.
found by the jury, no easement in favor of the premises of the plainti ff
h aving been created, the ruling as to how such easement could be d et ermined, if it existed, became immateria l.

.

TOOTHE

V.

BRYCE.

(Court of Chancery of New Jersey, 1S92.

50 N.

J.

Eq. 5S9, 25 Atl. 182.)

On o rder_to show cause why an injunction should not issue .
Heard upon bill and answer and accompanying affidavits.
The complainant, by his bill, seeks to establish and protect his rig ht
t o the benefit of a flow of water to his premises fr om the defendant's
premises, through t wo several pipes laid underground and forced^ JUC
b y two hydraulic rams, situate, with the spring that drives them, on
the defendant's prei-nise.-Y .
The facts as they appear in the pleadings and affidavits, or are admitted by the parties, for the purposes of this motion only, are as
follows : Before and on the 13th of April, 1892, the defendant w as j4
the owner of a tract containing about forty-five acres, which compr ised tAVp*
b oth tenements, situate in Madison, Morris county. New Jersey, and /l.^-,^
on that day" entered into a written contract with the complainant, by

jJ

In Bussmeyer v.
80 Me. 333, 14 Atl. 731 (1S8S), ace.
145 S. W. 772, 39 L. R. A. (N. P.) 549, Ann. Gas. 1913C,
1104 (1912), th e court h elfl that nn p.nspmpnf. fhert;^ plaimed had not hppn pi-e:iti^fl
by implied grant, do showing that there was any ''reasonable" aecessity therg f gr having been niaae, thougn tne evidehce prob;il)iy ^sLablislied that t n e ng nt
*
pinirfied was a nnnvenience. So, also, in ijanatora v. jkoss. Yt3 i\. Jdl. 4V(>, 8fAtL
^
936, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 629 (1912).
oljJ^^^*^
14 Still well V. Foster,
Jablonsky, 241 Mo. 681,

dfc^

•

6
*|*^
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in consideration

of $13.000, ag^reed to sell and
and complainant agreed to purchase and~pay
t hat price for the tract in question , consisting of forty-five acres and
twenty-three one-hundredths of an acre, e xcepting thereout ajiouse and
b arn and lot whereon they stood, containing one acre, the deed of con veyance to be delivered and the purchase-money paid^ on the lalh-dav
of May, at eleven o'clock in the morning, at a specified place in New
c onvey to complainant,

HjtA/^

^^^

A

M^^

tjy/^^^^A,

iJk
A^

'

\

/

At

of

contract there were upon the whole tract tw o
two_barns, and a green or hot-house, a s pnng of water and
t wo hydrauh r rams driven hy it*; water';^ with a pipe leading from
each, one to the green-house and one to one of the barns.
One dwel li ng and one barn and the green-hous e were on the partcontractedjo
be conveyed ; t he other dwelling and barn, the spr mg and rams were
o n the lot o f one a cre reservedT Included in the sale were a lot of
hot-house plants in the hot-house.
At and before the date of the contract the water was flowing co nti nuously at both the barn and green-house, in the latter of w hirh wprp
The water was discharged at the barn into an
the hot-house p lants.
open trough from which the cattle and horses drank, and at the greenhouse into a tank from which it was used in watering the plants. This
fl ow was observed by the rnmplainant, and he knew it was due to thej ^ctjon of a ram (he supposed there was but one) on the lot reserveiL and
s uch fl o w formed , in_ co.mpl_ai nantj. mind, a featur e _ q£ _ vaJxi e in the
The pipes and flow of water to the barn had existed for
premises.
several years, but that to the green-house had been in use for less than
two years. The ram which supplied it had been in place and use for
many years, and carried the water in a pipe along the road in front
of the premises in question to a property adjoining it on the other side,
which property was sold by the defendant in 1890 to another party, and
the flow of water to it was cut oflF and the pipe turned from the road
up to this green-house, and was in use there from that time on.
The corporate authorities of Madison have recently erected waterworks for the use of the town and its inhabitants, but no main has as
yet been laid in the street in front of these premises.
T he negotiations for the purchase and sale were carried on betw een
the complainant in person and an agent of the defendant , and n
w as sajdjjy either in their course about th ^ flow nf yater. Such" flow
Before ten
contniuedup to the date of the delivery of the deed.
o'clock on the morning of that day defendant directed his employe e
in charg^e of the premises to stop the operation of the rams, and th en
proceeded by train to New York to deliver the deed, which was don e
The man in charge stopped the ram supplying
about el ey^jiVlnek
the barn at once, but left the one supplying the green-house running
until three o'clock in the afternoon.
So that in point of fact the w ater was probablv not running to th e barn at the moment the deed w as
No notice was gi ven
delivered^but .was.j'jyLOniiig_iQ_Uie_^eer>House.
the

d wellings,

date

the
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to the complainant at the delivery of the deed that the flow of the water
had been stopped, nor was any mention made of it by either party.
Tii e^deed contained the usual verbiage as to appurte nf^"?^.'', ineluding "waY a>-WA ters, privileges/' &c.
The springs driving the rams are about fifteen feet lower than the
barn and green-house, so that t he water would not run naturally t^ ^
either . The difference in height between the spring and the rams
does not appear.
The parties agreed that the court should act upon its personal knowledge of the peculiarities of hydraulic rams, which, so far as necessary
for present purposes, are as follows : By the use of this machine the
power due to the fall from a given height of a given quantity of water is
utilized to lift a comparatively small fraction thereof to a height greater
than the source or head. The effect of the machine is precisely the
same as would be that of a water wheel driving an ordinary pump.
The ad vantage of the use of the ram is its extreme simplicity and d urability._ It wo rks automatic ally and in theory should run without stopping or touch by -the hand of man until its parts were actually worn out.
It is, however, liable to stop and requires the hand of man to start i t
again . I'his liability is due to several causes, none of which are of any
importance, and all can be guarded against by proper care in setting
it and in preventing substances other than water from passing through
chamber of
except one, viz.,
necessary part of the machine
This air comes in contact with
confined air which acts as a cushion.
and
liable to be absorbed by the water and exhausted, and when the
air-chamber becomes filled with water the ram works defectively and
The tendency of the air to be exhausted varies with
liable to stop.
the character of the water and the height or head to which
lifted.
If the water
lifted to
great height there
corresponding pressure of the water upon the air and the absorption of the air by the wasmall height to lift against,
ter
increased thereby, but' w ith
ke
may
feet,
thirty
rams
ru n fo weeks and m onths
fteen, twenty or
The process of recharging the airchamber with
wTthouT stop£mo[.
air
few minutes.
very simple and may be done by any person in
An hydraulic ram, properly set, may run for one or more years without any repair, and the operation of repair or renewal
very simple.
Pitney, V. C. The co mplainant rests his right to the continue
ow of the water upon the fact that such flow was apparent and con inuous at the time of the purchase, and constituted
valuable adjun^
the premises, rendering their use more beneficial and valuabl e.
Against the case thus made defendant makes three points — first,
that the use of the water in the way described was not necessar to
was n ot in actual use ^^*^'^'^'
the enjoyment of the premises; second, that
at the moment when the title passed third, that
was not in its n aure continuou s, since the water did not run by gravity, but by machinery, which required the intervention of the hand of man, upon the land
of the grantor, the defendant
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I

think

(Part
some

inaccuracy

2

of

thought and expression has arisen in the discussion by bench and bar of
this doctrine of the cr eation of an easement by imp Hcation upon the
severance of a tenement, as to the' importance ot the element of necessity, by faihng to distinguish between that class of cases where it has
been held or claimed that an easement is reserved by implication in
favor of that portion of the tenement which is retained by the grantor
in and upon that portion conveyed, and that other class of cases where
it has been held that an easement was granted in favor of the part conveyed in and upon the part reserved. In the former class of cases the
grantor is usually claiming an easement in direct derogation of his
own grant, while in the latter it is well held to be in accordance with,
and to flow naturally by implication from, his grant.
In fact it has been suggested that the grant in such cases is not by
implication, but that the quasi-easement passes with the quasi-dominant
tenement as, in substance, a part of the thing conveyed, and without
any regard to the element of necessity. On the other hand, in the case
of a reservation, it h as been held tha t there can be no •implied reservation of an easement in the land granted when the grantor has conve yed,
as he gener ally^does. all his riglit,'^title and in te rest therein, except such
gmi easement as is absolutely necessary to any enioyment of it wha tever,
a s m the case of a wa y of necessity.
Gale & W. Easem. *72 ; Godd.

^asenTcAm. Ed.) 266, 267; Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. (Ma'ss.) 102. 35
Am. Dec. 302; Oliver v. Pitman, 98 Mass. 46; Washb. Easem. *163,
*164, and cases.

Toi_permit_ the grantor to c la im such reserva ti on is to permit him
to derogate from his own gran t. So rigid was this rule held that in the
older cases the reservation of a right of way to and from the close
retained by the grantor out of the conveyance of the land surrounding it was put on the ground of the interest that the public had that

Th e
should not be unused and unproductive.
express
co nveyances in common use in this country contain an
con ve yance of all the right, title and interest of the grantor in andJ^
t he premises conveyed, and it is difficult to perceive on what groun d
s hort of absolute necessi ty any easement could be reserve d.
This distinction between a grant and a reservation by implicatio n
seems to be founded in logic and, as will appear further on, is
now thoroughly established in the English tribunals, and it seems to
me to furnish the true test as to the value and importance of the element of necessity in the establishment of easements upon the division
of tenements.
My examination of the authorities has led me to the conclusion tha t
where the right to the easement is based upon the ground that i t
passes^, as in substance, a valuable adjunct to the land conveyed, t he
the close so surrounded

eleni£n t_of^ece^sity is not a requis ite, and to use the word "necesIn saying this, I may
sary" in connection with it is to misuse it.
say that I am, in appearance at least, going contrary to what has
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said and decided in many cases; but I think t hat an exa miin ation of them will show that in most, if not all, of those instanc es
w here the case was that of an implied grant of an easement in rnnn ertio n with the conveyance of a quasi-dominant tenement, the so-called
"necessity" upon which the judges relied was, in fact, no necessity at
all, but a^rnere beneficial and valuable convenience , and that this elevation of a mere convenience to the level of a necessity was the result
of an attempt to obliterate the distinction between an implied gr ant
and an implied reservation, before referred to. and to place implied
reservations and implied grants upon the same footing , and to hold
that upon the severance of a tenement one part of which had been
subjected to a quasi-servitude, which was continuous and apparent, in
been

favor of

would be preserved, whether it be by
grant, when the dominant tenement is conveyed, or by reservation,
when the servient tenement is conveyed ; and as the latter could only
occur where the element of necessity was present, it was held that such
element must also be present in the former case.^® * * *
These cases in our own state have probably established the doctrine
here — certainly in this court — t hat in these cases of ^B ^,^^^"ent ^^^
c ontinuous easements, upon the severance of the tenement, a reserv ationof a guasi-ease ment will take place on the conveyance of the servient pa rt_^Yh££ey_erJ t would pass by way, of grant on the conveyan ce
of the dorni'^^"^ PP ^ti ^"d that in each case the eleniejij^ofnecessity is
a requisite.
But for myself, I desire to repeat, by way of protest, that
my examination of the authorities has l ed me to the conclusion that
th is doctrine of rnu tuality is n ot founded on solid ground and is misc hievous in its tendencies, and also tha t it is a misapplicatio rLj;: ^. tjie
the other, the easement

w ord "necessary" or "necessity" to apply it to such

a case, and leads

e

it,

it
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is

is
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it
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to uncertainty and confusion in attempting to define diflferent degrees
of the element, when, in fact, strictly speakmg, it is not capable of being graded.
I t seems to me that the proper inquiry in such cases is w)iether th e
a pparent and contmuous easement in question forms a part of the te nem_enj ;, a nd is beneficial to an d adds to its value for use , an d will con
t inue to do so in the futur^,
If it is, then the grantee
upon plain
principles, entitled to have
continued.
He
entitled to enjoy th
was when he bought
]ing as
with all its apparent appurtena nces,
apparent'appurtenances
are
ifjhose
apparently permanent, and are u seful
and
add
to
its
value.
"
III
■■!»
III
.
In tlie case in hand,
think there can be no doubt that the flow
of the water at the bam or stable and at the green-house
re valuable additions
the ^Ero2erty^ ncrease its beneficial use^ and als
that
necessary in the sense in wh ich that word has been used in
hat conne ction, and
defined by Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet in Kelly
15 A portion of the opLnion, in wbich the court reviews many English and
American cases, is omitted.
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Dunning, 43 N. J. Eq. 62, 10 Atl. 276; and I adopt the language
of Lord-Justice Mellish in Watts v. Kelson, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 166, above

V.

quoted, as applicable to this case.
It w ould be no answer to say, if it were truf , thcit tlip ^m-nplainant
may procure water to supply these places from the public water works at a comparatively trifling expen se. That expense, though
trifling, is continuous, and it was the relief from its burden which
formed the element of value in the water which was actually flowing-

II. The se cond objection made presents little difficu lty. Complainant is clearly entitled to have the premises in the condition which
His
they were at the time he made the contract — April 13th, 1892.
to
them
vested
at
that
As
the
contract
date.
was
and
right
positive
binding on both parties — defendant being bound to convey and the
complainant to purchase and pay the price — the familiar rule in equity
is that from that time on, the premises in question belonged to the complainant, subject to the lien of the purchase price, and that the purI t would be monstrnns, in Heerl,
chase price belonged to the defendant.
might,
to . hold that the defendant
at the very moment that the- cked
w ^ being deh y ered in New York^ by his agent in Madison d estroy
an _apparent and continuous

of

the benefit

Nor can

'

^

A

yj
*

Kjr
■'

V

jT

*»

ty

easement and deprive'^e^'comp TMnant

oi_ it>-

stands, deny the right of
his agent to sign the contract for him as his agent.
The execution
of the deed in pursuance of it was in ratification and adoption of
the previous contract, with all its burdens as well as its benefit.
III. The t hird question presents more difficu lty. Was the eas ethe defendant,

as the case now

its nature continuo us, considering the fact that the water
did not run by gravity, in the ordinary sense of the term, but was
forced up by a machine driven by the power of the fall of a greater
quantity, and that it would be necessary for the complainant to enter
on the servient tenement from time to time to readjust, repair and
renew this machine?
All cases of this character deal with artificial structures, situate
in whole or in part on the servient tenement, which are liable to fall
into disorder and decay, and a ll the adjudged cases hold that the owne r
o f. the dominant tenement may enter upon the servient tenement f or
It
t he purpose of repairing and renewing those artificial stn irtnrps.

m ent

in

and Mr. Gale quite
so declared in Nicholas v. Chamberlain,
properly calls this right of reparation and maintenance a "secondary easement" (Gale & W. Easem. *323 ; Washb. Easem. *24, *25),
which is appurtenant to the primary or actual easement.
If, in the case in hand, the water ran by gravity in an artificial
ohannel, complainant would have the right to enter from time to
time upon defendant's land, and repair and renews such part of it as
was there situate.
S o if the water — supposing it to be practica ble
—were raised by a dam ins tead of a ram tp the height nec p«isar Y to
was

Ch. 4)
m^l'p it
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house, the rjcfht of reparation a nd
and, in such a case as this, the
head or power would be employed to carry it.
These secondary easements, however, are not the easement which
passes with the conveyance by implied grant because apparent and
continuous.
They are, as before remarked, me rely incidents thereto,
a nd, because
of their non-continuous and desultory character, the
principal easement is none the less continuo us.
In this connection, what is said by Mr. Gale in his treatise is not
without import (*50) :
"An easement is a quality superadded to the usual rights, and,
as it were, passing the ordinary bounds of property ; and, with the
exception of those easements the enjoyment of which depends upon
an actual interference of man at each time of enjoyment, as of a
right of way,^ it is attended with a permanent alteration of the two
heritages affected by
benefited and the other
showing that one
burdened by the easement in question."
His idea oi
non-continuous easement
one whose enjoyment de upon
ends
an actual interference of man at each time of enjoyme nt
as in Polden v. Bastard, supra
Best.
257, L. R.
Q. B.) 156].
And
se ems to me that that
the correct te st, and that the mer£- fact
substantially self-acting, and does not ehat machine
used which
uire the constant attention of man, does not make
non-continuou s,
more
than
the
of
the
dam
water
any
propulsion
through an arby
tificial channel would have that effect.
said that the owner of
the servient tenement will be subjected to the servitude of
more
frequent entrance upon his land for the purpose of adjusting and repairing the ram than he would in case of an artificial ditch or pipe or
dam.
think the difference
But
one of degree and not of character, and
hardly necessary to say that a mere difference of degree will not alter the case.
•
will advise that an injunct ion issue.
^
|^

r enewal of this
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LIQUID CARBONIC
(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

1908.

CO. v.

WALLACE.

219 Pa. 457, 68

Atl.

1021, 26

L. R. A.

[N. S.] 327.)

J.

visi le, perm an ent and

in lavor of another part^no^en

ontinuo us servitude or easeme nt
aliens either, the purchaser takes
c

pjgn.

b

to an

o

it

J.

is

e

l_

Bil in quity for an injunction . Before Shafer,
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Error assigned was decree awarding an injunction.
Mitchell, C.
The legal principle governing this case
thus
expressed in Grace M. E. Church v. Dobbins, 153 Pa. 294, 25 Atl.
1120, 34 Am. St. Rep. 706: "W here an owner of land subjects part of

.__^

,

t

v
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to the burden or the benefit, as the case may b e." See, also,
Manbeck v. Jones, 190 Pa. 171, 42~Atr33d;
The facts are not in material dispute. In 1890 Wallace, one of app ellants. b ecame the owner o f a large lot of ground in th e twend elh
ward of the city of Pittsburg ! It was boun ded by three 'strppt 'TanH
the Pennsylvania Railroad, but being hilly and uneven, access to parts
of it was difficult or very inconvenient.
Wallace began to grade_
nd in the course of so doing roads were worn here and there ov er
he property by the hauling incident to grad ing, the principal road
so worn or constructed being in substantially the same position as
that over which the plaintiff now claims
right of way. In 189
Wallace conveyed to the plainti
a portion of said tract, bounded
Railroad, two streets and other lands of Wallac
he Pennsylvania
a fterwards conveyed to the Duquesne Reduction Companv .
At the
time of sale by Wallace to plamtirf the said road was used upon the
ground and ap pellants admit that sto n quarried upon other land
Wallace and sold to the plaintiff was hauled down over . Appellee
used
in the erection of its buildings and claims that
was in general use by the owners of the adjacent properties for access, and
ap peared that
had continued in such use until 1906, when appellan ts
uilt
fenceacFoss
and plaintiff filed this bil
The court found that
was he only wagon road on the lo and th^t
ccess from the streets by which the ppell ee's lot was bounded wa
mpracticable for loaded wagons at most points, and very incon v enient for any other purpose.
way of nec esThe learned court below re fused to find the road
sity, because there were other ways of access and egress however inRawle, 492.
convenient, citing McDonald v. Lindall,
The ourt, however, found that "the road wa apparent on th
round and there was nothing on the ground to indicate that
wa not
ntended to be permanent.
He therefore found that the right to the
use of the road pa ssed by implication as an easement, appurtenant to
t

t,

l.

it

it

a

s

a

a

e

s

The argument of the appellant rests mainly on the view that the road
having had its origin in temporary convenience to the owner of the

^

A.

249,

15

Am. St. Rep.

235

(cited though in
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s

larger lot was never intended to be permanent,' and that the intention was an essential element in the creation of a servitude.
The
principle in general may be conceded, and so long as the ownership of
the dominant and servient lands remains in the same party the application of the principle may be determined by his actual personal inquestion of conflicting rights rise and th
tent.
ut on
severance
iiT
nt which lies at the bqsis of the creation of
servitude is no longe
the grantor's actual and perhaps undisclosed intent,^ but the rnut ipl
t
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"
in Bank v. North, 160 Pa. 303, 28 Atl. 694).
The intention to be
s ought is not the undisclosed purpose of the actor, but the intentii:)n
implied and manifested by his act . It is an intention which settles,
not merely his own rights, but the rights of others who have or may
acquire interests in the property. Th ey cannot know his secret purpos e,
and their rights depend, not upon th at, but upon the inferences to, be
d ravy n from what is external and visibly."
The facts as found by the court in the present case were that Wallace was at the time of the sale "the owner of the land over which the
way is claimed and of the land to which it is now claimed to be apBe fore the grant. Wallace had laid out and opened_j n2fln
purtenant.
the ground the road in question, and it was the only road by which it
was practicable to have access to the land. The road was apparen t on
the ground, and there was nothing upon the ground to indicate that
it was not intended to be permanent."
The natural inference fro m
t hese facts would be that the road was intended to be permanent .
T hat inference t he grant ee was entitled to draw without rp p;arrl t n tVip
g rantor's actual but undisclosed intent , and it therefore became the law

of

the case.

De cree affirme d at the costs of appellant.^'

ADAMS

V.

^/^tJO^KJU^

^S/^-'O-^^

GORDON.

(Supreme Court of Illinois, 1914.

265 111. 87, 106 N.

E.

517.)

App ellant filed her bill in chancery in the circuit court of Lake county, Illinois, against appellee, f or an injunction to restrain him from i nt erfering with her in the exercise of her rights which she claimed in
16 In Martin v. Murphy, 221 111. 632, '77 N. E. 1126 (1906), and German Saving & Loan Co. V. Gordon, 54 Or. 147, 102 Pac, 736, 26 L. II. A, (N. S.) 331
(1909), q uasi easements of passage evidenced by board walks and in part to
upon seve vf ences, were held to be turned into re^ e asements bv implication
'
ance of ownersnlp ! So, also, in Kollo v. i\ersoii, 34 Utah, 116, W Pac. 263, 26
L. K. A. (JN. S.) 315 (1908), where the quasi easement was evidenced by a cement
See Polden v. Bastard, and note thereto, supra.
walk.
In Baker v. Rice, 56 Ohio St. 463, 47 N. E. 653 (lSi37), the court had to determine whether an easement of a way had been created by implication, the
deeds severing the common ownership having been delivered simultaneously.
The way was "plainly obvious and appai'ent." The court held the easement
was created by implication.
]\Iinshall, J., said: " But it is claimed, that on ly
s uch easements as are termed 'continuous' will pass by implicatio n in a grant,
and tiiat sucn as are termed 'discontinuous' will no t^ This is a distinction of
the civn law, and has been incorporated in the law of some of the states, particularly Maine and Massachusetts.
The former are such as operate without
the intervention of man, such as drains and sewers ; the latter require the intervention of man in their use, such as ways. T l;ie distinction is somew hat
a rbitrary and is not uniformly adopted, slh vvill appear from the cases cit ed.
The bgttgrml A and the one now more generally adopted, is not to conslder"tb e
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and a way thereto ,
demurrer was sustained to the
bill, and appellant electing to abide by her bill, a decree was entered
She prayed and perfected an
dismissing the bill for want of equity.
appeal to the Appellate Court for the Second District, which has transferred the cause to this court pursuant to the statute, for the reason
that a freehold is involved.
It appears from the allegations of the bill that prior to Novemb er
29, 1911, appellee was the owner of a tract of about one hundred o r
more acres of land situated on what is known as Deerpath avenue , in
November 29, 1911, he entered
t he vicinity of Lake Forest, Illino
portion jof this
into
contract with John F. Tracy for the sale of
land, in which he contracted, among other things, tha the purchas er
hould have the right to the uig_Qf the_well located on his adjacenj
roperty, together with the pump, gasoline engine and tank situ ated
hereon, u ntil such time as public water mains should be installed in
Deerpath avenue, w ith the right to use a path.- not exceeding eight fee
n width, from
gate on the west line of the property leading in a_d
ect line to the well the purch aser
maintain the well pump, engin
and tank at his own expense and furnish water for the use of appe llee
w ithout charge or expense to him, and should said Tracy fail to
maintain and furnish water, his right to the use of the well and pump
might be terminated by the vendor and all obligations under the contract canceled. On the same day the contract was made appellee co nv eyed the land described in the contract to said Tracy bv warrant
made to the provision in th
deed, n which no reference whatever
ontract in relation to the use of water facilities as above set fort h.
At the time the contract was made between appellee and Tracy appellease expiring on November
tenant on the property under
lant was
conveyed
Tracy
nuary
the land purchased by hi m
Ja
1912.
30, 1911.
respects
the same as the dee dJie
appellant by warranty deed in all
had received from appelle e, the deed making no mention whatever of
the easement contained in the contract between appellee and Tracy.
Appellant alleges the omission of this matter was due to the mistake
of the scrivener in drafting the deed, but she does not ask that the deed
or some years the water facilities locat ed on appellee
be reformed.
and have been used by him and his ten ants, includin o- apppiia.nt, tor
the purpose of supplying the premises now owned by her with water
for domestic purposes and to supply water for the stables, lawns and
gardens thereon, aid water facilities being absolutely necessary an
es sential to the full enjoyment of her premise s. Appellant charges that
one of the important factors inducing her to purchase the premises was
the fact that she should have the right to the free and unobstructed
use of the water facilities mentioned in the contract between said Tracy
he pump, pump house, tank and engine are located on
and appellee.
ap pellee's premises about one hundred feet from the west line, of appellant's property, and the water
conveyed from there to her premises
th e nature

of

an easement in certain water facilities

on the lands

of appelle e.
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A portion of the opinion is omitted.

g

al

is

it

if

a a

t

e

o

T

c

l

a

a

;

,

T

a

g

l

t

if

,

t

d

o p

it

t

a

p

a

.

it,

and buildings by means of an underground pipe leading from the tan k
o n appellee's property to die house, stable, l awn and garden on app ell ant's premises . The pipe is visible on appellee's land between the point
where it leaves the tank and enters the ground, and also visible on
appellant's premises where it emerges from the ground and connects
A vie w
with the faucets, plugs, Hush-boxes and hydrants on her land
pu rTracy
by
premises
purchase
of
her
o f the
at the time of- the
and
Tracy
c hase from
would have disclosed that the faucets, plu^s. flus hb oxes and hydrant on her property were connected with the tank on
appellee's lan d, and that the pump, pump house, engine and tank situated thereon were used as the means of supplying these premises with
water, and t hat the water facilities thus provided were highly benefici al
to her property .
No public water mains have been installed or constructed in Deerpath avenue leading to this property, and it is ind isp ensable to its use and enjoyment by appellant that she have the ad v antage of water facilities provided for
situated on appellee's land
After appellant became
purchaser appellee permitted her to continue to use the water facilities for some time without protest and
from time to time to make the necessary repairs thereon. Shortly
before filing the bill he demanded of her the ayment of $50 which he
claimed was due on
former tenancy by her, and when she refused o
was without any foundation , appellee refus ed
ay, on the ground that
allow her servants to make repairs, on the engine use for pumpm
water into the tank locked the door to the pump house, shut the water
ofif, forbade appellant or her servants to use the well or the pathway
thereto and blockaded the same by installing posts and wires across
the pathway, and th reatened violence to appellant and her servants
hey attempted to obtain water from the well or to use the pathw ay
eading thereto . The bill pra yed for an injunctio n enjoining the appellee from interfering with appellant's rights in the premises and in
the use of the water, pump house, engine and tank and other water facilities as above set forth, and for general relief. A eneral demiir rer
w as sustained to the bill, setting forth the above facts. Appellant electdecree was entered dismissing the bill for
ed to abide by her bill and
his appeal followed .
want of equity.
The errors assigned are, (1) that the court erred in sustaining the
demurrer to the bill and (2) that the court erred in dismissing appellant's bill for want of equity.
Craig, J.^'' Appellant by her bill asserts and seeks to establish and
perpetu
right in the nature of
easem ent in the adjoining
maintain
ands of the appellee in the use and maintenance of certain water faijities located thereon, by means of which her house, barn, garden
exists,
an
his right,
and premises are supplied with water.
for
fee,
bill
the
estate
in
and
filed
purasement appurtenant
an
freehold, and the case
pose of establishing such an easement involves
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properly transferred to this court Tinker v. Forbes,
N. E. 503 ; Foote v. Marggraf, 233 111. 48, 84 N. E. 42;
Yarlott,
v.
Foote
238 111. 54, 87 N. E. 62; Espenscheid v. Bauer, 235
111. 172, 85 N. E. 230.
Appellant insists that she is entitled to the benefits of the cojitiact
o f November 29. 1911, between Tracy and appelle e, and also that the
was therefore
136

111.

221, 26

water facilities

on appellee's land constitute an open a nd vi sible ea se-

me nt appurtenan t to her premises, which passed by the deed of conveyance of the land from appellee to Tracy and from Tracy to her.

App ellee in s ists that no rights passed to appellant under the contrac t
withTracy, tor the reasons it was never executed by Tracy, that it
was a pe rsonal contrac t, and th at it became merged into and exti nished by the_deed subsequently made conveying the land to Tracy .
The appellee further insists that in order for an easement to pass as
appurtenant to land, it must be open, visible and continuous and such
as does not require the interference by man. We do not deem it necessary to pass upon each one of these contentions separately, but the
substance of each and all of these contentions will be given full consideration.
T he object in construing and interpreting an instrument is to- ascert ain and make it speak the true i ntention and meaning of the par ties
at the time it was made, and where any doubt exists as to its sense and
meaning, re sort may "be had to the circumstances surrounding i^s _exe cution, for the purpose of ascertaining
the subject matter and th e
s tandpoint of the parties m relation thereto .
Without this knowledge
it would be impossible to fully understand the meaning of an instrument or the effect to be given to the words of which it is composed.
Goodwillie Co. v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 241 111. 42, 89 N. E. 272.
This knowledge is almost as indispensable as that of the language in
which the instrument is written, and a reference to the actual condition
of things at the time as they appeared to the parties themselves will
often afford the court great help in construing such language and arriving at the t rue intent and meaning of the agreement they have mad e.
By referring to the situation of the parties and a condition of the premises at the time appellant became a purchaser of the same, we find she
had been a tenant thereof for some years, the length of time not being
stated in the bill, and during all of that time had used and enjoyed all
of the privileges which she now claims as an easement appurtenant to
her premises.
In purchasing;- the property she had a r ight to assume
expect
a nd
she was buying itin its then condition and would havT^
r i^ht to use and enjoy alFof those necessary conveniences which ha d
been placed thereon by the owner and were used in connection therg witb^ and were recogn iz ed by the owner as beiiify ^ppnrt-pn;^nt to th e
premises a nd passing with a lease under which she had enjoyed the
same as a tenant.
The rule is, w here _the owner of lands divides his property into two
parts and disposes of one part, he by implication includes in his grant
gu
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in the remaining part as were nece s sary for th e
enioyment
r easonable
pf the part which he grants in the form in whic h
i t was at tlie time he transferred the property , the general rule of law
being, that when a party grants a thing, he by implication grants whatever is inc ident t ojt and nec essary to its be np.fidal enioyment.. Newell
al l siirVi

(^a'cements

1421004^31 N. E. 176; Keegan y. Kinnare, 123 111. 280, 14
N. E. 14 ; Foote y. Yarlott, supra ; Feitler y. Dobbins, 263 111. 78, 104
N. E. 108S; Martin y. Murphy, 221 111. 632, 11 N. E. 1126; Hankins
V. Hendricks, 247 111. 517, 93 N. E. 428; Powers y. Heffernan, 233
111. 597, 84 N. E. 661, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 523, 122 Am. St. Rep. 199.
y. Sass,

A nd

is

l-

,

a

j

p

it

it

a

a is

t

it,

it is not necessary that the easement claimed by the grantee l) e
absolutely necessary to the use and enjoyment of the property : "it is
s ufficient if it is hig hl y ^convpnipnt and beneficial therefo r."
(Newell
y. Sass, supra ; Powers y. Heffernan, supra!) Where an owner sells a
portion of his land he is presumed to intend that the purchaser shall take
it in its then condition. (14 Cyc. 1166.) This intention is to be sought,
not in the undisclosed purpose of the vendor, but in what is manifest
and implied from his acts.
Liquid Carbolic Co. y. Wallace, 219 Pa.
457, 68 Atl. 1021, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 327; Hopewell Mills y. Savings
Bank, 150 Mass. 519, 23 N. E. 327, 6 L. R. A. 249, 15 Am. St. Rep.
235.
In Feitler y. Dobbins, supra, the rule is stated as follows : "The
law applicable to the situation here is, that where the owner of entire
premises arranges for ways, light, etc., for the benefit of the different
parts or portions of the premises, and afterwards the premises are
severed and the title vested in separate owners, each grant will carry
with
without being specifically mentioned, the rights and burdens and
advantages imposed by the owner prior to such severance. The do cthing im rine
founded upon the principle that the conveyance of
ports
grant of
as
actually exists at the time the conveyance
made, unless
con trary mtentio T^js m^nifestpd tn fhe gra
This doc-

N. E. 176] Plankins v. Hendricks, 247 111. 517 [93 N. E.
few of the cases which will illustrate how
The following are
;

104 [31

."

111.

;

[6

Morrison v. King, 62 111.
trine has often been applied by this court.
N. E. 689] Newell v. Sass, 142
30; Clarke v. Gaffeney, 116 111. 362

a

a

a s

:

is

a

is

i

f

e

a

a

a

a

a

a
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it

:

a

428]
that doctrine has been appHed by the courts in analogous cases
In Larsen v. Peterson, 53 N.
was held
Eq. 88, 30 Atl. 1094,
sink in the
that
water pipe leading from
driven well in
yard to
kitchen of
pump by which water
dwelling house, there ending in
could be habitually drawn from the well to the kitchen for domestic
conveyance of the dwelHng house, alone, by
purposes, would pass by
the owner of both house and yard, although the well and water pipe
were both hidden from view, and that the same result would follow
simultaneous conveyance of the house to one person and the yard
and well to another,
the latter took with notic
of the connection
between the well and pump. In this connection see, also, 14 Cyc. 1183,
where the rule
"If the owner of land devise
stated to be as follows
system of pipes or conduits through which water
conveyed from

<^-^
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one portion of his premises to another portion fnr the bene fit
to which the water is thu s
conveyed , the right to receive water through such pipes or condu its
"
over the land conveyed will pass to the grantee by ?^ n^'"a J wnrrk
s prin^.on

o f the latter and then alienates the portion

In Ingals v. Plamondon, Th 111. 118, a furnace flue projected eight
inches through a party wall. The owner of the two lots divided by the
wall sold one of them and afterwards sold the other. A question arose
between the first and the second grantees as to the right to maintain
the flue.
The flue was shown to be necessary to the maintenance of
the furnace and its existence apparent to the second vendee when the
premises were purchased, and the easement was upheld as appurtenant
to the premises.
In P owers v. Heffernan, s upra, it was held that where the owner of
a building, upon erecting a new building on an adjoining rot, uses the
stairway and hall of the old building for many' years as the only means
of access to the second floor of the new building, an easement attaches
in favor of the new building upon a sale of the old building, although
the only reservation in the deed is the right to one-half the party wall
between the two buildings.
This holding is based on the principle that
the
ow
here
ner
^w
o_f_a building, whi l e he was seized of the entire tid e,
made certain arrange ments with reference to access, heat, light an d
a jr which are hig h ly beneficial and convenient to the use and enjoy ment of the property an d e nhance its value, sells a portion of the build i ng he sells it in its t h e n condition,
p remises is subject

to th e burdens

a nd each portion of the severe d
or advantages thereby imposed o r

conferred upon the oth er-b y the own er.
In Foote v. Yarlott, supra, we held that where the owner of a flatbuilding executed two trust deeds for the north and south halves of the
building, respectively, and afterward installed a heating plant so as to
heat the whole building, the heating plant being located on the north
half, an easement was created in favor of the south half in the beneficial use and enjoyment of that part of the heating plant located in the
north half, which right could be asserted by anyone who might become
the owner of the south half under the trust deed.
It was there said :
"After the trust deeds were executed, and before the extension of the
time of payment, the owner of the property put in the steam heating
plant, with its pipes and radiators, to heat the entire' building.
While
it was designed for the benefit of every part of the building, that portion where the steam heat was generated was on the north half. If
the plant had been in the building at the time of the making of the trust
deeds an easement for the enjoyment of the heating plant by anyone
who should become owner of the south twenty feet upon foreclosure
would have passed although not expressly stated, on the principle that
when a party grants a thing he grants everything pertaining to it necessary to its enjoyment.
The owner could not create any charge or
easement on the north half, after the execution of the trust deeds, to
the detrmient of the owner of that half, but the natural conclusion

Ch. 4)

CREATION OF EASEMENTS BY IMPLICATION

535

would be that the installing of the heating plant subject to the right of
of the south half to the beneficial use of the same plant constituted an addition to the security as to the north half, and so far as
appears that is true. The owner installed the heating plant, which increased the value of both parcels and which was necessary for the
convenient and comfortable enjoyment of both, in such a way that the
portion of the plant designed to generate the steam heat was on the
north half, and the advantages and burdens of the arrangement attached
to the property.
Even more liberal principles ought to be applied in
such a case than in case of the implied reservation sustained in Powers
V. Hefifeman, 22>^ 111. 597, 84 N. E. 661, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) bZo, 122
Am. St. Rep. 199. I n our opinion the trust deed incjudes the easem ent
of the beneficial use of that part of the heating plant located on t he
north twenty fee t, and the owner of said north twenty feet must permit such beneficial use by anyone who may become the owner of the
south twenty feet under the trust deed."
N q^ distinction, in p^'nriplg^ exists or can be made in the applicati on
of the law of easements, between easement of heat, light qnd air of of
i ngress and egress , and the right to the use and enjoyment of tlie water
rights and facilities shown in the case at bar. Nor can it well be said
that an easement in the beneficial use and enjoyment of the heating
plant in Foote v. Yarlott, supra, was more open, visible and continuous,
and susceptible of being operated, used and enjoyed without the interference of man, than the water facilities, pump and engine are in the
case at bar. The aid of man to put them in operation and keep them in
repair is equally necessary and essential in both cases. The above cases
so conclusively answer appellee's contentions upon this question as to
render a further discussion of them at this time wholly unnecessary. * * *
F or the reasons given, the decree will be reversed and the cause r emanded to the circuit court of Lake count y, with di rections to ove rrule
the de murre r, and for further proceedings in accordance with the
views herein expressed. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
the owner

BUTTERWORTH

v.

(Court of Appeals of New York, 1S71.

CRAWFORD.
46 N.

Y.

349, 7 Am. Rep. .352.)

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Court of Common Pleas, for the city and county of New York, affirming judgment
entered upon the report of a referee.
The facts of this case, as found by the referee, are as follows : He nry Vulkening in 1864 owned two houses ad j oining each other on the
north side of Forty-Sixth street, i n the city of New York, known as
While such owner, he dug
Nos. 83 and 85 West Forty-Sixth street.
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formed a vault, extending partly into the yard of each ho use,
constructed^ drain from such_yault, running through the Jo t of
house No. 85, to the sewer in Forty-Sixth str eet. He then built a
divi sion fe nce between the yards of the two houses, extending from
the rear of the houses to the rear of the lots, which fence was upon
the division line, and crossed the vault in the center. He constructed
an outhouse on either side of such division fence, over the vault for
said house respectively, the roof of such outhouse extending a few
a nd
a nd

.H''
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it
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r
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inches above the fence.
A fter constructing such vault and outhouses, on the 11th dav of
December. 1865. he conveyed the house and lot No. 85 West Fort ySixth street, to the defen dant in this action, by full cove nant jwarrantee deed.
The defendant, immediately on the receipt of such deed, took possession of the said premises.
Th ereafter, on the 26th day of Jan ua ry, 1866, Vulkening conveyed said house, known as No. 83 We st
Forty-Sixth street to the plain tiff.
In the summer of 1866, tVie defendant built a privy on his premises
No. 85 West Forty-Sixth street, about twelve feet further towards
the rear of his lot, and extended the drain to the vault of such privy,
and then cut off the connection between that portion of the vault on
the plaintiff's lot and the said drain.
The de fendant upon the trial offered to show, that there was not hin g in th e a ppearance of the premises at the time he bough t, to g ive
notice that t he privy was drained through his lot . This was refused
by the referee,""and the defendant's counsel excepted.
The de fendant's counsel also offered to prove, that the def endant
ha d no notice when he bought, that the privy was drained through
lot. This was rgfuse by the referee, and the defendant's counsel duly
excepted.
The referee, as conclusions of law, decided
That the defenda nt
ad no right to cut off or obstruct the communication, from that par
the vault on th
aintiff's lot, through he drain on the defendant'
~
~
premises to the sewer in the stre et.
That the plain tiff was entitled to judgme nt, restraining the defendantfriiai--eOTTtifrumg such obstruction, and requiring the defendant to
pen such dra in, and to estore the sam to the condition
was in at
the time of the said conveyance to the plaintiff.
Rapallo,
We have come to the conclusion that the drain in
ontrove rsy didj ciot constitute an apparent servitude or easement, and
that consequently the case does not present the question so fully ardominant and servient tenement are
gued before us, whether when
and
he
makes
conveyance of the servient
owned by the same person,
tenement first, with covenants of warranty, and against incumbrances,
and without the express reservation of any easement, such conveyance
will preclude him or his assigns from afterward asserting in favor of
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the dominant tenement, which he retains, the benefit of the easement
in the premises so conveyed. We therefore refrain from expressing
an opinion upon that point.
All the authorities cited on the argument, by the learned counsel
for the respective parties, concur in holding th at the rule of law wh ich
cr eates an easement on the severance of two tenements or heritag es,
b y the sale of one of them, i s confined to cases where an appare nt
s ig^n of servitude exists on tlie part of one of them in favor of th e
other ; or as expressed in some of the authorities, where the mark$
of the burden are open and visible.
U nless therefore the servitude be open and visible, or at least, un l esj; there ^ <^ ^om e apparent mark or sign, \vbirh would inrlirate its
e xistence to one reasonably familiar with the subject, on an insp ection
o f the premises, the rule has no application.

is

a

c

a

t

b

Q

it,

There was nothing in the situation or appearance of the premises
to indicate that there was any drain from the privies in question.
D rains are not ^^
of privies constructed as
3. necessary accompaniment
In cities, municipal regulations provide for their being
t hese were .
cleansed by licensed public scavengers, and this practice is frequently
brought to the notice of the inhabitants i'n a very obvious manner. No
evidence was introduced to show that drains from them were usual
in the locality in question. But had such evidence been given, it does
not appear that there was any thing to indicate that the privy of
the neighboring house was drained through the lot sold to the defendant.
In the case of Pyer v. Carter, 1 Hurl. & Nor. 916, which was much
relied upon on the argument, and in the opinion of the learned court
below, the dominant and servient tenement had originally been one
house.
This house had been divided into two parts. The drainage
was of the water which fell upon the roof, and it may well be, that
the situation and arrangement of the building were such as to indicate
that some drain necessarily existed as an appurtenant to the house,
and that upon the division of the house into two parts, that drain became common, and afforded drainage for both of the parts through
one of them.
Such seems to have been the fact; for the court says, in. rendering
judgment, that "the defendant must have known, or ought to have
known, that some drainage existed, and if he had inquired, would have
known of this drain."
^~
That decision recognizes the necessity of establishing that the ser vi-( j;L.^>^/
and
t ude is apparent, or that there is an apparent mark or sign of
seems to be
ased on the ^ct that the situation and construction of
premises
sign .
he
afforded such
In Washburn on Easements (2d ed.), p. 68, the learned author, after
reviewing the cases on this subject, states that he onsiders the doc drain
-trine of Pyer v. Carter confined to cases where
necessary

\
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makes
a common drain
for •both;
t o both houses,' a nd the owner
and
—
i ' «^
.
.
;
t his arrangement is ajicaxgilt and nhviniT, to an observer .
If Pyer v. Carter goes farther than that, or, at all events, if it ap pl ies to cases where there is no apparent mark or sign of the drain, it
i s not in accordance with the current of the authoritie s.
The bearing of that case upon the question, whether the alleged easement was one of necessity, upon the point as to the order in which the
tenements were sold, and upon the other questions, which were argued
before us with so much learning and ability, need not now be considered, as we do not propose at this time to decide those questions ; and
for the same reason we forbear reviewing the numerous other authorities to which we have been referred, b a_sing our decision upon th e
s ingle ground that the servitude claimed was not apparen t.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with
costs to abide the event.
All concur.
Judgment accordingly.

(^n.c^,J

WEEKS

V.

NEW YORK, W. &

(Court of Appeals of New York, 1912.

207 N.

B.
Y.

RY. CO.
190, 100 N.

E.

719.)

Appeal from a iud; :;^ment of the Appellate Divisio n of the Supreme
Court in the second judicial department, entered June 13, 1911, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a dismissal of
the complaint by the court on trial at Special Term.
The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated
in the opinion.
CiiASK, J. On July 30, 1906, the p laintiff purchased two lots of
l and in New Rochelle w hich were in part described in the deed as
follows : "known and distinguished as lots numbers fifty-seven and
fifty-eight (57 and 58) on a certain map entitled 'Map of Property
Belonging to W. Chalmers, J. C. Wilson and Others, New Rochelle,
N. Y.,' dated December, 1904, made by Horace Crosby, C. E. filed in
the Westchester County Register's office, whi ch lots a rg iI'' Q'"P pn ^'timl arly bounded and desc ri bed as follows : Beginning
at a point on the
westerly side of Cedar street as shown on said map (detailed description omitted), to the said westerly side of Cedar street and running
thence southeasterly along the said westerly side of Cedar street,
eighty-one and one one-hundredths (81.01) feet to the point or place
of beginning."
The d efendants subsequently became the owners of all the other lot s
fron tinp^ on the so-called street, north of Orchard street m said city,
ancl they commenced the er ection of an embankment across said so c alled street, north of Orchard street, so as to obstruct the plaintiff 's
r i^ht of access to her said lots.
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This action was commenced and the complaint alleges in detail the
plaintiff's ownership in fee of said lots, and the acts of the defendants,
including an allegation, "T hat said railway company, its agents or
have caused to' be erected across said Cedar street, sam e
being a public street, and are now erecting said embankment so as to
c ompletely obstruct the right of access of this plaintiff through sa id
"Ced ar street to her said property." The complaint demands judgment:
"(1) That the defendants be enjoined an d r estrained from in any way
interfering with the free use of said Cedar street by tliis plaintiff.
(2)
That defendants be co mpelled to remove from said Cedar street al l
o bstructions now erected thereon interfering with the free access of
plaintiff to her premises through said street."
The plaintiff's failure to recover a judgment protecting her right
of access to said lots has apparently resulted from the extraordinary
attitude of her counsel in insisting that the so-called street is a public street or highway when he was wholly unable to sustain such position. The court did, however, find the following facts :
"Second. That in or about the month of December, 1904, W.
Chalmers, Frederick A. Steele and J. C. Wilson, at that time the owners of the so-called Maple Park tract in New Rochelle, duly filed a
map of said tract, surveyed by Horace Crosby, in tlie office of the
Register of Westchester county.
"Third. That the description of the premises in the deed of Chalmers et al. to plaintiff, bounds same as abutting on Cedar street as indicated on the map filed by said Chalmers et al. in December, 1904,
the abutting lot being described in said deed and on said rr"p as lot
number 58."
"Sixth. T hat the defendant the City and County Contract Compa ny
is owner in fee of all the land or right of way over which the line o f
t he defendant New York. Westchester
& Boston Railway C ompany
h gs been constructed , or is about to be constructed in t he, said Maple
Park Tract, and more particularly is owner in fee of the lots 11, 12,
13 and 14, and th at part of Cedar stree t over which the line of the
defendant, New York, Westchester & Boston Railway Company passes,
and also of all of Ce dar street north of Orchard street, exce pt tha t
p ortion opposite lot 58 to the center of said Cedar stree t.
"Seventh. That defendants have caused to be placed on Cedar street
aforesaid near Orchard street, obstructions consisting of stone, which
completely block access over Cedar street northerly from said Orchard
street, and placed said stone there before the commencement of this
action."
"Tenth. T hat plaintiff by the obstruction of stone aforesaid, is de pri ved of all access to her premises, lots 57 and 58. over said Ce^ r
e mployees,

street from Orchard stree t, and has been so deprived before the commencement of this action."
"Twelfth. That plaintiff after delivery of deed to her of lots 57 and
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58, used Cedar street more or less each year since, for going to and
coming from said premises, to and from Orchard street.
"Thirteenth. T hat plaintiff has not at anv time consented to t he
c losing of C edar stre et by defendants or their ag ents.
"Fourteenth. That at the time of delivery of deed, Exhibit 1, to
plaintiff, Chalmers et al. the owners of the entire tract, still owned all
the lots abutting on Cedar street north of Orchard street, and did not
convey the balance of said lots until after plaintiff owned and had possession of lot 58 under the said deed and said deed was filed of rec-

ord."
The pl aintiff requested the court to find, as conclusions of law : "14.
That the proof shows that plaintiff is entitled to some relief and that
"17.
the court should therefore have given judgment for plaintiff."
T hat plaintiff is entitled to a judgment directing defendants to xtmove all obstructions from Cedar street and enjoining defendants
from fu rther obstructing the said street and inter fering with plainti ff's
free access over Cedar street to her property described in the complaint." The co urt refused to find the conclusions of law requested
b y the plaintiff, but did find that the complaint states facts sufficie nt
to constitute a cause of action, and that tlie plaintiff has no adequat e
remedy at law. It also found that that part of Cedar street north of
Orchard street is not and never has been a public street, and that th e
defendants are entitled to judgment dismissing the p laintiff's complaj nt
u pon the merits, and judgment was entered accordingly .
The facts found show that the pl aintiff had a p r ivate easement ovg r
t he so-called Cedar street. Her rights as the owner of such "easemen t,
a § between herself and tfie defendants, are similar to the rights of a n
a butter upon a public street or highway .
In Lord V. Atkins, 138 N. Y. 184, 191, 33 N. E. 1035, 1037, the
court say : "It is well settled that when the owner of land lavs ito ut
i nto, distinct lo ts, with intersecting streets o r_avf.njaes,_a nd sells the
lots with reference to such streets, his grantees or successors cannot
afterwards be deprived of the benefit of having such streets kept
open. W hen, in such a case, a lot is sold bounded bv a street, the p urc haser and his grantees have an eas eme nt in the stree t for the_jnyp oses of access, which is a property righ t." See, also, Reis v. City of
New York, 188 N. Y. 58, 80 N. E. 573 ; 'india Wharf Brewing Co. v.
B. W. & W. Co., 173 N. Y. 167, 65 N. E. 985; Story v. N. Y. Elev.
R. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122, 165, 43 Am. Rep. 146; Bissell v. N. Y. C.
R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 61; Gerard on Title to Real Estate, 551, 821;
Jones on Easements, § 430; Elliot on Roads and Streets, §§ 18, 144.
Upon a trial before a court or referee an exception to a general
finding of law, holding that one party is entitled to recover against
the other, raises the question as to whether, upon all the facts found,
the successful party was entitled to judgment.
Hemmingway v.
Poucher, 98 N. Y. 281.
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The pl aintiff, upon her pleadings and upon

the facts found, was
private
easement and grantin g
recognizing her
e ntitled to a jud.gment
h er some relief on account of the invasion of her rights.

The judgment should be reversed and a ne w trial gra nted, with costs
to abide the event.
CuLLEN, Ch. J., and Gray, Wi;rner, Willard Bartlett, HiscocK and Collin, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed, etc.^*

CITY OF BATTLE CREEK
(Supreme Court of Michigan,

v.

1914.

GOGUAC RESORT ASS'N.
181

Mich.

241, 148 N. W. 441.)

Bill b y the city of Battle Creek against the Goguac Resort Association Limited, and others for an injunc tion. From a decree for complainant, defendants appeal.
Bird, J. The complainant, as well as the defendant association, are
r ijarian owners on Lake Goguac . This lake is near the city of Battle Creek, and covers 360 acres, and is f ed by subterranean spring s.
Co mplainant purchased a parcel of land bordering on the lake in 1886,
and comme nced to take therefrom its water supply in 1887 . From
that time on, its consumption of the water increased, until it reached
upwards of 3,000,000 gallons per day at the time this suit was filed.
The d efendant association 'is the owner of lands bordering on the lak e
It maintains a summerresort and
a djoining those of complainants.
Complainant has for some
batliing^ beach during the summer months.
time objected to the bathing at the resort, on the theory that it polIts
luted and rendered the water unfit for the use of its inhabitants.
p rotests were not heeded by the association, nor by the other defend a nts who own and manage i t. In order to enforce what it conceived
to be its rights, th is bill was filed to perpetually restrain the defendan ts
f rom operating their bathing beach . The chancellor who heard the
case gran ted the relief pra yed, and the def endants have appealed . The

18 What would be the situation if the deed made no mention of streets, but
referred for description to a plat which showed contemplated streets touching
the property conveyed?
L and is sold and conveyed, reference being made for description to a pl at
s howing a great many pi-oposed new streets, only one of which, however, touch In which of sucn contemplated streets, if any, does
es the property conveyec^
S ee Dan tne purchaser acquire rights ? What rights, if any, does he acquire?
i elson v. Sykes. 157 Cal. 6S6. 109 I'ae. 87, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1024 (1910) ; Harrington v. City of Manchester, 76 N. H. B47, 82 Atl. 716 (1912).
What would be the situation if lots are sold and conveyed after reference to
a plat which shows contemplated streets, but no reference is made to such plat
In the deed, nor is there any reference m the deed to the proposed streets?
See Pyper v. Whitman, 32 R. I. 510, SO Atl. 6, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 938 (1911) :
Danielson v. Sykes, supra.
What if the grantor does not own the land on which the contemplated streets
are to be laid out?
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most serious question raised by defendants is that the complainant has
n o such right to the use of the water as entitled it to the relief granted.
Both complainant and defendants are r iparian owners, and as suc h,
i n common with others, they own the bed of the lake, and by virt ue
of such ownership both have a right to a reasonable use of its water s
for domestic, agricultural, and mechanical purpose s. Clute v. Fisher,

N. W. 614; 40 Cyc. p. 635. Unless the complainant
can show that it has some right other than that which arises by reason
of riparian ownership, it has no greater right in the waters than have
the defendants.
As a riparian owner, the complainant has no r ight
t o divert the water for the purpose of selling it to the inhabitants o f
Battle Creek . Stock v. City of Hillsdale, 155 Mich. 375, 119 N. W.
435 ; Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N. Y. 463, 44 Am. Rep. 393 ;
Ulbricht V. Water Co., 86 Ala. 587, 6 South. 78, 4 L. R. A. 572, 11
Am. St. Rep. 72; Lord v. Water Co., 135 Pa. 122, 19 Atl. 1007, 8
L. R. A. 202, 20 Am. St. Rep. 864; Sparks Manfg. Co. v. Town of
Newton, 57 N. J. Eq. 367, 41 Atl. 385.
The question therefore gets around to this: Whether one ripar ian
Mich.

65

48, 31

is entitled to equitable relief as against another ri parian owner,
aid him in diverting the water to uses other than for riparian pu rposes.
this were a suit by complainant to protect its right to some
>wner
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reasonable use of the water incidental to its riparian ownership, it
would present a dififerent question, b yit when it seeks relief oi
haracter to facilitate ts business of unlawf ully diverting the water .^
prays for relief to which
not entitleH as
mere riparian owner .
But counsel argue that the complainant's right
something more than
legislative act whereby the city was
riparian right, and oint to
authorized to go beyond its corporate limits to acquire water rights
and, when acquired, to protect such rights against pollution.
Act No.
428, Local Acts of 1887.
We are unable to see how this act has any
force in these proceedings.
hat act authorized the complainant^ to
beyond its corporate limits and acquire water rights by purc hase or
ondemnation, which right
did not then have until the act was passe
Houghton Common Council v. Mining Co., 57 Mich. 547, 24 N. W.
In pursuance of this act, the city purchased
mall parcel of
820.
land on the shore.
lie city as never exercised its authori
unde
act, excep to become
th
riparian owne r. If in pursuance of this
act complainant had acquired all the water rights at Goguac Lake, either by purchase or condemnation,
would then be in
position to
attempt
Th
not
insist upon what
now insisting upon.
act does
riparian
rights
complainant
to enlarge the
of the
at the expense of the
and indeed the legislature would have no _a uother riparian owner
thority to onfer such rights upon the city without compensation, bein made therefor.
has acquired the
that
Another claim made by complainant
£end right by prescription to take its water supply from the lake.
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ants' riparian rights began in 1885. before complainant's di d. When
complainant purchased, it was with the view of putting down wells;
later it installed an intake. As the use of the water by the city increa se d, the lake was lowered to such an extent that defendants filed a bi ll
to restrain complainant from lowering the water and interfering wit h
t heir riparian righT s! The city recognized the rights of the defendants
and other riparian owners by d iverting Minges brook into the lake ,
which action brought the lake back to its normal level, since which
time it has been so maintained. After diverting Minges brook into the
The record
lake, the chancery suit was discontinued by stipulation.
s hows no such adverse use of the water as would ripen, into a prescrip tive righ t : but, even if we assume to the contrary, the right acquired
would be no more than the right to take the water subject to the use
which the defendants and their predecessors in title have made of
it since the resort was established in 1885. The prime object of th e
c i_ty in filing this bill was not to establish its own right to use the wa t er as it has been using
but to restrain defendants from making the
which they have made since 1885
If this relief
to be
u^e of
he city has shown n
should be based upon some right.
granted,
riparian owner
would be entitled to n
rescriptive right, and as
such relief .
Were the city attempting to establish its right to take
the water as
has done in the past, other questions might arise which
are not important on this record.
In view of the conclusion reached upon this question,
will be unnecessary to consider the other questions raised. The decree of th
tjial ^ourt will be reversed, and the bill dismissed, with costs to dePendants.
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concurred with Bird,
Brooke,
find myself unable to agree with the conclusions of >Ok
my Brother Bird in this case. In addition to the facts stated by him
*
in his opinion,
should be noted that the complainant city of Battle f^^^tj^
located its water-works from
Creek purchased the land upon which
^^*fc^
one Surby, who was at that time and for many years had been consmall way upon the banks of the lake.
summer resort in
ducting
He sold to the city
portion of his land with the knowledge that the
pumping station thereon and to supply its citicity intended to erect
His resort business at that
zens with drinking water from the lake.
tends
the
to show that bathing
record
time was insignificant, though
to some extent. Surby not only stoo
by his patrons was indulged
large amount of money in the establish by_ and sa v_the city expend
ld the land to tlie city to be use
of its plant, but actually
mer
for that purpose. Som time after the city had placed in operation its
waterworks, the def endant resort association purchased from Sur by
his adjacent lands, and rebuilt the buildings and added many attrac a

t

e
;

among these was the estabions in order to induce large patronag
bathing beach with dressing rooms and otlier necessary
lishment of
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It further appears tliat

at the time
of
the lake,
shores
its pumping station upon the
the city estabHshed
the lake had no visible inlet or outlet, but was supposed to be fed by
springs. The use of the water by the complainant city had a tendency
to reduce tlie mean level in the lake, and after some years the recession of the waters became so marked as to cause much complaint from
other riparian owners, whereupon the c ity secured tlie right to div ert
a small stream called Minges brook from its natural course into th e
s outherly end of the lake , since which time it has been able, through
a proper manipulation of the waters of such brook, to maintain the lake
at its normal level, although in the meantime the daily consumption
of the city has reached something like 3,000,000 gallons. It will thu s
b e seen that the taking of the water from tliejake by the complainan t
in flicts no injury upon t he defendant or o ther riparian ownej s. It
further appears that since the establishment of said plant the city limits of the city of Battle Creek have been extended so that they now
embrace the entire site of the waterworks plant upon the banks of the
lake as well as a further very considerable frontage, apparently used
as a public park.
My Brother Bird's opinion proceeds upon tlie theory that the use
complainant is making of the waters of this lake is both unreasonable
and unlawful.
Under the circumstances disclosed by this record, I
find myself unable to agree with him on either proposition.
No pe rs on has a property right in wate r.
The right is usufructuary only ,
and the modern authorities all tend to establish the principle thatj one
r iparian owner may not restrain the use of the water by anotHer riparian owner for nonriparian purposes, u nless such use results in
injury to the first. The very recent case of Stratton v. Mt. Hermon
Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N. E. 87, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 57,
Ann. Cas. 191 5 A, 768, is instructive upon this point. There the defendant, a riparian owner, took the water from a running stream and
diverted it to nonriparian lands upon a different watershed, for use
upon lands wholly separated from its riparian lands. The case contains a very full review of all the authorities.
It is there said:
".The question in such a case is not whether the diversion, being
for a legitimate use, is in quantity such as is reasonable, having regard
to all the circumstances, as it is in cases of distinctly riparian uses,
but only wh ether it causes actual damage to the person complain ing.
* * * That there can be no recovery for a diversion of water

accommodations

for a proper use, so small in quantity and of such character that it
occasions no injury to the present or future use of the lower riparian
land is recognized in other jurisdictions" — citing cases.
I am further of the opinion that the complainant is entitled to the
relief prayed upo n th e ground of estoppe l, As before pointed out,
the parties held title as riparian owners from a common grantor, SurIt is to my mind entirely clear that Surby, having sold a part
by.
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of the land belonging to him upon the shore of the lake for the purof enabling the city to establish a system of waterworks for the
JjtjJ^xJljty ^
supplying of drinking water to its inhabitants, would not be heard to -^.^^^a/T
s ay that he had the right to make such use of the waters upon h is
^^^SS^*^^^9^'
a djoining lands as would render waters taken by the city unfit for ^V-*^ **-*-^When the resort association purchased from
the contemplated use.
Surby, it purchased with constructive knowledge that the city ha d ^jfj^^y}/ ^u^t^t^
- —
b ought from its grantor, and with actual knowledge of the fact that
^
-<-a.>&«.^"v*
t he city was then taking its supply of drinking water from the lake
by means of its plant, plainly yisible . Under the circumstances I am ^aJulXK A^^*""^
of opinion that Surby's grantee is under exactly the same disability j^^ 1^-C4 _
.
that would attach to Surby had he attempted to render his grant value•
was
less by a pollution of the waters immediately after the grant
pose

\0\

/"

made.

I am further unable to agree with the proposition that the use which
the defendant resort association is making of the waters of the lake
In the case
is, under the circumstances, either reasonable or lawful.
of People V. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N. W. 211, 64 L. R. A. 265,
100 Am. St. Rep. 588, the court held, though with some apparent difficulty, that Mr. Hulbert, a riparian owner, could not be punished for
bathing in this lake, although his act was in violation of a legislative
enactment. Act No. 428, Local Acts 1887. Whatever may be said
of the propriety of this decision, and its soundness is questioned by
complainant, it is apparent that the court was mindful of the possibility of future developments when it very carefully limited the efMr. Justice
fects of the decision to the single point then in issue.
Moore, in concluding his opinion, said :
"I n what we have said we do not mean to intimate that an uppe r x
p roprietor may convert his property into a summer resort, and invi te /
large numbers of people to his premises for purposes of bathing, .gjtd I
g ive them the right possessed only by the riparian owner and his f am - j
i ly. We are undertaking to decide only the case which is presented-^
here."
This court thus clearly foreshadowed its probable action if such a
case arose.
It is unnecessary to predicate complainant's right to relief upon the fact that the health of 30,000 people is endangered by
defendants' unlawful acts. T he city as a riparian owner, with but a
si ngle resident upon the land who used or was entitled to use the w aters of the lake for drinking purposes, would have the absolute righ t
to enjoin his neighbor from making such use of the water as would
r ender it unfit for drinking purpos es.
Defendants filed a cross-bill, in which it asks that complainant be
restrained from diverting any of the waters of the lake through its
pipes. Even if complainant's use of the water was wrongful, injunctive relief would be denied. Stock v. City of Hillsdale, 155 Mich. 375,
119

N. V/.

435.
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Tam of Qninilin t^^^ <^^P dpr ree of the rirnn't rntirl" sliniilrl he- afrmed,
fi
w ith costs to complainant.
McAlvay, C. J., and Kuhn and Steere, JJ., concurred with

Brooke,

J."

19 See Tabor v. Bradley, 18 N. T. 109, 72 Am. Dec. 49S (1S5S), wliere_a_iaslit
to^ flood remain ing laruls of the grantor was claimed to have passed bv im|f },fed
grant ji n oil couveyajee of g^tract of land with mill and milldaui thereon. The
land conveyed was described by metes and bounds, with no men tion of the mill
or dam. It appeared that the grantor had no know ledge of the existence of
the mill and dam, and of course no knowledge of the flooding.
See, also, Pwllbach Colliery Co. v. Woodman, [1015] A. G. 634, where property was leased with power to carry on thereon the trade of miners.
Other
premises were leased by the same landowner to a butcher.
The colliery c<mipany erected on the premises demised to it a screening ajtparatus, the operation
of which resulted In the deposit of dust upon the butcher's buildings.
It was
iiitpr ■•ilin, by fhp fnll ierv comi'iin.\. in an action against it furj niif-oyfptirlptl,
sance. that the grant of the privilege to carry on the trade of miners author i zed the comlEIssxon or a nuiaance as against the lessor and titose claimin g
under liim!
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ESTATES CREATED

SECTION

1.— ESTATES
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IN FEE SIMPLE

LITTLETON'S TENURES.

1.
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Tenan t in fee simp le is he which hath lands or tenements to hold to
him and his heirs for ever. And it is called in Latin, feodum simplex,
for feodum is the same that inheritance
and simplex
as much as
to say, lawful or pure. And so feodum simplex signifies
lawful or
pure inheritance.
Quia feodum idem est quo hsereditas, et simplex
idem est quod legitimum vel purum. Et sic feodum simplex idem est
man would purquod hsereditas legitima, vel hsereditas pura. For
chase lands or tenements in fee simple,
behooveth him to have these
words in his urchase, to have and to hold to him and to his heirs
for
thes
For
man
wor^s^iis heirs) make the estate of inheritance.^
purchase lands by these words, To have and to hold to him for ever;
or by these words, To have and to hold to him and his assigns for ever
in these two cases he hath but an estate or jerm_ofJ.ife,. for that there
lack these words (his heirsjj whi ch words only make an estate of inheritance in all feoffments and grants.*
Section

2

1

1

In many states the necessity of usinjr the word "heirs" hns been done away
either expressly or Indirectly by statute.
Tlie state statutes sliould be consulted.
Section 51 of the Conveyaiieiiig Act (St. 44-45 Vict c. 41) provides
that in deeds executed after I)e(einl)er 31, ISSl, it shall be suttioient, in the limitation of an estate in fee simple to use the words "in fee simple," without tlie
word "heirs." In re Etliel and Mitchell's and Hutler's Contract, [1901J
Cli945, held the words "in fee" not sutiicient under the statute.
Even at common law there were exceptions to the rule requiring the word
"heiis." See Bl. Comm. •lOS, *109.
grant 'to A. for life and after his
"The grant 'to A. and his heirs' and
decease to his heirs,' according to the primitive force and effect of the expressions, were manifestly identical, inasunich as they both conferred life estates
upon A., and upon the persons designated as his heii*s in succession. They
were still construed as identical, notwithstanding
the change in the position
and interest of the heir consequent upon the enlarged power of alienation in
the ancestor; the limitation 'to the heirs,* in both cases, ceased to confer directly any estate upon the persons answering to that designation, and was referred to the estate of the ancestor, which, though expressed to be in the first
enlarged to an estate of inheritance, so that the heir took only
place for life,
by descent.
This is the oiigin and simplest form of the rul^e in Shelley's Case,
an ancient rule of great importance in construing the Timitations of estates,
I>eake, Law of Property in Land
which will be noticed more fullv hereafter."
[Randall's Ed.J 24. See 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 9G3 et seq.
it
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McCULLOCK

V.

(Supreme Court of Missouri, 1802.

HOLMES.

Ill

(Part

2

'^^^^^^<-j

Mo. 445, 19 S. W. 1096.)

Barclay, J.

This is an action of ejectment involving the title to a
piece of land in Lincoln county.
Tlie facts are admitted.
The case turns upon the effect to be given to the following clause in
a deed from Oliver Holmes (the common source of title) and his wife
to Azra A. Holmes, dated, April 11, 1855, and duly recorded about the
same time, viz.

:

J^
,

.

"

***'^'

*

*

*

unto him the said Azra A. Holmes
for and during his natural life and then to his two children, Laura
Eliza and Mary Emily Holmes, and their heirs and assigns forever,
and if either of said children shall die without issue in the lifetime of
their father, then all of said lands is to go to the survivor."
The chronology of the principal facts, affecting the controversy, is
as follows :
First. Mary Emily Holmes died without issue, some years before
Azra A. Holmes.
Second. Azra died in April, 1888.
Third. He left his widow, the defendant in possession, and his
daughter, Laura Eliza, one of the plaintiffs, who has intermarried with
Mr. McCullock, the other plaintiff.
The fact that the limitation above quoted appears only in the "haben^
dujn^clause of the conveyance to Azra A. Holmes does not deprive it
of its legal force or effect. All parts of the deed should be considered
in gathering its meaning, and the true intent it designs to express,

"To have and to hold

throughout, should be eft'ectuated.
In the premises of this deed "A. A. Holmes" is named as grantee,
while in the habendum the extent of his estate is defined, and the remainder now in consideration carved out.
All parts of an instrument are to be construed as consistent with
each other, if such construction be possible.
Where land is conveyed to an individual, without adding to his
name, as grantee, the word "heirs" or other words of inheritance, the
fee thereby passes to him under the law of Missouri, "unless the intent to pass a less estate shall expressly appear or be necessarily imThejntent
Rev. S't. 1889, § 8834.
plied in the terms of the grant."
case,
and
is lawfully
to pass a less estate is very evident in the present
expressed, Farrar v. Christy's Adm'rs (1857) 24 Mo. 453 ; Spyve v.

Tophani (1802) 3 East, 115.
Even under the strictest

common-law rules of conveyancing, a
in
to
those
mentioned
the premises of a deed might be instranger
1 Wood on Controduced in the habendum as a grantee in remainder.
veyancing (6 Eng. Ed.) Habendum (B), p. 336.
The limitation in the case at bar is not uncertain or obscure. Azra
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took a life estate in possession. During its currency, one of the possible remaindermen died. The other, the present plaintiff, survived
Azra. She is plainly entitled to the estate, the contingency having been
resolved in her favor. The trial court so held. Its judgment is affir m-_
Sherwood, C.
and Black and Brace, JJ., concur.^
ed.

;
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In Palmer v. Cook, 159 111. 300, 42 N. E. 796, 50 Am. St. Rep. 165 (1896)
Following
lands were conveyed by one Thomas Stewart to Ms two children.
Thomas
"And
the description of the property was the follo\ving clause:
Stewart, as for myself, retain possession and reserve the use, profits and full
control during my life
and further, in case either of the grantees dies with"This
out an heir, her interest to revert to the survivor." The court said
deed eifected an absolute fee simple conveyance by the first clause of the deed
fee
and vested the estate. By the last clause an attempt is made to mount
upon a fee, which can only be done by executory devise. Smith v. Kimbell, 153
Fowler v. Black, 136 111. 363. 26 N. E. 596, 11
111. 368, 38 N. E. 1029 (1894)
L. E. A. 670 (1S91)
Giiswold v. Hicks, 132 111. 494, 24 N. E. 63, 22 /^ni. St.
Rep. 549 (1890).
It is further principle of construction of deeds, that if the
terms used vest
fee in the first taker, other parts of the instrument showing
Carpenter v. Van Olinder,
an intention to give
less estate will not control.
127 111. 42, 19 N. E. 868,
L. R. A. 455, 11 Am. St. Rep. 92 (1889). Under the
statute, the conveyance being to the grantee and her heirs and assigns, the
By the use of terms of definite legal
terms have, in law, a definite meaning.
meaning the intention can be determined from the language used.
If that
language means a certain thing and nothing else, then the only reasonable conThe
struction is that what was intended was expressed in the language used.
language used did not create an estate in joint tenancy nor a life estate. Under these principles this deed reserved to tlie grantor a life estate and vested
fee in the grantees, and the clause, 'and further, in case either of the grantees
dies without an heir, her interest to revert to the survivor,' must be held to be
inoperative, as a limitation of the fee."
In Cover v. James, 217 111. 309, 75 N. E. 490 (1905), lands were conveyed to
two of the grantoi'"s children, with the follomng provision immediately following the description of the premises: "In case of the death of either A. Ford
Cover or Bessie Cover, the other to have the whole of said property without
litigation." A. Ford Cover died before Bessie Cover, and the question was
The court, inter
whether the heirs of said A. Ford Cover took any interest.
alia, said
"Section 13 of chapter 30 of Hurd's Revised Statutes of 1903, page
441, provides that 'every estate in lands which shall be granted, conveyed or
devised, although other words heretofore necessary to transfer an estate of
inheritance be not added, shall be deemed a fee simple estate of inheritance,
if a less estate be not limited by express words or do not api^ear to have been
Here the
granted, conveyed or devised by construction or operation of law.'
deed does expressly state that in case of the death of either of the grantees
the survivor shall have the whole of the property, thus clearly limiting the esIt is intate granted to both jointly for life, with the right of survivorship.
sisted, however, by counsel for appellees that this last provision cannot be given effect because it does not appear in the granting clause of the deed, or, as
is said, does appear in the habendum, and reliance is placed upon the case of
Palmer v. Cook, 159 111. 300, 42 N. E. 796, 50 Am. St. Rep. 165 (1896). In that
case
deed somewhat similar to the one now before the court was construed
as conveying the fee simple title to the grantees, and it was held that the expression, 'in case either of the grantees dies without an heir her interest to revert to the survivor,' was an attempt to mount
fee upon a fee, and was therefore void. The granting clause of that deed was held to convey the fee simple title under the provisions of section
of chapter 30, supra. If a fee simple
title was in fact granted, it is clear that that estate could not be limited or
qualified by the subsequent language.
Merely because the deed was substantially in the form prescribed by section
however,
fee simple title was not
necessarily conveyed. That section prescribes the form of the deed, and provides that every deed substantially in that form shall be deemed and held to be
a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, etc.
but it must be construed in
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[N. S.] 956,

V.

Battle, J;

(Part

2

ELLSBERRY.

S2

lis

TITLES

Ark.

209, 101
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Am. St. Rep. 60.)

involves the construction of so much of a
deed executed by John T. Hamblett and wife to Georgena EUsberry
as is in the following words :
"Know all men by these presents, That we, J. T. Hamblett and Cordelia P. Hamblett,- his wife, for and in consideration of the sum of
one dollar to us in hand paid, and for the love and affection we have

This

case

connectiqn with section 1^, supra, under which, if a less estate he limited by
express words or appear to have been granted, conveyed or devised by construction or operation of law, the conveyaiue, not using words heretofore necessiiry
to transfer an estate of iiilieritnnce. shall not be deemed to convey a fee simple estate. * * * That the position of counsel for aiinellee and the decision
of the conrt below do violence to his expressed intention must be conceded.
In Mirtel v. Karl. i:« 111. 05. 24 N. E. 55*'., S I.. U. A. C5."5 (L^90), a warranty
deed by John IMittel conveyed premises to 'Maria Jobst and Michael .lobst. her
In construing
husband, and the survivor of them, in her or his own right.'
that deed, after holding that the words 'the survivor of them,' etc., could not
be ignored, we say (i:!.*? 111. OS, 24 N. E. 554. S h. R. A. 655) : 'These words were
placed in the deed by the contrarting piirties for a purpose, and they cannot
arl)itrarily lie rejected. In the construction of written contracts it is the duty
of the court to ascertain the intention of the parties, and the intention, when
ascertained, must control; but in arriving at the intention, effect must be
given to each clause, word or term emi)loyed by the party, rejecting none as
meaningless or surplusage' — citing Lehndorf v. Cope, 122 111. 317, VA N. E. 505
And after discussing the question as to whether that deed convened
(1887).
an estate in joint tenancy, we further said (I'-VA 111. 70. '24 N. E. 5.55. 8 L. R. A.
655): "We think the language of the deed, when properly understood, will adndt of but one construction, and that is, that the premises were conveyed to
Maria and .Michael Jobst for life, with a contingent remainder in fee to the
I5y the language of the grant, to "Michael Jobst and Maria Jobst,
survivor.
and the survivor of them, in his or her own right,'" it was doubtless intended
that the one who should die first should take only a life estate in the premises,
with the remainder in fee to the survivor and his heirs.' The authorities cited
in support of this position, as well as the reasoning of the learned judge who
wrote the opinion, fully supjmrted it. It is there further said: 'There is no
way in which it can be held that Jobst and his wife took the fee as tenants
in connnon without rejecting the clause in the deed providing that the survivor
should take the fee, and we are aware of no rule of construction under which
that can be done. As is said in Riggin v. Love, 72 111. 55:5 (lS74i a construction
which requires us to reject an entire clause of the deed is not to be admitted
except from unaveidable necessity: but the intention of the parties, as manifested by the language employed in the deed, should, so far as practicable, be
carried into effect.' So in this case, whether the father understood the difference between the estates in joint tenancy and tenancy in conunou or not, he
marufestly did understand what his desire was, that is, that the survivor of
his children, the grantees, should have the entire estate; and under the rule
announced in Mittel v. Karl there is no difficulty in giving effect to that inWe think the court below was in error in holding that A. Ford Cover
tention.
and Bessie Cover took the estate as tenants in common and in sustaining the
Under the views here exdemurrer to the bill of the appellant, Bessie Cover.
pressed it is clear that the coniplainanrs in the cross-bill were entitled to no
relief under the same, and whether, technically, the motion to strike it from the
See, also, Baunian v. Stoller. 2;!5 111.
tiles was proper or not, is unimportant."
Buck v. Garber, 261 111. 378, 103 N. E. 1059 (1914);
480. 85 N. E. 057 (1008);
Graves v. AY heeler, 180 Ala. 412, 61 South. 341 (1913), ace.
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for our daughter, Georgena Ellsberry, we hereby convey, sell, give and
bequeath to the said Georgena Ellsberry, and unto her heirs and assigns
forever, the following lands lying and being situate in the county
of Woodruff and State of Arkansas, to-wit : Lots numbered twelve
(12), thirteen, (13) and fourteen (14) in block number fourteen (14) in
the town of Augusta, to have and to hold the same unto the said
Georgena Ellsberry and unto her heirs and assigns forever, with all
the appurtenances thereto belonging.
Provided, however, that should
the said Georgena Ellsberry die without issue and before her husband,
Wm. M. Ellsberry then the property herein conveyed is to revert unto
the said Wm. M. Ellsberry."
The granting clause of the deed conveys the lands described to the
grantee in fee simple. The habendum defines the estate the grantee is
to take to be the fee simple, with a proviso limiting the estate in certain contingencies to a life estate.
ThejDroviso or condition is repug-jriantjto_the_grariting cliiuse. Which prevails?
In Maker v. Lazell, 83 Me. 562, 22 Atl. 474, 23 Am. St. Rep. 795,
the court said : "There is one rule pertaining to the construction of
deeds, as an cient, general and rigorous^^s_any other.
It is the rule
that a grantor cannot destroy his own grant, however much he may
modify it or load it with conditions, — the ru l e that, having onc e granted an estate in his deed, no subsequent clause, even in the same deed,
can operate to nullify it.
11 Bac. Abr. 665;
Shep. Touch. 79, 102.
We do not find that this rule has ever been disregarded, or even seriWe find it often stated, approved, and
ously questioned, by courts.
sometimes made a rule of decision. In Duke of Marlborough v. Lord
Godolphin, 2 Ves. S'r. 74, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, 'in whose judgments equity shone resplendent,' declared that the courts either of law
or equ ity should not adopt such a construction of an instrument of devise as would defeat the interests given. In Cholmondeley v. Clinton,
2 Jac. & Walk. 84, which was a case most elaborately, argued and considered, it was said by the court that where a limitation in a deed is
perfect and complete, it cannot be controlled by intention collected
from other parts of the same deed." To support this rule of construction, the court cites and comments upon the following cases : Budd v.
Brooke, 3 Gill (Md.) 198, 43 Am. Dec. 321 ; Ackerman v. Vreeland,
14 N. J. Eq. 23 ; Wilder v. Davenport, 58 Vt. 642, 5 Atl. 753 ; Cutler
v. Tufts (Mass.) 3 Pick. 272; Wilcoxson v. Sprague, 51 Cal. 640;
Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co. v. Hewett, 55 Wis. 96, 12 N. W.
382, 42 Am. Rep. 701.
In Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co. v. Hewett, 55 Wis. 96, 12 N.
W. 382, 42 Am. Rep. 701, Mr. Justice Lyon, delivering the opinion
of the court, said : "Which of these two conflicting clauses in the deed
of 1873 should prevail? This question must be determined by rules
of law * * * governing the construction of deeds. One of these
rules is that a deed is always construed most strongly against the grantor. 4 GreefarCruise, Real Prop. p. 352, tit. 32, ch. 20, § 13. Another
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two clauses in a deed, and the latter is contradictory to the former, the former shall stand. This is an application
of the_ancient rule or maxim that 'the first deed and the last will shall
* * * jf ^^g subsequent clause in the deed of 1873 is
operate.'
regarded as a habendum, then we have this rule laid down by Citiise

is that where there are

in the title above cited (chapter 21, %^75, 76): '\VlLere the habendum is
repugnant and contrary to the premises, it is void, and the grantee will
take the estate given in the premises. This is a consequence of the
rule already stated, that deeds shall be construed most strongly against
the grantor ; therefore he shall not be allowed to contradict or retract,
by any subsequent words, the gift or grant made in the premises.
Thus, if lands are given in the premises of a deed to A. and his heirs,
habendum to A. for life, the habendum is void, because it is utterly
" * * * *
repugnant to and irreconcilable with the premises.'
The conveyance in fee simple carries with it the power to dispose
of the estate by deed or will. The power of alienation is an inseparable incident of such an estate.
So the deed in question conveyed to
Mrs. Ellsberry tlie estate in fee simple with the power to disposejof_it
The limitation of it to a life estate was repugnant to the granting
,
clause, and was void.
Reversed, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opin-

/
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FIRST UNIVERSALIST SOCIETY
(Supreme

Bill in
ance

of

Judicial Court of

aiassachusetts, 1892.
15 L. R. A. 231.)

v.

BOLAND.

155 Mass. 171, 29 N.

E.

524,

Superior Court, for the sp ecific perform.plaintiff to sell and by the defendant to
was submitted to the Superior Court, and,

equity^ filed, in the
an agreement by the

purchase land.

The

case

4 A portion of the opinion, in whicli tlie court reviews a number of cases, la
omitted.
5 Prindle v. Orphans Home, 153 Iowa, 2.34. 133 N. W. 106 (1911), ace.
But see Wilsob v. Terry, 130 ]\Iich. 73, 89 N. W. 566 (1902) ; Jacobs v. All
Persons, etc., 12 Cal. App. 163, 106 Pac. 896 (1909) ; Midgett v. Meekins, 160 N.
C. 42, 75 S. E. 728 (1912) ; Johnson v. Barden, 86 Vt. 19, S3 Atl. 721, Ann. Cas.
1915A, 1243 (1912) ; Wood v. Logue, 107 Iowa, 436, 149 N. W. 613 (1914) ; Kenner v. State (Arlv.) ISO S. W. 492 (1915).
Lands were conveyed to X., "his heirs and assi,?ns forever, subject to the
limitations hereinafter expressed as to part thereof," etc. In the habendum
the estate of the grantee as to one-half Avas limited "to his own use, benefit,
* * * to descend to
and behoof during his natural life, and at his decease
and the title thereof vested in the children" of said X. by him lawfully begotten. The question was as to the estate acquired by X. Tyler v. Moore, 42 Pa.

374 (1862).
By deed lands were conveyed to M., "her children

and assigns forever," with
habendum to M., "her heirs and assigns forever."
Held that M. took a fee
simple, and not as tenant in common with her children.
Bines v. Mansfield,
96 Mo. 394, 9 S. W. 798 (1888).
Cf. Karclmer v. Hoy, 151 Pa. 383, 25 Atl. 20
(1892) ; Morton v. Babb, 251 111. 4S8, 96 N. E. 279 (1911).
As to the propriety of declaring trusts in the habendum, see Nightingale v.
Hidden, 7 R. I. 115 (1S62).
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after judgment for the plaintiff, to this court, on appeal, on an agreed
statement of facts, and was as follows :
On April 9, 1842, Joseph D. Clark and twenty-five or thirty other
persons formed the plaintiff society, with a constitution which adopted
as the basis of its religious faith the profession of belief accepted by
the General Convention of the Universalists at its session at Winchester, New Hampshire, in 1803, and provided for three trustees to
be the executive power of the society and to see that all votes of the
society were carried out. On April 3, 1854, Clark for the expressed
consideration of nine hundred dollars conveyed the land in question
by a dee d containing the usual covenants to the plaintiff society, "to
have and to hold to the said First Universalist Society and their assigns, so long as said real estate shall by said society or its assigns be
devoted to the uses, interests, and support of those doctrines of the
Christian religion embraced in the Confession of Faith adopted by the
General Convention of Universalists held at Winchester, New Hampshire, in the year eighteen hundred and three. And when said real
'estate shall by said society or its assigns be diverted from the uses, interests, and support aforesaid to any other interests, uses, or purposes
than as aforesaid, then the title of said society or its assigns in the
same shall forever cease, and be forever vested in the following named
persons, and such persons shall be the legal representatives of any of
such persons at the time the same so vests as aforesaid in the following
undivided parts and proportions, to wit: to Stephen M. Whipple
^*°/iooo, Alanson Cady ^^''/looo, John F. Arnold ^^Yiooo, Joseph D.
Clark ^"/looo. [Here followed the names of thirty-seven others after
each of which was placed a fraction in thousandths.]
To have and to
hold the above granted premises, with the privileges and appurtenances
thereto belonging, to the said grantees, their heirs and assigns, to them
and their use and behoof forever, as aforesaid."
On December 16, 1885, Clark executed and delivered to the plaintiff
society a quitclaim deed of the same premises, "intending hereby to
vest in said society absolutely and in fee simple the title to said premises free and discharged of all the conditions, restrictions, and restraints as to the uses, interests, and purposes for which said premises
are to be used and enjoyed by said society, as set forth in my said deed
of April 3, 1854, and to enable said society to sell, lease, or otherwise
use and dispose of said premises to all intents and purposes as if no
restraints or contingent interests had been created by my said deed or
referred to therein."
Upon the land so conveyed to the plaintiff a church was erected,
which from the time of its erection to the present time has .been occupied and used for religious worship by the plaintiff society, without
any change in the profession of faith mentioned in the deed of April
3, 1854, or in its constitution.
The agreement in question was made
by the parties on April 20, 1891, but the defendant, upon the tender of
a deed to him from the plaintiff, refused to cai*ry it out, on the ground.
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among others, that the plaintiff society never was seised in fee simple,
but at most obtained only a qualified or conditional fee, and could not
convey a good and clear title.
The parties having ascertained that between April 3, 1854, and
December 16, 1885, C[ark had gone into bankruptcy, the plaintiff waived any rights which it might have under the deed of December 16,
1885, and relied for its title upon the deed dated April 3, 1854.
Ar.LEX, J. The limitation over, which is contained in the deed of
Clark to the plaintiff in 1854, is void for remoteness. Wells v. Heath,
10 Gray, 17, 25, 26;
Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3 Gray, 142,
152, 63 Am. Dec. 72}i.
The fact that the grantor designated himself
as one of the persons amongst many others to take under this limitation, does not have, the effect to make the limitation valid. He was
to take with the rest, and stand upon the same footing with them.
Where there is an invalid limitation over, the general rule is that
the preceding estate is to stand, unaffected by the void limitation.
The
estate becomes vested in the first taker, according to the terms in which
it was granted or devised. Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3 Grav,
142, 156, 157, 63 Am. Dec. 725; Sears v. Russell, 8 Gray, 86, 100;
Fosdick v. Fosdick, 6 Allen, 41, 43; Lovering v. Worthington, 106
Mass. 86, 88; Lewis on Perpetuity, 657.
There may be instances
in which a void limitation might be referred to for the purpose of giving a construction to the language used in making the prior gift, provided any aid could be gained thereby.
In the present case, we dc
not see that any such aid can be gained. The estate given to the first
taker does not depend at all upon the validity or invalidity of the
limitation over, and the construction of the language used is not
aided by a reference thereto.
The grant to the plaintiff was to have and to hold, etc., "so long
as said real estate shall by said society or its assigns be devoted to
the uses, interests, and support of those doctrines of the Christian
religion," as specified. "And when said real estate shall by said
society or its assigns be diverted from the uses, interests, and support
aforesaid to any other interests, uses, or purposes than as aforesaid,
then the title of said society or its assigns in the same shall forever
cease, and be forever vested in the following named persons," etc.
These words do not grant an absolute fee, nor an estate on condi-^
tion, but an estate which is to continue till the happening of a certain
event, and then to ceas_e.
That event may happen at any time, or
Because the estate may last forever, it is a
it may never happen.
fee. Because it may end on the happening of the event, it is what
is usually called a determinable or qualified fee. The grant was not
upon a condition subsequent, and no re-entry would be necessary;
but by the terms of the grant the estate was to continue so long as
the real estate should be devoted to the specified uses, and when it
should no longer be so devoted, then the estate would cease and deterNumerous illustrations of words proper to
mine by its own limitation.

<3h. 5)

ESTATES CREATED

555

create such qualified or determinable fees are to be found in the books,
one of which, as old as Walsingham's Case, 2 Plowd. 557, is "as long
as the church of St. Paul shall stand." Brattle Square Church v. Grant,
3 Gray, 142, 147, 63 Am. Dec. 725;
Easterbrooks v. Tillinghast, 5
Gray, 17; Ashley v. Warner, 11 Gray, 43; Attorney General v. Merrimack Manuf. Co., 14 Gray, 586, 612; Fifty Associates v. Howiand,
11 Mete. 99, 102; Owen v. Field, 102 Mass. 90, 105;
1 Washb. Real
Prop. (3d Ed.) 79; 2 Washb. Real Prop. (3d Ed.) 20, 21 ; 4 Kent,
Com. 126, 127, 132, note; 2 Crabb, Real Prop. §§ 2135, 2136. 2 Flint.
Real Prop. 230, 232; Shep. Touchst. 121, 125.
A question or doubt, however, has arisen, though not urged by
counsel in this case, whether after all there is now any such estate
as a qualified or determinable fee, or whether this form of estate
was done away with by the statute Quia Emptores.
See Gray, Rule
against Perpetuities, §§ 31-40, where the question is discussed and authorities are cited. We have considered this question, and whatever
may be the true solution of it in England, where the doctrine of tenure
still has some significance, we think the existence of such an estate
as a qualified or determinable fee must be recognized in this country,
and such is the general consensus of opinion of courts and text writers. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct v. Chandler, 9 Allen, 159, 168; Leonard
V. Burr, 18 N. Y. 96 ; Gillespie v. Broas, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 370 ; State
V. Brown, 27 N. J. Law, 13; Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. 335 ; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & Mississippi Railway, 94 111. 83, 93; 1
Washb. Real Prop. (3d Ed.) 76-78; 4 Kent, Com. 9, 10, 129. See,
also, of English works in addition to citations above, Shep. Touchst.
101; 2 Bl. Com. 109, 154, 155; 1 Cruise Dig. tit. 1, §§ 72-76; 2
Flint. Real Prop. 136-138; 1 Prest. Est. 431, 441; Challis, Real
Prop. 197-208.
Since the estate of the plaintiflf may determine, and since there is
no vaHd limitation over, it follows that there is a possibility of reverter in the original grantor, Claik.
This is similar to, though not
quite identical with, the possibility of reverter which remains in the
The exact nature
grantor of land upon a condition subsequent.
and incidents of this right need not now be discussed, l^ut it represents whatever is not conveyed by the deed, and it is the possibility
that the land may revert to the grantor or his heirs when the granted
Challis, Real Prop. 31, 63-65, 153, 174, 198, 200,
estate determines.
212; 1 Prest. Est. 431, 471; Newis v. Lark, 2 Plowd. 403, 413;
Shep. Touchst. 120; 2 Washb. Real Prop. (3d Ed.) 20, 579: 4 Kent,
Com. 10; Smith v. Harrington, 4 Allen, 566, 567; Attorney General v.
Merrimack Manuf. Co., 14 Gray, 586, 612; Brattle Square Church v.
Grant, 3 Gray, 142, 147-150, 63 Am. Dec. 725; Owen v. Field, 102
Mass. 90, 105, 106; Gillespie v. Broas, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 370; Gray,
Rule against Perpetuities, §§ 33, 34, 39, and cases cited.
Clark's possibility of reverter is not invalid for remoteness. It has
been expressly held by this court, that such possibility of reverter
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upon breach of a condition subsequent is not within the rule against
perpetuities.
Tobey v. Moore, 130 Mass. 448; French v. Old South
Society, 106 Mass. 479. If there is any distinction in this respect between such possibility of reverter and that which arises upon the determination of a qualified fee, it would seem to be in favor of the
latter.
But they should be governed by the same rule. If one is
not held void for remoteness, the other should not be.
The very
many cases cited in Gray, Rule against Perpetuities, §§ 305-312, show
conclusively that the general understanding of courts and of the profession in America has been that the rule as to remoteness does not apply; though the learned author thinks this view erroneous in principle.
We have no occasion to consider whether the possibility of reverter would or would not pass to an assignee in bankruptcy or insolvency, because the plaintiff expressly waived any right it might
have under the second deed from Clark, and we have not, therefore,
felt at liberty to consider the second deed, and have been confined to
the construction and effect of the first deed.
See Rice v. Boston &
•Worcester Railroad, 12 Allen, 141. This being so, the plaintiff's titk
must be deemed imperfect, and the entry must be: Bill dismisse d.
-ff-v

AU

SECTION 2.— ESTATES IN FEE TAIi;

STATUTE DE DONIS CONDITIONALIBUS.

is

it

;

it

is

if

a

if

is,

First, concerning lands that many times are given upon condition,
to wit, where an}'- giveth his land to any man and his wife, and
that
to the heirs begotten of the bodies of the same man and his wife,
the same man and his wife die
with such condition expressed that
between
them
their
bodies
heir
of
begotten, the land so given
without
heir;
in
case also where one giveth
shall revert to the giver or his
condition annexed, though
lands in free marriage, which gift hath
the husthis, that
be not expressed in the deed of gift, which
band and wife die without heir of their bodies begotten, the land so
in case also where one giveth
gi,ven shall revert to the giver or his heir
seemed very hard
the
heirs
of
his
body issuing,
land to another and
and yet seemeth to the givers and their heirs, that their will being
observed. In all the
expressed in the gift was not heretofore nor yet
cases aforesaid after issue begotten and born between them, to whom
the lands were given under such condition, heretofore such feoffees
had power to aliene the land so given, and to disinherit their issue
of the land, contrary to the minds of the givers, and contrary to the
form expressed in the gift. And further, when the issue of such
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feoffee is failing, the land so given ought to return to the giver or his
heir by form of gift expressed in the deed, though the issue, if any
were, had died; yet by the deed and feoffment of them, to whom
land was so given upon condition, the donors have heretofore been
barred of their reversion of the same tenements which was directly
repugnant to the form of the gift : wherefore our lord the king, perceiving how necessary and expedient it should be to provide remedy
in the aforesaid cases, hath ordained, that the will of the giver according to the form in the deed of gift manifestly expressed shall
be from henceforth observed, so that they to whom the land was
^iven under such condition shcill have no power to aliene the land so
given, but that it shall remain unto the issue of them to whom it was
given after their death, or shall revert unto the giver or his heirs if
issue fail, either by reason that there is no issue at all, or if any issue
be, it fail by de ath.-the.,heir„of
such issue failing. . Neither shall the
second husband of any such woman from henceforth have anything
in the land so given upon condition after the death of his wife, by
the law of England, nor the issue of the second husband and wife
shall succeed in the inheritance, but immediately after the death of
the husband and wife, to whom the land was so given, it shall come
to their issue or return unto the giver or his heir as before is said.
And forasmuch as in a new case new remedy must be provided this
manner of writ shall be granted to the party that will purchase it.
*
*
* The writ whereby the giver shall recover when issue faileth is common enough in the chancery.
And it is to wit that this
statute shall hold place touching alienation of land contrary to the form
of gift hereafter to be made, and shall not extend to gifts made before.
And if a fine be levied hereafter upon such lands it shall be void in
the law, neither shall the heirs or such as the reversion belongeth unto,
though they be of full age, within England, and out of prison, need
to make their claim.
Westm. II, c. 1, 13 Edw. I, A. D. 1285.

LITTLETON'S TENURES.
Tenajitjn

of the statute of W.

2, cap. 1, for before the said statute, all inheritances were fee simple ; for all the
gifts which be specified in that statute were fee simple conditional at
the common law, as appeareth by the rehearsal of the same statute.
And now by this statute, tenant in tail is in two manners, that is to
say, tenant in tail general, and tenant in tail special.

Section

fee_ tail is by force

13.
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COKE UPON LITTLETON.
"Before the said statute all inheritances were fee simple."
Here
fee simple is taken in his large sense, including as well conditional
or qualified, as absolute, to distinguish them from estates in tail since
the said statute.
Before which statute of donis conditionalibus, if
land had been given to a man, and to the heirs males of his body, the
having of an issue female had been no performance of the condition ;
but if he had issue male, and died, and the issue male had inherited,
yet he had not had a fee simple absolute;
for if he had died without
issue male, the donor should have entered as in his reverter.
By having of issue, the condition was performed for three purposes : First,
to alien : Secondly, to forfeit : Thirdly, to charge with rent, common,
or the like. But the course of descent was not altered by having issue ;
for if the donee had issue and died, and the land had descended to his
issue, yet if that issue had died (without any alienation made) without
issue, his collateral heir should not have inherited, because he was
not within the form of the gift, viz. heir of the body of the donee.
Lands were given before the statute in frank-marriage, and the donees
had issue and died, and after the issue died without issue; it was
adjudged, that his collateral issue shall not inherit, but the donor shall
re-enter.
So note, that the heir in tail had no fee simple absolute at
the common law, though there, weje^ divers descents,
If lands had been given to a man and to his heirs males of his body,
and he had issue two sons, and the eldest had issue a daughter, the
daughter was not inheritable to the fee simple, but the younger son
per formam doni. And so if land had been given at the common law
to a man and the heirs females of his body, and he had issue a son and
a daughter, and died, the daughter should have inherited this fee
simple at the common law ; for the statute of donis conditionalibus
createth no estate tail, but of such an estate as was fee simple at the
common law, and it is descendable in such form as it was at the common law. If the donee in tail had issue before the statute, and the issue had died without issue, the alienation of the donee at the common
law, having no issue at that time, had not barred the donor.
If donee in tail at the common law had aliened before any issue
had, and after had issue, this alienation had barred the issue because he claimed a fee simple; yet if that issue had died without issue,
the donor might re-enter, for that he aliened before any issue, at
what time he had no power to alien to bar the possibility of the donor.
In gifts in tail these words (heirs) are as necessary, as in feoffment^
and grants ; for seeing every estate tail was a fee simple at the common law, and at the common law no fee simple could be in feoffments
and grants without these words (heirs), and that an estate in tail is
but a cut or restrained fee, it followeth, that in gifts in a man's lifetime no estate can be created without these words (heirs), unless it
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of frank-marriage, as hereafter shall be shewed. And where
Littleton saith (heirs), yet heir in the singular number in a special

be in case

b.

;

is

if

is,

is

:

is

is is,

case may create an estate tail, as appeareth by 39 Ass. p. 20. hereafter
mentioned. And >et if a man give lands to A. et hseredibus de corpore
suo, the remainder to B. in forma prsedicta, this is a good estate tail to
B. for that in forma prasdicta do include the other. If a man letteth
lands to A. for life, the remainder to B. in tail, the remainder to C.
in forma preedicta, this remainder is void for the uncertainty.
But if
the remainder had been, the remainder to C. in eadem forma, this had
been a good estate tail ; for idem semper proximo antecedenti ref ertur.
If a man give lands or tenements to a man, et semini suo, or exitibus
vel prolibus de corpore suo, to a man, and to his seed, or to the issues
or children of his body, he hath but an estate for life; for albeit that
the statute provideth. that voluntas donatoris secundum forman in
charta doni sui manifeste expressam de caetero observetur, yet that
will and intent must agree with the rules of law. And of this opinion
was our author himself, as it appeared in his learned reading aforementioned upon this statute, where he holdeth, if a man giveth land to
a man et exitibus de corpore suo legitime procreatis, or semini suo, he
hath but an estate for life, for that there wanteth words of inheritance.
"Of his body." These words are not so strictly required but that
they may be expressed by words that amount to as much : for the example that the statute of W. 2 putteth hath not these words (de corpore) but these words (haeredibus) viz. : Cum aliquis dat terram suam
alicui viro et ejus uxori et hseredibus de ipsis viro et muliere procreatis.
If lands be given to B. et hseredibus quos idem B. de prima uxore sua
legitime procrearet, this is a good estate in especial tail (albeit he hath
no wife at that time) without these words (de corpore).
So it is if
lands be given to a man, and to his heirs, which he shall beget of his
wife, or to a man et hseredibus de carne sua, or to a man et haeredibus
In all these cases these be good estates in tail, and yet these
de se.
de
words
corpore are omitted.
It is holden by some opinions, that if there be grandfather, father
and son, and lands are given to the grandfather, and to his heirs begotten by the father, the father dieth, the grandfather dieth, the son
is in as heir to the grandfather begotten upon the body of his father,
and the wife of the grandfather in that case shall be endowed.
But
in
land
formam
certain it
that
some cases one shall have the
per
doni that
not issue of the body of the donee, which see Section 30.
This word may in many cases be omitted or expressed
"Begotten."
as hseredibus de carne,
by the like, and yet the estate in tail
good
aforesaid; and
hseredibus de se, hsered' quos sibi contigerit, &c. as
where the word of Littleton
or
ingendered
begotten, procreatis, yet
the word be procreandis, or quos procreaverit, the estate in tail
good and as procreatis shall extend to the issues begotten afterwards,
so procreandis shall extend to the issues begotten before.
Co. Litt. 19a, 20a,
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(Supreme Court of Kansas, 1913.
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Kan.

70S, 129 Pac. 1131.)

BuRCH, J. In the year 1893 John Ewing made his will. The fourth
paragraph reads as follows :
"Fourth: I will and bequeath to my daughter, Mary A. Nesbitt, nee
Ewing, and to the heirs of her body, the south half (y^) of the northwest quarter (i/4) of section No. twenty-one (21), township thirteen
(13), of range twenty-four (24), in Johnson county, Kansas."
Devises using the same language were made to the testator's other
children, four in number.
Besides these the will contained four other
devises, which were expressly stated to be "free and clear of all entailment," thus clearly indicating the intention of the testator to create estates tail by the phraseology employed in paragraph 4 and those
like it In 1895 John Ewing died, leaving as his heirs the five children who were the beneficiaries of his will. The will was duly probated, the estate was administered and closed, and Mary A. Nesbitt
entered into possession of the tract of land devised to her. In the
year 909 she died without having borne children and was survived by
her husband, William J. Nesbitt, who continued in possession of the
land.
Soon after Mary A. Nesbitt's death her brothers and sisters
commenced an action of ejectment, and for rents and profits, against
William J. Nesbitt, claiming to be owners in fee simple. He answered
claiming a one-fifth interest in the land and praying for partition.
Judgment was rendered for the defendant and the plaintiffs appeal^
The will contained a residuary clause in which the testator gave to
his children surviving him, share and share alike, "all other property,
goods, chattels, moneys, stocks, credits, and effects" of which he might
die seized.
The defendant claims that his wife was the donee of an
estate tail ; that the donor retained a reversionary interest in fee simple expectant upon the estate tail; that
by virtue of the residuary
will,
descended,
of
the
this
reversion
was
not
clause
disposed of
upon the death of the donor, to his heirs, one of whom was his daughter, Mary A. Nesbitt; and that upon her death the defe ndant, as her
surviving husbajd,, took her ^.hare^af the fee.^which was gneifif tli^.. If,
however, the residuary clause of the will was effectual to devise the
one-fifth
reversion to the testator's children, Mary A. Nesbitt took
Under
interest which, upon her death, descended to the defendant.
one-fifth interest in the land
either theory the defendant's claim to
the law of tliis state recognizes estates tail as they existed
valid
under the common law of England at the time of the colonization of

if

is

a

a

it

if,

J

this country.

a

a

a

a

grant to man and the heirs of his
Under the early common law
fee on condition that he had heirs of his body.
body was a grant of
conditional fee. If the donee
The fee so granted was designated
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had no heirs of his body, the condition was not performed arid the land
reverted to the donor.
If heirs of the donee's body were bom, the
condition was regarded as performed and the donee was at liberty to
make a conveyance which would bar him, his issue, and the donor's
reversion.
He could likewise charge the land with rents and encumbrances which would bind his issue, and the estate was forfeitable
for his treason. If the condition were performed but the donee made
no conveyance, the land descended, upon his death, to the specified
issue, who were at liberty to convey. If they made no conveyance
the land reverted to the donor. If the condition were performed but
the issue died, and the donee then died without having made a conIn order to_bar J:he p osveyance, the land reverted to the donor.
sibility of reverter to the donor and to restore the descent to its ordinary course under the common law, donees of conditional fees were
in the habit of making conveyances as soon as issue was born and
To stop this practice, which evaded the
taking back warranty deeds.
condition and defeated the intention of the donor, the nobility of the
realm, who were desirous of perpetuating family possessions, procured
the passage of the statute of Westminster II, known as the statute
13 Edw. I, c. 1, June 28, 1285.
This.
_^de donis conditionalibus."
statute took away, the power of alienation and declared that the will of
the donor, plainly expressed, should be observed, and that tenements
givelrTto a man and the heirs of his body should go to his issue, if there
The" judges interwere any, and if not should revert to the donor.
preted this statute to mean that the donee no longer took a conditional
fee capable of being disposed of as soon as issue was bom, but that
he took a particular estate, denominated an estate tail, and that instead of a possibility of reverter only remaining in the donor, he had
Some
a revers ion in fee simple expectant upon the failure of issue.
of the social consequences of this statute are thus described by Blackstone :
"Children grew disobedient when they knew they could not be set
aside ; farmers were ousted of their leases made by tenants in tail ; for
if such leases had been valid, then under colour of long leases the issue
might have been virtually disinherited ; creditors were defrauded of
their debts ; for, if a tenant in tail could have charged his estate with
their payment, he might also have defeated his issue, by mortgaging
it for as much as it was worth ; innumerable latent entails were produced to deprive purchasers of the lands they had fairly bought; of
suits in consequence of which our ancient books are full : and treasons
were encouraged, as estates-tail were not liable to forefeiture, longer
than for the tenant's life. So that they were justly branded, as the
source of new contentions, and mischiefs unknown to the common
law; and almost universally considered as the common grievance of
the realm."
2 Commentaries, *116.
Notwithstanding these mischiefs, the statute forms one of the funAig.Prop. — 36
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damental institutes of the land law of England which three and a quarter centuries later was transplanted in the New World.
Before the settlement at Jamestown, in the fourth year of James I
(1607), a number of statutes had been passed whereby the privileges
They were made forfeitattending estates tail were much abridged
able for treason. 26 Henry VIII, c. 13. Certain leases by the tenant
in tail not prejudicial to the issue were allowed to be good in law. 32
Henry VIII, c. 28. The statute of fines (4 Henry VII, c. 24) was
construed to permit the tenant in tail and his heirs to be barred by levying a fine {32 Henry VIII, c. 36). Such estates were chargeable with
the payment of certain debts due the king (33 Henry VIII, c. 39),
and by construction of the statute, 43 Eliz. c. 4, an appointment to
charitable uses by a tenant in tail was held to be good, 2 Bl. Com. 117
et seq.
The most serjous blow, however, to the evils fostered by estates tail under the statute de donis was struck by a bold piece of
In Taltatum's case, reported in Year Book. 12
judicial legislation.
Edw. IV, 19 (1472), the judges, upon consultation, held that a common recovery suffered by a tenant in tail accomplished the complete
destruction of the estate tail.. This mode of barring estates tail is
thus described in 1 Washburn on Real Property (6th Ed.) § 186:
"This was a fictitious suit brought in the name of the person who
was to purchase the estate, against the tenant in tail who was willing
to convey. The tenant, instead of resisting this claim himself, under
the pretence that he had acquired his title of some third person who
had warranted
vouched in, or, by
process from the court, called
his third person, technically the vouchee, to come in and defend the
title. The vouchee came in as one of the dramatis personce of this
word disappeared and was
judicial farce, and then without saying
defaulted.
was
principle of the feudal law adopted thence by
man conveyed lands with
the common law, that
warranty, and
better title, he
the grantee lost his estate by eviction by one having

a
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it

should give his warrantee lands of equal value by way of recompense.
would be too barefaced to cut off the rights of reversion as
And as
tail, by
well as of the issue
judgment between the tenant and
was gravely adjudged, 1st, that the claimant should have
stranger,
and 2d, that the tenant should
the land as having the better title to
have judgment against his vouchee to recover lands of equal value on
the ground that he was warrantor, and thus, theoretically, nobody was
If the issue in tail or the reversioner, or remainder-man,
harmed.
lost that specific estate, he was to have one of equal value through
this judgment in favor of the tenant in tail, whereas in fact the
vouchee was an irresponsible man, and
was never expected that he
in
was anything more than
the
dummy
game. The result of this,
kind of pia fraus to elude the statute De
which Blackstone calls
Donis,' was that the lands passed from the tenant in tail to the claimant
in fee simple, free from the claims of reversioner, remainder-man, or
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issue in tail, and he either paid the tenant for it as a purchaser, or
conveyed it back to him again in fee-simple."
The precedent of fictitious suits as means of acquiring or conveying
property was found in the Roman law, and the practice of resorting to
them was supposedly introduced in England by the clergy to evade the
statute of mortmain.
Spence's Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery, p. 141, note. The solemn piece of jugglery already described
later became more involved.
"Complex, however, as the proceedings above related may appear,
the ordinary forms of a common recovery in later times were more
complicated still ; for it was found expedient not to bring the collusive
action against the tenant in tail himself, but that he should- come in as
one vouched to warranty.
The lands were, therefore, in the first place
conveyed, by a deed called the recovery deed, to a person against whom
the action was to be brought, and who was called the tenant to the
The proceedings then took place in the Court of
praecipe or writ.
Common Pleas, which had an exclusive jurisdiction in all real actions.
A regular writ was issued against the tenant to the prrecipe by another
person, called the demandant; the tenant in tail was then vouched to
The tenant in tail, on being
warranty by the tenant to the praecipe.
vouched, then vouched to warranty in the same way the crier of the
Court, who was called the common vouchee.
The demandant then
craved leave to imparl or confer with the last vouchee in private, which
was granted by the Court; and the vouchee, having thus got out of
Court, did not return; in consequence of which judgment Vvas given
in the manner before mentioned, on which a regular writ vyas directed
to the sheriff to put the demandant into possession."
Williams on
Real Property (17th Ed.) p. 108.
In all cases there was an agreement or understanding that the person
who acquired an estate tail by means of a common recovery should
or convey
to the original tenant in tail in fee simple, or
pay for
as such tenant might direct.
The result was that estates
dispose of
tail and all remainders over and the reversion were effectually barred
As Blackstone said, by long acquiescence and use, these recoveries came
to be looked upon as
legal mode of conveyance by which
tenant in
tail might dispose of his land.
Com. *117. This rightof conveyance became, in contemplation of the law, an inherent and j^nseparable~
incident of an estate tail and covenants and conditions attempting to
Washburn
^e^train the exercise of the tight were held to be void.
188. The same purpose was accomplished
on Real Property (6th Ed.)
by the equally fictitious proceeding of fine.
In volume of his Commentaries (14th Ed.) p. *14, Chancellor Kent
said
"Estates tail were introduced into this country with the other parts
of the English jurisprudence, and they subsisted in full force before
our Revolution, subject equally to the power of being barred by
fine
or common recovery."
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These estates are now very generally changed by legislation into fee
simples, or reversionary estates in fee simple, or may be converted intq_
fee simples by ordinary conve3^ance, 2 Bl. Com. 119 (Cooky's note).
In the pages following the above quotation from Kent much of this
legislation is referred to.
The territorial legislature of 1855 passed an elaborate act relating
Stat, of Kan. Terr, 1855, ch. 26.
Section 5 of this
to conveyances.
act reads as follows :
"That from and after the passage of this act, where any conveyance
or devise shall be made whereby the grantee or devisee shall become
seized in law or equity of such estate, in any lands or tenements, as
under the statute of the tliirteenth of Edward the first, (called the statute of entails) would have been held an estate in fee tail, every such
conveyance or devise shall vest an estate for life only in such grantee
or devisee, who shall possess and have the same power over and right
in such premises, and no other, as a tenant for life thereof would have
by law ; and upon the death of such grantee or devisee, the said lands
and tenements shall go and be vested in the children of such grantee
or devisee, equally to be divided between them as tenants in common,
in fee ; and if there be only one child, then to that one, in fee ; and if
any child be dead, the part which would have come to him or her shall
go to his or her issue ; and if there be no issue, then to his or her heirs."
This, of course, constituted a deliberate legislative modification of
the common law relating to estates tail.
In 1859 the territorial legislature completely revised the act of 1855 relating to conveyances, making radical changes in its substance and content. Laws 1859, ch. 30.
The subject matter of the section quoted was entirely omitted and
nothing whatever was substituted for it either in tlie revision or in any
other statute. The result was that section 5 was repealed by implication, and since the legislature had its attention specially directed to estates tail by that section the purpose evidently was to restore the common law on the subject.
This intention is made more apparent by
the passage of the following act at the same session :
"The common law of England and all statutes and acts of Parliament in aid thereof, made prior to tlie fourth year of James the First,
and which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom and not
repugnant to or inconsistent with the constitution of the United States
and the act entitled 'An act to organize the Territory of Nebraska and
Kansas,' or any statute law which may from time to time be made
or passed by this or any subsequent Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Kansas, shall be the rule of action and decision in this Territory, any law, custom or usage to the contrary notwithstanding."

Laws 1859, ch. 121, § 1.
The constitution adopted in July,
admitted to the Union on January

1859, under which
31,

1861, contains

the state was

nothing which
upon the subject either directly or remotely, and the legislature
has not since dealt with it. Nothing is to be found in the acts relatins:
bears
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to conveyances, descents and distributions, or wills, incompatible with
the existence of such estates, and in their unfettered form such estates
are not out of harmony with the conditions and wants of tlie people of
Kansas. On the other hand, they exactly meet the requirements of testators in the situation of John Ewing. He desired to give his daughter an estate for life, in order to secure to her a home and some measure of comfort and welfare while she lived. After that he desired that
the remainder should go to her children in fee. But h e did not desire
that his_^9n-in-la_w should take the whole gift should she die childless,.to
be enjoyed by him and perhaps a strange second wife and their chi]dren. The court knows of no reason in law, morals, or public policy
why these sentime nts should not be respected, and they were clearly
and fully expressed by tlie language of the will, interpreted by the
common law. The overweening propensity to perpetuate family name
and family property which made estates tail so obnoxious in the middle
ages is fairly curbed by the right of a tenant in tail to convert his tenancy into a fee simple, and is not a menace to the general welfare of
the people of this state ; and it will be remembered that this right beFines and recoveries,
came one of the characteristics of the estate.
however, are not adapted to any of our needs, are inconsistent with the
code of civil procedure and consequently can not be resorted to, as portions of the common law, in aid of the general statutes of this state.
The effect of these indirect, fictitious and
Gen. Stat. 1909, § 9850.
operose proceedings was merely that of a deed of record, and the same
end may now be accomplished by an ordinary conveyance. The fiction
and the form alone are obsolete. The substance of the proceeding — a
conveyance —and the essential character of the estate tail — the right to
convert the estate into a fee simple by a conveyance — are preserved.
If, therefore, Mary A. Nesbitt had chosen, in her lifetime, to make_a
conveyance of the land devised to her, she would thereby have barred
herself, her issue, born and unborn, and her father's reversion.
While the mere possibility of a reverter such as attended conditional
gifts under the ancient common law is not a subject of disposal by will,
reversions in fee under the statute de donis may be devised. The result is that Mary A. Nesbitt was given by the will an estate tail in the
land in controversy.
She also took by virtue of the residuary clause of
the will, one-fifth of the reversion in fee expectant upon her death
without issue.
Upon_ her__ death this interest passed to h er husband,
■
the, defend ant.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.'
6 Estates in fee tail are recognized in Delaware as still subsisting.
In Hazzard ^. Hazzard (Del. Super.) 94 Atl. 905 (1915), it was held that upon a levy
and sale under an execution against a tenant in tail the purchaser acquired a
fee simple ; the statute (Rev. Code Del. 1915, § 4365) providing that such purchaser should acquii'e such estate as the judgment debtor might convey. By
section 3235, Rev. Code 1915, it is provided that a person having an estate tail
shall have power to alien the lands in fee simple or for other less estate by
See, however, the same case reversed in 97 Atl. 233 (1916).
deed.
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On October 27, 1906. Etta Kline commenced an action in tlie court
of common pleas of Pickaway county against the plaintiff in error,
Harriet Dungan and others, asking for the partition ot certain real
Thereafter, to-\vit, on November 22,
estate in her petition described.
1906, Adolph G. Wilson also brought suit in said court of common
pleas against said Harriet Dungan and others, asking partition of the
same lands. On motion these cases were consolidated and tried as one
The lands of which partition was asked consisted of three tracts,
case.
two of which, by the will of Titus Dungan, had been devised to "Elizabeth Wilson and the heirs of her body," and the other tract had been
devised to said "Elizabeth Wilson and the heirs of her body" by one
]\Iary Ann Kirkendall. The devisors Titus Dungan and Mary Ann
Kirkendall both died prior to June 18, 1883, and the will of each had
The devisee Elizabeen duly admitted to probate prior to that time.
beth Wilson had seven children, among whom were two sons, William
T. and George H. Wilson. William T. Wilson died on January 16,
1887, his mother Elizabeth Wilson surviving him. She died October 27,
1906.
On July 4, 1878, during the lifetime of his mother, William T.
Wilson deeded to one George Dungan an undivided one-seventh interest in the premises which had been devised to Elizabeth Wilson and
the heirs of her body, and thereafter said George Dungan deeded the
On June 18, 1883,
same to the plaintiff in error, Harriet Dungan.
life,
in
full
also deeded an
George H. Wilson, his mother being then
undivided one-seventh interest in said lands to George Dungan, which
interest was subsequently deeded by said George Dungan to one John
Schleyer and by the latter to Harriet Dungan, the plaintiff in error.
George H. Wilson died in October, 1896, ten years prior to the death
of his mother Elizabeth Wilson. The deeds of William T. and George
H. Wilson, although containing no covenants of general warranty, contained recitals that would perhaps estop each of them, if living, from
asserting title to the property therein described.
The controversy in this case is between the children of William JT.
and George H. Wilson on the one side, and Harriet Dungan the plajnThe children of William T. and
tiff in error on the other side.
George H. Wilson claim to be the owners of, and entitled to such interest in the real estate to be partitioned, as would have descended
to their fathers WilHam T. and George H. Wilson respectively, if they
had survived their mother Elizabeth Wilson, the first donee in tail.Harriet Dungan, plaintiff' in error, claims title to the same premises
under arid by virtue of the alleged conveyances made as aforesaid by
said William T. and George H. Wilson in their lifetime, and she further contends that the children of the said William T. and George .H.
Wilson, because of the recitals in said conveyances, are now estopped
from claiming any interest in or title to the premises sought to be par-
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titione d. In both the court of common pleas and the circuit court —
to which latter court the case was taken on appeal — this claim of Harriet Dungan was determined against her. She now prosecutes error
to this court asking a reversal of the judgment of the circuit court.
Crew, J.^ If the estate tail devised to Elizabeth Wilson was not
alienable by tlie issue in tail during her life, subject to her tenancy
therein, then the grants made by William T. Wilson and George H.
Wilson, who both died before their mother, were wholly void and no
Therefore
estoppel thereunder can be invoked against their children.
the
record
as
the decision of this case, upon the facts
presented by
herein, depends primarily upon whether or not William T. and George
H. W ilson during the lifetime of their mother, wei"e severally seized
of a fee simple estate in the' premises which they respectively assumed
to convey to George Dungan.
That under the wills of Titus Dungan
and Mary Ann Kirkendall, Elizabeth Wilson, as devisee, took an estate tail in the premises in controversy, is conceded, and the contention
of Harr iet JDungan, plaintiff in error, is, that under the devises therein
madejo, Elizabeth Wilson and the heirs of her body, that William T.
and Ge orge H. Wilson as her cliildren, upon the death of said testat ors, e ach immediately, by force of the provisions of Section 4200, Re^
vised Statutes, became entitled to and vested with an absolute estate
in^fee simple to a one-seventh part of the premises so devised to their
mother, Elizabeth Wilson, as first donee in tail. Onjhe other hand, it
is claimed by the children of William T. and George H. Wilson, all of
whom are defendants in error herein, that their fathers, during the lifetime of Elizabeth Wilson, had no estate or interest in said premises
which they of right could alienate or convey, that until the death of
said Elizabeth Wilson, the interest of William T. and George H. Wilson in said premises was that of a mere possibility or expectancy which
could ripen into title and become a vested estate or interest, only in the
event that they survived their mother, Elizabeth Wilson, the first donee
in tail. In both the court of common pleas and in the circuit court, the
contenti on of Harriet Dungan was held to be erroneous and was determined against her, and in this we think ther ewas no error.
Section 4200, Revised Statutes, provides as follows : "No estate in
fee simple, fee tail, or any lesser estate, in lands or tenements, lying
within this state, shall be given or granted, by deed or will, to any person or persons but such as are in being, or to the immediate issue or
descendants of such as are in being at the time of making such deed or
will ; and all estates given in tail shall be and remain an absolute estate.,
in Jee simple to the issue ^f the first donee in tail." Counsel for plaintiff in error, in discussing the effect of this statute, say in their brief :
"The first part of the section, preceding the semi-colon, permits the
granting of a limited estate tail and it forbids the granting of the same
to persons who are in fact more remote than the immediate issue of
persons in being at the time said grant is made." This claim, ignoring
7

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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it does the word "descendants" found in the statute, is in part at
kast clearly erroneous. It will be observed that by the language of the
first clause of this section the entailment by deed or will, is not restricted to persons in being, or to the immediate issue of such as are in
being, but the limitation is, to persons in being, "or to the immediate
issue or descendants of such as are in being at the time of making such
* * *
deed or will."
That, during the life of Elizabeth Wilson, first donee in tail, her children William T. and George H. Wilson had n o estate or interest_m
the premises devised to her which they of right could alien or convey
as

while not heretofore directly decided by this court has, we think, by
necessary implication, been so determined in several cases. In Pollock
V. Speidel, 17 Ohio St. 448, in discussing the scope and effect of the
act of 1811 (now section 4200, Revised Statutes), Scott, J., says : "The
statute recognizes the first donee in tail as holding an estate for life
only, as tenant in tail ; and does not convert the estate into a fee simple
till it reaches the hands of his issue." While it would seem to be, and
was, incorrect to speak of the first donee in tail as holding an estate for
life, as tenant in tail, this apparent inaccuracy of statement is sufficiently, and we think correctly explained in Harkness v. Corning, 24
Ohio St. 428, where the court say: "A somewhat similar expression
is used by the learned judge delivering the opinion of this court in Pollock V. Speidel, 17 Ohio St. 447. The controversy in that case was between the issue of the donee and the defendant, claiming under a conveyance from the donee, and the question was as to the quantity of interest conveyed. The judge said the 'statute recognizes the first donee
in tail as holding an estate for life only, as tenant in tail.' The idea intended to be expressed was that the donee, holding only as tenant in
tail, could not convey an estate that would endure beyond his own fife.
To give to the expression the meaning claimed by plaintiff's counsel,
that the donee took a mere life estate, would render the opinion not
only inconsistent with itself but with the fourth proposition of the syllabus." This case of Harkness v. Corning, supra, is also decisive of the
proposition, that the statute does not become operative until the estate
passes by the first donee in tail and reaches the issue of such donee,
when, as said in the opinion (24 Ohio St. at page 426), on the determination of the interest of such donee and of such rights as the law annexes
to his interest while held by him, the statute then enlarges the estate tail
in the hands of such issue into an absolute estate in fee simple.
When the case of Pollock v. Speidel, supra, was a second time before
this court, 27 Ohio St. 86, the court, in considering and discussing the
eft'ect of the last paragraph of the statute which reads, "and all estates
given in tail shall be and remain an absolute estate in fee simple to the
issue of the first donee in tail," say that the issue of a tenant in tail
"has no legal rights in the premises during the tenant's life. The issue
takes, if at all, by descent as heir of the body, and the maxim is 'nemo
" The action was one in
est hseres viventis.'
ejectment, and was
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brought by the children of one James Pollock, who was the son of John
Pollock, Jr., first donee in tail, against the defendant to recover possession of certain real estate of which they claimed to be seized in fee
simple as heirs of said James Pollock. The defendant denied the title
of plaintiffs and alleged title in himself under a conveyance from said
James Pollock by deed of general warranty executed June 30, 1831.
While it does not positively and affirmatively appear at what time John
Pollock, Jr., the first donee in tail died, and the court in the opinion
so state, yet it does appear from the agreed statement of facts therein :
"III. That John Pollock, Jr., left some five children besides James
Pollock, the grantee in the deed dated June 30, 1831." We therefore
conclude that the fair and reasonable inference is, and that the fact
was, that John Pollock, Jr., the father of James, died before he did,
and as, upon the death of his father, James as issue in tail would thereupon take, by force of the statute an absolute estate in fee simple, with
full power of alienation, he would of course, as would also his heirs,
be estopped by his deed of June 30, 1831, which was a deed of general
warranty, and this would be so, as said by the court in that case, even
though John Pollock the first donee in tail was living at the time of its
execution. Upon no other theory, than that James survived his father,
can the decision in this case be reconciled with other decisions of this
court, or be supported and upheld.
Our statute of entailments. Section 4200, substantially in its present
form, was copied from the statute of Connecticut, and the precise question we are now considering was decided by the supreme court of that
state in Dart v. Dart, 7 Conn. 250, where it is said by Peters, J. : "2.
What estate passed from the plaintiff, by his deed to the releasees?
By the common law, a release is a secondary conveyance, and is a discharge of a man's right in land or tenements to another, who hath some
former estate in possession. Shep. Touch. 318, 2 Bl. Com., 328. But
in this state, a release is considered as a primary conveyance, and passes all the right of the releasor to the releasee, provided no other person
be in possession adversely ; and operates as a conveyance without war1 Sw. Dig. 133.
But if he have no right, nothing passes, not
ranty.
even a chose in action.
What es ta];£,..,tfa£n^. liad th e issu e o i the fir.st ,
done e in tail, during his life? My. answer
none. The plaintiff could.,,
the refore, convey none.
Such issue
only an heir apparent or presumptive
His title
the bare possibility, or mere chance, of becoming
'nemo est haeres viventis.'
eventually the heir in tail; for the maxim
And
well settled rule, that
rnere £ossibility cari not be released
and the reason thereof is, that
release supposes
right
_orconyeyed
IrTBemg;
Shep. Touch. 319; Bac. Abr. tit. Release, H."
follows from the foregoing, we think, that the judgment of the circuit court in the present case was ight and should be affirmed. Judg/7
ment affirmed.^
,
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In many states statutes relative to estates tail have been passed. See
Stimson, Am. St. Law,
1313;
143^
In MichBrewster on Conveyancing,

570

DEEivATiVE TITLES

(Part

2

SECTION 3.— LIFE ESTATES
I. Conve;ntional

LITTLETON'S TENURES.
Tenant for term of life is, where a man letteth lands or tenements
to another for term of the life of the lessee,,or for term of tlie^Jife_of
another man. In^ this case the lessee is tenant for ternL.oi life.. But bycommon speech he which holdeth for term of his own life, is called tenant for term of his life, and he which holdeth for term of another's
life, is called tenant for teim of another man's life (tenant pur terme
d'autre vie.)
Section 56.

COKE UPON LITTLETON.
"Or for term of the life of another man." Now it is to be understood, that if the lessee in that case dieth living cesty que vie (that is he
for whose life the lease was made), he that first entereth shall hold the
land during that other man's life, and he that so entereth is within
Littleton's words, viz. tenant pur autre vie, and it shall be punished
for waste as tenant pur auter vie, and subject to the payment of the
rent reserved, and is in law called an occupant, because his title is by his
And so if tenant for his own life grant over his
first occupation.®
estate to another, if the grantee dieth there shall be an occupant.
In
like manner it is of an estate created by law; for if tenant by the curtesy or tenant in dower grant over his or her estate, and the grantee
dieth, there shall be an occupant.
But against the king there shall be
no occupant, because nullum tempus occurrit regi. And therefore no
man shall gain the king's land by priority of entry. There can be no
occupant of anything that lieth in grant, and that cannot pass without
deed, because every occupant must claim by a que estate and aver the
life of cesty que vie. It were good to prevent the uncertainty of the
estate of the occupant to add tliese words (to have and to hold to him
igan the statute is as follo\rs:

"All

estates tail are abolished, and every estate

'Uhic'h would be adjiidfied a fee tail, ac-cording to the laws of the territory
of Michi^^an, as it existed before the second day of March, one thousand eight
hundred and twenty-one, shall for all i>un'f^«^s be adjudtred a fee simple; and
if no valid remainder he limited thereon, tshall be a fee simjile alisohilc." IIoweirs Ann. .'^t. 1912, § 10(525. There are many states in which the statutes are
substantially as above, omitting the italicized portion; tlie part in italics,
though not so conimon, is found in several statutes.
» See 1 Stimson's
Am. St. Law, § 1335; Howell's Ann. Mich. St. 1912, |
10628 ; St. 7 Will. IV & 1 Vict. c. 26, ss. 3, 6 ; St 60 & 61 \'ict. c. 65, part 1.
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and his heirs during the life of cesty que vie) and this shall prevent
the occupant, and yet the lessee may assign it to whom he will ; or if he
hath already an estate for another man's life witholit these words, then
it were good for him to assign his estate to divers men and tlieir heirs
* * *
during the life of cesty que vie.
You have perceived, that our author divides tenant for life into two
branches, viz., into tenant for term of his own life, and into tenant for
term of another man's life ; to this may be added a third, viz., into an
estate both for term of his own life, and for term of another man's
life.
As if a lease may be made to A. to have to him for term of his own
life, and the lives of B. and C. for the lessee in this case hath but one
freehold, which hath this limitation, during his own life, and during the
lives of two others. * * *

If

man grant an estate to a woman dum sola fuit, or durante
viduitate, or quamdiu se bene gesserit, or to a man and a woman during
the coverture, or as long as the grantee dwell in such a house, or so
long as he pay xl. &c. or until the grantee be promoted to a benefice,
or for any like uncertain time, which time, as Bracton saith, is tempus
indeterminatum : in all these cases, if it be of lands or tenements, the
lessee hath in judgment of law an estate for life determinable, if livery
be made; and if it be of rents, advowsons, or any other thing that lie
in grant, he hath a like estate for life by the delivery of the deed, and
in count or pleading he shall allege the lease, and conclude, that by
foric thereof he was seised generally for term of his life.
If a man make lease of a manor, that at the time of the lease made
is worth £20. per annum, to another until £100. be paid, in this case
because the annual profits of the manor are uncertain, he hath an estate
for life, if livery be made determinable upon the levying of the £100.
But if a man grant a rent of £20. per annum until £100. be paid, there
he hath an estate for five years, for there it is certain, and depends
And yet in some cases a man shall have an unupon no uncertainty.
certain interest in lands or tenements, and yet neither an estate for life,
for years, or at will. As if a man by his will in writing, devise his
lands to his executors for payment of debts, and until his debts be
paid ; in this case the executors have but a chattel, and an uncertain interest in the land until his debts be paid; for if they should have it for
their lives, then by their death their estate should cease, and the debts
unpaid ; but being a chattel, it shall go to the executors of executors
for the payment of his debts ; and so note a diversity between a devise
and a conveyance at the common law in his life time. And tenant by
statute merchant, by statute staple, and by elegit, have uncertain interests in lands or tenements, and yet they have but chattels, and no freehold, whose estates are created by divers acts of parliament, whereof
more shall be said hereafter. And so have guardians in chivalry which
hold over for single or double value uncertain interests, and yet b'Jt
chattels.
a
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If

one grant lands or tenements, reversions, remainders, rents, advowsons, commons, or the like, and express or limit no estate, the lessee
or grantee (due cei*emonies requisite by law being performed) hath
an estate for life. The same law is of a declaration of a use. A man
may have an estate for term of life determinable at will; as if the king
doth grant an office to one at will and grant a rent to him for the
exercise of his office for term of his life, this is determinable upon the
determination of the office.
A., tenant in fee simple, makes a lease of lands to B. to have and
to hold to B. for tefm of life, without mentioning for whose life it
shall be, it shall be deemed for term of the life of the lessee, for it shall
be taken most strongly against the lessor, and as hath been said an estate for a man's own life is higher than for the life of another.
But
if tenant in tail make such a lease without expressing for whose life,
this shall be taken but for the life of the lessor, for two reasons.
First, when the construction of any act is left to the law, the law
which abhorreth injury and wrong, will never so construe it as it shall
work a wrong; and in this case, if by construction it should be for the
life of the lessee, then should the estate tail be discontinued, and a new
reversion gained by wrong; but if it be construed for the life of the
tenant in tail, then no wrong is wrought.
And it is a general rule, that
whensoever the' words of a deed, or of the parties without deed, may
have a double intendment, and the one standeth with law and right,
and the other is wrongful and against law, the intendment that standeth with law shall be taken.
Secondly, the law more respecteth a lesser estate by right, than a
larger estate by wrong; as if tenant for life in remainder disseise tenant for life, now he hath a fee simple, but if tenant for life die, now is
his wrongful estate in fee by judgment in law changed to a rightful
estate

for life.

Co. Litt. 41b, 42 a, b.

LITTLETON'S TENURES.
And it is to be understood, that there is feoffor and feoffee, donor
and donee, lessor and lessee.
Feoffor is properly where a man inf eoffs another in any lands or tenements in fee simple, he which
maketh the enfeoft"ment is called the feoffor, and he to whom the feoffment is made is called the feoffee. And the donor is properly where
a man giveth certain lands or tenements to another in tail, he which
maketh tlie gift is called the donor, and he to whom tlie gift is made is
called the donee.
And the lessor is properly where a man letteth to
another lands or tenements for term of life, or for term of years, or to
hold at will, he which maketh the lease is called lessor, and he to whom
the lease is made is called lessee.
And every one which hath an estate
in any lands or tenements for term of his own or another man's life.
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is called tenant of freehold, and none other of a lesser estate can have
a freeho ld; but they of a greater estate have a freehold ; for he in fee
sim2le hath a freehold, and tenant in tail hath a freehold, &c.
Section 57.

ROSSE'S CASE.
(Court of Common Pleas, 1600.

5

Co. 13.)

Between Peter Rosse and Aldwick in an ejectione firmse, which began Pasch. Z1 Eliz. Rot. 499, the case was such ; a lease is made to A.
and his assigns, habendum to him during his life, and the lives of B.
and C. and if this limitation during the life of B. and C. were void or
not, was the question. And it was adjudged, that the limitation was
good; for where it was objected that when a man hath two estates in
him, the greater shall drown the less, and that an estate for his own
life is higher than for the life of another ; and therefore an estate for
To
his own life, and for the lives of others cannot stand together.
Bar,
the
in
the
case
at
lessee
answered
and
resolved
that
that it was
had but one estate, which hath this limitation, scil. during his life, and
the lives of two others, and he hath but one freehold, and therefore
there^cannot be any drowning of estates in the case, but he hath an
estate of freehold to continue during these three lives, and the survivor
of them.**

In re AMOS.

CARRIER

V.

(Court of Chancery.

PRICE.
[1891] 3 Ch. 159.)

Originating summons by the executors of the will of James Amos,
asking for the determination by the Court of questions arising in the
administration of his estate.
By his will, dated the 20th of October, 1888, the testator appointed
And he gave,
Robert Carrier and J. N. Clark to be his executors.
devised, and bequeathed unto Thomas Price a leasehold house known
as 27, Bath Terrace, "the conditions to be as follows : that the property be left to him for his life and for the life of his heir, after which
it becomes the property of the Boiler Makers and Iron Ship Builders
There followed similar gifts in precisely similar terms, and
Society."
to
exactly similar conditions, of two other (freehold) houses
subject
The will
to Henry Poole and Thomas Henry Williams respectively.
continued thus, "that each of the above keep the property held by them
in good repair, and shall pay to the trustees the sum of 4s. per week,
10 See

Brudnel's Case,

5 Co. 9a

(1592).
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And tliat the further sum of
of as follows :
Fund,
and £5
viz., i5 per annum to the Boiler Makers Benevolent
Should either of the parties refuse or
per annum to the executors.
fail to comply with the foregoing conditions they shall forfeit all rights
until the whole of the mortgage be paid.

£3 6s. 8d. each per annum be paid by them to be disposed

a

11

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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to the property, and the executors shall cause the same to be handed
over to the Boiler Makers Society forthwith."
The attesting witnesses to the will were the two executors.
The Defendants to the sumrhons were the three devisees. Price,
Poole, and Williams; the Boiler Makers and Iron Ship Builders Society; and the Boiler Makers Benevolent Fund; and Elizabeth Reece,
the wife of J. H. Reece, who was the heiress-at-law and one of the
next of kin of the testator.
The Boiler Makers Society was registered under the Trade Union
Acts, 1871 and 1876. It was governed by an executive council. The
rules provided for the payment by members of monthly contributions
for the purpose of forming a fund for providing weekly pay for the
members during sickness, super-annuation allowances, and other pecuniary benefits. There were also provisions relating to strikes and
trade disputes. Rule 39 provided for the formation of a Benevolent
Fund for the benefit of the widows and children of members. This
fund was under the control of the executive council.
The summons asked that a construction might be put upon the devises, bequests, and directions in the will contained of and concernirig;^^
the three houses given to Price, Poole, and Williams respectively, and
that the effect of the gift of £5 per annum to the Boiler Makers Benevolent Fund and £5 per annum to the executors might be determined.
North, J.^^ * * * 'j^|-,g Qj^|y remaining question is^ what interI confess I do not understand what
est do the tenants for life take?
the testator had in his mind ; and I can only construe his language as
I find it. In my opinion, the property is given to each devisee or
legatee for a limited interest, which is described as "for his life and for
the life of his heir." For the devisee's own life the gift is clearly good.
whether the interest which he takes comes to an end
The question
"upon his death, the interest for the life of his heir being too vague to
do not see any reason in point of law which prevents
be recognized.
no hiatus of any kind
the gift to
the gift from being good. There
the devisee for his Hfe would necessarily come to an end at his death.
his heir
as_But at the very moment of his death the person who
nothing discontinuous in the limitation which
certained, and there
see no ground for saying that the heir
from being good.
prevents
limitation to
tenant for two
In my opinion,
takes beneficially.
think
lives, the lives being his own and that of his heir in each case.
can see nothing in
the meaning of the testator's words, and
that
law to prevent their taking effect.
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and to the Benevolent
these sums is a condition subsequent,
and, as the person who takes the land cannot legally pay them, he is
not liable to forfeit his land by reason of his not doing that which he
cannot legally do.
the executors

THOMPSON

V.

BAXTER.

j'X

107 IVIinn. 122, 119 N. W. 797, 21 L. K. A.
[X. S.J 575.)

(Supreme Court of Iklinnesota, 1909.

Brown, J. Proceedings in forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
instituted in justice court, where _defendant had judgment.
Plaintiff ,
appealed to the district court, where a like result followed.
From the
judgment of that court she appealed to this court.
The ac tion inyolves the right to the possession of certain residence^
propert y in the city of Albert Lea, and was submitted to the court
helow upon the pleadings and a stipulation of facts. It appears that
jilaintjff is the owner of the premises; that she acquired title thereto
b y purchas e from a former owner, who had theretofore entered into
a contract 5y~ which he leasecTand dernised the premises to defendant
at an agreed monthly rent of twenty-two dollars; and plaintiff's title
is subject to all rights that became vested in defendant thereby. The
lease, after reciting the rental of the premises and other usual conditions, contained upon the subject of the term of the tenancy, the following stipulation : "To have and to hold the above-rented premises
^
unto the said party of the second part (the tenant) his heirs, executors,
administrators, and assigns, for and during the full term of while he
shall wish to live in Albert Lea, from and after the first day of December, 1904."
The only question involved under the stipulation is the
const ruction of this provision of the lease. Defendant has at all times
paid the rent as it became due; but, if plaintiff has the right to terminate the tenancy and eject him, proper notice for that purpose has been
given. __Ap£ellant contends that the lease created either a tenancy at
will, at sufferance, or from month to month, and that plaintiff could
terminate the same at any time by proper notice. The trial court held^,
in ha rmony with defendant's contentioUj, that the contract created a
li f e est^ate in defendant, terminable only at his death or removal from
Albert Lea. Appellant assigns this conclusion as error.
A determination of the question presented involves a construction
of the lease and a brief examination of some of the principles of law
applicable to tenancies at will, at sufferance, from month to month, and
life estates. Deeds, leases, or other instruments aft'ecting the title to
real property are construed, guided by the law appHcable to the particular subject, precisely as other contracts are construed, and eft'ect ,
given the, intention of ..the_^arties.
Lawton v. Joesting, 96 Minn. 163,
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104 N. W. 830; Whetstone v. Hunt, 78 Ark. 230, 93 S. W. 979, 8 Ann.
Cas. 443, and extended note. The contract before us, though somewhat £ecuhar and unusual as to the term of the tenancy intended to be
It granted the
created, is nevertheless clear and free from ambiguity.
demised premises to defendant "while he shall wish to live in Albert
therefore, the only question
Lea." The legal effect of this language

in

the case.
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Tenancies at will may be created by express words, or they may
arise by implication of law. Where created by express contract, the
writing necessarily so indicates, and reserves the right of termination
to either party, as where the lease provides that the tenant shall occupy
the premises so long as agreeable to both parties. Richardson v. LangTaunt. 128; Say v. Stoddard, 27 Ohio St. 478. ^uch tenridge,
ancies arise by implication of law where no definite time
stated in
the contract, or where the tenant enters into possession under an
contract for
specific term and he subsequently
agreement to execute
void lease, or where he
refuses to do so, or one who enters under
holds over pending negotiations for
new lease.
The chief characteristics of this form of tenancy are (1) uncertainty respecting the
term, and (2) the right of either party to terminate
by proper notice
and these features must exist, whether the tenancy be created by the
express language of the contract or by implication of law. An accuWood, Landlord
Tenant, 43, in the folrate definition
given in
one who enters into the posseslowing language: '_^A_tenant at will
sion of the lands or tenements of another, lawfully, but for no definite
term or purpose, but whose possession
subject to termination by
at
he
to
an
end to it. He
the landlord
sees fit
called
put
any time
tenant at will 'because he hath no certain or sure estate, for the les"
sor may put him out at what time
pleaseth him.'
A tenancy at sufferance arises where the tenant wrongfully holds
over after the expiration of his term, differing from the tenancy at
will, where the possession
by the permission of the landlord.
Kent, Com. 117; Edwards v. Hale,
Allen (Mass.) 462. He has a
naked possession without right, and, independent of statute,
not enWood, Landlord
Tenant,
also arises
titled to notice to quit.
where
mortgagor holds over after the expiration of the period of
redemption on foreclosure.
Stedman v. Gassett, 18 Vt. 346. In fact,
this relation exists in all cases where
person who enters lawfully into
the possession wrongfully holds possession after his estate or right
has ended. Kinsley v. Ames,
Mete. (Mass.) 29; Jackson v. McLeod,
Wood, Landlord
12 Johns. (N. Y.) 182;
TenBlackstone, 150;
ant,
A te nancy from month to month or year to year arises where no
fixed at so much per
definite time
agreed upon and the rent
be,
month,
as
the
and
terminable
at the expiration
or
case
may
year
has
been
of any period for which rent
Finch v. Moore, 50
paid.
Minn. 116, 52 N. W. 384. This form of tenancy can never exist where
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the lease or contract prescribes a fixed tinie.^ The mere fact that rent
is payable monthly does not alone determine the character of the tenancy. The monthly or yearly payments and an intention to limit the
term to a month or year must in all cases concur to create this species
of tenancy.
From these general principles of the law of tenancy it is quite clear
that the lease under consideration does not come within either class
Its language does not expressly define it as a tenancy at
mentioned.
will, and no such relation arises by implication, for the reason that the
term is not indefinite, within the meaning of the law on this subject, nor
is the right to terminate the lease reserved to the lessor. Indefiniteness
or uncertainty as to the term of the lease is illustrated by instances
where one occupies land by the naked permission of the owner (Hull
V. Wood, 14 Mees. & W. 681 ; Williams v. Deriar, 31 Mo. 13; Larned
V. Hudson, 60 N. Y. 102), or a person who holds under a void deed
(Stamper v. Griffin, 20 Ga. 312, 65 Am. Dec. 628; Executors v. Houston, 16 Ala. Ill), or where he enters under an agreement for a lease
not yet executed (Emmons v. Scudder, 115 Mass. 367), or under a
lease until the premises are sold (Lea v. Hernandez, 10 Tex. 137; Ela
V. Bankes, Zl Wis. 89), and under various circumstances wiiere no
time is specifically agreed upon. In the lease under consideration the
tenancy^is limited by the time defendant sliall continue to dwell in Albejt^^ea, and this limitation takes the case put of the class of tenancies at will.
It is equally clear that a tenancy at sufferance was not
created by the contract.
There has been no wrongful or unlawful
holding over after the expiration of the term. Nor does tlie rule of
tenancy from month to month apply for the reasons already pointed
out.
We therefore turn to tlie question, the turning point in the court below, whether the instrument created a life estate in defendant within
the princTpIes'of law applicable to , that branch of land titles.
It is
tEoroughly settled that a life estate may be created by a deed, lease, or
devise, either witb or without a stipulation for the payment of rent.
This class of tenancies differs in many essential respects from tenancies
at will, or from year to year, or at sufferance; the principal distinction
being that the former confers a freehold upon tbe tenant, and the latter a mere chattel interest. Tbe lease under consideration embodies all
the essentials of a life tenancy. . It contains the usual words of inheritance, necessary at common law, running to defendant, "his heirs,
executors, administrators, and assigns," and grants the right of occupancy for the term stated therein.
Life estates or life tenancies are clearly defined in the books, and
1 Taylor,
the lease here involved brings it within this class of estates.
Landlord & Tenant, §§ 52, "^Z, states the rule as follows: "An estate
for life may be. createjd either by express limitation or by a grant in
If made to a man for the term of his own life, or
general terms.
Aig.Pkop. — 37

y
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for that of another person,

he is called a tenant for life.
Bu t the
may also be created by a general grant, without defining any
specific interest, as where a grant is made to a man, or to a man and
his assigns without any limitation in point of time, it will be considered
* * *
as an estate for life, and for the life of the grantee only.
Where a grant is made, subject to be defeated by a particular event,
and there is no limitation in point of time, it will be ab initio a grant.
of an estate fqrjife, as much as if no such event had been contemplated. Thus, if a grant be made to a man so long as he shall inhabit a
certain place, or to a woman during her widowhood, as there is no certainty that the estate will be terminated by the change of habitation or
by the marriage, respectively, of the lessees, the estate is as much an
estate for life, until the prescribed event takes place, as if it had been
so granted in express terms."
The author's statement of the law is sustained by the otlier writers
on the subject (4 Kent, Com. 27; 2 Blackstone, 121), and by the adIn Warner v. Tanner, 38 Ohio St. 118, a life estate
judicated cases.
was held to be created by a lease for a yearly rent extending during
the time the lessee should continue to occupy the premises for a particular purpose. In Mickie v. Woods' Ex'r, 5 Rand. (Va.) 571, 574,
the grant was to continue so long as the tenant should pay the stipulated
rent. It was held a life estate. A grant "so long as the waters of the
_Pelaware shall rvui" was held in Foster v. Joice, 3 Wash. C. C. 498,
In Hurd v. Gushing, 24
Fed. Cas. No. 4,974, to create a life estate.
Mass. (7 Pick.) 169, the premises were leased at a fixed yearly rent
for the term "so long as the salt works" to be located thereon should
continue in operation. It was held a life estate. In Thomas v. Thomas,
17 N. J. Eq. 356, it was held that a right given by a will to occupy
at a specified annual rent certein premises so long as the devisee "may
desire to occupy the same as a drug store" amounted to an estate for
life. See also to the same effect, 16 Cyc. 614; Maverick v. Gibbs, 3
McCord (S. G.) 315; People v. Gillis, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 201; Roseboom V. Van Vechten, 5 Denio (N. Y.) 414; Ely v. Randall, 68 Minn.
estate

(^

]^

177, 70

_

N. W.

980.

within the rule of these authorities, and the trial court properly held that it vested in defendant a
life estate, terminable only at his death or his removal from Albert
Lea.
,
Judgment affirmed.^'
-.^^jlJ' .
The

lease in the case at bar conies

^^

Beauchamp y. Runuels, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 212, 79 S. W. 1105 (1904), contra.
fee of certain lands was vested in a board of
deputies, which was authorized to allot portions of the lauds to persons to hold
same so long as they should be willing, and pay a specified annual rent, and
conform to the orders and regulations to be made from time to time by the
deputies. The seventeenth section of the act empowered the deputies to dispose, by absolute sale, any portion of the premises, freed from any claim by
By t'he twenty-second section no sale was to be effected
any resident allottee.
without the consent of the majority of tlie allottees in regular meeting as12

By act of Parliament tlie
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where tenepossibility of issue extinct
man and to his wife in especial tail,
one of
ments are given to
tenant in tail after possibility
them die without issue, the survivor
of issue extinct. And
they have issue, and the one died, albeit that
during the life of the issue, the survivor shall not be said tenant in
the issue die without
tail after possibility of issue extinct; yet
which
be
not
issue
so
there
alive
issue,
as
may inherit by force of
any
tenant in tail after
the tail, then the surviving party of the donees
possibility of issue extinct.
Also,
man and to his heirs which he shall
tenements be given to
beget on the body of his wife, in this case the wife hath nothing in the
seised as donee in especial tail. And in
tenements, and the husband
this case,
the wife die without issue of her body begotten by her
tenant in tail after possibility of issue
husband, then the husband

Tenant in

extinct.

after the possibility of issue
For
but one of the donees, or the donee in especial tail.
after
be
in
tail
in
tail
be
said
tenant
the donee
cannot
to
general
because always during his life, he may by
possibility of issue extinct
possibility have issue which may inherit by force of the same entail.
And so in the same manner the issue, which
heir to the donees in especial tail, cannot be tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct,
for the reason abovesaid.
And note, that tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct shall
not be punished of waste, for the inheritance that once was in him,
10 H.
But he in the reversion may enter
he alien in fee, 45 E.
And

note, that none can be tenant in tail

3.

if

1.

6.

is

:

extinct,

22.

Sections 32, 33, 34.

a

a

it

a

certain elec
sembled. Under a statute alloaving only freeholders to vote at
tion, was an allottee of such lands entitled to vote?
Under a devise "to M." of "my cottajre and all
contains at Nahant — to use
-t _^ .
for the term of five years or longer," what estate did M. take?
Land was leased at
certain rent "for such time as the lessee, his heirs and
provision that
assigns, may occupy the same for a sawmill yard." There was
possession should be yielded to the lessor, "his heirs or assigns, at the time of
What
the expiration of the occupation of said premises for sawmill purposes."
See Gilmore v. Hamilton, 83 Ind. 196 (1SS2).
estate did the lessee have?
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(B) Husband's Interest in Wife's Realty

man taketh

a

where

a

Tenant by the curtesy of England
seised

is,

LITTLETON'S TENURES.
wife

in fee simple or in fee tail, general, or seised as heir in tail espe-

is

by

;

is

it

is

is

if

cial, and hath issue by the same wife male or female born alive (oyes
ou vife,) alheit the issue after dieth or liveth, yet
the wife dies, the
husband shall hold the land during his life by the law of England.
And he
called tenant by the curtesy of England, because th
used
in no other realm but in England only.
And some have said, that he shall not be tenant by the curtesy, unless the child, which he hath by his wife, be heard cry
for
the cry
Therefore Ouxre. Secproved, that the child was born alive.

tion

Zd.

MONTGOMERY

v.

TATE.

(Supreme Court of Indiana, 1S59.

12

Ind.

615.)

it

a

it

a

d

a

is

;

a

is

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

J.

WoRDEx,
This was an actio'n by the appellee against the appellant, to recover the possession of
certain piece of laud described in
the complaint.
There are two paragraphs in the complaint, one claimfee simple, and the other
life estate in the land.
ing
Answer in denial. Trial by jury; verdict and judgment for plaintiff, over motion for new trial.
bill of exceptions
appears, that on the trial the plaintiff
By
title to the land in herself, either in fee simple
proved, prima facie,
or for life; but whether her evidence established, prima facie,
fee
life estate merely,
simple interest in her, or
wholly unnecessary
to determine for the purposes of this case
therefore we shall express
no opinion in reference to it.
After the plaintiff' became seized of the premises, she intermarried
still living, and the husband of the plainwith one John B. Tate, who
tiff. Afterwards, in September, 1840, Bates and Abrams recovered
judgment in the Fayette Circuit Court against William Tully an the
said John B. Tate, for the sum of 177 dollars, 60 cents, besides costs
of suit, on which an execution was afterwards issued, which was levied
upon the property in controversy, as the property of said John B.
Tate, "for and during the natural life of Ursula Tate, wife of said John
venditioni exponas, was afterwards
B. Tate," and the property, on
sold, according to law, to satisfy the judgment and costs.
James Miller and San ford P. White became the purchasers at the
sheriff's sale, and received his deed for the premises, conveying

Ch. 5)

ESTATES CREATED

581

to them the interest of said John B. Tate therein during the lifeThis took place in 1842. Miller and
time of his wife, Ursula Tate.
White afterwards conveyed to Elisha Vance, a nd Vance to t he defendant^ Montgomery.
On these facts, the Court charged the jury, "that if they believed the
evidence, it would be their duty to find for the plaintiff."
The defendant asked several charges, to the effect that if the jury
believed the propositions relied upon by defendant in support of his
title (substantially those contended in the evidence), it would be
their duty to find for the defendant.
These were refused, and the
defendant excepted to the ruling of the Court in giving and refusing
the charges.
At common law, by the marriage of Ursula with John B. Tate, he
became entitled to an, estate in her lands during their joint lives.
This estate is as absolute and perfect in him during that period, as,

by conveyance, or in any other mode. Itjs subject to sale
on execution against him, and may be conveyed by him.
Vide 2
KenFs Com. 131; Butterfield v. Beall, 3 Ind. 203; Junction Railroad
Co. V. Harris, 9 Ind. 184, 68 Am. Dec. 618.
But it is contended that the law of 1838 (R. S. 1838, p. 276, § 1),
in force at the time of the sale in question, subjecting property to
sale on execution, does not authorize such estates to be sold on execution.
It provides, "that the personal and real estate of every individual," &c., "including his, her, or their goods, chattels, lands, tenements and hereditaments, be and the same are hereby made subject to
execution," &c.
The counsel say that, "Nowhere do they find any law authorizing the selling of the wife's interest in land for the debts of her husband."
No interest of the wife is sold; for the entire estate in the
l and is, by the marriage, vested in the husband during their joint
\\yes_.
During .their joint lives she has no estate in the lands. Such
estate being vested in the husband, it is very clearly within the terms
of the statute, and subject to sale on execution against him.
See Acts
Subsequent legislation has, perhaps, changed this rule.
of 1847, p. 45, and 1 R. S. p. 321, § 5. But these acts can have no
influence on the case at bar, as the sale here took place before either of
them was enacted.
A contingency may arise that will abridge the term conveyed by the
sheriff's deed, to a less period than that of the life of said Ursula.
The death of said John B. leaving her surviving him, would, perhaps,
terminate the estate conveyed ; but this does not at all vitiate the deed.
It would be good for whatever interest he had in the premises, not
extending beyond the lifetime ofsaid Ursula.
Both husband and wife being still alive, the term conveyed b.y the
sheriff's deed is not yet expired, and the defendant's title to premises
derived from such sale, still subsists.

if

accfuired
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Court was wrong, and

(Part
the judgment

2

must be re-

versed.

The judgment
trial/3

with costs.
is £eversed
"■
;

Cause remanded for a new

/

/
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(Supreme Court of Vermont,
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1837.

9

Vt.

326.)

This was an action of ejectment for about seven eighths of an
acre of land in the village of Danville.
On trial the
Plea, severally, not guilty, and issue to the jury.
plaintiffs introduced a deed from Josiah Bellows to Caleb Wheaton,
dated 10th May, 1828, containing the land in question.
He also introduced, a levy of execution upon the same land in his favor, against
John Stearns, one of the defendants, dated August 5th, 1834. He then
introduced evidence, tending to prove, that Caleb Wheaton was the
father of John Stearns' wife, the other defendant, and that he died
seized and possessed of the premises sued for, and that his estate
was nearly settled and the debts all paid, and that he left a wife and
two children living, to wit: Mrs. Stearns and Zalmon Wheaton.
The plaintiff further introduced evidence tending to show, that
John Stearns had absconded to Canada, about two years ago, and a
short time before the levy, and that his wife and children lived on and
took care of the premises.
The plaintiff' then produced two written notices, one to Mrs. Steams,
and one to C. Davis, defendants' counsel, requiring them to produce
a deed, from said Zalmon Wheaton to Mrs. Stearns, of the premises,
and no deed being produced by defendants and no copy of any
deed being offered by the plaintiff, he offered Zalmon
Wheaton
as a Avitness to prove the contents of a deed, executed by him ; which
testimony was objected to by the defendants but was admitted by the
court, and said Zalmon was sworn, and testified that he, on the 5th
October, 1832, executed a quit claim deed of the premises to his sister,
j\Irs. Stearns, and that she, at the same time, executed a quit claim
deed to the witness of some other real estate left by their father, and
that there was no distribution of the real estate among the heirs by
decree of the probate court, and that the widow of Caleb Wheaton
had relinquished her right of dower, in consideration of a support,
guarantied by the witness. Here the plaintiff rested his case. It was
13 "We are still living under the common-law
rule which gives the husband
a freeihold estate for the joint lives of himself and his wife in her lands which
she held at the time of her maniage, except such as she held to her sole and
separate use.
In this land, therefore, the petitionee has such a freehold interIn that sense and to that extent it is his estate. He is entitled to the
est.
rents and profits thereof."
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 77 Vt. 73, 76, 58 Atl. 969, 67
L. R. A. 969, 107 Am. St. Rep. 749, 2 Ann. Cas. 315 (1904), per Stafford, J. See,
also, Ballantiue & Sons v. Fenn, 88 Vt. 166, 170, 92 Atl. 3 (1914).
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The defendants readmitted the defendants had issue born ahve.
this evidence the
that
upon
to
the
jury,
court
instruct
quested the
or either.
defendants,
plaintiff was not entitled to recover against both
But the court instructed the jury, that if they believed the said testimony, the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession, of the premises,
and costs, against both defendants ; to which decision of the court, in
admitting parol evidence, in relation to the deed to Mrs. Stearns, and to
the said instructions to the jury, the defendants excepted.
RedfiEld, J.^* * * * The freehold title of the wife being made
out, and the plaintiff's levy being admitted to be formal, and it being
also admitted, that the defendants had issue born alive, it only remains
to in quire whether the defendant, John Stearns, had such an estate in
the Tand, as was liable to be levied upon by his creditors.
The "statute." pro vide"s. that, "any estate, held by the debtor in his
own right in fee, or for his own life, or the life of another, paying no
rents therefore," shall be subject to be levied upon.
We see no difficulty in considering this an estate, which the debtor
jield in his own right. The title was, indeed, derived through the right
of his wife, but, by virtue of th e marriage, he, as husband, acquires certain ri ghts, amo ng^jyhich, the use of the freehold estate of inheritance
of th e wife , during the covcrture,_is__one. After issue born alive, this
estate is enlarged and extends not only during the coverture, but
till t he death of the husband, except in one event, which will be named
This, in England, after the death of the wife, was denomhereafter.
inated an estate by the curtesy, but is strictly an estate, which the husband hofcTi in his own right, whether before or after the death of the
wife. He may bring trespass or ejectment in his own name, for any
injury to the usufruct during the continuance of his estate.
The next inquiry is, whether this is an estate for the life of the debtor. It is undoubtedly true, that this estate might be determined by
But
a div orce, a vinculo, before the death of either husband or wife.
into
to
enter
remote
as
not
of
so
this is a contingency
expectation,
the ordinary calculations of the duration of the relation of married
life. It is one of those extreme cases, which, like earthquakes and
tempests in the natural world, or like public executions in the history
of individual existence, do, indeed, sometimes occur, but which no one
feels bound to expect or to provide against.
Only a portion of the opinion is given here.
Canby v. Porter, 12 Ohio, 79 (1813), the plaintiff in ejectment claimed unThe land in
der an execution sale upon a jiidignient against the defendant.
question was owned in fee by defendant's wife. Issue had been born. In upholding plaintiff's contention the court said : "'We have been furnished \^'ith no
argument by the defendant;
but the plaintiff's right to recover seems plain.
For the interest of the husband is a legal estate; it is a freehold during the
joint lives of himself and wife, with a freehold in remainder to himself for
life, as tenant by the curtesy, and a remainder to the wife and her heirs, in
It is a certain and determinate interest, whose value may be easily asfee.
certained by reference to well-known rules. It is, in every sense, his 'land,'
■within the meaning of the statute, and liable to respond for his debts."
14
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This, then, is an

estate for the Hfe of the debtor, depemiing upon
this remote contingency, which no honest or prudent man could anticipate in his own case, and which the law cannot regard until it occurs.
And should the contingency happen, and thus the estate of the levying
creditor be determined, it is no detriment to the debtor, nor has he
His debt is paid, and the loss and risk,
any just cause of complaint.
if any, fall upon the creditor.
But if this were a contingency still less remote, it would not change
the character of the estate.
An estate to a woman durante viduitate, or dum sola, or to a man, so
long as he shall dwell in a particular house, are all estates for life,
although each particular class of those estates is liable to be determined
any hour, and that during the life time of the person, by the term of
whose existence the estate is otherwise to be measured.
1 Cruise's Di* * *
1 Institutes,
gest, 77.
42, a.

The judgment of

the County

FOSTER

Court is affirmed.

V.

,^jla/

J^^'

"

MARSHALL.

(Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire,

3S.51.

22 N. IT. 401.)

Writ of entry.

The facts in this case are sufficiently stated in the
Court.
Bell, J. The principal question arising in this case, is as to the
effec t of the Statute of Limitations upon the demandant's right of
action.
It appeared that the demanded premises were set off by a
committee of partition, appointed by the Court of Probate, to Mary
Foster, formerly Mary Eastman, the mother of the demandant,_as her
share of the estate of her father, Samuel Eastman, deceased, on the
14th of May, 1814. Mary Foster was then tine wife of Frederick Foster, by whom she then had one or more children.
Frederick Foster
died in 1834, and his wife in 1836.
They had six children, whose
opinion

K2

of

the

rights are said to be now vested in the plaintiff.
The defendant proved, that in 1817, one Morrill was in possession,
claiming to be the owner of the demanded premises.
He conveyed
the same by deed, dated July 3, 1817, to one Marshall, who entered and
occupied, claiming title, till April 30th, 1847, when he conveyed to
the tenant, who has since remained in possession. The tenant claims
that he has a perfect title by thirty years undisturbed and peaceable
possession.
The demandant alleges that his right is not barred, because at the time when tlie disseisin occurred, in 1817, Mrs. Foster
was a feme covert, and up to 1834 her husband had an estate for life
in the premises and she had no right of entry until his decease, and
consequently no right of action till then, and that since that time twenty
years have not elapsed.
Under the Statute of Limitations, which was in force in this State
before the Revised Statutes, it must be considered settled, that the
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Statute did not affect the T\ght of a remainderman or reversioner, during the continuance of the particular estate; and that neither the acts
nor th e laches of the tenant of the particular estate could affect the
Wells v. Prince, 9 Mass. 503; Wallingparty entitled in remainder.
Tilson v. Thompson, 10 Pick. (Mass.)
471;
Hearl,
15 Mass.
ford V.
359.

No right of entry or action accrued to, or vested in the heirs of the
wife during the continuance of an estate by the curtesy. Jackson v.
Schoonmaker, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 390.
But the party entitled is not barred, until tlie usual period of limitation after the termination of the life estate. Heath v. White, 5 Conn.
228; Witham v. Perkins, 2 Greenl. (Me.) 400.
If, then, the husband had, in this case, an estate by the curtesy, or
any interest in the land which would entitle his wife, who survived,
to be regarded as seised only in remainder or reversion, she and her
heirs would have the full period of twenty years after the death of tlie
husband, to commence their action.
To constitute a tenancy by the curtesy, the death of the wife is one
of the four things required.
The estate of the husband is initiate
It is consummate on the death of the wife.
upon the birth of issue.
4 Kent's Comm. 29; Co. Litt. 30, a.
By the intermarriage, the husband acquires a freehold interest, during the joint lives of himself and his wife, in all such freehold property of inheritance, as she was seised of at the time of marriage, and
a like interest vests in him in such as she- may become seised of durThe husband acquires jointly with the wife, a
ing the coverture.
seisin in fee in the wife's freehold estates of inheritance, the husband
and wife being seised in fee in right of the wife. Gilb. Ten. 108; Co.
Litt. 67, a; Palvblank v. Hawkins, 1 Saund. Rep. 253, n. ; s. c. Doug.
350.

a

&

2

a

§

2

it,

This interest may be defeated by the act of the wife alone ; as if,
at common law, the wife is attainted of felony, the lord by escheat
could enter and eject the husband. 4 Hawk. P. C. 78; Co. Litt. 40, a ;
Vin. Ab. Curtesy, A; Co. Litt. 351, a.
After the birth of issue the husband is entitled to an estate for his
own life, and in his own right, as tenant by the curtesy initiate.
Co.
Litt. 351, a, 30, a, 124, b; Schermerhorn v. Miller, 2 Cow. (N. Y.)
439.
He then becomes sole tenant to the lord, and is alone entitled to
do homage for the land, and to receive homage from the tenants of
which until issue born must be done by husband and wife.
Black.
90; Co. Litt. 67, a, 30, a.
Comm. 126; Litt.
Then he may forfeit his estate for life by
felony, which, until issue born, he could not do, because his wife was tlie tenant.
Black.
Wife, 47.
Comm. 126; Roper, Hus.
If the husband, after the birth of issue, make feoffment in fee, and
then the wife dies, the feoffee shall hold the land during the husband's
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life; because by

is

is,

;

&

it

&

8

;

8

3

&

3

a

a

&

is

is,

e

a

it

if

is

is

b

r

a

if

8

is

is

is it,

a

is

a

&
is

y/

the birth of issue, he was entitled to curtesy, jvhich_
beneficial interest passed by the feoffment.. Co. Litt. 30, a.
If such feoffment is .made before issue born, the husband's right
to curtesy is gone, even though the feoft'ment be conditional and be
afterwards avoided. And if in such case the husband and wife be
divorced a vinculo matrimonii, the wife may enter immediately.
Guneley's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 7Z.
The husband's estate after issue born, will not be defeated by tlie.at
tainder of the wile,, for his tenancy continues, he being sole tenant.
1 Hale, P. C. 359;
Co. Litt. 351, a, 40, a; Bro. Ab. Forf. 78.
The obvious conclusion from these views of the nature of the interest of a tenant by the curtesy initiate
that such tenant
seised
of
freehold estate in his own right, and the interest of his wif is^
mere reversionary interest, depending upon the life estate of the husband. The necessary result of this
that the wife cannot be prejudiced by any neglect of the husband, and of course she may bring her
action, or one may be brought by her heirs, at any time with in twenty
^ears after the decease of the husband, when his estate by the curtesy,
whether initiate, or consummate, ceases, and her right of action, or
that of her heirs, accrues. In tliis respect there
no distinction between curtesy initiate and curtesy consummate.
Melvin v. Locks
Canals, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 140.
So far as we are aware, this principle has never been questioned,
where the inheritance of the wife has been conveyed to
third person, either by the deed of the husband alone, or by
deed executed by
husband and wife, which from some defect did not bind the interest
of the wife. Miller v. Shackleford,
Dana (Ky.) 289; Culler v.
Metzer, 13 Serg.
R. (Pa.) 356, 15 Am. Dec. 604; Fagan v. Walker,
27 N. C. 634; McCorry v. King,
Humph. 267, 39 Am. Dec. 165;
Melius V. Snowman, 21 Me. 201
Meraman v. Caldwell,
B. Mon.
B. Mon. (Ky.) 177;
(Ky.) 32, 46 Am. Dec. 537; Gill v. Fauntleroy,
Melvin v. Locks
Canals, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 140. But
has been held,
v.
Canals, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 161
Locks
(Melvin
Kittredge v. Locks
Canals, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 246, 28 Am. Dec. 296,) that where
disseizin has been committed upon the wife's estate, the disseizin
done
alike to the husband and wife; that
joint right of entry and of action accrues to both for the recovery of
and that
such remedy
not prosecuted within twenty years,
barred.
This
true where the husband has acquired no estate by the curseized merely in the right of the wife of her estate.
Such
tesy, and
Humph. (Tenn.) 298; Melius
are the cases of Guion v. Anderson,
V. Snowman, 21 Me. 201.
And
the husband
tenant by curtesy, as he and his wife are
seized of the fee in right of the wife, the action must be brought by
joint seizin in fee alleged in them in her
husband and wife, and
Anon., Buls. 21. Their joint ight pj action
arred by the
right.
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of twen tyyears after it accrues.
the reversionary

the estate

But it by no means follows,
right of the wife, accruing in possession after

of her husband has

ceased, is also barred.

It

is wel l settled,

that the sam e party may have several and successive estates in the
same property, and several rights of entry by._virtu£„oi_those estates,
and one of thos e rights may be barred with out the o thers being afHunt v7Burn, 2 Salk. 422; Wells v. Prince, 9 Mass. 508;
fec^d.
Stevens v. Winship, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 318, 11 Am. Dec. 178; Tilson v.
Thompson, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 359.
And every reason, which can exist in favor of the right of any reversioner, applies equally in this case, namely, that a reversioner has
as such, no right of entry and no right of action during the particular
estate, and consequently is not barred until twenty years after his own
right of entry accrued. 2 Sugd. V. & P. 353 ; 3 Steph. N. P. 2920,
10; Wells v. Prince, 9 Mass. 508; Stevens v. Winship, 1
n.
Pick. (Mass.) 318; Wallingford v. Hearl, 15 Mass. 471; Tilson v.
Thompson, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 359; Jackson v. Schoomaker, 4 Johns.
(N. Y.) 390, before cited. Besides, the wife by reason of her disability can make no entry to revest her estate during the coverture.
Ijitt. p. 403 ; Co. Litt. 246, a. Coke says, in express terms, "after coverture, she (the wife,) cannot enter without her husband."
In Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 74, 15 Am. Dec. 433, and
Heath v. White, 5 Conn. 228, this question arose, and was decided in
accordance with our views, and we think upon sounder principles than
the cases in Massachusetts, to which we have referred.
We have compared the provisions of the Revised Statutes with the
older Statutes, and do not perceive, that there is, as to the point in
question, any difference in their effect. Under neither would the plaintiff propose to claim any advantage from the proviso. His ground is
not that the ancestor was a married woman, when her right accrued ;
but that her marriage and the birth of one or more children had vested
a life estate in her husband, and that the disseizin was done to him,
and that no right of action accrued to her in virtue of the reversionary
interest, under which her heirs now claim, until she became a widow,
and the husband's estate had terminated ; and that the action is
This appears to us a
bro ught within twenty years after that event.
correct view of the case, and of the law ; and the verdict must therefore be set aside, and a

New trial granted.
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BORLAND'S LESSEE

et al.

HUNTER'S LESSEE

v.

(Supreme Court of Ohio, 1853.

v.

(Part

2

MARSHALL.

DURRELL.
2 Ohio St. 308.)

They are wrltS-oi
Both these cases depend on the same question.
errorjtfi the court of common pleas of Hamilton county, and are part
of the series to which belong the cases of Buchanan v. Roy's Lessee,
2 Ohio St. 251, and Fowler's Lessee v. Whiteman, 2 Ohio St. 270.
In the case of Borland's Lessee v. Marshall, it was proved by the
plaintiffs, that Isabella Hill, a sister of Timothy Trimble, deceased,
acquired title to one-seventh of one-half of the land in controversy,
by the decease of her brother in 1810. That Isabella died leaving issue, of whom Isabella, wife of Charles Borland, was one, and that on
the death of her mother, in 1837, Isabella Borland acquired title, by
descent, to one-fourth of one-seventh of one-half of the land. That
Isabella, the younger, was married to Charles Borland in 1819, and
that she died intestate in 1845, leaving two children as her heirs at
law, who are the lessors of the plaintiff in this case. These facts they
prove by Charles Borland, the husband of Isabella, and the father of
the children.
It was also proved, or admitted by the plaintiffs, that at the date
of the adverse possession of Mr. Longworth, the lands were wild and
unsettled.
In the case of Hunter's Lessee v. Durrell, it was proved by the
plaintiffs, that Elizabeth Trimble, a sister of Timothy Trimble, was
married, in 1790, to Samuel Hunter, by whom she had lawful issue.
That Elizabeth Hunter died about the year 1838, leaving issue, who
are the lessors of the plaintiffs, and that her husband and the father
of the plaintiffs was living when this suit was brought.
The lands
were wild, and all the lessors of the plaintiffs were non-residents of
the State of Ohio.
The plaintiffs then rested their cause, and a motion was made by
the defendant in each suit for non-suit on the ground that, by the plaintiff's own showing, a freehold estate was outstanding in Messrs. Borland and Hunter, respectively, as tenants by the curtesy, and that no
recovery could be had on the demises of the present plaintiffs during
the existence of the estates by the curtesy.
These motions the court
allowed, and directed judgment of nonsuit, which were accordingly
entered.
The_plaintiffs in each case took a bill of exceptions to the action
of the court in granting the judgment of nonsuit, and to review that
action of the court upon these motions these writs of error are prosecuted.
Thurman, J. The decision of this cause depends upon the answer
that shall be given to the following question : Is a man entitled to
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curtesy in lands, the title to which descended to his wife during coverture, but which were in the actual possession of an adverse claimant
from the time her title accrued until her death ? It is very clear that.
by the strict rule of the common law, he is not; and for the reason
tliat neither the wife, nor the husband in her right, was, at any time
during coverture, actually seized of the premises. Four_t hings. ac cording to the common law, are necessary to create an estate by the
curtesy, viz: marriage, seizin of the wife, issue, and death of tlie wife.
Co. Lit. 30a. And where the wife's title is derived by inheritance, or
the seizin must be
any other mode requiring an entry to perfect
in deed, and not merely in law. Co. Lit. 29a; Jackson v. Johnson,
Cow. (N. Y.) 98, 15 Am. Dec. 433.
and this
contended, that in Ohio seizin
But
unnecessary
What
the reason of the common-law rule
leads us to inquire:
If does
Does the reason exist in this state.
requiring seizin?
not,
the maxim applicable, "cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex," the
eason ceasing, the law itself ceases?
The books generally, and with but few exceptions, give but one reason for the rule making seizin indispensable to curtesy, namely, that
as, by the common law, livery of seizin was necessary to the transfer
of
freehold estate by deed, and an entry necessary to perfect the
title to such an estate, of an heir or devisee,
followed that unless the
wife, or the husband in her right, was actually seized, her issue could
for, owing to the want of
never, as her heirs, inherit the lands
actual seizin, she never acquired an inheritable estate.
But unless she
had an estate of inheritance there could be no curtesy, as
was indispensable to the existence of curtesy that the mother be seized of an
estate which might descend to her heirs, and "the tenancy by curtesy
an excrescence out of the inheritance."
Bac. Abr. 11 (Bouvier's
edition).

a
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Thus, Littleton says (section 52)
"And memorandum that, in evman taketh
wife seized of such an estate of teneery case where
ments, etc., as the issue which he hath by his wife, may by possibility
inherit the same tenements of such an estate as the wife hath, as heire
to the wife; in this case, after the decease of the wife, he shall have
tlie same tenements by the curtesie of England, but otherwise not."
Commenting on the above expression, "as heire to the wife," Coke
secret of law, for except the wife be actually
says "This doth implie
seized the heire shall not (as hath been said) make himself heire to
the wife and this
the reason that
man shall not be tenant by tlie
curtesie of a seisin in law." Co. Lit. 40a.
And, in illustration of the law that the wife must have an estate inheritable by her issue, the following case
put: "If lands be given
to
woman and to the heires males of her body, she taketh
husand
hath
shall
not
be
tenant
dieth,
band
he
issue
by
daughter and
the curtesie
because the daughter by no possibility could inherit the
mother's estate in the land; and therefore where Littleton saith, issue
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by his wife male or female, it is to be understood, which by possibility may inherit as heir tO' her mother of such estate." Co. Lit. 29b.
Blackstone puts the same case, and adds : "And this seems to be the
principal reason why the husband can not be tenant by the curtesy of^
any lands of which the wife was not actually seized, because, in order
1:0 enl;itle himself
to such an estate, he must have begotten issue that
may be heir to the wife ; but no one, by the standing rule of law, can_
be heir to the ancestor of any land, whereof the ancestor was not. actuj_
2 Bla. Com. 128.
alTy seized."
In a subsequent passage, he suggests an additional reason. It is
as follows : "A seizin in law of the husband will be as effectual as a
seizin in deed, in order to render the wife dowable : for it is not in
the wife's power to bring the husband's title to an actual seizin, as
it is in the husband's power to do with regard to the wife's lands ;
which is one reason why he shall not be tenant by the curtesy, but of
such lands whereof the wife, or he himself in her right, was actually
seized in deed." 2 Bla. Com. 132. The only authority referred to by
Blackstone, in support of the above, is Co. Lit. 31, where the diversity
between dower and curtesy is noticed, but no such reason as Blackstone gives for denying curtesy is stated, although it may be inferred.
What Coke says is as follows : "For a woman shall be endowed of a
seizin in law. As where lands or tenements descend to the husband,
before entry he hath but a seizin in law, and yet the wife shall be endowed, albeit it be not reduced to an actual possession, for it lieth not
in the power of the wife to bring it to an actual seizin, as the husband
may do of his wife's land when he is to be tenant by tlie curtesy, which
is worthy the observation."
As before observed, it is only by inference that this passage supports Blackstone's remark.
It is to some extent fortified, however,
by the following language in 7 Viner's Abr. 149, namely : "Feme shall
be endowed of a seizin and possession in law, without seizin in deed,
quod nota; for otherwise it is of tenant by the curtesy, and the reason seems to be, inasmuch as the baron may enter in jure uxoris, but
the feme can not compel her baron to enter into his own land."
On the other hand, the following extract from 3 Bac. Abr. 12, is
certainly opposed to the existence of this reason, as the idea is rejected that the allowing or disallowing curtesy is dependent on the
ability or inability, industry or negligence, of the husband. "But now
of such inheritances, whereof there can not possibly be a seizin in fact,
a seizin in law is sufficient ; and therefore if a man seized of an advowson or rent in fee, hath issue a daughter, who is married and hath
issue, and he dieth seized, and the wife dieth likewise before the rent
becomes due, or the church becomes void, this seizin in law in the wife
shall be sufficient to entitle her husband to be tenant by the curtesy,
because, say the books, he could not possibly attain any other seizin,
as indeed he could not ; and then it would be unreasonable he should
suffer for what no industry of his could prevent. But the true reason
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wife hath these inheritances which lie in grant, and not in
hvery, when the right first descends upon her; for she hath a thing
and nobody else interposes to
in grant when she hath a right to
prevent it."
In Davis v. Mason,
Pet. 507,
L. Ed. 239, the foundation of the
relates to the
rule
thus stated in the opinion of the court: "As
tenure by curtesy, the necessity of entry grew out of the rule, which
freeinvariably existed, that an entry must be made in order to vest
hold (Co. Lit. 51), and out of that member of the definition of the
should be inheritable by the
tenure by curtesy which requires that
issue.
When
descent was cast, the entry of the mother was necessary, or the heir made title direct from the grandfather, or other person last seized."
A careful examination of the authorities makes quite apparent that
not the only, reason of
this
correct statement of the principal,
the rule.
No other reason
found in the books, except the suggestion
refused where there was no actual
before referred to, that curtesy
seizin, because the husband might, by diligence, have obtained such
not universally admitted.
seizin. But this idea, as we have seen,
Our next inquiry is, Do thej^e reasons, or either of tliem^_exist_in^

if

is

is

is

a

is

it

a

it

a

is

it

1

7

it,

is, that the

a

is

;

d

a

is

a

is

is

a

Ohio?
That livery of seizin has never been essential, in Ohio, to the creation of
freehold estate, nor an entry necessary to perfect the title
of an heir or devisee,
well known to every lawyer.
The most common instrument of conveyance
deed^ofbargain_arads_ale,. which,
without the aid of
statute of uses, transfers both the legal and equitable estate.
Nay, further, mere deed of quitclaim, or release,
sufficient, even where the releasee has no prior interest in the land. But
our ep artu re from the English law does not stop here for an adverse
poss ession does not prevent the transfer of title, either by deed, de^
held by the grantor, ancestor, or
Whatever title
scent, or devise.
;
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testator, may be thus transferred, notwithstanding the lands are adOhio, 232 Helfenstine
versely held by another. Holt v. Hemphill,
Ohio, 275, pt.
V. Garrard,
Hall v. Ashby, Ohio, 96, 34 Am. Dec.
424.
might seem, from what was said in Holt v. Hemphill, that
an adverse possession would be fatal to
deed
but that such posseswas expressly decided in Hall v. Ashby.
sion in no wise affects
As, then,
created in Oh^o without entry,
freehold estate
manifest that the principal,
not the only reason, of the rule requiring actual seizin to give curtesy does not exist in this state.
But allowing that the minor reason before stated did exist in England, does
husband to be denied curtesy in
exist here?
Ought
Ohio upon the ground that he might have entered upon the land durhe did not, he was guilty of a fault that deing coverture, and that
servedly bars his right? There may have been much reason for saying so in England, when the rule requiring seizin was established
for, by the failure of the husband to enter, the wife and her issue
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might lose tlie estate, which it was plainly his duty to prevent, if possible. j.)Ut in Ohio her title is as perfect before as after entry; and.
in general, it would be nothing less than absurd to make a man's right
depend upon whether he had gone for a moment upon the land and
"broken a twig," or "turned a sod," or "read a deed." There is, however, one case, and perhaps but one, in which, if curtesy exists, the
heirs of the wife might be prejudiced by a failure of the husband to
obtain possession, namely, when by such failure the bar of the statute
of Hnu'tations becomes perfect against them. But this would probably
occur so rarely as to furnish but a slight foundation for the rule we
are considering.
Nor is it the only case in which a remainderman, or
reversioner, may be powerless to preserve his estate.
If A, tlie owner
in fee of lands in the adverse possession of B, devise or convey them
to C for life, with remainder to D, it is manifest that, as the statute
of linn'tations began to run against A, and therefore continues to run
against C and D, the latter may lose his estate through the neglect
So, when the statute be gins to
or failure of C to obtain possession.
run against a feme sole, and she afterward marry, she may lose her
land by the nesflect or inability of her husband to recover it.
These possible cases of hardship it is the province of legislation to
guard against, and not of the courts. Were we to say that there shall
be no curtesy where the possession was held adversely during the coverture, because to give it m.ight, by possibility, result in the loss of the
estate to the heir, it is very probable that, in guarding against hardships
on the one side, we would open the door to quite as much, or more,
For it is very far from being true that the
hardship on the other.
failure to obtain possession during the coverture, is always attributable
He may have freely spent his time, labor,
to the husband's neglect.
and money to recover the land, and yet, without any fault of his, be
unable to succeed in the lifetime of the wife. Decide as we may, and
doubtless there will be room for cases of hardship to arise; but, as was
truly said by Duncan, J., in Stoolfoos v. Jenkins, 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.)
173: "Courts can not usurp legislative functions, or new-model the_
law according to their own ideas of natural justice, or redress hardships in each particular instance." And it is never to be forgotten that
all wise laws are framed with a regard to what is likely to occur, rather
than to that which is only possible.
On the whole, the conclusion to which we have arrived is, that neither of the reasons given for making actual seizin indispensable to
curtesy, affords any sufificient foundation for the rule in Ohio. It remains to be considered whether the reason of the rule having ceased,
or rather never having existed in this state, the rule itself exists here.
Tenancy by the curtesy has always been known to our law and is recognized by our statutes. We can not deny its existence ; but may we not
deny the necessity of a requisite, that properly enough formed a place
in the common law, but has no reason to support it in our jurisprudence? We are materially aided in this inquiry by the American deci-
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5ions upon the subject of curtesy. These decisions may be reduced into
three classes :
1. Those in which there being no adverse possession, the husband
and wife were held to be constructively seized in deed, and such constructive seizin deemed sufficient.
2. Those in which there was an adverse possession ; but a recover}in ejectment, on the demise of the husband and wife or the husband
alone, took place during the coverture ; and in which there was held to
be curtesy, although no actual possession followed the recovery.
3. Those in which an adverse possession was decided to be no bar
to curtesy.
Of the first class, Jackson v. SelUck, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 262. and Davis
v. Mason, 1 Pet. 506, 7 L. Ed. 239, may properly, perhaps, be called
the leading cases. . Many others might be cited, for the general current
of American authority certainly admits curtesy in this class of cases.
Of the second class, Ellsworth v. Cook, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 643, is the
leading case.
To the third class, belong Bush v. Bradley, 4 Day (Conn.) 298, approved in Chew v. Comm'rs of Southward, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 160, etc.
Now, a careful scrutiny of these cases will show that, in nearly all
of them, the decisions were arrived at by an application of the ma.xim
"cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex."
It was so expressly declared in
Davis V. Mason. That case respected lands in Kentucky. After giving,
in the passage hereinbefore quoted, the reason of the rule requiring
seizin, the judge, who delivered the opinion of the court, went on to
say: "But in Kentucky, we understand, the livery of seizin is unheard of. Freeholds are acquired by patent, or by deed, or by descent,
without any further ceremonies ; and in tracing pedigree, the proof of
entry, as successive descents are cast, is never considered as necessary
If a
to a recovery, or in any mode affecting the course of descent.
right of entry therefore exists, it ought by analogy to be sufficient to
sustain 'the tenure acquired by the husband, where no adverse possession exists ; as it is laid down in the books relative to a seizin in law,
'he has the thing, if he has a right to have it.'
Such was not the ancient law ; but the reason of it has ceased.
It has been shown, that in
the most remote periods exceptions had been introduced on the same
ground ; and in the most modern, the rule has been relaxed upon the
We ought not to be behind the British courts in
same consideration.
the liberality of our views, on the subject of this tenure."
So in Jackson v. Sellick the court said: "We must take the rule
(requiring seizin) with such a construction as the peculiar state of new
lands in this country require."
Both these cases seem to proceed on the ground that the wife, though
not actually, was yet constructively seized in deed. Hence the allusion,
in. each case, to the fact that there was no adverse possession to rebut
The question whether an adverse possession would
the presumption.
Aig.Peop.— 38
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be fatal to the claim to curtesy was not presented. The cases in effect
decide, not that seizin in deed is indispensable, but that, if there must,

seizin is sufficient.
But in Bush v. Bradley,
raised. The premises, during the whole peYet the
riod, of the coverture, were adversely held by a third person.
husband was adjudged to be tenant by the curtesy.
The real estate
law of Connecticut was, in all respects material to the present inquiry,
the same as that of Ohio; and the court held that, as the reason of the
rule requiring seizin did not exist, seizin was unnecessary, and that the
To the same effect is the
symmetr}^ of the law required this decision.
following language of the court in Stoolfoos v. Jenkins, 8 S. & R. 175 :
"The actual seizin of the husband during coverture is necessary to entitle him, as tenant by the curtesy, by the common law ; though such actual seizin by the husband is not necessary by our law, if there be a
potential seizin, or right of seizin. This has been decided to be sufficient in this state." This ruling, as well as the case of Bush v. Bradley,
was approved in the case in 5 Rawle, 160, before cited, the court holding that it was sufficient to entitle the husband to curtesy, that the wife
owned the land and had a right "to demand and recover the immediate
possession thereof." ^^
In the light of these decisions, and the considerations upon which
they rest, we can hardly err in holding that the reason, or reasons, of
the rule requiring seizin in deed, having no existence in Ohio, the rule
itself does not exist. And, certainly, tlie symmetry of our law demands
this. It would be strange indeed, and only lead to confusion and perplexity, if, while every other tenancy may be created in this state without entry, or regard to the fact of adverse possession, a tenancy by the
curtesy could not. Nor does a rule strongly commend itself to the good
sense of men that makes the existence of the estate depend upon an
almost, or quite, imaginary distinction between seizin in law and constructive seizin in deed.
The constructive seizin relied on in Jackson
Sellick,
Mason,
and Ellsworth v. Cook, was in substance
V.
Davis v.
nothing but a seizin in law. It is a mere fiction to say that a man is
actually possessed of that v\'hich is in no one's possession, and it is
plainly untrue to say so when the thing is in the possession of another.
The reasoning of the courts in all these cases, if carried to its legitimate result, makes seizin in deed, either actual or constructive, wholly
unnecessary ; and this result is not in conflict with the principles of the
common law. For even at common law, a seizin in law is sufficient to
give curtesy in all inheritances created without entry. 3 Bac. Abr. 12 ;
Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 98, 15 Am. Dec. 433; Ellsworth
It is therefore a mere application of a
V. Cook, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 643.
common-law principle to say that a seizin in law is sufficient in Ohio,
In the
where in no case is an entry necessary to create an inheritance.
for
law,
"seizin
in
law
case before us, Mrs. Borland was seized in
is a
right to lands and tenements, though the owner is by wrong disseized

be seizin, a constructive

the question was directly
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Her husband, there being issue
6 Jacob's Law Die. 41.
born, became tenant by the curtesy, and as he was yet in life when the
ejectment was brought by her heirs, the common pleas did right to
nonsuit them.
The decision of this case also decides the case of Doe ex dem. Hunter et al. V. Durrell ; the only difference in tlae cases being that there was
an adverse possession in the one and not in the other. ^"^
of them."

J^J^ ^

WATSON

V.

WATSON.

(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,

This was

an action

1838, before Bissell,

In

the life-time

of ejectment; tried

at

1839.

-

-

13 Conn. 83.)

Hartford, September term,

J.

of Ann Watson, and until her death,

the demanded
premises were owned by her in fee; and the plaintiffs are her children
and heirs at law, by John Watson, to whom she was lawfully married,
and who is still living.
The plaintiffs claimed, that John Watson had
not an estate by the curtesy in the premises ; and to establish this point,
they offered in evidence the following writing, under his hand and seal,
dated the 23rd of February, 1837, after the death of his wife: "Know
all men, by these presents, that I, John Watson, do hereby publish, declare and make known, to all whom it may concern, and especially the
heirs and children of my late wife, Ann Watson, that I have not, at
any time hitherto, and now do not claim, demand, possess, or in any
manner or to any extent whatever, have, or pretend to have, any right,
title or interest in three pieces of land (describing the premises) but do
now fully, absolutely and without any reservation, disclaim and reject
any and all right, title and interest in the same, which I might or could
have had, by operation of law or otherwise, by reason of my surviving
my said wife, or any title to said premises which she had during her
De Grey v. Richardson, 3 Atk. 469 (1747).
Lands are conveyed to A. for life, remainder in fee to B., a woman. B. marries, issue is born, and B. dies, all during tJie lifetime of A. Is B.'s husband entitled to an estate by the curtesy? See Todd v. Oviatt, 58 Conn. 174, 20 Atl.
440, 7 L. R. A. 693 (1SS9) ; Redus v. Hayden, 43 Miss. 614 (1870) ; Dozier v.
16 See

Toalson, 180 Mo. 546, 79 S. W. 420, 103 Am. St. Rep. 586 (1904) ; Ferguson v.
Tweedy, 43 N. Y. 543 (1871) ; Watkins v. Thornton, 11 Ohio St. 367 (1860).
As to the rights of the husband of a trustee or cestui que trust, see Kenneson's Cases on Trusts, 223 et seq. ; Ogden v. Ogden, 60 Ark. 70, 28 S. W. 798,
46 Am. St. Rep. 151 (1894) ; Carson v. Fuhs, 131 Pa. 256, IS Atl. 1017 (1890).
Lands are conveyed to a woman and the lieirs of her body ; she marries,
has issue which dies, and then she dies mthout issue, leaving her husband surviving.
Is her husband entitled to curtesy? See I'aine's Case, 8 Co. 34 (1587).
An estate is devised to a woman in fee, with limitation over, in case she dies
under the age of twenty-one, without issue ; she marries, has issue which dies,
Is lie
and then she dies under twenty-one, leaving her husband surviving.
See Buckworth v. Thirkell, 3 Bos. & P. 652, note (1785).
entitled to curtesy?
See, also, Buchannan v. Sheffer. 2 Yeates (Pa.) 374 (1798) ; Weller v. Wener,
28 Barb. (N. Y.) 588 (1858) ; Hatfield v. Sneden, 54 N. Y. 280 (1873) ; Withers
V. Jenkins, 14 S. C. 597 (1880).
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John Watson, attested bytwo witnesses, acknowledged before a justice of the peace, and recorded
in the town records. It was admitted by the plaintiffs, that John Watson was tenant by the curtesy of the demanded premises, and that they
could not recover in this action, unless by operation of this writing, he
The defendant objected to the admission of it in
had no such estate.
life."

This writing was signed and

sealed by

evidence to the jury; and the court rejected it; and a verdict p assed ,
The plaintiffs thereupon moved for a new trial.
for the defendant.
Waite, J. The object of a disclaimer, is, to prevent an estate passing from the grantor to the grantee. It is a formal mode of expressing
the grantee's dissent to the conveyance before the title has become
In some cases, it may be highly proper; as where a
vested in him.
deed is made conveying an estate to one for life, with a remainder to
another in fee. Here, in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, the
law would presume the assent of the grantee in remainder, upon delivery of the deed to the grantee for life, for the benefit of both. But
if the remainder-man chooses not to take the estate, he may disclaim,
So, where a deed is
and thereby remove all presumption of assent.
executed to several persons, and delivered to one for the benefit of all,
if one dissents, he may disclaim, and furnish evidence that his share
Treadwell et al. v. Bulkley et al., 4 Day,
still remains in the grantor.
395.

But if

the grantee once assents, and the title thereby becomes vested
in him, he cannot, by any disclaimer, revest the estate in the grantor.

a

a

a

is

:

a

a

it,

For if he could, the disclaimer would have the effect of a deed, which_
it cannot have; the object of the latter being to transfer property, of ^
the former to prevent a transfer.
But in a case of descent, the heir cannot, by any disclaimer, prevent
the estate from passing to him.
It vests in him immediately upon the
death of the ancestor; and no act of his is required to perfect his title.
He cannot, by any act, cause the estate to remain in the ancestor ; for
the latter is incapable of holding
after his death. Nor can he, by
disclaimer, transfer the estate to any other person, as tlie heir of the
for, as has already been observed, the object of disclaimer
ancestor
not to convey, but to prevent
conveyance. He is, therefore, in the
same situation, upon the death of the ancestor, as
purchaser, who has
transfer can only be made,
assented to the conveyance. In both cases,
by some instrument adapted to the conveyance of real estate.
A devisee, however, stands in the same situation as purchaser.
no
he dissents, the estate passes to the heir, in the same manner as
will had been made.
entirely optional with him to take or refuse
Barn.
Aid. 31.
the estate devised. Townson v. Tickell et al.,
In the present case, the disclaimer was made by one who was entitled
Is he, in this respect, like a
to the property as tenant by the curtesy.
This species of estate has sometimes been classed
grantee, or an, heir
rather an estate thrown
with those acquired by purchase.
But
upon tlie tenant by operation of law. Co. Litt. 18b. It partakes more
is

it

?

&

3

is

It

if

a

If
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acquired by descent than by purchase.

of the wife, the estate vests in him. Like
Immediately
cause
the heir ,"Tie cannot, by refusing to take
to remain in the
disclaimer, transfer
wife j_ nor can he, by
to others. The estate
thus vested in him, becomes immediately liable for his debts
and he
cann ot, by any refusal to take the property, defeat the claims of his
;

a

it

it

it,

upon the death

a

cred itors.
The disclaimer offered in evidence could have no effect in shewing
title in the plaintiffs; and was properly rejected by the court.
We are, therefore, satisfied, that no new trial should be granted.
In this opinion the other Judges concurred.
New trial not to be granted. ^^

(Q Wife's Interest in Husband's Realty

LITTLETON'S TENURES.

BROUGHTON
(Court

Error of

of Queen's Bench,

v.

RANDALL.

1596.

Cro. Eliz. 502.)

;.

;

*

*

a

*

judgment in Wales in dower.
Note here, the title of the feme to recover dower was, that the father and son were joint-tenants to them and the heirs of the son and
they were both hanged in one cart but because the son (as was deposed
by witnesses) survived, as appeared by some tokens, viz., his shaking
his legs, his feme thereupon demanded dower.
And upon this issue
nunques seisie dower, this matter was found for the demandant.*"

In

;

re Starbuck's Estate, 137 App. Div. 866, 122 N. Y. Supp. 584 (1910;
Y. 531, 94 N. E. 109S (1911) Crenshaw v. Moore, infra, p. 616.
"Curtesy is abolished or modified, in many states, by statutes which must be
17 See

consulted."

;

201 N.

4

Id.,

ISA part of

Kent's Comm. *29, note.
the report relating to another point is omitted.
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man
Tenant in dower is, where
seised of certain lands or tenements in fee simple, fee tail general, or as heir in special tail, and taketh
wife, and dieth, the wife after the decease of her husband shall be
endowed of the third part of such lands and tenements as were her
husband's at any trme during the coverture, to have and to hold to
the same wife in severalty by metes and bounds for term of her life,
whether she hath issue by her husband or no, and of what age soever
the wife be, so as she be past the age of nine years at the time of the
death of her husband, (for she must be above nine years old at the
time of the decease of her husband,) otherwise she shall not be endowed.
Section 36.
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This was an action for dower in several parcels of land which Hannah Holbrook demands on the seizin of her deceased husband Ezra
Finney during the coverture.
The cause came before the court on a case stated by the parties, in
which it is agreed that John Finney, the father of Ezra and of three
other sons, was seized of the premises in fee, and on the 13th of
Alarch, 1786, by his deed of that date, in consideration of £400. conveyed the premises with other parcels of land to his said four sons in
equal proportion in fee simple, the demandant then being the wife of
Ezra ; that immediately and by a deed of even date with the deed from
John, the four sons mortgaged the same lands to their father in fee,
to secure to him the payment of the said sum of i400. with interest,
and also a maintenance during his life; that these deeds were duly
acknowledged on the same day, and registered the day after; that in
December in the same year^zra, the husband of the demandant, died;
that in 1787 the mortgagee foreclosed the mortgage,, the conditions
thereof having been broken; that in 1790, by virtue of the levying of
an execution to satisfy a judgment recovered against John Finney the
father by the present tenant, he became seized in fee of the premises
described in the writ; and that the execution of the said deeds was in
pursuance of a previous agreement to the same effect made between
the parties.
Upon these facts it was submitted to the court whether the demandant was entitled to recover her dower.
Parsons, C. J. [After reciting the substance of the case as agreed
The question before the court upon these facts, is
by the parties:]
whether Ezra Finney the husband was, during the coverture, so seized
of the premises, that the demandant has a right to her dower. He was
not so seized, unless from the operation of tlie deed from his fatlier
to himself and his three brothers.
1. That this conveyance was
The tenant has made two objections.
of an estate to jointenants, of which the demandant's husband was not
the survivor. 2. That her husband had that instantaneous seizin only,
which will not entitle her to dower.
It is settled that if an estate be devised to two or more equally to be
divided, they are tenants in common. The same construction is applied
to a devise to two or more share and share alike.
Show. Pari. Cas. 210.
Also the words equally to be divided in a covenant to stand seized, or
in the surrender of a copy-hold, or in a deed appointing uses, create a
tenanc)' in common. 2 Vent. 365, 6; 1 Salk. 391 ; 1 Wils. 341, 2. This
construction has been adopted, because the words in equal shares, or
equally to be divided, import a division in futuro.
The words in this deed are in equal proportion; and it is said that
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they do not imply a future division, but are applied only to the respective interests in the thing conveyed. On this ground they must be
considered as wholly inoperative ; for without them, the grantees would
have taken an equal interest in the lands granted. To give them operation, may they not be considered as equivalent to the words in equal
purparties or shares, and thus contemplate a future partition?
But it is not necessary now to decide this point, for by the statute
of 1785, c. 61, passed three days after the execution of these deeds, it
is enacted that all estates which had been, or which should be aliened
to two or more persons, shall be deemed to be tenancies in common,
unless it be manifestly the intent of the alienor that they should be held
as joint estates ; with a saving to the survivor of any estate in jointenancy before created and already vested in him. This statute has a retrospective effect, and comprehends this conveyance ; and there seems
to be no constitutional objection to the power of the legislature to alter
a tenure, by substituting another tenure more beneficial to all the tenants.
If this objection had been pressed, it would have been unnecessary
to consider
as the statute of 1783, c. 52, in force when the deeds
were executed, although repealed by the last cited statute, had abolished
the principle of survivorship among jointenants, and had enacted, that
on the death of
jointenant, the joint estate, of which he was seized,
In consequence of these provisions, the
should descend to his heirs.
dowable, as on the death of her husband there
wife of
jointenant
could be no survivor, who would be in by title paramount to her claim

of

dower.^®

The demandant must therefore recover, unless

the second objection
law
where
seized but
should prevail.
thfe husband
that
certainly
for an instant, of this seizin his wife shall not be endowed. The seizin
for an instant
where the husband by the same act, or by the same
conveyance, by which he acquires the seizin, parts with it. Thus
feoffment in fee his wife shall not be endowed,
tenant for life make
for by making the same feoffment which passed the fee, he acquired
feoffment, his wife shall
fee.
Cro. 615. And
joint-tenant make
several estate
not be endowed, for by the feoffment he was seized of
but for an instant, which he acquired and parted with by the feoffment.
So
feoffment be to B. and his heirs to the use of C. and his heirs,
the wife of B. shall not be endowed, for he was but an instrument; and
the same feoffment, which gave him the seizin, by the statute of uses
fine be entransferred
to C. Nor shall the wife of the conusee of
dowed, when by the same fine the estate
rendered back to the conusor.
Co. 77 a.
Let us now compare the present conveyances with these principles,
for the previous agreement may be laid out of the case. If the deeds
,
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19 Davis V. Logan,
State statutes not uncomDana (Ky.) 185 (1839), ace.
monly have abolished the survivorship feature of joint tenancies.
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pursue it, it is useless: an-l if they do not, we myst he £^overried wholly
back to the father,
by the construction of the deeds.
T]]*^ mortgage
from the terms of
of even date with the conveyance from him^
They are therefore to be considered as parts of the same contract, and
tak ing elT['ect_a.t the same instant,
The conveyance from the father
took effect when he delivered his deed the mortgage back took effect
when the mortgage deed was delivered
but both being of even date
vyere delivered at the same time. The mortgagors were therefore seized but for an instant, taking an absolute estate in fee, and instantaneconditional estate in fee.
ously rendering back
T^hese two instruments must therefore be considered as parts of one and the same cojitract between the parties in the same manner as
deed of defeazance
forms with the deed to be defeated but one contract, although engrossed on several sheets and no interval of time intervened between
the taking, and the rendering back of the fee.
But
the husband had continued seized for any portion of time^.
however short, his wife would have been entitled to dower; as
the
conveyance back had been made posterior in point of time, or by
deed distinct from the first grant. There
the case of Nash v. Preston
reported in Cro. Car. 190, illustrating and supporting these principles.
In that case
seized in fee bargains and sells the land to the husband for £120. in consideration that the bargainee shall redemise
to
and
wife
for
the bargainor
his
nominal rent,
twenty years, rendering
with
condition that
the bargainor at the end of twenty years paid
back the £120. the bargain and sale should be void. The bargainee acand dies.
His wife shall have dower because
cordingly redemised
the land by the bargain and sale was vested in the husband.
But
would have been otherwise
the land was in, and was out of the husband by one act. In the case at bar, the execution of the two deeds,
they being of even date, w^as done at the same instant, and constitutes
but one act.
The demandant therefore cannot support her claim, as her husband
was never so seized as to entitle her to dower. According to the terms
of the agreement submitting the case to the court, the demandant must
become nonsuit.
ir

v.

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

walker.
1S14.

2

shoe:maker

/

,

Serg, & E. 554.)

a

Case stated for the opinion of the Court.
By the last will and
testament of Phcebe Shoemaker, deceased, dated the 2d August, 1788,
and by
deed of trust from Benjamin Shoemaker and Elizabeth his
wife, to John Reynell, bearing date the 31st October, A. D. 1765,
Charles Shoemaker, "was vested with, and entitled to the remainder
of one-eighth of all the real estate in the said deed mentioned after
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estate thereby given to his mother, EHzabeth

Shoemaker, shall
have expired," &.c.
On the 4th June, 1792, Charles Shoemaker, by deed in consideration of a debt of above 4,000 pounds sterling to Hathrip & Co. and
to secure the same, also of 20 shillings, granted, &c. to John Whitesides "all his estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand, of, into,
and out of all the residue of the remainder of the said one-eighth
of the real estate above-mentioned, as well as all and every the real
estate of him, the said Charles Shoemaker, wheresoever the same may
be, and whether it be in possession, reversion, or remainder."
The demandant was married to Charles Shoemaker on the 7th
January, A. D. 1798.
Elizabeth Shoemaker, the mother of Charles, died the 23d April,
the

i-

1

-

^

■'-■'

1798.

Charles Shoemaker died the 4th April, 1807, leaving a widow and
children.
John Whitesides, in the life-time of Elizabeth Shoemaker, viz. on
the
day of
granted and conveyed the estate in question
to the defendant.
The que stion submitted to the decision of the Court is, whether
the widow is entitl ed to her dower in the estate so devised to Charles.
If the Court shall be of opinion in the affirmative, then
Shoemaker?
be
to
entered for the demandant for an amount to be ascerjudgment
tained by the counsel. Otherwise, judgment to be for the defendant.
TiLGHMAN, C. J. In this case two questions are made.
1. Whether
a widow is entitled to dower of a trust estate.
2. Whether she is entitled to dower of an estate, the remainder of which in fee was vested
in her husband, dependent on an estate for life in a third person,
which said remainder her husband had aliened during the coverture.
1. In England a woman is not dowerable of a trust estate although
a husband may be tenant by the curtesy.
This is the more remarkA woman has
able, as dower is the favourite of the common law.
her dower where the husband had only a seisin in law, but a man can.\'o
not be a tenant by the curtesy unless there was a seisi^n jii Jact.
reason
has
been
her
dower
good
assigned for excluding the wife of
in a trust estate.
It rests upon usage, which though not now approved cannot be altered by any authority less than the parliament.
In Pe nnsylvania the usage has been more reasonable and more analThe husband and wife
ogous to the general principles of dower.
are placed on an equal footing.
He has his tenancy by the curtesy,
and she has her dower.
I do not know that the question has ever
been brought to a decision in this Court.
The reason of this I take
to be, that it has never been doubted.
I have frequently heard it
taken for granted, but never seriously questioned.
I do not understand that the learned counsel who now makes the point, supposes
the law to be in his favour.
But he wishes it to be settled by a solemn decision.
It is best that it should be so. My opinion is, that

%
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2. By the common law there can be no dower, unless the husband
is seised Tn^act or in law of the freehold, as well as the estate of
inheritance, during the coverture.
This is not questioned by the
counsel for the demandant.
But he supposed, that in this state the
law might be different, in consequence of some provisions in our
intestate acts.
He has, however, very candidly and very properly declared, that upon examining the act of assembly he finds, that
its provisions are not applicable to a case where the husband had
aliened his whole interest by deed.
That is the present case. The
jemandant^ therefore, is not entitled to a recovery of ^ower.
Ydat^s, J., and Brackenridge, J., concurred.

BATES

v.

BATES.

(Court of Common Pleas, 1697.

1

Ld. Raym.

326.)
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Dower. The tenant pleads, that the husband ne unques fuit seisie
que dower. Upon which issue being joined, the jury find, thit Ralph
Bates, husband of the demandant was seised of the lands now dtiiianded
for life, remainder to A. and B. trustees for ninety-nine years, re-~
mainder to the heirs of the body of Ralph Bates, &c. et
And
&c.
was argued for the demandant, that the husband died seised of an
estate tail executed
for the intervening estate being for years, ought
not to be regarded.
That the feoffment of the husband would have
discontinued the intail, which proves that he was seised of it.
See
Bulstr. 29, 30; Cro. Car. 233, 234;
Roll. Abr. 632;
Vin. 516,
and that his warranty would have been lineal to
pi.
son, which
in by descent. ^_contra
was argue
proves that the son
for thg^
that
dower
was
allowed
law
for
the
the
of
the
wife
support
by
jtenant^
and her children; and therefore where by such allowance the wife and
her children cannot be supported, no dower can be allowed, for lex
non facit inutilia.
Then dower in these cases, where the mesne term
thousand years, would be so remote, that
might be for
would be
of no avail to the wife. And as to the objection, that the heir was in
was answered, that that signifies nothing, because
by descent;
the
intervening estate had been for life, the heir had been in by descent,
and yet in such case without doubt the wife
not dowable.
This case- was thrice argued at Bar, and at the first argument the
Court doubted, because the estate tail
so disjoined by the intervening
lease, and though
be vested,
not executed; and perhaps (they
said) the feoffment of the husband would not have discontinued the intail. At the second argument Treby, Chief Justice, was of opinion
As to the rights of the widow of a trustee or cestui que trust, see KenneCases on Trusts, 223 et seq.
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for the demandant, because at the instant of the death of the husband
ther e was but an estate for years in the trustees, and the estate tail
was in the husband; and (by him) the instant should be divided in
favour of dower, as Cro. Eliz. 503, Broughton v. Randall. But upon
the third argument judgment was given for the demandant upon this
reason, bec ausejhe husband had a freehold and inheritance in him, and
the_ intervening estate, being only for years, ought not to be regarded.
For at common law such a term was a precarious thing, the freeholder
A
might have destroyed it at his pleasure by a feigned recovery.
descent, which tolls an entry, does not disturb a term ; and if tenant
for Hfe commits waste, such an intervening term will not obstruct the
action of waste, as an intervening estate of freehold would do. And
therefore all the Court was of opinion, that such intervening term
would not hinder dower, as it would have done if it had been an estate
for ITfe,^^ according to the opinion of Perkins, 336, the only authority in the books for that resolution,
jjidgment was given for the,
demandant.
-^y^-

EDWARDS

V.

(Supreme Court of Alabama,

BIBB.
1875.

54

Ala.

475.)

from Limestone County Court.
Heard before Hon. R. S. Watkins.
This was a bill in equity, filed by Ann C. Edwards and her husband, against Mary P. Bibb individually, and as administratrix of
the estate of David Porter Bibb, deceased, and certain of his heirs
Appeal

at law, seeking to have dower allotted to her in certain lands in
their possession.
The complainant, Ann C, in the year 1857, intermarried with one
Thomas Bibb, Jr., and continued to live with him as his wife until
his death, and afterwards intermarried with her present husband and
Her claim of dower in said
co-complainant, Julian T. Edwards.
lands arose in this wise: Prior to the year 1840, Thomas Bibb, Sr.,
(the father of Thomas Bibb, Jr., complainant's first husband,) was
seized of a valuable tract of land in Limestone county, the lands in
question, known as the "Belmina estate."
Thomas Bibb, Sr., died on the 23d day of April, 1840, leaving a
last will and testament, which was duly admitted to probate in that
The will, among other provisions not necessary to be here
county.
noticed, devised said Belmina estate, with the exception of a small portion, (which he had conveyed to one Jackson,) to testator's wife, Parmelia Bibb, during her natural life, and at her death "untO' my eldest
son, Thomas Bibb, and his lawful male issue, and in case my said
21 What would be the situation
gent estate?

if

the intervening

freehold

were a conttn-
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son Thomas should die, leaving no lawful male issue, or leaving such
male issue, the same should become extinct, before he or they shall
arrive at the age of twenty-one years, and likewise leaving no male isthat said estate,
sue, then, and in that case, my will and desire
with the property named and devised to my said wife, shall become the property of my son, David Porter Bibb, to descend to the lawful male issue of him my said sOn Porter."
This clause of the will was once before construed in this court, in
3,n ejectment
suit brought to recover the lands, in which dower
See Edwards and Wife
souglit, from the heirs of David Porter Bibb.
V. Bibb et al., 43 Ala. 666.
About the year 1855, said Parmelia departed this life, after taking
possession of the lands devised to her for life, and thereupon said
Thomas Bibb, Jr., entered and took possession, and so remained until
his death in 1861, leaving a daughter, the fruit of his marriage with
will from
complainant, but never having had any male issue. He left
which his widow duly dissented, and which in the view the court
took of this case need not be further noticed. In 1865 the said David
Porter Bibb entered into possession and so remained until his death
in the latter part of that year, intestate. The appellees, Mary P. Bibb,
his widow and administratrix, and his heirs at law, were in possession
of said lands at the time of the filing of said bill, and had made partition among themselves.
The chancellor dismissed the bill on demurrer, and hence this appeal.

&

[For subsequent opinion, see Bibb v. Bibb, 79 Ala. 437.]
Stoxe, J."^^ In the case of Edwards
Wife v. Bibb et

al., 43

Ala.

under the will
of Thomas Bibb, Sr., Thomas Bibb, Jr., took an absolute title in fee to
the i)roperty therein described as
portion of the Belmina estate, or
did
pass to David Porter Bibb on the death of Thomas Bibb, Jr.,
Thomas Bibb, Jr., had died "leaving
'JJeaving^ no lawful male issue."
no lawful male issue."
was then ruled that the words of the will constituted
valid "executory devise" of the estate over to David Porter
Bibb. An application for
rehearing in that cause was overruled, and
the decision became final, settling for all time the rights of the parties
to that suit to the property involved therein.
The present
an aj^plication by the widow of Thomas Bibb, Jr., for
that
dower in the same lands, the title to which,
was determined
suit, passed from Thomas Bibb, Jr., and his heirs, by his death,
"leaving no lawful male issue." We are asked to review the decision
*
that cause.
pronounced
It results from what we have said above, that under the will of
Thomas Bibb, Sr., Thomas Bibb, Jr., took an estate, determinable on his
and that inasmuch as he did so die, the
dying "leaving no male issue"
*

*

;

in

22

A portion of the opinion is omitted.
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666, die question considered and decided was, whether

Ch.

ESTATES CREATED

5)

605

executory devise over to David Porter Bibb took effect at the death
We shall, consequently, in the discussion of the reof the former.
maining questions presented by this record, deal with the subject as
if there were no words of entailment in the devise we are considering.

it,

Under this will thus construed, Thomas Bibb, Jr., either took a fee
simple, having another fee engrafted upon it by way of executory devise, to come into being on the happening of an event therein provided
for as a conditional limitation, or he took only a life estate, and at his
death, his lawful male issue, if he had left such, would have taken as
If the latter be the true construction of the devise, no one
purchasers.
will contend that Thomas Bibb's widow would be dowable of the
lands.
Supposing, then, that the estate of Thomas Bibb was a de-.
feasible fee, the question comes up, is his widow entitled to dower, the
estate of her husband having expired with his life?
Few questions of the law have been more discussed, or have given
rise to more perplexing distinctions than that of the widow's right
to (lower in lands, the title to which passed out of her husband contemporaneously with his death, by force of some limitation, reversion or remainder.
The case in hand is one of remainder, which has
taken effect. The question is thus stated by a very accurate writer:
"Is the widow entitled to dower after the estate of her husband has
determined, before its natural expiration, by the happening of an
but without
i)articularly mentioned in the instrument creating
disturbing or overreaching his prior seisin?"
The case of Buckworth v. Thirkell,
one of the first cases on this
Bos.
Pul. 652, note. That case came before Lord Mansquestion.
field, one of England's greatest jurists, and
was determined that the
in
husband was entitled to curtesy. The rule
the
regard to dower
same on this question as that in regard to curtesy.
The case of Buckworth v. Thifkell has not had the good fortune
of commanding universal assent.
Mr. Butler, in his note to Coke
upon Littleton, page 141, while conceding that upon the termination
of an estate tail by the failure of issue, the right of curtesy or dower
will attacli as
prolongation of the estate, yet contended that when
fee simple
determined by
valid executory devise, neither curtesy
or dower ensues.
Other writers contend for the same distinction.
See very full discussions of this question in Park on Dower, page
157 et seq.;
Scrib. on Dower, 284 et seq. To follow them through
the shadowy mazes of their disquisitions would tend rather to bewilder than instruct. The human mind
not wont to rest satisfied
disti
can
rictions
when
find
substantial
differences to rest
no
w^ith
th em on.
Speaking of dower, as affected by conditional limitations. Chancellor Kent says
in
more emphat"The estate of the husband
ical degree, overreached and defeated by the taking effect of the
limitation over, than in the case of collateral limitation;" and, he
a

is

a

is,
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a

a

is

it
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adds, "the ablest writers on property law are evidently against the
authority of Buckworth v. Thirkell, and against the right of the dowress when the fee of the husband is determined by executory devise, or
shifting use." 4 Kent's Com. 50.
Mr. Jacob, in his learned note published in the appendix to 2 Bright
on H. & W. p. 468, says : "Upon the introduction of conditional limitations by way of use and executory devises, it became a question
whether dower or curtesy should cease when the estate was determined
by either of these modes. Upon principle, it would seem that the decision of this question ought to be guided by analogy to the general rule
of the common law, and not by analogy to the excepted case of
an estate tail. * * * The conditional limitation destroyingIt
the estate, defeats the whole of that which is expressly granted.
included
in
the
implicaif
that
would be singular,
which is
grant by
He adds, "The supposed rule, (speaktion only, could be preserved."
ing of Mr. Preston's attempt to justify the rule laid down in Buckworth v. Thirkell,) rests on very doubtful grounds."
In New York, it was decided by Chancellor Walworth that where
an estate in fee was terminated by the happening of a conditional limitation, and the executory devisees took as purchasers, the widow of
See Adams v. Beekman, 1
the first devisee could not have dower.
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Paige (N. Y.) 631.
In the case of Weller v. Weller, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 588, the same
question arose as in Adams v. Beekman, supra. The court said, "The
widow takes her estate through the husband, and not from him like
one who inherits ; for he can do no act which will divest her right.
And when the estate of the husband is determined by the happening
of an event which defeats its further continuance, the estate in dower
must be determined with it. It is a part of the same estate of freehold and inheritance of which the husband was seized, and, to the extent of
so much abstracted from what would otherwise descend to
The wife's right to dower ceased with the
the heirs at law.
could only proceed.
This conclusion conflicts
estate out of which
the
with Lord Mansfield's judgment in Buckworth v. Thirkell.
rule, however, given by Mr. Cruise in his treatise on the law of real
the rule now sustained by Mr. Park with singular
property, and
ability in his work on the law of dower."
"There
Washburn, in his work on Real Property, vol.
p. 212, says
class of cases where, what at first sight might seem to be an inconThus, in the familiar case of tenant in
sistent doctrine
applied.
tail dying without issue, although the estate, as one of inheritance,
determined, and the remainder over upon such
contingency takes
effect, yet,
having been an estate of inheritance in the tenant, his
widow,
he dies, will be entitled to dower,
being by implication
estate
an
incidental
of law annexed to such an
as
portion
part of
of the quantity of enjoyment designated by the terms of the limitation
itself. And the doctrine
broadly laid down by writers upon the sub-
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ject, that wherever the husband is seized during coverture of such an
estate, as is in its nature subject to the attachment of dower, the right
of dower will not be defeated by the determination of that estate by
its regular and natural limitation."
He adds : "This class of cases
has given rise to much ingenious speculation and grave diversity of
opinion, where the estate of the husband is one of inheritance, but
ceases at his death by what is called a conditional limitation."
The case of Buckworth v. Thirkell was followed in Moody and Wife
V. King, 2 Bing. 447; and in this country, in the cases of Milledge v.
Lamar, 4 Desaus. (S. C.) 617; Evans v. Evans, 9 Pa. 190, and Northcut V. Whipp, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 65. In a later case in South Carolina,
Wright V. Herron, 6 Rich. Eq. 339, the court of errors was equally
divided, and no decision was pronounced.
This case presented the
same question as the one presented in Buckworth v. Thirkell.
In the case of Evans v. Evans, supra, the opinion of the supreme
court of Pennsylvania was pronounced by Chief Justice Gibson — one
of the ablest jurists that ever sat on that bench. It will be seen that
he was laboring to break down the imaginary distinction attempted
to be drawn by Mr. Butler and others between the cases of remainderover, made and provided to take effect after the termination of an estate tail by failure of issue, and the termination of an estate in fee
simple by failure of heirs, with a valid limitation over by way of
executory devise. He says : "I can not apprehend tlie reason of his
[Mr. Butler's] distinction between a fee limited to continue to a particular period at its creation, which curtesy or dower may survive, and
the devise of a fee simple, or a fee tail, absolute or conditional, which,
by subsequent words, is made determinable upon some particular
He
event, at the happening of which curtesy or dower will also cease."
propounds, and in eft'ect answers, the following pertinent inquiry,
"How to reconcile to any system of reason, technical or natural, the
existence of a derivative estate, after the extinction of that from
which it was derived, was for him [Mr. Butler] to show; and he has
not done it."
Any attempt to maintain a distinction between the claim of dower
or curtesy, when the inheritance in an estate tail has failed, and a
limitation over has taken effect, per formam doni, and the same result
when an estate in fee has been determined by the happening of the
event upon which a conditional limitation over was made to take
effect, by the terms of the instrument creating the title, is too artifiDower is a derivative
cial and technical to command our assent.
estate; it is derived from the estate of the husband. It is the creature
of the law, not of contract. While the husband lives, there is no estate in dower.
It is an interest, carved out of, or abstracted from the
inheritance ; or out of the estate of the husband's alienee, if the widThe husband, by
ow survives, and has not delinquished her dower.
any conveyance made, or recovery suffered by him, cannot bar, or
impair her right.
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When, however, by the very terms of the conveyance or devise, legal in form and purpose, the estate of the husband expires with him,
cutting off per formam doni, the heritable quality of his estate, and
the title passes to another as purchaser by a valid limitation over, the
primitive estate is gone, and there is nothing left from which dower
We do not declare what would be the result, if the
can be derived.
It will
of
mere reversion to the devisor or grantor.
case were one
be time enough to consider that question when it arises.
Decree affirmed.
Chief Justice BrickEll, having been of counsel, not sitting.^'

ELLIS

v.

KYGER.

(Supreme Court of Missouri, 1SS6.

90 Mo. COO, 3 S. TV. 23.)

Black, J.

This is a suit for the assignment of dower. One of the
plaintiffs, Polly Ellis, and her former husband, Isaac Jacobs, on the
thirteenth of November, 1859, conveyed to Frederick Billum, in trust
for the Pacific railroad, a parcel of land twelve hundred and sixtyThe deed
seven feet in length by an average width of five hundred feet.
is
the
that
if
Pacific
Railrecites that it
made "upon
condition
the
road Company shall not construct the said railroad through said tract,
or if, when constructed, they shall not establish a freight and passenger station upon said tract, then the conveyance shall be null and
Isaac Jacobs
void, but otherwise to remain in full force and eff'ect."
The railroad was completed to a point beyond the
died in 1863.
There was evidence, the bill of
tract of land in question in 1865.
exceptions recites, tending to show that the company failed to perform the conditions in the deed, and evidence to the contrary effect.
In 1869, Asa Whitehead procured deeds from some of the heirs of
Jacobs, and in that year built a house upon the lots in question, which
was destroyed by fire. Neither Jacobs in his lifetime, nor his heirs,
ever entered or made any effort to recover the property for condition
In 1878, Coventry, Cockrell and Zoll, who had acquired the
broken.
title of Whitehead and the other heirs of Jacobs, quit-claimed a part
of the premises described in the deed to the trustee of the railroad
company, and the company at the same time quit-claimed the residue to
them, from whom defendant acquired his title.
The trial court gave an instruction that, upon the evidence the
That the conditions in the deed for
plaintiffs could not recover.
the construction of the railroad through the land therein described,
and the establishment of a freight and passenger depot thereon, were
conditions subsequent, is too clear to call for the citation of authorities. The trustee became seised of the premises, though the estate
in him continued defeasible until the conditions were performed,
23 See

notes to Lessee of Borland v. Marshall, supra, 5S8.

Ch.

5)

ESTATES CREATED

609

waived, released, or barred by the statute of limitations, or by estopAs no time was fixed within which the conditions were to be performed, the law would allow the company a reasonable time. 2 Wash.
Real Prop. (4th Ed.) 1. Since the railroad was completed to a point
beyond the land in question, in 1865, a reasonable time has long since
elapsed; and we must assume, under the instructions given, that the
company has failed to perform the stipulations in the deed to the
trustee.
It is well settled that an action of ejectment may be maintained by
the grantor or his heirs for condition broken, without any entry or
demand of possession.
Austin v, Cambridgeport Parish, 21 Pick.
(Mass.) 215; Plumb v. Tubbs, 41 N. Y. 442; Cowell v. Spring Co.,
100 U. S. 55, 25 L. Ed. 547.
Our statute with respect to actions of
ejectment leads to the same conclusion. R. S., 1879, §§ 2240-47. But
it is equally well settled that non-performance of the condition alone
does not divest the estate.
Performance of the condition may be
waived ; and the estate continues in the grantee after the breach until
he, who has a right to insist upon performance, elects to declare a
forfeiture. The estate continues with its original incidents until entry
or some act equivalent to it. 4 Kent, 127; 2 Wash. Real Prop. (4th
Ed.) 12; 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. (8th Ed.) 130; Memphis & C. R. Co.
V. Neighbors, 51 Miss. 412 ; Kenner v. Contract Co., 9 Bush (Ky.) 202 ;
Knight V. Railroad, 70 Mo. 231. The grantee in the deed of trust,
therefore, continued to be the owner of the premises at and after the
death of Jacobs, who was not seised at any time after the delivery of
A widow is entitled to be endowed in all the lands of which
the deed.
her husband, or any person to his use, was seised of an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage, to which she shall not
have relinquished her dower.
R. S. 1879, § 2186. As the plaintiff
here relinquished her dower by deed duly acknowledged, and her husband did not enter for condition broken, and was, therefore, not seised
of the premises in dispute at any time after the delivery of the deed,
it would seem to follow that the plaintiff is not entitled to dower.
Washburn says, it is enough that the husband had a seisin in law, with
the right to an immediate corporal seisin.
If it was not so, it might
often be in the husband's power, by neglecting to take such seisin, to
deprive his wife of her right to dower. 1 Wash. Real Prop. (4th Ed.)
215:
But here the husband made no entry, nor was he seised in law.
The same author in the same connection says, if, at common law, the
husband had not, during coverture, anything more than a mere right of
entry or of action to obtain seisin, it would not be sufficient to entitle
his widow to dower.
The mere right of entry upon lands was not
suf^cient to give dower.
1 Scrib. on Dower, 243.
If the husband dies
before entry, in a case of forfeiture for condition broken, his wife is
not dowerable, because he had no seisin, either in fact or law. 4 Kent
(13th Ed.) 38. In Thompson v. Thompson, 46 N. C. 431, the court said,
Aig.Pbop. — 39
pel.
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by way of illustration: "So where one makes a feoffment upon condition, and dies after condition broken, but without revesting his estate by entry, and afterwards the heir enters and revests the estate,
the widow is not entitled to dower."
It results from what has been said, both upon principle and authority, that the plaintiff is not entitled to dower in the premises in
question. The result would be the same had the heirs of Isaac Jacobs,
and not their grantees only, entered for breach of the condition in the
deed to Billum.
It is further insisted by the appellants that the defendant is estopped from denying plaintiff's right to dower. This contention is based
upon the fact that the defendant's grantors acquired possession and
claim of title, at least, from Whitehead, who made claim and took
possession alone under his deeds from the heirs of Isaac Jacobs.
The authorities all show that the right to enter for condition broken
descended to the heirs of Jacobs, the right not having been exercised
But though this be true, it does not follow
by him in his lifetime.
that the widow would, for that reason, be entitled to dower.
We
have seen that she would not be entitled to dower because her husband
was not seised, either in fact or law. There
therefore, nothing inconsistent between
claim under them, and the claim that the widow
should not be endowed.
urged that the general common law rule, which confined the
right to take advantage of the non-performance of
condition subsequent annexed to an estate in fee to the grantor or his heirs, has
been modified by our statutes with respect to conveyances.
We do
not stop to consider this question, for
cannot affect the result before
reached in this case.
The judgment
therefore, affirmed.
All concur.

V.

DOE

ex dem.

SMITH'S HEIRS.

(High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi,

1844.

?

WALLIS

Smedes & M. 220.)

a

Appeal from the circuit court of Holmes county.
This was an action of ejectment, brought by the heirs at law of
Chafin Smith, to the October term, 1839, of the circuit court of Holmes
tract of land lying in that county. The declaracounty, to recover
tion and notice were served on Joseph Wallis, who, at the July special

;

it

;

it,

it

it,

it

term, 1840, appeared, and caused himself to be made defendant, confessed the lease, entry, and ouster, &c., and pleaded not guilty.
On
the trial
was proved that the plaintiffs were the heirs at law of Chafin
Smith, who in his life-time was admitted to have had title to the land
in dispute, that he lived upon
and, at the time of his death,
was
his homestead that Joseph Wallis purchased
at sheriff's sale, under
an execution against Jane Smith, who was the widow of said Chafin
Smith, and claimed
by virtue of said purchase that at the time of the
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commencement of the suit, the land was in possession of one Martin,
who held and claimed it as his own; that Joseph Wallis sold it to said
Martin, but none of the witnesses knew of any written contract between them, or conveyance to Martin.
The defendant's counsel then read to the jury the execution, sheriff's
return thereon, and the deed under which he purchased and claimed.
It was admitted that the widow was still living.
No further evidence being offered by either party, the defendant's'
counsel moved the court to instruct the jury.
1st. That if they believed, from the evidence, that Jane Smith was
the widow of Chafin Smith, and that he owned and lived upon the
lands in dispute, at the time of his death, and that the same have been
purchased by the defendant, under executions against her, and that she
is still living, that unless they are satisfied, from the evidence, that her
dower in his lands has been assigned to her, they must find for thf
defendant.
2d. That the widow of a decedent
by law, entitled to the possession of the tract of land constituting the homestead of her husband, at
assigned to her.
the time of his death, until her dower in his lands
3d. That unless the jury believe, from the evidence, that the defendant was in possession, at the time of the service of the declaration in
this cause, they must find for the defendant.
4th. That the deed of the sheriff conveys only such title as Jane
Smith herself could lawfully have made.
All of which the court refused to give, and, at the request of the
plaintiff's counsel, instructed the jury, "That
they believe, from the
testimony, the defendant, either in his own person, or by another
claiming under him, was in possession of the land, at the time of
sufficient proof of possession, to entitle the plainbringing the suit,
tiff to recover, so far as possession
concerned."
To all of which the
defendant's counsel excepted. The jury found for the plaintiffs, and
the court rendered judgment accordingly.
The defendant's counsel
then moved for
new trial his motion was overruled, and he appealed
to this court. The errors assigned are, the refusal of the court below
to give the instructions asked by the defendant, and giving that asked
for by the plaintiffs.
Clayton,
This was an action of ejectment, brought by the defendants in error as the heirs of their ancestor, to recover
tract of
land in Holmes county.
Two errors are assigned for reversing the
judgment.
first objected that the land was the homestead or place of residence of Smith, the ancestor, at the time of his death, that he left
widow who, under the statute,
entitled to the premises until her
dower
assigned to her, and that the plaintiff in error claims under
the widow as the purchaser of her interest at execution sale.
At common law the widow had
right to remain in the mansionhouse of her deceased husband for forty days after his death, within
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which time it was the duty of the heir to assign her dower. But before
such assignment she could not maintain ejectment for it. Adams on
Ejectment, 65 ; 1 Th. Coke, 601 ; 2 C. & P. 430. She has no vested es4 Kent, 62.
tate for Hfe in any particular part, until after allotment.
The right of quarantine, or the right to remain in possession of the
mansion-house, is by our statute extended, so as to enable her to retain
it free from molestation and rent, until her dower is assigned. H. &
'H. 353. Under a similar statute in New Jersey it has been decided,
that an action of ejectment will not lie against her, unless her dower
had been previously assigned. Den v. Dodd, 6 N. J. Law, 367, This
decision is against the weight of English and American authorities,
in states in which no such statute exists ; but it may be a just construction, and applicable to our own statute.^*
But be this as it may, this
right of enjoyment of the mansion-house, we regard as a mere personal
privilege, one which cannot be transferred to a third person ; and that
such third person claiming under her may be put out by the heir, and
driven to the remedy to recover the dower. Until assignment the widow has no estate in the lands, and her claim is a mere charge or incumbrance upon them. We think therefore, that this defence cannot be
* * *
sustained.
See 4 Kent, 61.^**
Judgment is therefore reversed and a new trial granted.

FLYNN
(Supreme

Judicial Court of
42

V.

FLYNN.

Massachusetts, 1S9S. 171 Mass. 312, 50 N. E. 650,
98, 6S Am. St. Rep. 427.)

L. R. A.

Lathrop, J.

The land in which the plaintiff had an inchoate right
of dower was taken by the city of Boston by right of eminent domain,
for the purposes of a schoolhouse, the city acting by virtue of and in
accordance with the provisions of the St. of 1895, c. 408. This act, in
sec. 2, gives the board of street commissioners of Boston, at the request
of the school committee, power to "take by purchase or otherwise such
lands for school purposes as said school committee, with the approval
of the mayor, shall designate, and to take any lands under the right of
eminent domain."
The board is also required to "sign, and cause to be
recorded in the registry of deeds for the county of Suffolk, a statement
containing a description thereof as certain as is required in a common
conveyance of land and stating that the same are taken for school purposes ; and upon the recording of any such statement the lands described
therein shall be taken in fee for said city." We assume that all the formalities required have been complied with, and that the city now owns
the land in fee.
Callahan v. Nelson, 128 Ala. 671, 29 South, 555 (1900).
The balance of the opinion, in which the court concluded that the portion
of the c'harge regarding the sufficiency of the proof of possession to entitle the
plaintiff to recover was erroneous, is omitted.
24 See
26
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The question then is whether an inchoate right of dower is such an
interest in land that, when the land is taken by the right of eminent
domain, the wife may apply to a court of equity to have in some way
the benefit of such interest. We are not aware that this right has ever
before been asserted in this Commonwealth, and this is the first time
that the question has been presented for our decision.
It is declared by the Pub. Sts. c. 124, § 3, as follows : "A wife shall
be entitled to her dower at common law in the lands of her deceased
husband."
This chapter makes many provisions in regard to dower,
but there is none which relates to the question before us.
At common law, "a woman is entitled to dower out of all the lands
whereof her husband was seised in fee simple, at any time during the
1 Greenl. Cruise, 175.
coverture."
There is no doubt that the inchoate right of dower is an encumbrance upon land. Shearer v. Ranger, 22 Pick. 447.
The release of
such a right of dower is a good consideration for a promise. Bullard
v. Briggs, 7 Pick. 533, 19 Am. Dec. 292; Holmes v. Winchester,
133
Mass. 140; Nichols v. Nichols, 136 Mass. 256. It is a contingent right,
which the wife during coverture may have the assistance of the court
to establish or protect. Burns v. Lvnde, 6 Allen. 305 ; Davis v. Wetherell, 13 Allen, 60, 90 Am. Dec. 177; Madigan v. Walsh, 22 Wis. 501;
Clifford v. Kampfe, 147 N. Y. 383, 42 N. E. 1 ; Buzick v. Buzick, 44
Iowa, 259, 24 Am. Rep. 740. So, too, a wife having an inchoate right
of dower may maintain a bill in equity to redeem land from a mortgage
in which she has joined with her husband to release dower. Davis v.
Wetherell, 13 Allen, 60; Lamb v. Montague, 112 Mass. 352. See Pub.
Sts. c. 124, § 5. But if the mortgage contains a power of sale, and the
wife has joined in the deed with her husband in release of her dower, a
sale of the land in pursuance of the power bars all claim and possibility
of dower. Pub. Sts. c. 181, § 19.
While a wife may, under Pub. Sts. c. 124, § 6, bar her right of dower
by releasing the same in a deed executed by her husband, or by a subsequent deed executed either separately or jointly with her husband, yet
she cannot convey her inchoate right of dower to a person to whom
her husband has not conveyed the land. Such a deed is void. Mason
V. Mason, 140 Mass. 63, 3 N. E. 19.
See also Reiff v. Horst, 55 Md.
42.
In Mason v. Mason, it was said by Mr. Justice Devens : "While
the inchoate right of dower is a vested right of value, dependent on the
contingency of survivorship, it is not that separate property which
passes by conveyance, but a right which one entitled thereto may, under certain circumstances, release.
It is of a peculiar character, and,
before assignment, the wife has no seisin." While the word "vested"
is used in this case, it would seem that the word "contingent," which
was used by Chief Justice Parker in Bullard v. Briggs, 7 Pick. 533,
539, 19 Am. Dec. 292, would more accurately describe the nature of the
estate.
After an assignment of dower is made, the widow acquires no
new freehold, her seisin being deemed in contemplation of law a con-
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Even after the death of the husband, a creditor cannot at law attach
the right of the widow to have her dower assigned to her, or take the
McMahon v. Gray, 150 Mass. 289, 22 N. E. 923, 5
same on execution.
L. R. A. 748, 15 Am. St. Rep. 202. Until dower has been assigned to
her, a widow has no estate in the land of her deceased husband. Smith
V. Shaw, 150 Mass. 297, 22 N. E. 924; State v. Wincroft, 76 N. C. 38.
Nor can she object to a partition of the land among the tenants in
common.
Motley v. Blake, 12 Mass. 280; Ward v. Gardner, 112
Mass. 42.
There can be no doubt that the inchoate right of the wife is always
subject to any encumbrance or infirmity in the husband's title existing
at the time he became seised ; and we are also of opinion that it is
subject to any incident attached to it by law. The land may be sold
on a petition for partition, if the husband is a tenant in common. Pub.
Sts. c. 178, § 65. When this happens, it has been held in a well considered case in Indiana that the wife is not a necessary party to the
partition proceedings, and is not entitled to share in the fund derived

from

the sale.

h. R. A.

Haggerty

v.

Wagner,

148

Ind.

625, 48

N. E.

366, 39

384.

Land may be sold for taxes, and if there is a surplus it is to be paid
"to the owner of the estate." Pub. Sts. c. 12, § 35 ; St. 1888, c. 390, §
40.
In a case arising under a New York statute, which directed that
any surplus arising on a tax sale "shall be held for the use of and paid
over to the person legally entitled upon his establishing his right thereto," it was held that the owner of the land was entitled to the surplus.
People V. Palmer, 10 App. Div. 395, 41 N. Y. Supp. 760. It was also
held in this case that the interest which the wife of the owner had in
the land by virtue of her inchoate right of dower, although a valuable
interest, was not an "estate" in the land which would give her a right
to redeem from the tax sale, under a statute giving a right to redeem
to "any person or persons having an estate in, or any mortgagee of"
any land sold for taxes.
It is also an incident of land that it is liable to be taken by the right
of eminent domain, and we are of opinion that when it is so taken in
the lifetime of the husband, the wife is not entitled, on account of her
inchoate right of dower, to have any portion of the money received for
the land either paid to her directly, or set aside for her benefit on the
contingency of her surviving her husband. If the land had not been
taken, the husband could have done what he pleased with it during his
life. He might have sold it for its full value, yet the wife could not
interfere, or deprive him of the use of any part of the purchase money.
In case the husband survived the wife, the purchaser would have a good
title, which the heirs of the wife could not interfere with. If the chief
value of the estate should consist of a building on the land, which was
insured by the husband, and the building should be destroyed by fire.
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no one would contend tliat the wife had any interest in the insurance
money, or that a court of equity would compel a part of the money to
be set aside for her benefit unless the husband would agree to rebuild
the house. Again, if a parcel 'of land should be washed away by the
negligent maintaining of a dam, and the owner of the land should
recover as damages the full value of the land, would not the money so
received be his to do with as he pleased?
The only case in support of the doctrine contended for by the petitioner which has been decided by a court of last resort is that of Wheeler V. Kirtland, 27 N. J. Eq. 534, decided in 1875 by the Court of Errors
and Appeals in New Jersey.
It laid down a new doctrine, which has
not since been recognized except by a court of inferior jurisdiction,
and which we are of opinion is opposed to sound principles.
The case of Wheeler v. Kirtland was partly decided on the ground
that the rule laid down in Moore v. New York, 8 N. Y. 110, 59 Am.
Dec. 473, had been repudiated or modified in later decisions in that
State, citing In re Central Park Extension, 16 Abb. Prac. 56, 68, and
Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298, 13 Am. Rep. 523. In Moore v. New
York, 8 N. Y, 110, 59 Am. Dec. 473, lands in which the wife had an
inchoate right of dower were taken by the right of eminent domain.
After the husband's death, his wife claimed dower in them. The statute under which the land was taken authorized commissioners to make
"a just estimate of the damage to the respective owners, lessees, parties, and persons respectively entitled unto or interested in the hands."
It was said by Gardiner, J. : "The question is whether the possibility
of dower accruing to the wife after marriage, but before the death of
the husband, is an interest in law, within the purview of this statute.
* * * Such a possibility may be released, but it is not, it is believed, the subject of grant or assignment, nor is it in any sense an interest in real estate."
It was held in In re Central Park Extension, 16 Abb. -Prac. 56, 69, on
the authority of Moore v. New York, that the inchoate right of dower
was not an interest in real estate, Judge Ingraham, however, added,
after quoting the remarks of Gardiner, J. : "It might have been added
to that case, that the right was transferred from the land to the money
received for the land by the husband, if the wife survived him."
The case of Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298, 13 Am. Rep. 523,
merely decides that, if a husband is induced to part with his land by
fraud, his wife has such an interest that she can join witli him in an
action against the fraudulent purchaser.
The rule laid down in Moore v. New York, so far from being repudiated or modified in that State by later decisions, has been recognized and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Witthaus v. Schack, 105
N. Y. 332, 11 N. E. 649, where it is said by Ruger, C. J. : "The settled
theory of the law as to the nature of an inchoate right of dower is that
it is not an estate or interest in land at all, "but is a contingent claim
arising not out of contract, but as an institution of law, constituting
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a mere chose in action incapable of transfer by grant or conveyance,
but susceptible only during its inchoate state of extinguishment.
By
force of the statute this is effected by the act of the wife in joining
with her husband in the execution of a deed of the land. Such deed,
so far as the wife is concerned, operates as a release or satisfaction of
the interest and not as a conveyance, and removes an encumbrance instead of transferring an interest."
See also Hammond v. Pennock, 61

N. Y. 145, 158.
The only case which has been brought to our attention that has followed Wheeler v. Kirtland is In re New York & Brooklyn Bridge, 75
Hun, 558, 27 N. Y. Supp. 597, and 89 Hun, 219, 34 N. Y. Supp. 1002.
But the view taken of the nature of the inchoate right of dower in
this case does not seem to be in conformity with the cases above cited
from the higher courts of New York.
In the cases of Bonner v. Peterson, 44 111. 253, and In re Hall's Estate, L. R. 9 Eq. 179, cited by the plaintiff, the husband had died, and
the widow's right of dower was no longer inchoate when the land was
taken.

For the reasons before stated, we are of opinion that the bill should
be dismissed. So ordered.^*

CRENSHAW
(Supreme Court of Tennessee, 1911.

v.

MOORE.
124 Tenn. 528, 137 S.

W.

924.)

Lansdun, J. William R. Moore died in Shelby county testate, and
his widow, Mrs. Charlotte Blood Moore, dissented from his will.
Such proceedings were had in the county court of Shelby county that
she was assigned a year's support, to the value of $20,000, and dower
of one-third of his real estate. The complainant brought this suit to
collect from her an inheritance or succession tax on both her year's
support and dower, under the act of 1893 (Shannon's Code, section
724), as amended by chapter 479 of the Acts of 1909.
The act of 1893 imposed a tax upon "all estates, real, personal, and
mixed, of every kind whatsoever, situated within this State, whether
2 6 Cf. French v. Lord, 69 Me. 5.S7 (1S79) ; Borough of York v. Welsh. 117 Pa.
See Benton v. City of St. Louis, 217 Mo. 687, 118 S.
174, 11 Atl. 390 (1SS7).
W. 418, 129 Am. St. Rep. 5G1 (190S).
In BroAvn v. Brown, 82 N. J. Eq. 40, 88 Atl. 186 (1913), the court entertained
a bill in equity by a wife to protect her inchoate dower in certain lands held
by the defendant in trust for her husband against a possible conveyance to an
See, too, Brown v. Brown, 94 S. C. 492, 78 S. E. 447 (1913).
innocent purchaser.
where it was held that under some circumstances a court of equity would interfere to protect a wife's inchoate dower against waste. But see Rumsey v. Sullivan, 166 App. Div. 246, 150 N. Y. Supp. 287 (1914).
In Whiting v. Whiting (Me.) 96 Atl. 500 (1916), the plaintiff, who had been
induced by fraudulent representatiois of her husband to join in a deed of his
land, was held entitled to maintain a bill in equity against him to have him
declared a trustee of a certain portion of tlie purchase price for her benefit.

The plaintiff's only interest in the laud was her contingent interest provided
for by the statute in place of the common-law dower.
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within or out
seized
or possessed
die
who
may
from
of this State, passing
an)' person
laws
this State,
of
intestate
of such estates, either by will or under the
therein,
transferred
or any part of such estate or estates, or interest
by deed, grant, bargain, gift, or sale, made in contemplation of death,
or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after the death
of the grantor or bargainor," passing to collateral kindred of the owner ; and section 20, ch. 479, Acts of 1909, provided "that inheritances
not taxed under the present laws shall pay a tax as follows : All inheritances of $5,000 and over, but less than $20,000, a tax of one per
centum of their value. All inheritances of $20,000 and over, a tax
of one and one-fourth per centum of their value, to be collected by
the county clerk of each county."
This is a privilege tax imposed on the right of acquiring property
by succession. State v. Alston, 94 Tenn. 674, 30 S. W. 750, 28 LR. A. 178; Knox v. Emerson, 123 Tenn. 409, 131. S. W. 972. Likethe person or persons dying seized thereof be domiciled

wise it is a special tax, and the rule is that laws imposing such taxes
are to be construed strictly against the government, and favorably to
the taxpayer.
English v. Crenshaw, 120 Tenn. 531, 110 S. W. 210,.
17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 753, 127 Am. St. Rep. 1025.
The widow's year's support is given her by statutory provision,
which is found in sections 4020 and 4021 of Shannon's Code. It is
inconceivable that the legislature intended to levy the tax in question
upon this bounty of the widow, given her by the law out of her husband's personal estate.
She does not succeed to the husband's title
to the property set apart to her as a year's support, but acquires it adBy the act of
versely to his administrator by virtue of the statute.
and
commissioners,
of
to
her
the
the
separation
personalty assigned
by
the subsequent confirmation of their report by the court, the title to the
specific property thus set apart becomes absolutely vested in the widow.
The obvious intention of the legislature in passing this statute was to
provide a temporary support for her and her family immediately on
It is an extension by law of her right of
the death of her husband.
out
of
the personal estate of her husband for one year^after
support
his deatli, and is founded in a sound public policy, which has for its
purpose a conservation of the family upon the death of the husband.
The widow does not succeed to the right of the husband, nor does she
take the property under the intestate laws of this State. It is a special provision made for her in the law for the support of herself and
her family. Bavless v. Bayless, 4 Cold. 363 ; Railway Co. v. Kennedy,
90 Tenn." 185, 16 S. W. 113.
Nor do we think that the widow's dower is subject to this tax. By
the common law, if a husband acquire an estate which is subject to
descend to his heirs, the wife, at the same time the husband acquires
his title, has vested in her the right of dower ; and although the husband aliened the estate, the wife's dower would attach.
By the acts of
the widow
4139,
section
1784 and 1823, carried into Shannon's Code at
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is dowable in one-third part of all the lands of which her husband
died seized and possessed, or of which he was equitable owner.
In
all other respects, the widow's right of dower in this State is the same
as it was at common law.
It has the same qualities as the commonlaw right of dower, but its quantity was cut down by the statutes referred to. This right originates with the marriage.
It is an incumbrance upon the title of the heir at law, and is superior to the claims
of the husband's creditors.
Its origin is so ancient that neither Coke
nor Blackstone can trace
and
as "widespread as the Christian
religion and enters into the contract of marriage among all Christians."
fiction of law, the estate in dower relates to the marriage.
"By
adjudged in Ful wood's Case,
Co., 65, that the widow shall
hold her dower discharged from all judgments, leases, mortgages, or
other incumbrances made by her husband after the marriage, because
her title, being consummated by his death, has relation to the time of
the marriage, and, of course,
prior to all other titles. She claims by
and through her husband, has the oldest title,
under him for the
valuable consideration of marriage, the best respected in the law, and
cannot be disturbed by any other claiming under the husband."
Combs
V. Young,
Yerg. 226, 26 Am. Dec. 225.
The preamble to the act of 1784, which was the first passed in this
State reducing the quantity of the widow's dower estate, recites, in
substance, that the dower allotted by law in lands for widows, in the
then unimproved state of the country, was
very inadequate provision
for the support of such widows; that
was only just and reasonable
that those who, by their prudence, economy, and industry had contributed to raise up an estate to their husbands, should be entitled to
— thus showing that the legislature recognized that the
share in
widow's dower under this act had the same origin and was of the
same quality as her dower existing at common law.
seen that, whether
be considered that the widow holds
So,
purchaser from her husband by virtue
her dower in the nature of
be merely a provision of the
of the marriage contract, or whether
in
cannot be considered that her right
law made for her benefit,
succession to that of her husband upon his death, or that the husband
While
true that
bestows
upon her in contemplation of death.
not consummated until the death of the husband,
her right to dower
carved out of only such realty as he owned at his death,
and that
does not follow from this premise that the widow succeeds to his
She derives
by virtue of the marriage,
title by the intestate laws.
and in her right as wife to be consummated in severalty to her upon
Cold. 14.
Boyer v. Boyer,
tlie death of her husband.
The supreme court of Illinois, in Billings v. People, 189 111. 472,
construction of the inheritance
59 N. E. 798, 59 L. R. A. 807, upon
tax law of that State, together with tlie laws governing the descent and
difdistribution of the property of persons dying intestate reached
The reasoning of tliat
ferent conclusion from that reached by us.
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court is predicated chiefly upon a construction of the statutes of that
State, which are essentially different from those of this State. It is
stated, however, that, while the husband cannot deprive his wife of
her inchoate right of dower, the State may, and that she does not
Withhold by contract, but holds by laws which the State may change.
out undertaking to meet all of the arguments set forth in support of
this very able opinion, we are content to hold that, under a proper
construction of the statute in question, the legislature did not intend
to tax the widow's dower as an inheritance from the estate of her
husband, or a succession to his rights therein. As stated heretofore,
she does not inherit from her husband, but derives her right by virtue
of her marriage, which is consummated upon her husband's death,
and becomes an incumbrance upon the inheritance of the heirs at law,
and is, to that extent, an interest adverse to the inlieritance from the
husband.
For the same reason she does not succeed to the rights of
the husband. Her dower is intended for her support and maintenance,
and an intention to tax it will not be imputed to the legislature, except
where the language employed makes it plainly imperative to do so.
Billings V. People, supra, is the only case cited by counsel which
discusses the question at issue in any way, and no case is cited discussing the liability of the widow's year's support for the tax involved
But, upon reason, we are content to hold that neither the year's
here.
support nor dower is subject to the tax. It results that the decree of
the court below is affirmed, with costs.^^

INGRAM
(Superior

V.

MORRIS.

Court of Delaware,

1844.

4

Har.

111.)

Plea, that the land was sold on a judgment
Summons in dower.
against the husband, which was -a lien thereon at the time of the marriage. Replication and issue.
It was admitted that Samuel Ingram was seized of an estate of inThe judgment
heritance in the premises at the time of the marriage.
upon which the land was sold bore date on the same day of the marriage, and there was no evidence which, in pwint of time, preceded the
other. Yet the title of the widow of Samuel Ingram to dower depended on this question; for if the judgment was a subsisting judgment at the time of the marriage, the sale of the land which was afterwards made in execution of that judgment discharged the land of
2 7 See In re Estate of Sanford, 91 Neb. 752, 137 N. W. SG4 (1912) ; In re BulSee, also, In re Estate of Strahan,
len's Estate (Utah) 151 Pac. 533 (1915), ace.
93 Neb. 828, 142 N. VV. 678 (1913), enlarged statutory substitute for dower;
Kohny v. Dunbar, 21 Idaho, 258, 121 Pac. 544, 39 I.. R. A. (N. S.) 1107, Ann. Cas.
1913D, 492 (1912), community proiierty ; In re Thompson's Estate, 85 Misc. Rep.
291, 147 N. Y. Supp. 157 (1914), tenancy by entireties.
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wife's right to dower attached and could not

2

was entered,

be divested

by a

judgment subsequently entered.
Ridgely, for the claimant, argued that the claim of dower was a
favored claim; and, in the absence of evidence, the jury would imply
in favor of dower.
He showed that the judgment was entered on a
bond, dated many months before, and argued that the delay of entering the judgment should be considered to the prejudice of the party
claiming under it; that the burthen of proof was on the defendant,
who pleaded an affirmative plea in derogation of this favored right.
Jenkins' Rep. 274 ; Parke on Dower, 2.
Wootten, contra, argued from the fact of the entry of judgment on
the day of the marriage, that the inference should be made that it
was entered before the marriage, for the very purpose of binding tlie
land so as to prevent the right of dower ; that the common usage of
the country was, for marriage to take place in the evening, after the
usual hour of doing business in tlie public offices ; and that if the
marriage and entry of judgment were at the same moment the wife
would not be dowable, for his seizin otherwise than as subject to dower,
would be only momentary. And such a seizin gives no right to dower.
1 Johns. Dig. 518;
Stow v. Tifift, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 458, 8 Am. Dec.
266.

The jury rendered

a verdict

GRADY

for the demandant

V.

McCORKLE.

(Supreme Court of Missouri, 1874.

57 Mo. 172, 17 Am. Rep. 676.)

Wagner, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

it

it,

This was a suit commenced in the Circuit Court of Howard county,
against the defendants, the widow and heirs of Leonard Grady, deFrom the
ceased, for the assignment of dower in certain real estate.
record it appears, that in the year 1859, William Grady, the plaintiff's
husband, was seized of the land in controversy, and agreed with his
son, Leonard Grady, that if he would go on the land and improve
he would convey the same to him by deed, by way of advancement,
and charge him with its value at the time he took possession.
Under this agreement Leonard took possession of the land and made
improvements on the same, and continued to reside on and cultivate
up to the time of his death.
William Grady died without having conveyed the land according to
the agreement, and without having fixed any price thereon, to be
charged as an advancement.
In the year 1865, after the death of William and Leonard, the father and son, the widow and heirs at law of Leonard, who are the
defendants in the present case, filed their petition in the Circuit Court
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against the plaintiff and the heirs of William, setting out the facts
as above stated, and praying the court to decree that the land should
be held by them as the widow and heirs of Leonard, as if the same
had been conveyed to him by William in his life time, and to fix a
valuation thereon, at which they should be charged for the same.
In this proceeding plaintiff v)as duly served with process, but made
The court made a decree in accordance with the prayer
no answer.
of the petition, declaring that the land "described be, and the same
is hereby vested in the plaintiffs, to be held by them as if the same
had been conveyed by said William Grady in his life time, to the said
Leonard Grady, and that the title of defendants, as the widow and
heirs of William Grady be divested."
The court below held that this decree barred the plaintiff, the widow
of William Grady, from having any dower in the premises, and this
is the only question in the case.
The statute provides that "every widow shall be endowed of the
third part of all tlie lands whereo-f her husband, or any other person
to his use, was seized of an estate of inheritance, at any time during
the marriage, to which she shall not have relinquished her right of
dower, in the manner prescribed by law, to hold and enjoy during
her natural life."
1 Wagn. Stat. p. 538, § L
The right of dower attaches whenever there is a seizin by the husband during the marriage, and unless it is relinquished by the wife
in the manner prescribed by law, it becomes absolute at the husband's
death. After the right of dower has once attached, it is not in the
power of the husband alone to defeat it by any act in tlie nature of
an alienation or charge.
It is a right in law, fixed from the moment
the facts of marriage and seizin concur, and becomes a title paramount
to that of any person claiming under the husband by subsequent act.
Co. Litt. 32a.
The alienation of the husband, therefore, whether voluntary, as by
deed or will, or involuntary, by proceedings against him or otherwise,
will confer no title on the alienee, as against the wife in respect of her
dower.
It is a necessary consequence of this rule, that all charges or derivative interest created by the husband, subsequent to the attachment of
the wife's right, are voidable as to that part of the land which is recovered in dower. As the husband cannot defeat his wife's dower by
any alienation of the land by himself alone, so neither can he bind
her by any modification of the nature of the seizin, nor by any merger
or extinguishment produced by his own act without her concurrence.
Scribn. Dower, 577.
In conformity with these principles, it has been held that if a woman,
after she becomes a widow, is made a party to a suit to foreclose a
mortgage executed by the husband alone, and no allegation be made
in the petition in reference to her claim for dower, the decree will not
be considered as affecting her dower estate.
Lewis v. Smith, 9 N,
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Am. Dec. 706; Thompson v. Reeve, 12 Mo. 157; Crenshaw
Mo. 98; Freem. Judg. § 303.
Neither the petition nor the decree in the case of Leonard Grady's
widow and heirs v. WiHiam Grady's widow and heirs, made any mention of the subject of dower, nor was it at all litigated or drawn in
question. The whole object, extent and scope of that proceeding was
to have the agreement and undertaking of William Grady specifically
The rights against the widow and heirs were precisely
performed.
the same as they would have been against William Grady, had he
been alive and made a party to the suit. But a suit against him would
not have affected his wife's right to dower, without any concurring act
on her part. The decree divested his title out of the widow and heirs,
and vested it in the widow and heirs of his son.
Nothing more was
502, 61

V. Creek,

52

attempted and nothing more was done.
The question of the plaintiff's right of dower' was neither raised nor
decided, and was not made a subject of adjudication in the suit for
The plaintiff did not answer, and although she
specific performance.
was perhaps properly made a party, my conclusion is, that she is not
barred from claiming her dower interest in the land — she having done
nothing to relinquish the same.
Wherefore the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded;
the other judges concur.^ ^

CATLIN
(Supreme Judicial

V.

Court of Massachusetts,

WARE.
1812.

9 Mass. 218, 6 Am. Dec. 56.)

This was a writ of dower, to which the tenant pleaded in bar: 1st
That the demandant's husband Joseph Catlin was never seized, &c. on
which issue was joined.
2d That the said Joseph, being seized in his
demesne as of fee, on the 28th day of March, 1793, by his deed of
that date duly acknowledged, &c. for a valuable consideration, bargained and sold the same land, in which the demandant claims her
dower, to one David Horton in fee simple ; and that the said Abigail,
by the consent of her husband, for the consideration in the said deed
expressed, and also of one dollar paid her by the said David, assented
and agreed to the same deed of the said Joseph, and then and there by
her act and consent, signified by her affixing her seal to the said deed,
and subscribing her mark thereto, she being unable to write her name,
barred herself of all right of dower in the same premises and every
part thereof : by virtue whereof the said David became seized in fee
of the same premises, free and exempt from all claim, demand or right
of dower of the said Abigail therein.
2 8 Cf. Phillips V.
32 Mich. 438 (1875).

Phillips, 30 Colo. 516, 71 Pac. 363 (1903) ; Ligare
But see Bennett v. Harms, 51 Wis. 251, 8 N. W.

v. Semple,
222 (18S1).
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The demandant replied, that she did not by her act and consent
signified, &c. bar herself, &c. and tendered an issue to the country,
which was joined by the tenant.
The several issues thus joined were tried at the last April term of
this court in this county, before Sedgwick, J., from whose report it
appears, that the seisin of the demandant's husband and her coverture
were agreed, as alleged in the writ.
The tenant produced the deed of Joseph Catlin to David Horton,
mentioned in the pleadings.
It purported a conveyance in fee of the
land, in which dower is demanded, and to
after the name and seal
of her husband, were set the demandant's seal and mark. But her
name was not otherwise mentioned in the deed, nor were there any
words tlierein purporting or implying
release of her right of dower.
The deed was acknowledged by tlie husband, and recorded but there
was no acknowledgment by the wife.
On the part of the tenant
was insisted at the trial, that the latter
issue was proved on his behalf.
But the judge directed
verdict on
both issues in favour of the demandant; referring to the decision of
the court, the question whether that direction was right.
was also referred to the court to determine any question which
might arise from the finding of the jury, respecting the improved
value of the land
the improvements having arisen from ditching the
land, making walls, and erecting and improving buildings.
The jury returned a verdict conformably to the directions of the
judge; assessed the demandants' damages at 49 dollars 50 cents; and
certified that the improvements made upon the demanded premises,
since the conveyance thereof by Joseph Catlin, were at the rate of
fifty per cent.
Curia. Two objections, made to the deed read in evidence at the
trial of this cause, have been replied to by the counsel for the tenant.
As to the second, the want of an acknowledgment by the wife, we
think an acknowledgment unnecessary in the case.
One party to
to
and
that
the wnole that
deed acknowledging
gives notoriety
recorded,
deed be acknowledged and
yet on
necessary. Though
still to be
the issue of non est factum the execution of the deed
Neither was an acknowlhad not been acknowledged.
proved, as
edgment by the wife necessary in order to make the deed binding on
bound by such, as the law
her. She must know her own acts, and
authorizes her to execute.
and
The other objection to this deed has much more weight in
indeed fatal to the defence of the action. A deed cannot bind a party
contains words expressive of an intention to be
unless
sealing
In this case, whatever may be conceived of the intention of
bound.
the demandant in signing and sealing the deed, there are no words
implying her intention to release her claim of dower in the lands conthat operation. It was merely
veyed which must have been, to give
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2

of the husband, and the wife is not by it barred of her right

to dower.^®
to the question referred to us, respecting the increased value of
lands, in which the demandant claims her dower, as they have
arisen from the labours and expense of the purchaser, it is our opinion that she is entitled to her third part of the land, in the condition
Had the heir
it was in at the time of the alienation by her husband.
of the husband been the tenant, and the improvements been made by
him after the land descended, it would have been otherwise ; for it
was his folly not to assign the dower to the widow, before he made

As

the

the improvements.^**

Judgment on

the verdict.

ROBINSON
(Supreme

Judicial Court of

V.

BATES.

Massachusetts,

3 Mete. 40.)

1841.

Writ of Dower, wherein

J.,

.the demandant claimed her dower in land
in Webster, in the seizin and possession of the tenant, and counted
upon the seizin of her late husband, William Robinson.
The action
was tried, on the general issue, before Wilde,
who reported the

follows

:

case as

a

a

The demandant proved her marriage with said William in 1792, his
seizin of the demanded premises from the time of said marriage until
1816; the death of said William in 1837; and
demand of dower,
made upon the tenant on the 11th of March, 1840.
The tenant then introduced
judgment recovered in this court, at

3

a

9

a

;

;

6

9

;

7

1,

7

29 Cox V. Wells.
Blackf. (Ind.) 410, 43 Am. Dec. 9S (1845); Lothrop v.
Ohio, 194, pt.
Foster, 51 Me. 307 (1SG3)
28 Am.
McFarland v. Febiger,
Dec. 632 (1835), ace. Johnson v. Montgomery, 51 111. 185 (1S69), semble contra.
«ee Leanied v. Cutler, 18 Picli. (Mass.)
(18.36).
As to the ability of the husband and wife to make an effective conveyance
of the wife's inchoate dower alone, see Davenport v. Gwilliams, 133 Ind. 142,
See, also, Hart v. Burch. 130 111. 426, 22
31 N. E. 790, 22 L. R. A. 244 (1892).
L. R. A. 371 (1889) INIason v. Mason, 140 IMass. 63, N. E. 19 (1885).
N. E. 831,
30 "Nor is the widow's right in lands which have been alienated by the husband alone limited to the value of such lands at the date of such conveyance.
It is to be admitted that authority may be found for such rule, but the overAVhelming weight is to the contrary.
It is, of course, equitable in such cases
that the widow shall not be permitted to profit by an increase in value due to
improvements and betterments made or created by the labor and money of the
grantee, who has expended them in good faith, believing he had a perfect title
but in all increase arising from the general growth, prosperity, and development of the country, or from any other source than the labor and expense of
Butler v. Butler, 151 Iowa, 583, 58S,
the grantee, she is entitled to share."
It was accordingly held in that case that
132 iST. W. 63 (1011), per Weaver, J.
wiie
value upon the inchoate dower of
the court had no jurisdiction to hx
who had not joined in a deed of her husband and decree that upon a deposit
of such sum by the grantee, to abide the determination of survivorship, the
land should be held free of such dower.
Occasionally the rule is laid down as above quoted, but omitting any referIn re Tomlinson,
Del. Ch. 446, 81 Atl.
iince to the good faith of the grantee.
See Park on Dower, *256 et seq.
468, 585 (1911).
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September term, 1828, by one Morris Larned against said William
Robinson, and a levy, in due form, in October, 1828, of the execution
which issued on said judgment, upon the demanded premises : Also
a judgment, at the October term, 1830, of this court, in a writ of
entry brought by said Larned to recover the demanded premises
of William Robinson, Junior, and Sylvanus Robinson, then tenants
in possession thereof, and the writ of habere facias, issued on said
judgment, with the return of an officer thereon, stating the delivery
of seizin to said Larned in November 1831 : Also a deed of said premises, afterwards made to the tenant by said Morris Larned, dated November 30th, 1831, and duly acknowledged and recorded.
The tenant then offered to prove, that in December, 1816, said
William Robinson, by his deed, duly executed and recorded, for the
consideration of $4,000, conveyed the premises in question to one John
Jacobs, Junior, and that the demandant joined him in said deed, and
released her dower in said premises. The demandant's counsel objected
to the admission of this evidence, because the tenant did not claim
under this conveyance. But the evidence was admitted, upon the tenant's counsel intimating that they expected to prove this conveyance
fraudulent and void as to creditors, and that, if so, it would, by St.
1805, c. 90, § 5, bar the demandant of her dower.
The tenant also
proved a conveyance of the demanded premises by said Jacobs to the
aforesaid William Robinson, Junior, and Sylvanus Robinson, by deed
duly executed, and recorded in February, 1822,
The tenant then offered to introduce the abovementioned judgment
of Morris Larned against William Robinson, to prove that the aforesaid conveyance from said Robinson to Jacobs, in December, 1816,
in which the demandant joined and released her dower, was fraudulent and void as to creditors, and that therefore the demandant
The dewas barred of her dower, by force of the statute aforesaid.
mandant objected to the admission of that judgment for this purpose,
because it was between different parties, and not binding on her; and
because it had no tendency, in itself to prove fraud in said deed to
Jacobs ; there being no proof on what ground the verdict and judgment in that case was rendered.
The judge ruled that said judgment could not be admitted for
the purpose for which it was offered.
To this ruling the tenant
excepted. A verdict was taken for the demandant, which was to be
set aside and a new trial granted, if the court, should be of opinion that the record of said judgment was admissible for said purpose.

Wilde, J. The demandant having made out a prima facie case, entitling her to dower, the general question is, whether the defence
He relies
set up by the tenant is sufficient in law to bar her claim.
Robinson,
the
William
in
from
of
the premises
on a deed
question
which
demandant's late husband, to one John Jacobs, Junior, in
Aig.Pbop. — 40
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deed the demandant joined, and thereby released to the said

(Part 2
Jacobs her

right of dower in the premises.
It is admitted, that the tenant has no title under Jacobs ; but his
counsel contends that he has, by the common law, a right to plead in
bar, and under St. 1836, c. 272>, abolishing special pleadings, to give
in evidence under the general issue, a conveyance by the demandant to a third person under whom he does not claim ; and he relies
on the case of Wolcott v. Knight, 6 Mass. 418, and sundry other cases,
in which this principle is laid down. "For," it is said, "although the
tenant may have no title, still if the demandant has no right to recover, he cannot be permitted to draw into question the seizin of the
tenant, whether he acquired it by right or by wrong." Stearns on Real

Actions,

226.

It

has been argued by the counsel for the tenant, that this principle
is applicable to a case of dower, where the demandant had relin-

quished her inchoate right of dower by joining her husband in a conBut the contrary doctrine is laid down in Pixveyance to a stranger.
ley V. Bennett, 11 Mass. 298. And that case, we think, was rightly
decided.
The tenant's counsel contended, that as the demandant had once released her claim, she was for ever estopped to demand dower, whoever may be in possession of the land. But it is very clear that a stranger cannot be bound by, nor take advantage of, an estoppel. An estoppel, to be binding, must be reciprocal, and parties and privies only
are bound thereby.
Whether the demandant's deed may by law operate as a release, or
in any way, except by way of estoppel, is a question which it is not
necessary to decide ; because, if it may operate so as to pass the right
to the grantee, this action may well be maintained for his benefit, or
for the benefit of his assigns ; as they cannot maintain an action in
their own names, to enforce their right against the tenant.
But there is another answer to this objection to the demandant's
title, which is entirely satisfactory and conclusive.
The tenant, at the
trial, ofifered to prove that the conveyance to Jacobs, was fraudulent
and void as to the creditors of the grantor, and that, on that ground,
he had recovered judgment for the possession of the premises against
the assignees of the said Jacobs.
Now we are of opinion that the
tenant, having avoided the deed to Jacobs, cannot now be allowed to
set it up as a bar to the demandant's claim.
In Stinson v. Sumner, 9
Mass. 143, 6 Am. Dec. 49, it was decided that where a wife releases
her claim of dower, by joining her husband in a conveyance, and
the purchaser recovers back the purchase money on account of the
grantor's defect of title to the land, the release of the wife thereby
becomes inoperative, and does not bar her right of dower after her
The principle, on w^hich that decision is founded,
husband's decease.
applies conclusively to the present case. The tenant has avoided the
deed of the husband, and defeated the estate on which the demand-
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ant's release of dower was intended to operate. By law, therefore,
and in justice, she was thereby restored to her former rights.
The other ground of defence depends on the construction to be given
to St. 1805, c. 90, sec. 5, which provides "that all the lands, tenements, and hereditaments of which the intestate died seized, and also
all such estate which he had fraudulently conveyed, with intent
to defraud his creditors, shall be liable for the payment of his
debts, and may be recovered and applied thereto, saving to the
widow her dower therein ; except in the estate so fraudulently conveyed, to which she had legally relinquished her right of dower."
The execution, under which the tenant claims title, was extended on
the premises in the lifetime of the demandant's husband, and is not
therefore within the letter or the meaning of the statute, which is
expressly limited to the lands, tenements, and hereditaments of an
intestate, and to the proceedings after his death.
If the demandant's dower is subject to forfeiture, it must be applied to the equal
benefit of all the creditors, and the tenant has gained no priority or
title under the execution, in respect to the claim of the demandant.
Wildridge v. Patterson, 15 Mass. 148. Where a statute in clear
terms is limited to a certain class of cases, the limitation is not to be
extended by construction, especially if it would thereby subject an

forfeiture.
Judgment on the

estate to

verdict."^

31 See Huntzirker v. Crocker, 185 Wis. 38, 11,5 N. W. .340, 15 Ann. Cna 444
(1908) ; In re Lingafelter, ISl Fed. 24, 104 C. C. A. 38, 32 L. K. A. (N. S.) 103
(1!)10), where the conveyance was set aside in bankruptcy proceedings because
preferential.
But compare iMiller v. Wilson, 15 Ohio, IDS (184fi).

Statutory Provisions as to Dower.— In practically all of the states there
are statutes relative to dower. These statutes vary in their terms and scojie,
and should be consulted by the student.
In many states the statutes provide
for a dower almost, if not wholly, identical with the common-law dower. In almost an equal number of states it is declared by statute that dower is abolished, and provision is* made, usually in the chapter on TJescenls, whereby, upon
the death of the husband, the widow shall take a specified interest in his realty. I'nder these latter statutes a nice question may arise as to the nature of
the widow's title; that is, whether the common-law principles relative to dower have any applicability, or whetlier it is to be treated pm-ely as a case of inheritance.
In Fletcher v. Holmes, 32 Ind. 497, 510 (1870), the court said : "It
seems clear, therefore, that the right of the widow, under the statute, to a
third of the lands of her deceased husband, is not as dowress, but it rests in
lier, at his death, as an heir, by descent.
The estate thus given is much larger
than that of dower. It is a fee simple, and not merely an estate for life.
It
differs in many other respects from dower; it entitles the wife, without assignment, to immediate possession, as a tenant in common with the other heirs,
and she may convey it at pleasure.
On the other hand, it has some of the incidents of dower. The widow is made a favored heir, and the interest which
descends to her is exempt from liability for the payment of the debts of the
estate. And so, by section twenty-seven, she is not only entitled to a thirpl of
all the lands of which her husband may die seized in fee simple, and of all in
•which he has an equitable interest at the time of his death ; but also of all of
which he may have been seized in fee sin)ple at any time during the coverture,
in the conveyance of which she did not join in due form of law," etc.
How about such interest being subieet to the inheritance tax? See In ro
Estate of Strahan, 93 Neb. 828, 142 N. W. 678 (1913).
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SECTION 4.— ESTATES FOR YEARS

LITTLETON'S TENURES.
Tenant for term of years is
lands or tenements to another
number of years that is accorded
when the lessee entreth by force

where a man letteth (lou home lessa)
for term of certain years, after the
between the lesser and the lessee. And
of the lease, then is he tenant for term

of years.
Section 58.

COKE UPON LITTLETON.
Words to make a lease be, demise, grant, to farm let, betake; and
whatsoever word amounteth to a grant, may serve to make a lease.
In the king's case this word Committo doth amount sometime to a
grant, as when he saith Commissimus W. de B. officium seneschalsise,
&c. quamdiu nobic placuerit, and by that word also he may make a
lease : and therefore a fortiori a common person by that word may do
the same.
For regularly in every lease for years the term
. "Of certain years."
must have a certain beginning and a certain end; and herewith
agreeth Bracton, terminus annorum certus debet esse et determinatus. And Littleton, is here to be understood, first, that the years
must be certain when the lease is to take effect in interest or possession.
For before it takes effect in possession or interest, it may
depend upon an incertainty, viz. upon a possible contingent before it
begin in possession or interest, or upon a limitation or condition subsequent. Secondly, albeit there appear no certainty of years in the lease,
yet if by reference to a certainty it may be made certain it sufficeth.
Quia id certum est quod certum reddi potest. For example of the first.
If A, seised of lands in fee grant to B. that when B, pays to A. 20
shillings, that from thenceforth he shall have and occupy the land
for 21 years, and after B. pays the 20 shillings, this is a good lease
for 21 years from thenceforth. For the second, if A. leaseth his land
to B. for so many years as B. hath in the manor of Dale, and B. hath
then a term in the manor of Dale for 10 years, this is a good lease
by A. to B. of the land of A. for 10 years. If the parson of D. make
a lease of his glebe for so many years as he shall be parson there,
this cannot be made certain by any means, for nothing is more uncertain than the time of death. Terminus vitse est incertus, et licet nihil
certius sit morte, nihil tamen incertius est hora mortis. But if he make
a lease for three years, and so from three years to three years, so
long as he shall be parson, this is a good lease for six years, if he
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continue parson so long, first for three years, and after that for
three years; and for the residue uncertain.
If a man maketh a lease to I. S. for so many years as I. N. shall
name, this at the beginning is uncertain; but when I. N. hath named
the years, then it is a good lease for so many years.
A man maketh a lease for 21 years if I. S. live so long; this is a
good lease for years, and yet is certain in incertainty, for the life
of I. S. is incertain. See many excellent cases concerning this matter
put in the said case of the Bishop of Bath and Wells. By the ancient
law of England for many respects a man could not have made a lease
above 40 years at the most for then it was said that by long leases
many were prejudiced, and many times men disherited, but that ancient law is antiquated.
"And when the lessee entreth by force of the lease, then is he tennot
ant for term of years." And true it
that to many purposes he
not good
release made to him
tenant for years until he enter as
to him to increase his estate, before entry
but he may release the
Neither can
rent reserved before entry, in respect of the privity.
the lessor grant away the reversion by the name of the reversion,
before entry. But the lessee before entry hath an interest, interesse
termini, grantable to another. And albeit the lessor die before the lessee enters, yet the lessee may enter into the lands, as our author himAnd so
the lessee dieth before he
self holdeth in this Chapter.
entered, yet his executors or administrators may enter, because he presbe made to two,
ently by the lease hath an interest in him; and
and one die before entry, his interest shall survive.
Co. Litt. 45b, 46a,

LITTLETON'S TENURES.
a

is

it

And
to be understood, that in
lease for years, by deed or
without deed, there needs no livery of seisin to be made to the lessee,
but he may enter when he will by force of the same lease.
Section 59.

HARE

et al. v.

CELEY.

(Court of Common Pleas, 15S8.

Cro. Eliz. 143.)

it

a

Trespass for breaking their close called Church-field, and metes
and bounds it. The jury find a special verdict, that the place where
was sixteen acres lying in
field called Church-field, and meted
by other metes and bounds that were mentioned in the new assignment, of which Hare was seised in fee, and eas exposuit to the other
three to sow at halves, scil. that he should find one half of the seed,
and the other three the other half, and should manure the land; and
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that Hare should have one moiety of the grain there growing when
it was reaped, and the others the other moiety; and after the land
was sown, A. entered by the command of the defendant, and spoiled
a great part of the corn.
Upon which entry and spoiling, the action
was brought. — First matter, If Church-field being found to be a great
field, in which divers men had interest, if the sixteen acres in it may
be called Church-field? And as to this the Court spake little. — Second matter. If this exposing the land to half be not a lease of the
land, so as the action was to be brought in the name of Hare and the
three? — Third, admitting it was a lease, if Hare be not tenant in common with them of the corn ; for the moiety of that which was sown,
was his?
The Couet held it no lease of the land, but otherwise if it be for
two or three crops : and therefore, as to the breaking of the close.
Hare only was to bring the action ; and as to the spoiling the corn,
But in that they joined
they ought to join being tenants in common.
in the action for breaking the close, whereas he ought to have brought
it alone, it was adjudged the writ should abate.

CASWELL

V.

DISTRICH.

(Supreme Court of New York, 1S36.

15 Wend,

379.)

Error from the Monroe common pleas. The plaintiff as executrix of
D. Caswell, brought an action of assumpsit against Districh for the rent
of certain premises. The defendant pleaded the general issue.
On
the trial, the plaintiff produced a written agreement between her testator and the defendant to the effect; that the testator had agreed
to let the defendant have his farm for one year, and that Districh
had agreed to sow oats and give the testator one third in the half bushel; corn, one third in the basket; to sow three lots (particularly described) into wheat, and give the testator one third in the half bushel
— the meadow, three cocks out of five, and the rest half delivered
in the barn. The plaintiff proved the quantities of grain raised by the
defendant, and rested.
The defendant insisted that the instrument
produced was an agreement to work the land on shares, and not a
lease securing rent ; that the parties therefore were tenants in common
in the crops, and an action for the rent of the premises would not lie.
Whereupon he moved for a nonsuit, which was granted by the court.
The plaintiff sued out a writ of error.
Nelson, J. The agreement between the parties was a letting of
the premises upon shares, and, technically speaking, was not a lease.
Bradish v. Schenck, 8 Johns. 151; Foote v. Colvin, 3 Johns. 216, 3
Am. Dec. 478; Whipple v. Foot, 2 Johns. 421, 3 Am. Dec. 442; De
Mott V. Hagerman, 8 Cow. 220, 18 Am. Dec. 443. There is nothing
which indicates that the stipulation for a portion of the crops was
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The shares were of the specific
by way of rent; but the contrary.
crops raised upon the farm.
It is very material to the landlord, and
no injury to the tenant, that this view of the contract should be maintained, unless otherwise clearly expressed, for then the landlord has
an interest to the extent of his share in the crops.
If it is deemed
rent, the whole interest belongs to the tenant until a division.
Where
a farm is let for a year upon shares, the landlord looks to his interest
in the crops as his security, and thereby is enabled to accommodate
tenants, who otherwise would not be trusted for the rent.
This case is clearly distinguishable frbm that of Stewart v. Dougherty, 9 Johns. 108. There the court, from the correspondence between the
phraseology of the instrument and the terms usual in leases in the
reservation of rent, came to the conclusion that the, proportion of the
crops specified in the agreement was intended as payment of rent in
kind, and that therefore the whole interest belonged to the tenant.
If my conclusion be correct, then the parties were tenants in common in the crops, and as the plaintiff stood in the place of her testator,
she was not entitled to sustain her action, and the common pleas did
right to grant a nonsuit.
Judgment

affirmed.^^

STEEL

V.

FRICK.

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

1867.

56

Pa.

172.)

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland county ;
No. 90, to October term, 1866.
This was an action of covenant, commenced April 6th, 1863, by David Z. Frick against James Steel, and was founded on an article of
agreement dated January 8th, 1862, by which "Steel agrees to let
the said Frick farm his part of the Warden farm, now in the occupancy of James D. Porter, for the term of one year, commencing on
the 1st day of April next — the said Frick to put one field in corn, and
work it sufficiently well, and to put the cornstalk field out in oats in
the spring in good time and order, and to sow so much of the land
in wheat and rye in the fall as the said Steel may wish, or as is fit
to be sowed, and to haul out all the manure and put it on the ground
before sowing, and to keep up the fences in good repair, and to sow so
much of the land with timothy and cloverseed as it not intended to be
Putnam v. Wise, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 234, 37 Am. Dec. 309 (1841).
v. Donahoe, 125 Wis. 513, 103 N. W. 1009 (1905), the arrangement
entered into was held to have created a relatiou.'ship of master and servant and
that, therefore, the ownership of the crops was wliolly in the landowner, the
So,
cropper acquiring an interest therein only after division by the landowner.
also, in Ivelly v. Rnmnierheld, 117 Wis. 620, 94 N. W. 619, 98 Am. St. Kep. 951
(1903), where the lando\\aier sued the cropper in replevin to recover the half
of the crop by him harvested and appropriated ; and in Farrow v. Wooley, 138
Ala. 207. 36 South. 384 (1902).
32 See
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ploughed immediately again, and to deliver the said Steel the one-half
of all the oats, corn, wheat and rye at market, when wanted or ready
for delivery. All to be done in a sufficient manner as farming should
be done, and to pay all the taxes assessed or to be assessed for the year
1862 — the said Frick is to have all the hay he makes, and all the pasture
during said year on said land."
The "Warden farm" contained in the whole about 159 acres, and
belonged to Steel and one David Williams. In an action of partition
by Williams against Steel, to February Term, 1862, judgment quod
partitio fiat was rendered May 12th, 1862, and a writ de part. fac. issued
to August Term 1862.
The evidence was, that Frick went to the house on the premises on
the 1st of April, 1862, with all his goods. Porter had the house locked
and would not let Frick in ; he had to haul his goods away and put
them into a barn about two miles off, and his family into an almost
untenantable house at another place.
There was evidence that Frick
was not prevented from farming the land, but made no attempt to
do so; also, that upon Frick's informing Steel that he could not get
possession. Steel said he would give him a house and land off his own
farm, more than he was to get there ; that Steel thought the offer was
a good one, but that he did not wish to leave the neighborhood.
The court (Buffington, P. J.) charged :
"Steel and Williams were the owners of this land as tenants in
common. Steel leased his part to the plaintiff, Frick, from 1st April,
1862 to 1st April, 1863.
This is not a contract to lease to him the
whole of the land, but only his part. The name of Porter is introduced, not to define the amount of interest leased, but the description
of the tract, his interest in which was leased.
Steel had no right to
the entire possession, but Williams had as good a right to his part of
the tract.
[Steel, however, did agree to lease to him his part of the
land. That was a covenant to enable him to get and hold the possession, and enjoy the undivided half or all the interest Steel had,
including not only the farm land, but the barn, house and other buildIf he made a contract
ings necessary to the enjoyment of the farm.]
which he could not comply with, it was his fault, or his misfortune;
and if the contract was a fair one, Frick had a right to the possession, and was prevented from enjoying the premises according to the
either by the act of
spirit of the agreement, and he could not enjoy
Steel, or his want of right or power to give possession, then the tenant would be entitled to recover whatever damages he sustained.
"[If the jury believe Frick was thus deprived of the possession,
either by the act or want of power in Steel to give possession, Frick
entitled to recover.]
no excuse that he could not give
possession."
There was verdict for the defendant for $315.91 damages.
The defendant took
writ of error, and assigned for error the parts
of the charge included in brackets.
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Thompson, J. If the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant in this case, is to be regarded as a lease of the premises, it would
It would
pass the possession of the buildings on it to the lessee.
The instrument is
necessarily be a covenant for quiet enjoyment.
very inartificial, but we think it contains all the elements of a lease.
It sets out by a stipulation, that "Steel agrees to let Frick farm his
part of the Warden farm, now in the possession of James D. Porter."
This is a letting to farm by equivalent "words to these, "To farm
let," which are operative terms in leases.
The premises mentioned
were well understood, at least no dispute exists on the ground of
After this preliminary stipulation, then follows "for the
description.
It may as well be said here, that this and what
term of one year."
After stipulating
follows is nothing like a contract for cropping.
about the mode in which the farming was to be done, and that the
lessee should haul out all the manure to the fields, and keep the fences
in good repair, then follows the reservation of rent, which was to be
"the one-half of all the oats, corn, wheat and rye, to be delivered to
Steel at market when wanted, or ready for delivery, and the payment
of all the taxes for the year 1862, Frick to have all the hay and the
pasture of the land during the year."
A cropper is one hired to work land and to be compensated by a
share of the produce.
Such a contract gives him no legal possession
of the premises, further than as a hireHng. The legal possession remains in the hirer or landlord, and hence the remedy by distress is
not applicable to him: Fry v. Jones, 2 Rawle, 11; Adams v. McKesson, 53 Pa. 81, 91 Am. Dec. 183. That the above contract is not a
hiring to work land merely, is evident. The lessee was to farm the
lessor's share or portion of the Warden farm for the term of one
— to do it in a sufficient manner as farming should be done, and
3'^ear
to pay all taxes. This left the mode of farming to the lessee, as it
is not stipulated to be done in a particular way, and necessarily gave
him the possession and control to do the farming in his own way, unlike the relation of a mere hireling — still more unlike cropping, as the
stipulation that the lessee was to pay the taxes. One hired to crop
would hardly be expected to pay taxes. But it is further apparent in
this, that Frick was to have the possession of the premises for the
specified term, on the stipulation that he was bound to haul out the
manure, and keep the fences in repair. These stipulations clearly look
to a possession of the premises by the lessee; so, too, is the stipulation for all the pasturage during the year. If then the contract means,
as we think it does, that the possession was to be in Frick, this evinces
the intention to create a tenancy.
That the rent was reserved, payable in kind by a share of the grain,
In Fry v. Jones, on the
does not militate against the idea of a lease.
demise of a grist-mill, the lessee to render one-third of the toll as rent,
it was held by this court that the lessor might distrain for rent. The
principle to be applied in that case was illustrated by the learned judge,
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"We have almost always," says Rogers,
by the case of farm-letting.
share of the produce of the
"adopted the mode of renting for
farm, which
preferred by tenant and landlord;" and he follows this
remark by concluding that a distress was the remedy in such
letting.
R. 52,
An implication of
doubt in Warren v. Forney, 13 Serg.
incident to
lease, may possibly arise
whether the right of distress
in refusing to express any opinion
from the remark of Tilghman, C.
on the point, although he said he did not consider
legitimately beit;
but
v.
decided
to
was
five
Fry
years subsequently,
longing
Jones
and both by illustration and the announcement of the very principle
is.
Watts
settled the doctrine that
S.
So in Jones v. Gundrim,
.531, rent payable in hire was held to be liable to distress, and the case
of Jones V. Fry was relied on as authority for it. The same doctrine
Watts
S. 157.
very distinctly announced in Rinehart v. Olwine,
in
letsettled,
consider
the
and
that
this
case
there
was
We
doctrine
term, with
reservation of rent sufficiently certain to perting for
mit of
distress. This being so, the agreement for tenure was broken
on the failure of the plaintiff to get possession, being kept out by
The declarations of the
person in possession under the defendant.
defendant, and his offer to give the plaintiff'
house and land in another place, was some evidence of the understanding as to the possession.
Upon the whole, we see no error on the part of the court in construlease, and in charging as
did on the
ing the instrument in question
of.
affirmed.^*
complained
subject-matter
Judgment

SECTION 5.—ESTATES AT WILL AND FROM YEAR
TO YEAR

LITTLETON'S TENURES.

it

is

is

is,

Tenant at will
where lands or tenements are let by one man to
another, to have and to hold to him at the will of the lessor, by force
of which lease the lessee
in possession. In this case the lessee
called tenant at will, because he hath no certain nor sure estate, for
the lessor may put him out at what time
pleaseth him.
Section 68.

;

9

a

a

33 In Warner v. Abbey, 112 Mass. 355 (1873), the arrangement
for cropping
was held to amount to
lease.
A. leased premises to B. for three years, with the privilege of five, upon
shares, B. to to all the work, find all the seed, and to deliver to A. one-third
the crops.
The farm was to be cropped in
way specified, and B. was to have
the use of certain farm implements of A., and was to take good care of same.
N. W.
Could B. assign his interest to X? Randall v. Chubb, 46 Mich. 311,
Meyer v. Livesley, 45 Or. 487, 78 Pac. 670, 106
4119, 41 Am. Rep. 1C5 (1881)
Am. St. Rep. 667 (1904).
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COKE UPON LITTLETON.
"Tenant at will is, where lands or tenements are let by one man to
another, to have and to hold to him at the will of the lessor, &c." It
is regularly true, that every lease at will must in law be at the will of
both parties, and therefore when the lease is made, to have and to hold
at the will of the lessor, the law implieth it to be at the will of the lessee also ; for it cannot be only at the will of the lessor, but it must be
at the will of the lessee also. And so it is when the lease is made to
have and to hold at the will of the lessee, this must be also at the will
of the lessor ; and so are all the books that seem prima facie to differ,
clearly reconciled.
"The lessor may put him out." There is an express ouster, and implied ouster; an express, as when the lessor commeth upon the land,
and expressly forewarneth the lessee to occupy the ground no longer;
an implied, as if the lessor without the consent of the lessee enter into
the land, and cut down a tree, this is a determination of the will, for
that it should otherwise be a wrong in him, unless the trees were excepted, and then it is no determination of the will, for then the act is
lawful albeit the will doth continue. If a man leaseth a manor at will
whereunto a common is appendant, if the lessor put in his beasts to
use the common, this is a determination of the will. The lessor may
by actual entry into the ground determine his will in the absence of
the lessee but by words spoken from the ground the will is not determined until the lessee hath notice. No more than the discharge of a
factor, attorney, or such like, in tlieir absence, is sufficient in law until they have notice tliereof.
Co. Litt. 55a, b.

LITTLETON'S TENURES.
Also, if a man make a deed of feoffment to another of certain lands,
and deHvereth to him the deed, but not livery of seisin ; in this case
he, to whom the deed is made, may enter into the land, and hold and
occupy it at the will of him which made the deed, because it is proved
by the words of the deed, that it is his will that the other should have
the land ; but he which made the deed may put him out when it plea»eth him.
Section 70.
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COKE UPON LITTLETON.
between a tenant at will and a tenant at
is always by right, and tenant at sufferat
will
for
tenant
sufferance ;
A tenant
ance entreth by a lawful lease, and holdeth over by wrong.
at sufferance is he that at the first came in by lawful demise, and after
his estate ended continueth in possession and wrongfully holdeth over.
As tenant pur terme d'auter vie continueth in possession after the decease of Ce' que vie, or tenant for years holdeth over his term; the
lessor cannot have an action of trespass before entry,
Co. Litt. 57b.

There is

a great diversity

LEIGHTON

V.

THEED.

(Court of King's Bench, 1701.

2 Salk. 413.)

If

H. holds land at will, rendering rent quarterly, the lessor may determine his will when he pleases ; but if he determines it within a
quarter, he shall lose the rent which should have been paid for that
quarter in which he determines it. So the lessee may determine it
when he pleases, but tlien he must pay the quarter's rent.
Per
How, C. J.

TURNER
(Exchequer

v.

Chamber,

MEYAIOTT.
1823.

1

Bing.

158.)

It

is

is

it

a

a

a

is,

Trespass for breaking and entering plaintiflf's house. At the trial
before the Lord Chief Baron, Guilford Summer assizes, 1822, it appeared that the plaintiff had been tenant of the house to the defendant, from week to week ; that he had received a regular notice to quit,
but omitted to deliver up possession, whereupon, the defendant, at a
time when nobody was in the house broke open the door with a crowbar, and other forcible applications, and resumed possession.
Some
little furniture was still in the house. The Chief Baron having said
that the law would not allow the defendant thus forcibly to reinstate
himself, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, whereupon,
Taddy, Serjt., obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, and
Pell, Serjt, now showed cause against the rule. The question
whether when
tenant refuses to deliver possession after
regular
notice to quit, the landlord may make
forcible re-entry: but
cannot be permitted he should take the law into his own hands, and dothat by violence which
usually accomplished by an action of ejectment.
contrary to the first principles of law, that he should become judge in his own cause, and substitute his own strength for the
ordinary civil process. If there had been resistance, and death had
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crime of murder would have been committed;
and it
makes no difference that nobody was in the house, for the defendant
could not ascertain that till he entered, and the plaintiff" might have
come up while the violence was in progress.
Some furniture being
in the house, this was not a case of vacant possession. The statute of
double value where the tenant
11 G. II, which gives the landlord
what
is
over,
shows
the
holds
appropriate remedy in such cases ; but
that statute would be useless, if the landlord might thus take the law
into his own hands. It might be urged, that if the landlord had proceeded irregularly he would be liable in an indictment for a forcible
entry, but his subsequent liability would not justify the previous
In Taunton v. Costar, 7 T. R. 431, the entry made by the
wrong.
landlord's putting his cattle on the ground was entirely peaceable, and
so that Lord Kenyon's observato that there could be no objection;
tion, "that if he dispossessed the tenant with a strong hand, he would
be liable for a forcible entry, but there could be no doubt of his right
to enter on the land at the expiration of the term," was uncalled for
by the case before him, and leads to the absurdity, that, in certain cases,
a landlord may enter, and yet he shall be punished for the entry.
Pell also referred to Davies v. Connop, 1 Price, 53.
Dallas, C. J. The high respect which I entertain for my lord chief
baron, has alone made me hesitate a single moment, and even now,
perhaps, as the cause is to go down to be tried again, I ought not
whether
landlord has
to express an opinion. The question
right
to enter in the manner the defendant did under the circumstances
of this case, in which the tenant held over after his right to possesIt
sion had ceased, and the landlord's right to enter had accrued.
must be admitted he had
right to take possession in some way
in point, to show that he might
the case of Taunton v. Costar
enter peaceably and that no ejectment was necessary. If he had used
an offence of itself
but an offence against the pubforce, that
he has done wrong, he may be indicted.
lic for which,
Park,
The declaration states that the
am of the same opinion.
defendant broke and entered the house of the plaintiff, but the fact
the plaintiff had gone out, and the house was not his,
was not so
a

;

I

J.

if

;

is

is

;

a

a

the

is,

ensued,

a

I

I

J.

a

a

is

a

but his landlord's, who had
right to break his own door; as no
person was within, there could be no danger to any man's life. Lord
clear the landlord could
Kenyon says, in Taunton v. Costar, "it
There can be no
have justified in
plea of liberum tenementum.
doubt of his right to enter upon the land at the expiration of the
term;" and that decision, in my judgment, goes the whole length of
the present.
case similar
BuRROUGH,
was once concerned at the cock-pit in
used the same arguments as have now been
to the present, where
urged by my brother Pell, but Lord Kenyon and Lord Alvanley whowere there, entertained no doubt, and said the landlord might enter.
The rule for new trial in this case must be made absolute.
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2

GAY.
6 Car.

& P.

2S4.)

Trespass for breaking and entering a room of the plaintiff, being
There were also counts for expulsion,
parcel of a dwelling-house.
and for taking the plaintiff's goods.
Plea — General issue.
It appeared that the house at which the trespass occurred belonged
to the defendant, who had let it to a person named Jury, who had
under-let a part of it to the plaintiff.
It further appeared that Jury
was under notice to quit at Midsummer,
1833, but that the plaintiff did not quit at that time, the defendant having distrained his goods
in the month of August, 1833, for the rent due up to Midsummer:
it was also proved that the plaintiff had said that he would not leave
till he could suit himself, which would be within a fortnight; however, it appeared that after that fortnight the plaintiff did not leave;
and the defendant procured a number of Irishmen' to go to the house,
and after getting the plaintiff to go away, by sending a boy to tell
him that his master wanted him, the Irishmen entered the plaintiff's
room, and turned his wife out into the street, and put the plaintiff's
furniture out at the window.
Thesiger, for the defendant. — I submit that this was no trespass in
the defendant;
he was the landlord, and the tenancy had expired,
In the case
and he had therefore a right to resume the possession.
of Turner v. Meymott, 7 Moo. 574, it was held that where a tenancy
had determined, the landlord was not a trespasser if he broke into the
house.
Lord Lyndhurst, C. B. There the tenant had gone away and had
not left his family in possession.
The tenant was in that case out
of possession,' and no one was in possession. Where that is so, the landlord may enter if the term is at an end.
Thesiger.— In the case of Taylor v. Cole, 2 T. R. 292, it was held
that the breaking was the gist of the action, and that the expulsion
was merely aggravation.
Lord Lyndhurst, C. B. How do you say the tenancy was put an
end to?
Thesiger. — The tenancy terminated on ]\Tidsummer-day.
Lord Lyndhurst, C. B. You distrain after that.
Ball. — There was also a disclaimer by the plaintiff.
A witness for the defendant stated, that he called on the plaintiff
in July or August, 1833, and told him that it was an injury to his
landlord that he should stay in the house contrary to his agreement;
and that the defendant replied, that he would not go, as it was a comfortable thing to pay no rent, and that he would not leave for Mr. Gay,
or Mr. Jury either.
Lord Lyndhurst, C. B. (in summing up.) Even if the plaintiff
had promised to leave at a particular day, the conduct of the defend-
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ant is unjustifiable.
There is no proof of any distinct promise of the
go away at any particular time; but even if he had so
promised, I am of opinion that the conduct of the defendant cannot be
If the defendant had a right to the possession, he should
justified.
have obtained that possession by legal means.
Verdict for the plaintiff — Damages £50.^*

plaintiff to

POLLEN AND WIFE
(Court of Common Pleas, 1859.

v.

BREWER.

7 C. B. [N. S.] 371.)

The first count of the declaration charged

an assault on the female

plaintiff, the second (which was abandoned at the trial) the like with
an allegation of loss of service, &c., the third an assault upon the male
plaintiff, the fourth breaking and entering the plaintiff's dwelling-house
and forcibly expelling him and his wife and family, and the fifth was
trover.
The defendant pleaded not guilty.
v. Harlanrl, 1 M. & G. 644 flSJO), the plninfifP. who hfid hoen
by the defendant from premises to the possession of which
the defendant was then entitled, sued for assault and battery.
Tindal. C. J.,
said : "Tliis case involves a qnestion of great importance and one of very general application, namely, whether, after a tenancy has been determined by a
notice to niiit, the landlord may enter on the r)remises wliilst the tenant still
remains in possession, and after requesting him to depart and give up the
possession, and his refusing so to do. may turn him out of possession by force,
* * *
u.sing as nmch force and no more than is necessary for that purpo.se.
nie point above stated must be nece.ssarily determined before this case is ultimately decided. It appears, hpwever, to me that such question cannot, upon
the present finding of the jury, be properly brought before us. * * * For if
the landlord, in making his entry upon the tenant, has been guilty either of a
breach of a positive statute, or of an ofCence against the common law. it appears to me that such violation of the law in making the enl rj' causes the po.sse.ssion thereby obtained to be illegal, and that the allegation in the plea that
34 In New-ton
forcibly ejected

one of the defendants was lawfully in possession at the time the assault was
committed is negatived."
a tenant hold over the land
Hosanqnet. .7.. said: "Some things are clear.
after the expiration of his term, he cannot treat the lessor, who enters peaceably, as a trespasser; and the lessor, in such ease, may justify his own entry
upon the land by virtue of his title to the possession. * * * On the other
hand, the lessor, who is out of posse.ssion. cannot maintain an action of trespass
against a tenant holding over. He must first acquire a lawful pos.session bel^ut if the lessor enter upon the land to
fore he can maintain such action,
take pos.session, he may treat as trespassers all those who afterwards come
upon it (Hey v. Moorhouse. 6 New Cases. 52, 8 Scott, 1.56 [1S."9|), or who, having unlawfully taken possession, wrongfully continue upon the land, as in the
case of Butcher v. Butcher, 7 B. & C. 402 (1S27), whei'e the defendant had
come into possession of the land by intrusion, and the rightful owner, having
entered, was held entitled to maintain an action of trespass against him. The
lessor may even break and enter a house, provided it be enii)ty, which has been
occupied and held' over by his tenant, though the tenant may have left some of
Hut no case has
Turner v. Meymott, 1 Hing. 15S (1S2:-;).
his property therein.
yet lieen decided in which the lessor has been held to be justified in e.xpelling
by force from a dwelling house a person who, having lawfully come into possession of it, has merely continued to hold possession after the expiration of his

If

title."
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The cause was tried before Williams, J., at the sittings at Westminster after last Term. The plaintiff swore, that, in May, 1858, he
entered into a negotiation with the defendant for an assignment of a
lease of certain premises which the defendant held, that the defendant agreed to let him into possession, and gave him the key, and that
shortly afterwards the defendant went to the premises with two men,
and assaulted the plaintiff and his wife, and turned them and their
children and furniture into the street.
The defendant denied that he had ever agreed to let the premises to
the plaintiff, but stated that he gave him the key for tlie purpose of
enabling his agent to inspect the premises. He also denied the alleged
assaults, and proved that, the plaintiff having refused to redeliver
possession of the premises to him on demand, he entered and expelled
him.
The jury, however, found that there was a tenancy of some sort, and
that the alleged assaults were committed;
and they found for the
on
the first count 20s. damages, on the third count 40s., and
plaintiffs
on the fourth count £25. The learned judge reserved leave to the defendant to move to reduce tlie damages by the last-mentioned sum, if
the court should think there was any evidence of a determination of
the tenancy.
ErlE, C. J. I am of opinion that this rule must be made absolute
to reduce the verdict by i25., the amount of damages found upon the
fourth count. It is clear that the plaintiff had at the utmost only the
interest of a tenant at will. I incline to think that the defendant never
intended to create even that limited interest: but the jury have found
it. The defendant, having a right to determine the plaintiff's possession at any moment, sent to demand the key, telling the plaintiff at
the same time (by letter) that he was in against his will.
I am of
opinion that either of these was a sufficient intimation to the plaintiff
that he was no longer tenant at will, and that his continuance of the
possession was without a shadow of right, and therefore that the defendant was justified in treating him as a trespasser and removing
him from the premises.
There was abundant evidence that, at the
time of the expulsion, the plaintiff was on the premises without any
I therefore think the rule must be made absolute.
right.
Williams, J. I also think there was sufficient evidence of a determination of the will, and consequently that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover damages for the expulsion.
Crowder, J. I am of the same opinion. I do not see what more
the defendant could do than he did to determine what the jury have
found to be a tenancy at will. It is said that there was no proper determination of the tenancy, because the demand of ppssession or the
key, was accompanied by an assertion that there never was any tenancy at all. I do not, however, see how that can cut down the evidence of determination.
The defendant demands the key, then a correspondence ensues, and then he makes an entry. This was a clear in-
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timation to the plaintiff of his election to determine any right he might
have.
BylEvS, J. I also am clearly of opinion that the rule to reduce the
damages should be made absolute. I have nothing to add to what has
fallen from the rest of the court.
Rule absolute.

CURTIS
(Supreme

Judicial Court of

V.

GALVIN.

Massachusetts,

1861.

Tort for entering the plaintiff's dwelling-house,

1

Allen,

215.)

and removing his
The
defendants
therefrom.
proved,
his
family
furniture and ejecting
the
owner of the
in justification, that the defendant Galvin, being
premises, conveyed them by deed to the other defendant Carney, and
that, eight days before the acts complained of, Carney informed the
plaintiff thereof, and gave him notice to quit. At the trial in the superior court Rockwell, J., directed a nonsuit, arid the plaintiff alleged
exceptions. The facts appear more fully in the opinion.
BiGiiLOW, C. J. It appears by the testimony of the plaintiff that,
in October 1858, prior to the alleged trespass, the premises from which
Inasmuch as he offered no evihe was ejected belonged to Galvin.
dence of any right to their occupation created by an instrument in
writing, he could have no greater title or interest tlierein than an estate at will.
Rev. St. c. 59, § 29. On the facts stated in the exceptions, this is the most favorable view which can be taken of his right
to the possession and enjoyment of the premises, prior to the conveyBut, on a familar and well settled rule
ance to the defendant Carney.
of law, this tenancy at will was determined, and the plaintiff became
a tenant by sufferance only, by the conveyance from Galvin to Carney,
the other defendant, on the 9th of said October.
Howard v. Merriam,
5 Cush. 563, 574 ; McFarland v. Chase, 7 Gray, 462.
The evidence offered by the plaintiff to impeach this conveyance,
and to show that it was colorable, and was in fact made for the purpose of enabling the said Galvin to eject the plaintiff from the premises, was rightly rejected.
The deed was a valid one as between the
parties. It passed the title to the premises. The grantor had no power
to compel the grantee to surrender the estate conveyed to him.
It
violated the legal rights of no person.
It is true that a creditor of
the grantor, who could show that he was thereby hindered, delayed
and defrauded of the collection of his debt, or a subsequent purchaser
without notice, who could prove that the deed was made with intent
to defraud him, might impeach the conveyance, and set it aside on tlie
well settled principles of the common law as declared in Sts. 13 Eliz.
c. 5, sec. 2, and 27 Eliz. c. 4, sec. 2.
But in such case the deed is
valid between the parties; and, witli this exception, we know of no
Aiq.Pbop. — 41
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rule of law which restrains the owner in fee from the free and unfettered alienation of his estate. It is only an exercise of a legal right,
which works no injury to any one, least of all to a person who holds
He took his estate or interest in the premises subunder the grantor.
ject to all the legal rights of the owner therein, and must be presumed
To him, thereto have known them, and to have assented thereto.
The determinafore, the maxim volenti non fit injuria is applicable.
tion of an estate at will, by an alienation by the owner of the reversion, is one of the legal incidents of such an estate, to which the right
of the lessee therein is subject, and by which it may be as effectually
terminated as by a notice to quit given according to the requisitions of
Indeed it is difficult to see upon what ground a deed can be
the statute.
held void, as being colorable or fraudulent, which is made in the exercise of a legal right, and which has no effect on the rights of a third
party, who seeks to set it aside, other than that which was necessarily
incident to the estate which he held in the- premises.
The dictum of
the court in Howard v. Merriam, ubi supra, cited by the counsel for
the plaintiff, was not essential to the decision of that case, and cannot
be supported on principle or authority.
It follows that, after the conveyance of the demised premises, the
plaintiff became tenant by sufferance only, and could not maintain
this action of tort in the nature of trespass quare clausum against the
defendant Carney, who was the grantee in the deed ; nor against the
other defendant, who acted under his authority in attempting to eject
At the time of action brought, it was
the plaintiff from the premises.
A tenant by sufferance holds possession
not the plaintiff's close.
wrongfully. Co. Litt. 57b, 271a. The defendants had a full right of
entry. Meader v. Stone, 7 Mete. 147.
Exceptions overruled.

SAY

V.

STODDARD.

(Supreme Court of Ohio, 1S75.

27 Ohio

St. 47S.)

Error to

the Superior Court of Montgomery County.
The plaintiff in error was plaintiff in the court below, where his

amended petition was demurred to, on the ground that it did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This demurrer was sustained, and plaintiff not desiring farther to amend, judgment was enThe action of the court in sustaining the demurtered for defendant.
'rer is here assigned for error. The petition was substantially as fol-

lows:
That, on August 27th, 1869, James Celey leased a dwelling-house in
the city of Dayton, in the county of Montgomery, with the lot whereon
said house is situate. Said written lease being as follows, to wit:
"Henry Stoddard, Sr., has rented to James Celey his Fowler House,
on lot No. 4, on the east side of St. Clair street, between Water and

Ch. 5)

ESTATES CREATED

648

First streets, in Dayton, at a rent of thirteen dollars a month, for so
long as the parties shall mutually agree to continue the renting under
this agreement. Said Celey being in the employment and service of
Stoddard & Co., in their mill ; they are to pay the rent monthly or half
monthly, as may be most convenient, out of Celey's wages. Either
party may put an end to this renting by giving the other party four
days' notice, in writing, that this renting is to cease at the expiration
of four days from the service of such notice on the other party. Said
Celey agrees to use arid treat the premises in a proper tenant-like manner while he occupies.

"[Signed]

The rent to commence August 27. 1.869.
Henry Stoddard, Sr.

"[Stamp.]
"Paid up to Oct. 1, 1869."
That James Celey, on the

"James Celey.

27th day of August, 1869, with Henry
Stoddard, Sr.'s, consent, took lawful and peaceable possession of the
premises, under said lease, and continued in possession thereof till the
'7th day of December, 1869, when he moved out of said premises.
That while said Celey was in possession of said premises, and before
he moved out, he did, on the 1st day of December, 1869, rent two
rooms of said house to the plaintiff, George Say, .for six dollars p^r
month — Say paying to Celey, on the day of renting, four dollars rent
on the month of December, 1869; that on said 1st day of December,
1869, Say, with his wife, moved into the said two rooms of said house,
while Celey, with his family, occupied the other room, with small
kitchen, immediately in the rear of and adjoining the two rooms occu
pied by Say. Said Celey continuing to occupy the rooms in the rear of
Say's, till the 7th day of December, 1869, when he, Celey, moved out
of the premises; Celey owing, on back rent, seven dollars for month of
November 1869; George Say and his wife continued in possession of
his two rooms from December 1st till December 15th, 1869, when, on
December 15th, 1869, E. Fowler Stoddard, the defendant, the son of
Henry Stoddard, Sr., with screw-driver, hatchet and ax, went, on said
15th day of December, 1869, to the front door of the room fronting on
St. Clair street, Say and his wife being in their rooms at the same time ;
that E. Fowler Stoddard, with his instruments aforesaid, and without
the consent of Say or his wife, and against their remonstrance, proceeded to get possession of said rooms, occupied at the time by Say
and his wife, by taking hold of the knob of the front door, leading into
tlie front room, which was fastened by a lock. The door being opened
by defendant, the plaintiff, Say, warning him not to come in. That the
defendant, on said 15th day of December, 1869, and while Say (who
was 69 years old in March, 1871) and his wife were in their rooms, did
enter their rooms, and did remove, take off, and carry away five doors
and five windows — being all the doors and windows belonging to the
rooms occupied by the plaintiff, George Say, and his wife ; and also being all the doors and windows of the rooms occupied by Celey
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and his family, till he moved, December 7, 1869, excepting one
door in rear room of house. And in removing one of the doors
in the room, immediately in the rear of and adjoining the front
room, in order to get at the door to take it off the hinges the
defendant did move a cupboard of plaintiff, so he could get at the door
After the doors and windows were taken away
with his screw-driver.
by defendant, the plaintiff' hung up at the door, strips of carpet. The
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§
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Richardson

v. Langredge,
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;

2

;
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day, on which the doors and windows were taken down and carried
away by defendant, was cold and chilly, and remained cold till plaintiff
left said premises, which was on the 20th day of December, 1869.
Plaintiff being compelled to leave the premises by reason of defendant's
acts, as aforesaid.
Snow had fallen while plaintiff was in possession
of rooms, and during the time the doors and windows were out.
No written notice to leave said premises was ever served by anyone
— on either Say or Celey.
Neither did Celey ever serve a written notice on Stoddard, Sr., or
defendant, that he, Celey, would leave the premises.
Said Henry Stoddard, Sr., died on November 1, 1869, testate, leaving
the said defendant one of his executors and devisee under the will of
said decedent. Said plaintiff says that by reason of the acts of the defendant herein set forth, said plaintiff has sustained damage five thousand dollars, for which he asks judgment.
Scott, Chief Judge. The contract of lease between Stoddard, Sr.,
and Celey, set out in the petition in the court below, created, by its
express terms, a tenancy at will.
True, the rent was to be $13.00 a month, and was to be paid by Stoddard & Co. out of Celey's wages, monthly, or half monthly, as might be
But the renting was to continue for "so long as the
most convenient.
parties shall mutually agree to continue the renting under this agreement." And, again : "Either party may put an end to said renting by
giving the other party four days' notice, in writing, that this renting
is to cease at the expiration of four days from the service of such noIt is clear, from this language, that the tenant
tice on the other party."
was to hold at the will of the lessor, though while the tenancy continued
the rent was to be paid monthly or half monthly. ^^ The character of
the tenancy is not affected by the fact that four days' notice of its determination, is provided for in the contract ; for in a general tenancy at
will, reasonable notice must be given by the party whose will determines
to the other party; and the contract here fixes the length of that
notice. It
said by Blackstone
"An estate at will
where lands and
tenements are let by one man to another, to have and to hold at the will
of the lessor, and the tenant by force of this lease obtains possession."
Bl. Com. 145 Litt.
68.
Such tenant has no certain indefeasible estate, nothing that can be assigned by him to any other, because the
lessor may determine his will, and put him out whenever he pleases.
Bl. Com. 145 Taylor's Landl. and Ten. 48.
Taunt.

12S (1811), ace.
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Tenancy at will may be determined by implication of law. Such implication will arise on the deatli of either of the parties. So, if a tenant
at will assigns over his estate to another, who enters on the land he is
a disseisor, and the landlord may have an action of trespass against
him, Greenl. Cruise on R. Pr. 244; Taylor's Landl. and Ten. 48.
So, also, a desertion of the premises by the lessee, puts an end to
For he thereby discontinues his lawful possession
a tenancy at will.
and terminates his relation to his lessor, which is only of a personal
character, and he ceases to have any interest in the premises which he
can transfer or control.
The plaintiff shows, by his petition, that Stoddard, the lessor, died
November 1, 1869, leaving the defendant his devisee of the premises.
Celey, the lessee, continued in possession till December 1st, when he
undertook to sublet a part of the premises to the plaintiff.
It is not
alleged that the defendant assented to tliis continuance of possession,
or subletting.
On the 7th of December, the lessee, Celey, removed
wholly from the premises ; and, eight days afterward, the grievances
occurred of which the plaintiff complains.
As against the defendant,
the plaintiff acquired no rights by his contract with Celey, for the
latter had none which he could transfer.
The facts stated do not
show that the relation of landlord and tenant was ever created between
tlie parties to this suit. There was neither privity of estate, nor of contract between tliem. And the acts complained of were but the lawful
exercise of the rights incident to the defendant's ownership of the
premises, and are not charged to have been attended with any unnecessary interference either with the plaintiff's person or property.
We think the court below properly sustained the demurrer to the
plaintiff's petition, and its judgment is affirmed.

READER

V.

PURDY.

(Supreme Court of Illinois, 1S66.

Appeal from K?ne; Isaac G.
Erastus S. Purdy, in the fall
rora, which he obtained of Otis
sion of the same with his family,
from that time until the spring

Wilson, J.
of 1858, built

41 111. 279.)

a house on a lot in Aucontract,
on a parol
went into possesand occupied the same as a homestead
following the assault and battery for
which this suit is brought.
In 1861, Reader, whose wife was sister
to Purdy's wife, obtained from Otis the legal title of the premises on
which Purdy and wife lived, and brought an action of ejectment for
the possession of the same.
On the first trial of the ejectment suit,
the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Purdy, and a new 'trial was
granted to Reader ; and between the time of the first trial and that of
the second trial of the ejectment suit, to-wit: in October, 1862, Reader, Baker and Barker, in the absence of Purdy from home, got admission into the house, and then proceeded to put Mrs. Purdy and the
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Mrs. Purdy, who is described as
a weak hltle woman, wcighinj^ ninety-six pounds, fought for her possession willi great energy. She locked one of the doors and gave the
key to her daughter, from whom it was taken, then went at the assailants with hot water, a stick of wood and a bayonet belonging to her
furniture out of

the house by force.

it,

husband, who had been a soldier in the army, and, insomuch that one
of the assailants was obliged to hold her by the wrists, to enable the
other two to get out the fiirniture. Innally, after all the furniture had
been got out of the house, except that in her bed-room, she succeeded
in nailing a board across the door and barring the assailants out. By
this time the city marshal and others arrived, and the attempt to dispossess her, which had occupied from nine to twelve o'clock in the
morning, was abandoned. The second trial of the ejectment suit occurred in May, 1863, and the record therein was introduced in evidence
on the trials of these causes, as showing that at the time of the assault
the title to the property of which Purdy 's family were in the occupancy
No new trial was ever granted or apwas in the defendant Reader.
The court instructed the jury:
peal taken in the ejectment suit.
he who stands by advising,
1. That in trespass all are principals,
etc., as well as he who does the act.
2. That if defendants obtained admission to the premises theretofore occupied by plaintiffs, with intent to remove plaintiffs by force,
then defendants were trespassers from the beginning.
3. The fact that the defendant Reader was the owner, and entitled
to the possession of the premises occupied by the plaintiff, is no justification for the assault and battery upon the plaintilT's wife, if any such
is proven, and no justification of his attempts to take possession of the
premises occupied by the plaintifT by force, and no justification for
the removal of plaintiff's property therefrom by force, if any such
force is proven; j)rovided that the plaintiff and his family were in the
quiet possession of the said premises at the time of such assault and
force; neither can that fact be regarded by the jury in mitigation of
any actual damages caused the plaintiff by such assault and force.
The other instructions present nothing essentially dilTerent. The
jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs in the suit of Purdy and wife,
for $5a), and in the suit of Purdy for $450.
Lawrence, J. These two cases, although separately tried, depend
upon the same facts and present similar questions, and it will be more
convenient to dispose of both in one opinion.
In October, 1862, Reader, claiming to be the owner of a house ocaccompanied by the other
cupied by Purdy and his wife, entered
of
the
Purdy was not at
for
taking
purpose
appellants,
i:)Ossession.
leave,
Reader
commenced
whereupon
home. Mrs. Purdy refused to
She resisted this, and he seized
putting the furniture out of doors.
her and held her by the wrists, while Baker, one of the co-defendants,
continued to remove the furniture. This was somewhat damaged, and
some slight injury was done to the wrists of Mrs. Purdy by tlie force
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The appellants finally abandoned their atapplied in liolding^ lior.
tempt to lake possession and withdrew.
Two actions of trespass have been brought, one by Turdy alone, and
one by Purdy and wife jointly. The declaration in the suit hrouj^ht by
Purdy contains three counts, the first being for the assault upon his
wife, the second for the injury to the personal property, and the third
for breaking his close and carrying o(T his furniture. The declaration
in the suit of I'urdy and wife contains two counts, both of which are
for the assault upon the wife. There were pleas of not guilty, and an
A vercHct for
agreement that all defenses might be made under them.
in
in
case,
the i)laintirf of $450
one
and $500
the other was returned by
the jury, and a judgment was rentlered uiK)n it from which the defendants appealed.
It is insisted by the appellants that Reader, being the owner of the
premises, had a right to enter, and to use such force as might be necessary to overcome any resistance, and that he cannot be made liable
as a trespasser, although it is admitted he might have been compelled to
restore to Purdy, through an action of forcible entry and detainer,
the possession thus forcibly taken. The court below instructed otherwise, and this ruling of the court is assigned for error.
We should not consider the question one of much difficulty, were it
not for the contradictory decisions in regard to
and we must admit
that the current of authorities, up to
comparatively recent period,
adverse to what we are convinced must be declared to be the law of
this State. P.ut the rule cannot be said to have been firmly or authoritatively settled even in England, for Hrskine, J., observes in Newton v.
Harland,
Man.
Gr. 644 (39 E, C, L, 581), that "it was remarkable
question so likely to arise, should never have been directly brought
before any court in banc until that case." This was in the year 1840,
was held that the owner
and all the cases prior to that time, in which
in fee could enter with
strong hand, without rendering himself liable
to an action of trespass, seem to have been merely at nisi prius, like
T, R. 431. Still this was
the oft-quoted case of Taunton v. Costar,
But the point had never received
the general language of the books.
such an adjudication as to pass into established and incontrovertible
law, and
contrary rule was held by Lord Ivyndhm-st in Hilary v.
P. 284 (25 E. C, L. 398). But in Newton v. Harland,
C.
Gay,
already referred to, the court of Common Pleas gave the question malandture consideration, and finally held, after two arguments, that
tenant holding over after
lord who should enter and expel by force
expiration of his term, would render himself liable to an action for
But the later case of Meriton v. Combs, 67 E. C. L. '788,
damages.
seems to recognize the ojiposite rule, and we must, therefore, regard
question which one would expect to find among the most firmly settled
in the law as still among the controverted points of Westminster Hall.
In
the same conflict of authorities.
In our own country there
has been uniformly held, that, under
plea of liberum
New York
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tenementum, the landlord, who has only used such force as might be
necessary to expel a tenant holding over, would be protected against
an action for damages. Hyatt v. Wood, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 150, 4 Am.
Dec. 258, and Ives v. Ives, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 235. In Jackson v. Farmer, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 201, the court, while recognizing the rule as law,
characterize it as "harsh, and tending to the public disturbance and individual conflict."
Kent, in his Commentaries, states the principle in
the same manner, but in the later editions of the work, reference is
made by the learned editor in a note, to the case of Newton v. Harland,
above quoted, as laying down "the most sound and salutary doctrine."
In Tribble v. Frame, 7 J. J. Marsh, (Ky.) 599, 23 Am. Dec. 439, the
court held, that, notwithstanding the Kentucky statute of forcible entry and detainer, the owner of the fee, having a right of entry, may use
such force as may be necessary to overcome resistance, and protect
himself against an action of trespass, under a plea of liberum tenementum. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has
held, that, although trespass quare clausum may not lie, yet, in an action of trespass for assault and battery, the landlord must respond in
damages, if he has used force to dispossess a tenant holding over. The
court say, "he may make use of force to defend his lawful possession
but, being dispossessed, he has no right to recover possession by force,
and by a breach of the peace." Sampson v. Henry, 11 Pick. (Mass.)
379.
See also Ellis v. Page, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 43 ; Sampson v. Henry,
13 Pick. (Mass.) 36 ; Meader v. Stone, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 147, and Moore
But, by far the most able and exhaustive discusV. Boyd, 24 Me. 242.
sion that this question has received, was in the case of Dustin v. Cowdry, 23 Vt. 635, in which Mr. Justice Redfield, delivering the opinion of
the court, shows, by a train of reasoning which compels conviction, that,
in cases of this character, the action of trespass will lie. .And he also
says : "Whether the action should be trespass quare clausum, or assault and battery, is immaterial, as under this declaration, if the defendant had pleaded soil and freehold, as some of the cases hold, the
plaintiff might have new assigned the trespass to the person of the
plaintiff", and a jury, under proper instructions, would have given much
the same damages, and upon the same evidence, in whatever form the
declaration is drawn." The case of Mussey v. Scott, 32 Vt. 82, cited
as inconsistent with this case does not in fact conflict with it. It only
holds that trespass quare clausum will not lie in behalf of a tenant for
an entry not within the statute of forcible entry and detainer.
In this conflict of authorities we must adopt that rule which, in our
judgment, rests upon the sounder reason.
We cannot hesitate, and
were it not for the adverse decision of courts, which all lawyers regard
with profound respect, we should not deem the question obscured by
a reasonable doubt. The reasoning upon which we rest our conclusion
Hes in the briefest compass, and is hardly more than a simple syllogism.
The statute of forcible entry and detainer, not in terms, but by necessary construction, forbids a forcible entry, even by the owner, upon
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the actual possession of another.
Such entry Is, therefore, unlawful.
unlawful,
If
it is a trespass, and an action for the trespass must necessarily lie. It is urged that the only remedy is that given by the statute,
— an action for the recovery of the possession. But the law could not
expel him who has entered if his entry was a lawful entry, and if not
lawful all the consequences of an unlawful act must attach to it.^ The
law is not so far beneath the dignity of a scientific and harmonious
system that its tribunals must hold in one form of action a particular
act to be so illegal that immediate restitution must be made at the costs
of the transgressor, and in another form of action that the same act
was perfectly legal, and only the exercise of an acknowledged right.
It is urged that the owner of real estate has a right to enter upon and
enjoy his own property. Undoubtedly, if he can do so without a forcible disturbance of the possession of another; but the peace and good
order of society require that he shall not be permitted to enter against
the will of the occupant, and hence the common law right to use all
He may be wrongfully kept
necessary force has been taken away.
out of possession, but he cannot be permitted to take the law into his
own hands and redress his own wrongs.
The remedy must be sought
through those peaceful agencies which a civilized community provides
for all its members. A contrary rule befits only that condition of society in which the principle is recognized that
He may take who has the power,
he may keep who can.

And

If

it must necessarily follow
that so much may be used as shall be necessary
to overcome resistance, even to the taking of human life. The wisdom
of confining men to peaceful remedies for the recovery of a lost possession is well expressed by Blackstone, book 4, p. 148 : "An eighth
offense," he says, "against the public peace, is that of a forcible entry
and detainer, which is committed by violently taking or keeping possession of lands and tenements with menaces, force and arms, and without
This was formerly allowable to every person
the authority of law.
disseized or turned out of possession, unless his entry was taken away
or barred by his own neglect or other circumstances, which were explained more at length in a former book. But this being found very
prejudicial to the public peace, it was thought necessary, by several
statutes, to restrain all persons from the use of such violent methods,
even of doing themselves justice, and much more if they have no justice in their claim. So that the entry now allowed by law is a peaceable
one; that forbidden, is such as is carried on with force, violence and
unusual weapons."
In this State, it has been constantly held that any
entry is forcible, within the meaning of this law, that is made against
the will of the occupant.
We state, then, after a full examination of this subject, that in our
opinion the statutes of forcible entry and detainer should be construed
as taking away the previous common law right of forcible entry by
the

right

to use force be once admitted,

as a logical sequence,
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the owner, and that such entry must be, therefore,

held illegal in all
forms of action.
There are, however, some minor points upon which both of these
judgments must be reversed. In the suit brought by the husband alone,
the court refused to instruct the jury that the plaintiff could not recover <for any damages to the real estate. This instruction should have
been given. Although the occupant may maintain trespass against the
owner for a forcible entry, yet he can only recover such damages as
have directly accrued to him from injuries done to his person or property, through the wrongful invasion of his possession, and such exemplary damages as the jury may think proper to give. But a person
having no title to the premises, clearly cannot recover damages for any
injury done to them by him who has title. It would be a startling doctrine to hold that the wrongful occupier of land could make the owner
thereof to respond to him in damages for timber that the owner might
cut upon the premises. This point was decided by this court in Hoots
v. Graham, 23 111. 82, to the decision in which case we fully adhere.
In the case brought by Purdy, the court, after telling the jury they
could give exemplary damages, gave the following instruction for the

plaintiff:

"In estimating

the

jury have

the amount

of exemplary damages, if they find any,
the unlawful purpose

a right to take into consideration

for which defendants were together, if any is proven ; the force and
violence with which they attempted to carry out that unlawful purpose,
the wantonness of the attack upon the premises, family and property
of the plaintiff, if the proof show any such, and the willfulness of the

defendants in doing the acts, if the evidence show any such."
The suit brought by Purdy and wife had been already tried, and in
that suit the jury had been instructed they might give exemplary
damages, and they had undoubtedly given them. The record of that
suit was in evidence on the trial of the second suit. The court refused
the instructions asked by the defendant, and properly, in the form they
Neither is there
were drawn, except as to the one already considered.
instruction,
in
and yet it is of
the foregoing
anything in itself wrong
such a character, that the court, in order to secure a fair consideration
of the case by the jury, and having refused all the instructions drawn
by the defendant, should, of its own motion, have modified the somewhat augmentative effect of this one by telling the jury that they were
also, in estimating the exemplary damages, to consider the fact that
the jury in the other suit had been authorized to give exemplary damages, and to take into consideration on that question the amount of the
verdict in the other case. We must hold, that, in strict law, exemplary
damages are recoverable in both cases, because the suits are brought in
dift"erent rights.
In the suit by Purdy and wife, if Purdy fails to collect the judgment in his lifetime, on his death it would go to the wife
surviving him, and not to his personal representatives. But, apart from
that contingency, the fruits of both judgments go into his pocket. It

Ch,

5)

ESTATES CREATED

651-

would, therefore, be highly proper that the jury, in considering the
question of punitive damages, should have taken into consideration not
only the circumstances of aggravation enumerated in the instruction,
but also the fact, that these same circumstances, and the same transaction, had been submitted to another jury, in a suit prosecuted in reality
for the benefit of the same plaintiff, and, so far as related to the single
question of the amount of vindictive damages, the amount of the former verdict would have been a proper subject of regard.
The jury were also told in the third instruction for the plaintiff, at
the suit of Purdy, that the fact, that the defendant was the owner and
entitled to the possession of the premises occupied by the plaintiff could
not be regarded by the jury in mitigation of any actual damages caused
to the plaintiff by the assault and force. This is undoubtedly true so
far as actual damage was concerned, but it would not be true in regard
to exemplary damages, unless we are prepared to say, that it is as inexcusable for a person to attempt to recover his own property by force as
it would be to attempt to rob another of property to which the assailant
had no claim.
This would not be contended, and while, therefore, the
third instruction was strict law, yet, in connection with the other instructions in regard to exemplary damages, and unexplained by anything in behalf of the defendant, we think the jury would be likely to
This is more especially true in regard to the suit of Purdy
be misled.
and wife, for in the third instruction for the plaintiff in that suit, the
jury are told the same thing as to damages, but the word actual is left
out These instructions should have been so modified, that the jury
would clearly understand on the question of vindictive damages, they
would have a right to regard the fact, that the defendant was the owner
and entitled to the possession of the property, a fact proven in the case.
This last objection applies equally to the instructions in both cases.
The others above considered apply only to the suit of Purdy. There
is, however, another fatal objection to the judgment in favor of Purdy
and wife. Both counts in that declaration are for injuries done to the
person of the wife. A suit could not have been maintained in their
joint names for injuries done to the property of Purdy. Yet the court,
against the objections of defendants, allowed the plaintiff to give in
evidence the injury done to the furniture. This was wholly inadmissible, except so far as might be necessary to explain the assault on the
person of the wife, and, in a case of this character, notwithstanding
the instruction given for the defendants, this evidence would have a
strong tendency to improperly prejudice them in the minds of the jury.
In order to prevent misapprehension we would say, in conclusion,
that, for. a mere entry by the landlord upon the possession of his tenant
holding over, unaccompanied by any trespass upon either the person
or personal property of the occupant, only nominal damages could be
recovered, because the plaintiff has no legal right to the possession.
The gravamen of actions of this character is the trespass to the person,
If, for example, a tenant of a
and goods and chattels of the tenant.
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house should remove his family and furniture at the end of the term,
but refuse, without reason, to surrender the key to his landlord, and
still claim the possession, the landlord might, nevertheless, force the
door of his vacant house, without incurring a liability to more than
He would be liable to an action of forcible entry
nominal damages.
and detainer, and to an action of trespass, in which nominal damages
would be recovered, because the entry would be unlawful, but to nothing more. But for an entry, while the house is still occupied by the
family and furniture of the tenant, and for forcibly thrusting them into
the street, or attempting to do so, he would be liable to such damage
as a jury might deem the case to require.
A landlord, however, would
have the right to enter upon the possession of his tenant for certain
purposes, as to demand rent or to make necessary repairs, and we must
be understood as confining the action of trespass quare clausum by the
tenant against the landlord, even for the recovery of nominal damages,
to those cases, where an action of forcible entry and detainer would
lie under our statute. By the application of this principle much of the
apparent conflict in the authorities can be explained.
The judgment in both of these cases must be reversed and the case
remanded. Reversed and remanded.^*
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Tort for an assault in forcibly ejecting the plaintiff from her dwelling house.
appeared
At the trial in the Superior Court, before Brigham, C.
house
that the plaintiff was the wife of John C. Low, who had hired
of Josiah Low, the owner thereof, under an oral lease, and had occupied the same for two years under that tenancy; and that in March,
lease of the house under seal to Zeno P.
1873, Josiah Low made
Elwell, and both of them in writing gave notice to John C. Low of this
lease, and to quit the premises.
The plaintiff testified that on April 15, 1873, she was occupying the
house with her husband and family, consisting of her son, eleven years
hired servant, and that, while her husband was absent
of age, and
from home, the following events took place: "About ten o'clock in
saw
furniture wagon stop in front of the house. The
the morning,
doors were all fastened. Elwell and his wife came to the back door,
and tried it. Mrs. Elwell came and knocked on the window and said,
She said she
said she must not cross the threshold.
'Let me in.'

McCrory,
ace

(1851),

Kan. 678, 90 Pae. 277, 11 L.. K. A. (N. S.) 468, 12 Ann.
Noel
Entelman v. Hagood, 95 Ga. 390. 22 S. E. ,545 (1895)
Dustin v. Cowdry, 23 Vt. 631
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They went away, and I
should come in, she had a deed of the place.
I
the
front
door.
a
at
was
heard
noise
combing my hair: I opened
the door into the front entry, and found the front door open, the bolt
lying on the floor, and Elwell and his wife standing on the step, he
having an iron bar in his hand. The door had been bolted by me before that time. I forbade their crossing the threshold, but they came
I own this
in.
Elwell said, 'You forbid my crossing the threshold.
house, and want you to go out.' I told him not to lay his hands on
me.
They then proceeded to take out the furniture, carpets, etc., and
The hired man was
to bring in their own. My boy was by my side.
near me, and Elwell took him by the collar and put him out. There
were six men with them in the street.
They were not at the door at
the time it was broken, and did not do anything except remove furMr. Josiah Low was one of them. The others were neighniture.
bors and men who had brought the defendants' furniture from
I remained in the house, most of the time in my bedGloucester.
All my furroom, until about half past two o'clock in the afternoon.
niture had been removed, except a box on which I was sitting.
Elwell came to me and removed me by force from the box, and carried
it out. Afterwards he came to me and directed me to leave the house,
which I refused to do.
He then took me by the shoulders and
ran me out of the house, from my bedroom, through the sitting-room,
into the street.
My boy followed me. Elwell said, in his wife's presence, that he was acting under her directions." , It was admitted that
she was jointly liable with him for whatever was done, if either was
liable ; and that, if they had the right to remove the plaintiff by force,
at the time she was removed, no more force was used than was reasonably necessary in either instance.
The case was reported, by consent of parties, before verdict, to this
court; the parties agreeing that if, upon these facts, the defendants
could not justify the acts admitted to have been done by them, the
case was to stand merely for an assessment
of damages; if otherwise, the plaintiff should become nonsuit.
The case was argued in November 1875, and was afterwards submitted on briefs to the whole court.
Gray, C. J. A tenant holding over after the expiration of his tenancy is a mere tenant at sufferance, having no right of possession
If the landlord forcibly enters and expels him,
against his landlord.
the landlord may be indicted for the forcible entry. But he is not liable
to an action of tort for damages, either for his entry upon the prem-,
ises, or for an assault in expelling the tenant, provided he uses no more
force than is necessary.
The tenant cannot maintain an action in
the nature of trespass quare clausum fregit, because the title and
the lawful right to the possession are in the landlord, and the tenant, as against him, has no right of occupation whatever.
He cannot maintain an action, in the nature of trespass to his person, for a
subsequent expulsion with no more force than necessary to accomplish
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because the landlord, having obtained possession by an
though subject to be punished by the public as a breach
of the peace, is not one of which the tenant has any right to complain,
has, as against the tenant, the right of possession of the premises ;
and the landlord, not being liable to the tenant in an action of tort for
the principal act of entry upon the land, cannot be liable to an action
for the incidental act of expulsion, which the landlord, merely because of the tenant's own unlawful resistance, has been obliged to resort to in order to make his entry effectual. To hold otherwise would
enable a person, occupying land utterly without right, to keep out
the lawful owner until the end of a suit by the latter to recover the possession to which he is legalV entitled.
This view of the law, notwithstanding some inconsistent opinions,
is in accordance with the current of recent decisions in England and in
this Commonwealth.
In Turner v, Meymott, 7 Moore, 574, s. c. 1 Bing. 158, it was decided that a tenant whose term had expired could not maintain trespass against his landlord for forcibly breaking and entering the' house
In Hillary v. Gay, 6 C. & P. 284, indeed. Lord Lyndin his absence.
hurst at nisi prius, while recognizing the authority of that decision,
ruled that if the landlord, after the expiration of the tenancy, by
force put the tenant's wife and furniture into the street, he' was liaAnd in Newton
ble to an action of trespass quare clausum fregit.
v. Harland, 1 Man. & Gr. 644, s. c. 1 Scott, N. R. 474, a majority of
the Court of Common Pleas, overruling decisions of Baron Parke and
Baron Alderson at nisi prius, held that under such circumstances
the landlord was liable to an action of trespass for assault and batthe purpose;

act which,

tery.

But in Harvey v. Brydges,
opinion,

upon the point

14

raised

M. & W. 437, Baron Parke stated his
in Newton v. Harland, as follows :

of the peace is committed by a freeholder, who, in
order to get into possession of his land, assaults a person wrongfully
holding possession of it against his will, although the freeholder may
be responsible to the public in the shape of an indictment for a forciI cannot see how it
ble entry, he is not liable to the other party.
is possible to doubt that it is a perfectly good justification to say that
the plaintiff was in possession of the land against the will of the
defendant, who was owner, and that he entered upon it accordingly;
even though, in so doing, a breach of the peace was committed."
Baron Alderson concurred, and said that he retained the opinion that
the decision of
he expressed in Newton v. Harland, notwithstanding
The
the majority of the Court of Common Pleas to the contrary.
opinion thus deliberately adhered to and positively declared by those
two eminent judges, though not required by the adjudication in HarIn Davis v. Burrell, 10 C. B.
vey V. Brydges, is of much weight.
821, 825, Mr. Justice Cresswell said, that the doctrine of Newton v.
Harland had been very much questioned. And it was finally overruled
"Where

a breach
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in Blades v.' Hig-gs, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 713, where, in an action for an
assault by forcibly taking the defendant's property from the plaintiff's
hands, using no more force than was necessary. Chief Justice Erie,
delivering the unanimous judgment of the court, approved the statement of Baron Parke, above quoted, and added: "In our opinion,
all that is so said of the right of property in land applies in principle
to a right of property in a chattel and supports the present justification. If the owner was compellable by law to seek redress by action
for a violation of his right of property, the remedy would be often
worse than the mischief, and the law would aggravate the injury,
instead of redressing it." See also Lows v. Telford, 1 App. Cas. 414,

426."
In Commonwealth v. Haley, 4 Allen, 318, the case was upon an indictment for forcible entry, and no opinion was required or expressed as to the landlord's liability to a civil action.
The judgment in Sampson v. Henry, 11 Pick. 379, turned upon a
question of pleading. The declaration, which was in trespass for an
assault and battery, alleged that the defendant assaulted the plaintiff, and with a deadly weapon struck him many heavy and dangerous
blows. ~ The pleas of justification merely averred that the defendant
was seised and had the right of possession of a dwelling-house, that
the plaintiff was unlawfully in possession thereof and forcibly opposed
the defendant's entry, and that the defendant used no more force
than was necessary to enable him to enter and to overcome the
plaintiff's resistance; but did not deny the use of the dangerous weapon and the degree of violence alleged in the declaration ; and were
therefore held bad, in accordance with Gregory v. Hill, 8 T. R. 299,
The remarks of Mr. Justice Wilde, denying the right of
there cited.
a party dispossessed to recover possession by force and by a breach of
the peace, would, if construed by themselves, and extended beyond
the case before him, allow the tenant to maintain an action of tresin direct
pass against the landlord for entering the dwelling-house,
opposition to the judgment delivered by the same learned judge, in
another case, between the same parties, argued at the same term and
decided a year after.
Sampson v. Henry, 13 Pick. 36.
In the latter case, which was an action for breaking and entering
the plaintiff's close, and for an assault and battery upon him, the
court held that the plea of liberum tenementum was a good justification of the charge of breaking and entering the house, but not of the
personal assault and battery. That decision, so far as it held that the
landlord was not liable to an action of trespass quare clausum fregit
by a tenant at sufferance for a forcible entry, has been repeatedly
S7 In Edwiek v. Hawkes, IS Ch. D. 199 (1881), Fry, J., approved of the doctrine of Newton v. Harhmd, and allowed daiiiases for injuries done to the plaintiff's wife on account of a forcible entry. The judge said that persons who
have a right of entry on land must enter "in a peaceable and easy manner,

and

if

they cannot do so they must resort to the courts."
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affirmed. Header v. Stone, 7 Mete. 147; Miner v. Stevens, 1 Cush.
482, 485; Mason v. Holt, 1 Allen, 45; Curtis v. Galvin, 1 Allen, 215;
Moore v. Mason, 1 Alien, 406. And, so far as it allowed the plaintiff to recover, in such an action damages for the incidental injury to
Eames v. Prenhim or to his personal property, it has been overruled.
tice, 8 Cush. ZZ7 ; Curtis v. Galvin, ubi supra.
It has also been adjudged that a landlord, who, having peaceably
entered after the termination of the tenancy, proceeds, against the tenant's opposition, to take out the windows of the house, or to forcibly
eject the tenant, is not liable to an action for an assault, if he uses
Mugford v. Richno more force than is necessary for the purpose.
ardson, 6 Allen, 76, 83- Am. Dec. 617; Winter v. Stevens, 9 Allen,
For the reasons already stated, we are all of opinion that a per526.
son who has ceased to be a tenant, or to have any lawful occupancy,
has no greater right of action when the force exerted against his person
is contemporaneous with the landlord's forcible entry upon the premises.

Our conclusion is supported by the American cases of the greatest
weight. Jackson v. Farmer, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 201 ; Overdeer v. Lewis,
1 Watts & S. (Pa.) 90, Z7 Am. Dec. 440; Kellam v. Janson, 17 Pa. 467;
Stearns v. Sampson, 59 Me. 568, 8 Am. Rep. 442 ; Sterling v. Warden,
The opposing decisions are so crit51 N. H. 217, 12 Am. Rep. 80.
in an elaborate article upon this
examined
and
satisfactorily
ically
subject in 4 Am. Law Rev. 429, that it would be superfluous to refer
to them particularly.
The tenancy of the

plaintiff's husband under an oral lease was but a
tenancy at will, which, by the written lease from his landlord to the
defendant, and reasonable notice thereof, was determined, and he
Pratt v. Farrar, 10 Allen, 519.
became a mere tenant at sufferance.
It being admitted that, if the defendants had the right to remove
the plaintiffs by force, no more force was used than was reasonably
necessary, this action cannot be maintained.

Plaintiff

nonsuit.^*

K

38 Vinson v. Flynn, 64 Ark. 453, 43 S. W. 146, 40 S. W. 1S6, 39
R. A. 415
(1897) ; Allen v. Kelly, 17 R. I. 731, 24 Atl. 776, 16 L. R. A. 798, 33 Am. St. Rep.
See, also, Hus;£ans v. Bridges, 29 Pa. Super. Ct. R. 82 (1905; ;
905 (1892), ace.
Rush V. Aiken Mfg. Co., 58 S. C. 145, 36 S. E. 497, 79 Am. St. Rep. 836 (1900),
repudiating views earlier expressed in Sbarp v. Kinsman, IS S. C. 108 (1882).
In Smitii V. Detroit L. & B. Ass'n, 115 Mich. 310, 73 N. W. 395 (1897), the

landlord, in the tenant's temporary absence after the expiration of the term,
entered upon the premises and broke into the house, removed the furniture to
an outbuilding, and then forcibly prevented the return of the tenant. It was
Bliss v. Johnson, 73 N. Y. 529
held that the tenant had no cause of action.
(1878) ; Mussey v. Scott, 32 Vt. 82 (1859) ; Davis v. Burrell, 10 C. B. 821 (1851),
ace. Wilder v. House, 48 111. 279 (1868) ; Mason v. Hawes, 52 Conn. 12, 52 Am.
Rep. 552 (1884), contra.
Occasionally it has been declared that, while there is no basis for an action
by the forcibly ejected tenant in trespass quare clausam, there may be a recovery for trespass to the person or goods, even though there may have been
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FIELD.

(Court of King's Bench, 1701.

3

Salk. 222.)

Holt,

Ch. Just. Where a lease is made at will, the lessee, after
a quarter of a year is commenced, may determine his will, but then
he must pay that quarter's rent; and if the lessor determine his will
after the commencement of a quarter, he shall lose his rent for that
quarter; but if a lease be made from year to year, quamdiu ambabus
partibus placuerit; in such case, after a year is commenced, neither
the lessor nor the lessee can determine their wills for that year, because
they have willed the estate certain for so long time.

Per

BRAYTHWAYTE
(Court of Exchequer,

v.

1S42.

HITCHCOCK.
10 Mees. &

W.

494.)

Debt for rent. The first count of the declaration stated a demise,
on the 26th of October, 1840, from the plaintiff to William Hitchcock, of a messuage and premises, to hold for one year from the
25th of December then last, and so on from year to year if the plaintiff and the said William Hitchcock should respectively please, at the
annual rent of £140., payable quarterly on &c. : that, during the said
tenancy, to wit, on the 17th July, 1841, all the estate and interest of
the said W. Hitchcock in the said messuage and premises came to and
vested in the defendant, by assignment from the said W. Hitchcock :
and alleged as a breach the nonpayment by the defendant of £35., a
quarter's rent due at Christmas, 1841. There was also a count on an
account stated.
The defendant pleaded, first, nunquam indebitatus ; secondly (to
the first count,) a denial of the demise of W. Hitchcock : and thirdly
(to the first count,) a denial that the estate and interest of W. Hitchcock vested in him the defendant: on which issues were joined.
At the trial before Lord Abinger, C. B., at the Middlesex sittings
after last term, the plaintiff put in evidence an agreement, dated the
17th December, 1840, and signed by the plaintiff only, whereby the
plaintiff agreed to exiecute a lease of a cottage, &c. to W. HitchIt
cock, for seven years, at a yearly rent of £140., payable quarterly.
tlie
was proved that no lease had been executed in pursuance of
agreeno excessive force.
See Levy v. McClintock, 141 Mo. App. 593, 125 S. W. 546
(1909) ; Steams v. Sampson, 59 Me. 56S, S Am. Rep. 442 (1871), semble.
As to what amounts to a forcible entry under the forcible entry and detainer
statutes, see Smith v. Detroit L. & B. Ass'n, supra.
On the right of a forcibly ejected wrongful possessor to proceed under the
forcible entry and detainer statutes asainst the ejector, who was entitled to
possession, see Page v. Dwtght, 170 Mass. 29, 48 N. E. 850, 39 L. R. A. 418
(1S97).

Aig.Pbop. — 12
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ment, but that W. Hitchcock had entered into possession of the cottage
shortly after the date of the agreement, and had paid two quarters'
rent up to Midsummer, 1841, at the rate of £140. a year. The plaintiff
then proved a notice to the defendant to produce a deed of assignment, bearing date the 17th July, 1841, of the cottage, from W.
Hitchcock to the defendant; and on its nonproduction, called a witness, who produced a paper which he said was a true copy of the original assignment, which he had read and compared with it.
It was
objected that this copy could not be read in evidence for want of a
stamp ; but the Lord Chief Baron overruled the objection, and the copy
was read : from which it appeared, that by the deed of assignment,
which was executed both by W. Hitchcock and the defendant, after
reciting the agreement of the 17th December, 1840, and that no lease
had been executed in pursuance thereof, W. Hitchcock assigned to the
defendant, his executors, &c., all the said agreement, and all benefit
and advantage thereof, and all his estate, title, and interest therein, to
hold to the defendant, his executors, &c., absolutely, subject nevertheless to a proviso for redemption.
It was contended for the defendant, that there was no sufficient evidence of a demise whereby a tenancy
from year to year was created, as alleged in the declaration.
The Lord
Chief Baron overruled the objection, and the plaintiff' had a verdict
for iZ})., leave being reserved to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit, if the Court should be of opinion that there was no sufficient evidence of the assignment.
Erie now moved accordingly for a rule to enter a nonsuit, and also
for a new trial, on the ground that * * *
Secondly, under the agreement recited in the deed, W. Hitchcock
was a mere tenant at will, no lease having been executed, and there
was not sufficient evidence from which to infer a demise from year to
He had therefore no assignable
year, as alleged in the declaration.
interest in the premises. He referred to Brashier v. Jackson, 6 M. &

W.

549.

Lord Abixger,

C. B.^°

I

think the evidence was sufficient to show

from year to year, under the agreement which was duly
executed by the plaintiff; the cases which have been decided on this
point go fully at length. Here there is the additional fact of an admission under the defendant's hand, in the deed of assignment, that
an agreement for the lease was executed by the plaintiff.
But the
plaintiff's case does not rest solely on the agreement to let; there is
the fact of William Hitchcock having been in the possession of the cottage for more than a year, and having paid two quarters' rent under
the agreement.
William Hitchcock had therefore an assignable intera tenancy

est, which passed to the defendant

under the deed proved at the trial.
the provisions of the Stamp Acts relate
only to such copies as are evidence per se, and that the word "copy"

As to

39

the other point,

I think

Part of the statement is omitted.
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there means an authenticated copy, receivable as evidence in the first
instance.
Here the copy was evidence, only because the party who
produced it had compared it with the original, and swore to the contents of
word for word.
Parke, B.
am of the same opinion.
Although the law
clearly
settled, that where there has been an agreement for
lease, and an
mere tenant
occupation without payment of rent, the occupier
at will; yet
has been held that
he subsequently pays rent under
that agreement he thereby becomes tenant from year to year. Payment of rent, indeed, must be understood to mean
payment with refTaunt,
erence to
yearly holding; for in Richardson v. Langridge,
128,
party who had paid rent under an agreement of this description, but had not paid
with reference to year, or any aliquot part of
tenant at will only.
In the
year, was held nevertheless to be
distinct proof of the payment of rent for two
present case, there was
(fjarters of
the additional fact of an occupation for
year. There
more than
M.
year; but in the case of Cox v. Bent,
Bing. 185,
P. 281, where
lease, had occupied
party, under an agreement for
for more than
year, the Court held that
tenancy from year to
year existed, not on the ground of the occupation, but because the
think,
party had during that occupation paid
half-year's rent.
therefore, the fact of such
payment was the stronger evidence in this
case, and that William Hitchcock may be taken to have been
yearly
due assigntenant. Then, as to the question whether there has been
bechuse,
ment of such his interest,
think
clear that there has
although the deed in its commencement recites only the agreement, the
operative part of
conveys and assigns "all that the hereinbefore recited agreement of the 17th of December, 1840, and all benefit and
advantage thereof, and all that and those the said messuage or tenement and premises at &c., and all the right, title, interest, property,
claim, and demand whatsoever, at law or in equity, of him the said
William Hitchcock in the said premises," &c. On the other point
quite agree with my Lord Chief Baron that no stamp was requisite,
inasmuch as, though the document might in form have been read as
was in truth read only as
memorandum
copy of the original,
with the
to refresh the memory of the witness, who had compared

40

cf.

pra, p.

Doe ex dem. Bastow v. Cox, 11 Q. B. 122 (1847)
G42.

;

deed.*"
Say v. Stoddard, su-
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THOMSON

(Court of Queen's Bench, 1840.

v.

AMEY.

12

Add. & El.

476.)

Ejectment, on the several demises of Elizabeth Thomson and others,
to recover possession of a farm occupied by the defendant.
• On the trial, at the Cambridge
Spring assizes, 1839, before Tindal,
C. J., it appeared that on 29th July, 1835, articles of agreement had
been entered into between Miss Thomson, the lessor of the plaintiff,
and the defendant, whereby Miss Thomson, for and on behalf of herself and others, devisees in trust under the will of her father, in consideration of the rent and covenants thereinafter mentioned to be paid
and performed by tlie defendant, agreed with the defendant, so far
as she lawfully could or might, that she and all other necessary, parties should and would grant a lease of the farm to defendant, excepting out of the said lease agreed to be made all trees, mines &c., with
liberty of ingress and egress for the intended lessors, for fourteen
years, from 11th October then next, at a rent of i346., payable quarAnd it was thereby agreed, that there should be contained in
terly.
the lease covenants to repair, the said "intended lessors" finding rough
timber; that defendant should not assign without license; tliat defendant should use the premises agreed to be demised in a husbandlike and proper manner according to the best system of husbandry practised in that part of the country ; that defendant should, during the said
term, scour ditches and drains, and make and renew hedges ; that defendant would not destroy any trees, nor grow two successive crops
of white corn or grain on any of the arable land without summer tilting, or taking a green fallow crop; nor sell or suffer to be taken off
the premises any of the hay or straw grown, or manure made thereon,
but should spend them on the premises. And it was further agreed
that the lease should contain a proviso empowering the intended lessors
to enter on the premises as of their former estate in case defendant
should fail in observing any of the covenants or agreements therein
contained ; and all other usual and proper covenants in leases of a like
nature. It was also agreed that defendant should execute a counterpart of the lease, and defray the expense of the articles of agreement.
The defendant entered into possession at the time fixed for the commencement of the term, and continued to hold and pay the rent until
action brought ; but no further lease was ever made or executed.
Before the commencement of the action, notice of several breaches
of agreement was served on the defendant by the lessor of the plaintiff. One of these, namely, that defendant had taken successive crops
of white corn on the same land without summer tilting or green fallow, was satisfactorily proved on the trial, and the plaintiff had a verdict, subject to a motion for a nonsuit on the grounds hereafter stated.
In the following term, B. Andrews obtained a rule nisi in pursuance
of the leave reserved.
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C. J. In this case the defendant was let into posan
agreement, which gave the parties a right to go into
session under
equity to compel the execution of it by making out a formal lease.

Lord Denman,

Under such circumstances it has long been the uniform opinion of
Westminster Hall, that the tenant in possession holds upon the terms
of the intended lease. One of these terms was, that the lessee should
not take successive crops of corn, and that the lessor should have
power to re-enter on the breach of such agreement. This agreement
It has been
and proviso apply to the yearly tenancy of tlie defendant.
to
the parol tenargued, that the terms of the lease cannot be applied
ancy, inasmuch as some of them, such as the agreement for repairs,
Whether
are not usually considered as applicable to such tenancy.
the obligation to repair can be enforced under such circumstances, at
least as to substantial repairs, may perhaps be questionable ; but at all
events, the agreement as to cropping the land is one which is consistent
with a yearly tenancy.

Pattkson, J.

In Mann

v. Lovejoy, Ry. & M. N. P. C. 355, though
from those of the present case, yet, in principle, the
It is said, that a
ruling of Abbott, C. J., is in favour of the plaintiff.
covenant respecting the rotation of crops cannot be engrafted on a
yearly tenancy, but I see no reason why it should not. The tenant in
the facts differed

possession under such circumstances is bound to cultivate the land,
as if he were going to continue in possession as long as the lease its.elf
would have lasted. It is argued, that the tenancy arises by operation
of law upon the payment of rent, and that the law implies no particular mode of cropping, nor any condition of re-entry.
But the terms
upon which the tenant holds are in truth a conclusion of law from the
facts of the case, and the terms of the articles of agreement; and I
see no reason why a condition of re-entry should not be as applicable
to this tenancy as the other terms expressed in the articles.
Williams, J. It is admitted, that, if this were a case of holding
over, the terms of the written agreement wouM apply.
In principle,
there is no distinction between that case and the case of a tenant who
enters and pays rent upon the faith of an executory agreement for a
lease.

Rule discharged.**
Tilt v. Stratton, 4 Ring. 446 (1828). In Doe d. Eigge v. Bell,
471 (179.3), the court, Lord Kenyon, C. J., said : "Though the agreement be void by the Statute of Frauds as to the duration of the lease, it must
regulate the terms on which the tenancy subsists in other respects, as to the
rent, the time of the year when the tenant is to quit, etc.
So where a tenant
41 See

5

Doe d.

Term Rep.

holds over after the expiration of his term, without having entered into any
new contract, he holds upon the former terms. Now, in this case, it was
agreed, that the defendant should quit at Candlemas ; and though the agreement is void as to the number of years for which the defendant was to hold, if
the lessor choose to determine the tenancy before the expiration of the seven
years, he can only put an end to it at Candlemas."
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COHN.

(Court of Appeals of New York, 1890. IIS N. Y. 300, 23 N. E. 29S, 7 L. E. A.
CO, 16 Am. St. Kep. TGI.)

Bradley, J. The action was brought to recover rent of premises described in a written lease made by the agent of the plaintiffs' intestate
to the defendants in January, 1884, for the term of two years and
five months, commencing on the first day of March, 1884, and ending
on the first day of August, 1886, at the yearly rent of $3,000, payable in equal monthly payments, on the last business day of each month.
The authority of the agent to make the lease not being in writing it
was void. 2 R. S. (1st Ed.) p. 134, § 6. The defendants went into
possession on tlie first of IMarch, 1884, and continued to occupy and
pay rent up to August, 1885, when they left the premises and sought
to surrender the possession up to the plaintiff's intestate, who declined to accept it. He recovered for the amount of rent at the rate
mentioned in the lease from the first of August, to the first of March
following. While the cases are not entirely in harmony on the subject, the doctrine now in this state is such that the defendants on
going into possession of the premises and paying rent, became, by reason of the invalidity of the demise, tenants from year to year, and in
such case the continuance of occupancy into the second year rendered
them chargeable with the rent until its close. They could then only
terminate their tenancy at the end of the current year.
Reeder v.
Sayre, 70 N. Y. 180, 26 Am. Rep. 567 ; Laughran v. Smith, T:> N. Y.
205.

out of
such relation commence and terminate?
It is contended by the defendant's counsel that inasmuch as the end of the term designated by
the terms of the lease was the first of August, 1886, that was the time
when the yearly tenancy in contemplation of law terminated, and,
therefore, the surrender was properly made on the first of August,
1885.
It is urged that this view is in harmony with the recognized
principle that, although the lease was invalid the agreement contained
in it regulated the terms of the tenancy in all respects, except as to
the duration of the term, and Doe v. Bell, 5 D. & E. 471, is cited.
There a farm was, in January, 1790, let by a parole lease, void by the
statute of frauds, for seven years, the lessee to enter upon the land
when the former tenant left, on Lady-day, and into the house on the
He entered
25th of May following, and was to quit at Candlemas.
accordingly and paid rent. A notice was served upon the tenant September 22d, 1792, to quit on Lady-day. In ejectment brought against
him it was claimed, on the part of the lessee, that his holding was
from Candlemas, and, therefore, the notice was ineffectual to terminate the tenancy. Lord Kenyon, in deciding the case, said and held
that "it was agreed that the defendant should quit at Candlemas, and

The question presented is

:

When did

the rental year arising
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though the agreement is void as to the number of years for which
the defendant was to hold, if the lessor choose to determine the tenancy before the expiration of the seven years, he can only put an end
to it at Candlemas."
That case has in several instances been cited by
the courts of this state upon the question of the force remaining in
And in Schuyler
the terms of the agreement embraced in a void lease.
V. Leggett, 2 Cow. 663, it was remarked by Chief Justice Savage, in
that such an agreement "must regulate the terms on which
citing
the tenancy subsists in other respects; as the rent, the time of year
when the tenant must quit, etc." And the citation was repeated to
Cow.
the same effect by the Chief Justice in People v. Rickert,
230.

The question here did not arise in either of those two cases, nor
they be treated as authority that the time for termination of
tenancy from year to year, in any year other than that of the desigvoid
nated expiration of term,
governed by such designation in
The
lease for more than one year rather than by the time of entry.
effect sought to be given in the present case to the case of Doe v.
In Berrey v. Lindley,
Bell
not supported by English authority.
M,
G. 496, the tenant entered into possession of premises under
an agreement void by the statute of frauds, by the terms of which
half from Michaelmas.
he was to hold five years and
Several years
after his entry, and after expiration of the period mentioned in the
a
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agreement, the lessee gave notice to his landlord to terminate the tenIt was there contended on the part of the latancy at Michaelmas.
ter, and Doe v. Bell was cited in support of the proposition, that the
time designated in the agreement for the termination of the tenancy
But the court decided otherwise, ^nd held
governed in that respect.
that the notice was effectual to terminate the tenancy. The views of
the court there were to the effect, that, although the tenancy was from
year to year, the tenant might without notice have quit at the expiration of the period contemplated in the agreement, but having remained
in possession and paid rent subsequently to that time, he must be
considered
tenant from year to year with reference to the time of
the original entry.
The same principle in respect to holding over
term was announced
in Doe v. Dobell,
A.
E. (N. R.) 806, where
was said that "in all
cases the current year refers to the time of entry unless the parties
stipulate to the contrary."
The doctrine of the English cases seems to be that
party entering
under
lease, void by the statute of frauds, for
term, as expressed
in
of more than one year, and paying rent
tenant
treated as
from year to year from the time of his entry, subject only to the right
to terminate the tenancy without notice at the end of the specified
term. And to that extend and for that purpose only, the terms of
held
agreement, in such case, regulate the time to quit. This right
to be reciprocal.
Doe v. Stratton,
That proposition
Bing. 446.
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not without sensible reason, for its support. The lease for more tlian
one year, unless made in the manner provided by the statute, cannot
be effectual to vest the term in the lessee, yet in other respects the.
rights of the parties may be determined by its terms, so far as they
are consistent with its failure, to create any estate or interest in the
And that
land or any duration of term for occupancy by the lessee.
Porter v. Bleiler, 17
principle is properly applicable to such leases.
Barb. 154; Reeder v. Sayre, 70 N. Y. 184, 26 Am. Rep. 567; Laughran
V. Smith, 75 N. Y. 205, 209.
This view does not aid the defendants. They became tenants from
year to year as from the time of their entry ; and although by virtue
of the terms of the agreement, in tliat respect, in the lease, they may
have been at liberty to quit on the first of August, 1886, if they had
remained until then, such time in that, or the year previous, could not
The defendants
be treated as the end of any year of the tenancy.
of the original
entered
second
from
the
time
upon the
year
having
entry, it was not within their power to terminate their relation or
liability as tenants until the end of the then current year, which did
not terminate until the first of March, was reached.
The conclusion, from these views, necessarily follows that the judgment should be affirmed.
All concur, except Brown, J., not sitting.

Judgment

affirmed.*^

CLAYTON

V.

BLAKEY.

(Court of King's Bench, 1798.

8

Term Rep.

3.)

This was an action against a tenant for double rent, for holding over
after the expiration of his term, and a regular notice to quit. The
first count of the declaration stated a holding under a certain term,
determinable on the 12th of May then past'; and other counts stated
a holding from year to year, determinable at the same period.
It
in
evidence, that the defendant had held the premises for
appeared
two or three years, under a parol demise for twenty-one years from
day mentioned, to which the notice to quit referred ; and the
Statute of Frauds directing that any lease for more than three years,
not reduced into writing, shall operate only as a tenancy at will, it
was contended, at the trial of the last assizes for Northumberland, that
the holding should have been stated according to the legal operation
and as there was no count adapted to that
of
as
tenancy at will
Rooke, J., howstatement, that the plaintiff ought to be nonsuited.
amounted to
ever, considering that
tenancy from year to year,
over-ruled the objection, and the plaintiff obtained a verdict.
misWood now moved to set aside the verdict, on the ground of
direction, relying upon the positive words of the stature
42 See Adams v. City of Cohoes, 127 N. Y. 175, 28 N. E. 25 (1891)
?. Avery, 23 Conn. 304 (1S54).

;

a

a

;

it

a

it,

the

Larkin

ESTATES CREATED

Ch. 5)

665

Lord Kenyon, C. J. The direction was right; for such a holding
now operates as a tenancy from year to year. The meaning of the
statute was, that such an agreement should not operate as a term ;
but what was then considered as a tenancy at will, has since been
properly construed to enure as a tenancy from year to year.
Per Curiam. Rule refused.*'

GRISWOLD

V.

BRANFORD.

(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,

190S.

80 Conn. 453, 68

Atl.

987.)

Action to recover rent, brought to and tried by the Court of Common
Pleas in New Haven County, Bennett, J. Facts found and judgment
rendered for the plaintiff for $420, and appeal by the defendant.
No
error.
The plaintiff sought to recover the agreed rent of certain premises
for the year beginning October 1st, 1899. He set up a parol lease for

a

a

a

it,

that term, and alleged that the defendant entered into possession under
continued in possession through the term, and had paid no rent. The
defendant pleaded
general denial and the statute of limitations.
Prior to October 1st, 1897, the parties entered into
parol agreement whereby the plaintiff undertook to lease and the defendant to
hire the premises for the term of two years from said October 1st, at
an annual rental of $300 payable annually at the end of each year. The
defendant thereupon went into occupation on said day and continued
in such occupation throughout tlie two-year period, and paid the
Before the period
agreed rent at the end of each year as stipulated.
had expired
new parol agreement, embodying precisely the same
terms and for the same time was made, and the defendant continued
its possession confessedly until January 1st, 1900, and as the plaintiff
claims, until May, 1901. The premises were hired and used for the
On December 31st, 1899, the selectmen
purposes of the Town Court.
gave written notices to the plaintiff and the officers of the court that

a

a

&

1

1

a

a

;

§
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3

"It is true the Revised Statutes, c. 60, 21, declare that all interests or
estates in lands, created without any instrument in writing, shall have the
yet we think that this estate, when
force and effect of estates at will only
once created, may, like any other estate at will, by subsequent events, be changtenancy from year to year. In the case before us the lessee entered
ed into
into possession, and the possession was continued from year to year, until
July, 1844, and the rents semi-annually paid by the lessee and accepted by the
landlord.
From these facts a new agreement may well be presumed, and the
estate, which was originally created by the statute as an estate only at will,
expands into
holding from year to year."
Barlow v. Wainwright, 22 Vt. 88,
52 Am. Dec. 79 (1849).
Ellis v. Paige,
Pick. (Mass.) 43 (1822), contra.
tenant who had gone
See Richardson v. Giffard,
A.
E. 52 (1834), where
into possession under an agreement for
lease for three years at an annual
rent, but which agreement was not executed as required by the- Statute of
Frauds, was held liable on an undertaking in such agreement to keep the premises in repair.
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on and after January 1st, 1900, its sessions would be held in the town
hall, and that, as was the fact, suitable accommodations had been provided there.
On January 1st the defendant removed from the plaintiff's building substantially all of its furniture, but the judge of the
court continued to hold its sessions there until May 1st, 1901. No rent
was paid after October 1st, 1899. The action was begun September
28th, 1906. Judgment was rendered for $300 as the rent for one year
from October 1st, 1899, with interest thereon from October 1st, 1900.
Prkntice, J. Prior to October 1st, 1897, these parties entered into
a parol agreement whereby the plaintiff undertook to lease the premises
in question to the defendant for the period of two years from and after
said October 1st, for an annual rent of $300 payable at the end of each
year. The defendant thereupon, on said date, entered into possession
of the premises and thereafter remained in possession thereof until
January 1st, 1900, if not later. The amount of rent in said parol agreement stipulated to be paid, was paid as agreed for each of the two years
succeeding October 1st, 1897. Beyond question, therefore, the defendant became a tenant from year to year, and remained such tenant down
The recited facts disclose a lease not actionable
to October 1st, 1899.
and the payby the statute of frauds, an entry into possession under
ment and acceptance of the stipulated annual rent, thus satisfying even
more exacting conditions than those contended for by the defendant as
necessary to create by implication of law
tenancy from year to year,
and more exacting ones than our law requires.
Lockwood v. Lockwood. 22 Conn. 425, 433; Larkin v. Avery, 23 Conn. 304, 316; Corbett
When, therefore, the
v. Cochrane, 67 Conn. 570, 577, 35 Atl. 509.
defendant, with the acquiescence of the plaintiff, remained m possesnew
sion after October 1st, 1899, as
confessedly did,
tenancy for
new and different
year commencing on that date was created, unless
situation arose from the second parol agreement and the conduct of
Washburn on Real Property,
797;
the parties under it.
Kent's
115;
Tenant,
on
If
Comm.
55.
this ineffective
Landlord
Taylor
agreement and subsequent conduct was barren of legal results, the accountability of the defendant to the plaintiff for the amount of rent
for which judgment in this case was rendered, and for that amount
covering the precise period described in the complaint, follows. And
judgment for that amount might, under those conditions, have been
avers
lease by parol
rendered upon the present complaint, although
for one year, made on or about October 1st, 1899. The facts do not,
indeed, show
technical lease of any kind, or that the parol lease was
one for the expressed period of one year from that date, but they do
disclose
tenancy with an obligation to pay an agreed rental of $300,
and that the tenancy was one for the year in question, all as the result
of the acts of the parties. Larkin v. Avery, 23 Conn. 304, 316. Acts
and contracts may be stated according to their legal effect, and immaPractice Book, 1908, p. 244,
terial variances are not to be regarded.
144; page 245,
149.
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The defendant is thus placed in the position where, as one of the
conditions of any successful defense he may interpose, he must establish a new tenancy beginning October 1st, 1899. Counsel appear to
have been unmindful of the full significance of the pre-existing relation
of the parties as bearing upon both the incidental question as to whether the defendant's continued possession was under a new tenancy sufficiently established, or under a mere continuance of the term of die old
one, and upon the ultimate question of the plaintiff's right to recover
the $300 rental for which judgment was obtained. The plaintiff's counsel approaches the question at issue as though the parol agreement of
1899 was the first significant fact in the record, and upon the assumption that the possession after October, 1899, was so clearly referable
to it that there would be attached to that possession the same imporThe defendtance as would have been attached to an original entry.
ant's counsel likewise looks to the events of 1899 as determining the
relations of the parties, but urges that there is a distinction not to be
lost sight of between an entry and a continuance in possession as evidencing a holding under a tenancy having its origin in an agreement
ineffective in itself.
Approaching the question at issue in the manner thus indicated, the
plaintiff claims that the defendant's possession after October 1st, 1899,
following the new parol agreement, created a new and independent
status. This status, he says, was that of a tenancy from year to year.
The practical result of this claim is that while the origin of the tenancy
after October 1st, 1899, is found in the events of that year, the character and incidents of the tenancy are precisely the same as would have
resulted from the defendant's occupancy had there been no attempt to
make a renewal lease.
The defendant's position with respect to the
of
a new tenancy referable to the new agreequestion of the creation
stated,
ment is not definitely
although the inference to be drawn from
the distinction he makes between a continued occupancy and a new
entry would seem to indicate that it was that no such new tenancy came
into existence. His main contention, however, is that whatever new
tenancy may have been created by the events of 1899, it was one at will
and not one from year to year.
We have already observed that a successful defense involves the
establishment by the defendant of two propositions, to wit: (1) That
the defendant's possession after October 1st, 1899, was under a new
tenancy of some sort, and (2) that this tenancy was, to say the least,
not one from year to year. If it be assumed, as the plaintiff claims
and the defense requires, that a new and independent tenancy originated in the events of 1899, the question remains as to its character.
The defendant urges that it was one at will, since no rent was paid for
any occupancy or period after October 1st, 1899. His contention is
that the payment of rent must concur with possession by the lessee under a term lease in violation of the statute of frauds, in order that a
tenancy from year to year be created by implication of law, and that
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without such payment the tenancy will be regarded as one at will.
Whatever the rule may be elsewhere, such is not the law of this jurisdiction.
Tenancies from year to year by implication are the results
of judicial legislation as a measure of equity and sound policy.
1
Washburn on Real Property, § 797. In this State the long-established
rule is that when parties make an oral lease of lands reserving rent,
which lease is non-actionable by reason of the statute of frauds, and
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the lessee thereafter enters into possession under the lease, there results a tenancy which under ordinary conditions at least will by implication of law be regarded as one from year to year. Larkin v. Avery, 23 Conn. 304 ; Corbett v. Cochrane, 67 Conn. 570, 35 Atl. 509.
This rule has an especial appropriateness in this State where parol
leases for a term not exceeding one year under which possession is
taken are not invalid by our statute of frauds.
The same result would
of course logically follow, where the lessee remained in a possession
previously acquired, if the circumstances were such as to sufficiently
disclose that his continued possession was referable to the ineffective
as an agreement made, although not enlease, and therefore under
forceable in and of itself. Andrew v. Babcock, 63 Conn. 109, 121, 26
Atl. 715. Section 4043 of the General Statutes 1902 first enacted, in
substance, in 1866, prescribes that a holding-over possession, standing
by itself, shall not be regarded as evidence of any agreement of further
lease.
It does not, however, prevent tenancy from being established
by other recognized means. One of these means, recognized long before the legislation of 1866, was that of supplementing proof of the
agreement non-enforceable under the statute of frauds, with proof of
tenancy
the acts of the parties disclosing
recognition by them of
91 Lockwood v. Lockwood, 22
in fact under it.
Swift's Digest, s.
Conn. 425
Larkin v. Avery, 23 Conn. 304. The only significance
mere payment and receipt of rent,
which can reasonably attach to
to be found in
recognition of
tenancy of some sort under the invalid lease, and our own courts have well said that, however satisfacrecognition might be, there might well be one sufficiently
tory such
disclosed in other ways. In some jurisdictions, rent payments of annual sums or aliquot parts thereof have been, by reason of their indication of the intention of the parties, regarded as essential to the conversion of what by force of statute or judicial construction are prima
not
facie tenancies at will into tenancies from year to year. Such
the law of this State.
The defendant having, for the reasons stated, failed in his contention
that the tenancy after October 1st, 1899, was other than one from year
to year, the judgment appealed from was properly rendered.
Upon our conclusions the defense that the statute of Hmitations had
run against the plaintiff's claim
confessedly not well made.
There
no error. In this opinion the other judges concurred.
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(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

1904.
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& R. R. CO.

209 Pa. 550, 5S

Atl.

924.)

Appeal from report of viewers.
From the record it appeared that plaintiffs who were liquor dealers,
entered into a verbal undertaking with Rieker, the then owner, the
terms of which were that they agreed to pay twenty-five cents for each
barrel of beer more than the regular price elsewhere, as rental. The
rental was "payable just as the beer bill was payable — paid at all times,

* * * somealong different periods, — running account,
times every week they got a check.'' The understanding was that the
plaintiffs "had a right to remain on that lot as long as you [they] wanted," or, as the owner's son testifies, they "could have stayed as long as
they felt."
The tenants erected buildings on the premises which were used for
bottling, storage, liquor-room and offices, — and also a stable, wagon
shed, coal shed and outbuildings and machinery necessary to the conduct of their business.
The defendant company being desirous to enter upon the lands for
railroad uses, presented a bond in the usual form, which was approved
May 16, 1901, and thereafter viewers were appointed for the purposes
*

*

*

stated.

The defendant gave notice to the plaintiffs December
it desired possession of the lot March 1, 1902, and stated

20, 1901, that

the notice was
given to allow them time to arrange their affairs, but did not take actual
possession of the premises until June 4, 1902.
The plaintiffs disregarded the notice, and the railroad company proceeded to the demolition of the buildings.
The court gave binding instructions for defendant.

Per Curiam. The appellants were tenants at will of Rieker. The
agreement under which they went into possession was altogether indefinite as to the time it was to last ; they were to "remain as long as they
wanted."
The rent was not fixed either as to amount or time of payment, but was deterrnined by the number of barrels of beer they should
purchase from their lessor, and was payable "just as the beer bill was
payable." A clearer case of tenancy at will would be hard to discover.
Under such circumstances the mere fact that the tenancy ran along for
more than a year did not change its character or convert it into a tenancy
from year to year. "Where the duration of the term is left uncertain
* * * the lessee holds ab initio as a tenant at will. And the mere
payment of rent will not change the tenancy into one from year to year,
unless there are other circumstances to show an intention to do so, as
for instance an agreement to pay rent by the quarter, or some other
ahquot part of the year :" 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) tit
Landlord & Tenant, p. 183. But "the mere payment of a periodical
rent, however, will not necessarily have the effect of changing the ten-
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ancy at will into a periodical tenancy and parol evidence may be admitted for the purpose of showing the character of the payment:" 18
Am, & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.), p. 186. It was on this last principle that the issues in McDowell v. Simpson, 3 Watts, 129, 27 Am.
Dec. 338, and Dunn v. Rothermel, 112 Pa. 272, 3 Atl. 800, were sent
to the jury to determine whether the leases were at will or from year
to year. In both cases the rent was paid yearly, and the expression of
Justice Kennedy, in the former, so much relied on by appellants, that
"if the tenants were suffered to hold under it for upwards of a year,
paying the rent as it became due, and the plaintiff receiving it without
objection, the lease instead of continuing to be a lease strictly at will
would thereby become a lease from year to year," must be read in
connection with the facts of the case.
Being tenants at will, the termination of the lessor's estate, even
though by involuntary alienation under eminent domain determined
the appellants' lease, and made them technically tenants at sufferance
of the railroad company. The difference, however, is not practically of
All they were entitled to in either case was notice
any importance.
and a reasonable time to remove their goods and fixtures.
This they
received, but failed to avail themselves of, and the learned judge below
was justified in treating their conduct as an abandonment.
The filing of the bond by the railroad company did not change the
nature of the tenancy, nor the rights of the appellants except so far as
it substituted the company as lessor in place of Rieker.
The bond was
security for such damages as the appellants "shall be entitled to receive
for the entering by the said company upon the said lands, and establishing and constructing the said additional tracks and structures thereon."
If the company had entered immediately and demolished the buildings
in the construction of its tracks, it would have been liable just as its
predecessor, Rieker, would have been, for the damages caused by want
of reasonable opportunity to appellants to remove their property, but
such opportunity having been given, there were no damages, and the
verdict was rightly directed for defendant.
Judgment affirmed.**

RIGHT

d.

FLOWER

v.

(Court of King's Bench, 17S6.

DARBY
1

et al.

Term Rep.

159.)

Ejectment tried at the last assizes at Salisbury, before Plotham,
Baron, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court of King's Bench on the following case:
That the lessor of the plaintiff was seised in fee of the premises
in question. That on the 11th day of May, 1781, the defendant Darby
took the premises, which are a house in Salisbury, and occupied them
4 4 See Doe d. Tomes v. Chamberlain,
42 Vt. G37 (1870), ace.

5

M.

&

W.

14 (1839) ;

Sheldon v. Davey,
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from that time under a parol demise at £10. per anto
commence from Midsummer then next following.
rent
the
;
The defendant Darby let part of the premises to the defendant Bristow. That on the 26th March, 1785, the defendant Darby was served
with a notice to quit on the 29th of September following.
entitled to reThe question
whether the lessor of the plaintiff
cover
certain
determinable on
When lease
Lord Mansfield, C.
because
event, or at
necessary,
particular period, no notice to quit
both parties are equally apprized of the determination of the term.
If there be lease for year, and by consent of both parties the
tacit rentenant continue in possession afterwards, the law implies
ovation of the contract. They are supposed to have renewed the old
But then
agreement, which was to hold for
year.
necessary
for the sake of convenience, that,
either party should be inclined
to change his mind, he should give the other half
'year's notice before
notice
the expiration of the next or any following year: now this
the middle of the year, and therefore not binding, as
to quit
contrary to the agreement.
As to the case of lodgings, that depends on
particular contract,
The agreement between the
and
an exception to the general rule.
month or less time, and there to be sure much
parties may be for
shorter notice would be sufficient, where the tenant has held over the
time agreed upon, than in the other case. The whole question depends
upon the nature of the first contract.
AsHHURST,
There
no distinction in reason between houses and
lands, as to the time of giving notice to quit. It
necessary that both
should be governed by one rule. There may be cases, where the same
hardship would be felt in determining that the rule did not extend
as in the case of
lodging-house in Lonto houses as well as lands
tenant at Lady-Day to hold as in the present case:
don, being let to
the landlord should give notice to quit at Michaelmas, he would by
that means deprive the lessee of the most beneficial part of the term,
notorious that the winter
since
by far the most profitable season of the year for those who let lodgings.
BuLLER,
taken for granted by the counsel for the plaintiff,
tenancy at
that the rule of law, which construes what was formerly
to the
not
from
to
does
apply
lands
into
year
year,
will of
tenancy
reaThe
distinction.
no ground for that
case of houses, but there
that the agreement
letting for year at an annual rent
son of
letting from
the parties consent to go on after that time,
then
an anyear to year. This reason extends equally to the present case
has been deand upon such
holding
here reserved
nual rent
This docnecessary.
termined that half
year's notice to quit
the
of
Eighth.
Henry
trine was laid down as early as in the reign
The rhoment the year began, the defendant
[13 H. VIII, 15 b.]
had
right to hold to the end of that year; therefore there should
as a public-house
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have been half a year's notice to quit before the end of the term. This
gives rise to another objection in this case, upon the distinction between
six months and half a year. The case in the Year-Books requires half
a year's notice; but here there is less than half a year's notice, and
therefore it is bad on that ground also.
Judgment for the defendant.

HERTER

V.

MULLEN.

{Court of Appeals of New York, 1899. 159 N. Y. 28, 53 N. E. 700, 44 L. B. A.
703, 70 Am. St, Rep. 517.)

Martin, J.

This action was to recover seven months' rent of a
dwelling house situated upon Madison avenue, in the city of New
York. There was a lease between the parties, by which the defendants rented the premises from May 1, 1894, for the period of one year,
the rent payable in monthly installments in advance. The rent for that
term has been paid. By this action the plaintiff seeks to recover rent
for a portion of the succeeding year, on the ground that the defendants held over after the expiration of their term, and thus became
liable for the rent of the premises for that time. The facts are undisputed. The defendants alleged as a defense to the action the making
of the contract or lease with the plaintiff; that in the month of February, 1895, before the expiration of their term, they notified the
plaintiff that they would not retain the premises for another year,
and that after such notice the plaintiff and his agents were permitted
to show the premises, and to place the usual notice "To Let" upon
them, which remained during the balance of the term.
The defendants then specially alleged that on May 1, 1895, the defendants were prevented from yielding up the possession of the premises by the act of God in afflicting their mother, who was a member
of their family, with a disease which, at that time, previously, and
subsequently, including May 15th, confined her to her bed so that
it would have endangered her life to take her from the house; that
for that reason, and no other, of which the plaintiff had full knowledge
and notice, the defendants were obliged to and did occupy a small
portion of the premises until May 15th; that all their property,' furniture, and belongings and their family were removed from the premises,
and every part thereof, on May 1, 1895, except from the sick room in
which their mother was confined, and that they were forbidden by the
physician in charge to remove her until May 15th, when she was at
once removed.
Upon the trial it was admitted that upon the 1st of February, 1895,
the defendants notified the plaintiff that on the 1st of May they would
give up and surrender the possession of the premises. That they were
occupied under the lease was admitted, also the rate of rent, and the
fact that the defendants, from necessity, held over after the expira-
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tion of the lease some 15 days. The plaintiff then admitted the facts
set up in the answer as to the impossibility of the defendants' surrendering possession at the expiration of the year, so that the question
presented is whether, notwithstanding the facts alleged in the answer,
the plaintiff was entitled, as a matter of law, to recover rent for the
succeeding year, upon the ground that the defendants held over after
the expiration of their term. •
The admission of the plaintiff amounts to a concession that, by rea-.
son of the sickness of the defendants' mother, it was impossible for
them to surrender up the possession of the premises to the plaintiff;
that, so far as it was possible, they did so; and hence, that their
If there was any doubt as to the
retention was wholly involuntary.
question of impossibility, it should have been submitted to the jury,
and the defendants' exception to the direction of a verdict was well
taken. Thus, in a word, the question is whether that impossibility justified the defendants' action, or whether, although it was impossible to
surrender the entire premises, the holding of a small part for a few
days imposed upon them a liability for rent for the succeeding year.
It is well settled that, where a tenant voluntarily holds over after the
expiration of his term, he may be held as upon an agreement to hold
for a year upon the terms of the prior lease. Conway v. Starkweather,
1 Denio, 114; Board v. Clark, 33 N. Y. 251;
Haynes v. Aldrich, 133
N. Y. 287, 289, 31 N. E. 94, 28 Am. St. Rep. 636. The basis of this liability is often said to be an implied agreement upon the part of the
tenant to hold for another year. While I doubt, as I always have,
the propriety of calling, this class of obligations implied contracts, but
think they are to be regarded as duties which
the
law imposes, yet, whether they be denominated implied contracts or duties created by law, in either case the right arises upon' an implication of law, and in no sense upon an express or absolute contract.
It is also well settled that, where a duty or charge is created by law,
and the performance is prevented by inequitable accident or the act
of God, without fault of the party sought to be charged, he will be
excused, but where a person absolutely, and by express contract,
binds himself to do a particular thing, which is not at the time impossible or unlawful, he will not be excused, unless through the fault
of the other party. The reason given for the latter portion of this
rule is that he might have provided by his contract against inevitable accident or the act of God.
Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99,
62 Am. Dec. 142 ; Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 N. Y. 272, 82 Am. Dec.
349; Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62, 7 Am. Rep. 415.
Thus the
most that can be said of the obligation that arises from the relation
of landlord and tenant and follows by a general lease is that the
tenant is charged with the duty of vacating the premises at the
end of his term.
If he fails, it is a breach of his duty, and ordinarily the law implies or creates a liability on his part for anAig.Pbop, — 13
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other year's rent. This being a duty impUed or created by law, and
not by an express or absolute agreement, it falls within the first part
of the foregoing rule, and hence it is obvious that, if the tenant's removal was rendered impossible by inevitable accident or the act of
God, he is excused for his omission to surrender the premises, at least
so far as it creates a liability for a year's rent which is implied by
law. The reason for the distinction between the effect of impossibility
. of performance,
occasioned by inevitable accident or the act of God,
upon an obligation created by express contract and upon an obligation
which the law implies, has been held to rest "upon the unwillingness
of the law to at once create, impose, and exact the performance of
an obligation forbidden or rendered impracticable by the interposition
of Providence."
School Dist. v. Dauchy, 25 Conn. 530, 68 Am. Dec.
371.

a

is,

Under the principle of the authorities relating to this subject, I
think it is clear that, as the obHgation sought to be enforced was
one created by law, and not by the agreement of the parties, impossibility of performance was a valid excuse, and the defendants cannot
Moreover, the same
be held for the rent for the subsequent year.
result may be reached upon another ground.
There are many cases
where the courts have impHed a condition in a contract to the effect
that a party is relieved from its terms where its performance has,
without his fault, become impossible. The principle upon which those
cases are based is that, when the contract was made, the parties contemplated that the condition which subsequently existed might arise,
and render performance impossible, and that the implied condition is
to be construed as a part of the existing contract, and thus relieves
the party from liability in case that condition arises.
Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62, 7 Am. Rep. 415; Lorillard v. Clyde, 142 N. Y. 456,
462, Z7 N. E. 489, 24 L. R. A. 113; Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y.
507, 28 N. E. 595, 14 L. R. A. 215; Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N. Y. 40,
44, 27 Am. Rep. 7; Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best. & S. 826; Robinson
V. Davison, L. R. 6 Exch. 269; Kein v. Tupper, 52 N. Y. 550, 555;
Dolan V. Rodgers, 149 N. Y. 489, 492,' 44 N. E. 167.
To hold in this case that this agreement was made upon an implied
condition that the defendants should not be required to vacate the
premises at the expiration of their term in the event that it was rendered impossible by inevitable accident or the act of God is quite within the principle of the authorities cited.
But, be this as it may, it
is manifest that the charge or liability which the plaintiff' seeks to enforce was created by law, and not by agreement, and that, as its performance was prevented without the defendants' fault, they were excused from the onerous liability which the plaintiff now seeks to
enforce.
It may well be, and doubtless
true that the plaintiff
may recover for the time the premises were occupied by the defendants, or if, by reason of their failure to surrender up the premises,
additional damages follow, that they may be recovered in
proper ac-
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tion so that all damages caused by the defendants* misfortune would
for the subsequent
year upon the implied contract or duty imposed by law seems to me
clear.
These considerations lead me to the conclusion that the judgment in
this action should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, widi costs
to abide the event. "'^

be borne by them, but that he cannot recover the rent

GOLDSBOROUGH
(Supreme Court of Illinois, 1S92.

v.

GABLE.

140 111. 2C9, 29 N.

E.

722, 15

L. R. A.

204.)

ScHOLriELD, J. Appellant brought covenant against appellee for
Upon the trial in the circuit court, appellant read in evidence

rent.

executed by himself to appellee, leasing certain real estate in
Peoria from March 18, 1883, until March 18, 1884, for $840, payable
in installments of $70 on the 18th day of each month; occupation
of the premises, after the execution of the deed, by appellee until
the ISth of October, 1888 ; the payment of the stipulated rent for the
term described in the deed; the failure of appellee to surrender
possession of the premises at the expiration of the term, and his continued occupancy thereof ; payment of the same rent for the first
month after the expiration of the term, as provided by the deed to
be paid by the month during the term ; and the payment of other sums
for rent from time to time throughout the period that appellee occupied the premises ; amounting, however, in -the aggregate, to a less
sum than the total amount of rent due at the rate provided to be paid
by the deed.
Appellee was permitted to introduce evidence, over the objection ol
appellant, tending to prove that, after the expiration of the term described in the deed, and after he had paid appellant one month's rent
for the occupation of the premises at the rate provided to be paid in
the deed, namely, on the 28th of May, 1884, he commenced negotiating
with appellant to reduce the rent for the premises; that the negotiation was protracted until the 9th of July following, when it was
agreed between appellant and appellee that the rent for the premises should be reduced to $50 in lieu of $70 per month, as it had been
theretofore;
and the court refused to instruct the jury, at the instance
of the appellant, that, even if they believed such agreement had been
proved, it was "invalid, and could not be enforced," but, on the contrary, the court instructed the jury that, if they believed from the
evidence that such agreement had been proved, it was valid, and the
a deed,

The concurring opinion by O'Brien, J., and the dissenting opinion by Gray,
Parker, C. J., and Haight, J., concurred with O'Brien and
are omitted.
Martin, JJ., in voting for reversal. Bartlett and Vann, JJ., concurred with
Gray, J.
706 (1S65) ;
See Doe v. Crago, 6 C. B. 90 (1S4S) ; Oakley v. Monck, 3 H. &
Dougal V, McCarthy, [1S93] 1 Q. B. 736.

J.,

45
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plaintiff was thereafter entitled to recover only $50 per month for the
rent of the premises.
In our opinion, the court erred in these several rulings. There was
no evidence given on behalf of appellee tending to prove that he had

is

a

it

;

if

it,

is

it

is

It

is

a

a

is

It

3

&

;

;

is

;

it

it,

surrendered the premises to appellant before the making of the agreerhent of July 9, 1884, or that he had offered to do so, and refused to
execute the terms of the lease, or that there was any reason why he
could then have surrendered the premises and refused to execute the
Appellee having remained in possession after the
terms of the deed.
expiration of the term described in the deed, without any new contract
with appellant in respect thereto, it was optional with appellant to
treat him as a trespasser, or to waive the wrong of holding over, and
treat him as a tenant; and, by accepting the payment of the month's
rent thereafter from appellee, appellant made his election, and appellee then became a tenant of the premises under appellant, from year
to year, upon the same terms and subject to the same rent, etc., as
is provided to be paid in the original deed.
Prickett v. Ritter, 16
111. 96; Hunt v. Morton, 18 111. 75;
McKinney v. Peck, 28 111. 174;
Cloth Co. V. Gardner, 99 111. 151; Webster v. Nichols, 104 111. 160.
The only respect wherein the agreement of the 9th of July, 1884,
whereof evidence was permitted to be given to the jury, purported
to change this tenancy from year to year, is in the amount of the
monthly payment of rent to be made.
Appellee, by that agreement,
is required to do nothing which he was not already obligated to do as
tenant from year to year, and appellant's duties are in no wise lessened or changed thereby.
It simply purports to obligate appellee to
pay and appellant to receive $50, where they were already obligated,
the one to pay and the other to receive $70. There is thereby neither
in fact nor in presumption of law injury or loss to appellee, or gain or
benefit to appellant.
It follows that it is an agreement, as clearly as
— mere nudum
one can be, without any consideration to support
inand so
pactum
binding upon neither of the parties, and
susceptible of being enforced in this suit. Titsworth v. Hyde, 54 111.
386; Seybolt v. Railroad Co., 95 N. Y. 562, 47 Am. Rep. 75; Davenport V. Society, 33 Wis. 387 Johnson's Adm'r v. Sellers, 33 Ala. 265
Amer.
Eng. Enc.
Gordon v. Gordon, 56 N. H. 170. See, also,
Law, 390, 391, and notes.
impossible to say that the agreement was made as an adjustdoubtful right, for appellee's own tesment of
dispute in regard to
timony shows that there was no fact in dispute between him and apHis testimony
pellant.
only that he claimed that the rent should
be reduced, and that appellant resisted the claim at first, but finally
cannot be held that
yielded to the extent shown by the agreement.
nof
in any way estopped by the agreement, since
appellant
done that which he would
shown that appellee has in consequence of
otherwise not have done, whereby he will be injured
the agreement
be not carried out
nor can be held that the agreement has the effect
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gift as to the difference between the $50 and the $70
because
there was executed no receipt or release for the
month,
per
amount, and there was no proof of any action of the parties equivalent thereto.
The judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are reversed,
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.
an executed

KING

V.

DURKEE-ATWOOD CO.

(Supreme Court of Minnesota,

1914.
1915A,

126

Minn.

452, 148 N.

W.

207,

L. R. A.

235.)

BuNN, J. Defendant was a tenant of plaintiff under a lease from
month to month, the leased premises being a store in Minneapolis and
a flat above it.
The rent was payable monthly in advance. April 4,
1913, defendant caused to be served on plaintiff a notice of the termination of the tenancy of May 31st. Defendant did not, however, vacate the premises on the date named, but continued in possession until
June 30th, when it ceased to occupy the premises for any purpose, and
delivered the keys to plaintiff.
The holding over was with the knowledge and consent of plaintiff, though there appears to have been no
agreement as to the terms upon which the tenant held over. Apparently it was understood that the tenant was to move to new quarters
as soon as they were ready, and that it was not the intention of defendant to continue its occupancy of the leased premises beyond the
month of June.
\
This action was brought to recover the rent of the store for the
months of June, July, and August, and of the flat for tlie months of
June and July. Plaintiff was unable to rent the store in July or AuDefendant admitted its
gust, but occupied the flat the latter month.
liability for the month of June, during which it occupied the premises,
but claimed that it was not liable for the July and August rent. The
trial was to a jury. The court instructed that the tenant's holding over
after May 31st made the notice a nullity, that the case was as if no
notice had been given, and that defendant was liable for the July and
August rent. The verdict was in accord with this instruction. Defendant moved for a new trial, and appealed from an order denying such
motion.
The decision here depends upon whether the instruction of the court
to the jury, above referred to, is a correct statement of the law as appHed to the facts in the case.
1. If the notice was rendered a nullity by the tenant's holding over,
it must be on the ground of waiver.
It is clear, in this state at least,
that a notice by the landlord to a tenant to quit may be waived by the
landlord, and that such notice is thenceforth inoperative.
Arcade Invest. Co. v. Gieriet, 99 Minn. 277, 109 N. W. 250. See note to Wisner
V. Richards, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 160.
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It is doubtless true that a tenant may withdraw or waive a notice to
plainly correct that
quit given by him. And if he does waive
the situation
Clearly, notice was
as
no notice had been given.
necessary in order to terminate this tenancy at will or from month to
month. Rev. Laws 1905,
3332.
Did the tenant, by holding over after the time named in the notice,
There are some statements in textwaive or withdraw such notice?
books, and at least one reported case, that lends support to the view
that such holding over
only presumptive evidence of waiver, and
not
as
matter
of law to continue the tenancy. In Cyc.
does
operate
thus stated
"No continuance of the tenancy
the law
necessarily
tenant continuing in possession after
implied from the mere fact of
for the
the expiration of
notice to quit given by such tenant.
jury to decide whether or not the tenant, by remaining in possession,
24 Cyc. 1336.
intends to waive the notice and continue the tenancy."
text,
But one case
cited as authority for the
and that
Jones v.
Sheares,
K. B.
Ad.
Nev.
H.
W. 43,
M. 428,
L.
El. 832,
153.
This
case
was
of
determined
the
court
Bench
King's
by
(N. S.)
notice, as
in 1836. The lessee of the coal under certain lands gave
do,
that
of
two
under the lease he had
to
at
the
end
years he
right
He continued for two
would deliver possession and end the term.
was claimed by the
months after the two years to work the coal, and
lessor that the notice was thereby waived. The lessee insisted that the
working was not carried on with any view of continuing the tenancy,
that the coal mined was taken from the pillars which supported the
roof, and that this was customary on leaving
mine. It was held that
tine question whether the lessee intended to waive the notice and contenant
tinue the tenancy was for the jury. Mr. Tiffany states that
holding over after the time named in his notice of intention to quit
tenant holding over, but that such
liable in use and occupation as
waiver or
retention of possession does not necessarily operate as
continuance of the former
withdrawal of the notice, so as to effect

a

a

is

2

&

T. 1464.
Tiffany, Landl.
But the decided weight of authority
that
tenant who holds over
furof
his
term
held
liable
as tenant for
after the expiration
may be
tenancy.
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ther period without reference to his actual wishes on the subject, and
tenant for
necessarily without reference to his intention to become
would seem to be
209, and cases cited.
Tiffany,
further term.
immaterial whether the term expires because of the termination of the
notice to quit, given where the lease
period named in. the lease, or by
Graham v. Dempsey, 169
at will.
or where the tenancy
requires
Denio (N. Y.) 113;
Pa. 460, 32 Atl. 408; Conway v. Starkweather,
N. Y. 309. 10 Am. Rep. 609. See, also. Smith
Schuyler v. Smith,
The doctrine
that the landlord
V. Bell, 44 Minn. 524, 47 N. W. 263.
for
or
another
to treat him as
period,
has the option to hold the tenant
He may eject the tenant or
tenant at sufferance.
trespasser or
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resort to summary proceedings to recover possession. But if he sues
for the rent, or demands
he elects to hold the tenant for another
period, and the tenant has nothing to say about it. The rule
perharsh one, but
too well settled generally and by our own
haps
Notes
decisions to justify departing from it. Smith v. Bell, supra;
to Minn. Rep. 427.
The length of the term for which the tenant will be held depends, in
In the
the absence of statute, on the character of his prior tenancy.
case of
prior tenancy from month to month, such as was the tenancy
in the case at bar, the tenant, on the election of the landlord to so treat
Smith v.
him, becomes or remains
tenant from month to month.
in
case
of
Bell, supra. And this would be so as to urban property
holding over without any new agreement after the termination of
lease for
definite tim6. Laws 1901, chap. 31 Rev. Laws 1905,
3333; Gen. St. 1913,
6812; Backus v. Sternberg, 59 Minn. 403, 61
N. W. 335; Ouade v. Fitzloff, 93 Minn. 115, 100 N. W. 660; Slafter
V. Siddall, 97'^Minn. 291, 106 N. W. 308.
See note in 25 L. R. A. (N.
also,
in 28 Am. St. Rep. 639.
S.) 857;
We are forced to the conclusion that defendant, by holding over
after the time specified for the termination of the tenancy, waived the
notice given by it. The trial court was therefore correct in instructing
the jury that the notice was
nullity, and that defendant would be
held just the same as though such notice had never been given.
follows that notice was necessary in order to terminate this
admitted that no such notice was given. Defendant retenancy.
6812), in support of
lies on the statute, before cited (Gen. St. 1913,
its claim that
liable only for one month's rent. But the cases of
Stees v. Bergmeier, 91 Minn. 513, 98 N. W. 648, Quade v. Fitzloff,
and Slafter v. Siddall, supra, are conclusive that this statute affords
defendant no relief.
It was enacted to do away with the harsh rule
tenant under
lease for
whereby, at the option of the landlord,
definite term who remained in possession after the termination of his
If the statlease was bound for another term on the same conditions.
at
all
over
after
the
ute applies
to
termination by notice of
holding
cannot be construed as maktenancy at will or from month to month,
new tenancy for
single month. In Slafter v. Siddall, the lease
ing
was for
year, and the tenant held over without any new agreement.
The statute was applied, and
was held that the tenancy was from
month to month. Clearly, when the original tenancy
one from month
to month, and the tenant has the right to give
month's notice and
relieve himself from further liability, the statute was not intended to,
month only. Indeed,
and does not, convert such tenancy into one for
nullity,
when we have said that the notice was
equivalent to
terminated.
It
at
will
was
not
remained in
the
tenancy
saying that
force until the tenant quit after the expiration of the time named in
new notice.
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It follows that the trial court was correct in holding that the tenancyhad not terminated, and that defendant was liable for the July and
August rent. Order affirmed.*®
ARBENZ

V.

EXLEY, WATKINS

(Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, ] 905.
4 Ann. Cas. 625.)

57

& CO.

W. Va.

580, 50 S.

E.

813,

Brannon, p.

John Arbenz, Sr., made a written lease, but not under seal, to Exley, Watkins & Co., leasing for a term of five years and
three months a brick building, including the vacant parts of certain
lots, in the City of Wheeling, the term commencing January 1, 1896,
and ending March 31, 1902, for the annual rent of $700.00, commencThe lessees took
ing April 1, 1896, payable in monthly instalments.
possession on the first week of January, and occupied the premises,
On September 15, 1898, a fire totally destroyed
paying rent monthly.
said building.
The lessees paid rent for that September and also for
October, but with the rent of October sent a letter, October 31, 1898,
to Arbenz, informing him that they "hereby" vacate tlie premises and
surrender them to him.
In November, 1898, Arbenz sued out a distress warrant against said
lessees for rent from November 1, 1898, to October 31, 1899, and the
same having been levied, a forthcoming bond was given, and in the
proceedings upon it in the circuit court of Ohio county a verdict was
rendered for the plaintiff for $502.54,. after deducting for failure to
repair an engine, and judgment given thereon, and the defendants took
a writ of error.
The defendants filed a plea denying grounds of attachment, and denying all liability for the rent claimed.
The judgment below was affirmed by this Court. Those matters will
appear in 52 W. Va. 476, 44 S. E. 149, 61 L. R. A. 957. On August 1,
1903, Arbenz brought assumpsit against Exley, Watkins & Co. to recover rent accruing later than that recovered in the proceeding above
mentioned — to recover rent for the period beginning November 1, 1899,
and ending December 31, 1902, a period of 38 months, at $700.00 per
year, and the suit resulted in a verdict for only $148.15, that is, for
the two months of November and December, 1899, the court holding
*6 See Mason v. Wierengo's Estate, 113 Mich. 151, 71 N. W. 4S9, 67 Am. St.
Rep. 461 (1897) ; Providence County Sav. Bank v. Hall, 16 R. I. 154, 13 Atl.

122 (1888), ace.

The X. Company was lessee of certain premises at an annual rental under a
lease expiring October 1, 1911. In July, 1910. a receiver was appointed to take
charge of the business of the company. The receiver at once took possession
and paid the rental in monthly installments until April, 1912, when he vacated
In an action for rent accruing after such vacation, on the theory
the premises.
that the holding over had created a tenancy from year to year, the court held
that after October 1, 1911, the receiver was merely a tenant at will. Dietrich
See, also, Blumenberg v. INIyres,
V. O'Brien, 122 Md. 482, 89 Atl. 717 (1914).
32 Cal. 93, 91 Am. Dec. 560 (1867) ; Pusey v. Presbyterian Hospital of Omaha,
70 Neb. 353, 97 N. W. 475, 113 Am. St. Rep. 788 (1903).
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that no recovery could be had after the current year ending that date,
on the theory that the tenancy from year to year then closed. The
few days after the fire the
that
theory against the right to recover
defendants wrote Arbenz the following letter: "Oct. 31st, 1898. Mr.
John Arbenz, City — Dear Sir: We beg to advise that we have vacated, the premises known as west building on 20th street, destroyed
by fire Sept. 15th, last, and hereby surrender possession of same.
Co."
Yours truly, Exley, Watkins
seal to the
On the former writ of error we held that for want of
created
lease the term of years named in
was not created, but that
did
not
that
letter
an estate from year to year, and
said
operate as
notice to quit, to end the tenancy so as to preclude recovery of rent up
1899, the rent in litigation in the former proceeding.
to November
We did not go further, as no later rent was involved in that case. The
Did the tenancy end 31st Dequestion presented in the second suit
cember, 1899?
Did that letter close the tenancy and stop the rent at
that date, the close of the current year 1899?
For the defendants the
contention is, that the letter, accompanied by actual vacation of the
premises, and coupled with the fact that in the circuit court in April,
1899, Exley, Watkins
Co. made defense in the former proceeding
denying liability for rent, operated as
notice to quit and closed the
tenancy 31st December, 1899.
Take the letter. The question rests mainly on it. It states the facts
that the lessees had vacated, and then surrendered possession.
does
not notify that at the end of
current year in future the tenant would
quit, but states present acts or past, vacation and surrender.
The
common law, for centuries, has required, in order that lessor and lessee, under
tenancy from year to year, may close the tenancy of his
own motion, that a notice to quit should be given six months before
the end of the current year. That period or time of notice must be
prior to the close of year. The Code 1899, chapter 93, section
provides that "a. tenancy from year to year may be terminated by either
party giving notice in writing to the other, prior to the end of any
year, for three months, of his intention to terminate the same." That
provision recognizes as still continuing the common law estate of tenancy from year to year and the process of terminating
by notice to
only in requiring written notice and fixing a
quit, and changed
shorter time of notice. Hence
seems that we must appeal to the com-,

;
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mon law and its mode of notice to test the efficiency of the letter as
notice to quit.
does not notify of
future act of quitting, but relies
on past vacation, and present surrender of possession for the effect of
the letter. It does not name
day or time in future when the tenancy
to end. The profession has always regarded tliis as
requisite in
think,
notice to quit,
476, says
Ten.
"Form
Taylor, Landlord
—
or,
The
notice
in
of.
particular day
may be given to quit on
general
terms, at the end of the current year of the tenancy, which will expire
next after the service of the notice; or, in one month after the next
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The latter form of expression is generally used where the
rent-day.
landlord is ignorant of the period when the tenancy commenced ; and
it is preferable even when the commencement of the tenancy is known,
as it provides against any misapprehension of the exact day when the
tenant entered."
1 Washburn
Real Prop. § 810 says: "Notice. The
Time. — Whether a longer or shorter time of notice is required, it must,
in order to be binding, clearly indicate the time when the tenancy is
to expire, and, of course, must be given a sufficient number of days
before the time so indicated."
The particular question before us
whether that letter
bad as
notice to quit because (1)
fuquitting at its date, not notice of
ture quitting at the end of
fails to state
year, and (2) because
time for quitting. Under the above and many other authorities we are
did not end the tenancy at any time. Currier v.
driven to say that
Barker,
Gray (Mass.) 224, and Steward v. Harding, Id., 335; Hanchet v. Whitney,
Vt. 31
Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn.
49 N. W. 327;
Grace v. Michaud, 50 Minn. 139, 52 N. W. 390; Phoenixville v. Walters, 147 Pa. 501, 23 Atl. 776; People v. Gedney, 15 Hun (N. Y.) 475;
Prescott V. Elm,
Gush. (Mass.) 346; Berncr v. Gebhardt, 87 Mo. App.
409; Huntington v. Parkhurst, 87 Mich. 38, 49 N. W. 597, 24 Am. St.
Law, 217, 26 Atl. 688; WaRep. 146; Finklestein v. Herson, 55 N.
Law, 2>2>7, 36 Atl. 665; Godard v.
ters V. Williamson, 59 N.
Rich. (S. C.) 346; Huyser v. Chase, 13 Mich. 98;
Carolina Railroad,
Rollins V. Moody, 72 Me. 135. The text-book writers seem to so requoted from some above. Tiedeman on Real Estate,
gard the law.
218, says that "the notice must not only be given for
certain length
to end, but the estate can only be deterof time before the estate
mined at the expiration of the time during which the tenant may lawcan only be determmed
e. at the end of the rental period
fully hold,
at the end of the year, quarter or month, according as the tenancy
yearly, quarterly or monthly tenancy. The notice must
respectively
to
be sufficiently clear in its terms as to the time when the tenancy
Inst,
241.
notice
Minor's
"The
must
part
expire."
Kerr, R.
end with the period at which the tenancy commences."
Lomax, Dig. 164;
Greenleaf's Cruise, R. Prop.
Prop. 1310.
26.
Chitty on Contracts (Uth Ed.) 485, speaking of English
248,
common law, gays, "The notice must be framed with reasonable cerGray (Mass.)
tainty as to the time of quitting." In Currier v. Barker,
present demand or notice to quit was insuffiwas held that
227,
technistated as follows — "The notice to quit
cient, and the rule
It fixes time at which tenant bound
well understood.
cal, and
time at which the
right to enter at
to quit, and the landlord has
both
are
fixed
and are
The
of
terminates.
by
rights
parties
rent
enter,
to
and
tenant
landlord
decline
the
dependent on it. Should the
quit according to notice, the tenant could no longer be holden for rent,
'deteralthough he had given no notice to the landlord'. The lease
manifest,
mined' by such notice, properly given by either party.
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therefore, that when such consequences depend upon the notice to be
given, the notice should fix with reasonable exactness the time at which
See, also, Walker v.
these consequences may begin to take effect.
Sharpe, 14 Allen (Mass.) 45."
Of course, much force is to be given to the harmonious construction
Still, I have had a question
of the many cases by the text writers.
whether the cases mean only that period of time before the termination
must expire on the day of the close of the year, or that the notice
must designate the time when the tenant intends to quit. Such seems
to be the law. The only question is. Does it fit this case? It does seem
of great force to say, that the only object of notice is to manifest an
intent of one party to end the tenancy, and to inform the other party
of that intent, and that the letter in this case did that. Arbenz surely
knew that his tenants designed to end the tenancy, because he knew
that they had quit the premises and surrendered possession.
What
more could formal notice do? True, it coiild not go to end the tenancy 31st December, 1898, because from the letter to that date was not
three months.
But could it not end the tenancy at close of 1899?
Now, if the tenants had on the date of the letter given notice that they
would quit 31st December, 1899, who would say that it would not be
sufficient? Did not that letter disclose intent to quit? By law it could
not operate to close the tenancy 31st December, 1898, because the time
would be too short.
Would it not operate then as soon as the law
would let
just as formal notice at the date of the letter would have
done, that is, December 31, 1899?
Arbenz had notice of his tenants'^
intention to quit. Why could not that notice operate at the earliest
date the law would allow
to operate?
In addition,
anything more
could in reason be demanded to disclose the intention of the tenants to
stop the tenancy and to inform Arbenz of such intention, we add that
the tenants in April, 1899, in court defended the claim of Arbenz to
rent prior to November, 1899. Their defense was that the building
was destroyed and they had sent that letter and abandoned possession.
But here comes in the answer that the statute, reiterating common
law prevalent for centuries, tells how the tenant must end his tenancy, that is, by written notice.
dangerous for us to insert an exthe landlord had knowledge of the tenant's
ception by saying that
intention,
stands for notice.
may not be improper to say that
have given labored investigation of this case, as other members of the
Court' have, and have been impressed with the weight of the line of
defense just stated, and have struggled to find
justification for adoptas the payment of the whole rent by the defendants, without any
ing
return, works
hardship, which all the members of the Court appreciate; but
am compelled to say that to decide against the plaintiffs
would be to fly in the face of practically
unanimity of authorities
through several hundred years in all quarters where the common law
rules. As applied generally the rule
right as applied in this case,
works hardship but we cannot bend
fixed rule to suit
hard case.
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Counsel says that the statute only requires three months notice
before end of year, and that the written notice need not specify time of
quitting, and that to say so is to read such a requirement into the statute.
We answer that the statute only recognizes as the law already
the requirement of notice to terminate a tenancy from year to year,
and it has not changed the common law requisites of the notice. We
have cited to us the Georgia case of Roberson v. Simons, 109 Ga. 360,
34 S. E. 604, in which the opinion says that while mere abandonment
of premises at the end of the year "might perhaps" be sufficient to
bring home notice to the landlord of the tenant's intention to terminate
the tenancy, "so as to prevent the landlord recovering rent beyond the
year immediately succeeding such abandonment."
This is mere opinion. It was not at all in judgment — a thought in the mind, not maBetz v. Maxwell, 48 Kan. 143,
turely considered for actual judgment.
29 Pac. 147, seems to support the defense in saying that as the landlord from abandonment of possession knew of the intention to quit,
formal notice was useless. This seems to be answered by the quotation above from Currier v. Barker. And it runs counter to the principle which all authorities assert, that mere abandonment will not dis"The
pense with notice, but the tenancy and liability for rent go on.
tenant's liability for rent continues till he puts an end to the estate by
notice, whether he continues to occupy the premises or not." 1 Washb^
R. Prop. § 807. So far is this so, that the landlord may, at his choice,
relet and recover the difference, or let the premises stand vacant. Merrill V. Willis, 51 Neb. 162, 70 N. W. 914; 6 Ballard, R. Prop. § 462;
Schuisler v. Ames, 16 Ala. TZ, 50 Am. Dec. 168; Adams v. Cohoes, 127
N. Y, 175, 28 N. E. 25, is strongly relied on. The judge writing the
opinion does say that knowledge of intention to quit brought home to
the landlord will dispense with formal notice. - In the vast mass of
New York decisions it is readily noticed there are multitudinous conflicts. This case is in conflict with other decisions in New York itself.
It seems that the New York statutes entered into the case.
We do not go on the theory that the former decision is res judicata
to fix right to recover the rent involved in the present case. That case
was for rent for a certain period of time — this for another. That case
is res judicata to establish that it was a tenancy from year to year, but
did not say how long. A case may settle principle, but not be res judicata as to matters not immediately involved.
We are compelled to reverse the judgment and render judgment for
the plaintiff for his demand. Reversed.
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SECTION 6.— CONCURRENT ESTATES

CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY.
An

whether in possession or in remainder, admits of being
so limited that several distinct individuals
may be entitled to conMoreover, several persons may
current and simultaneous interests.
take the same estate concurrently by descent; either at the common
law, in the case of a descent to several sisters, or the representatives of several sisters ; or by a descent in gavelkind among several
brothers, or their representatives ; or by other special custom, among
The several inseveral brothers and sisters, or their representatives.
dividuals so entitled will, according to the nature of the relation subsisting between their interests, be (1) joint tenants, (2) tenants in
common, (3) parceners, also styled coparceners, or (4) tenants by
entireties.
Littleton's definition of joint tenancy is founded upon the mode
in which an estate is limited to joint tenants. If lands are limited to
several persons by name, habendum to them for life, or lives, those
persons are joint tenants during that life or those lives. Litt. sect,
277.
They have an estate pur autre vie in joint tenancy. Similarly,
if lands are limited to several persons by name, habendum to them
and their heirs, those persons are joint tenants in fee simple.
Joint tenancy is equally applicable to fees (excepts fees in general
tail, as mentioned in the next following paragraph), to estates of mere
freehold, and to chattel interests. Litt. sect. 28L
An estate in general tail cannot be limited in joint tenancy, because (except under the circumstances which would make the estate
an estate in special tail) there cannot be a single heir of the bodies of
the donees ; and the right of the several heirs in tail of the several
donees to inherit, secundum f ormam doni, which is expressly conferred
upon heirs in tail by the statute De Donis, would be repugnant to the
right of the surviving joint tenants, upon the death of one, to enjoy
the whole estate, which is the most prominent characteristic of joint
tenancy.
The distinguishing characteristic of joint tenancy is styled jus accrescendi, or the right by survivorship.
Upon the death of one out of
several joint tenants, the survivors hold the whole estate, and nothing
passes to the representatives in title (whether real or personal) of the
deceased tenant.
Litt. sect. 280.
But the practical advantage of the jus accrescendi is not necessarily equal for each of the joint tenants; for two men may have a
joint estate for the life of one of them ; in which case, if that one who
is cestui que vie should die in the lifetime of the other, the estate
estate,
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is determined, whereas, if the other should die in the lifetime of cestui
que vie, the latter has the whole estate and becomes thenceforward
sole tenant for his own life. Co. Litt. 181b. It still remains true, that
each upon the death of the other takes the whole estate; but in the
one case, the whole estate which he takes is reduced to nothing.
The right by survivorship is liable to be defeated by any act which
severs the joint tenancy and turns it to a tenancy in common.
Joint tenants must claim an equal interest by the same title and in
Co. Litt. 189a; Ibid. 299b.
the same right.
Therefore they can only
take by purchase.
And under limitations at the common law, they
must all take simultaneously.
But in limitations by way of use, if the
use is declared jointly to several persons, some of whom are not yet
ascertained or not yet in being, such last-mentioned persons, if and
when they are ascertained or come into being, will be joint tenants with
the others ; and the same rule holds good,, when the interests arise
Co. Litt. 188a ; and Harg, n. 13 thereon ; 2 Prest. Abst. 56.
by devise.
The identi'ty of the interest and title of joint tenants is commonly
analysed into the "fourfold unity" of interest, title, time and possession. 2 Bl. Com. 180-184.
This analysis has perhaps attracted attention rather by reason of its captivating appearance of symmetry
and exactness, than by reason of its practical utility.
It means only,
that each joint tenant stands, in all respects, in exactly the same position as each of the others ; and that anything which creates a distinction either severs the joint tenancy or prevents it from arising.
Blackstone seems not to have adverted to the fact, that the "unity of
time" is not, under the learning of uses and devises, an indispensable
requisite.
Joint tenants are said to be seised per my et per tout; which expression properly refers to two only, two being taken as a type or
pattern for two or more. In one sense each has nothing, and in another
sense each has the whole, nihil per se separatim et totum conjunctim.
In another sense, each has an equal aliquot share;
Co. Litt. 186a.
for
namely,
purposes of alienation, whether total or partial, and for
Ibid. Each can alienate his aliquot share,
purposes of forfeiture.
and can thereby sever the joint tenancy and turn it to a tenancy in
common. Herein joint tenants differ from tenants by entireties, who
are seised per tout only, and not per my ; and of whom, accordingly,
neither can prejudice the right by survivorship of the other to suc2 Bl. Com. 182.
ceed to the whole in severalty.
When two or more
The following point is practically important.
persons are joint tenants for their lives, whether by express limitation or by implication of law, and although the limitation be expressly
to the survivor of them, then, on a severance of the joint tenancy, the
share of each will afterwards be held for his own life only.
Co.
Litt. 191a; 2 Prest. Abst. 63. This is because the words in italics
are mere surplusage, which express nothing which the law would not
without them have implied.
Hence it appears, observes Lord Coke.
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that a severance of the joint tenancy of a lease for lives is beneficial
to the lessor.
In the limitation of a fee simple in joint tenancy, the words above
placed in italics, instead of erring from mere superfluity, are highly
pernicious.
They turn the limitation to a joint freehold for lives, with
a contingent remainder in fee simple to the survivor. Butl. n. 1 on Co.

Litt.

191a.

At

the common law, one or more

joint tenants could not

be compelled

Litt. sect. 290. Voluntary
by the other or others to make partition.
Co. Litt. 169a;
partition between them can be made only by deed.
c.
c. 1, and 32 Hen.
Ibid. 187a. By the statutes 31 Hen.

VIII,

VIII,

right of partition as appertained at common law to coparceners, is given both to joint tenants and to tenants in common.*^
A tenancy in common, though it is an ownership only of an undivided share, is, for all practical purposes, a sole and several tenancy
or ownership ; and each tenant in common stands, towards his own
undivided share, in the same relation that, if he were sole owner of the
whole, he would bear towards the whole.
And accordingly, one
tenant in common must convey his share to another, by some assurance
which is proper to convey an undivided hereditament; and he cannot
so convey by release.
2 Prest. Abst. 77.
A title by tenancy in common may be claimed by prescription. Litt.
sect. 310.
This proves the severalty of the interest.
Tenancy in common may arise in any of the following ways:
(1) By express limitation.
At the common law a gift or limitation contained in the premises
of a deed, which standing by itself would have created a joint tenancy, might be turned to a tenancy in common by express words in
the habendum ; such as, habendum the one moiety to the one and the
other moiety to the other of them. Co. Litt. 183b.
In modern assurances, which are commonly made under the Statute
of Uses, tenancy in common is limited in the habendum, by declaring
the use "as to one equal undivided moiety," or other fractional part, to
one of the persons, with similar declarations in favour of the others
respectively.
Litt. sect. 292.
(2) By the severance of a joint tenancy.
without partition,
severance,
alienation,
Similarly,
through
by
(3)
of the interests of coparceners. Litt. sect. 309.
(4) By construction of law.
Z2, the same

"It is

trtie that, in this court TChanceryl jointenancies are not favoured,
they are a kind of estates that do not make provision for posterity,
neither do I take it that courts of law do at this day favour theni ; althoiigli
Lord Coke says that jointenancy is favoured because the law is against the
division of tenures, but as tenures are many of tlieni taken away, and in a
great measure abolished, that reason ceases, and courts of law incline the same
way with this court."
Eawes v. Hawes, 1 Wils. 1G5 (1747), per Lord HardSee, also, Rigden v. N'allier, 2 Ves. 252, 258 (1751).
But see Goddai'd. v.
wicke.
Ivewis, 25 T. L. R. 813 (1909).
47
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is

a

is

in
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a

a

a

is

a

is

;

4.

a

;

1

3

5

7,

a

(i)

If (contingent) remainder be limited to the heirs of two living persons, not being husband and wife, which remainder must
therefore vest in interest at different times, the respective heirs will
take as tenants in common.
Windham's Case,
at p. 8a,
Rep.
resolution
Roe v. Quartley, T. R. 630.
limitation, in the form of an estate tail, to two persons
(ii) Under
neither married nor capable of lawful marriage, or to three or more
persons, they will take in common. Windham's Case, ubi supra, resolution
Other instances might be specified but in the present state of the
law, they are not material in practice.
There
nothing in the nature or origin of tenancy in common
to import any necessity that the shares taken by the different tenants must be equal; because they hold by several, or different, titles, not by
joint title. Litt. sect. 292. Their shares will, accordingly, be unequal, whenever the circumstances under which their
titles arose were such as to institute any diversity between them.
On an express limitation, unequal shares may be expressly limited;
and then the shares will be unequal from the commencement of tlie
tenancy. When the origin of
tenancy in common
by the severance of
joint tenancy, or by change in the title of coparceners, the
shares will in their inception be equal
but inequality may be subintroduced,
more
than
of
such equal shares becoming
one
sequently
by
united
the same hands.
Parceners, or coparceners, are two or more persons who together
constitute
no heir
single heir; as the daughters, where there
male, in respect to common law lands, and the sons, in respect to
gavelkind lands. Litt. sect. 241, 265.
As to gavelkind, see more at
large Rob. Gav. 138 et seq.
The same rule holds of sisters, aunts,
and other groups of female kinsmen in the same degree, there being
no prior heir male. Litt. sect. 242.
But with respect to gavelkind
lands,
to be observed that, though by the custom of Kent the
rule of coparcenary extends to collateral descents (Rob. Gav. 115), this
not necessarily true of gavelkind lands situated elsewhere; and
a custom to that effect must be proved as
special custom (Co. Litt.
140a, b).
The rule of representation holds good in descents in coparso that the issue of
cenary
person who.
living at the time of the
descent, would have been
parcener, will take in coparcenary along
with the other like persons. But such issue, as respects the amount
of their share, take per stirpes and not per capita. Co. Litt. 164b.
Parceners hold a position intermediate between joint tenants and
tenants in common.
Like joint tenants, they have among them only
one single freehold, so long as no partition
made. Like tenants in
common, they have among themselves no jus accrescendi; but upon
the death of one parcener,
descent takes place of her aliquot
share. And one parcener may at common law convey to another by
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female who, having no sisters, stands in the position of heir, is
the heir and not a parcener.
Litt. sect. 242.
One parcener was, even at the common law, entitled as against
the others to a compulsory partition.
Litt. sect. 241. The intrinof
between
the
shares
union
sic
parceners is shown by the fact that, on
a partition, nothing was held to pass from one parcener to another, and
therefore a partition between them was no purchase to make an alteration in the course of descent.
Voluntary partition might be made between parceners by mere parol
agreement, or by drawing lots, or by reference to the award of arbitrators agreed upon beforehand by all the parties. Litt. sects. 243,

of course styled

244, 246.

The Court of Chancery from very early times exercised jurisdiction in respect to partition, when land holden of the King in capite
descends
upon parceners, one or more of them being under age.
Fitzh. N. B. 256, F; Ibid. 260, B. This jurisdiction, being incident
to the tenure, and a consequence only of the necessity for livery of
the lands out of the King's hand, was practically abolished by 12 Car.
II, c. 24. Suits for partition were also frequently instituted and en
tertained under the court's equitable jurisdiction, when this had
and under this jurisdiction a decree
grown into general recognition;
for partition was regarded as a matter of right, upon proof of title. 2
Com. Dig. 762.
At the common law, upon the death of one parcener, her whole
share descended to her issue.
Tenancy by entireties, occurs, at the common law, when a gift or
conveyance, which, if made to two strangers, would create a joint
tenancy, is made to a husband and wife during the coverture.
Litt.
2 Prest. Abst. 39.
sect. 291, and Lord Coke's comment;
See Co.
Litt. 326a : "Where the husband and wife are jointly seised to them
and their heires of an estate made during the coverture."
The peculiarities of this kind of tenancy arise out of the identity
which the common law imagines to exist between husband and wife.
Litt. sect. 291. It is equally applicable to estates in fee simple, in
fee tail, for the lives of the parties, and pur autre vie. 2 Prest.
Abst. 39.
It constitutes the most intimate union of ownership known to
the law.
A husband, being tenant by entireties of freeholds with
his wife, cannot by any alienation bar her right by survivorship in
any part. Co. Litt. 326a; Doe v. Parratt, 5 T. R. 652, at p. 654.
They are accordingly said to hold per tout et non per my. 2 Bl.
Com. 182. The same rule formerly applied also to forfeiture. Co.
Litt.

187a.

Aig.Prop. — 44
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Husband and wife might be tenants by entireties, as between themof an undivided share; and might, as regards the owners
of the other undivided shares, be either tenants in common or joint
tenants. 3d Ed. by Sweet, pp. 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 2,7Z,
selves,

375,

376,

2>77.

MUSTAIN
(Supreme Court of Illinois,

V.

GARDNER.

190P>.

203

III.

2S4, G7 N.

E.

779.)

BoCGS, J. The appellants are the heirs-at-law of one Ola I. l\Tustain, who departed this life on the Uth day of December, 1900. They
filed a bill in equity in the circuit court of McDonough county against
Sarah A. Gardner and Charles H. Gardner, her husband, for the
partition of lots 3 and 4 in block 5, in Davis' addition to tlie village
of Blandinsville.
The title to the said lots was in one John T. JMustain
at the time of his deadi.
He left a will containing but two clauses,
which are as follows :
"First — It is my will that my funeral expenses and all of my just
debts be fully paid.
"Second — To my beloved daughter, Ola I., and my beloved wife,
Sarah A. Mustain, jointly, I give, devise and bequeath lots three (3)
and four (4), in block five (5), in Davis' second addition to the late
town (now village) of Blandinsville, to them and to tlieir heirs and
assigns forever."
The chancellor construed the second clause of the will to devise
the premises to the devisees therein named as joint tenants, and held
that upon the death of the said Ola I. Mustain the title thereto inured
as an entirety to the said Sarah A. Gardner, nee Mustain, as the surviving joint tenant, and sustained a demurrer to the bill and dismissed
the case.

The only question presented by this record is whether the devisees
took as joint tenants or as tenants in common.
Joint tenancies are
looked upon with disfavor in this State. For this reason section 5 of
the act concerning conveyances (1 Starr. & Cur. Stat. 1896, p. 916,)
was adopted. The section reads as follows: "No estate in joint tenancy in any lands, tenements or hereditaments, shall be held or claimed
under any grant, devise or conveyance whatsoever, heretofore or
hereafter made, other than to executors and trustees, unless the premises therein mentioned shall expressly be thereby declared to pass, not
in tenancy in common, but in joint tenancy; and every such estate,
other than to executors and trustees, (unless otherwise expressly declared as aforesaid,) shall be deemed to be in tenancy in common." **
The devise does not expressly declare that the estate thereby created
48 "American statutes on the subject are of three classes:
(a) Those reversins: the couunon law rule that an estate granted or devised to two or more persons is presumed to create a joint tenancy rather than a tenancy in common;
(b) those destroying survivorship ; (c; those expressly abolishing joint tenancy."
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and devised is an estate in joint tenancy and not an estate in common.
But such a declaration is not indispensable. It is enough if it shall appear from the phraseology of the devise that the testator understood
the nature and incidents of the two estates, and the language employed
be such as to clearly and explicitly show that the premises are not
to pass in tenancy in common.
Slater v. Gruger, 165 111. 329, 46 N.
E. 235. In the absence of an affirmative declaration that the estate
devised is in joint tenancy, an estate in tenancy in common will be
devised, unless it clearly and explicitly appears from the language employed that the testator understood the nature and incidents of the
different estates and intended to create a joint tenancy. The quality
of survivorship is the distinguishing feature of a joint tenancy, and
where the grant or devise expressly imparts that quality to the estate,
as did the deed under consideration in Slater v. Gruger, supra, it will
be deemed effectual to create a joint tenancy, though tlie negation
indicated by the statute be omitted.
The devise under consideration does not, in terms, negative tlie presumption which arises from the statute that it was the intention of
the testator to create an estate in tenancy in common, and does not, in
terms, declare it to be the intent to create a joint tenancy ; nor do we
find anything in the language of tlie devise to indicate that the testator understood the nature and incidents of the different estates, or
either of them, and desired that an estate having the peculiar characteristic of survivorship should pass by the devise.
The word "jointly,"
found in the devise, cannot be accepted as sufficient to show, clearly
and explicitly, that the testator intended that the estate devised should
Tenants in common or coparcenpossess the attribute of survivorship.
ers hold the estate "jointly" until a severance is effected.
Davis v.
Smith, 4 Har. (Del.) 68; Billingslea v. Baldwin, 23 Ud. 115. It is
entirely consistent with the use made by the testator of this word
"jointly" to construe it as indicating only an intent to devise vlie estate
to both devisees, and as it cannot be construed to declare, explicitly
and clearly, the intent that the estate, as an entirety, should inure to
the survivor of the devisees, it cannot avail to take the devise out
of the operation of the statute. The statute must be given effect and
the estate devised declared to be an estate in tenancy in common.
The decree is reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court,
with directions to that court to overrule the demurrer to the bill and
require the defendants to plead, answer or demur thereto. Reversed
and remanded, with directions.*®
Brf'wster on Conveyancing, § 151. The student should consult the statutes
and decisions of his state.
In Ohio the court early refused to recosinize joint tenancies as at common
Sergeant v. Steinlierger. 2 Ohio, ^505, 15 Am. Dec. 553 (1S2()). In Connecla^v.
Whittlesey v. Fulticut the court refused to allow the right of survivorship.
ler, 11 Coini. ,337 (1S36).
4 9 Overheiser v. Lackey, 207 N. Y. 229, 100 N. E. 738, Ann. Cas. 1014C, 229
Case v. Owen.
(1913) : Doran v. Beale. 106 Miss. 305, m South. fi47 (1013), aco.
139 Ind. 22, 38 N. E. 395, 47 Am. St. Rep. 253 (1894), contra.
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WIGGINS.

(Supreme Court of Indiana, 1893. 135 Ind. 178, 34 N. E. 999, 22
41 Am. St. Kep. 422.)'

I* R.

A. 42,

Daili^y, J. This was an action instituted in the court below, in
two paragraphs, in the first of which appellees allege, in substance,
that on and before December 15, 1884, one Lemuel Wiggins was tlie
owner of a certain tract of real estate therein described, containing
eighty acres; that on said day said Lemuel and his wife, Mary, executed and delivered to the appellees a warranty deed, conveying to
them the fee-simple of said real estate; that at the time of said conveyance tlie appellees were, ever since have been, and now are, husband and wife; that said deed conveyed to the appellees the title to
said real estate which they took and accepted, ever since have held,
and now hold by entireties and not otherwise ; that appellees hold their
title to said real estate by said deed of Lemuel Wiggins, and not otherwise; that on the 24th "day of April, 1877, Isaac R. Howard and
Isaac N. Gaston, who were defendants below, recovered a judgment
in the Randolph Circuit Court for the sum of $403.70 and costs,
against one John T. Burroughs and the appellee, Daniel S. Wiggins,
as partners, doing business under the firm name of Burroughs and
Wiggins ; that on May 12, 1886, said Howard and Gaston caused an
execution to be issued on said judgment and placed in the hands of
the appellant, Thornburg, as sheriff of said county, and directed him
to levy the same on said real estate, and that said sheriff did, on the
25th day of May, 1886, levy said execution on said real estate, or on
the one-half interest in value thereof, taken as the property of said
appellant, Daniel S. Wiggins, to satisfy said writ; tliat pursuant to
the levy tliereof said sheriff proceeded by the direction of said Howard
and Gaston to advertise said real estate for sale under said execution
and levy to make said debt, and did, on the 8th day of June, advertise
the same for sale on the 3d day of July, 1886, and will, on said day,
sell the same, unless restrained and enjoined from so doing by the
court; that said Daniel S. Wiggins has no interest in said premises,
subject to sale thereon; that the appellees hold the title thereto as
tenants by entireties, and not otherwise; that the sale of said tract
on said execution would cast a cloud on the appellee's title," etc.
The second paragraph is the same as the first, in substantial averments, except that in this paragraph the appellees set out as a part
thereof a copy of the deed under which they claim title to said real
estate as such tenants by entireties.
The granting clause of the deed is as follows : "This indenture witnessed!, that Lemuel Wiggins and Mary Wiggins, his wife of Randolph county, in the State of Indiana, convey and warrant to Daniel
S. Wiggins and Laura Belle Wiggins, his wife, in joint tenancy," etc.
Appellants separately and severally demurred to each paragraph of
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the complaint, and their demurrers were overruled by the court, to
which the appellants excepted, and, refusing to answer the complaint,
judgment was rendered in favor of appellees on said demurrers.
Appellants appeal, assigning as errors the overruling of said demurrers, and urge that the appellees under the deed took as joint tenants, and hence that the husband's interest is subject to levy and sale
A joint tenancy is an estate held by two or more
upon execution.
persons jointly, so that during the lives of all they are equally entitled
to tlie enjoyment of the land, or its equivalent in rents and profits,
but, upon the death of one his share vests in the survivor or survivors
until there be but one survivor, when the estate becomes one in severIt must always
alty in him and descends to his heirs upon his death.
Such estates may
arise by purchase, and can not be created by descent.
But the
be created in fee, for life, for years, or even in remainder.
be demay
tenancy
estate held by each tenant must be alike.
Joint
law
aims
title.
Our
of
which
the
unity
stroyed by anything
destroys
instruthe
arise,
except by
to prevent their creation and they can not
Griffin v. Lynch, 16 Ind. 396.
ment providing for such tenancy.
The 9th Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 850, says: "Husband and
wife are, at common law, one person, so that when realty or personalty
* * * they take as one person, they
vests in them both equally
take but one estate as a corporation would take. In the case of realty,
they are seized not per my et per tout, as joint tenants are, but simply
per tout; both are seized of the whole, and each being seized of the
entirety, they are called tenants by the entirety, and the estate is an
* * * Estates by entireties may be created
estate by entireties.
by will, by instrument of gift or purchase, and even by inheritance.
Each tenant is seized of the whole, the estate is inseverable — can not
be partitioned ; neither husband nor wife can alone affect the inheritance, the survivor's right to the whole."
This tenancy has been spoken of as "that peculiar estate which arises
upon the Conveyance of lands to two persons who are, at the time,
As to the
husband and wife, commonly called estates by entirety."
general features of estates by entireties there is little room for controversy, and there is none between counsel. Our statute re-enacts the
common law.
Arnold v. Arnold, 30 Ind. 305 ; Davis v. Clark, 26
Ind. 424, 89 Am. Dec. 47L
Strictly speaking, estates by entireties are not joint tenancies. Chandler V. Cheney, 37 Ind. 391 ; Hulett v. Inlow, 57 Ind. 412, 26 Am. Rep.
64; the husband and wife being seized not of moieties, but both seized
of the entirety per tout and not per my. Jones v. Chandler, 40 Ind.
588; Davis v. Clark, supra; Arnold v. Arnold, supra.
It has been said by this court in some of the earlier decisions that
no particular words are necessary. A conveyance which would make
two persons joint tenants will make a husband and wife tenants by the
It is not even necessary that they be described as such or
entirety.
their marital relation referred to. Morrison v. Seybold, 92 Ind. 298;
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Hadlock v. Gray, 104 Ind. 596, 4 N. E. 167; Dodge v. Kinzy, 101
Ind. 102; Hulett v. Inlow, supra; Chandler v. Cheney, supra.
But the court has said that the general rule may be defeated by the
expression of conditions, limitations and stipulations, in the conveyHadlock
ance, which clearly indicate the creation of a different estate.
V. Gray, supra; Edwards v. Beall, 75 Ind. 401.
Having its origin in the fiction or common law unity of husband and
wife, the courts of some States have held that married women's acts,
extending tlieir rights, destroyed estates by entirety, but this court
holds otherwise.
Carver v. Smith, 90 Ind. 222. 46 Am. Rep. 210.^°
And the greater weight of authority is in its favor. Our decisions
hold that neither, alone, can alienate such estate.
Jones v. Chandler,
supra ; Morrison v. Seybold, supra.
There can be no partition.
Chandler v. Cheney, supra.
A mortgage executed by the husband alone is void. Jones v. Chandler, supra.
And the same is true of a mortgage executed by both to secure a
debt of the husband. Dodge v. Kinzy, supra.
And the wife can not validate it by agreement with the purchaser
to indemnify in case of loss arising on account of it. State ex rel.,
v. Kennett, 114 Ind. 160, 16 N. E. 173.
A judgment against one of them is no lien upon it. Barren Creek
Ditching Co. v. Beck, 99 Ind. 247; McConnell v. Martin, 52 Ind. 434;
Orthwein v. Thomas (111.) 13 N. E. 564.
Upon the death of one, tlie survivor takes the whole in fee. Arnold
v, Arnold, supra.
The deceased leaves no estate to pay debts.
Simpson v. Pearson,
Admr., 31 Ind. 1, 99 Am. Dec. 577.
And, during their joint lives, there can be no sale of any part on
execution against either.
Carver v. Smith, supra ; Dodge v. Kinzy,
supra ; Hulett v. Inlow, supra ; Chandler v. Cheney, supra ; Davis v.
Clark, supra; McConnell v. Martin, supra; Cox's Adm'i* v. Wood,
20

Ind. 54.
The statutes extending

the rights of married women have no effect
whatever upon estates by entirety.
Carver v. Smith, supra.
Such estate is, in no sense, either the husband's or the wife's sepThe husband may make a valid conveyance of his
arate property.
interest to his wife, because it is with her consent. Enyeart v. Kepler,
118

Ind.

34.

5 Koulston V. Hall, 66 Ark.
Hiles V. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 30G,
762 (1895) ; BramberiT's Estate,

W. 600, 74 Am. St. Rop. 97 (1S99) ;
X. E. .337, .30 Ia R. A. .30.^, 43 Am. St. Rep.
156 Pa. 628, 27 Atl. 405. 22 I.. R. A. 594. 36 Aiu.
W'ilson v. Wilson. 43 Minn. .398, 45 N. W. 710 (1890),
St. Rep. 64 (1893), aec.
dictuui ; Swan v. Walden, 156 Cal. 195, 103 I'ac. 931, 134 Am. St. Rep. 118, 20
Ann. Cas. 194 (1909). dictum, contra.
In some states, irrespective of statute, the courts hare held there was no
Whittlesev v. Fuller. 11 Conn. .337 (1836); Kerner v.
tenancy by the entirety.
Farmers' &
McDonald, 60 Neb. 663, 84 N. W. 92. 83 Am. St. Rep. 550 (1900);
Merchauts' Nat. Bank v. Wallace, 45 Ohio St. 152, 12 N. E. 439 (1SS7).
305, 50 S.
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The rule that husband and wife take, by entireties was enacted in
this territory in 1807, nine years before Indiana was vested with
statehood, and has been repeated in each succeeding revision of our
statutes. It has tlius been the law of real property, with us, for eightysix years.
Section 2922, R. S. 1881, provides that "all conveyances and devises
of lands, or of any interest therein, made to two or more persons, except as provided in the next following section, shall be construed to
create estates in common and not in joint tenancy, unless it shall be
expressed therein that the grantees or devisees shall hold the same in
joint tenancy and to the survivor of them, or it shall manifestly appear, from the tenor of the instrument, that it was intended to create
,
an estate in joint tenancy."
Section 2923 provides that the preceding section shall not apply to
conveyances made to husband and wife.*^^
Under a statute of the State of Michigan, similar in all its essential
qualities to our own, the court held that "wh^re lands are conveyed, in
fee, to husband and wife, they do not take as tenants in common."

Fisher v. Provin, 25 Mich. 347.
They take by entireties; whatever would defeat the title of one.
would defeat the title of the other. Manwaring v. Powell, 40 Mich.
^

371.

They hold neither as tenants in common nor as ordinary joint tenThe survivor takes the whole. During the lives of both, neithei

ants.

has an absolute inheritable

divided half,
47

interest, neither can be said to own an un241 ; Allen v. Allen,

^tna Ins. Co. v. Resh, 40 Mich.

Mich. 74, 10 N. W. 113.
While the rule of entireties was predicated upon

a fiction, the legislative intent, in this State, has always been to preserve this estate, and
has continued the peculiar statute for this purpose.
Estates by entireties have been preserved as between husband and wife, although
joint tenancies between unmarried persons have been abolished, so as
to provide a mode by which a safe and suitable provision could be
made for married women. Carver v. Smith, supra.
"Where a rule of property has existed for seventy years and is sustained by a strong and uniform line of judicial decisions, there is but
little room for the court to exercise its judgment on the reasons on
which the rule was founded.
Such a rule of property will be over51 In Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402, 33 Am. Rep. 266 (1S7S), a statute providing that no instrument of conveyance shall be construed to create a joint
tenancy unless it is e.xpressly provided that the property shall t-e so held, was
not considered to affect the creation of tenancies by the entireties, for they are
not joint tenancies.
But where the statute provided that "conveyances to two or more in their
own right create a tenancy in connnon, unless a contrary interest is expressed"
it was held that a conveyance to two who were husband and wife created a
tenancy in common. Bader v. Dyer, 106 Iowa, 715, 77 N. W. 469, 68 Am. St.
Rep. 332 (1898).
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ruled only for the most cogent reasons and upon the strongest convicIt is evident that the Legislature of 1881
tions of its incorrectness.
did not intend to repeal the statutes establishing tenancies by entireties.
They simply intended to enlarge, in some particulars, the separate power of the wife, which existed already under the acts of 1852
and the year following. * * * 'j^ ^j^ ^ot abolish estates by entireties as between husband and wife, but provided that when a joint
deed was made to husband and wife, they should hold by entireties,
" Carver v. Smith,
and not as joint tenants or tenants in common.'
supra.
In Chandler v. Cheney, supra, the court says : "It was a well settled
rule at common law, that the same form of words, which, if the grantees were unmarried, would have constituted them joint tenants, will,
they being husband and wife, make them tenants by entirety. The rule
has been changed by our. statute above quoted."
The whole trend of authorities, however, is in the direction of preserving such tenancies, where the grantees sustain the relation of husband and wife, unless from the language employed in the deed it is
manifest that a different purpose was intended.
Where a contrary intention is clearly expressed in the deed, a different rule obtains.
"A husband and wife may take real estate as joint tenants or tenants in common, if the instrument creating the title use apt words for
the purpose."
Com., Shars1 Preston on Estates, 132; 2 Blackstone's
wood's note; 4 Kent's Com. side page 363; 1 Bishop on Married
Women ; Freeman on Co-Tenancy, section 12 ; Fladung v. Rose, 58

Md.

13, 24.

"And in

case

of devise and conveyances to husband and wife to-

gether, though it has been said that they can take only as tenants by
entireties, the prevailing rule is that, if the instrument expressly so
provides, they may take as joint tenants or tenants in common."
Stewart on Husband and Wife, sections 307-310;. Tiedeman on Real Property, section 244.
"And as by common law it was competent to make husband and
wife tenants in common by proper words in the deed or devise," etc.
Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa, 310; Brown v. Brown, 133 Ind. 476,
32

N. E.

1128, 33

N. E.

615.

So it seems that husband and wife may, by express words, be made
tenants in common by gift to them during coverture."
McDermott v.

French, 15 N. J. Eq. 80.
In Hadlock v. Gray, 104 Ind.

596, 599, 4 N. E. 167, 168, a conveyhad been made to Isaac Cannon and Mary Cannon, who were
husband and wife, during their natural lives, and the court says :
"The language employed in the deed under examination plainly declares that Isaac and Mary Cannon are not to take as tenants by entirety. This result would follow from the provisions destroying the
ance
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for this is the grand and essential characteristic of such
* * The whqle force of the language employed is
opposed to the theory that the deed creates an estate in fee in the husband and wife."
The court further says : "It is true tliat where real property is conveyed to husband and wife jointly and there are no limiting words
in the deed, they will take the estate as tenants in entirety. * * *
there may be conBut while the general rule is as we have stated
survivorship,

*

it,

a tenancy.

is

it,

if

it

is

r

a

a

it

if

a

It

a

is

a

ditions, limitations, and stipulations in the deed conveying the property, which will defeat the operation of the rule. The denial of this
proposition involves the affirmation of tlie proposition that
grantor
powerless to limit or define the estate which he grants, and this would
conflict with the fundamental principle that
grantor may for himself, determine what estate he will grant.
To deny this right would
be to deny to parties tlie right to make their own contracts.
seems
quite clear, upon principle, that
grantor and his grantees may limit
and define the estate granted by the one and accepted by the other,
although the grantees be husband and wife."
The court then adopts the language of Washburn, supra, and Tiedeman, supra.
In Edwards v. Beall, supra, the court hold that when lands are
granted husband and wife, as tenants in common, they will hold by
moieties, as other distinct and individual persons would do.
If, as contended by appellees, the rule prevail that the same words
which,
the grantees were unmarried, would have constituted them
joint tenants, will, they being husband and wife, make them tenants
would result as
by entireties, then
logical conclusion that husband
and wife cannot be joint tenants. Because, by this rule, words, however apt or appropriate to create a joint tenancy, would, in
conveyance to husband and wife, result in an estate by entireties — joint tenancy would be superseded or put in abeyance by the estate created
by law — tenancy by entirety,
The result of such reasoning would be to destroy the contractual
power of the parties where this relationship between the grantees
shown to exist. Any other process of reasoning would carry the rule
too far, and we must hold
modified to the extent here indicated.
wife,
Husband and
notwithstanding tenancies by entirety exist as they
did under the common law, may take and hold lands for life, in joint
tenancy, or in common,
appropriate language be expressed in the
deed or will creating
and we know of no more apt terms to create
a joint tenancy in the grantees in this estate than the expression "convey and warrant to Daniel S. Wiggins and Laura Bejle Wiggins in
joint tenancy."
These words appear in the granting clause of the deed conveying
the land in question, and the estate accepted and held by the grantees
thereby limited, and they hold not by entireties but in joint ten-
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A joint tenant's interest in property is subject to execution.
ancy.
Freeman on Ex. 125.
Judgment reversed, with instructions to the circuit court to sustain
tlie demurrer to each paragraph of the complaint.^^

PEGG

V.

PEGG.

(Supreme Court of Michigan, 1011. 1G5 INIich. 228, 130 N. W. 617, 33 L. It. A.
[N. S.] 1G6, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 925.)

Bird, J.

The bill of complaint in this cause calls for the construction of a deed made by Davis Pegg to Mary C. Pegg, the complainant.
Davis Pegg was the husband of complainant, and in the year
1897 he conveyed to her, by warranty deed in the usual form, an undivided one-half interest in and to the following described premises :
■''The west half (W. i/^) of the southeast quarter (S. E. 14) of section three (3), and the west half (W. 1/0) of the northeast quarter (N.
E. ^/4) of section ten (10), in Grand Traverse county."
In the deed, between the granting and the habendum clauses, is inserted the following clause :
"The objection and purpose of this deed is to convey to said second party such an interest in said land that the parties hereto will

it

;

it

it,

have an estate in entirety, and that the same shall survive and vest in
the survivor as a full and complete estate."
The deed was recorded in 1901, and in 1902 Davis Pegg died.
Complainant is in possession of the premises, and claims title thereto
on the theory that she and her husband owned the premises as tenants by entirety, and, she being the survivor, she takes the whole.
It
is claimed by the defendants, who are brothers and children of deceased brothers of Davis Pegg, that Davis Pegg and complainant were
the owners of the premises as tenants in common, and that upon his
decease an undivided one-half of tlte premises descended to them.
The defendants demurred to the bill, and the trial court made an order overruling
arid they have appealed from that order.
Davis Pegg conveyed an undivided one-half interest in said premHe retained an undivided one-half interest thereises to complainant.
this
was
in. After
done they had distinct titles, and were therefore
The title remained that way until Davis Pegg
tenants in common.
died. The question is, then: What became of his undivided half?
did
would descend to his heirs, the defendants
and
Ordinarily

a

a

5
2

See Hetzel v. Lincoln, 216 Pa. 60, 64 Atl. 866 (1906), Tvhere the conveyman and woman, by name, "jointly," the grantees being in fact
ance was to
husband and wife.
In iMoriis v. McCarty, 158 Mass. 11, 32 N. E. 938 (1S93), lands were conveyed
to A. and B., wife of A., "as tenants by the entirety aud not as tenants in comThe case arose upon
mon." A. and B. were not in fact husband and wife.
writ of entry by the heirs of B. against A. to recover an undivided one-half of
the premises.
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unless the clause wliich was inserted carried it in a different direction.
Complainant contends that it did not so descend,
because she and her husband owned the premises as tenants by the
entirety, and were made such by said deed, and that now, as survivor
of her husband, she is entitled to the whole of said premises.
In order to own the whole, as survivor, she would have to be seised
of the whole before his death. Whatever vested in her as survivor
must have been owned by both her and her husband before his death,
As neither one was
and each must have been seised of the whole.
seised of the whole, but both held by distinct titles, they could not have
been tenants by the entirety.
Neither were they tenants by entirety
of the undivided half conveyed to her, because Davis Pegg reserved
The
no interest in the undivided half he conveyed to complainant.
deed as a. whole cannot be construed as creating a tenancy by entirety,
because the law was not followed in creating it. At the common law,
tlie unities of time, title, interest, and possession had to be observed
in creating such an estate.
Blackstone's Commentaries, book 2, p.
182; 1 Washburn on Real Property (6th Ed.) p. 529. See suggestion
in Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich. 338, 43 N. W. 984, 18 Am. St. Rep.
SO descend,

404.

J.,

a

is

it

a

is

it.

The common law has remained unchanged in this respect and is
In the attempt to create an estate by entirety, in the
now in force.
case under consideration, neither the unity of time nor title was observed. The estate was not created by one and the same act, neither did
vest in them at one and the same time. If the clause inserted can be
said to be
part of the habendum of the deed, as
argued, then that
seeks to enpart of the habendum must fail, on the ground that
granted, into an estate of entirety,
large an estate in common, which
without complying with the rules of law for the creation of such an
estate.
By reason of these considerations,- the deed must be read as
The deed created
tenancy in
though the clause had been omitted.
common between complainant and her husband, and upon his decease
his undivided one-half of the premises descended to his heirs.
The order of the trial court, overruling defendants' demurrer, will
be vacated and set aside, and an order entered sustaining the demurrer.
OstrandBr, C.
and Hooker, Moore, and McAlvay, JJ., concurred in the result."^'

;

a

33 William Wright, the owripr of prpmises, executed
deed thereof containing the following: "Between William Wriglit, of the township of North Fhiins
in Ionia connty and state of Michigan, of the first part, and William Wright
and Elizabeth Wright [his wife] jointly, the survivor to have full ownership,
William died, and later Elizabeth.
of the same place, of the second part."
"VMiat were the rights of the heirs of each? Wright v. Knaiip, l.s;{ Mich. 656, 150
See. also, Michigan State Hank of l::aton Rapids v. Kern
N. W. 315 (101.5).
lu re Klatzl's Estate (N. Y.) 110 N. E. ISl (1915/.
dMich.) 155 N. W. 502 (1015)
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The bill

2

FONDA.

v.

of New York,

(Part

1821.

5

Johns. Ch.

388.)

seeks to call the defendant to an ac-

of Jellis Fonda, deceased, and, also,
count, as executor of
as executor of the estate of Henry V. Fonda, deceased, and, generally,
to make him account as trustee, acting- for and on behalf of the plaintiffs, in the management and disposition of the estate, real and personal, of Henry V. Fonda.
The defendant admits himself to have been the acting executor of
the estate of his father, Jellis F., and is ready to account for the personal estate, and the rents and profits of the real estate which he may
have received. The great contest in the case is as to the character in
which he acted, and the responsibilities which he has incurred, in respect to the estate, real and personal, of his brother Henry V.
the estate

p

*

*

*

The bill charges that the defendant received, in March, 1799,
the government of this state $6,500, as a compensation for the
extinguishment of the right derived from Jellis F. to 2,000 acres of
land in the Royal Grant, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to a moiety
of that sum, with interest. The defendant adm.its that the sum received was $6,250, but he claims title to the whole of it ; and contends,
in the first place, that his father, Jellis F., was only entitled, in his lifetime, to 1,000 acres, inasmuch as Brant Johnson, who sold him the
2,000 acres, owned only a moiety of
and that the other moiety bebrother of B. Johnson. He contends, in
longed to William Johnson,
the second place, that his brother Henry, by his deed of the 3d of
May, 1794, conveyed to him in fee, and absolutely, without any reservation or trust, his* interest in the 1,000 acres, for the consideration
of £100., and which consideration was paid by deed from the defendant to Henry, of the date of the 24th of April, 1794, of two lots in
the Royal Grant, and containing the like consideration.
2.

a

a

it,

from

6*

ted.

is

it

is

is

is

It

to be observed, as we proceed, that the defendant and his brother Henry were joint and equal residuary devisees of their father, JelHs
Fonda.
reason to believe that the deed of the 24th of April, was
There
not given as the consideration of the deed of the 3d of May following.
The want of concurrence in dates raises that presumption, especially
In the
left without any explanation.
as that want of concurrence
in proof, by the testimony of Simon Veeder, who
next place,
took the acknowledgment of the deed of the 3d of May, and delivered
the deed over to the defendant on the same day^ that Henry observed,
at the time, that the deed to Jellis F., his father, was deficient. The
certificate of acknowledgment bears date the 31st day of May, 1794, but
The statement of facts is omitted.

Portions of the opinion also are omit-

Ch. 5)
the certificate

April, bears

ESTATES CREATED

of acknowledgment

of the prior

701
deed

of

the 24th

of

date the 2d day of August, 1794, and both the acknowledgments were made before the same judge. The defendant was present when the acknowledgment of the deed of the 3d of May was taken ;

and when the deed was handed to him, he observed that the consideration mentioned in tlie deed was not the value of the property, but he
took the deed in order to save something for the children of his brother,
as his brother was pretty much involved in trouble.
These observations of tlie parties, made at the time of the execution
of the deed, are evidence that the deed was not taken as an absolute
purchase of the right of Henry to the 1,000 acres; and they are evidence that it was taken in trust, and, probably, with a view to facihtate
The
a compromise with the state, according to the charge in the bill.
testimony of Evert Yates and James Lansing shows that the deed of
the 3d of May was not considered by the defendant as an absolute
purchase of the right of Henry, and paid for, by the prior deed of the
24tli of April.
When the executors of Henry met, soon after his
death, the defendant told John Fonda, who asserted Henry's interest
in the money received upon the compromise, that Henry had no such
interest, for his father's title was incomplete, and he had since purchased up the Indian title of William Johnson, and considered it a speculation of his own.
Here was no suggestion that he had actually
bought in the right of Henry, a reply that would naturally have suggested itself, if such had been the fact.
It is also admitted, by the answer, that the title of Jellis F. to the
2,000 acres, had been conveyed by him, in his lifetime, to Abraham
G. Lansing; and that as the title proved partly defective, the defendant
and his brother Henry, as the representatives of their father, had
conveyed to Lansing, in 1793, other lands to the amount of 2,650
acres, derived to them from their father, in lieu of the 2,000 acres ;
and that Lansing had then released his right to the 2,000 acres, to the
defendant and Henry. The 2,000 acres were thus received back into
the funds of the estate, as a substitute for the 2,650 acres which had
been transferred ; and tlie two brothers became equally entitled, as
tenants in common and residuary devisees of Jellis F., to all the right
and interest, in law and equity, of their ancestor to the 2,000 acres.
The defendant, afterwards, on the 29th of May, 1795, purchased of
Moses Johnson, the heir of William Johnson, for $600, his right and
title to 1,000 acres, being part and parcel of 2,000 acres originally purchased by Jellis F. from Brant Johnson. The question, then, is, whether the defendant did not make that purchase for the joint benefit of
himself and his brother Henry. If the deed of the 3d May, 1794, was
given to the defendant, in trust for the purpose of facilitating the acquisition of a good title, then the purchase from Moses Johnson was
in trust for their joint benefit. The defendant has not interposed and
pleaded the statute of frauds against setting up a trust by parol, in
opposition to the deed of the 3d of May, 1794; and we are left at lib-
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erty to judge of the truth and effect of the parol proof. I am strongly
inclined to believe, that the deed was taken in trust, and that the subsequent purchase from iMoses Johnson was made in trust, and that
Henry was equally interested in the settlement made with the state,
in March, 1799; and that his representatives are entitled to a moiety
of the payment received from the state, (which payment amounted to
after allowing to the defendant, the payment he made to
$6,500,)
IMoses J., and a just indemnity for his expenses in procuring the satisfaction from the state.
In some cases, says Littleton, (sec. 307,) a release to one joint tenant
shall aid the joint tenant to whom it was not made, as well as him to
I will not say, however, that one tenant in comwhom it was made.
mon may not, in any case, purchase in an outstanding title for his exclusive benefit. But when two devisees are in possession, under an
imperfect title, derived from their common ancestor, there would seem,
naturally and equitably, to arise an obligation between them, resulting
from their joint claim and community of interests, that one of them
should not affect the claim, to the prejudice of the other. It is like
an expense laid out upon a common subject, by one of the owners, in
which case all are entitled to the common benefit, on bearing a due
proportion of the expense. It is not consistent with good faith, nor
with the duty which the connection of the parties, as claimants of a
common subject, created, that one of them should be able, without the
consent of the other, to buy in an outstanding title, and appropriate
the whole subject to himself, and thus undermine and oust his companion. It would be repugnant to a sense of refined and accurate justice.
It would be immoral, because it would be against the reciprocal
obligation to do nothing to the prejudice of each other's equal claim,
which the relationship of the parties, as joint devisees, created. Community of interest produces a community of duty, and there is no real
difference, on the ground of policy and justice, whether one co-tenant
buys up an outstanding incumbrance, or an adverse title, to disseise
and expel his co-tenant.
It cannot be tolerated, when applied to a
common subject, in which the parties had equal concern, and which
created a mutual obligation, to deal candidly and benevolently with
each other, and to cause no harm to their joint interest.
I have no
doubt, therefore, that in a case like the present, and assuming what
the evidence warrants us to assume, that the deed of May, 1794, was
taken by the defendant for trust purposes, that the purchase from
Moses Johnson ought, in equity, to enure for the common benefit, sub* * *
ject to an equal contribution to the expense.""
55 See Matthews v. Bliss, 22 Pick.
(Mass.) 48 (1839) ; Kennedy v, De Trafford,
[1897J A. C. ISO, where under a power of sale in a mortgage the mortgaged
premises were sold to one of the two tenants in common who had mortgaged
the premises.
Lord Hers&hell said: "But then it is said that the mere fact

that Kennedy was co-owner with Dodson of this property creates such a relationship between them that the one co-owner could not take this property and
hold it for himself, but that the other co-owner is entitled on equitable grounds
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PIGGOTT.

(Supreme Court of Indiana, 1883.

94

Ind.

14.)

'pj^g question which next demands conElliott, J.^®
sideration may be tlius stated : Is one who brings a partition suit,
holding, at the time, a deed from an assignee in bankruptcy conveying
two-thirds of the land, and holding, also, a certificate issued upon a
sale on a decree of foreclosure embracing all the land, estopped by a
decree rendered in the partition suit, awarding to him two-thirds of the
land and to the defendant one-third from asserting the title subsequently acquired by a deed excepted pursuant to the certificate of sale.
The right conferred on the holder of the certificate of sale was not
title
to the land ; it merely invested him with a lien on the land, which
a
might ripen into a title by the failure of the debtors to redeem the land
within tlie time prescribed by law. State ex rel. v. Sherill, 34 Ind. ^7 ;
Davis V. Langsdale, 41 Ind. 399; Hasselman v. Lowe, 70 Ind. 414;
Felton V. Smith, 84 Ind. 485 ; Wilhite v. Hamrick, 92 Ind. 594. When
the partition suit was commenced, the plaintiff in that suit was not the
owner of all the land, but was the owner of two-thirds, which was
properly set oflf to him. The title which he acquired to all the land
was a subsequent one.
It is settled that a decree in partition operates only upon the title
held at the time the suit was instituted, and has, ordinarily, no effect
upon a title subsequently acquired. Miller v. Noble, 86 Ind. ^27 ; Crane
V. Kimmer, 77 Ind. 215; Avery v. Akins, 74 Ind. 283, see page 290;

*

Arnold

A

*

v. Cutterbaugh,

decree in partition

*

92

Ind.

403.

does not create title

it merely severs possession
and awards to each tenant his share in severalty. Kenney v. Phillipy,
91 Ind. 511; Miller v. Noble, supra ; Utterback v. Terhune, 75 Ind. 363 ;
Teter v. Clayton, 71 Ind. 237; Avery v. Akins, supra.
It results from these settled rules that the decree in partition. does
not estop the appellant from asserting tlie title acquired under the deed
issued on the decree of foreclosure.
The title which a plaintiff is ordinarily required to set forth in the
;

to have it declared that the benefit of one linlf of that purchase should be his.
*
*
*
My Lords, DO authority has been cited in support of such a proposition.
Tlie only authority, if it can be so called, which has been cited is the case before Chancellor Ivent [Van Home v. Fonda. 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) .388 (1821)]:
but he connuences his ol'servatiotis by saying tliat he is not soinp to lay down
lie deals with
a general rule which would be applicable to such a case as this.
tbe jiarticular case, the circunisrances of which were peculiar and of iuiinense
complication, and he certainly does not lay down any rule or doctrine of law
It
which supports tbe argument which has been addressed to your Lordships.
It is enough to say that,
is not necessary to enter into the details of that c:ise.
even if it is to be taken as enunciating a rule of law which would be as applicable in this country as in Amenca, it does not enunciate any rule of law
which would be sufficient for the api)ellant in this case."
Cf. Holmes v. Holmes, 129 Mich. 412, 89 N. \V. 47, 95 Am. St. Rep. 444 (1902).
5 6 Parts of the opinion are omitted.
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complaint in partition is such as will enable him to secure the decree
of partition demanded in his complaint. It is not incumbent upon him
to make an issue settling all questions of title, or all rights of lien
holders, although it is proper for him to do so. If the appellees had
desired to settle all questions in the partition suit, they might, doubtless, have done so, by tendering proper issues ; but they chose to go to
trial on the single question of the right of Elston to a decree of partition, awarding him two-thirds of the land, and tendered no issue
as to his right as the holder of the certificate, issued upon the sale made
on the decree of foreclosure.
Nothing more was embraced in the issues in the partition suit than Elston's right to the two-thirds of the
land, and this was all that was adjudicated.
It was, indeed, all that
could have been properly adjudicated under the issues, for only a
claim to two-tliirds of the land was then asserted.
The application of these legal principles secures a just result in
the present instance. Mrs. Piggott had joined her husband in executing the mortgage sued on in the United States court, was a party to
the suit to foreclose that mortgage, and was, of course, chargeable
with knowledge that the decree covered all the land, that it was unsatisfied when the partition suit was brought, and that the time for
redemption had not then expired.
She could not, therefore, have any
reason for inferring that Elston was asserting a title founded on the
decree, since that would have been a title to the whole, and not merely
two-thirds, of the land. She had full knowledge of the extent of the
title he asserted, and must have known that it embraced only her husband's interest, and was founded on the sale made by the assignee
of her husband, under the order of the Federal court in the bankruptcy
proceedings.
The question which is next encountered may be thus stated : Does
the fact that the appellant, at the time he acquired the certificate of
sale issued on the decree of foreclosure rendered on the mortgage
executed by Albert Piggott, the husband, and Martha J. Piggott, the
wife, held a conveyance for two-thirds of the land from the assignee
in bankruptcy of Albert, the husband, executed after the sale on the
decree, preclude him, the appellant, from asserting against Martha
J., the wife, the title founded on the deed executed upon the foreclosure sale?
Appellee's counsel contend that the appellant is precluded from asserting title under the foreclosure sale, because he was, as they affirm,
a tenant in common with Martha J. Piggott, and could not, therefore,
buy in an outstanding lien and build a title on it. The general rule
that one tenant in common can not, by purchasing
unquestionably
title which will evict his co-tenant. This
an outstanding lien, acquire
rule, however,
subject to many exceptions and obtains only where
the relation of tenants in common exists in strictness, and where the
imIt
relation
such as to require mutual trust and confidence.
sale made by an assignee
possible to perceive how one who buys at
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charged in such a case
of trust and confiThe title is not a common one ;
dence to the wife of the bankrupt.
the interests are not reciprocal, and there is no fiduciary relationship
created. The title is secured by virtue of a judicial sale, and not by
the same instrument, nor from the same source, as that from which
the wife's claim is derived.
There is, we repeat, nothing in such a
case to create relations of trust and confidence, and, therefore, the
reason of the rule applicable to ordinary cases fails, and the time-honthat where the reason of the rule ceases so does the
ored doctrine
rule itself. An examination of the cases will show that we are right
in stating that the reason of the rule
that the relationship
one imposing trust and confidence and requiring the tenants not to assume
Mr. Freeman says
positions of hostility.
"If their interests accrue at different times, and under different instruments, and neither has superior means of information respecting*
the state of the title, then either, unless he employs his cotenancy to
secure an advantage, may acquire and assert
superior outstanding
title, especially where the cotenants are not in joint possession of the
Freeman, Cotenancy
155; Roberts v. Thorn, 25
Part.
premises."
Tex. 728, 78 Am. Dec. 552 Rippetoe v. Dwyer, 49 Tex. 498 King v.
Rowan, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 675 Matthews v. Bliss, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 48;.
Frentz v. Klotsch, 28 Wis. 312; Reinboth v. Zerbe, etc., Co., 29 Pa.
139; Brittin v. Handy, 20 Ark. 381, 7Z Am. Dec. 497.
not to be forgotten that the wife was bound both by the decree
and the mortgage, and the case is, therefore, altogether different from
one where the lien
created by the act of the law, as for taxes, or
where the encumbrance was created by
former owner through whom
both parties claim title. In such cases the burden
common one.
In the present case the burden rests alone on one of the tenants.
This
so by virtue of her own act creating
and by force of the
decree directing the execution of the lien by sale of the property.
Here, then, we find an essential element not found in cases to which
the general rule
ordinarily applied.
The wife, as against the mortgagee, owned
mere equity of redemption. Kissel v. Eaton, 64 Ind. 248; Haggerty v. Byrne, 75 Ind. 499;
Eiceman v. Finch, 79 Ind. 511; Baker v. McCune, 82 Ind. 585; Vermillion V. Nelson, 87 Ind. 194. This equity of redemption had been
barred by the decree of foreclosure, so that nothing remained except
the statutory right of redemption.
This
Eiceman v. Finch, supra.
right was one to be exercised pursuant to law, and the failure to exercise
made the title absolute upon the execution of the sheriff's
deed.
mere mortgage lien was, therefore,
Something more than
bought by the appellant, and he did not buy
by virtue of his position
as
cotenant, nor did his cotenancy give him superior means of knowlNo one could have had greater knowledge than Mrs. Piggott,
edge.
Aig.Peop. — 45
the husband's interest becomes

is

it,

a
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is

it

a

it

a

a
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as that embraced in our general question, with duties
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by whom the mortgage was executed, and against whom the decree of
Here, again, emerges an element pushing
foreclosure was rendered.
the case outside of the general rule.
There was, as already intimated, no obligation resting on the appellant to discharge the lien, for that obligation rested on the mortgagors. This obligation did not arise from the relationship of the parties, because the burden was not a common one, nor was there trust
or confidence. There was, therefore, nothing which, in law or equity,
imposed a duty on the appellant to pay off the mortgage and then sue
for contribution.
As no duty rested on him, and as he did not avail
himself of knowledge or opportunity supplied by his cotenancy, he was
as free to buy as anybody else.
The failure to redeem ensured the
loss of the property to Mrs. Piggott, and whether the judgment plaintiff or his assignee, the appellant, gets the title, can really make no difference to her, for the loss is in either case precisely the same.
Her
Opportunities for knowledge and for action were just the same against
the appellant as against his assignor; she had just as much right to redeem from the one as from the other.
We are well satisfied that this case is not within the general rule
forbidding one tenant in common from buying an outstanding lien and
and that the case assumed in our question
the
building title upon
*
one made by the record. ^^

HURLEY
Judicial Court of

HURLEY.

Massncliusetts,
2

(Supreme

v.

L. R. A.

1SS9.

148 Mass. 444, 19 N.

E.

545,

172.)

a

a

6,

8,

a

a

J.

is

Holmes,
In 1870 the petitioner,
This
petition for partition.
Thomas Hurley, inherited one undivided half of the premises from
On Nohis mother, subject to his father's tenancy by the curtesy.
half,
and
had bedied,
the
father
the
other
which
vember 14, 1879,
separate conveyance, descended to the petilonged to him under
later wife.
tioner and the respondents, two sons of the father by
On September
1879, before the father's death, the premises were
1880, the respondent
sold for taxes to one Capen. On December
Daniel T. Hurley paid Capen the amount necessary to redeem the
release from him.
At that time the respondpremises, and took
&

4

5
7

v. Cooper, SO 111. 221 (1875). contra.
v. Mathiot,
Watts
S. (Pa.) 251 (1S42), one tenant in common purchased the land from the county in which title had been vested by
reason of failure to pay taxes, after the time allowed for redemption had gone
The tenant in common so purchasing was held entitled to said land as
by.
again.st another tenant in common who offered to contribute to the redemption
cost.
But compare Oliver v. Hedderly, 32 Minn. 455, 21 N. W. 478 (1SS4),
where the cotenant who purchased from the purchaser at foreclosure sale, after
the time for redemption had gone by, had made arrangements for such trans-

Bracken

In Kirkpatrick

action with the mortga:;ee before the foreclosure.
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In the spring of 1882, Daniel T.
mother was in possession.
Hurley took possession; the petitioner has never ottered to repaj
any part of the sum paid to Capen ; and the question raised by the
ent's

exceptions is whether Capen's deed to him is a bar to this petition.
There has been some uncertainty as to the extent and grounds
of the principle that a purchase of a tax title by one tenant in common inures for the benefit of all. Frentz v. Klotsch, 28 Wis. 312,,
318; Insurance Co. v. Bulte, 45 Mich. 113, 120, 7 N. W. 707; Rothwell V. Dewees, 2 Black, 613, 618, 17 L. Ed. 309. Some cases dwell
principally on the existence of a fiduciary relation, (Lloyd v. Lynch, 28
Pa. 419, 424, 70 Am. Dec. 137; Van Home v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch.
(N. Y.) 388, 407; Flinn v. McKinley, 44 Iowa, 68; Weare v. Van
Meter, 42 Iowa, 128, 20 Am. Rep. 616; Venable v. Beauchamp, 3
Dana (Ky.) 321, 324, 28 Am. Dec. 74;) while others put the proposition
in the narrower form, that a tenant in common cannot take advantage
of a title created by his own default as against his co-tenant, (Choteau V. Jones, 11 Ih. 300, 322, 50 Am. Dec. 460; Voris v. Thomas,
12 111. 442; Dubois v. Campau, 24 Mich. 360, 368; Lacey v. Davis,
4 Mich. 140, 152, 66 Am. Dec. 524; Downer v. Smith, 38 Vt. 464,
468.
See Piatt v. St. Clair, 6 Ohio, 227 ; Bernal v. Lynch, 36 Cal.
135, 146; Carithers v. Weaver, 7 Kan. 110.)
Undoubtedly, as is said
Dixon,
Lewis,
in
C. ]., dissenting,
20 Wis. 350, 356, it will
Smith v.
by
be found in most of the cases that the party setting up the tax title
was under an obligation to pay the taxes.
It has been held that a tenant in common could purchase a tax title
from a stranger after the period of redemption had expired, and hold
it for his own benefit, (Reinboth v. Improvement Co., 29 Pa. St.
139 ; Keele v. Cunningham, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 288 ; W^atkins v. Eaton,
30 Me. 529, 536, 50 Am. Dec. 637; Coleman v. Coleman, 3 Dana (Ky.)
398, 403, 28 Am. Dec. 86;) and in diis commonwealth it is decided
that he may take an assignment of a paramount mortgage, and rely
on it to defeat a petition for partition, (Blodgett v. Hildreth, 8 AUen,
On the other hand, it has been held that a purchase of a tax
186.)
certificate before the period of redemption has expired, by one wha
is not a tenant in common at the time, will inure to the benefit of the
other tenants in common, if he becomes such before he gets the tax
Flinn v. McKinley, 44 Iowa, 68; Tice v. Derby, 59 Iowa, 312,
deed.
314, 13 N. W. 301.
Compare Sneed v. Atherton, 6 Dana, 276, 279,
Am.
Dec.
32
70.
There are strong grounds for saying that there were no special
fiduciary relations between the petitioner and the defendant in this case.
Their titles were in part derived from different sources. Frentz v.
Klotsch, 28 Wis. 312, 318. According to the bill of exceptions, the
defendant was not in possession when he took the tax deed, (Wright v.
Sperry, 21 Wis. 331, 337,) and he had no interest in the premises when
the tax was assessed, or until after they were sold, while the petitioner owned or>e-half, subject to his father's tenancy by the cur-
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is at least consistent with the facts stated to assume that
the petitioner was not relying on the respondent in any way.
See
j\Iatthews v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 52. Again, it would be pressing the
notion of default very far to say that, although the defendant was
a stranger to the estate at the time of the sale, yet, since he might
have redeemed, he could not found a title on his failure to do so. But
it is unnecessary to decide what would have been the effect if the defendant had taken a conveyance of the tax title to a third person, and
had given the transaction the form of an assignment ; for, whether the
defendant had a right to take an assignment or not, he certainly had
a, right to redeem and pay off the incumbrance.
Pub. St. c. 12, § 49.
58;
56,
See Coughlin v. Gray, 131 Mass.
Langley v. Chapin, 134
Mass. 82; Coxe v. Wolcott, 27 Pa. 154. Which of the two transactions took place may be a question for the jury, under some circumstances.
Coxe V. Wolcott, ubi supra. But, as was said in Watkins v.
Eaton, 30 Me. 529, 534, 50 Am. Dec. 637, a case very similar in
principle to the one at bar, "when a part owner obtains a conveyance
of his own share, and the share or shares of co-tenants, by payment
of the precise amount required to redeem them, he must be presumed,
in the absence of all rebutting testimony, to have done so in the exercise
of a legal right; and in such case the whole so conveyed will be redeemed from the sale."
See Sherwin v. Bank, 137 Mass. 444, 449.
It is plain, on the face of the deed accepted by the defendant Daniel T.
Hurley, that he redeemed the premises in the exerciseof his legal right
so to do ; and it follows that the lien of the tax sale was discharged,
in such a sense that it could not ripen into a legal title as against his
co-tenants, except upon their refusal or neglect to pay their share.
Watkins v, Eaton and Weare v. Van Meter, ubi supra.
Then the question arises whether, as the respondent has paid the tax,
and has not taken the steps to assert and preserve his lien prescribed
But
by Pub. St. c. 12, §§ 63, 64, 65, his rights are not gone altogether.
we think that it would be too harsh a construction of those sections
to hold that they apply to a redemption of the premises after a sale,
We interpret
when the tenant takes a deed which is put on record.
the statute as intended to apply to a payment in the first instance,
when, unless a certificate is filed as provided, there will be nothing in the registry to show the tenant's claim, and when no other
statutory mode of divesting the title of his co-tenants has been set in
motion.
We are of opinion that, although the tax is legally paid, as we have
said, yet the respondent Daniel Hurley is entitled to have the lien
kept alive for his benefit until the petitioner shall have paid his share.
Until that time, the petitioner has no right to the possession of any
part of the land, in equity or at law. Watkins v. Eaton, 30 Me. 529,
535, 50 Am. Dec. 637.
See McCabe v. Swap, 14 Allen, 188, 191 ; Gibson V. Crehore, 3 Pick. 475, 5 Pick. 146, 150; Popkin v. Bumstead, 8
Mass. 491, 5 Am. Dec. 113. Therefore the petition was rightly distesy.
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Pub. St. c. 178, § 3 ; Blodgett v. Hildreth, ubi supra ; Bradley
23 Pick. 1, 8; Hunnewell v. Taylor, 6 Cush. 472; Coughlin
Gray, 131 Mass. 57; Husband v. Aldrich, 135 Mass. 317, 318.

missed.
V.
V.

Fuller,

Exceptions

overruled.

JACKSON
(Supreme Court of North CaroUna, 1908.
[N. S.]

V.

BAIRD.
148 N. C. 29, 61 S.

E.

632, 19

L. R. A.

.591.)

Brown, J. It is admitted that Robert Baird was the owner of the
land in controversy, and that he executed a deed in trust to secure
$150 to S. H. Reid, trustee. After Robert Baird's death the land was
sold by the trustee, who conveyed it to Mrs. Julia D. Shuford for a
consideration of $286 by deed dated May 26, 1898. George Shuford
and his wife, the aforesaid Julia, conveyed the land to defendant
Laura Baird, wife of defendant John Baird, by deed dated May 28,
The trustee's deed to Mrs. Shuford, although dated May 26th,
1898.
recites that the sale took place on May 28th.
It appears that Julia
Baird joined in the execution of the note and deed in trust along with
Robert Baird. The plaintiffs allege that the debt was contracted for
The defendants deny this, and aver that John
■John Baird's benefit.
Baird signed as surety for his father, Robert Baird. The evidence offered upon this point is very meager and tends to prove that the money
borrowed was used in building a house upon the tract of land in controversy, which belonged to Robert Baird.
This case was presented to this court upon the theory that there is
evidence that Shuford bought in the property in trust for Baird, and
that consequently, as Baird is a tenant in common with plaintiffs, the
title he acquired, whether legal or equitable, must inure to the joint
benefit of all. We do not think there is any evidence whatever of a
fraudulent combination between Shuford' and Baird to effect a secret
sale of the property or to suppress bidding, although the testimony of
Judge Shuford may possibly be susceptible of the construction that he
intended the property for Baird, and that he was acting in his interest.
The contention of plaintiffs that John Baird could not acquire the
exclusive title at the sale is founded upon a misapprehension of the
law. The general rule is well settled that one co-tenant cannot purchase an outstanding title or incumbrance affecting the common estate
for his own exclusive benefit and assert such right against his co-tenants; but that rule does not apply under the facts of this case. The
title which was acquired by Shuford, assuming that he acquired it for
Baird, was not an outstanding title adverse to the title of Robert Baird.
It was the title of Robert Baird himself, the common ancestor under
whom all claimed, and the sale was being made under a deed executed
by such ancestor and to pay his debts, which was an incumbrance
on the land when it descended to plaintiffs and their coheir.
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It is held in the state that one co-tenant lawfully may purchase his
co-tenants' share of the common property under execution sale to pay
Likewise, it is held that one of the cothe debt of such co-tenant.
tenants may purchase the entire property at a sale to pay the comBaird v. Baird's Heirs, 21 N. C. 536, 31 Am.
mon ancestor's debt.
Dec. 399. In that case Chief Justice Ruffin says : "It is a very common case that one brother buys at sheriff's sale the undivided estate of
another brother in descended lands, either for the debt of the ancestor,
or that of the brother himself contracted after the father's death ; and
we believe the legality of such a purchase has never been questioned."
Again : "It is not the duty of one heir, or of one tenant in common as
* * * nor
such, to pay the debts of another tenant in common,
to refrain from buying to his own disadvantage, more than it is the
So it is
duty of any other person, wholly unconnected with them."
said by Judge Gaston that "a tenant in common, as such, is not a
trustee for his companion."
Saunders v. Gatlin, 21 N. C. 92.
It is likewise held in England that there is no fiduciary relation
existing between tenants in common, as such, and that a tenant in common of property previously mortgaged, who purchased the entire property at the mortgage sale, was entitled to hold it for his sole benefit.
This is an interesting case, decided by the House of Lords and Privy
Council, in which an elaborate opinion is delivered by Lord Herschell
and concurred in by the other Lord Justices.
See, also, 17 Am. &
cited;
and
Freeman,
Co-Tenancy,
cases
676,
Eng.
also.
§§ 162-165;
Blodgett v. Hildreth, 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 186; Sutton v. Jenkins (at
this term) -147 N. C. 11, 60 S. E. 643.
When the land in controversy descended upon these plaintiffs and
upon their coheir, John Baird, it was incumbered with the mortgage
to Reid made by their ancestor. When that mortgage was foreclosed
in the manner allowed b}'' law, any one of the heirs had a right to purchase the entire estate to protect his own interest, and he would acquire the title discharged of any trust to his coheirs.
There is no
evidence that John Baird agreed to purchase for the benefit of the
other heirs, or endeavored to suppress bidding, or practiced any other
fraud upon his co-tenants.
So far as the record discloses, the sale
appears to have been fairly made by the trustee, and it was open to the
plaintiffs -or any of them to attend and purchase if they so desired.
We think therefore the judgment of nonsuit should be affirmed.
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COLUMBET.

(Supreme Court of California, 1859.

12

Cal. 414,

73

Am. Dec. 550.)

This was an action by one tenant in common against his co-tenant,
who is in the sole possession of tlie premises, to recover a share of the
profits of the estate.
In the Court below, the defendant demurred to the complaint of
the plaintiff, upon the ground that "it does not state facts sufficient
Deto constitute a cause of action."
The demurrer was overruled.
fendant excepted, and subsequently answered.
This Court has considered the question of the sufficiency of tlie complaint, the substance
of which is set out in the opinion of the Court. The judgment of the
Court below is, that the bill be dismissed, and defendant have judg-ment for his costs.
Plaintiff appealed to this Court.
Field, J., delivered the opinion of the Court — Terry, C. J., and

Baldwin, J., concurring.

This action is brought by one tenant in common against his cotenant, who is in the sole possession of the entire premises, to recover
a share of the profits received from tlie estate.
The case was argued
which,
the
demurrer
to
the
upon
complaint,
by stipulation of the parties, was admitted to have been taken on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The complaint avers a tenancy in common between the parties ; the
the
sole and exclusive possession of the premises by the defendant;
receipt by him of the rents, issues, and profits thereof ; a demand by
the plaintiff of an account of the same, and the payment of his share ;
the defendant's refusal ; and that the rents, issues, and profits amount
to $84,000.
These averments, and not the form in which the prayer
for judgment is couched, must determine the character of tlie pleading. The complaint is designated a bill in equity, but the designation
does not make it such.
There are no special circumstances alleged
which withdraw the case from the ordinary remedies at law, and require the interposition of equity. The action is a common law action
of account, and, viewed in this light, the complaint is fatally defective.
It does not aver that the defendant occupied the premises upon any
agreement with the plaintiff, as receiver or bailiff of his share of the
rents and profits. It is essential to a recovery that this circumstance
exist, and equally essential to the complaint that it be alleged. By
the common law, one tenant in common has no remedy against the
other who exclusively occupies the premises and receives the entire
profits, unless he is ousted of possession when ejectment may be
brought, or unless the other is acting as bailiff of his interest by agreement, when the action of account will lie. The reason of tlie doctrine
is obvious. Each tenant is entitled to the occupation of the premises ;
neither can exclude the other; and if the sole occupation by one cotenant could render him liable to the other, it would be in the power
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of the latter, by voluntarily remaining out of possession, to keep out
his companion also, except upon the condition of the payment of rent.
"The enjoyment of the absolute legal right of one co-tenant would thus
often be dependent upon the caprice or indolence of the other. 1 Co.
Lit. 200; 5 Bac. Ab.'367; Willes, 209.
The statutes of 4 and 5 Anne, 16, gave a right of action to one joint
tenant, or tenant in common, against tlie other as bailiff, who received
more than his proportional share of the profits. At common law, the
bailiff was answerable, not only for his actual receipts, but for what
he might have made from the property without willful neglect, (Co.
Lit. 172, a. Willes, 210;) but as bailiff under the statute of Anne, he
was responsible only for what he received beyond his proportionate
share. That statute only applied to cases where one tenant in common received from a third person money, or something else, to which
both co-tenants were entitled by reason of their co-tenancy, and retained more than his just share according to the proportion of his interest. This was held in Henderson v. Eason, Exch. 9 Eng. Law and
Eq. 337. In that case, it was decided that if one of two tenants in
common solely occupies land, farms it at his own cost, and takes the
produce for his own benefit, his co-tenant cannot maintain an action
of account against him as bailiff for having received more than his
share and proportion.
The statute of Anne has never been adopted in this State, nor have
we any similar statute. The case at bar must therefore be determined
upon the principles of the common law.
By them, as we have observed, the action cannot be maintained against the occupying tenant
ufnless he is by agreement a manager or agent of his co-tenant.
The
occupation by him, so long as he does not exclude his co-tenant, is
but the exercise of a legal right.
His cultivation and improvements
are made at his own risk ; if they result in loss, he cannot call upon
his co-tenant for contribution, and if they produce a profit, his cotenant is not entitled to share in them. The co-tenant can at any moment enter into equal enjoyment of his possession : his neglect to do
so may be regarded as an assent to the sole occupation of the other.
On this point, the observations of Baron Parke in Henderson v.
Eason are pertinent, although that case arose under the statute of
Anne : "There are obviously many cases," says the Justice, "in which
a tenant in common may occupy and enjoy the land or other subject
of tenancy in common solely, and have all the advantage to be derived
from
would be most unjust to make him pay anything.
and yet
For instance,
dwelling-house or room
solely occupied by one
tenant in common without ousting the other, or
chattel
used by
CMie tenant in common, and nothing
received,
would be most inequitable to hold that by simple act of occupation or user, without any
agreement, he should be liable to pay
rent, or anything in the nature
of
his
for
to
co-tenant
that occupation, to which, to
compensation,
the full extent to which he enjoyed, he had
perfect right.
ap-
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pears impossible to hold such a case to be within the statute, and an
opinion to that effect was expressed by Lord Cottenham in McMahon
V. Burchell.
Such cases are clearly out of the operation of the statute.
Again, there are many cases where profits are made and are
actually taken by one co-tenant, yet it is impossible to say that he has
received more than comes to his just share. For instance, if one tenant employs his capital and industry in cultivating the whole of the
piece of land, the subject of the tenancy, in a mode in which the money
and labor expended greatly exceeds the value of the rent or compensation for the mere occupation of the land, in raising hops, for example,
which is a very hazardous adventure, and he takes the whole of the
crops, is he to be accountable for any of the profits in such a case,
where it is clear, if the speculation had been a losing one altogether,
he could not have called for a moiety of the loss, as he would have
been enabled to do had it been so cultivated by the mutual agreement
of the co-tenants?
The risk of tlie cultivation, and the profits and
the loss, are his own, and what is just with respect to the very uncertain and expensive crop of hops, is also just with respect to all the
produce of the land, the fructus industriales, which are raised by the
capital and industry of the occupier, and cannot exist without it. In
taking all the produce, he cannot be said to receive more than his
just share and proportion to which he is entitled as tenant in common,
as he receives in truth the remuneration for his own labor and capital,to which a tenant has no right."
The American cases are to the same effect. In Sargent v. Parsons,
12 Mass. 149, the Court said : "The action of account is maintainable
only against a bailiff; and a bailiff can only be one who is appointed
such, or who is made such by the law, which latter instance applies
only to a guardian, who is bailiff of his ward, and who is liable, not
only for rents and profits actually received, but also for those which
he might have received by a proper management of the estate.
One
tenant in common may, by contract, make another his bailiff or receiver; and if he does, he may bring him to account in this form of
action ; and probably, also, to avoid a process considered in some degree troublesome, might sue him in indebitatus assumpsit as on a
promise to account. But this must be for rents and profits actually
received beyond his share ; for, by the common law, no remedy is
given for a mere sole use and occupation by one of the tenants ; for
it is in the power of each tenant at any time to occupy ; and the not
doing it by one would look like an assent that the other should occupy
the whole."
In Woolever v. Knapp, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 265, the defendant had enjoyed the sole possession of a farm for five years, the rent and occupation of which was worth two hundred dollars a year. The plaintiffs
were his cotenants, and brought their action of account. The Court
decided that the action could not be sustained, holding that one tenant
in common who possesses the entire premises, without any agreement
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as to his possession, or any demand 'on their part

with him, is not liable to account in an
action for their use and occupation.
See, also. Nelson's Heirs v. Clay's
Heirs, 7 J. J. Alarsh. (Ky.) 139, 23 Am. Dec. 3S7.
We have treated this case as an action of account at law, but to the
fame result we should come if the proceeding were in equity. There
is no equity in the claim asserted by the plaintiff to share in profits
resulting from the labor and money of the defendant, when he has expended neither, and has never claimed possession, and never been liable for contribution in cases of loss.
There would be no equity in
giving to the plaintiff, who would neither work himself, or subject
himself to any expenditures or risks, a share in tlie fruits of another's
labor, investments, and risks.
The cases to which our attention has been called, in which equity
has sustained an account in favor of one tenant in common, out of
possession, against his co-tenant in possession, for the rents and profits,
are, with some exceptions in the Court of Appeals of South Carolina,
those in which the account was a collateral incident to a claim for
partition, and the rents and profits claimed were due from the defendant as a tenant of the plaintiff's interest, or were received by him when
they belonged to both parties, or were the proceeds of their joint labor
and expenditures.
Thus, in Pope v. Haskins, 16 Ala. 321, the defendant had leased of the complainant his undivided one-third interest in a
lot belonging to the parties as tenants in common, and upon the expiration' of the lease had rented out the lot to a third party, and received
the entire profits, and the bill was filed to obtain an account of the
rents and profits, and for a partition of the property. ,
In Hannan v. Osborn, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 336, the bill was filed for the
'partition and sale of a lot of land, and an account of the rents and profits, and the account directed was of the rents and profits received by
any of the parties, not of the profits made in the use and occupation of
the premises.
In Turner v. Morgan, 8 Ves. 143, the bill prayed partition of a house
at Portsmouth, and an account of the rent, under the following circumstances : The house was decreed to three persons, equally to be divided.
The defendant was tenant of tlie
The plaintiff purchased two-thirds.
house under a lease of (i22) twenty-two pounds a year, and refusing to
raise the rent, the plaintiff brought ejectment for his two-thirds. The
ejectment was defeated, the defendant purchasing the remaining third.
No
Upon this, the bill was filed. The Chancellor allowed a partition.
the
to
of
have
been
made
the
right
plaintiff
upon
to
appears
question
the
the
been
under
lease
and
tenant
account,
;
an
the defendant having
Chancellor observed, in relation to the account, that there was a possible distinction between the time during which the defendant was tenant, and the time since he became owner, but that justice would be
answered by inquiring what would have been a reasonable rent in each
year the account was sought.
to be allowed to enjoy the same
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The doctrine laid down by the Court of Appeals of South Carolina,
as to tlie liability of one co-tenant to another, is believed to be peculiar
In Hancock v. Day, McMul. Eq. (S. C.) 69, 36 Am.
to tliat Court.
Dec. 293, Thompson v. Bostick, McMul. Eq. (S. C.) 75, and Holt v.
Robertson, A'lcMul. Eq. (S. C.) 475, it was held that as between
tenants in common, the occupying tenant is liable for rent of so
much of the premises as was capable of producing rent at the time he
took possession, but not liable for that which was rendered capable by
his labor. The reasons upon which these decisions rest do not commend themselves to our judgment, and are insufficient to overcome the
force of the EngHsh, Massachusetts, New York, and Kentucky authorities.
The. demurrer should have been sustained; but as the same result
was obtained by a judgment rendered for the defendant on the merits
of the case, it will be sufficient to direct the affirmance of the judgment.^*
5 8 See

contra.

Gage v. Gage, 66 N. H. 2S2. 29

All.

543, 28

L. R. A.

829 (1890), semble

The Stat. 4 Anne, c. 16. § 27, has been deemed in some states a part of the
common law, as, for example, in Massachusetts and Maryland. Munroe v.
Luke, 1 Mete. 459 (1840) ; Flack v. Gosnell, 76 Md. SB, 24 Atl. 414, 16 L. R. A.
547, 35 Am. St. Rep. 413 (1892).
In many states there are statutes in varjang
terms giving to one co-owner a remedy along the general lines of the statute of
Anne, against another co-owner. See 1 Stim. Am. St. Law, § 1378.
By chapter 2, § 1 (paragraph 27 of Jones & A. Ann. St. of Illinois, 1913), it is
provided: "That where one or more joint tenants, tenants in common or coparceners in real estate, or any interest therein, shall take and use the profits or
benefits thereof, in greater proportion than his, her or their interest, such person or persons, his, her or their executors and administrators,
shall account
therefor to his or their co-tenant, jointly or severally."
Section 10956 of Howell's Michigan Statutes provides that : "One joint tenant or tenant in common, and his executors or administratoi's, may maintain
an action for money had and received, against liis cotenant, for receiving more
than his just proportion of the rents or profits of the estate owned by them
as joint tenants or tenants in common."
As to whether the rents and profits have been "received" so as to permit use
of the remedy under Stat. 4 Anne, c. 16, or similar statute, see Henderson v.
Eason, 17 Q. B. 701 (1851) ; Sargent v. Parsons, 12 Mass. 149 (1815) ; Woolever
V. Knapp, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 265 (1854) ; Cheney v. Ricks, 187 III. 171, 58 N. E.
59 Cal. 79 (1881).
234 (1900) ; Howard v. Throckmorton,
m West V. Weyer, 46 Ohio St. 66, 18 N. E. 537, 15 Am. St. Rep. 552 (1888),
under a statute which provided that "one tenant in common, or coparcener, may
recover from another his share of the rents and profits received by such tenant
m common or coparcener from the estate, according to the justice and equity
of the case," it was held that a cotenant in possession of the entire common
property could be required to account for his co-owner's share of the reasonable
See Thompson
worth of such occupation, thou2h there had been no ouster.
V. Bostick, McMul. Eq. (S. C.) 75 (3840) ; Early v. Friend, 16 Grat. (Va.) 21.
78 Am. Dec. 649 (1860) ; Hayden v. Merrill, 44 Vt. 336, 8 Am. Rep. 372 (1872)
ace.
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693.)

The defendant filed a declaration in set-off on an acContract.
count annexed for two fifths of the cost of repairs of a machine shop
in Lowell : and the only question in dispute in the case was the liability
of the plaintiff for any portion of such cost.
At the trial in the superior court, before Reed, J., these facts appeared : Calvert and Aldrich owned the machine shop and the machinery
therein in the proportion of two fifths and three fifths respectively, as
tenants in common ; and Aldrich, having agreed to pay to Calvert a
yearly rent for such occupation of Calvert's two fifths, was in occupation thereof when the building caught fire, and the roof, windows and
one of the floors were so burnt that the machinery was exposed to
injury by the weather. Calvert at this time was in Europe, but had
an agent in Lowell, to whom Aldrich immediately represented the imThe agent confessed such imporportance of repairing the building.
tance, but replied that he had no authority from Calvert to sanction any
repairs, and wrote to Calvert for instructions, who replied, declining
to make any repairs upon the building.
This letter the agent showed
to Aldrich, who meanwhile had caused the building to be repaired.
After the return of Calvert, Aldrich showed him the repairs and stated
to him the expenses thereof, and asked him to contribute his proportion of the same.
But Calvert, not disputing that the expenses were
reasonable, contended that he was not Hable for any portion of them,
and refused to contribute.
On these facts the judge ruled that the defendant could not recover
on his account in set-off, and ordered judgment for the plaintiff; and
the defendant alleged exceptions.
Foster, J. The issue in this action is on an account of one cotenant in common against another to recover from the defendant in
set-off part of the cost of certain needful repairs made by the plaintiff
It is not founded upon any conin set-off upon the common property.
tract between the parties, but upon a supposed legal obligation which,
if its existence were established, tlie law would imply a promise to
fulfill.
The doctrine of the common law on this subject is stated by Lord
Coke as follows: "If two tenants in common or joint tenants be of
an house or mill, and it fall in decay, and the one is willing to repair
the same, and the other will not, he that is willing shall have a writ de
reparatione facienda, and the writ saith ad reparationem et sustentationem ejusdem domiis teneantur, whereby it appeareth that owners
are in tliat case bound pro bono publico to maintain houses and mills
which are for habitation and use of men."
Co. Lit. 200b ; Id. 54b.
And in another place he says : "If there be two joint tenants of a wood
or arable land, the one has no remedy against tlie other to make inclo-
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sure or reparations for safeguard of tlie wood or corn," but if there be
two joint tenants of a house, the one shall have his writ de reparatione
facienda against the other.
This is said to be because of "the preeminence and privilege which the law gives to houses which are for
men's habitation."
Bowles's Case, 11 Co. 82.
In Carver v. Miller, 4 Mass. 561, it was doubted by Chief Justice
Parsons whether these maxims of the common law, as applied to mills,
are in force here, especially since tlie provincial statute of 7 Anne, c. 1,
revised by St. 1795, c. 74.
In Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass. 575, the plaintiff was seised in fee of
and the defendant of the chamber over
a room and the cellar under
head and of the remainder of the house the roof was out of repair
the defendant, being seasonably requested, refused to join in repairing
it; and thereupon the plaintiff made the necessary repairs, and brought
assumpsit to recover from the defendant his proportion of their cost.
This,
will be observed, was not
case of tenancy in common, but
of distinct dwelling-houses, one over the other. Chief Justice Parsons
said: "If there
legal obligation to contribute to these repairs, the
will
We have no statute nor any usage on the
law
promise.
imply
very
subject, and must apply to the common law to guide us." "Upon
full research into the principles and maxims of the common law, we
cannot find that any remedy
provided for the plaintiff." It was not
absolutely decided that an action on the case would not lie, but the
intimations of tlie court on the subject were such that no further atThe relations between tenants in
tempt appears to have been made.
comm.on were not actually involved in this case, and the remarks touching the writ de reparatione were only incidental and by way of illustration.
Doane v. Badger, 12 Mass. 65, was an action on the case. The plaintiff' had
well and pump on the defendant's land and
right to use
the defendant had removed the pump and built over the well, thereby
The judge before
depriving the plaintiff of the use of the water.
whom the case was tried had instructed the jury that the defendant, by
the terms of
deed under which he claimed, was bound to keep the
well and pump in repair, although they were out of repair when he purchased, and, without any previous notice or request, was liable in damages for the injury the plaintiff had sustained by his neglect to make
The court held that no such evidence was admissible under
repairs.
the declaration, the cause of action stated being
misfeasance, and the
proof offered being of
nonfeasance only; also, that
notice and request were indispensable before any action could be maintained.
Mr.
in
the
made
dehvering
opinion
some
observageneral
Justice Jackson
tions, unnecessary to the decision of the cause, the correctness of which
requires
particular examination.
He said that the action on the case
seems to be.
substitute for the old writ de reparatione facienda between tenants in common, and could not be brought until after
request and refusal to join in making the repairs.
He added: "From
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form of the writ in the register, it seems that the plaintiff, before
bringing the action, had repaired the house, and was to recover the
defendant's proportion of the expense of those repairs.
The writ conchides, 'in ipsius dispendium non modicum et gravamen.'
It is clear
that until he have made the repairs he cannot in any form of action
recover anything more than for his loss as of rent, &c., while the house
remains in decay. For if he should recover the sum necessary to make
the repairs, there would be no certainty that he would apply the
IMumford v. Brown, 6 Cow. 475, 16 Am.
money to that purpose."
Dec. 440, a per curiam opinion of the supreme court of New York,
and Coffin v. Heath, 6 Mete. 80, both contain obiter dicta to the same
effect, apparently founded upon Doane v. Badger, without further
research into the ancient law.
If it were true that the writ de reparatione was brought by one cotenant, after he had made repairs, to recover of his cotenant a due proportion of the expense thereof, there would certainly be much reason"
for holding an action on the case to be a modern substitute for the obsolete writ de reparatione.
But all the Latin forms of the writ in the
Register, 153, show that it was brought before the repairs were made,
to compel them to be m.ade under the order of court.
Indeed, this is
implied in the very style by which the writ is entitled, de reparatione
facienda, viz.: of repairs to be made; the future participle facienda
being incapable of any other meaning. This also appears in Fitzherbert.
N. B. 127, where the writ between cotenants of a mill is translated;
the words, in ipsius dispendium non modicum et gravamen, (quoted
by Judge Jackson,) being correctly rendered, "to the great damage and
grievance of him," the said plaintiff. Fitzherbert says : "The writ lieth
in divers cases; one is, where there are three tenants in common or
joint or pro indiviso of a mill or a house, &c., which falls to decay, and
one will repair but the other will not repair the same ; he shall have this
writ against them." In the case of a ruinous house which endangers
the plaintiff's adjoining house, and in that of a bridge over which the
plaintiff' has a passage, which the defendant ought to repair, but which
he suffers to fall to decay, the words of the precept, are, "Command A.
that," &c., "he, together with B. and C, his partners, cause to be reThe cases in the Year Books referred to in the margin of
paired."
Fitzherbert confirm the construction which we regard as the only one
of which the forms in that author are susceptible namely, that the
writ de reparatione was a process to compel repairs to be made under
the order of court.
There is nothing in them to indicate that an action for dam'ages is maintainable by one tenant in common against another because the defendant will not join with the plaintiff in repairing
the common property.
In a note to the form in the case of a bridge,
it is said in Fitzherbert: "In this writ the party recovers his damages,
and it shall be awarded that tlie defendant repair, and that he be distrained to do it. So in this writ he shall have the view contra, if it be
Dut an action on the case for not repairinq^. for tl^<=r- 1-p ^hall recover
the
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but damages." There is no doubt that an action on the case is maintainable to recover damages in cases where the defendant is alone
bound to make repairs for the benefit of the plaintiff without contribution on the part of the latter, and has neglected and refused to do so.
See Tenant v. Goldwin, 6 Mod. 311, s. c. 2 Ld. Raym. 1089; 1 Salk.
21, 360.

The difficulty in tlie way of awarding damages in favor of one tenant
in common against his cotenant for neglecting to repair is, that both
parties are equally bound to make the repairs, and neither is more in
default than the other for a failure to do so. Upon a review of all the
authorities, we can find no instance in England or this country in
which, between cotenants, an action at law of any kind has been sustained, either for contribution or damages, after one has made needful
repairs in which the other refused to join. We are satisfied that the
law was correctly stated in Converse v. Ferre, 11 Mass. 325, by Chief
Justice Parker, who said : "At common law no action lies by one
tenant in common, who has expended more than his share in repairing
the common property, against the deficient tenants, and for this reason
our legislature has provided a remedy applicable to mills." The writ
de rcparatione facienda brought before the court the question of the
reasonableness of the repairs proposed, before the expenditures were
incurred.
It seems to have been seldom resorted to ; perhaps because
a division of the common estate would usually be obtained where the
owners were unable to agree as to the necessity or expediency of reBetween tenants in common, partition is the natural and usupairs.
This is the
the
adequate remedy in every case of controversy.
ally
books,
in
the
and of the
authorities
probable explanation of the few
But if
obscurity in which we have found the whole subject involved.
we have fallen into any error in our examination of the original doctrines of the common law of England, it is at least safe to conclude
that no action between tenants in common for neglecting or refusing to
repair the common property, or to recover contribution for repairs
mad^ thereon by one without the consent of the other, has been adopted among the common law remedies in Massachusetts.
This result is in accordance with the rulings at the trial. Exceptions
overruled.^'*
5 9 "The general doctrine is that one tenant in common can compel his cotenant to share in the expense of necessarj' repairs to the common property, byrequesting him so to do.
the cotenant refuse to join in making such repairs,
he may, after such request and refusal, make them and recover of the cotenant
for his proportionate share. But he cannot, without the consent of his cotenant, make permanent improvements upon the conmion property at the expense of the tenants in common.
If he desires to improve his share of the
common property beyond what his cotenants will consent to, he must resort to
4 Kent, Clom,
a petition for partition, so that he can own his share in severalty.
420 to 42,3 (*.370, 371) ; 1 Wash. R. P. 420, 421 ; Kidder v. Rbrford, 16 Vt 169.
42 Am. Dec. 504 (1844)."
Farrand v. Gleason, 56 Yt. 6-33, a38 (1884). See Ward
V. Ward, 40 W. Va. 611, 21 S. E. 746. 20 L. R. A. 449, 52 Am, St. Rep. 911 (1895).
"A tenant in common cannot, in the absence of an agreement or understand-
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between tenants in common. The
defendant claimed to be allowed for necessary repairs made by him
upon the premises without notice to the plaintiff.
Bingham, J. The plaintiff seeks for an accounting, and to charge
the defendant for the rents and income of lands and buildings thereon.
The parties are tenants in common. The defendant has had the possession and income of the property since December 27, 1883, and has
in that time expended $370 in necessary repairs that materially increased the value of the buildings and the income, and claims to be
The plaintiff had no notice
allowed for the same in the accounting.
of the repairs, and was not requested to join in making them.
If we are to consider it settled at common law that one tenant in
common cannot recover of his cotenant a contribution for necessary
repairs, where there is no agreement or request or notice to join in
making them, or excuse for a notice not being given to join (Stevens
V. Thompson, 17 N. H. 103, 111, Wiggin v. Wiggin, 43 N. H. 561, 568,
80 Am. Dec. 192), because both parties, until this is done are equally
in fault, one having as much reason to complain as the other (Mumford
V. Brown, 6 Cow. 475^77, 16 Am. Dec. 440, Kidder v. Rixford, 16
Vt 169-172, 42 Am. Dec. 504, 4 Kent Com. 371, Doane v. Badger, 12
Mass. 65-70, Calvert v. Aldrich, 99 Alass. 78, 96 Am. Dec. 693), it
does not follow that in this proceeding for an equitable accounting for
the income, a part of which is produced by the repairs, the defendant
may not be allowed for them. There is a wide difference between a
right of action at common law to recover a contribution for repairs,
and a right to have them allowed out of the income, which exists in
In the first case, the party makes
part through their having been made.
them at his will on the common property without the consent or knowledge of his cotenant, while in the last the cotenant recognizes the existence of the repairs, that they have materially increased the income,
but demands the increase and refuses to allow for the repairs.
The
objection, that no privity, no joint knowledge, no authority existed, is
in equity and good conscience waived when the entire income is demanded. It is not unlike the ratification of the acts of an assumed
agent; it relates back to the time of making the repairs, and makes the

Bill in equity, for

an accounting

ing with his cotenant to that effect, make improvements

upon the common
at the expense, in any part, of his cotenant, so as to enable him to
recover any portion of tlie cost or value of the improvements, either in an action brought by him for that puriiose, or by way of set-off in an action brought
We are not speaking of repairs, nor of what
against him by his cotenant.
might be done upon a partition." Walter v. (ireenwood, 29 Minn. 87, 90, 12 N.
W. 145 (1882). But see Nelson v. Leake, 25 Miss. 199 (1852) ; Ruffners v. Lewis, 7 Leigh (Va.) 720, '60 Am. Dec. 51o (.1830).
proi^erty
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He cannot claim the repairs and
a privy from the beginning.
the income, and equitably ignore the expense of making them.
In Moore v. Cable, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 385, a bill for the redempplaintiff

tion of a mortgage, it was decided that the mortgagee should not be
charged for rents and profits arising exclusively from repairs made by
him.
In Jackson v, Loomis, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 168, 15 Am. Dec. 347, an
action of trespass for mesne profits against a bona fide purchaser, it
was held that he should be allowed against the plaintiff, in mitigation
of damages, the value of permanent improvements, made in good
faith, to the extent of the rents and profits claimed by the plaintiff.
Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 5 L. Ed. 547.
In Rathbun v. Colton, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 472, 485, it was decided that
when the rent of a trust estate is increased in consequence of improvements made by the trustee, the beneficiary may be put to his election,
either to allow the trustee the expense of such improvements, or be
deprived of the increase of rent obtained by means thereof ; that the
question was not whether the trustee has a right to make a charge for
the improvements, but whether the plaintiff's were entitled to receive
any benefit for them, they refusing to contribute their share towards
the expense.
It seems, however, that courts of equity have not confined the doctrine of compensation for repairs and improvements to cases of agreement or of joint purchases, but have extended it to other cases where
the party making the repairs and improvements has acted in good
faith, innocently, and there has been a substantial benefit conferred on
the owner, so that in equity and right he ought to pay for the same.
2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1236, 799b ; Coffin v. Heath, 6 iMetc. (Mass.) 76,
80. And in 2 Story, Eq. PI. § 799b, n. 1, it is said : "In cases where
the true owner of an estate, after a recovery thereof at law from a
bona fide possessor for a valuable consideration, without notice seeks
an account in equity as plaintiff against such possessor for the rents
and profits, it is the constant habit of courts of equity to allow such
possessor (as defendant) to deduct therefrom the full amount of all
meliorations and improvements which he has beneficially made upon,
the estate, and thus to recoup them from the rents and profits. * * *
So, if the true owner of an estate holds only an equitable title thereto,
and seeks the aid of a court of equity to enforce that title, the court
will administer that aid only upon the terms of making compensation
to such bona fide possessor for the amount of his meliorations and imThis is on the old,
provements of the estate beneficial to the owner."
established maxim in equity jurisprudence, that he who seeks equity
must do equity. Hannan y. Osborn, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 336 ; Dech's Appeal, 57 Pa. 468, 472 ; Peyton v. Smith, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 325, 349 ;
liibbert v. Cooke, 1 Sim. & S. 552.
The sum of $370 for the repairs may be deducted from the income,
Aig.Pkop. — 46
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if it amounts to that sum ; if not, then

(Part

2

to cancel the income, whatever

it may be.

It does not appear
The claim for insurance should be disallowed.
interest,
or with her
in
her
or
that it was procured for the plaintiff,
arisbenefit
knowledge, or that she has ever received or accepted any

ing from it.
Case discharged.
Blodgett, J., did not sit; the others concurred.

Appeal of
(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

ISSG.

Pvep.

Mr. Chief Justice
31st,

1886.

Mercur

KELSEY.
313

Pa.

119, 5

Atl.

447, 57 Am.

444.)

delivered the opinion of the Court, May

.

This bill was to compel partition of lands in which the appellees
held the undivided five ninths. The Court decreed partition, and
awarded to the appellants four ninths of the land. Their complaint
now is the refusal of the Court to allot to them a proportionate value
of the permanent improvements erected on the land by the appellees.
It may be conceded that there may. be cases of partition in which the
improvements should be held to enure to the benefit of all the co-ten-

It

is well intimated such might be the case where one co-tenant
undertakes to improve the whole estate as by erecting a building cov-

ants.

ering the whole of a city lot. Here, however the improvements appear
to have been such only as were reasonably necessary for the proper
enjoyment of the land by the co-tenant who made them. While the
title was in the wife of the appellee yet he was tenant by curtesy initiate, and therefore in making the improvements, presumably for
himself and his wife, he cannot be treated as a mere stranger or
While a tenant in common is liable to his co-tenant for
volunteer.
repairs absolutely necessary to buildings already erected and in being,
which fall into decay; yet he is not liable to his co-tenant for new
Beaty v.
and permanent buildings- which the latter erects thereon:
353;
Watts,
27
Am.
Dec.
238,
Bordwell, 91 Pa. 438; Crest v. Jack, 3
Hence, although the appellees owned
Dech's Appeal, 57 Pa. 467.
the larger share of the land they were powerless to compel the appelThe appellees must
lants to contribute towards the improvements.
either forego the proper use and enjoyment of their estate or else inThey chose to do
cur the necessary expense to make it productive.
the latter. The appellants paid nothing towards the improvements, and
This is a protheir estate was not injured by the erection thereof.
Due regard must be had to the equitable rights
ceeding in equity.
of each party. Under the facts of this case it would not be a just ap-
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plication of the rules in equity to give to the appellants any share of
the value of the permanent improvements made by the aypellees only.
Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellants.«o

GRISWOLD

V.

JOHNSON.

(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,

This was

an action

of ejectment;

1824.

5 Conn. 3G3.)

tried at New London, October

term, 1823, before Peters, J.
The plaintiff claimed title, by virtue of a deed from Charles Grisde bonis non with the will annexed of Dyar
wold, administrator
In support of the title of Dyar Throop, the plainThroop, deceased.
tiff produced the will of his father, Rev. Benjamin Throop, deceased,
containing the following devise : "To my two sons, Dyar and Benjamin, I give and bequeath to them, and their heirs and assigns, that
part of my farm which lies Easterly of Wolf-swamp brook to be equally divided between them for quantity and quality; and that my son
Dyar have the part next the brook; upon the consideration that they
bear their proportion with my other son, William, in paying what
debts and legacies my personal estate will not answer, if any there
That part of the farm, which lay Easterly of Wolf-swamp
be."
brook, was a tract of about thirty-seven acres; and the administrator's deed to the plaintiff contained about seventeen acres of that part
of such tract lying next adjoining the brook, including the demanded
prem-.ses, and described the land, which it purported to convey by
The plaintiff' claimed, and adduced evidence to
metes and bounds.
prove, that such land was one half in quantity and quality of the tract
of thirty-seven acres. He also claimed, that Dyar Throop took such
The judge instructed
land, under the devise, as estate in severalty.
the jury, that Dyar and, Ben jamin, under the devise, took the tract lying
Easterly of the brook, as tenants in common ; and that the deed, as
it embraced but a part of such common estate, describing it by metes
and bounds, was void, and conveyed no title whatever to the plaintiff.

The defendant claimed, and adduced evidence to prove, that Dyar
The plaintiff inrefused to take any of the land under the devise.
became inthereupon
refusal,
sisted, that admitting such
Dyar's part
therein,
as tentestate estate, and he became vested with an interest
ant in common with the other heirs of the testator ; and that the adLouvalle v. Menard, 1 Gilman (6 Til.) 39, 41 Am. Dec. 161 (1844) ; MarBurns v. Parker
v. Alexander, 26 Ind. 104. 89 Am. Dec. 458 (1866);
(Tex. Civ. App.) 137 S. W. 705 (1911) ; Nelson's Heirs v. Clay's Heirs, 7 J. J.
Marsh. (Ky.) 139, 23 Am. Dec. 387 (1832)-; Cosgriff v. Foss, 152 N. Y. 104, 46
N. E. 307, 36 L. R. A. 753, 57 Am. St. Rep. 500 (1S97) ; Howard v. Morrissey, 7]
Misc. Rep. 267, 130 X. Y. Supp. 322 (1911) ; Moore v. Williamson, 10 Rich. Eq.
(S. C.) 323, 73 Am. Dec. 93 (1858).
60 See

tindale

724

DERIVATIVE

TITLES

(Part

2

ministrator's deed to the plaintiff, whether it contained the whole or
a part of the common estate, conveyed the whole of Dyar's common
The judge instructed the
interest in the land described in that deed.
jury, that if the deed embraced any quantity of the common estate
less than the whole, describing it by metes and bounds, such conveyance was in law null and void.
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant; and the plaintiff
moved for a new trial, for a misdirection.
HosMER, C. J. The plaintiff claims title by the deed from Charles
Griswold, the administrator de bonis non, with the will annexed, of
The Rev, Benjamin Throop made his last
Dyar Throop, deceased.
sons,
will, devising to his
Dyar and Benjamin, a tract of land, of which
"To my two
the premises demanded is part, in manner following:
sons, Dyar and Benjamin, I give and bequeath to them, their heirs
and assigns, that part of my farm which lies Easterly of Wolf-swamp
brook, to be equally divided between them for quantity and quality,
and that my son Dyar have the part next the brook." The above tract
duly
contained thirty-seven acres, and the aforesaid administrator
authorized by the court of probate, gave to the plaintiff' a deed of
seventeen acres thereof, by metes and bounds, of that part of said
The plaintiff
land, which lies next adjoining the brook aforesaid.
insists, that Dyar Throop, under the aforesaid devise, took the land
described in the above deed, as an estate in severalty; while the defendant urges, that the said Dyar and Benjamin had title to the
The court
aforesaid land, east of the brook, as tenants in common.
charged the jury in conformity with the defendant's claim; and that
if the said deed embraced any quantity of said common estate, less
than the whole, by metes and bounds, such conveyance in law was
null and void.
Whether the charge of the court was correct, depends on the answer which the law gives to two questions, namely : Was the estate in
question devised in common to Dyar and Benjamin; and if so, was
the deed invalid.
1. Tenants in common are such as hold by unity of possession, because none knoweth his own severalty, and they occupy promiscuously.
Co. Litt. sec. 292; 2 Bla. Comm. 191. The infallible criterion of this
species of estate, is, that no one knoweth his own severalty ; and hence
the possession of the estate necessarily is in common until a legal partition be made.
But of an estate in severalty the criterion is, that a man
knows, what he has the exclusive right of possessing ; and his possession is sole, because no person has a right to occupy with him. If
an estate is given to a plurality of persons, without any restrictive,
exclusive and explanatory words ; from the nature of the case, they
are tenants in common. 2 Bla. Comm. 192, 180. If the grant superadds, that the property "is to be" equally divided" between them, the
estate is held in common, because these words are inapplicable to a
several estate.
2 Bla. Comm. 192.
Now, in the case under discus-
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sion, the devise to Dyar and Benjamin of a tract of land, constituted a
tenancy in common on the preceding principles ; and this more particularly is evinced, by the words "to be equally divided between
them, for quantity and quality;" an expression indicating a future
division of the property devised. The expression that "Dyar to have
the part next the brook,'' construing the devise in all its parts together,
and not dis jointly, denotes merely this; that when a future division
of the property shall be made, Dyar shall have his portion assigned
him in the place specified. It, however, has no possible effect on the
tenancy in common necessarily arising from the unity of possession ;
nor can it operate to produce such estate, unless by exchanging the
former words, instead of giving them their legal construction.
The
claim, that Dyar had devised to him an interest in severalty, is not a
little extravagant, inasmuch as the wisdom of the wisest would be baffled in the ascertainment of the bounds of this supposed several estate.
The question, what is its quantity, its form, its location, no one except a competent judiciary can resolve. No bounds are mentioned ; no
A court can take coglines are prescribed ; no quantity is given.
nizance of the case; and, in a legal mode, well understood, determine
the quantity, by the quality of the land, and, on principles of justice,
assign a distinct location to each of the devisees ; but there is no competency to the performance of either of these acts, by an individual.
2. The deed of this common estate, by metes and bounds, the one
tenant in common thus attempting to make a partition of the property,
without any co-operation of the other, is, undoubtedly void. The point
is at rest, and not to be questioned. Hinman v. Leavenworth, 2 Conn.
244, n. ; Starr v. Leavitt, 2 Conn. 243, 7 Am. Dec. 268 ; Mitchell v.
Hazen, 4 Conn. 495, 10 Am. Dec. 169; Bartlet v. Harlow, 12 Mass. 348,
7 Am. Dec. 76 ; Porter v. Hill, 9 Mass. 34, 6 Am. Dec. 22.
The determination of the Judge below was correct, and no new trial
is to be granted.®^

CRESSEY

V.

CRESSEY.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Petition for partition, filed in

1913.

215 Mass. 65, 102 N.

E.

314.)

Superior Court on March 17, 1911,
the petitioner alleging that he and the respondents Job H. Cressey,
Anna E. Emerson and Charles A. Newhall were tenants in common
of certain premises on Park Street in Lynn, their undivided shares being as follows : petitioner, eight twenty-eighths. Job H. Cressey, seven
twenty-eighths, Anna E. Emerson, seven twenty-eighths, and Dorman,
trustee for Charles A. Newhall, six twenty-eighths ; and that Arthur
L Newhall, Sarah Effie Newhall, Anna E. Emerson and Charles A.
Newhall claimed to own undivided interests other than as alleged.
61

Smith

Trumbull,

the

V. Benson, 9 Vt. 138, 31 Am. Dec. 614 (1837), ace.
28 Conn. 183, 73 Am. Dec. 667 (1859).

See

Marshall

v.
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McLaughlin, J., without a jury. The maHe ruled that the
stated in the opinion.
him
are
terial facts found by
in the petition,
out
partition should be made in the proportions set
made an interlocutory judgment accordingly, and reported the case for
determination by this court.
RuGG, C. J. This is a petition for partition of land on Park Street
in Lynn. The question at issue is the shares to which the several owners are entitled. The material facts are that in 1899 William M. Newhall died intestate, seized of several parcels of real estate, among them
being the Park Street land which is the subject of this petition, leaving
Title to all these parcels descended to
no widow and seven children.
his seven children as tenants in common. In 1903 on a judgment recovered against one of these children, Sarah E. Newhall, all her right,
title and interest in this Park Street land described by metes and
bounds was sold, and by mesne conveyances the right acquired thereIn March, 1904, William F.
by is now held by Charles A. Newhall.
Newhall' one of the seven children, died unmarried and intestate, leavThereafter
ing as his heirs his six surviving brothers and sisters.
Harriet
A.
Newhall
and
Sarah
E.
was
recovered
against
judgment
in
title,
interest
and
Newhall, on execution in which all their right,
bounds,
the Park Street land on July 27, 1904, described by metes and
was sold, and by mesne conveyances all right under this deed has come
In November, 1905, commissioners were appointed
to the petitioner.
Court
to make partition of the several parcels of real
the
Probate
by
William
M. Newhall at his decease among his six surestate left by
viving children as tenants in common, the share of each being set out in
In making partition the commissioners
the warrant as one sixth.
reported that the Park Street land, which they had appraised at $8,000,
was equal to four shares, and, as in their judgment it could not be
divided advantageously, they set it ofif to Anna E. Emerson, Sarah
E. Newhall, Harriet A. Newhall and Mary I. Cressey, to each one
fourth.
This report was confirmed in March, 1906. Between March
1906, and March, 1910, Mary I. Cressey deceased leaving her share to
The

case was heard by

In March, 1910, Harriet
Job H. Cressey, one of the respondents.
A. Newhall deceased, unmarried, intestate, leaving her four surviving
brothers and sisters as her heirs at law, namely Anna E. Emerson,
Sarah E. Newhall, Charles A. Newhall and Arthur I. Newhall.
The levy of the two executions against Sarah E. Newhall was not

upon the share held by her as tenant in common in the entire real es-

It did not follow the provisions
tate inherited by her from her father.
of R. L. c. 178, sec. 13, 14. As has been pointed out, each was a levy
apon all her title in only one of the several parcels held as tenants
in common, which one was described by metes and bounds. The levy
and sale upon execution of real estate of a debtor operates as a conveyance of the title which the debtor was capable of conveying. One of
several tenants in common cannot as against his cotenants make a sale
Bartlet v.
by metes and bounds of a portion of the common land.
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Mass. 348, 7 Am. Dec. 76; Benjamin v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 196 Mass. 454, 82 N. E. 681, 13 Ann. Cas. 306.
Sale on execution, which is in the nature of a statutory conveyance,
stands upon the same basis as a conveyance by the owner.
The case at bar is governed by Brown v. Bailey, 1 Mete. 254, in
which at page 257 Chief Justice Shaw said, respecting facts precisely
similar to those presented in the case at bar, "such conveyance or levy,
therefore, is good against the grantor and all claiming under him.
If then the other cotenants release, or if upon a partition, their full
shares are set off in other parts of the common estate, and the part
conveyed or levied on is assigned to the party whose share has thus
been conveyed or levied on by metes and bounds, such partition operates by way of estoppel and release, because no one has any longer
The principle that a conveyance by
a fight to contest its validity."
metes and bounds, whether by personal deed or statutory transfer,
by one tenant in common of a portion of the common estate, although
of no efifect against the consent of his cotenants, operates after partition by way of estoppel to transfer the title, has been affirmed repeatedly. De Witt V. Harvey, 4 Gray, 486, 491 ; Barnes v. Boardman,
157 Mass. 479, 32 N. E. 670; Barnes v. Lynch, 151 Mass. 510, 512, 24
N. E. 783, 21 Am. St. Rep. 470; Frost v. Courtis, 172 Mass. 401, 404,

Harlow,

12

N. E. 515.
The application of this principle results in something like a wager
or chance. The grantee gets nothing unless on partition the share
of the grantor should happen to include the parcel described by metes
and bounds in the deed. The grantor loses by estoppel and release all
his interest in the parcel so described if it should happen to be set
52

off to him.
By the partition, the interest of Sarah E. Newhall in the entire estate inherited by her both from her father and her brother, consisting of several parcels, was converted into a one fourth interest in the
Park Street property. Of this one fourth she acquired six out of seven
This
parts by inheritance of the one seventh of her father's estate.
share, or six twenty-eighths, is held by the first levy of execution,
which was made before the death of the brother, from whom she inherited. The one sixth of one seventh which she inherited from him,
constituting one out of seven parts of the one fourth of the Park
Street property, or one twenty-eighth, passed under the second levy,
under which also passed the entire share of Harriet.
The ruling
of the Superior Court as to who are the cotenants and their respective
shares was right.
Interlocutory judgment affirmed."*
62 Cf. Bising v. Stannard,
17 ISIass. 282 (1S21).
Cf. also Butler v. Roys, 25
Mich. 5.3, 12 Am Hep. 218 (1872).
See Eiiipric v. Alvarado, 90 Cal. 444. 27 Pae. .356 (1S91) : Youns v. Edwards,
33 S. C. 404, 11 S. E. 1066, 10 L. R. A. .55, 26 Am. St. Rep. 6S9 (1S90) ; Pellow v.
Arctic Iron Co., 164 Mlcli. 87, 128 N. W. 918, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 573, Ann. Cas.

1912B,

827 (1910).
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v.

(Supreme Court of Ohio, lS2o.

This was

(Part

2

SAYRE.
2 Ohio, 110.)

ejectment, and came before the court upon a case
agreed, adjourned from Greene county. The facts material to be reporteil, are these :
The defendant was in possession of a tract of land which had been
the property of his former wife, by whose death it had descended in
parcenary to her eight brothers and sisters ; with one of the latter
the defendant had again intermarried.
By a judicial proceeding in
the court of common pleas, partition had been made and a separate
part assigned to each by metes and bounds. The lessor of the plaintift
purchased the separate right allotted to three of the heirs, and took
separate deeds from each for so much land specifically described.
Error was afterward brought in the Supreme Court, upon the proceedings in partition, and they were reversed.
The declaration contained several demises ; among others, a separate
one for one undivided eighth part of each of the tracts contained in his
three deeds; and whether he could recover upon these deeds and
an

was the question submitted to the court.
It is well settled that where one joint tenant, or
tenant in common, has ejected, or withheld the possession from his
co-tenant, the person so ejected or held out of possession, may mainTo
tain his ejectment against the ejector or person in possession.
to
then,
necessary
it
is
consideration,
only
determine the case under
the
ascertain whether the lessor of the plaintiflf took anything under
three several deeds referred to in the agreed case, or, in other words,
demises,

Hitchcock, J.

whether he had any interest in the premises in dispute. The grantors
were three of the heirs of the deceased wife of John Sayre, Jr. By
the death of tlieir sister, the interest in the one hundred and fiftyfive acres of land was vested in them and their brothers and sisters as
coparceners, or tenants in common.
It is to be observed, that when
these deeds were executed, partition had been made of the one hundred and fifty acres of land, by judgment of the court of common
pleas, in pursuance of the statute in such case made and provided.
The three parcels which were conveyed to White had been, by this
judgment, aparted and set off to the grantors in severalty. Under the
then existing circumstances, they conveyed nothing more than they
had a legal right to convey.
So long as this judgment remained
in force, the title of the lessor of the plaintiff to the lands to him conveyed, was perfect.
This judgment, however, was subsequently reversed ; and it is necessary to ascertain how far the deeds, which were
before operative, were affected by this reversal.
That the reversal
must in part, at least, defeat the operation or validity of those deeds,
there can be no doubt. The judgment being reversed, tlie parties in
interest could be no more affected by it than if no judgment had beer?
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rendered. Under these circumstances, the decision of this case must
depend upon the solution of these several questions : 1. Can one of
two or more joint tenants, coparceners, or tenants in common, con2. If he can convey his invey his interest in the estate thus held?
held, can he convey it in a
thus
in
the
whole
property
terest or estate
which
purports to convey an
3. Is a deed, or grant,
part merely?
estate in severalty, when the grantor has, in fact, only an estate in
joint tenancy, coparcenary, or in common, void ; or does it convey
the whole interest of the grantor in the premises purporting to be conveyed ?
1. Can one of two or more joint tenants, coparceners, or tenants
in common, convey his interest in the estate thus held?
This is a question about which it is presumed there can be no disSuch conveyances are frequently made, and their validity is not
pute.
In fact, this is one of the most common modes resorted
questioned.
to for destroying a joint tenancy. One joint tenant aliens and conveys his estate to a third person, by \vhich means the joint tenancy is
severed and turned into a tenancy in common.
2. If one joint tenant, etc., can convey his interest or estate in the
whole property thus held, can he convey it in a part merely?
The determination of this question is attended with considerable
This difficulty, however, arises, not so much from any apdifficulty.
parent inconsistency, or impropriety in such grant, as from a possible
inconvenience which might result to the tenant who retains his estate.
One tenant in common may grant his entire interest or estate in a
particular species of property, a tract of land for instance, or he may
grant one-half as a smaller proportion of his interest in the same entire property. If this be correct, no good reason is perceived why he
may not grant his entire interest in a particular part. A. and B. are
seized of a section of land as tenants in common.
It is well established, that A. may grant his entire interest, or estate, in the section,
and the conveyance will be valid.
Upon what principle, then, can it
be said, that if he convey his entire interest in a particular quarter of
such section, such conveyance shall be void? Certainly A. and B.
tenants in common, as aforesaid, might with propriety unite and convey a particular quarter of the section, and a complete title in the
grantee would be vested.
Would not the title of the grantee be equally
valid, if the tenants in common should by separate deeds convey to him
their individual interest in that particular quarter?
This question, it
is believed, must be answered in the affirmative, and if so, it proves
conclusively that one tenant in common may transfer to a third person
his entire interest in a part of the property held in common. Otherwise we run into this absurdity, tljat a deed properly executed, by
one individual, which is an entire -thing, and purports to convey a
specific property, must depend for its validity upon the execution of
a similar instrument by a third person, who is in no way party to the
first. The principal reason assigned why one tenant in common shall
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that by so doing, he may
not be allowed to convey, as before stated
do
great injury to his co-tenant, by compelling him in case of partition, to take his proportion of the estate in small parcels, very much
If such evils would result, they ought possible
to his disadvantage.
does not follow, however, that because one of two
to be avoided.
tenants in common can convey his estate in a part of the property so
held, therefore the rights of his co-tenant are affected. This co-tenant
will still have the same interest in every part, and in the whole of the
property. He can still compel partition, and may have his share of the
property s€t off to him in severalty, in the same manner he could have
done had no conveyance been made.
Such, at least, as at present advised,
in this we are mistaken, the
Jthe opinion of the court, and
not
of
sufificient
objection
force to induce us to adopt any other principle, as applicable to this case, than as before stated.
Is
deed, or grant, which purports to convey an estate in severalty, when the grantor has in fact only an estate in joint tenancy, coparcenary, or in common, void; or does
convey the whole interest
of the grantor in the premises purporting to be conveyed?
to be so construed as,
Every deed
possible, to give effect to the
intention of the parties.
to be construed most strongly against
the grantor.
If the intention of the parties, apparent upon the face
of the instrument, cannot be carried into effect, this object should be
attained as far as
possible. Taking these principles into consideration, and adopting them as correct,
follow^s, that where an individual
undertakes to convey to another
greater interest in the thing conveyed
than what he possesses, the grantee may take that which was in his
A. conveys to B. one hundred acres of land by metes and
grantor.
bounds.
afterward ascertained that C. has title to fifty of the
one hundred acres included within the boundaries.
Will
be said
that B. can take nothing by this deed? On the contrary, all the lands
within the prescribed boundaries, to which A. had title, are, by the
conveyance, vested in B. So far as the deed can have effect, so far
ought. The circumstance that the grantor has attempted to convey
more land than he was possessed of, shall not prevent the deed from
conveying that of which he was possessed.
Upon the same principle,
A. and C. had been tenants in common of the same one hundred
acres of land, and A. had attempted to convey tlie whole in severalty
to B. so far as A. had any interest, that interest would, by the conveyance, have been vested in B.
Thus far the deed would take effect.
Under
B. would become tenant in common with C. in the same
manner he would have done had tlie conveyance from A. been for an
undivided moiety of the land.
These principles being applied to tlie case under consideration,
will be seen that the grantors of "tlie lessor of the plaintiff, although
they had not
several estate in the parcels of land by them to him
conveyed, yet had an interest as coparceners, or tenants in common
with others. That by the deeds of conveyance, this interest, what-
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ever it might be, was vested in the lessor of the plaintiff; and he being kept out of possession by the defendants, the action is well brought,
and the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment.
Let judgment, tlierefore,
be entered accordingly."^

SECTION 7.— REVERSIONS AND REMAINDERS

LEAKE, LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND.

If

tenant in fee simple convey the land to a person for a particular
estate only, as for an estate tail, or for term of life, or of years, there
remains in him and his heirs an estate expectant, as to the possession,
This estate is called
upon the determination of the particular estate.
the reversion, because the land then reverts or returns in possession to
* * *
him or to his heirs.
In like manner, if the tenant of a particular estate convey the land
* * *
for a less estate, he has a reversion left in himself.

The grant of a particular estate, leaving a reversion in the grantor,
creates a tenure between the tenant of the particular estate and the
reversioner.
This tenure is not within the statute of Quia Emptores,
for that statute extends only to alienations in fee simple, preventing
Hence rent reserved
any new tenure arising upon such alienations.
such
a
of
a
estate
is
the
upon
of
nature of rent servparticular
grant
ice, and is attended at common law with the remedy of distress.
And
a grant of the reversion impliedly carries with it all the incidents of
the tenure, as the rent service, if any, unless there be an express ex* * *
ception of such incidents in the grant.
If tenant in fee simple convey a particular estate in the land to one
person, and at the same time another estate, to commence in possession
immediately upon tlie expiration of the particular estate, to another
person, the latter estate is called, relatively to the prior particular esThus, if tenant in fee simple grant to A. for life,
tate, a remainder.
and after the determination of that estate to B. for life, the estate of
B. is a remainder relatively to the estate of A.
So, if the grant be
made to A. for life, and after the determination of that estate to B.
arid to his heirs, B. has a remainder in fee.
In the former example
there is a reversion in fee in the grantor ; in the latter the whole fee
In like manner, several reis disposed of and there is no reversion.
mainders may be created successively in the same land, either leaving
a reversion or with an ultimate remainder in fee.
63

The dissenting opinion of Burnet, J., is omitted.
Matter of Prentiss, 7 Ohio. 129, jit. 2, .30 Am. Dec.

See

hart

Campbell, 50 Mo. 597 (1S72) ; KoLanett v. Preston's
278 (1S4TJ); Stark v. Barrett, 15 Cal. .301 (1S60).
V.

20.3

(1836);
Barn2 Rob. (Va.)

Heirs,
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If a grant be made to A. for life, and after the lapse of a day after
his death to B. for life or in fee, the limitation to B. is not a remainder,
because it does not commence in possession immediately on the determination of the particular estate; it is a hmitation of a freehold estate to commence in f uturo, which in a common law conveyance is void,
and the reversion of A.'s estate remains in the grantor.
Also a limitation which is to take effect in defeasance of a preceding estate, without waiting for the regular determination of that estate
according to the terms of its limitation, is not a remainder ; and such
a limitation is void at common law.
But the preceding particular estate may be made determinable by a conditional limitation, and the
estate limited to take effect in possession immediately upon its determination, whether that happen under the conditional limitation or by
the expiration of the. full term of limitation, is a remainder.
The particular estate and the remainder must be created at the same
time by one conveyance or instrument ; for if the particular estate be
first created, leaving the reversion in the grantor, any subsequent disposition can be effected only by grant or assignment of the reversion ;
which is not thereby changed into a remainder, but still retains its
character of a reversion, to which the tenure of the particular estate
is incident.
A remainder which is certain as to the owner and absolute as to his
estate or interest is a vested remainder ; the remainderman is presently
invested with a portion of the seisin or freehold, the whole fee being
divided into a particular estate and remainder or remainders.
. But a remainder may be limited to a person not yet ascertained, or
to a certain person upon a condition precedent which may not happen
until after the determination of the particular estate; and whilst such
uncertainty lasts, as to the person or the interest, it is described as a
A contingent remainder becomes changed into
contingent remainder.
a vested remainder by the owner becoming certain or tlie condition
happening during the continuance of the particular estate.
According to Fearne: "A contingent remainder is a remainder limited so as to depend on an event or condition which may never happen
or be performed, or which may not happen or be performed till after
the determination of the preceding estate."
And, as he afterwards
explains : "It is not the uncertainty of ever taking effect in possession
that makes a remainder contingent; for to that every remainder for
life or in tail is and must be liable; as the remainderman may die
or die without issue before the death of the tenant for life."
The
present capacity of taking effect in possession, if the possession were
to become vacant, and not the certainty that the possession will become vacant, before the estate limited in remainder determines, universally distinguishes a vested remainder from one that is contingent.
The principle of the common law that the seisin of the freehold can
never be in abeyance, but must always be vested in some determinate
person imposed two rules upon the limitation and operation of con-
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tingent remainders : The first of which rules was that a contingent remainder of freehold must always have a particular vested estate of
freehold to support it.
The other rule resulting from the principle above stated is : That a
contingent remainder must formerly have become vested during the
continuance of the particular estate or at the instant of its determinaIf not then vested, it failed altogether, and the next limitation
tion.
took immediate effect.
The limitation of a contingent remainder for Hfe or in tail, as it conveys no estate, but only a possibility of an estate in a future event,
does not interfere with the limitation of a vested estate of freehold
in remainder ; and upon the contingent remainder becoming vested
during the continuance of the particular estate, the vested remainder
will be postponed in interest.
Where there is a contingent limitation in fee absolute, no estate
limited afterwards can be vested ; but twO' or more several contingent
remainders in fee may be limited as substitutes or alternatives one
for the other, so that one only take effect, and each subsequent limitation be substituted for a former if it should fail of effect; and the
inheritance in the meantime, if not otherwise disposed of, remains in
the grantor and his heirs, or in the heirs of the testator "until the contingency happens to take it out of them. Upon a devise of a contingent
remainder in fee, the fee subject to the contingency will pass as a
vested remainder under the will by a specific or residuary devise.
Randall's Ed., pp. 228, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 236, 237, 243, 244.
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CHAPTER VI
COVENANTS FOR TITLE
NOKE

V.

(Queen's Beuch. 1595.

,

^ ^f
J
lA
^«4r

[

»

y^

AWDER.
Cro. Eliz. 373, 436.)

Covenant. Wherein he shews that one John_King made a lease for
years to A.jd ie defendant, who by deed granted it to Abel, andja;^enq,ni£ d with him ^__yiat-be and his assignees should peaceably enjoy it
Abel grants it to J. S. who grants tlie term to
wi thout interruption.
t he plaintiff,
w ho being ousted by a stranger, brings this action; and
after issue joined upon a collateral matter, and after verdict for the
plaintiff, it was alleged in arresi^_ofJudgment, that this action lay not
for the second assignee, unless -Jie-CQuld shew the deed of the first
c^\ciianl, and of the assignment, and of every mean assignment; for
without deed_none can be assignee to take advantage of a ny cov enant, which cannot commence jwithout deed ; and to that purpose cited
Old Act, 102. and 19 Edw. II. "Covenant," 25. And if one be infeoffed with warranty to him his heirs and assignees, and the feoffee
makes a feoft'ment over without deed, the assignee shall not take advantage of this warranty, because he hath not any deed of assignme nt.
But if he had the deed, it should be otherwise; and to that purpose
vide 13 Edw. III. "Vouch." 17. 3 Edw. III. "Monstrans de Fayts"

Ibid. 44. 13 Hen. VII.
15 Edw. II.
But P opham held, that he shall have a dv antage ._w ith.QU,t ..the, de ed of assignment;
f o r there is a differenc e
^vhere•a covenan t is annexed to a thing, which
of its nature canno t
p ass at the fir st without deed, and where not.
For in the first case,
37.
13.

11

&

Edw.

14.

IV.

Ibid.

the assignee ought to be in by deed, otlierwise he shall not have advantage of the covenant; and therefore he denied tlie case of the
feoffee with warranty ; f or the second , feoffee sh^ll have benefit of he
warranty, although he
oth^not shew the deed of assignment, b u t shew s
tlie deed of the warranty : and so is the better opinion of the books.
And to that opinion the other justices incHned.
Sed adjournatur.
Vide 3 Co. 63.
It was now moved again. And all the Justices agreed, t hat the as s jo'nee shall have an action of covenant without she win g any
deed_2 f
t he assignment:
for it is a covenant which r un s w ith the estate: ^d
^
t he estate being passed without "^eed, the assignee "sfiall have the ben efit of the covenant also: and the executor of the baron, who is assignee in law, who comes in without deed, shall have the benefit of
such a covenant, as appears 30 Edw. 3. in Symkins Simonds' case.
And Popham and Fenner held, th^t a feoffee shall yi

j

w^.

164.

22 Ass. plea 88.

i
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r anty made to his feoffor, without shewing any deed of assignment :
f or the deed of assig;nment is not requisite, nor is it to any purpose to
s hew it ; for it app ears by the book s, th at being shew n, it is not trav ersable by the vouchee . And as a warranty or covenant is not grantnor to be assigned over without the estate; s o when the estat e
akhough it be by parole, the warranty and covenant ensue
Coke
assignee of the estate shall have the bene fit thereof.
and
the
it|
said,
that
Attorney General (who was of counsel with the defendant)
ill
for
the law was clear as you have taken
yet the declaration
he declares, quod cum Johannes King, 10 Eliz. let that to the defendto Abel
ant for years, virtute cujus he was possessed, and granted
to the
by indenture with the covenant, who in 15 KHz. assigned
plaintiff: and further alledgeth, that loiig time before that the said
Eliz.
K. had any thing, one Robert King was seised in fee, viz.
and so seised, died seised in 15 Eliz. and
descended to Thomas King,
who entered upon the plaintiff and ousted him; so he doth not shew
that John King who made the lease had any thing; for Robert King
was thereof then seised.
And then when John King let to the defendant, and he granted his term by indenture, nothing passed but by
then the lessee by estoppel cannot assign any thing over,
estoppel
and then the plaintiff
not an assignee to maintain this action. Sut
K. had at the time of the lease made by him, a lease
admitting that
for
greater number of years, and that Robert King had the freehold, and thereof died seised, and so all might be true which
pleadnot lawful.
ed tlien the entry of Thomas King upon the defendant
And this
So quacumque via data, this action cannot be maintained.
point for the case of estoppel was adjudged in this Court, in the case
of Armiger v. Purcas, in
writ of error.
And all the Court held here, th at was clear upon the matter shewn ,
for the plaintiff ought to have shewn an estat
kat the action lav not
King . ^t the time of the lease and assignment made, or
by descent in
an estate wherebv he might make
leas.^ . and that this was afterwards
nd so confess and avoid the estate in the lessor, otherdetermined
never lies upon the aswise his action of covenant lieth no t: aiid
ignment of an es tat by estopp el. Wherefore they were of opinion
to have then given judgment against the plaintiff; but afterward they
would advise until the next term.
Note. This was continued until Trin. 41 Eliz. and then being miOved
lease by estoppe
again, all the justices resolved, that the assignee of
shall not be
hall not take advantage of any covenant; but that
ntended
lease by estoppel, but
lawful lease.
But no sufficient
then as an entry by
title being shewn to avoid
stranger without title, which
not any breach. Wherefore
was adjudged for
the defendant.^
able,
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BEDDOE'S EX'R v. WADSWORTH.
(Supreme Court of New York, 1S39.

21 Wend.

120.)

Demurrer to declaration. Thi§ was a n action on covenants of jjjztran tv and for^uiet enjoyment , contained i n a deed of land , dated July
7th, 1797, exe cuted by the defendant to John Johnston . Each count
(there being six in all) averred that afterwards, viz. on tlie same day,
the defen dant.by Johnston's direction, and with his conse nt, surrendere d possession of the land to the testator . John Beddoe. who continu£ fl

in possession until Johnston, on the 16th August. 1802. bv indenture, in
consideration of one dollar, therein expressed as in hand paid b y
Beddoe. did *'remise. re lease. And forev er quit claim unto the said Jnh n
Beddoe. h is heir s and assigns forevejr, all the right, title, interest,
claim or demand, which the said John Johnston, &c. had in or to the
said tract, &c. to have and to hold the said tract, &c. unto the said
John Beddoe, his heirs and assigns forever, to his and their own proper
Ea ch count stated an eviction fr om
use, benefit and behoof, &c."
of
the
part
pre mises, while in possession of persons Haimin y nnd pr
Tohn Reddoe. the plamtitt^s testato r, and diirir |cy th^ litAti-m^ ^f t^»
t estator.
The eviction was alleged to have been in virtue of a title
in one Rachel Malin. All the counts except the sixth stated this titl e
t o be paramount to the defendant' s ; and all except the fifth averr ed
t hat the pla intiff^ as executor, had thereby incurred damages and cost s.
The hlth count averred that the testator in his lifetime, and the plaintiff since his death, had been obliged to pay them.
The first and second counts averred th at the defendant's deed to
Jo hnston was given to and received by Johnston-* for and in behalf ni
RpdHop, thp t^st^to^. and for his benefit.
All the counts except the third, concluded as for a breach of the covenant for q uiet enjoymen t only; the third was for a bre arl] nf the
c ovenant of warrant y only.
But the deed as set forth in eadi count
in fact contained cov enants of seisin, o f warranty, f or quiet enjoymen t,
a nd further assurance.
The defendant demurred to each count.
CowEN, J. If the covenants of warranty and for quiet enjoyment
passed by the quitclaim deed from Johnston to the plaintiff's testator,
the right of action sought to be shown by the declaration seems to
be clear in all the counts except the sixth.
Thi s count is defective in
averring
tha
t
the
eviction
by
paramount to that of the
was
a
title
n^t
Webb v. Alexander, 7 Wend. 281 ; Luddington v. Pulver,
deTendant.
6 Wend. 404 to 406; Greenby v. Wilcocks, 2
Johns. 1, 3 Am. Dec. 379 ;
indenture, the assi^ment by the lessor, and the breach.
To^a nlea nllPEp'ng
t hat prior to the making of said lease the lessor had conveyed the premises in
fee and th at thereafter the lessor has no Interest therein, there was a d eiu u ri;e?r" The Seniurrer was sustained.
Palmer v. Ekins, 2 Ld. Raym. 1550 (1728) .
See Cuthbertson v. Irving, 4 H. & N. 471 (1859) ace.
Noke V. Awder was approved in Nesbit v. Montgomery, 1 N. C. 181 (1800),
and in Martin v. Gordon, 24 Ga. 583 (1858).
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Ellis V. Welch, 6 Mass. 246, 4 Am. Dec. 122 ; per Savage, Ch. J., in
Rickert v. Snyder, 9 Wend. 421, 422; 4 Kent's Comm. 479, 3d Ed.
Non constat b nt Rachel Malin mav have proceeded to eviction upon
a right derived from Johnston or the testator himsel f. In the other
five counts, however, there is enough to show that d uring the life
ti me of Beddoe the testator, he either became personally liable on covenants to his grantees as to a part of the premises from which the y
were evicted by a title superior to the defendants , or suffered an in j ury in an eviction of his tenant by a like superior tit le. Then it is
averred either that the plaintiff was compelled to pay damages and costs
as executor, or, according to the fifth count, the testator in his life time
was obliged to pay a part, and the plaintiff another part after his
In either case, the right of action pertained to the testato r
death.
personally.
The covenant was broken by the eviction, and the whol e
d amages were due^ Hosmer, Ch. ]., in Mitchell v. Warner, 5 Conn. 504
to 506, the right to which passed on his death, not to his heir, but to
Hamilton v. Wilson, 4 Johns. 72, 4 Am.
hjs personal representative.

A

covenant real ceases to be such when broken, and no
It would not go to the heir by death, for
the same reason that it could no longer follow the land into the hands
of a devisee or grantee. See Markland v. Crump, 18 N. C. 94, 101, 27
Am. Dec. 230; Kingdom v. Nottle, 1 Maule & Sel. 355; s. c, 4 Maule
& Sel. 53.
This view of the case disposes of all the minor objections raised
There must be judgment for the defendant on the
by the demurrers.
sixth count, and for the plaintiff on all the others, unless either the first
or second point taken by the defendant's counsel is sustainable. These
are each applicable to the remaining five counts.
The first point
that
appears from five of the counts, that
when the defendant conveyed to Johnston, he, the defendant, had no
title; and as no estate therefore passed to the plaintiff's testator, the
covenants were not assigned; that covenants pass only as incidents
to an estate; and
there be none, the covenants cannot be said to
be annexed to an estate, much less to pass with it. The point seems
to suppose that these covenants can never be transferred where there
total want of right in the original covenantor, though his deed
transfer the actual possession.
seizes on the phrase in
Kent's
Comm. 471, note
3d Ed., and other books, "that they cannot be separated from the land and transferred without, but they go with the
land as being annexed to the estate, and bind the parties in respect to
privity of estate." No New York case was produced which denies
that they pass where the possession merely goes from one to another
by deed, and there
afterwards
total failure of title; but there are
several to the contrary.
Cow. 137; Garlock v.
Withy v. Mumford,
Closs,
Cow. 143, n. And see Markland v. Crump, 18 N. C. 94, 27
Am. Dec. 230; Booth v. Starr,
Conn. 244, 248,
Am. Dec. 233.
Aig.Prop. — 17
Dec. 253
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Nor, when we take the word estate in its most comprehensive meaning,
can it be said there is none in such a case to which the covenant may
attach. It is said by Blackstone to signify the condition or circumstance
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in which the owner stands with respect to his property, 2 Black. Comm.
103, and a m ere naked possession is an imperfect degree of title, which
rnay ripen into a fee by neglect of the real owner . Id. 195, 6. It
in short, n inchoate ownership or estate w ith which the covenants
astitle paramount;
and in that sense
against
run to secure
said in sev eral
signable within the restriction insisted upon.
ases that the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment refer em WaldronTv. McCarty,
haticallyjp the possession and not to the titl
Kortz
v.
Carpenter,
Johns.
Johns. 471, 473, per Spencer,
he meaning is. that however defective the title may be, th gse
120.
disturbed . When the
ovenants are not broken till the possession
atter even transpires, an action lies to recover damages tor the fai
ure both of possession and title according to the extent of such failu re.
The case of Bartholomew v. Candee, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 167, was
mainly relied upon in support of the ground taken by the first point. All
hat
covenant no longer runs with th land after
that case decides
The declaration was by the grantee of one Thorp, to
broken.
whom the defendant had conveyed in fee with covenants of seizin and
warranty; and breaches were assigned upon both. The defendant
pleaded and the jury found, that before the defendant conveyed to
Thorp, he had conveyed to one Sparks, who entered and died actually
seized, leaving the land to his children, who were still actually seized
when the defendant conveyed to Thorp. Mr. Justice Wilde arrives at
the conclusion hat the covenant of seizin was broken before th e.jieed
rom Thorp to the plaintiff _ and adds "This point being establish gd,
perfectly well settled that no action will lie on this contract in th
name of the assignee . By the breach of the covenant of seizin, an
action accrued to the grantee, which being
mere chose in action, was
not assignable."
He does not notice the covenant of warranty, but
seems to consider the claim under that as standing on the same ground
which
think might well lie under the pleas as found by the jury.
The fair import of these was, hat neither Thorp nor the plaint iff
ver had possession
so that, according to some cases, the covenan
warranty was also immediately broken
Du vall v. Craig,
Wheat.
45, 61, 62,
L. Ed. 180; Randolph v. Meek, Mart.
Y. (Tenn.) 58;
and according to our own
never could have any effect.
No p_o session ever having been taken under the deed, there could
no actu al
yiction, which
said to be essential to
recovery upon
covenant
ofw|o;antj^ Webb v. Alexander, Wend. 281 to 284, and thecases
tliere cited
Jackson, ex dem. Montresor, v. Rice,
Wend. 180, 182,
20 Am. Dec. 683, per Savage, Ch. J.; Vanderkarr v. Vanderkarr, 11
very full collection and consideration of the cases
Johns. 122. See
to this point, both as
respects the covenant of warranty and for
quiet enjoyment, by Hosmer, Ch. J., in Mitchell v. Warner,
Conn.
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521 to 526.
That an u nbroken covenant of warranty shall run with
the possession of the land, was not questioned by counsel or court in

Bartholomew v. Candee. nor was it in a subsequent and similar case,
Wheelock y. Thayer, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 68, also relied upon.
I have looked through the other cases cited by the counsel for the
defendant, and they all go to the point, eithe^ffiat a covenant broken
^ /\*f^
-—""
Thej e ■^^__— _
c eases to be assignable, orl:hat covenants in gross arp not so.
p ositions are indisputably settled ; and fw e have adopted the first, in
o rder to show that this action was properly brought hy John .Reddoe's
e xecutor instead of his heir.
I do not except from this remark the
case of Andrew v. Pearce, 4 Bos. & Pull. 158.
It is true that was
an action on covenants both that the defendant had authority to demise and for quiet enjoyment.
The t itle failed before the plaintiff
to ok an assignment; he entered and was ousted: and it wfis hflc^ that
h e^ could not recover, because themere f ail ure of t hg.J:^^l^ KrnVp th^
covenants. Mansfield, Ch. J., said expressly, the assignor had only a
•
»
right of action left, which he could not assign. It would seem by this
eviction,
title,
England,
in
case that,
woul d ^ju-c*-a-«-*^
a simple failure of
without
'*^C/f'*^
be a breach of the covenant for q uiet enjoyment.
With us the doc- |yt,4^^yv^ ^^^^
trme i s clearly otherwise. Kortz v. Carpenter, 5 Johns. 120; Norman ^ «^
"Va^S Ct^ L
V. Wells, 17 Wend. 160, and the cases there cited.
And see Mitchell
v. Warner, 5 Conn. 497, 522, and the very full reference there to the
New York cases. In Andrew v. Pearce, the lease was treated as totall y

j/jjj,

g one, by a failure of the title; whereas there was still a continuin g
possession, till the plaintiff was ousted, and then and not till then, acc ording to our cases, was the covenant for quiet enjoyment broken .
There is a difference in more respects than one between our own and
the English cases as to what shall constitute a breach of the covenants
of title, so as to take away their assignable quality. Even a covenan t
o f^seizin. made and broken in the same breath, is there held , to run wit h
the land, till actual damages are sustained by the breach.^ Kingdom
V. Nottle, 1 Maule & Sel. 355 ; 4 Maule & Sel. 53.
Kent's Comm.
471, 2, 3d Ed., says the reason assigned for the decision is too refined
to be sound. The case is followed by Backus' Adm'r v. McCoy, 3 Ohio
211, 17 Am. Dec. 585; but severely criticised in Mitchell v. Warner,
5 Conn. 497 to 505 ; Kent's Comm. ut supra, note a.
But secondly, if the covenant be in its own nature available to the
assignee as a protection against the total failure of the defendant's
title, and if it be assignable by a grant of the land, it is insisted
that none of the counts in the declaration show that such- a grant was
made from Johnston to the plaintiff's testator.
All the counts sto p
with ave rrjpjpr thaf Jo hnston, for the consideration of one dollar, re noised, released and forever quit-claimed to the testator in fee . Technically, these are but words ^f relea se ; and as up previous lease fro m
Jo hnston to the testator is shown, it is supposed th at the g:ranting
words are inoperative . Thi s objection supposes that the words used
ca nnot carry the estate except as p art o f a conveya nce by, lease and

^''
t,

*/

/
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release ; and that, in order to give them effect, a lease should be
shown, either by its production and proof, in the usual way, or its
recital in the release; a nd this formal strictness wo uld seem still
Doe, ex dem. Pember, v. Wagstaff, 7 Carr. &
tojgrevaUjn England.
v. Irwin, 3 Johns. 365, 366, Van Ness, J., said,
Bennett
In
Payne, 477.
a mere release or quit-claim^ unless the releasee is in possession, is
void. _R nt 1-hp declaration, in the case at bar, shows that the gra ntee
was in possession. Even this strictness was, however, totally exploded,
by the case of Jackson, ex dem. Salisbury, v. Fish, 10 Johns. 456,
the operative words as set forth in the declaration being held of themThe
selves sufficient to raise and execute a use under the statute.
case
Had
that
conveyance was there held good as a bargain and sale.
occurred to counsel, we should doubtless have been saved the exfor we do not remember its bein g
amination of this objection;
d enied on the argument that words which are sufficient to pass a i te
i n conveyancing are equally sufficient in pleading by way of averment.

The

dem

urrers are overrule

d as to all the counts except the six th,

must be given for the plaintiff .
The demurrer to the sixth count is well taken, and judgment must
be given f or the ,de ^endant as to tha t count, with leave to both parties

a nd the judgment

to amend.*

SQtBERG

v.

(Supreme Court of South Dakota,

ROBINSON.
1914.

34 S. D. 55, 147 N.

W.

87.)

PoLLEY,. J. On the 27th day of January, 1906, one C. C. Robinso n
wife executed and delivered to W. J. and J. L. Smith a certa in
warranty deed, purporting_to^onvey
to said Smiths, with other propenv^qu arter section of land in Hughes Coun ty. On tlie 9th day of
January, 1907, sai d Smiths executed and delivered to -plaintiffs a warr ant}'- deed, purporting to convey said land to plaintiffs, but neither the
Robinsons nor the Smiths were ever in the actual possession o f the
a nd

2 See Dickinson v. Hoomes' Adm'r, 8 Grat.
(Va.) 406 (1852) ; Slater v. Kawson,
Mete, (aiass.) 450 (1840), s. c. 6 Mete. (Mass.) 439 (1813), aec.
See, also, Dickson v. Desire's Adm'r, 23 Mo. lol, 66 Am. Dec. 661 (1856);
Backus' Adm'rs v. McCoy, 3 Ohio, 211, 17 Am. Dec, 585 (1827).
A., the owner of premises, lived thereon with her husband, he p^YJPg ^"hp
taxes and looking ^aftpr repnjrs^ t^tK laoth join ed in a deed c onveying the premises to X., the deed cnntainlnp ; fovpn^nts by them that she was seized, also for
qu iet ^niayme nt and ge neral warrant y. X. conveyed to Y., who, after eviction .
ShonLI there be a "recovery?
A. anTB. on the CQvenant.s.
sue^
What should be the result where "ElTe spouse s ought" to be held liable by the
assignee of the covenantee had an inchoate dower interest in the premises?
See H. T. & C. Co. v. Whitehouse (Utah) 154 Pac. 950 (1916).
A conv_eyance with warranty is made hv one "o^-- in possession: the cov enantee goes into possession and conveys to the plaintiff, wno is evicted , ^ojjld
the covenantor b e held liable on the covenant ? See Wead v. Larkin. 54 111. 489,
5"Xm: Rep. 14§'(1870) ; Tillotson v. Prichard, 60 Vt. 94, 14 Atl. 302, 6 Am. St.
Rep. 9"i (I8S7).
1
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land. Thereafter, one Vesev commenced an action against plaintiff s
f or the purpose of quieting titleto said premises and to enjoin plaiji Said action
tiffs in this action from asserting further claim thereto.
was defended by plaintiffs but, on the trial, it de veloped that, from a
ti me long prior to the attempted conveyance from the Robinsons"" to
the Smiths and down tothe time, of the triah said Vesev was the absolute, owner in fe^ of the land in question ; that, while Robinson's
-C
title appeared to come through Vesey, the d eed which purported t o '^•^
d ivest him of his title proved to be a>-ig^ggj;; v and he had judgment ^ '&CA
prayed for. Upon appeal to this court, said judgment was affirmed. A'^^
Vesey v. Solberg, 27 S. D. 618, 132 N. W. 254.
^
In the deed from Robinson to the Smiths, Robinson and wifa covenanted Xvith the Smiths: "Their heirs and assigns that they are well
%^jl^ /tA^^v^
\
^
s eized^in fee of the lands and premises aforesaid and have goo d right
^
^*
convey
that
and
to sell aiid
the same in manner and form aforesaid ."
(/C#vt>»-u^»*
"the above bargained and granted lands and premises in quiet and
peaceable possession of the said parties of the second part, their heirs
a nd assignsTand against all persons lawfully claiming or to claim the
whole or any p art thereof the said parties of the first p art will warra nt c^^^^jf . A
x^^x
*
.
.
The deed from the Smiths to plaintiffs c onand forev er,.defend."
'^
impor
tained coyen^^nts
similar
^^^'*'**^^*'^
After the affirmance of the judgment quieting title to the said
aintiffs commenced this action against the de
premises in Vesey,
endant as administrator of the estate of the said C. C. Robinson, w hol^^,^,t_..^^ ^^
had died in the meantime, for the pur po se of recovering on the abo\^ ^ffT
uoted covenants in the Robinson deed of January
During ^-«^^'*^^**'**
1906^
The */ /(<tCH^*i*.*s*^
all of this time, the land in question was vacant and unoccupied.
summons,
but only one of C^v^C*^
Smi ths were named as defendants in the
them was ever served, and as to him, the action was dismissed. Plain
^^.j^^tM.
iff seeks to recover the amount Robinson had received for the land /rfg^^^,
with interest, together with the expenses necessarily incurred in e-\
ending the Vesey case in the circuit court^ upon appeal to this court
pd upon motion for rehearing, including attorney's fees for^onduct -
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Plaintiffs had judgment in the circuit
ing all of these proceedings.
From this judgment and the order denying a
court for $1183.98.
new trial, defendant appeals.
ontended by appellant that, as Robinson had neither pos (1) It
ession nor right of possession at the time he executed the eed to
the Smiths th_e covenants sued upon were HroVpn a«; «;oon as mad
and, thereTbre, did not run with the land nor inure to the benefit ^f
his remote grantees. As to the covenant of seizin, this contention
undoubtedly correct. Our statute, section 1139, Civ. Code, enumerates
*"
certain covenants as those which run with tlie land, but no mention
a
,^gLjk^»^
made of the covenant of seizin, and ys covenant does not nm with ^^^^^^
Ji/t^
he land
ale y. Frazier,
Dak. 196, 30 N. W. 138.
^^^
/^^A^^A^
Under
statute like ours
would appear that
only the immedi-^^^ ^"^'^^^J
ate grantee of the covenantor who can recover on this covenant. Plain-*^^ X-*"*'^*
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the breach of this
covenant, and they, in turn, could have recovered from defendant,
provided they brought their action within the period of the statute of
But there was no
limitations.
3 Wash. Real Property (5th Ed.) 504.
such privity o f contract between plaintiffs and defendant's intestate as
\vould entitle them to recover against defendant.
plaintiff's complaint (thfit "f gniet
(2) The other covenant set out in
a Hiffprpnt prnpr>,t;ifmn
By express statute, this
e njoyment j_prpt;ppt^
covenant d oes run with the land : Civ. Code, § 1139. This covenant is
made for the benefit of remote as well as immediate grantees, and,
unless there is something in the facts connected with this case to relieve appellant from liability on the covenant, the plaintiff is entitled to
This is conceded by
recover, and the judgment should be affirmed.
appellant, but, to avoid Hability, he contends that, because his intestate
had no estate whatever in the premises at the time of making the
covenant, and because his intestate's grantee did not go into possession
of the land, there was nothing to which the covenant could attach to
carry it to the covenantor's remote grantees. He also contends that,
the covenantor having neither possession nor right of possession at the
time he made the covenant, a constructive eviction took place at once
and that the covenant immediately ripened into a cause of action in
favor of his covenantee that neither ran with the land nor passed to
his covenantee's grantee, and that, in any event, more than six years
had elapsed since the breach of the covenant and plaintiffs' action is
In other words, that,
barred by the six years statute of limitations.
in this particular case, the effect of both covenants is exactly the same,
and plaintiffs are not entitled to recover on either. If appellant's positiort is correct, the covenant for quiet enjoyment contained in the
Robinson deed could never, under the facts in this case, become the
basis for a recovery by anyone except his immediate grantee. Ahhough
the deed purporting to divest Vesey of his title was a forgery and
conveyed no title in fact, it a ppeared upon its face to be a valid coj ivevanc e and the apparent chain of title from Vesey to plamtitts was
perfect. For aught plain tiffs knew, or could know until Vesey asserte d
his title, tVipyjy prp thp aKsolute owners of the fee and could hax e-sone
into the physi cal possession of the land at any tim e.
Supposmg plaintiffs had taken possession and afterward had learned
the facts relative to the title to the land, and, before they had been disturbed by Vesey, had brought this suit against defendant for breach
of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, he could have said: "You have
not been disturbed in your rightful possession of the land and you
While your deed may not be good, it is yet
may never be disturbed.
color of title, and if you are not disturbed by Vesey within the time
for bringing an action for that purpose, your present title, although
defective, will ripen into a title that can never be disturbed by anyone.
In other words, you have no cause of action until you have been acThis would be a complete defense
tually ousted by a decree of court."

tiffs could have recovered from the Smiths upon
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to plaintiff's demand, or the most they could recover would be nominal
damages only.
^
Thj ^he proposition that covenants found in deeds purporting, to /Ipa/^^A-'^^'''^
c onvev title to land do not run with the land unless the covenanto r
^fT^ ^y
of some estate in the land to which the covenant cou ld ^OCm^^'^-^
^vas possessed
attach is supported bv manv. if notthe great weight of, judicial dec isions is not questioned.
Notable among the more recent decisions to
Bull
v.
Beiseker, 16 N. D. 290, 113 N. W. 870, and reportthis effect is
ed with an extended note, in 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 514; Mygatt v. Coe,
147 N. Y. 456, 42 N. E. 17, a New York case; and Wallace v. Pereles,
109 Wis. 316, 85 N. W. 371, 53 L. R. A. 644, 83 Am. St. Rep. 898.
In Bull V. Beiseker, supra, the court said : "The action was brought
and the complaint framed upon the mistaken theory that the covenants
contained in defendant's deed to Johnson were covenants running with
the land, and therefore passed to Washburn by the deed from Johnson to him. This probably would be true if any title or possession was
transferred by such conveyances ; >but, nnHpr thp fartc allpgpH j^ 1-Tip
c omplaint, neither title nor possession, actual or constructive,
pass ed
under the deeds, and hence there was nothing for the covenants t o
r\ip with. - There, was a constructive eviction of the grantee immediately upon the execution and delivery of the deed to Johnson; and a
cause of action for breach of the covenants in such deed at once arose
in his favor against the Beisekers to recover damages therefor; and
the deed from Johnson to Washburn did not operate to assign to the
latter such cause of action."
And in Wallace v. Perles, supra, the Wisconsin court said: "We
therefore hold th at where the record shows that the gr antrtr 1-|pH nn
ti tle and no possession, and there is no proof that the grantee too k
p ossession , the c ovenants of the grantor are personal to the grante e,
an d are not transmitted to subsequent grantees by a mere convevan ce
of the land."
And, again, in Mygatt v. Coe, supra, we find : "It must be regarded
as the law of this case t hat privity of estate is essential to carry cov en ants of warranty and quiet enjoyment to subsequent grantees in orde r
t o support a right of action by them against the original covenanto r.
"
when there is an eviction by paramount title.
These cases are fully supported by very many, if not all, of the
preceding decisions on the same subject.
The covenants usually found in deeds of conveyance of real property, are the subject of legislative enactment in many of the states.
Our statute, section 1138, Rev. Civ. Code, reads as follows: "Every
covenant contained in a grant of an estate in real property, which is
made for the direct benefit of the property, or some part of it then
in existence runs with the land."
Section 1139: "The last section includes covenants of warranty, for quiet enjoyment, or for further as* * * ."
surance, on the part of a grantor
But these statutes do not seem to have changed the rule that, in
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o rder that the covena nt will run with tlie land so as to inure to th e
benefit of a remote grantee, the covenantee must have received som e
estate in the land to which the covenant could attach .
It seems to be generally held that, where the covenantor delivers the
possession of the land to his grantee and he, in turn, puts his grantee
in possession, this constitutes a p rivity of estate sufficient to carry the
covenant with the land. And it may be taken as true tliat the reason
for the rule originated at a time when physical possession of land was
But this reason no longer exists.
the chief muniment of. title thereto.
A person who has a ^rant nf land from the owner of tht^ fee hernmes
an
t he absolute riwnpr thereof and is entitled to all the benefits
that^c

tlierefrom. even though neither of them was ever in jthe
This being the case, why should it be neca ctual possession thereof.
essary that actual^ as distmguished from constri ctive, po^ ession should
be delivered in order to carry a covenant with the land when the covenantor was without title? It is for the purpose of prntpctino- fVip
c ovenantee and his p^rantees in their f j g ht- nf po ssession of the lan d,
and to protect them ap ;-ainst defective title thereto that the covena ^^*'i'='
made._ The right of quiet enjoyment of a piece of land is its most valuable attribute, and a covenant from a grantor that his grantee shall
be protected in the quiet enjoyment thereof adds materially to the
value of the land itself, and a material portion of the consideration
paid for the grant may be, and as a rule is, paid because of the covenantee's expectation of the right of quiet enjoyment of the demised
I ^a perfect title is pa s^sed to the grantee then he n eed
premises.
neve r avail himself of the covenantin his deed, while, on the other
h and, if it should develo p thnt th*^ ^'''v ^nr ^ntnr h ad no estate whatev er
i n tlie p rpiriJQpg attempted to be conveyed, the grantee could not, ex c ept as against his immediate covenantorr avail himself of the cnvp be derived

nant. _ This, at least, is the logical conclusion to be drawn from the
decisions holding that a remote grantee cannot recover upon a covenant
unless the covenantor had som e estate in the land when the coven ant
w as mad e.
Some cases, notably Kimball v. Bryant, 25 Minn. 496, and Iowa
Loan & Trust Co. v. Fullen, 114 Mo. App. 633, 91 S. W. 58, hold that,
although a covenantor must have some estate in land at the time of
making the grant to which covenants can attach in order to enable
a remote grantee to recover on a breach of the covenant, yet, nevertheless,
such grantee, however remote, who is holding under said
grant at the time of the assertion of, and eviction under, the paramount title, may recover the damages occasioned by the lack of title.
This is upon the ground that the covenant was broken as soon as made
and at once ripened into a chose in action in favor of the covenantee,
and that the transfer of the land by successive warranty deeds passed
this cause of action along through the successive grantees until such
time as an actual eviction by paramount title took place, when the
party who suffered damage by reason thereof might enforce the cause
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of action that accrued in favor of the first grantee against the original
covenantor.
Against this doctrine, this court is already committed.
Hill V. City, 33 S. D. 324, 145 N. W. 570. We believe plaintiffs shou ld
r ecover; but we think they should recover as upon tlie covenant itse lf,
r ather than upon successive assig^r ^p^^^-g of a cause of action that ha d
a ccrued in favor of some prior grantee . Under the theory adopted
by the Missouri and Minnesota courts, unless the eviction take place
and the action be commenced within the period prescribed by the statute of limitations for bringing such action, then the right to recover
will be barred by the statute, and the party who is holding under the
grant at the time of the eviction and the one who suffers the real damIowa L. & T. Co. v. Fullen,
age cannot reach the covenantor at all.
supra.

But, again, since it is held that a delivery of the possession of
the disputed premises is necessary in order that the covenant of a
grantor without title may inure to the benefit of his remote grantees,
then the constructive possession of the grantee ought to be sufficient
to carry the covenant. I n this case, while the Smiths acQiu'red no t itle
t Q the land by virtue of their deed from the Robinsons, still they had
the apparent title even as against Vesey himself.
The county records
n
had
a
showed that they
perfect diain^of tjtl^, g d. therefore, the Smi ths
grantees
and th eir
rplaintinsinthis action^ as against the defem Japt
possession of the granted
shouCT'^ e held to have had constructive
premises , and that plaintiffs are entitled to recover against the defendant" because of the eviction by Vesey.
T his, of course, involv es
th^ doctrine of estoppel l^y deed; and we believe this to be a prop er
/X^
/J
.
case for the application of this doctrine .
I
( ^C-Aa-*--^
The rule of estoppel by deed is stated in 16 Cyc. 686, as follows : ^
n
"
A person who assumes to convey an estate bv deed is estopped, a s ^^^''^''Tf^f**^
against the grantee, to assert anything in derogation of the dee(j . He
AsJ-M^
will not be heard, for the purpose of defeating the title of the grantee . "''^A
to say that at the time of the conveyance he had no title, or that non e
\\
p.assed by the deed : nor can he deny to the deed its full operation and
"
effect as a conveyance.
(3)

^-

Where

of the fee to a piece
that he will protect his grantee and assigns in their
peaceful possession thereof, and it afterward develops that he was not
the owner of the fee and cannot defend his grantees in their possession
of the land, and they c ajl upon him to respond in damages, why sho uld
he not be estopped from saying that he did not have, and convey the
c onstructive possession^oF the land as he represented he Had and "lor
wdiich he had received a valuable consideration , and that, therefor e.
his covenant did not pass beyond his immediate grantee and that he is
not liable to the party who has suffered by his broken covenant ? And
why should the rule just quoted not apply?
True, no case has been called to our attention where a covenantor
has been held to be estopped by his deed from claiming that he had no
a grantor represents himself as the owner

of land and

agrees

/
\l
^i^C-^
~

V|

/J^n^-A/-^

^Rj^^

»
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in the land, attempted to be conveyed, at the time he made the
covenant, and thereby escape habiHty to a remote grantee who had
been evicted; but neither has any reason been suggested why this
should not be done ; and w e hold that the defendant is estop ped_by the
covena nts in his intestate's deed TFom denying that his intestate posany estate in the land in question at the time the deed was m nde :
anH thnt responde nt is entitled to rprnve r upon the broken cov e* ^
nant.^
The judgment should be modified in regard to the amount of interest
allowed respondents as herein indicated, and as so modified it is af-

estate

'

firmed.

ANDREW

V.

(Court of Common Pleas, 1S05.

Covenant.

of February,

PEARCE.
1

Bos. & P. N. R, 158.)

The declaration stated, tha t by indentu re, dated the 25th
P. Best, the Defendant's testator, d emise^ to on e

1764,

Garland and his assigns a certain messuag e and tenemen t, commonly known by the name of Lower Bofindle, in the county of Cornwall, for the term of 99 years, at the y early^ rent of £4. per annum,
covenanting that he, the said P. Best, at the time of the grant and_d emise, had in himself good, right, and lawful and absolute autho rity_to
grant and demise the said premises ; and also for the qu iet enjo yment
of the said John Garland, his executors, administrators, and assigns,
during tlie said term, without the let, hindrance, molestation, or denial
of him the said P. B., hiis heirs and assigns, and of all and every other
person whatsoever ; that, by virtue of the said demise, th e said Jo hn
Garland, on the 25tli of February, 1764, entered into the said pre mises and became possessed thereof, a nd that afterwards, viz. by deed
pf the 22d of June, 1'791, he assigne d to one John Bennett, his executors, administrators, and assigns the said demised premises for the
residue of his, the said John Garland's, term therein; th at John Benviz., by deed of the 2d of No^ n ett accordingly entered , and afterwards,
vember, 1801, as signed to the Plaintifif, his executors, administrato rs,
T ohn

and assigns the said premises for the remainder of the said term then
to come and unexpired ; th at the plaintift' accordingly entered and was
possessed thereof until ejected therelrom.
The declaration then alleged, "that the said P. Best deceased, at the
time of making the said indenture of lease, had not, n or had he. at
a ny other_time whatsoever, any right, or title to the said de mised premi ses, with the appurtenances, or any party thereof, in him, the said P.
Best deceased, in his life time, or any authority whatsoever, whereby
or by virtue whereof, he, the said P. Best deceased, might or could
lease or demise the said demised premises, or any part thereof, with the
3

A portion of the opinion dealing with matters of damages is omitted.
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appurtenances, or any part thereof, to the said John Garland, to hold
the same, or any part thereof, to him the said John Garland, his executors, administrators, or assigns, from the said 24th day of February, 1764, for, and during, and unto the full end and term of 99 years
from thence next ensuing, and fully to be complete and ended; and
gid demise by the said P. Best, decea^
t hat after the _maki'^g' ^^ \\l^:
and after the said Plaintiff became such assignee of the said demise
premises as aforesaid , and dur ing the continuance of the said term,
to wit, on the 1st day of January, in the~yeaFof our Lord 1802, at
.
Bodmin aforesaid, in the county of Cornwall aforesaid, he said Thom- ^
rightfully
to
entitled
hav WA^/f
Pearce became and was lawfully and
nd enjoy the immediate possession of the said demised premises ^ith ^9
he appurten ances, under and by virtue of a title thereto, in oppo sind
ion to the said title of the said Plaintiff to the possession thereof
he said Thomas Pearce being lawfully and rightfully entitled to he
aid immediate possession of the said demised premises, with the appurtenances of the said Thomas Pearce, afterwards and while the
said Plaintiff so was in possession of the said demised premises, with
the appurtenances, and before the expiration of the said term of 99
years thereof demised by the said P. Best deceased as aforesaid, to wit,
.
on, &c." pr oceeding to state an ejectment for the premises by
Pearce, and judgment against the present Plaintiff, and writ of possession in consequence; and concluded that the said P. Best, deceased,
in his life time, and the said T. Pearce, executor as aforesaid, since
ad rtot kept their covenant with the Plaintiff since he be his death
ame assignee of the covenant made by the said P. Best, in his life time
with the said Tohn Garland and his assigns .
The Defendant pleaded, "that the said P. Best, mentioned in the
said declaration, at the time of making the said indenture of demise
therein mentioned, and from thence until and at the time of his death
hereinafter mentioned, was se ised in his demesne as of fee ta male
of and in the said tenements, with the appurtenances, mentioned in the
to say, to
said declaration and in the said indenture of demise, that
him and the 'heirs male of his body lawfully issuing, and being so
seised thereof, he, the said P. Best, afterwards and before the making
of the said supposed indenture of assignment between the said John
Bennett and the said Plaintiff, also mentioned in the said declaration
(to wit), on the 4th day of June in the year of our Lord 1794, at, &c.,
di ed so seised of such his estate of and in the said ten ment with the
ppurtenances without heir m^ale of his body lawfully issuing: and so
the said Defendant says that before the making of the said indenture
of assignment between the said John Bennett and the said Plaintiff
(to wit) on the said 4th day of June in the said year of our Lord 1794,
upon the death of the said P. Best, the said term of years in the said
tenements, with the appurtenances, granted by the said indenture of
demise mentioned in the said declaration, and the estate and interest of
the said John Bennett in the same tenements, ceased, and became and
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To tliis plea the Plaintiff
were wholly void, ended, and determined."
demurred, and the Defendant joined in denjurrer.
Sir James AIansfield, Ch. J. T his is an action of covenant, a nd
gy^
fy
th e declaration states that Peter Best in 1764 demised the premises in
y4^
/|
II
question for 99 years to Tohn Garland , and c ovenanted that he had
|X«^
good right to make such demise, and that Garland should q uietly enjoy
IaJ^
I!
the premises during the said term; that Garland in 1'791 assigned to
Jki^^
V
Bennett, and Bennett in 1801 a ssigned to the Plaintiff, who was ejecte d
by Thomas Pearce under a title superior to that of Peter Best . The
plea states that Peter Best, at the time of the demise, was seised of the
premises i n tail m ale, and before the assignment by Bennett to the
Plaintiff, died so seised without heirs male of his body, w hereupon t he
t erm of years ceased and determi ned.
U pon these pleadings, it is
c lear that Peter Best had no power to make a demise of these premises
to continue for 99 years if he should die without issue maje ; but that
it was a good lease so long as he should live, and he might have lived
till the end of 99 years. On this demurrer every fact is admitted ; it is
clear therefore that at the time when Bennett assigned to Andrew. Be nnett had no interest in the premises ;_.the lease is stated to have becom e
absolutely void by the death of Peter Best without heir male . The
lease then having become absolutely void, what could be the operation
of the assignment by Bennett to Andrew? H e could neither assig n
the lease nor any interest under it because the lease was gone.
What
of
sort
right
had
Bennett?
any
any
thing,
only
If
co
it
uld
be
a
r ight
yy
^
f
covenant,
o
action
on
the
and
that
could
not
be
law
.
assigned
by
m. Jk
A^
{
t he person who made the assignment had no interest in the premises,
\L/^^*0^ A
v-X) t he assignment itself could Jiave no operation . Consequently there is
I no ground upon which the present action can be maintained, -and therefore judgment must be given for the Defendant.

y(\/^

Judgment for

the

Defendant

WILLIAMS

v.

BURRELL.

(Court of Common Pleas, 1845.

1 C.

B. 402.)

TiNDAL, C. J.*

The material facts out of which the questions sent
Master of the Rolls have arisen, are very few.
George O'Brien, Earl of Egremont, b eing tenant for life, with a-ieasing p_ower, _by indenture of lease, bearing date the 24th of March. 1B 05 ,
demise d to John Williams, the plaintiff^ for ninety-nine years, if thre e
to us by his honour the

persons there in-named should so long live ; which lease, upon the death
of the tenant for life was he ld to be voi d a s against the remainder- man,
by the judgment of a court of law, on the ground that it was not made
in due conformity with the leasing power. This lease contained in it a
clause in the following terms ; viz. "And the said earl, for himself, his
*

A portion of the opinion only is printed here.
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heirs and assigns, the said demised premises, with the appurtenances
unto the said John WilHams, his executors, administrators, and assigns,
under the rent, covenants , conditions, exceptions, and agreements be
f ore expressed, against all persons whatsoever lawfully claiming t he
And
s ame, shall and will during the said term warrant and defend."
question
original
lessee
the
ether
wh
the
this
state
of
facts
is.
upon
caiy/^
rnaintain covenant against the executors of the tenant for Hfe. upo rC ^
the clause of warranty above set forth .
And a second question is then put to us, namely, whether in the
case of another lease granted precisely under the same circumstances,
and in the same form, the executors of the assignee of the original
* * *
lessee can maintain such action.
As to the question arising on the second lease, we think that the
e xecutor of the assignee of the lessee has the same right of s uiag_pn
tliis covenant as the original lessee .
In Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, fourth resolution, it was held
th at a covenant in law for title would pass with the estate : and th ere
i s nei t her principle nor authority to shew that an express covenant ,
e ither for title or quiet enjoyment, will not equally pass, and be available for the assignee of the lessee, or the executor of such assignee ^.
And, although in Andrew v. Pearce, 1 New Rep. 158, it was held
that nonaction was maintainable upon the (-nvenant for quiet enjoyme nt
b y the assignee of the lessee against the executor of the lessor: ye t
t hat was expressly on the ground that the lease had become absolutel v
void bv the death of the- lessor before the assignment made to Xhe
pl aintiff

;

a fact which

does not occur in the presenLtase."

BEARDSLEY

v.

KNIGHT.

(Supreme Court of Vermont, 1S32.

4

Vt.

471.)

This was an action of covenant, and the declaration contained two
counts. The first alleged that the defendant and one Elijah Hyde, deceased, on the 3d day of March, 1808, for the consideration of eighteen
hundred dollars, by deed of that date, duly executed, acknowledged
and recorded, according to law, conveyed to Ebenezer Hatch, his
heirs and assigns, the undivided half of a certain piece or farm of
land, lying in the town and county of Grand-Isle, to wit, the first division lots drawn to the rights of Thomas Tolman, Samuel Herrick,
and John Wood ; and that the said Knight and Hyde, in and by said
5 See Lewis v. Cook, 35 N. C. 193 (1851), whicli was as follows : A. and his
wife joined in a deed to B. of tlie wife's land, which, because of a defect in
execution, operated only as a conveyance of A.'s life estate. B. conveyed to
X. "and his heirs" by deed with covenant of warranty. By levy of execution

and sale thereunder the land came to P., who went into possession, and continued therein until after the death of A., when he was evicted by the heirs of
Mrs. A. P. then sued D., the administrator of B., for breach of the covenant
-of warranty. A nonsuit of P. was held erroneous.

v

)
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covenanted to and with the said Hatch, his heirs and assigns,
that they would warrant and defend the premises against all lawful
claims and demands whatsoever ; that afterwards Hatch by deed dated
November 20, 1812, for a valuable consideration, quit-claimed the
south half of said premises to the plaintiff, including the south part of
the aforesaid lot drawn to the right of John Wood ; by virtue of which
the plaintiff entered into possession, and became seized and possessed
of the premises, as assignee of the said Hatch; that Reuben Clapp,
administrator of one Alexander Gordon, afterwards, on the 26th day
of January, 1822, sued out a writ of ejectment against the plaintiff,
demanding the seizin and possession of thirty six acres of the east
corner of said lot, drawn to the right of John Wood ; and such proceedings were had in said action, that in January, 1828, the said Clapp
recovered judgment in said action against said Beardsley for the
seizin and possession of the premises demanded, with one cent damages, and his cost, taxed at $112.52; and afterwards took out a writ
of possession, and by virtue thereof he entered upon, and took possession of, the demanded premises, and dispossessed said Beardsley
of the same ; and averring that the title on which the said Clapp recovered was elder and better than the title derived from said Knight and
Hyde by said Hatch, and independent of the same.
In the second count the conveyance by Knight and Hyde to Hatch,
was set out as in the first. It was then alleged that, on the 8th day of
July, 1807, Knight and Hyde conveyed the undivided half of the premises, to the plaintiff, by virtue of which conveyance the plaintiff entered into possession ; and after the execution of the deed by Knight
and Hyde to Hatch, as before mentioned. Hatch also went into possession of an undivided half of the premises;
whereby the plaintiff and Hatch were seized as tenants in common, ahd so continued,
until the 20th day of November, 1812, when they made partition of
the premises, by which the plaintiff became seized and possessed of the
south half thereof in severalty, and of thirty six acres on the south
part of the lot drawn to the right of John Wood, and so continued
seized and possessed,
until the eviction by Clapp, as mentioned in
the first count.
The plaintiff claimed to recover of the defendant the value of the
thirty six acres from which he had been evicted by Clapp, and all the
cost and charges to which he had been subjected in defending the
said action of ejectment.
The defendant pleaded that he had kept and performed his covenants according to the form and effect of the said indenture of said
covenant. On which plea, issue was joined. On the trial in the county
court, the plaintiff insisted the burden of proof lay on the defendant to
make good his plea. But the court decided that the plea was a general
denial of all the material allegations in the declaration, and put the
plaintiff on proof of every material fact alleged. The plaintiff then
offered in evidence the deed set forth in his declaration from Knisrht
deed,
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without objection; and the deed from Hatch
of November, A. D. 1812, acknowledged on
This
the same day, and recorded on the 9th day of October, 1813.
a
excepting
of
the
grantor,
no
seal
affixed
to
the
deed had
signature
within
written
scroll or circle made with a pen, and the word "seal"
it. The defendant objected to its admission, and insisted that it was
not sealed, and, therefore, could not be given in evidence to the jury.
The plaintiff insisted that it was sealed, and offered, in connection
with
parol evidence to prove, that he went into possession of the
to Hatch, which was read

it,

it,

to himself, dated the 20th

a

a

a

a

it

;

a

if

is

It

J.

a

a

;

a

a

it

a

it

in 1812, and continued in pospremises therein described, under
session under
till 1829, when he was evicted as set forth in his declaration, and that whether the deed was sealed or not, was
question
of fact for the jury. The court determined that the deed was not
sealed, and that whether
was sealed or not, was
question of law
for the court to try, and not the jury; and, therefore, excluded it.
The plaintiff' then offered
quit-claim deed from Knight and Hyde
to himself, dated in 1807, of one equal undivided half of the same
and
premises included in the deed from Knight and Hyde to Hatch
tendered evidence to prove that the plaintiff, under his deed from
Knight and Hyde, and Hatch, under his deed from the same, occupied said premises from 1807 to 1812, as tenants in common: that in
1812, Hatch and the plaintiff made
division of the premises, and continued ever after to occupy and enjoy the same in severalty under said
division; that by said division the land mentioned in the declaration
was set apart to the plaintiff; and that he held and occupied the
premises as his own, under said division, from 1812 till the time of the
eviction, mentioned in the declaration.
Which deed and parol evidence
were objected to, and excluded by the court, who directed the jury to
return
verdict for the defendant; which they accordingly did. To
the several decisions of the court the plaintiff excejDted, and the cause
was ordered to the Supreme Court.
Williams,
The plaintiff has declared against the defendant in
covenant. The declaration contains two counts. The defendant pleads
performance, and tenders an issue which
was considered
joined.
by the county court that this plea put the plaintiff on proof of every
material fact in his declaration. • The plaintiff contends, that, under
this issue, his derivative title was not denied, nor the character in
which he sued. But
the plea required the plaintiff to shew
breach
of the covenant declared on, and this was not questioned, he must, to
shew such breach, prove an eviction of some one holding under Hatch
and this made
necessary to prove
conveyance from Hatch to himself. The plaintiff does not sue as assignee, nor in the right of another,
as an executor, or administrator, or assignee of
bankrupt, in which
case his character as assignee would not be denied under the plea.
But he sues as on covenant made with him, and coming to him with
the land, by virtue of
deed from Hatch.
The eviction of the plaintiff would be no breach of the defendant's covenant with Hatch, unless
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plaintiff claimed title to the land through Hatch. Hence it was incumbent on the plaintiff to show a conveyance from Hatch, and this brings
in question the validity of the instrument which was offered as Hatch's
It seems that it was objected to, and excluded as not
deed to plaintiff.
* * *
sealed.®
been
having
The instrument, therefore, offered in evidence as the deed of Hatch,,
was not a deed or conveyance of land, as it wanted one of the essential
requisites to constitute it a deed. The paper from Hatch to the plaintiff', having been rightly excluded by the court, there is no other ground
on which the plaintiff' can recover of the defendant on the covenants
contained in the defendant's deed to Hatch. The argument that the
plaintiff" was in possession, and, therefore, might avail himself of the
covenant as running with the land, is wholly destitute of foundation.
His possession, as against Hatch, may have been adverse, so that he
was acquiring a title by the statute of limitations as against him ; but
if so, it would be, at least, singular, if he could acquire a title as
against Hatch by a trespass, and, at the same time, by the same trespass, acquire a right to Hatch's claim against the defendant on the covenants in his deed. Although a deed from Hatch to the plaintiff might
under some circumstances be presumed, yet, as presumptions are made
to quiet men in possession, I do not know that it has ever been contended before, that they would create a right of action on the deed
presumed. A deed might be presumed to give a legal origin to a possession; but an instrument not under seal cannot be presumed to
be a deed for the purpose of giving an action of covenant thereon, or
an action of covenant on a deed farther back in the chain of title.
It
seems that the plaintiff had a quit-claim deed from the defendant and
Hyde, dated 8th July, 1807, of one undivided moiety of the land in
dispute. If he was not in possession under that deed, he was in without title, and can have no claim upon the defendant if he has not kept
his covenant with Hatch, for the other moiety of the same premises.
It is said the evidence on the second count was excluded by the court.
This count appears to be decidedly bad ; and although the court may
have erred in excluding the testimony altogether, and the regular
.course might have been to have admitted the testimony, leaving the
defendant to move in arrest, or bring his writ of error, yet this court
would not, on that account, grant a new trial, when we should be under obligation to arrest the judgment thereon on account of the insuffiBut it will be observed that notwithstanding
ciency of the declaration.
the pleader in framing the declaration avoided any distinct reference
to the instrument which purported to be a deed from Hatch to the
plaintiff, which was excluded as not being sealed, yet, to avail himself
of the covenant made with Hatch, and entitle himself to shew the
eviction as a breach of that covenant injurious to him, he declares that
6 The portion of the opinion in which
the court considered the sufficiency
the deed from Hatch to the plaintifC is omitted.
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of the part of which he was evicted, as assignee 6f
Hatch.
To support this count, therefore, it was necessary for him
to show a legal assignment from Hatch, and if he failed to introduce
a regular deed from Hatch to himself, the count would fail for want
of proof. This count, therefore, as well as the other, depended upon the
validity of Hatch's conveyance to the plaintiff; and that being excluded, all other testimony was irrelevant, and was properly rejected.
If neither Hatch nor his grantee were evicted from the premises, the
plaintiff has not become liable on his covenant to Hatch. If the plaintiff" was evicted from his undivided part, he is without remedy at law,
as his title to an undivided moiety was nothing more than a quit-claim
deed from the defendant and Hyde, on which he has not set up any
claim; and his title to the other moiety was under a writing from
Hatch which the Court consider as no legal conveyance.
On every view which we have been able to take of the case, we can
see no remedy for the plaintiff at law; and the judgment of the county court must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.'^
he was possessed

ST. CLAIR
(Supreme Court of Ohio, 1836.

V.
7

WILLIAMS.
Ohio, 110, pt. 2, 30 Am. Dec. 194.)

This is an action of covenant reserved from

the county

of Ham-

ilton.

Williams, the defendant, conveyed a tract of land, with warranty,
to Davis, in 1816.
Davis afterward conveyed the same land to St.
Clair, who died seized in 1820, leaving the plaintiff his widow, to whom
the premises were set off as dower.
She has been evicted by a recovery in ejectment, under a paramount title, and she brings this
action against Williams, upon the warranty in his deed to Davis, claiming that it passed with the land to her.
Lank, J. The question arising in this case is, whether the right of
action upon a covenant of warranty annexed to a conveyance in fee,
passes to one who holds but an estate for life in the land. It is no subject of doubt that an assignee is entitled to the benefits of all covenants running with the land. Backus' Adm'rs v. McCoy, 3 Ohio, 219,
17 Am. Dec. 585 ; King v. Kerr's Adm'rs, 5 Ohio,' 156, 22 Am. Dec.
777.
Nor is it doubted where a covenant running with the land is
divisible in its nature, as if the entire interest of separate parts of land
pass to different individuals, that a right of action accrues to each
party, to recover his proportion of the warranty.
Van Home v. Grain,
1 Paige (N. Y.) 455 ; Astor v. Miller, 2 Paige
(N. Y.) 78; Touchstone,
199; Co. Lit. 385, 386.
But a plain distinction is made between the
holder of a part of the land, and the holder of a part of the estate ;
Deason v. Findley,
Aig.Prop. — 48

T See

145 Ala, 407, 40 South. 220 (1906),
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the former may vouch as assignee, or bring warrantia chartae ; the latter has the benefit of the warranty by aid prayer, or by the voucher
of him who holds the remainder, Co. Lit. 385, a; 4 Dane, 51 ; Wood's
Conveyancing, Z7Z. The same distinction is carried into the modern
action of covenant. The assignee, upon whom is cast the benefit or
the obHgation of covenants, is he who holds the whole estate or term.
Doug. 183 ; 1 East, 502. These principles settle the present suit. The
plaintiff could not vouch as assignee, nor have warrantia chartae under
the ancient law, nor can she sustain an action of covenant, because she
The right of action on the warranty
does not hold the whole estate.
passes to the heirs, and her remedy is by a new assignment of dower.

Judgment for defendant.*

LEWES

V.

RIDGE.

(Court of Common Pleas, 1601.

Cro. Eliz. 863.)

The defendant, being seised of land in fee, let it for
Covenant.
life, remainder for life, rendering rent. He afterwards acknowledged
a statute; and after that by indenture bargained and sold the reverand covenanted with the bargainee, his heirs, and assigns, that
be discharged within two years of all statutes, charges and
incumbrances, excepting the estates for life. The statute is extended,
and thereupon this reversion and rent was extended. The bargainee
grants this reversion to the plaintifif, who, for not discharging of this
statute, brings covenant.
And all this matter being disclosed by the
count, it was thereupon demurred.
The question principally moved
was, whether the plaintifif, as assignee, shall have benefit of this covenant made to the bargainee by the common law, or by the 32 Hen.
Vni, c. 34? But because the covenant was broken before the plaintifif's purchase, the land being then in extent, and so a thing in action,
which could not be transferred over, it was adjudged for the defendant that the action was not maintainable against him.
And here the Court held clearly, that the 32 Hen. VIH, c. 34,
doth not extend to covenants upon estates in fee or in tail, but only
upon leases made for life or for years, and therefore this assignee was
out of the statute^ But for the other matter principally it was adjudged ut supra.^
sion

;

it should

8 See McClure's Ex'rs v. Gamble, 27 Pa. 288
(1856) ; White v. Whitney, 3
Mete. (Mass.) 81 (1841).
9 In Lucy v. Levington, 2 Lev. 26 (1671), the executor of the grantee sued the
grantor for breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment, broken during the lifetime of the grantee. Held, the action was properly brought by the executor.
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NOTTLE.

(Court of King's Bench, 1813.

1

Maule

& S. 355.)

This action was brought by the plaintiff, as executrix of Richard
Kingdon;' and the declaration stated, that by indentures of lease and
release of the 11th and 12th of May, 1780, the defendant conveyed to
R. Kingdon in fee a 4th part of certain lands therein particularly described, with a proviso for redemption upon payment of £450; and
that the defendant covenanted for himself, his heirs, executors, and
administrators, with R. Kingdon, that he the defendant was at the
time of the execution of the indenture seized of and in the premises
of a good and indefeasible estate of inheritance in fee simple: and that
he had good right to convey the same to R. Kingdon and his heirs :
and farther, that the defendant would from time to time, upon every
reasonable request of R. Kingdon, his heirs or assigns, but at the defendant's costs, execute any farther conveyance for the purpose of
assuring and confirming the premises to R. Kingdon, his heirs and assigns ; and then the following breaches were assigned : first, tliat the
defendant was not seized in fee at the time of the execution of the
indenture : secondly, that the defendant had not at that time good right
to convey : lastly, that the plaintiff, as executrix after the death of
R. Kingdon, made a reasonable request to the defendant to execute
an indenture between the defendant of the first part, the plaintiff of
the second part, and Samuel Anstice of the third part, intended to
be a release of the premises for suffering a common recovery for the
better assuring and confirming the premises to the uses mentioned in
the deed ; and tendered the same to the defendant for execution, but
the defendant refused to execute.
The defendant demurred to the first and second breaches, assigning
for causes that they are assigned too generally, and are not sufficiently precise and certain, and that it does not appear that R. Kingdon sustained or could have sustained any damage by the said breaches
of covenant, or either of them, nor that he was at any time interrupted
or disturbed in his enjoyment of the premises conveyed to him by the
nor that the said Elizabeth has or claims any interest in
defendant;
the premises, or that she is heir at law, or assignee of the same, or any
part thereof. He demurred also to the last breach, assigning for causes,
that it does not appear that the said Elizabeth hath or claims to have
any interest in the premises, as assignee or otherwise, of R. Kingdon,
nor to what person, or for whose use the deed of release was intended
to enure, or why or for what reason Samuel Anstice was made a party
thereto, nor that the said deed of release was a reasonable conveyance or assurance in that behalf : and also for that the said last mentioned breach of covenant cannot by law be joined in the same declaration with the other breaches of covenant in the said declaration assigned: and also for that the said declaration as to the said breach
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of covenant lastly assigned is in various other respects insufficient, informal, and defective.
Joinder.
IvORD EllEnborough, C. J. This is a case in which a person may
have formed his opinion from what is to be found in a book of very
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excellent authority, I allude to Comyn's Digest, in which it is laid down
generally that if a man covenant with B. upon a grant or conveyance of
the inheritance, his executor may have covenant for damages upon a
breach committed in the lifetime of his testator. But when that position comes to be compared with Lucy v. Levington, which is the
will be found not to be borne
authority there cited in support of
in
case
its
in
for
that case there was an evicout by that
generality
tion in the life-time of the testator, and therefore the damages in
respect of such eviction, for which the action was then brought, were
properly the subject of suit and recovery by the executor; and nothing
descended to the heir. But in this case there
no other damage than
such as arises from
breach of the defendant's covenant that he had
good title, and there
difficulty in admitting that the executrix can
recover at all, without also allowing her to recover to the full amount
of the damages for such defect of title; and in that case
recovery
for
by her would bar the heir
apprehend the heir could not afterwards maintain another action upon the same breach. Had the breach
here been assigned specially with view to compensation for
damage
sustained in the life-time of the testator, and so as to have left subject
of suit entire to the heir, this action might have gone clear of the diffiwould not operate as
culty, because then
bar to the heir; but
framed as
now is,
seems to me that
would operate as a bar to his
action.
new point; and
certainly
thought, that more authorities could be found than what have been cited, which, however, from
the industry of the gentlemen who have argued the case,
not very
should have paused. But what has been cited from Co.
probable,
Litt., and the other authorities, that the executor of
person who died
seized of
rent could not maintain an action to recover the arrears
incurred in the life-time of his testator, inasmuch as he could not
represent his testator as to any contracts relating to the freehold and
in
inheritance,
great degree an authority to show that in the present case the executrix does not stand in
situation to take advantage
of this breach of covenant. Therefore on the principle of what
here laid down, and in the absence of any damage to the testator, which,
recovered, would properly form
part of his personal assets,
do
not know how to say that this action
maintainable.
LE Blanc,
This action
brought by the executrix to increase
the personal estate of the testator. The difficulty arises from its being
breach of covenant in the life-time of the testator. The
assigned as
breach assigned
in not having a good title. But how
that breach
shown to have been
damage to the testator. It
not alleged that the
estate was thereby prejudiced during the life-time of the testator; and
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after his decease any damage accrued, that would be a matter which
concerns the heir. The distinction which attends real and personal covenants with respect to the course in which they go to the representatives of the person with whom the covenants are made, is a clear
'one; real covenants run with the land, and either go to the assignee
of the land, or descend to the heir, and must be taken advantage of
by him alone; but personal covenants must be sued for by the execNow this is a covenant on which after one breach has been
utor.
assigned and a recovery had thereon, the party cannot again recover.
It is not like a covenant for not repairing, for a breach of which damages may be recovered now, and again hereafter, and so toties quoties ;
although even in that case there is always a difficulty in apportioning
But here no breach from which a damage accrued to
the damages.
the testator is stated at all. Yet the action is brought to increase the
personal estate, which belongs to the executor ; when the estate itself,
has come to the heir.
such as it
Bayle;y,
The testator might have sued in his life-time but having forborne to sue, the covenant real and the right of suit thereon,
devolved with the estate upon the heir. If this were not so, and the
executrix was permitted to take advantage of this breach of covenant,
she would be recovering damages to be afterwards distributed as perand
sonal assets, for that which
really
damage to the heir alone
yet such recovery would be a complete bar to any action which the
The case of Lucy v. Levington struck me as
heir might bring.
appears
because in that case
strong authority for the defendant
eviction,
an
the
testator
the
there was
actual damage accruing to
by
whereby he was deprived of the rents and profits during his life, and
have
of course the personal estate was so far damnified. There, as
before observed,
the executor could not have sued, no other person
could, because the testator having been evicted, there could be no heir
of the land, and that was given as reason why the action was holden
to be maintainable.
Per Curiam. Judgment for defendant.

V.

NOTTLE.

(Court of King's Bench, 1815.

4

KINGDON

Maule &

S. 53.)

by the plaintiff as devisee of Richard Kingdon; and the
plaintiff declares that by indentures of lease and release of the 11th
and 12th of May, 1780, the defendant conveyed to R. Kingdon in fee
fourth part of certain lands therein particularly described, with a proviso for fedemption upon payment of £450; and that the defendant
covenanted for himself, his heirs, executors, and administrators, with
R. Kingdon, that he the defendant was at the time of the execution of
the indenture seized of and in the premises of
good and indefeasible
a

a
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DERIVATIVE

758

of inheritance

TITLES

(Part

2

in fee-simple;
and that he had good right to
Kingdon and his heirs ; and then the plaintiff
avers that R. Kingdon, on the 3d of May, 1791, duly made his will,
&c. and thereby devised the same premises to her in fee, and died
seised, and that she (the plaintiff) entered into the premises, and became
and was and continually hath been possessed thereof, and seized of
and entitled to all such estate and interest of and in the same as R.
Kingdon had in his lifetime, and at the time of his death, and assigns
for breach, 1st, That the defendant, at the time of the execution of the
indenture, was not seized, &:c. ; 2dly, That he had not good right to
convey to R. Kingdon and his heirs, &c. And so the plaintiff says, that
by reason thereof the premises are of much less value, to wit, less by
£2000. to the plaintiff than they otherwise would be, and that she
hath not been able to sell, and hath been prevented and hindered from
selling the same, for so large a price or so beneficially and advantageously as she otherwise might have done. And so she saith that
the defendant hath not kept his covenant so made with R. Kingdon,
but to keep the same with R. Kingdon in his lifetime, and the plaintiff,
since his death, hath wholly refused.
Demurrer assigning for cause, Ist^ That it appears by the declaration that the supposed breaches of covenant therein assigned were
committed in the lifetime of R. K., before tlie plaintiff had any estate
or interest in the premises ; and also, that it does not appear by the
declaration that R. K. was at any time disturbed or interrupted in the
enjoyment of the premises by the defendant or any other person, or
sustained or could have sustained any damage by the same supposed
breaches of covenant or either of them, and also for that it is not alleged that the plaintiff hath at any time since the death of R. K.
bfeen interrupted or disturbed in the enjoyment of the premises, or
any part thereof, or hath sustained any damage from the supposed
breaches of covenant or either of them ; and also that it does not appear that any person hath refused to purchase the premises on account of the supposed breaches of covenant, and also that the allegations that the premises are of much less value than they otherwise
would be, and that the plaintiff hath not been able to sell, and hath
been prevented and hindered from selling the same for so large a
price or so beneficially and advantageously as she otherwise might have
done, are too general, and do not give the defendant sufficient notice
of the supposed damage.
Lord Ellenborough, C. J. The rule with respect to the executor's
right to sue upon breaches of contract made with the testator was considered in the former case of Kingdon v. Nottle as subject to some
qualification; and in a still more recent case, [Chamberlain v. Williamson, 2 M. & S. 408,] it was considered that he could only Recover in
respect of such breach as was a damage to the personal estate.
But
here the covenant passes with the land to the devisee, and has been
broken in the time of the devisee, for so long as the defendant has
estate

convey the same to R.
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not a good title, there is a continuing breach and it is not like a covenant to do an act of solitary performance, which, not being done, the
covenant is broken once for all, but is in the nature of a covenant
to do a thing toties quoties, as the exigency of the case may require.
Here, according to the letter, there was a breach in the testator's lifetime ; but according to the spirit, the substantial breach is in the time
of the devisee, for she has thereby lost the fruit of the covenant in
not being able to dispose of the estate.
Le Blanc, J. If the covenant is to cease with the breach of
then
be broken, and the covenantee die immediately after, the covenant will be gone; and yet the injury arising from the breach would
accrue altogether to the devisee.
Dampier,
but
This
covenant which runs with the land
broken, how
may be broken but once, and ceases eo instanti tliat
can
be
covenant which runs with the land?
Fe,r Curiam. Judgment for the plaintiff.^*

V.

WARNER.

(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,

1825.

5

MITCHELL

C6nn. 497.)

a

a

This was an action on the covenants of warranty in
deed of land.
The plaintiff declared, that the defendant, Curtis Warner, on the 30th
of May, 1817, for the consideration of $1500, by his deed duly executed, granted and sold to George Welton
certain piece of land in
said deed described as lying in Roxbury, on Jack's brook, .containing

a

;

a

;

a

two acres, with
dwelling-house, clothier's works, &c. standing thereon, bounded South on Roswell Warner's land, &c.
that in and by
said deed, the defendant did for himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, covenant with said Welton, his heirs and assigns, that at
and until the ensealing of said deed, he was well seised of the premises as
good indefeasible estate in fee-simple, and that he had good
right to bargain and sell the same, in the manner and form as was
in said deed by him before written, and that the same was free from
all incumbrances
that the defendant, in and by said deed, did covenant and bind himself and his heirs forever to warrant and defend
said granted and bargained premises to the said Welton, his heirs and
that on the 7th
assigns, against all claims and demands whatsoever;
of March, 1822, Welton and the defendant, by quit-claim deed, by
valuable consideration, released to the plaintiff
them executed, for
land,
the same
buildings and privileges, which the defendant had conveyed to Welton, by the first mentioned deed, and the plaintiff became

825.

2

;

9

a

5

:

10 Ace.
King v. Jones,
Taunt. 418 (1814), where ttie covenant sued on by
tlie heir of the grantee was for further assurance.
The grantee in his lifetime
tine, Avhich request had been denied.
had called upon the covenantor to levy
Ex. 99 (1874) Turner v. Moon, [1901]
But see Spoor v. Green, L. R.,
Ch.
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vested with such right and title thereto as Welton had acquired, and
was the assignee of all the covenants in the defendant's deed to Welton, and had good right to take benefit thereof.
Breaches of these covenants were then assigned as follows: That
at the time when the defendant made and executed his deed to Welton,
he, the defendant, was not well seised of the premises, as a good indefeasible estate in fee-simple, and had not good right to bargain and
sell the same, in manner and form as stated and set forth in said
that the
deed, and the same was not free from all incumbrances;
defendant has not kept and performed his covenant to warrant and
defend the premises to the plaintiff, but has broken the same, for
that long before and on the 30th day of May, 1817, and at the time
when the defendant made, executed and delivered his deed to Welton,
one Roswell Warner was well seised and possessed, in his own right
in fee-simple, of the right and privilege of turning the water of Jack's
brook in said deed mentioned, (and which brook or stream of water
runs through and upon said land, and was, at the time of the conveyance by the defendant to Welton, and ever since has been, of great use
in carrying on the business of a clothier's shop in said deed described,
also of great value and use in carrying a carding-machine and other
water works, *which the plaintiff has, since he took tlie deed from
Welton and the defendant, erected on said land, and by said stream,)
from a certain dam, which had been previously erected across said
brook upon said land, on to the meadow of said Roswell Warner below, so much thereof as should be necessary for the purposes of watering the same ; that on the 1st of April, 1822, said Roswell Warner,
by virtue of such right and privilege, entered upon said land, and diverted the water from said stream, at said dam, and turned it upon
his said meadow, to water the same, and has ever since used said
stream for tliat purpose; by means whereof, the plaintiff has wholly
lost the benefit of said stream, and the use of said clothier's shop,
carding machine and other water-works thereon;
and so the said
Roswell Warner had disseised and dispossessed the plaintiff of said
water-works and of tlie benefit of said stream.
The defendant pleaded, that at the time of executing said deed to
Welton, he, the defendant, was well seised of the premises in said deed
described, and had good right to convey tlie same, as in said deed set
forth ; that the premises were free from all incumbrances whatsoever ;
and that the defendant has warranted and defended the premises to
the plaintiff against all claims and demands, according to the form
and effect of said deed, and of the several covenants therein contained.
On this plea issue was joined.
On the trial of the cause at Litchfield, February term, 1824, before
Hosmer, Cli. J., the plaintiff, after proving the deeds mentioned in
the declaration, adduced evidence to prove the right of Roswell Warner
to turn the water of Jack's brook on to his own land, and the exercise
of that right to the plaintiff's damage, which constituted the only
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breaches relied upon of the covenants in the defendant's deed to Welton. To the competency, as well as to the relevancy of tliis evidence,
The Chief Justice, in his charge to the jury,
the defendant objected.
expressed the following opinion :
"First, as to the covenant of seisin. The facts adduced in evidence
did not prove it to have been broken; the right claimed to exist in
Roswell Warner being an incorporeal hereditament only, and like a
right of way or of turbary, not any part of the freehold, but perfectly
compatible with the covenant of seisin, on which the plaintiff has de-
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clared.
The declara"Secondly, as to the covenant against incumbrances.
tion having alleged, by way of breach, that the premises granted 'were
not free from all incumbrances,' and nothing more, under this negative averment, without any specification of the nature of the incumIt should
brance complained of, the proof offered was inadmissible.
have been definitely set forth, to appraise the defendant of its nature,
and give him the requisite information to prepare himself for a defence.
Further; the actual exercise of the right of turning water
from Jack's brook, by Roswell Warner, was not an incumbrance warranted against; but the incumbrance consisted in the incorporeal hereditament, viz. the right of turning the water; the covenant, from
its nature, being broken instantaneously, on the delivery of the deed,
or not at all. And if the exercise of the right were an incumbrance,
it was not alleged to be so in breach of the covenant aforesaid.
The facts stated, by the
"Thirdly, as to the covenant of warranty.
plaintiff, if proved, did not amount to an eviction in breach of the
aforesaid covenant; but if they were established, by the evidence, the
jury must find for the plaintiff, and leave the defendant to his legal
remedy, the facts appearing on the record.
"Fourthly, as to the damages. As no breach of the covenant of warranty was alleged, but of a disturbance only, the jury must give the
plaintiff reasonable damages for the actual injury."
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, with twenty dollars
The defendant then moved in arrest of judgment, for the
damages.
and the court arrested judgment on
insufficiency of the declaration;
that ground.
To obtain a reversal of the latter decision, the plaintiff
He also moved for a new trial, on the
brought a writ of error.
ground of a misdirection.
HosM^R, Ch. J. The case made by this motion, presents two questions for determination.
The first
whether the plaintiff, claiming to be the assignee of
the covenant of seisin, can maintain an action on that covenant.
broken instantaneously on the deThis covenant, from its nature,
never broken.
runs in the words of the
livery of the deed, or
Now,
he
well seised.
present tense, and asserts, that the grantor
fulfilled;
well seised according to his covenant, the agreement
false, and immediately
he
not well seised, the covenant
and
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broken.
It follows from this, that it is a personal covenant, which,
most clearly, never runs with the land, and that the grantee, in whose
time the breach existed, can alone sue upon it; for, after a breach
the cause of action can never be assigned. It would be the assignment
of a chose in action, which the common law will not permit. That
the covenant of seisin, if false, is broken as soon as it is made, appears from Shep. Touch. 170; from Bickford v. Page, 2 Mass. 460;
from Marston v. Hobbs, 2 Mass. 437, 3 Am. Dec. 61 ; from Bennett
V. Irwin, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 365; from Abbott v. Allen, 14 Johns. (N.
Y.) 253; from Greenby et al. v. Wilcocks, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 1, 3 Am.
Dec. 379; from Pollard et al. v. Dwight et al., 4 Cranch, 430, 2
L. Ed. 666; from 1 Swift's Dig. 370; and from Mitchell v. Hazen,
4 Conn. 495, 10 Am. Dec. 169. From its nature, it does not run with
the land, as none but real covenants do ; and these are always susHence, as
pended on some act posterior to the delivery of the deed.
I have said before, having been broken, the covenant has become a chose
in action, and therefore cannot be assigned.
In
1 Swift's Dig. 370.
Bickford v. Page, 2 Mass. 455, it was said by the court: "This covenant being broken before the release, was, at tliat time, a mere chose
in action, and unassignable."
The court, in the case of Greenby &
al. v. Wilcocks, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 1, 3 Am. Dec. 379, determined, that
the assignee of a covenant of seisin could not recover.
The opinion
was delivered by Spencer, J., in which he says: "Choses in action are
incapable of assignment at the common law ; and what distinguishes
these covenants, broken the instant they were made, from an ordinary
chose in action?
The covenants, it is true, are such as run with the
land ; but here the substratum fails, for there was no land whereof
the defendant was seised, and of consequence, none that he could
alien : the covenants are, therefore, naked ones, uncoupled with a right
to the soil."
The same point was adjudged as far back as the reign of Queen
Elizabeth, in Lewes v. Ridge, Cro. Eliz. 863 ; and the case, so far as
I can find, has never been overruled. The principle settled in that
case, was this ; that an assignee shall not have an action upon a breach
of covenant before his own time. The same principle was recognized
in Marston v. Hobbs, 2 Mass. 439, 3 Am. Dec. 61 ; in the determination of which case, it was said by Parsons, Ch. J., when delivering the
opinion of the court ; that "no estate passed, to which these covenants
e. of seisin and right to convey) could be annexed, because in fact
broken before any assignment could be made, they were choses in action, and not assignable."
In Com. Dig. tit. Covenant, B.
asserted, that "covenant does not lie by an assignee, for
breach done
before his time."
It cannot run with the land for nothing having
been conveyed, what land
there for
To the same efto run with
fect
s.
in which
26,
Lucy v. Levington,
c.
was
175,
Lev.
Vent.
decided, that for
of
the
breach
covenant of quiet enjoyment in the
testator's time, the executor was authorized to recover; and of his
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Opinion was that eminent judge Sir Matthew Hale. Similar doctrine
is to be found in the Digest of Baron Comyns, tit. Covenant, B. 1.
In relation to principles so well established, one or two modern
decisions in Westminster-Hall in opposition to them, however they
might there be regarded, ought not here to be considered as of any
The first of them is the
Such decisions have been cited.
autliority.
The defendant
case of Kingdon, Ex'r v. Nottle, 1 Mau. & Selw. 355.
had conveyed to Richard Kingdon, the testator, certain property, and
and had good right to convey. It
covenanted that he was seised of
and
breach, tliat he was not seised of the premises
was averred as
covenant,
the court adjudged, that the executor could not sue on the
without shewing special damage to the testator, but tliat the heir
was
was said by Lord Ellenborough, that "the covenant,
might.
true, was broken, but that there was no damage sustained in the testator's life-time." To this observation of that learned and able judge
was
The covenant being broken the instant
cannot subscribe.
made, the damage, most obviously, was the whole consideration paid
and
loss to conceive what other or furtlier dam.age could
am at
arise.
In the surrounding states, as well as in our own,
unquestionably
established, that the damage
the consideration paid
and that tliis
This, then,
Immediate on the delivery of the deed.
the first objection to the determination, that whatever may be the law of Westminster-Hall, the damage, in the case alluded to,
justly considered
as not nominal, but real, and indeed all that the party can experience.
the whole consideration paid.
This principle alone shews, that
the determination in Kingdon v. Nottle
and
inapplicable to us
likewise authorizes the assertion, that Lord Ellenborough and his associates, had they resided in Connecticut, and there pronounced their
opinion, would have decided the case before them differently from
what they have.
To the determination in Kingdon v. Nottle there
sound objection.
opposed to principles, uniformly, and for centuries, estabHshed in Westminster-Hall.
was said by Lord Ellenborough,
in
the case alluded to, that "if the executor could recover nominal damwould preclude the heir, who
the party actually damnified,
ages,
from recovering at all
The force of thfs reasoning depends entirely
on the assertion tlnat the heir
"the party actually damnified
and
this
an incorrect position, the argument wholly fails.
Now,
not true, that the heir
the party damnified.
The damage arises entirely by the breach of the covenant in the life-time of the testator;
and the testator
the only person, who receives damage.
Thus were
all the determinations before the last mentioned decision. To this effect was Lewis v. Ridge, Lucy v. Levinton, and the law as laid down
in Comyn's Digest; and not
case or Dictum was there to the conIndeed, the admission of Lord Ellenborough,
trary.
that the covenant was broken in the life-time of the testator, most conclusively
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shews, that the heir was not damnified. His own damage must result
from his title to the land, and not from the covenant broken, to which
Now, as to tlie land, the heir never had title; nor
he was no party.
that the grantor was not seised,
had his ancestor. The complaint
How, then,
and had conveyed no title.
possible, tliat the heir
should inherit land, to which his ancestor had no title? If, then, he
had no title to the estate supposed to be conveyed, and he was no party
to the covenant, and the breach happened before his ancestor's death,
In my opinion, none. On tlie other
the ground of his claim
what
in the testator's life-time, and the
as
the
covenant
was
broken
hand,
damage resulting from the breach was due to him; after his death,
his executor, standing in his place, had the right of suit.
For the
incontrovertible, that where the testator can maintain coveprinciple
nant in his life-time, on
cause of action then existing, his executor
may support the same action after his death.
Swift's Dig. 371

a

;

a

It

4

&

Toll. Ex. 158, 432.
Another writ of covenant was brought by Kingdon, as devisee,
Mau.
against Nottle,
Selw. 53, upon the covenant of seisin before mentioned, on the ground tliat the covenant run with the land,
and that the breach happened to the devisee. Consistently with the
former determination, the court decided in favour of the plaintiff.
required some ingenuity to sustain an action on
covenant, for
breach happening in the time of the testator, before the devisee (the
plaintiff) could have any interest in the covenant and more especially,
it

as no special damages were laid.
For
was not stated in the case,
that the plaintiff was, at any time, interrupted or disturbed in the enjoyment of the premises; or that he sustained any damages, by the
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breach of the covenant, in the testator's life-time.
Accordingly, this
point was met, by Lord Ellenborough, who said
"The covenant passes
with the land to the devisee, and has been broken in the time of the
devisee; for so long as the defendant has not
good title, there is.
a continuing breach, and
not like
covenant to do an act of solitary performance, but
in the nature of
covenant to do a thing
toties quoties, as the exigency of the case may require."
From this opinion
am compielled to dissent in omnibus.
First,
affirm, that the novel .idea attending the breach in the testator's lifetime, by calling
"a. continuing breach," and therefore a breach to the
heir or devisee at
subsequent time,
an ingenious suggestion, but
of no substantial import. Every breach of a contract
continuing
breach, until
in some manner healed but the great question
to
whom does
continue as
breach
The only answer is, to the person, who had title to the contract, when
was broken.
remains,
as
was,
breach to the same person, who first had
cause of action
upon it. If
be anything more,
not
continuing breach, but a
new existence. In the next place,
assert, that
like
covenant
to do an act of solitary performance
and for this plain reason, that
in its nature,
covenant for
solitary act, and not
successive
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the covenant is broken, that

is,

was not seised,
as futile
second supposed breach
and
infracted to the core
thing dashed in pieces.
as the imaginary unbroken existence of
future act, at different times,
covenant to do
has no analogy to
and canhas no uturition
breaches.
Avhich may undergo repeated
or
seised,
but
the
sound;
grantor
not be partly broken and partly
wholly.
violated
inviolate,
or
not seised
and therefore, the covenant
Not further to pursue the subject, remark, that, in my judgment, the
case of Kingdon v. Nottle may justly be said to authorize the assignsupposition as unfounded as
ment of a chose in action by devise
one.
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novel.
therefore, conclude, that the determinations in the above mentioned cases of Kingdon v, Nottle, are against the ancient, uniform
and established law of Westminster-Hall; against well settled principles and decided cases in the surrounding states; and that the judges
pronouncing them, would have been of an opinion different from the
one expressed, had they recognized the principle here well established,
in its nature, total, and
that the breach of the covenant of seisin
whole
consideration
the measure of damages the
money paid for tlie
As
am of opinion that the plaintiff cannot
land.
consequence,
sustain his action on the covenant of seisin.
The next question relates to the covenant of freedom from incumbrances.
The deed of the defendant to George Welton contains
covenant of
this description
and the plaintiff claims title to the covenant, and
deed of quit-claim
breach of
right to recover for
by virtue of
from the defendant and Welton.
Without
further statement of
fact,
sufficient to remark, that the plaintiff has no right to recover for the breach of this covenant; and
he had, no breach of
assigned.
First, he has no title to the covenant of freedom from incumbrances,
nor right to recover for the breach of it. His only claim
founded
on the principle, that this covenant runs with the land. In opposition
to this claim,
observe, that the covenant above-mentioned was personal, and not
real covenant; that
was broken in the testator's
life-time, and could not run with the land, — peculiarity attending real
covenants only; and of consequence, that George Welton
the only
person who can sue on this unassignable contract.
This covenant
classed, by the late Chief Justice Swift, (in the
first volume of his Digest, p. 370,) with the covenant of seisin and of
and in relation to them all, he correctly says
good right to convey
"These covenants must be all broken at the time of executing the deed.
or they never can be; for
at that time, the grantor
not well
seised of the premises, as an indefeasible estate, or
he had no right
to sell, or
any incumbrance existed, then the covenants are broken.
But
the grantor
seised, has right to sell, or there are no incumbrances at the time of making the deed, then these covenants can never
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for no subsequent act
will amount to a breach of them ;
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These covenants, of course, cannot be real
or incumber tlie estate.
covenants ; for being broken at the instant of their creation, they are
choses in action, and cannot be assigned. The distinguishing feature of
the real covenant, is, that it may be broken at a future time ; and it
is this quality, which renders it assignable ; but it must be assigned before it is broken; for when once broken, the right to recover damages, is a chose in action, which cannot be assigned."
With these observations, I entirely concur. The fundamental question, on which the whole doctrine depends, is, when is tlie covenant of
freedom from incumbrances broken?
It is a covenant for a fact, existing or said to exist, not in future, but in prsesenti; at the moment
when the deed is delivered.
The phraseology of the covenant
that
the premises are free from incumbrances
in
funot that they shall
ture be free
seised, and has
just like the expression the grantor
can never be brokgood right to convey." If the covenant be true,
be false,
en;
broken immediately, in which event
chose
in action, and cannot be assigned. The doctrine contended for was
adjudged, by the supreme judiciary of Massachusetts, in Prescott v.
Trueman,
Mass. 627,
Am. Dec. 246, and by the supreme court of
York,
in Delavergne v. Norris,
New
Am. Dec.
Johns. (N. Y.) 358,
281.12
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Secondly, no breach of the covenant in question has, by the plaintiff, been assigned. The averment
merely this — tliat the estate "is
not free from all incumbrances."
sufficient to say, that the law
requires the incumbrance to be specially named and set forth
or the
defendant will always be taken by surprise.
Incumbrances, in their
nature, are numerous.
A mortgage,
way,
right to dig turf, to
pasture cattle, or to have dower assigned, and in short, an easement
of any kind,
an incumbrance, because
load or weight on the
land, and must lessen its value. Prescott v, Trueman,
Mass. 630,
Am. Dec. 246.
opposed to the fundamental principles of pleading, (which are to inform the court, the jury, and, above all, the party,
by the altercations in writing) to authorize
general allegation that
there are incumbrances, without declaring what they are. The point
settled, by first principles, and he
too clear for controversy.
In
Marston v. Hobbs,
Mass. 433,
Am. Dec. 61,
was said, by Chief
Justice Parsons, that the breach of the covenant against incumbrances,
like that for quiet enjoyment, must be specially assigned, shewing its
nature, and the interruption complained of. The same point was ad-

1

;

6

3

11 See Hall v. Dean, 13 Johns. (N. Y.^ 105 (1S16);
Post v. Campau, 42 Mich.
N. W. 272 (1879).
90.
But see Guerin v. Smith, 62 Mieh. 3G9, 2S N. W. 906
(18S6).
12 Cf. Dehority
Worley v. Hineman,
v. Wrijrht, 101 Ind. .382 (1885);
Ind.
App. 240. 3.3 N. E. 2G0 (INO.Jt
Security Bank of Minnesota v. Holmes, 65 Minn.
531, 68 N. VV. 113, 60 Am. St. Rep. 495 (1S!)6).
.See Richard v. Bent, 59 111. 38, 14 Am. Rep.
(1871), contra.
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judged, by the same court, Bickford v. Page, 2 Mass. 455 ; and in De
Forest v. Leete, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 122, it was said, by the supreme court
of New York, that under a general assignment of a breach of the covenant against incumbrances, the plaintiff cannot give evidence of his
having bought in an incumbrance, because it was not specifically alleged in the declaration; and for the admission of such evidence, a new
trial was granted.
The charge of the judge to the jury, in this case, is free from exception. The covenant in question, as was said by him, is broken instantaneously, if ever ; and under the negative averment is not free
from incumbrances, the jury were correctly instructed, that proof of
a particular incumbrance was inadmissible, because it should have been
set forth specifically, to apprize the defendant of its nature, and give
him the means of preparation for his defence.
Peters, Brainard and Bristol, JJ., were of the same opinion.
New trial not to be granted.^*

SCHOFIELD

V.

IOWA HOMESTEAD CO.

(Supreme Court of Iowa, 1S71.

32 Iowa, 317, 7 Am. Kep. 197.)

Action upon the covenants of a deed for lands. Trial to the court
without a jury, and judgment for plaintiff.
Defendant appeals.
Beck, J. I. The counsel of the respective parties agree that the
action is based upon the covenant of seisin, which is sufficiently
expressed in the deed. As a defense, the answer alleges that, prior to
the commencement of the action, plaintiff, for value, sold and conveyed a part of the lands to another, and that the covenant declared
on passed with the land, so far as the contract covered the same, to
the purchaser from plaintiff, and that recovery in this action for the
land so conveyed is barred.
To this defense a demurrer was susThe question thus presented for our determination is this:
tained.
Does the covenant of seizin run with the land?
We are fully aware of the discord of authorities upon this question, and that a great majority of the American cases hold the covenant to be in prsesenti, and that it is broken, if at all, when the deed
is delivered, and that the claim for damages thereby becomes personal
in its nature to the grantee, and is not transferred by a conveyance
to a subsequent grantee.
But in England the rule prevails that the
with
land,
covenant runs
the
and recovery for a breach thereof may
be had by the assignee of the grantee in the deed.
Kingdon v. Nottle, 1 Maule & Selw. 355 ; 4 Maule & Selw. 53 ; King v. Jones,
5 Taunt. 418;
4 Maule & Selw. 186; 1 Smith's Lead. Cases, Am.
notes to Spencer's Case, p. 150; 4 Kent's Com. 472; 1 Washburn on
Real Prop. 649.
13 See Collier v. Gamble, 10 Mo. 467 (1847) ;
(18S0) ; Peters v. Bowman, 98 U. S. 56, 59, 25 L.
3 Mete. (Mass.) 390 (1841).

Cole v. Kimball,

Ed,

91 (1878) ;

.52
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adopted, and the rule in Kingdon
V. Nottle, followed by the supreme courts of Ohio and Indiana/*
with the modification, however, in Ohio, that when the grantor has
neither title nor possession, and is therefore unable to transfer either
by his deed, the covenant is broken as soon as made, and becomes
a mere right of action which is not transferred by a subsequent
conveyance of the land. Backus' Adm'rs v. McCoy, 3 Ohio, 211, 17
Am. Dec. 585 ; Foote v. Burnet, 10 Ohio, 317, 36 Am. Dec. 90; Devore
V. Sunderland, 17 Ohio, 52, 49 Am. Dec. 442; Alartin v. Baker, 5

The English doctrine

Blackf. (Ind.)

has been

232.

A

similar rule, applicable to covenants against incumbrances, formerly prevailed in Massachusetts, but has been abandoned. Wyman
Sprague v. Baker, 17 Mass. 586.
V. Ballard, 12 Mass. 30+;
A like doctrine is recognized in South Carolina. Brisbane v. McCrady's Ex'rs, 1 Nott & McCord, 104, 9 Am. Dec. 676.
The English rule is commended to us by reason and justice, and
Chancellor Kent, while condemning the reasons upon which it is
supported in Kingdon v. Nottle, admits that the American doctrine
is supported upon a "technical scruple," and assigns the most conclusive reasons in support of the opposite English rule, 4 Kent, 472.
The object of all covenants in conveyances of lands, relating to
their title or their enjoyment, is to secure indemnity to the party
entitled to the premises in case he is deprived of them. The subsequent vendee, in the language of Kent, "is the most interested and
the most fit person to claim the indemnity secured by them (the covenants), for the compensation belongs to him as the last purchaser and
first sufferer."
The American rule will operate oppressively in all cases where
the land has been subsequently conveyed by the grantee, either toward the grantor or subsequent purchaser.
If the purchaser is
evicted he ought to receive the indemnity secured by the covenant,
for he is not only, as is said by Kent, the first sufiferer, but the only
sufferer in every instance, except when he has not paid for the land.
When the grantee, under the deed containing the covenant, has sold
and received pay for the land, it would be gross injustice to permit
him to recover, for he would not in that case sustain damages.
But
under the rule, to which we are now objecting, the grantee may
recover on the covenant of seizin and, if there be a covenant of
warranty in the deed, the subsequent grantee may also recover upon that contract against the first grantor.
But if there be no covenant of warranty, we would have the equally strange case of a party,
the first grantee, recovering damages when he is entitled to none, and
the party really injured unable to recover.
Other instances of unjust and unreasonable results could be mentioned.
The "technical scruple," as it is called by Kent, upon which the
14 See,

also, Mecklem v. Blalie, 22 Wis. 405, 99 Am. Dee. 68 (186S), ace
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: The covenant is broken the init then becomes a chose in action
held by the grantor in the deed. Brady v. Spurck, 27 111. 478 ; King v.
Adm'x of Gilson, 32 111. 348, 83 Am. Dec. 269. But how can this be
a reason in support of the doctrine under the laws of this State which
What legal principle
permit the assignment of all choses in action?
would be violated by holding that the deed from the first grantee operates as an assignment of this chose in action ?
Deeds under the laws of this State have been reduced to forms of
Intricate technicalities have been pruned away, and
great simplicity.
All
they are now as brief and simple in form as a promissory note.
choses in action, as I have just remarked, may be assigned and transThe covenant of seizin (if it be held that such a covenant
ferred.
exists in a deed of the form authorized by the laws of this State),
as we have seen, is intended to secure indemnity for the deprivation of
the title and enjoyment of the lands conveyed.
Why not brush away
the "technical scruples" gathered about the covenant of seizin, as we
have the like technical and cumbrous forms of the instrument itself,
and enforce it for the benefit of the party who is really injured by its
breach, even though, in so doing, we find it necessary to hold that a
chose in action is assigned and transferred by the operation of the
deed''
To my mind, the position reached by this course of argument is impregnable, and I cannot be driven from it by the great weight of
authorities in support of the contrary doctrine.
We conclude that plaintiff was not entitled to recover for the land
conveyed by him, and that the court erred in rendering judgment for
the full amount of the consideration paid, as shown by the deed.
II. The plaintiff's counsel argues that, admitting the covenant runs
with the land, being entire, a conveyance of a portion of the premises
But this position is in convests no right of action in the grantee.
It is held that covenants running with the
flict with the authorities.
land are susceptible of division, so that if the land be conveyed in
parcels to several persons, each may maintain an action upon the
Kane
covenant to recover for the land in which he has an interest.
V. Sanger, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 89; Dickinson v. Hoomes' Adm'r, 8 Grat.

American

doctrine is based,

is this

stant the conveyance is delivered

;

(Va.) 353.
This rule is based upon sound reason, and accords with the analogies
* * *
of the law.^"^
On account of the error in holding that the covenant sued upon
does not run with the land, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.^*

A portion of ttie opinion relating to the burden of proof is omitted.
Hall v. Plaine, 14 Ohio St. 417 aSG3) ; Geiszler v. De Graaf, 160 N.
T. 339, 59 N. E. 993, 82 Am. St. Rep. 059 (1901) : In re Hanlin, 133 Wis. 140, 113
N. W. 411, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1189, 12G Am. St. Rep. 938 (1907) ; Brooks v. Mohl,
Aig.Pbop. —49
16

16 See
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MARKLAND
(Supreme Court of North Carolina,

v.

1S34.

(Part

2

CRUMP.
IS N.

C. 94, 27 Am. Dec. 230.)

fi.

This was an action to recover damages for the breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment contained in a deed whereby the defendant
The breaches assigned,
conveyed land to the intestate of the plaintiff.
were: 1st. The eviction of the intestate by paramount title. 2nd.
The eviction of the bargainee of the intestate.
The plaintiff having made out a prima facie case, for the defence
it was proved that the interest of the intestate in the land, had, before
fa. against the intestate, to one Alarthe eviction, been sold under a
cum, and that the latter was the person who had really been evicted.

a

a

Upon this fact being admitted, his honour. Judge Sewell, at Rowan,
on the last Circuit, ruled that the plaintiff, to entitle himself to
disturbance, either of his intestate, or of some
verdict, should "show

under him, as his tenant, whose possession was that
That the plaintiff as administrator, could not recover
of the intestate.
disturbance, when the person disturbed could claim the benefit
for
of the covenant, in the deed to the intestate. That the covenant dedid not. If
clared on, either ran with the land to the assignee,' or
the former, the assignee being the person disturbed, was entitled to
its benefit — that but one action could be maintained for the disturbance, and to allow that action to be brought by one whase interest had
passed away, and who had received the full value of the land, for

a

it

a

person holding

disturbance which in no way molested him, and this to the prejudice
the person really injured, who had lost both the lands and his monThat
on the
ey, was not consistent either with reason or justice.
extend
land,
and
to
other hand, the covenant did not run with the
had not been
fa. then
the assignee — the purchaser under the
broken by the eviction of the latter."
non-suit, and
In submission to this opinion, the plaintiff' suffered
appealed.
RuFFiN, C.
The opinion delivered in the Superior Court,
that
entertained by this Court and very much upon the reasons expressed
For
would seem to be
first principle, that in an
by his honour.
action sounding in damages, none can be recovered,
none have been
sustained by the plaintiff.
jSIarcum, the purchaser at sheriff's sale, has been regarded by the
plaintiff's counsel, as
purchaser with warranty; because, under the
statute, he can have recourse to Tucker, the defendant in the execution.
The Court supposes
clear, that he
an assignee, who, by reason of
is

it

a

if

a

it

;

J.

is

a

it

fi.

if

of

3

;

6

104 Minn. 404, 116 N. W. 931, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1195, 124 Am. St. Rep. G29
(1908).
Hut see Zent v. Picken, 54 Iowa. 535,
Backus' Adiu'rs v.
N. W. 750 (ISSO)
McCoy,
Ohio, 211, 17 Am. Dec. 585 (1827).
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the privity of estate, is entitled to the benefit of, and bound by all
covenants running with the land.
Spencer's Case, 6th Resolution, 5
recourse
against Tucker, would amount to
Rep. 17. But whether such
such a warranty, or ought to be construed to have the same effect,
Because we think,
the Court does not deem it necessary to determine.
an express warranty from Tucker to Marcum, would not, upon the
eviction of the latter, give an action to Tucker against Crump, on his
covenant of warranty, nor be a bar to that of Marcum against Crump
on the same covenant.
In support of the proposition to the contrary, the counsel for the
plaintiff has been able to adduce no case, in which that was the point
In Kane v. Sanger, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 89, Chief Justice
adjudged.
Spencer states the general rule to be, that where covenants run with
the land, if it be conveyed before a breach of the covenant, the assignee
only can sue upon the subsequent breach ; but if the assignor be himself bound in his deed, to indemnify the assignee against such breach,
there the assignor onl]^ can bring the action. This is certainly a very
But
explicit declaration of the opinion of a most respectable Judge.
it is not entitled to the authority of an adjudication; because it was
not necessary to the decision of the case, and is only a dictum. There
the plaintiff, who was the assignor, had immediately taken back the legal estate, by way of mortgage in fee; and therefore his assignee
could not, under any circumstances, have had an action ; for at the
time of the breach, he was not the assignee, but the plaintiff was reinvested with the estate by force of the mortgage.
Upon this ground
the plaintiff' had judgment.
As it was held, that in the case proved, the
effect of the plaintiff"'s warranty could not be a bar to the action, it
became immaterial to determine what the effect would have been,
if the estate had remained in the assignee, until his eviction.
No English case is referred to by the Chief Justice, and but one in
this country, that of Bickford v. Paige, 2 Alass. 460.
This last case
does not seem to us to admit of such an interpretation.
Chief Justice Parsons says, that "the assignee alone can sue, unless the nature
of the assignment be such, that the assignor is holden to indemnify the
assignee against a breach of the covenants by the original vendor;
which is founded on the principle, that no man can maintain an action
to recover damages, who has suffered none."
This is a very clear
opinion, that an assignee without a covenant from his immediate
vendor, may sue on a remote covenant; and that he alone can sue in
such a case ; and that for the very best of reasons — because no body
else is injured.
But it affords no inference, that an assignee with
warranty may not also sue on a remote covenant, but only, that in
such case, he is not the only person, who can have remedy for a
breach. In the context, it must mean, that the assignee who is evicted,
may sue the remote covenantor for the damages sustained by him ; but
that this case is not like the former in which he alone could have the
action; because in this case, another, besides the assignee, may sus-
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namely, his assignor upon his engagement to indemnify.
the assignor could not sue, because he
could not be injured; so where he paid the damages to the assignee
upon such an engagement, the assignor could sue, because he then had
But because the assignor can bring an action after suffersuffered.
ing, it does not follow that he can bring his action upon the eviction
of his assignee, and before satisfying the assignee, and to the exclusion of the assignee himself.
This construction of the language of Chief Justice Parsons is that
adopted by the Court in Withy v. Mumford, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 137, in
which the doctrine laid down in Kane v. Sanger, is pointedly denied,
under such circumstances as to destroy its authority; even in the
Courts of New York. For had the point been necessary to a decision
in Kane v. Sanger, it is adjudged directly to the contrary in Withy v.
Mumford, in which it was held, that the assignee, who is evicted,
may sue any one or more of the covenantors, whether immediate or
remote; and that an assignor, who has himself covenanted, cannot
sue a prior covenantor, until he has himself satisfied the evicted assignee; but that upon doing that, he can.
This Court is at loss for a reason upon which the first rule laid
down in the Supreme Court of New York can be sustained, or the
second can be impeached. If there be a reason, it must be peculiar
to covenants and conveyances of land. None such is perceived; and
to JUS, the position contended for seems to be inconvenient, unjust,
It multiplies suits, by requiring each asand contrary to analogy.
signee to sue his own vendor only. It may defeat the evicted person
of his damages, by enabling his insolvent assignor to recover the
money from the only person among those liable, who is able to pay it ;
and he may refuse to pay it over. Covenants which run with land,
were always exceptions to the maxim of the common law, that choses
in aqtion could not be assigned. They cannot be separated from the
land, and transferred ; but with the land they could, as being annexed
to the estate in possession, and bound the parties in respect to the
privity of estate. In other instances of assignments tolerated by law,
the assignee having for the time being the right, is alone entitled to
an action on the contract^ and may have his action against any of the
parties bound, either mediately or immediately.
Negotiable mercantile instruments, afford a similar example. The holder may sue, not
only his own endorser, but also any one whose name is on the paper.
But an endorser cannot have an action against any party prior to himself, until he shall have taken up the paper from the last holder, and
thus become the holder to his own use. The good sense of this principle seems to make it necessarily applicable to all cases of successive
engagements of indemnity.
It is admitted that, if the grantee with warranty, convey without
warranty, the last grantee may sue directly on the covenant of the first
grantor. It is not seen why the interposing a second warranty should.

tain damages,
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nor how it

can, restrict the assignee to a remedy on the last covenant.
each case, the first covenant came to him, as being annexed to the
estate ; and thus belonging to him, he, and not another, ought to have
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made, the
until he gets satisfaction.
When that
the action on
then the injured person, and may have his acperson who makes
for the benefit of all parties, that
tion to make himself whole. It
direct recourse on the person ultimately
each claimant should have
he be able to respond.
responsible,
An argument was drawn for the plaintiff, from the doctrine of
entitled
that
vendor who warrants,
Co. Rep.
Buckhurst's Case,
to keep the title papers, which contain covenants to which he may rehe has a
that
sort for his indemnity.
The inference sought
must be because he alone can bring an action on
right to the deed,
the covenants in them, or that such possession gives him the exclusive
right of action. In our opinion, that consequence cannot be deduced.
breach subsequent
affords no better ground for his action for
to his assignment, than for such action before any breach, in anticiThe possession of the title deeds may indeed put the
pation of one.
difficulty in framing his declaration, making profert,
assignee to
and giving evidence of
deed not in his own possession, which he
must encounter, and get over as well as he can.
Indeed,
may be,
the record shows that he
profert,
that he may be excused from
But these obstacles merely arise out of
not entitled to the deeds.
the rules of pleading and evidence, as between the assignee and covenantor sued; and have no reference to the rights of an intermediate owner, who has parted from his title.
The first feoffor can
make direct satisfaction to the person evicted, or take
release
from him.
That an assignee may sue the remote covenantor, the case of Middlemore v. Goodall, Cro. Car. 503,
direct authority.
true
that the plaintiff there did not state in his declaration, that his conveyance was with warranty; so that the effect of such
covenant
not precisely shown by that case. But
true,
that
does
equally
not appear that the deed to the plaintiff did not contain such
covenant.
Now every declaration must give
complete cause of action,
and
the law be, that an assignee with warranty cannot sue on any
prior covenant, the declaration ought to aver that the plaintiff
an
assignee without one. Nothing of that kind
found in that case, nor
in the precedents. They are silent as to the covenants contained in
all the deeds, under which the plaintiff claims, except the particular
covenants on which the suit
brought, and only sets forth the operative parts of the deed, as conveying the estate to the plaintiff.
Nor has any case, or precedent been found, of
plea, that the conveyance from the plaintiff's vendor, or from some assignor between
himself and the defendant, did contain covenants, although the case
of such covenants, posterior to that of the defendant in the action,
must frequently have occurred.
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a still broader ground was asserted in the argument;
that even
the assignee Marcum could sue, yet the plaintiff, as
administrator of Tucker, the defendant's bargainee, could- also have
the former
his action
the two actions resting on different grounds
on privity of estate, and the latter on privity of contract.
For this no direct authority has been cited, and we suppose there
can be none. For
proposition of simple justice to the covenantor,
It has however been likened
that both actions cannot be maintained.
the
action
of
to the case of
covenant by
lessor against an assignee of the lessee, and also against the lessee himself; both of
but the ordinary case of
which will certainly lie. That, however,
creditor having
right to look to two persons severally for the same
he allowed to collect it. This would
debt, from one only of whom,
be the anomalous one, of two persons having each the distinct right to
debtor, the same money, although he ought
recover and collect from
to pay
but once.
The present case
lessor claimreally correlative, not to that of
ing from the lessee and his assignee the rent due him, but to that
of
lessor who has assigned his reversion and sues the lessee on the
covenants in the lease for rent arising after the assignment.
That
such an action cannot be sustained upon the privity of contract has
been settled ever since Lord Coke's time.
Walker's Case,
Rep. 22.
It
there laid down "that
the lessor grants over his reversion, now
the contract runneth with the estate, and therefore the grantor shall
not have any action of debt for rent due after his assignment, but
the grantee shall have it; for the privity of contract follows the esnot annexed to the person but in respect of the estate."
tate, and
The explanation of the difference he proceeds afterwards to give, and
most reasonable. "The lessee himself," he says, "shall not prevent by his own act such remedy which the lessor hath against him
but when the lessor grants over the reversion, there, against his own
grant he cannot have remedy, because he has granted to another
the reversion, to which the rent
incident."
thus seen, that
to an action by the lessor against the lessee or his assignee,
full answer, that the plaintiff had assigned before the rent accrued.
The same principle embraces the present case.
Tucker, the defendant's grantee, cannot have the action, because he conveyed to
Marcum, before the breach, the estate to which the covenant was
incident, and the original privity of contract will not siipport the action, but in respect of the privity of estate continuing, or of the loss
of the estate and damages thence arising to the plaintiff.
Indeed,
privity of contract alone was sufficient without reference
to the estate, the present plaintiff might recover as well
his intestate had conveyed without, as with warranty;
for the covenants
inserted hi the deed do not make
more or less an assignment of the
land. Yet the very cases cited admit the assignee's sole right to sue,

Ch.

G)

COVENANTS

FOB

TITLE

775

for if he had not the
been a warranty by his vendor;
right there would be no redress.
But there are other cases from which it is clear that mere privity of
contract will not suffice to sustain an action; but the plaintiff must
show a damage arising to himself in particular, from the breach alThose of Kingdon v. Nottle, 1 Maule & Selw. 355, and 4
leged.
Maule & Selw. 53, are clear examples. The defendant conveyed to
the testator with a covenant of seisin ; and the first action was brought
by the plaintiff as executrix, upon the idea that such a covenant was
broken as soon as entered into, and therefore that, as in other cases
of a breach in the testator's time, she ought to sue in that character.
But it was held otherwise on demurrer, because although the warranty was broken in the testator's time, yet the declaration did not
show a special damage to him in his life-time, and the heir or devisee took the estate such as it was, and was entitled to the benefit of
the covenant; and therefore the executrix could not sue, and claim
the damages as personalty, since the testator had not so treated the
breach of covenant. Lord Ellenborough said there would be a difficulty in admitting the executrix to recover at all, that is, upon the declaration aa framed, without allowing her to recover the full amount
of damages for the defect of title; and in that case, the heir would
be barred by her recovery ; for the heir could not maintain another acAll the Judges,
tion for the same breach and the same damages.
indeed, put it pointedly, that the recovery by the executrix would be
a bar to the heir, and leave no subject of a suit for the devisee, although the estate such as it was, came to him, and the damage was
actually to him. Accordingly when the same plaintiff, in the last case,
sued as devisee, there was judgment for her.
These cases are contrary to several in this country in one respect;
which is, tliat upon a covenant of seisin the assignee of the land cannot have an action, since the breach is necessarily before the assignment. Greenby v, Wilcocks, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 4, 3 Am. Dec. 379, and
Bickford v. Paige, 2 ]\Iass. 460. That difference does not aft'ect the
question before us ; and tlie case of Kingdon v. Nottle is a clear
authority for this principle, that whenever a person is in the land in
privity of estate with the covenantor, eviction or defect of title is not
necessarily to the damage of one who has merely a privity of contract; but that such latter person must particularly show his damIt further establishes, that
age, before he can sue on the contract.
the action of the person who has only a privity of contract will not
lie, because a recovery in it would be a bar to the person who had
the privity of estate, to whom the injury is immediate, and who therefore has the first right to satisfaction.
Upon the whole, therefore, the Court is of opinion, both upon authority and reason, that a purchaser with warranty from his vendor
may sue upon a covenant of warranty to his vendor; and as a con-
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that the latter cannot sue, until he shall have sustained
damage by making satisfaction upon his own covenant.
This is the more proper here, since the rule established in this state
for measuring the damages ; because the plaintiff's intestate ought not
to recover his purchase money, but only what Marcum recovered from
him ; that is to say, the purchase money and interest paid by Marcum.
Williams v. Beeman, 13 N. C. 483.
The observations on the first point supersede the necessity of examining the question, whether an estate passed by the defendant's deed or
not. The declaration is not framed on a covenant to convey, as if this
were such an agreement and not a conveyance ; but on this as a covenant of warranty of an estate conveyed. The gravamen is the eviction of Marcum, the assignee, and the damages arising therefrom;
and not a refusal to make an assurance. Now the eviction of the intestate's assignee can never, per se, be an injury to the plaintiff; but
to the assignee alone, until he shall have called on the plaintiff to
make him whole.
When that shall be done, the plaintiff can state
a case in his declaration, on which a special damage to his intestate,
or to himself as administrator, can be seen and assessed to him.
sequence,

Per Curiam.

Judgment

WILSON

affirmed.^

v.

^

TAYLOR'S EX'RS.

(Supreme Court of Ohio, 1S59.

9 Ohio

St. 595.)

This is an action of covenant. Reserved in the district court of
Licking county. The case stands upon demurrer to rejoinder.
The material allegations of the declaration are substantially these:
That Taylor (the defendant's testator) conveyed the land, which is the
subject of the covenant sued on, to Wilson, the plaintiff; that Wilson
conveyed to Thomas Legget ; that Legget conveyed to William Weis,
who went into possession; that all these conveyances contained like
covenants of general warranty against all incumbrances and claims
of all persons whomsoever; that at the time Taylor made his deed
and covenants to Wilson, one Rebecca Houston, then wife of
John
Houston, Taylor's grantor, had in the land a contingent right of dower,
which became absolute; and that in Taylor's lifetime she filed her petition against Weis, and procured dower in the land to be assigned to
her; and that Weis^ thus evicted of part of the land, brought an action upon the covenant made by the plaintiff, Wilson, to Legget, and
recovered a judgment against the plaintiff for $284.43, and costs of suit,
which he was compelled to pay. To make himself whole again, Wilson
brought this action on the covenant made by Taylor to him.
Taylor's executors plead, in substance, in bar of the action, that
17 See Booth v. Starr,
1 Conn. 244, 6 Am. Dee. 233 (1814) ;
136 Mass. 504 (1884) ace.
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v. Carter.
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Weis had brought an action against Taylor on the same covenant upon
which the plaintiff, Wilson, sues, and had recovered judgment against
Taylor for its breach for $280.23, which he had fully paid.
Wilson replies that Weis had recovered judgment for $414.43 against
Legget on the covenant made by him directly to Weis, as well as the
judgment against die plaintiff, Wilson, of $284.43, mentioned in the
declaration, and the judgment of $280.23 against Taylor, mentioned in
the plea; that these judgments recovered by W^eis were on the successive coyenants made by Taylor, Wilson, and Legget; and that the
recovery of dower and consequent eviction was the common and only
breach of all and each of the covenants ; and that the amount of the
judgment against Legget, to wit, $414.43, was the true amount of damages sustained and proved by Weis ; that of the damages, Taylor paid
only $148.08, and that the plaintiff, Wilson, paid $172.46, and costs
and expenses.
To this Taylor's executors rejoin, setting up the same defense made
To this rejoinder Wilson demurs.
by their plea.
BrinkErhoff, C. J. The covenant in this case sued on, was a covenant -running with the land ; and Weis, the last grantee, having been
evicted from part of the land embraced within the successive covenants of warranty, brought several actions simultaneously against each
of the successive covenantors, and recovered several judgments against
This, it seems to be settled, he might properly do. King v.
each.
Kerr's Adm'rs, 5 Ohio, 155, 22 Am. Dec. 777 \ Foote v. Burnet, 10
Ohio, 317, 36 Am. Dec. 90, and notes.
But though he might have
his several actions, either simultaneously or successively, against all
his covenantors, whether immediate or mediate, yet it is equally well
settled, that he could have but one satisfaction.
It seems that, for some unexplained reason, judgment in these several actions, thus simultaneously brought against the successive covenantors, were taken for very different amounts, varying from about
And Taylor, the first covenantor, having paid
$280 to about $414.
and satisfied the judgment against him, and which was amiong the
smallest in amount, the question presented by the demurrer
whether
this satisfaction of the judgment against him
a bar to an action
over against him by the plaintiff, who was an intermediate covenantee,
after payment by the latter of
judgment recovered at the same time?
The question seems to be one of first impression, and our minds are
not free from difficulty in regard to it; but, on the whole, we are
unanimously of opinion that the plea
good. As before remarked,
Weis, the last covenantee, and who suffered damage by reason of
partial eviction, was entitled to his several action against all the prior
covenantors.
Not only was his right of action perfect against all, but
the same rule of damages would apply as to all; and, although he
could have but one satisfaction, yet he was clearly entitled to recover
the full amount of his damages against each.
If he failed to make the
proper showing in order to recover the full amount of his damages

DERIVATIVE

778

TITLES

(Part

2

against each, it was his own fault; and having collected and received
the amount recovered against the first covenantor, who occupied tlie
position in law of a guarantor of all the subsequent grantees, it seems
to us that Weis' claim under all the covenants must be held satisfied;
and that all enforcement of the judgments against the other intermediate covenantors was wrongful, and in violation of the principle that
he could have but one satisfaction.
Taylor ought not to be subjected
to different actions, and liable to several recoveries for the same breach
of the same covenant.
It follows from this that the plaintiff has mistaken his remedy. He
ought, after the satisfaction by Taylor of the judgment against him,
to have either resorted to a court of equity to restrain the collection
of the judgment against himself, or, if circumstances forbade that, to
have sued to recover back the money he had paid on the judgment
against him, as for money had and received by Weis wrongfully, and
which in conscience he ought not to retain.
Demurrer overruled, and caiuse remanded.^*
Release of Covenantor.

See Middlemore
v. Goodale, Cro. Car. SO.I
Chase v. Weston, 12 N. H. 413 (1841) ; Susquehanna & W. Val. Railroad & Coal Co. V. Quick, 61 Pa. 32S (1SG9).
18

(16.39) ;

The cases above given under the heading "covenants for title" have been
selected with a view especially to the development and presentation of the
problems arising out of the running of such covenants with the ''land," probably
the most difficult phase of the general subject.
On this and other phases of
the subject, the student should further consult Rawle on Covenants for Title.
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CHAPTER VII
ESTOPPEL BY DEED

LITTLETON'S TENURES.
Also

these words

which are commonly put in such releases, scilicet

(quae quovismodo in f uturum habere potero) are as void in law ; for no
riyht passeth by a release, but the ri g ht which the releasor hath at th e

the release made . For if there be father and son, and th e fa disseis ed, and tlie son (living his father) releaseth by his dee d
t o the disseisor all the right which he hath or may have in the same
tenements without clause of warrantie. &c.. and a fter the father dietli ,
&c., the s on may lawfully enter upon the posse ssion of tlie disseisor,
for th at he had no right in the land in his fathe r 's hfe (pur ceo que il
n'avoit droit en la terre en la vie son pier) but t he right descended to
him after the release mad e 'by the death of his father, &;e.
t ime

of

t her be

"Section

446.

^T^

^^Jj ,^ A<->C«

y

(^{l^

ru>4j>^^^

COKE UPON LITTLETON.
Note, a man may have a present righj, though it cannot take effect
i n possession, but in futuro.
As he that hath a right to a reversion or remainder, and such a right
But here in the case which Littlehe that hath it may presently release.
ton puts, where the son release in the life of his father; this release is
void, because he hath no right at all at the time of the release made.
b ut all the ri p^ht w as at thnt time in th^ father; h"t ^f^ er the decea se
o_f..the father, the son shall enter into the land against his own_ re* * *
lease^

For if there be a warrantie annexed
then the son shall be barred. For albeit the release cannot bar the right for the cause aforesaid, yet the ^yarrantie may rebut .
and bar him and his heirs of a future right which was not m him"at
that time : and th e reason (which in all cases is to be sought out) where fore a warrantie being a ^^yyenant xeal- should bar _a . future rig^ht, js
f or avoiding of circuity of action (which is not favoured in law) ; as he
that made the warrantie should recover the land against the ter-tenant,
and be by force of the warrantie to have as much in value against the
same person. § 265a.
"Without clause of warrantie."

t p the release,

«
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McCRACKIN

(Supreme Court of New York, 1817.
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WRIGHT.

Johns.

193.)

This was an action of ejectmeo t. brought to recover 200 acres of
The
land, on the west side of lot No. 60, in the town of Sterhng.
cause was tried before Mr. Justice Yates, at tlie Cayuga circuit, in 1816.
Peter Boise, bv deed poll, dated the 5th of Julv. 1794. and which
was recorded on the 12th of Tune. 1807. wherein he is described as lat£
private in the first New York regiment, in consideration of f^rty
pounds, gr ant ed, b arg ained, sold, and quit-claimed to the lessor of thg
plaintiff, in fee, "all that militarv right, or parcel of land, granted t o
him as bounty lands, for his services in the regiment aforesaid, durip g
t he late war."
The deed contained no covenant s or warranty .
On the 2d of April, 1806, an act was passed by the legislature of
this state (Laws 1806, c. 95), entitled, "An act, for the relief of Peter
Boise, and others," by which it was enacted, "t hat it shall and may b e
l awful for the commissioners of the land office, and thev are hereby
required to grant le tters pat ent to Peter Bo is e, late a soldier in the fir st
New York regirn ent , commanded by Colone l Goose Van Schaick, in the
Ime of the army" of the United States, a nd his heirs and assigns forey er,
for the quantity of two hund r ed acres of land, in the tract set apart for
the use of the line of this state, serving in the army of the United
States, a s a gratuity for h is s ervice s a nd sufferin gs in the l^^te revol ut ionary war :_ provided, that"5ie grant shall be to the s aid Peter Boisej
during his life only, and afterwards to his heirs in fee." In pursuance
of this act, letters patent, bearing date the 20th of November, 1806,
for the premises in question wer e issued to Peter Boise, under the
great seal of the state.
The judge ruled, that the act of the Legislature above mentioned,
was a private act, and that the deed from Boise to the lessor of the
plaintiff, being prior in date to the patent, did not entitle him to recover .
A verdict was accordingly rendered for the defendant.
The plaintiff moved for a new trial, and the case was submitted to
the court without argument.
SpEnce^r, J. The decision of the judge at the circuit, was correct,
on two grounds : ^
2. The deed from Boise to McCrackin is a bargain and sale, and q uit
claim , and he had then no title to convey in the premises ; and no title,
not then in esse, would pass, unl ess there was a w arranty in the deed ;
i n which last case, it would opera te as an esto ppel, for avoiding circuity
ot action. (Co. Lit. sect. 446, 2657a and b ; Bennett v. Irwin, 3 Johns.
.366.)

Motion denied.

1

The court's opinion covering the first ground Is omitted.
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S Or. 259.)

damages
^n action to recover
certain covenants in a deed . On May 23,

for an allege d
1870, John H.

of
Kendall and wife, for a val uable consideration, sold a certain lot in th e
t own of Corvallis, Benton county, Oregon, to James R. Bayley, and
then and there made, executed, and delivered to him their deed for the
same, as follows : "That the party of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of eight hundred dollars to them in hand paid,
* * have
bargained , sold, an d conveyed, u nto the said party of
the second part, the following described premises, to wit : All of thg jr
right, title, an d ^ interest in and to lot number one .jaJblock. number
eWen, in the city of Corvallis, Benton county, and state of Oregon,_to
b reach

h ave and to hold the said premises, with their appurtenances

,

R. Bayley, his heirs and assigns forev er. And
H.
Kendall
does hereby c ovenant to ^nd with the said
John
s aid

Tames

<Vi

unto the
the said
Tames

R.

^,

Bayley, his heirs and assigns, that I am the owner in fee simple o f (c)^gA A» <y ^
s aid premises ; that they are free from all incumbrance s, and that I
w^l_warrant_a nd defend the s ame from all lawful claims whatsoever."
Tna^ttn^nrne when said deed was made, the s aid Kendall was no t
the owner of any portion of said lot except the south half thereof, and ^^•'*'**'
n either h e nor hi s heirs have warr anted or detende d tne said premises
A{^7t^ *''' *
to the said Bayley, but on the contrary, at the time when said deed was
made and delivered to him, the north half of said lot was seised and
possesse d by the Corvall is, LQd.ge,. N o. 14. Ancient Free anid Accept ed
Masons, of Benton county, Oregon, by virtue of an older and better
title. Said Kendall having died prior to the commencement of this
^m
action intestate, it was br ought against appellant as the administratrix
^Mf"^^"^^^^
of his es Laj£.
'7'/ Y^JbumJU
The answer of appellant, after denying certain allegations of the ^^
,
complaint, sets up as a separate defense : That at the time when said A'V^iC'**^VH-^
Kendall made the deed mentioned in the complaint in this cause, he did
not sell or convey to the respondent all of said lot number one in block
number eleven, b^ut^that he sold only the right, title, and interest he
then had in said lot, which was the south half of said lot; that at the
time of making said deed, the said Kendall was the owner in fee simple of the south half of said lot. That said south half was all that said
Kendall attempted to convey to respondent by said deed, and was all
that had been bargained for by him at the time, and was all th .git said^
co yenant of title related to, and was so understood at the time of said_
A demurrer was interposed to this part of the answer,
gurcha se.
which was sustained by the court, and judgment rendered against Jhe
a ppellant, from wh ich \\e. appeals.
The order and judgment of the
court sustaining the demurrer to this portion of the answer, is the
principal and main ground of error complained of here.

/ jn^
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was clairpp^ pri tlip argument, that the deed only purports to co nvey such right, title, and interest as the grantor then had in said ot
one, a nd no more , and the covenants, although more general, should be
held to have reference only to such right and title as the grantor then
had in said lot, whatever that might be. This doctrine appears to be
maintained by the decisions of Massachusetts and one or two other
states; but t he modern decisions of the most of the state courts, a nd
o f the supreme court of the Unit erl ,'^tatp^^ maintain a contrarv do ct rine.
They hold that "w hatever may be the form or nature of th e
pnveyance used to pass real pro perty, if the o-rantn r sets forth on th e
face of the instrument by way of recital or averment^ t hat he is seise d
or possessed of a particular estate in the _premiseSj. and which estate
the deed purports to convey; or what is the same thing, if the seisin
or possession of a particular estate is affirmed in the deed, either in
express terms or by necessary implication, the grantor and all p ersons
in privi ty with him shall be estopped f r om ever afterwar ds deiiying
"aTFewa s so seised and possessed at th e time, he m ade the conveyance." Van' Rensselaer v, Kearney, 11 How. 325, 13 L. Hd. 703;
Fairbanks v. Williamson, 7 Greenl. (Me.) 96 ; Jackson ex dem. JMunroe
V. Parkhurst, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 209.
In Taggart v. Risley, 4 Or. 235,
this court adopted that doctrine, and that case we think is decisive of
this one.
Mr. Rawle, in his work on Covenants, in commenting on this subject, says: "W hen, however, it has distinctlv appeared in such conv eva nce, either by a recit al, a n adm iss ipn. a covenant, or otherwise, t hat
t he parties actually mtended to convey annrecenre reciprocally
a c ertain estate, thev have been held to be estopped from denying the operat ion of the deed, according to this intent ."
Rawle on Covenants, 388 ;
Jackson v. Waldron, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 178. By reference to the deed,
it will be seen that Kendall and wife "bargained, sold, and conveyed
|.j.jg following described premises, to wit:
All their right,
title, and interest in and to lot number one in block number eleven."
And there
asserted by way of covenant, "that he wa,s owner in ee
of said premises, and that he would warr ant and ^defend tb£
sinip
same from any lawful claims whatsoever
The word "premises" evidently refers to the who^*^ '^^ ^nt nnmhpr nn'". d"^^''''^^d in the deed, and
as
not to one half of
contended_by Jhe appellant. We think that
the appellant
estopped by the recitals and covenants of this deed from
averring and proving the matters sought to be set forth in the answer
as
defense to this action.
There being no error in the record, the judginent of the court below
affirmed.
Kelly, C.
do not concur in the opinion of the
(dissenting).
court, and will briefly give the reasons for my dissent.
conceded
that he deed of
H. Kendall _a nd wife to
R. Bayley conveyed o
he latter only the right, title, and interest which thev had in lot one
block eleven^ and not the lot itself but the court holds that the cove-
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nant of Kendall and wife th at they were the owners in fee simple of
th e premises, is a covenant that they were the owners of the entire
lot. I do not so understand it. The deed conveyed only the interest
which the grantors then had in the lot. The hahendum limits the estate
then granted to the interest which they then had in the premises, and
I do no t
the warranty is that they were the owners of the premises.
c onsider that the word premises, as here expressed, means the entir e
l ot, but o n ly the interest which the grantors then sold . If they had covenanted that they were the owners of lot number one, then there would
have been no doubt of their liability in this action. I think this pos iti on is supported by the decision of the supreme court of Massach us etts in the case of Sumner v. Williams^ 8 Mass. 162, 5 Am. Dec. 83,
and is not in conflict witli the case of Taggart v. Risley, decided by
this court in 4 Or. 235.
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Van Fi.ee;t, V. C. The defendant seeks_t o have an injunction,
which has been granted against the further prosecution~or an action
of ejectment, dissolv ed. The facts on which the motion must be de- —
cided are undisputed.
They show that M ary Verm i lya died seized in ^-<>%/v|.«^ .
fe e of the lands in dispute, in 1824. leaving a will, i n which she "^^de
k^^r^ MxatJ^I
/"the following devise : "And also I give and devise all my real esta te, ^"^lA
\ w hatsoever ajid. wheresoever., unto my niece, Mary Ann Jarvis, my
A mother, Sarah Vermilya, and my brother,
Thomas Vermilya, to the
urvivor of them, and to the heirs and assigns of such survivor
The lands in dispute passed bv^liis devise.
The devisees died in
First, ararrVerm ilya, March 30th, 1834,^secthe following;) order
ond, M arV-^mn Jarvis, January 29th, 1846, and, lastly,
hon-fasW ern iilv_a^. in September, 1853.
Mary ^Ann Jarvis married Thomas S.
1840, and had by him two children, viz., the
Christopher January
de fendan (Thomas V.
V. Christo pher.
Christopher) and James
after
the
death
of
his
mother,
Sarah VerThomas^Vermdya, shortly
conveyed
the lands in dis milya, and on the 10th of October, 1834,
deed containing the following recitals;.
ute to Mary Ani?^arvis,
"Whereas, Mary Vermilya, late of the city of New York, deceased,
^as in her lifetime seized in fee simple of and in certain lots of land,
hereinafter particularly described
and whereas, the said Mary Verwill,
her
in
and
her
did,
by
by
duly made to pass real estate,
milya
bearing date September 2d, 1824, ive and devise all her real estate,
^UaA^
ev
whatsoever and wheresoever, unto her niece, Mary Ann jarvis,
mother. Sarah Vermilya. and her brother, Thomas Vermilya to the
survivor of them, and to the heirs and assigns of such survivor; and
now .dead, and the said propwhereas, Sarah Vermilya, my motlier,
in
me
the
said
n
ow
vested
Thomas
Vermilya, and Mary Ann
erty

r'
.F
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Jarvis, in fee simple, a nd I. the said Thomas Vermilva. beiiisf Heslrous
of vesting the whole in mv n iere^ Mary ^nn jarvis, no w this ind enture witnesseth," &c.
The deed then, in consideration of the sum of $100, grants , b argai ns
a nd sell s unto Mary Ann Jarvis, and to h er heirs and assigns, a ll_the
g rantor's estate, right, title and interest whatsoever, under the will o f
Mary Vermilya o r otherwise, ot, m and to the lands therein described.
The deed is wi thout covenants, but the habendum declares that th e
'assigns, shall' have and hold the lands, t o
her and their u se , absolutely^ loreve ri
^
On the 6th of September, 1844, Mary Ann Jarvis, together with
her husband, Thomas S. Christopher, by deed containing covena nts
f yTlfr.aL:arajraaty , conveyed the lands in dispute to John Arbuckle.
t;i'nrp tlnpn^ in
inVt-n^ nf peveral nipsnp rnnvcyances, they h ave become
vested in t he com plainant.
No dispute is raised respecting tlie regularity of the complamant s title; the objection to her case goes deeper;
i s denied th?it thp .emn-^p f r^^m which she derived her title could grant a
g rantee, and henieTfs~

=e.

and^

Jt

fee,

Thomas Vermilya, the survivor of the three devisees, died, as alHe left a will, b y w hich he ga ve
ready stated, in September, 1853.
his whole estate to the defendant (Thomas "V". T. (^hristoplTer") and to
t he defendant's brother, James J. V. Christophen and to the defe ndant's father. Thomas S. Christopl,ien
The defendant's father and
brother both subsequently died intestate, and without leaving any other
relative as near in blood as he; co nsequently, the
wllol^SS Jate of
w hich Thomas^^ermilva was seized at the time of hisoeath is now
vested in the defendant . The defendant, under a claim that the deed
from Thomas Vermffya to Mary Ann Jarvis passed o nly a life estate ,
and that the f ee is now, vested in him, has brought an action of ej ectment against one of the complainant's tenan ts. That suit has been
enjomed at the instance of the complainant, and the q uestion now
before \he- rnnrt is. whether or not, o n the facts first narrated, the
d efendant is entitled to have that injunction clissolve"3T"" The rnain topic
of debate presented by the case is. whe ther "orTiot the deed ot 1834 ,
lade by Thom^ to Mary Ann, should be adjudged to have c reate d
In estoppel, which should debar Thomas, and those standing in his
•ights, from asserting a claim to the estate subsequently cast up on him
by the death of jytar ^y Ann . ^At the time Thomas made that deed, it
is admitted he was seized of o nlv a life estate, with .a possibilitv Jiai:
the contingent remainder in fee might vest in him as surviv or.
The legal construction of the devise is, in my judgment, entirely
clear. T he three devisees took a joint estate for life,, with contin .tyen1r emainder in fee to the survivor . Under our svstem of real prooert v
1aw, neither words of inheritance nor perpetuity are nece ss ary
to_2 iss
a fee by w ill.
By the common lav/ tliey were, but a devise to A and
his assigns torever, or to A and his heir, would pass a fee. 4 Com.
Dig. 161, tit. "Estate by Devise," n. (4). So a devise to_on£_et sanguini

J

^
ii ^^'
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would p ass an estate of like quanti ty. Gilbert on Dev. 19. By a
statute passed in 1784, it is enacted that all devises in which the words
h eirs and assigns, or heirs and assigns forever^ are omitte d, fl^d no
jt/jJ^^
expressions are contained whereby it shall appear that such devise w as ^
i ntended to convey an estate for life only, shall be construed, deeme d
rnnrt'. nf la\y and equity, to convey an estate n
and adiudg^ed. in
e

e

if
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it
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a
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d

evisee,

§
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a

if

simple in as full
manner as
the lands had been g-iven to th
13.
Rev. p. 300,
and to his heirs and assigns forever
Hence, as the law stands,
devise to A, simpliciter, in which nothing"
appears indicating
purpose to give him only a life estate, will create
ear that
th
In view of the provisions of this statute,
fee.
dcA ^se in this case had been to the three, and to the survivor, witho ut
more, the survivor would have taken the fee, and such, obviously, in
ee
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view of die terms of this devise, must have been the construction
would have received according to the common law, and in the absence
of
A devise to two, and the survivor
statute like that just cited.
of them, and the heirs of such survivor, gives them
joint estate for
life only, with contingent remainder in fee to the survivor.
Fearne
on Rem. 66,
187 a; Vick v. Edwards,
P. Wms. 372.
Th omas Vermilva, then. rrnrHinp; to \he legal construction of th
de vise, became seized of the fee of the lands in dispute on the deat
of his niece, ^Mary Ann Christopher.
he defendant stands in his
ace, with no grea ter rights or higher equity! Me is sirriply the donee
of Thomas, and the case must be decided in the same manner that
would be
Thomas were the person seeking to dissolve this inTlig
junction.
_recitals of the deed made by Thomas to Mary A nn
shoj fc^ beyond all question, that the estate about which they were deal ing, and which Thomas intended to onvey, and Ma ^'y ^nn f>-pp^tf»rl
~
o get, \vas the fee. Tt
incontrovertible that the decisive and consaid, that "the
that in which
trolling representation of the deed
said property
now vested in me, Thomas Vermilya, and my niece,
"
hey manifestly dealt on the basi
Mary Ann Jarvis, in fee simple.
hat they were the owners absolntely of a«; great and RS pprfprt-an
possible to hold in land s.
state as
D o the recitals of this deed create an estoppe against Tho mas
There is an apparent conflict in the adjudicationslipon the questio
warranty of title but
whether
deed of bar ain and sale.
withot:|t
co ntaining recitals "sJiowing that the parties eviaentlyQeairunder
belief that the grantor was seized of
greater estate in the lands tha n
actually
had at the time of its execution, will bind or trans fer, by
he
e.stoppel._
contin gent su bsequently acquired estat e.
Some seem to
hold that
grant in this form
utterly inefficacious to pass an estate
not yet vested, and can only operate as
conclusion between the parties and their privies on an estate vested at the time of its execution
while thers, resting upon
much more liberal and just basis, hold tha
w hether
contingent or an after-acquired interest will pass by estopAig.Peop. — 50
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p d, as the

result of a conve3'ance in this form, depends entirely upo n
it was the in t ention of the parties to convey it.^nd that wh enappears that such was their intention, it is the duty o f
clearly
e ver it
adjudge
t he court to
an est opp e l, in order that the deed may he ra.r \ vhether

r ied into effect according to the minds of the partie s. No review of
on this subject will be attempted.
The limits of a judicial opinion are neither sufficient nor adapted to such an undertaking.
The cases will be found collected in the American notes to the Duchess
of Kingston's Case, 2 Smith's L. C. 623 et seq.
I n my opinion, the latter view is the correc t one . It commends itself to my sense of justice as being in entire accord with certain fundamental doctrines of the law, and it is obviously better adapted to promote and further justice than its opposite.
It appears to be a natural
deduction from, if not an actual exemplification of, that great prij ncip le which declares that in searching for the meaning of an instrumen t,
t hat interpretation
shall prevail which is "as near the minds and apparent intent of the parties as it possibly may be, and the law will pgrmit.!.'
Shep, Touch, ch, V, p. 85. And "i f it cannot operate in one
fo rm, it shall opera fp ir» tV.Q<- whj^h, by ^^^''^l'"'^^'^^pff^ c-tuate the int enth e prirties".
Goodtitle v. Bailey, Cowp. 597.
tio^ j>f
The most accurate and lucid statement of the essentials of such an
estoppel that has come under my observation, is that given by Mr.
Justice Nelson, in pronouncing the opinion of the supreme court of
the United States, in the case of Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How.
297, 301 (13 L. Ed. 703) in which he says: "T hat if tlie deed bea rs
on its face evidence that the grantor intended to convey, and the gran t ee expected to become invested with an estate of a particular descri pt ion or quality, and that the bargain proceeded upon that footing^e tween the parties, then, although it may not contain any covenants o f
lltle,_in the technical sense of the term^ still, the legal operation an d
effect of the instrument will be as binding upon the grantor and those
claiming under him, in respect to the estate thus described, as if a
formal covenant to that effect had been inserted, at least so far as to
es top them trom ever afterward denying that he was seized of the par t icular estate at the time of the conveyance ."
the learning

Then, after a careful examination of several previous adjudications,
both by the courts of England and of this country, he further says:
"The principle deducible from the authorities seems to be that whatever may be the form and nature of the conveyance to pass real property, if the grantor sets forth on the face of the instrument, by way of
recital or averment, that he is seized or possessed of a particular estate in the premises, and which estate the deed purports to convey,
* * the grantor, and all person
n privity with him, shall b e
e stopped from ever afterwards denying that he was so seized and p ossessed at the time he made the conveyance . The e stoppel works upo n
t he estate, and binds an after-acquired title as betwee n the
parties and
privies. The reason
that the estate thus affirmed to be in the party

^

is,

>
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time of the conveyance, m ust necessarily have influenced the
grantee in making the purchase, and hence the grantor and those in
p rivity with hmi, in good faith and fair dealing, should be foreve r
t hereafter preclu ded fr om gain saying it."
The rule thus established vi^as subsequently affirmed in French v.
Spencer, 21 How. 228, 16 L. Ed. 97, Chancellor Walworth, prior to
the decision of Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, had enunciated the same
doctrine, substantially, in giving his opinion, as a judge of tlie court
of errors of New York, in Jackson v. Waldron, 13 Wend. (N. Y.)
178; and his formula of the rule was subsequently quoted and approved in Fitzhugh v. Tyler, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 559. The learned editor of the American notes to the Duchess of Kingston's case, states
that the f air result of the more recent cases would se em to be, that
^vhenever the terms of the deed, or of the covenants which it contams,
c learly show that it was meant to convey an absolute and indefeasible
t itle, and not merely that which the grantor has at the time, it will biiTH
and pass e very estate or interest which may vest in him subsequent to
i ts execution, whether the warranty which it contains be general or
special, and although it may contain no warranty whatever . 2 Smith's
L. C 636. In the language of Mr. Justice Nelson, it is clear that this
doctrine is founded upon the highest principles of moralit y, and recommends itself to the justice and common sense of every one.
B ut for the presence of another fact in the recit als o f this deed ,
viz., a c orrect recital of t h e terms o f _the devise . 1 think it might very
at the

xO

/ /y^
'"^^^^'^
^

^-^,^?'^

>^

O-'^-t"*-^
"

..^"nL.^-!^^^-^

properly be declared, at this point, without further consideration, that
T he presence of this fact makes the r ethe defendant is estopped.
c itals, in their legal essentials, flatly contradictory .
The grantor says
hold
lands
in
fee
in
that he and his grantee
the
; but
stating the facts
from which this conclusion is deduced, he shows, at least to the pr ofessi onal mind, that his deduction is entirely unwarrante d. Now, it
cannot be doubted tliat it was originally held that there could be no
estoppel by deed where the truth appeared on the face of the instru- |(72w«^
ment. 4 Com. Dig. 205, tit. "Estoppel" (E 2) ; Sinclair v. Jackson, 8 |
Cow. (N. Y.) 543; Pelletreau v. Jackson, 11 Wend. (N. Y.)
Jefferys v. Bucknell, 2 Barn. & Ad. 278; Wolling v. Camp, 19 N. J. Law,
/ '
148.
But t his rule, like all other legal rules, was formnbted for the
^^
^^
^^'^^
doing of justice, and when it cannot be used for that purpose, but it s
fl
e nforcement will lead to injustice or wrong, it should be disregarded.
k/"^C4-*»-. V*-*-^
Equity recognizes no rule as binding which will constrain it to do ^<yt--i^u*^
injustice.
Recently this rule has been repudiated by three of the superior
courts of England — chancery, exchequer chamber and queen's bench.
I n the court of c hpnrpry, T,nrrl T helinsford declared that the appea rance of the truth on the face of the deed constituted a reason rather
why the .party should be held to be estopped, than that he .should - he.
permitted to gainsay or disprove what he ha4 previou sly adniitjted or
alleged. I quote his words : "It appears to me that the circumstance
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embodies, should be carried out
greement of the parties, which
either by giving effect to their intentions in the manner which they
have prescribed, or, by w ay of estopp el, oprevent their denying the
Jolly v.
ight to do the acts which they have authorized to be done
224.
Arbuthnot,
De G.
And Chief Baron Kelly, in giving his opinion in Morton v. Woods,
there were anv decisions or di cta
L. R.
Q. B.) 293, said that
which held tbnt wVipre he truth appears tliere can be no estoppel,
and he thought
overru led
hat doctrine must now be considere
case,

when before the court
O. B.) 658.
of queen's bench was decided in the same way. L. R.
cannot be dpnied |hat the truth appears on the face of th
Now
onsideration,
deed under
ut
also ntirely clear liat the parties
did not appear there.
dealt with ach other as th ough
must also
false, as well as what
be admitted that what
true,
declared on
the face of this instrument, and that the parties dealt with each other,
obviously, understanding that truth and falsehood, in this instance, were
consistent. The truth was obscurely stated, and the falsehood plain ly,
and they dealt, consequently, on the hat;is of the falsehoo
In thi
condition of affairs,
think
would be
manifest misappHcation
The true rule
gal principles to say that the truth bars the estoppe
take to be this: Whether the appearance of the
,upon this subject
truth on the face of the instrument will defeat an estoppel or not, must
can
so expressed that
altogether depend upon the fact whether
be readily seen and understood by the person who ought to be influenced by
or in manner so technical or obscure that, although
must
be admitted
was not
certain
appears in the instrument, yet
seen nor understood by the person who should have been influenced
but that he dealt with the party sought to be estopped as though
by
the words on which the estoppel
founded expressed the whole truth.
Th great purpose, lying at the foundation of the law of estoppeL
same
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prevent fraud, either actual or legal . Estoppels are to be used as
shields, not as swords.
A simple reading of the recitals of this deed
can leave no doubt on the mind of any person as to the basis on which
the parties dealt. They were dealing with the fe e. Thomas intende
o grant_t<;> Mary Ann the fee simple absolute, and she expected to get

it

the estate for which she paid her money, and that was
Thomas were
Thomas intended to convey to her. Now,
falsehere insisting that inasmuch as his deed told both the truth and
hood,
was equitable and just that he should be allowed to recover
the lands in dispute, in spite of the fact that he had received full compensation for them many years ago, his conduct, according to my
notions of legal ethics, would constitute
fraud of the most offensive
character.
homas's donee, in legal principle
not in mnraly; stan ds
ust exactly where Thomas would,
he. instead of the defendan
were now asking for
dissolution of this injunctio n. My conclusion
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is that it should be adjudged that the defendant is es topp ed by the
deed,oXX834.
But another ground for equitable relief remains to be considered.
The complainant contends that, even if it be admitted that Thomas had
no interest in the lands, at the date of his conveyance, upon which a
deed of bargain and sale could operate, by way of estoppel or otherwise, still, inasmuch as it distinctly appears on the face of his deed
that it was intended to convey any future interest which he might acquire, and was not intended to be limited to the interest which he
then had, equity will enforce the deed as an executory agreement to
c onvey the subsequently-acquired interest.
This contention is founded,
on the most obvious principles of justice, and is supported bv verv high
author ity] The adjudications supporting it will be found collected in
2 Smith's L. C. 641; 2 Story's Eq. Jur. § 1040 c; and 2 Spence's
Eq. Jur. 852. Chief Justice Tilghman, in McWilliams v. Nisly, 2 Serg.
"
Equity will enforce a
& R. (Pa.) 509, 515 (7 Am. Dec. 654), said:
covenant to convey an estate whenever it shall be acquired by tne
covenantor, and the case is not the less strong where there is an absolute conveyance."
T his ground of relief is, unquestionably^ a matter of jvhjch a court
o f equity only can take cognizance.
While I am decided in my opinion that the deed of Thomas to Mary Ann contains matter which creates an estoppel against Thomas and all who may claim under him
as heirs or devisees", still, so far as I am aware, the question whether
matter of
as
a deed in this form will create an estoppel or not
law, undecided in this state.
To compel the complainant^ therefor e,
litigate the question of estoppel in the court where the action of
jectment
ear
pending,
tribunal whidi
to send her to
ncompetent to give her one measure of relief o which sh seems enitled . If the injunction should be dissolved, and
should then turn
outuiat the court in which the action of ejectment
pending should
be of opinion that the deed created no estoppel, the complainant wou ld
e_ compelled either to yield possession of the land, or return here in
rder that her ad ditional claim to relief m ght bp Hptprm inpH.
For these reasons think the de fendant's motion sho uld be denied.^

&
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^

j
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2

A., in possession of lands as devisee of his father, who in his lifetime was
equitable owner thereof, executed
mortgage of those lands to B., reciting ^,-.
.
La.
therein that he, A„ was legally or equitably entitled to the premises, and also
^
^
^ ^*.
covenanting that he was lawfully or equitably seised thereof.
Later A. ac-'^^V"^
quirefl the legal estate and mortgaged the premises to C, who took without no'TT^
'**
tice of B.'s rights.
In ejectment by A. against C. it was contended on behalf
^Sr^-^^*^'
legal
of A. ttiat C. was estopped to set up the
estate. It was held that there
was no such estoppel. Right d. Jefferys v. Bucknell,
B.
Ad. 278 (1831).
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FACE BRICK CO.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 1S92, 1893. 157 Mass. 57, 31 N. E.
717, 159 Mass. 84, 34 N. E. 177.)

u^;(^'

This is a writ of entryto f oreclose a mor tgagee . The case on the
agreed facts, so far^TTt needs to be stated, is this. O ne Waterm an
'The hrst was
made a first_mortgage, and later a second Jnortgags.
was
him.
T henj he
land
the
to
subsequently
reconveyed
foreclosed and
^^
^
thirri
holder of the second mortga ^ejcnr'^'P}'^'^
pjex^^^n^ \vho_ conv ^yed to_thf dfHrrand ,anJ- The tenant is a grantee under Water* * * V'
man.
(j>Cf^ »f U/^t«l» i*AM^ fcKAnTJ
In the granting part m t his deed, the land is stated to be * conveye d
subj e ct to" a c ert ain right of drainage, a certain easement, "and the
"
The covenants are as follows : "And
mortgage hereinafter named,.
I, the said grantor, for myself and my heirs, executors, and administrators, do covenant with the said g^rantees and their heirs and assign s,
that I am lawfully seised in fee simple of the aforegranted premises ;
cer tain mortgage *'
*:hat tliey are free from all encumbrances.
e>^ce| Tl^
(iven by me to the Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, dated March 1,
1872, to secure the sum of forty thousand dollars, t he rip^ht nf drainag- e
a nd the easement aforesaid ; that I have good right to sell and convey
t he same to the said grantees," and their heirs and assigns torever,^s
aforesaid : and that I will, and mv heirs, executors, and administrators
shall, warrant and defend the same to the said grantees ^and their heirs
an d assigns forever, against tlie lawtul claims and demands of all pg r* * *
gons, except the rip"ht nf (j j-^nacrp anH tlnp
^easement aforesai d-"
Holmes, J.^ When this case was before us the first time, 157 Mass.
5'7, 31 N. E. 717, it was as sumed by the tenant t hat the o ril y gnestj on
was jvhether the covenant nf warranty in the serond mor|:gage should
be construed as warranting a gainc;! thp fi^^g^•mrirfgrogA-^:
attempt
Q]\^o
was made to deny that, if it was so construed, the title afterwards acquired by the mortgagor would enure to the benefit of the second mortgagee under the established American
doctrine^ The tenant now des ires to reopen the agreed facts for the purpo^of showing that af ter
a breach of the covenant in the second mortgag e , and before he r ep urchased the land, the mortgagor went into bankruptcy and got h is
d ischar ge. TTTe judge below ruled that the discharge was immaterial,
and for that reason alone declined to reopen the agreed statement, and
the case comes before us upon an exception to that ruling.
The tenant's counsel frankly avow their own opinion that the disThe statement of facts is talcen from the opiuion reported in 157 Mass. 57,
N. E. 717.
fhp n oveoant o f >\nrrnn<-Y 1" tha. coonprj mort£!;ng;e shoi^ lfl
/^t Wiis held fh.q«;
bV ^coiistniejl.
Welbon v. Welbon, 109 Mich. 356, 67 N. W. 33.S (1896) ; Smith
V. GauL), jy .>^.D. ,337, 123 N. W. 827 (1909). ace.
Dunn v. Dunn, 3 Colo. 512
(1877) semble; Briclcer v. Bricker, 11 Ohio St. 240 (1860), contra.
3
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ch arge in bankruptcy makes nn rlifFerencf' . B ut they say that the inu ri ng of an after acqu ired title by virtue o f a covenant of warranty mu st

due either to a representation or to a promise contained m the cov if it is due to the former, which they deem the co rr ect
doctrine, then they are entitled to judgment on the agreed statement of
facts as it stands, o n the ground that there can be no estoppel by an
i nstrument when the truth appears on the face of
and that m thi
ase the deed showed tha the grantor was conveying land subj ect to
mortgage . If, however, contrary to their opinion, the title inures by
reason of the promise in the covenant, or to prevent bircuity of action,
then they say the provision
discharged by the discharge in bankbe

s
^

is

t

c

it,

enant, and that

ruptcy.

However anomalous what we have called the American doctrine may
Mr. Rawle and others (Rawle on Covenants (5th Ed.)

be, as argued by
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set settled in this State as well as elsewhere.
discharge in bankruptcy has no effect on this oper^tj on
ed also that
of the covenant of warrant in an ordinary deed where the w arranty
coextensive with the grant. . Bush v. Person, 18 How. 82, 15 L. Ed.
Gibbs
273 Russ v. Alpaugh, 118 Mass. 369, 376, 19 Am. Rep. 464.
Gray, 217; Rawle on CoveV. Thayer,
Cush. 30; Cole v. Raymond,
nants, (5th Ed.)
251.
would be to introduce further technicaH ty
a different rule should be appHed whe re
into an arti ficial doctrine
mortgage against which th
he conveyance is of land subject to
No reason has been offered
and
defend.
rantor covenants to warrant
distinction, nor do we perceive any.
for such
But
said that the operation of the covenant must be rested on
some general principle, and cannot be left to stand simply as an unjustified peculiarity of
particular transaction without analogies elsewhere in the law, and hat this g-enerp] prinriplp ran he fnund nnlyJ n
he doctrine of estoppel by representation^
held, as the cases
and
show,
cited
that the estoppel does not depend on permany others
sonal liability for damages.
Rawle on Covenants, (5th Ed.)
251.
If the American rule an anomaly, gains no strength by being referred to
principle which does not justify
in fact and by sound
reasoning. The title may be said to enure by wav of estoppel when ex laining the reason why
discharge in bankruptcy does not aff ct thi
but
peration of the warranty
so, the existence of the estoppel does
not rest on the prevention of fraud or on the fact of a representation
actually believed to be true. It
technical effect of
technical representation, the extent of which
determined by the scope of the words
devoted to making it. A subsequent title would innre to the grant ee
when the grant was of an unencumbered fee although the parties agreed
parol that there was
mortgage outstandinof Chamberlain v. Meeder, 16 N. H. 381, 384; see Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U. S. 546, 5.60, 12
Sup. Ct. 868, 36 L. Ed. 812, and his shows that tlie estopp
determined by the scop of the conventional assertion, not by any question
of fraud or of actual belief.
247 et seq.),
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But the s cop e of the conventional assertion is determined by the
scope of the warranty which contains it . Usually the warranty is of
what is granted, and therefore the scope of it is determined by the

of the description. But this is not necessarily so ; a nd w^hen the
w arranty says that the grantor is_to be taken as assuring^ vou that he
r\np<:: nnt- n^Her
o wns and will defen d you in the unencumbereH fff,
hat by the same deed he avows the assertion not to be the fact The
warranty is mtended to fix the extent of responsibility assumed, and
by that the grantor makes himself answerable for the fact being true.
hereby estop myse lfto deny _fact,
man by
n short,
deed says,
prelimin ary that the fact
not
does not matter that he recites as
an
difference
between
and
statement
The
ordinary
warranty
true._
in
deed is, that the operation and effect of the latter depends on the
whole context of the deed, w hereas the warranty
put in
jhe exress purpose of estopping the grantor to the extent of jtsj^ds. ., Tlie
reason "why the estoppel should operate, is. that such was the obviou
intentpn ot the par ties." Blake v. Tucker, 12 Vt. 39, 45.
"T Ta general covenant of warra nt following
conveyance of oob
he grantor's right title, and mterest were made in such a form tha
was construed as more extensive than the conveyance, there wou ld
v.
an estoppel coextensive yyith the covenant .
See Blanchard
in
Brooks, 12 Pick. 47, 66, 67 Bigelow, Estoppel (5th Ed.) 403.
So
he case of
deed by an heir presumptive of his expectancy with
cD .:Kena nt of ^j^sUH ant;^ . In this case, of course, there
no pretence that th
title coextensive with his warran ty. Trull v. Eastment,
grantor has
Mete. 121, 124, 37 Am. Dec. 126. In Lincoln v. Emerson, 108 Mass.
first mortgage was mentioned in the covenant against encumbranc87,
es in
second mortgage, but was not excepted from the covenant of
The title of the mortgagor under
warranty.
foreclosure of the first
mortgage was held to inure to an assignee of the second mortgage.
Here the deed disclosed the truth, and for the purposes of the tenan
rgument
cannot matter what part of the deed discloses the trut
u nless
should be suggested that
covenant of warrant cannot be
nade more extensive than the grant, which was held not to be ttie faw
in our former decision^ See also Calvert v, Sebright, 15 Beav. 156,
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The uestio n jemains whether
whhout actu d''notice, assu ming
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See Dniry v. Holden, 121 111. 1.30, 1.3 N, E. 547 (1SS7), where immediately
following? the description of the lots conveyed there was the following clause
"Suhject.tn thp f<7)1niwiT^<^in cumhrances on said dpsfriher^
rpm^'sps: One for
the principal sum of $19,606, and the other for the principal sum of $6,500."
'J'he eed c-ontained full covenants of warr'onty and against incumbrances,. the re
ThP nnnvt ntn Til 'iiWH^'M
einsr nn px p^ptions wTintever to th e r^jvpunntp
E. 54S) said: "It is said the deed
contained lull covenants of warranty, to which there was no exc-eption
that thereby Drury's grantor covenanted that he would warrant and defend the lots conveyed against the holders of
all incumbrances. The covenants extended only to what was conveyed, nd
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of this Commonwealth for nearly forty
covenants
of warranty from one capab le
with
u
nder
a
deed
that,
years,
the grantor mures^
o f executing
title afterwards acquired
notonly
the grantor, bu
grantee,
as
against
w ay of estoppel to the
grant
him
after acquir by
from
descent or
lso as against one holding
Pick. 52. White v. Patten, 24
in the new title
Somes v. Skinner,
Pick. 324. Russ V. Alpaugh, 118 Mass. 369, 376, 19 Am. Rep. 464.
We are aware that this rule, especially as' applied to subsequent granSee
tees, while followed in some States, has been criticised in others.
has been too long
Rawle on Covenants (4th Ed.) 427 et seq. But
established and acted on in Massachusetts to be changed, except by legislation."
Knight V. Thayer, 125 Mass. 25, 27. See Powers v. Patten,
528, 11 Am. Rep.
R.
71 Me. 583, 587, 589; McCusker v. McEvey,
295
Tefft v. Munson, 57 N. Y. 97.
urged for the tenant that this rule should not be extended. _Bu
bad exception to
no reason for makmg
bad rul e, that
As the title would have inured as against
subsequent purchaser from
the mortgagor had his deed made no mention of the mortgage, and
our de sion his covenant of warranty operates by way of estop 3
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has been the settled law

notwithstanding

the mortgage

of

no intelligible reason
can be stated why the estoppel should bind
purchaser without actual
notice in the former case, and not bind him in the latter.
entiUpon the whole case, we are of opin on that the demandant
m accord with the decision in
ed to judgment.
Our conclusion
Sandwich Manuf. Co. v. Zellmer, 48
very similar case in Minnesota.
,

E

^

Minn. 408, 51 N. W. 379.
xcep.cns overrule.
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CHRISTMAS

dem.

(Court of King's Bench, 1829.

BaylEy, J.*

v.

OLIVER.

10 B. & C.

ISl.)
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fine levied
Th case depended upon he effect of
"
Knn Mary the wife of Joseph
contingent remainder-man 'in
Brooks Stephenson was ntitled to an estate m fee upon the conti nency of her surviving Christian, the widow of Theophilus Holm es
and she and lier husband conveyed the premises to Thomas Chandl ess
for ni nety-nine years and evied a fine to support that conveyanc e.
hristian, the widow, died leaving Mrs. Stephenson living, so tJia
he contingencyupon which the limitation of the fee to Mrs. Stephen son depended, happened, and this ejectment was brought by the assignees of the executors of Thomas Chandless, in whom the term for

r

."

T

,

g

r

e

that was not the lots absolutely, but the lots subject to the incumbrance . Th
eal covenant wa .tjbat, other ^vise than as sublect to the incumbrances named
the lots were free from all noumbrances. anr) 1-)int-. the grantor wnnl^l -^^nrant and defend
the" title
See, also, Koch v. Hustis, 113 Wis. 604, 89 i^. W.
"■
"•
'■

S38 (1902).

The statement of facts is omitted.
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It was conceded upon the argume nt
ninety-nine years was vested.
t hat the fine was binding upon Mr. and Mrs. Stephenson , a nd all wh o
c laimed under them by estoppel ; but it was insisted that such fine operated by way of estoppel only ; that it therefore only bound part ies
and privies, not strangers ; tliat the defendan ^t. not being proved to
co me in under Mr. and Airs. Stephenson, was to be deemed not a
privy, but a stranger ; and that as to him, the estate was to be considTo support this
ered as still remaining in Mr. and Mrs. Stephenson.
the
latter
of
the
relied
part
judgment dedefendant
upon
position, the
497;
&
and that
8
B.
C.
livered by me in Doe dem. Brune v. Martyn,
part of the judgment certainly countenances the defendant's argument
The rea soning, however, in that case, is founded upon the s uphere.
p osition that a fine by a contingent remainderman operates by estopp el,
a nd by estoppel onlv ; its operation by estoppel, which is indisputable,
was sufficient for the purpose of that decision, whether it operated by
estoppel only, or whether it had a further operation, was quite immaterial in that case ; and t he point did not there require that investigati on,
w hich the discussion in this case has made necessar3 ^ We have, therefore, given the point the further consideration it required, and are satisfied upon the authorities, t hat a fine by a contingent remainder-m an,
th ough it operates bv estoppel, does not operate by estoppel only, b ut
t hat it has an ulterior operation when the contingency happens^ ; thatJ :he
e state which then becomes
vested feeds the estoppel; and that the fi ne
o perates uPon that estate, as though that estate had been vested inj jie
c ognizors at the time the fine was levied .
In Rawlins's Case, 4 Co. 52, Cartwright demised land, not his, to
Weston for six years ; Rawlins, who owned the land, demised it to
Cartwright for twenty-one years; and Cartwright re-demised it to
Rawlins for ten ; and it was resolved that the lease by Cartwright,
when he had nothing in the land, was good against him by conclusion ;
and when Rawlins re-demised to him, then was his interest bound by
the conclusion ; and when Cartwright re-demised to RawHns, now was
Rawlins concluded also. Rawlins, indeed, is bound as priv}'-, because
he comes in under Cartwright; but the purpose for which I cite this
case is, to shew that as soon as Cartwright gets the land, his interest
in it is bound. In Weak v. Lower, Poll. 54, (A. D. 1672,) Thomas, a
contingent remainder-man in fee, leased to Grills for 500 years, and
levied a fine to Grills for 500 years, and died. The contingency happened, and the remainder vested in the heir of Thomas, and whether
this lease was good against the heir of Thomas was the question. It
was debated before Hale, C. J., and his opinion was, that the fine did
operate at first by conclusion, and passed no interest, but bound the
heir of Thomas ; that the estate which came to the heir when the contingency happened fed the estoppel ; and then the estate bv estop pel
b ecame an estate in interest, and of the same effect as if the conti ngencv had_happened before the fine was levied : and he cited Rawlins's
Case, 4 Coke, 53, in which it was held, that if a man leased land in
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which he had nothing, and afterwards bought the land, such lease
would be good against him by conclusion, but nothing in interest till
he bought the land ; but that as soon as he bought the land, it would
become a lease in interest. The case was again argued before the Lord
Chancellor, Lord C. J. Hale, Wild, Ellis, and Windham, justices, and
they all agreed that the fine at first enured by estoppel ; but that when
the remainder came to the conusor's heir, he should claim in nature
of a descent, and therefore should be bound by the estoppel ; and th.en
t he estoppel was turned into an interest, and the cognizee had then a n
e state in the land.
In Trevivan v. Lawrence, 6 Mod. 258, Ld. Raym.
1051, Lord Holt cites 39 Ass. 18, and speaks of an estoppel as running
— as creating an interest
upon the land, and altering the interest of
in or working upon the estate of the land, and as running with the land
to whoever takes it. In Vick v. Edwards,
P. Wms. 372 (1735), Lord
contingent remainder-man as
albot must have considered
fine by
having the double operation of estopping the conusors till the contin gency happened, and then of passing the estate . In that case, lands
were devised to A. and B. and the survivor of them, aud the heirs of
such survivor, in trust to sell the master reported that they could not
make
good title, because the fee would vest in neither till one died.
On exceptions to the master's report. Lord Talbot held, that
fine_b
good title to the purchaser by estoppel for
he trustees would pass
was certain one of the two trustees
though the fee were in abeyance,
must be the survivor, and entitled to the future interest consequently,
his heirs claiming under him would be stopped by reason of the fin
the ancestor to say, quod partes finis nihil habuerunt, though he that
levied the fine had at the time no right or title to the contingent fee.
And the next day he cited Weale v. Lower. Now, whether Lord Talbot were right in treating the fee as in abeyance, and the limitation to
the survivor and his heirs as
contingent remainder or not,
evident he did so consider them and he must have had the impressjo n
hat the fine would have operated not by estoppel onlv. but by wav
had the latter
gissing the estate to the purchaser because, unless
operation as well as the former,
could not pass
good title to the
purchaser.
In Fearne, c.
said, "\ ^e are to remem (Edit. 1820) p. 365,
conti p-fiit ^^maiader may, before
vests,
ber, however, that
passed by fine by way of estoppel, so as to bind the interest which shal
afterwards accrue, by the contingency:" and after stating the facts in
Weale v. Lower, he says,
was agreed that the contingent remainder
descended to the conusor's heir; and th ough the fine operated at firs
by conclusion, and passed no interest, yet the estoppel bound the heir
and that upon the contingency, the estate by estoppel became an estate
in interest, of the same effect as
the contingency had happened before
he fine was levied.
Upon these authorities we are of opinion that the fine in this case
had
double operation, — that
bound Mr. and Mrs. Stephenson b^
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or conclusion

so long as the contingency continued ; but th at
happened, the estate which devolved upon M rs.
Stephenson fed the estoppel ; the estate created by the fine, by way of
estoppel, ceased to be an estate by estoppel only, and b ecame an intere st,
and gave Mr. Chandless. and those having right under him, exactl y
what he would have had had the contingency happened before the fin e
was levied,
Postea to the plaintiff.^
e stoppel
Avhen

the contingency

PERKINS

V.

(Court of Appeals of Kentucky,

Bennett, J., delivered

\^.^iji/\y^

1S90.

90

Ky,

611, 14 S.

W.

640.)

of the court.
interest in the land in controve rsy,
an d conveyed tlie whole oT \\^^q_ Y{.oxz.z^ Dunham by deed of general
w arran ty.
Thereafter Terry inherited tliat part of the land that he
own,
did not
and t his action o f eje ctment is brought by Terrv's hei rs
to_recoverJh6 possession ot that par^f_dieja nd thus inherited frorn
the appelTeeT He resists the righFoTlhe appellants to recover the said
land upon the ground t hat die tit le that Terry inherited was tran sf erred to his vendee by ejtoppel. The appellants contend that the docN. G. Terr y

Xi\4^*^^^

COLEMAN.

the opinion

o wned an undivided

7 "By the commpa law there were only t wo classes of conyey;a nces wh ich
w ere held to ope rate upon the after-acqnire d'Titl e-^-those Sy
^teoffmenfTI By^ne ,
or by co mmon re(i2i; ery, and tins from their solemnity and publicity, and ttiose
by Indenture of lease from the implied covenants arisins; upon such indenttrrPST'
dark v. balver, 14 Cal. 612, 627, 76 Am. Dec. 449 (1S60), per Field,
See, also, Burtners v. Keran, i>4 Grat. (A^a.) 42 (1873).
C. J.
In Sturgeon v. Wingfield, 15 M. & W. 224 (1846), where the lessee sued the
assignee of the lessor for breach of covenant made by the lessor, the defenses
were (1) that there had been no demise to the plaintiff, and (2) that no reversion had come to the defendant.
The lessor at the time of making the lease
had no interest in the premises, but later acquired an interest.
The court, by
Parke, B., said, "On the first issue, the verdict clearly must be entered for the
plaintiff, that there was such a demise to him as is stated in the declaration.
Then, as to the second point, all the reversion of Hogarth, which was a reversion by estoppel. pas.sed from him to the defendant.
This estoppel, was fed by
the d(^mise for one hundred years from the Broderer's Company to Hogarth, the
lessor, and thereby the lease from him to the plaintiff became good in point of
interest."
What would be the result where from the face of the lease it appears that
the lessor has no Interest?
"A., lessee for life of B., makes a lease for years by deed indented, and after
purchases the reversion in fee; B. dies; A. shall avoid his own lease, fo r he
m ay confess and avoid the lease which too'^Tlfect in point nf interest and .d et ermined by the death pf B." Co. Litt. 47b.
"Debt for rent on an indenture of lease for forty years. The defendant
pleaded that a year before the plaintiff made a lease for forty years to A., virtute cujus A. entered and was possessed ; and that thou-xh the defendant did
afterwards enter, yet he was accountable to the said A. On demurrer Carthew
argued, that the second lease was void for the fii-st thirty-nine yeai-s, and so
was the reser\ation, and that here was no estoppel, because the last of the forty years passed by the lease." See Gilinan v. Hoare, 1 Salk. 275 (1673).
A., lessee for five years, le ases to B. for twenty-five years, and later acquir es
t he reversi on lU Itjy.
any, effect does such acquisition of the fee have
VVhatrtf
'
—
— '■
^
-~
—
iig6h B.'s pbiJlUOuT
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trine of estoppel d£es not protect strangers to the transaction ; but
only the parties an'd privies are bound thereby ; and as the appellee
is neither party nor privy, he can not avail himself of the estoppel
that would bar the appellants' right as against Dunham or his privies.
I t is true that vyhere the estoppel merely affects the consciences o f
the partie s , and not the title, i t; does n nf nperate on stra ngers to th e
"
transaction ; but where it works an interest in the land" conveyed ,

"

'

Where it clearly appears from the
Tt runs with it. and is a title.
the
vendor
has
that
conveyed, or agrees to convey, a good ^^^
writing
1 t
Zt^
a nd sufficient title, and not merely his present interest in the land,
^^^^J jTIa^.^^
the agreement runs with the land , and repeats itself every day; and
if the vendor, at tlie time of the conveyance, has not title to the land, X»A>tX lS^^ A
"
eo instante." inures to the be nbut su bsequently acquire s the title,
immediately
In other words,
efit of die vendee and his privies.
ransferred by the law of estoppel to the vendee and his privies, because by the contract, which daily repeats itself, the vendor's title,
conwhenever acquired,
transferred to the vendee and his privies
equently,
stranger to the transaction, in an action of ejectment by
he vendor against him, where he must recover upon the strength of
his title^ and not upon the weakness of his adversary, may show that
he has thus parted with his title.
The
affirme
dgment
d.

is

'^

ju

t
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a
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y^^^d^

JORDAN
(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

V.
1910.

CHAMBERS.
226

Pa.

573, 75

Atl.

956, 134 Am. St.

Rep. 1081.)

Ej ectment for

J.
it

t

,

o

J.

land in Jefferson townsh ip. Before Kennedy, P.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.®
Defendant appealed.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff.
Brown,
The itle to the land involved in this ejectment passed
ut of the commonwealth in 1817 and M ary Robb acquired title to

r

it

by

was sold in
After her death
dated September 15, 1832.
appellant,
under an orde
1837 by her administra tor, the father qfjhe
of the orphans' court for tHe payment of debts, and the title which the
appellant claims, passed to him through su ndry conveyance s, starting
with the deed from Mary Robb's administrator to Hugh Toner and
ending with that of the sheriff of Allegheny county to himself.
Though ^
j/^
an unbroken chain of title by deed was shown in the appellant, th ^^^^^"^^^^"^
;roof submitted by the appellee, whose claim to title by adverse pos -y/W#'»'»^**'
period jin^>>f24mi^ ^^
session was sustained by the jury, was that from 1837 to 1897,
the lit x^S^CA.
of sixty years, poss ession of the land had never been taken
gr antee of Mary Robb's administrator nor by any ubse quent gran tee
claimi ng under Ton er.
Q^ja^^JtZ.^*' ^
deed

«

s

b
y

a

p

*•

e

jt

Tlie charge to the jury and certain requests are omitted.
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The a dverse possession upon which tlie appellee relied and recovered
in 1865. I n that year — twenty-seven years after the sale b y
started
AjLm^ ^L*t^V
Mary Robb's administrator— ane Robb , the widow of Oliver Robb,
'^
* Ci^ya son of Mary Robb, \vas in possession of the farm, living on it a nd
c laiming it as her own . There was no title, in her out of Mary Ro bb.
-L (^JiA^*'*^
^ "
By her last will and testament, admitted to probate October 12, 1869,
Jane Robb d evised the farm to her son Rob ert. On August 16, 1870,
he executed & ge neral warranty deed f or tlie coal underlying the propIn
erty to Thomas J. Keenan, Malcolm Hay and Robert Woods.
1874 his interest in tlie farm, excepting the coal, was s old at sheriff' s
^rr"'
sale, a nd , by various conveyances, it finally became vested in Herm an
deed for the qn eKeenan executed
l^^*^^^*^
^ liandel, t o whom Thomas
hird interest in the coal which Robert Robb had undertaken to conve
Upon the de ath of Herman Handel the property
him in 1870.
pass ed to the appellee in 1897, under proceedings in partition in the
orphans' court ot Allegheny county.
Under instructions free from
error as to the measure of proof required from the appellee to sustain
itle claimed to have been acquired by her by adverse possession
/)^^^^
he jury, with ample evidence before them, found her title to be goo
j)^ jl^^iA^-^ML
IS most earnestly contended that, as tlie title to two-thirds of the
'^^L
coal
still outstanding in Malcolm Hay and Robert Woods, or their
^
under the deed of 1870 from Robert Robb,
representatives,
general
•i(f'^^^^\^ ^y\
in
verdict
favor
of
the plaintiff for tlie land, including the coal, ought
^^^♦"lil*^
not to be sustained. While at first blush this may seem plausible,
"'T^/«#**'*^
clear, upon reflection, that
cannot avail the appellant. When Ro bert
Robb conveyed the coal in 1870 he had no interest in
nor in the su r~
ace above itT In lUbb — tive years before — Jane Robb, his mother,
became the adverse occupant
the property, and for five years after
her death he continued the adverse possession as her devisee, but_dur:
those ten years neither""she nor he acquired any right in the prop rty as against the real owner or owners, and against them nothin
could have been acquired by adve rse posses sion until the fullsta tuory period oT twenty-one years' adverse possession ha expired. During all those twenty-one years the trespassers could at any time have
been driven from the land by the holders of the paper title.
Duxing
lmt period there was no title at all in Jane Robb or in anyone claim ng under her as the adverse occupier of tlie premises. In 1886, and
not before, title by adverse possession became rooted in the land, but
its roots went no deeper than 1886.
"If, according to Lord Mansfield, the right of possession
taken away from the former owner, and
according to Chief Justice Tilghnian,
acquired by the disseisor's
occupancy for the statutory period. Judge Gibson was strictly accurate
when he said, in Graffius v. Tottenham,
Watts
494, 37 Am.
Dec. 472, that th effect of the statute was to transfer to the advers ghas run.
He added, 'the title of
ccupant the title against which
the original owner
u naffecte and un tramm elled ill the last moment
and when
vested in the adverse occupant, by the completion of
t
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statutory bar, the transfer has relation to nothing which preceded
' "
Woodward, J.,
it- , the instant of conception is tlie instant of birth.
in Schall et al. v. WiUiams Valley Railroad Co., 35 Pa. 191. B^the
Robb to Keenan. Hay and Woods tliere was no severanc e
dee_ d_from
of the coal. There could not have been, fo r the deed conv eyed nothi no- to them?
Neither these grantees nor any one claiming under them
at any time before or since the acquisition of the title by adverse possession in 1886 have made any attempt to sever the coal from the
surface.
I n 1886. when title bv adverse possession vested in Handel, then n
of the surface, not only it, but what was beneath it^ vested
ossession
p
i n him : but when the title so vested in him he was in the same position as Robb would have been in 1886, if still in adverse possession of
Havin g
the property, claiming ownership in it by such possession.
u ndertaken to convey the coal when he had no title to it. if rnn fronted
b y his conveyance of the same at the time of his acquisition of titl e
by adverse possession, h e would have been estopped, as against h is
grante es, from denying t heir equitable ownership in the coal and cou ld
i rave been compelled to convey to them. ("It is not to be doubted that'
a vendor who undertakes to sell a full title for a valuable considera-, ^2h>«-*-v^(^
tion, when he has less tlian a fee simple, but afterwards acquires tliv
fee, holds it in trust for his vendee, and will be decreed to convey it
to his use."J Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 299. In Chew v. Barnet, 11 Serg.
& R. 389, Judge James Wilson conveyed to Chew before he had title
to the property.
A conveyance was subsequently made to him by his
vendors under articles of agreement with him. To secure the purchase
money he executed a mortgage upon the property upon which it was
subsequently sold at sheriff's sale. When Chew, in an action of ejectment, sought to recover the property from the sheriff's vendees, it was
held that their title was paramount to his, and it was said by Gibson,
J. : "What is the nature of the estate which Mr. Chew acquired by
the conveyance from Judge Wilson? When that conveyance was executed, the legal title was in Jeremiah Parker, by patents from the
commonwealth ; and Judge Wilson having nothing but an equitable title under the articles, could convey nothing more ; his deed, therefore,
passed to Mr. Chew only an equitable title. But it is said, the subsequent conveyance from Jeremiah Parker to Judge Wilson inured to
It did so ; but only in equity, and to entitle
the benefit of Mr. Chew.
liim to call for a conveyance from Judge Wilson ; and not as vesting
T he fa cts prethe title in him, of itself, as contended, by estoppel.
sented constitute the ordinary case of a conveyance before tli e granto r
has acquired the title ; in which the conveyance operates as an ?^o^repment to convev. which, when the title has been subsequently acquire d.
may be enforced in chancery. 'A
t he

J

Where

wit h

general warranty land which he does not
own at the time, but afterwards acquires the ownership of
he printhat such acquisition inures to the b-enefit of the
ciple of estoppel
a

is

t

it,

one conveys
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g rantee, because the grantor is e s topped to deny, against the terta^
of his warranty, that he had the title in questio n. Burtners v. Keran,
42. But the estoppel of the grantor, who subsequently
24 Grat.

(Va.)

acquires title for what he had und£rtal^n^io_^2ieyiousl};_sell, inures
only to the benefit of his grantee, who can compel a proper conveyT hose who w ere
a nce after tlie acquisition of title by the grantor.
conveyance
take no advan can
not privies or p arties to the original
t age of estoppel arising from it . ""AllerTyr Allen, 45 Pa. 468. Estoppel s
may hp hy HppH hnt f^<;|-npppk h y Heed avail Only in favor of parti es
and privies.
Sunderlin v. Struthers, 47 Pa. 411. To this appellant
the estop pel of the appellee a s agai nst Robert Robb's conveyance o f
the coal is unavailing, for Yie was no party or p rivy to it. _ The situation as It existed at the time this ejectment was brought was a title
in the appellee for herself absolutely to the surface and one-third
of the coal, and as trustee for Hay and Woods, or those claiming under them, for an equitable title to two-thirds. B ut this outstanding equi table title to a portion of the coal was of no avail to the appellant a s
a gainst the appellee, the hol der of the legal title to the surface ajiA of
t he coal, entitled under that title to possession of b oth .
In 1902 an ejectment was brought for this land by Rebecca J. BenThe original denett et al., clai ming by desce nt from Mary Robb.
fendant in the action was the present appellant, but the appellee and
The jury were sworn
others, as claimants, were made co-defendants.
as against all the defendants, and the verdict having been rendered
in their favor, the further contention of the appellant is that his title
All that heed be said as to
is res adjudicata, in view of that verdict.
t his is that the verdict was in favor of all the defendants, but settled
no title in dispute among tliemselve s. Whether Chambers could assert title as against his codefendants, or any of them, remained, as
the court properly said in overruling a motion for a new trial, to be
settled in a controversy likely to arise between them.
This is that controversy.
Nothing in the assignments of error calls for further discussion.
They are all overruled and the jud gment is affirmed."

n

» A. made a deed of premises to B., with general covenant of
warrani:^ ; the
next .V(\'ir a (1(M'(1 of the same premises was mado l)y "X.""fo 'AT,' Who thcrtMipon
\vo\\\ into imsscssiou and continued therein for the period of the statute of liiHItTitions. In an action of ejectment by a .grantee of B., it was held that A. was
entitled to judfonent.
Chatham v. Lansford, 149 N. C. 363, 63 S. E. 81, 25 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 129 (1908).
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AIKENS.

(Supreme Court of Vermont, 1S53.

25 Vt. 635.)

Appeal from the Court of Chancery.
The bill was brought by the
orator to_foredo^se_a mortgage, dated the 19th day of July, 1845, and
to forecl ose the equity of redemption, of Daniel Aikens and those
claiming under him, of three pieces or parcels of land in Barnard, described in said bill and mortgage, as follows : one piece of about
one hundred acr es, called the "Paul Ellis Farm."
One other piece of
land contammg about o ne hundred acres Jcnown as the "Lease Lot."
And also a piece of land contammg about fifty acres. Th e bill was in
* * *
the usual form.
H enry Murphy answering says, that he claims title to a certain
part of the mortga ged premises described in the orator's bill as th e
"
"
And turtner says,, that he will insist in defence to said
Lease Lot.
action, that on the 20th day of November , 1848, the said "Lease Lot,"»
belo nged to the Society for the Propagation oi the Gospel , &.C.,— s ubj ect to such interest a s the orator might have by virtue of the mortgage deed from said Aikens to him, m euLiuiied in said -bill of com plaint, which interest extended only to the unexpired portion of the
lease formerly made by said Society to one Abial Frye, dated January
That on said 20th
1st, 1836, for the term of thirty years thereafter.
a
durable
said
executed
lease of sa:id
1848,
November,
of
Society
day
f
November,
t
hat
the
27th
o
Aikens,
and
on
1848,
land to the said
day
th e said Daniel Aikens conveyed to thi s defendant by deed o f warr anty the same premises, subject to the payment of a yearly rgn t to
said Society, in consideration of $300, paid by this defendant .
That on the first day of January, 1836, said Society were the exclusive owners of the premises, and d id lease the same, to sai d Frye for
t hirty years for a certain reserved rent ; that said Frye gave a mor tgage deed to one Willard Caryl, and said Caryl afterwards quit-claim ed
to one A. Howe and others, all of whom qu it-claimed their interest to
the said Aikprm

That afterwards,

and previous to the time of the execution of
the orator's deed by the said Aikens, said Aikens contracted in writing for the sale of the same to one William Dutton, and that he
took possession under said contract ; that afterwards while said Frye
and said Dutton were both in possession, said Society commenced their
ejectment suit for the possession of the premises, in the Windsor County Court, and at the November Term of said court, in 1846, did recover the possession of the same.
Catherine Murphy answering, sets forth the same facts, and says
that said Henry Murphy, before the bringing of the orator's bill, executed and delivered to her a deed of the said premises, which deed
Aig.Peop. — 51
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Daniel Aikens did not answer.
Testimony having been taken upon the matters in issue between
the orator and said Sarah A. Goddard, the cause, December Term,
1852, was heard on the bill and answers of said Henry and Catherine
Murphy ; and on the bill, pleadings and evidence, as to said Sarah ;
and at said term, the Court of Chancery decreed that as to said Henry
and Catherine Murphy, and said Sarah A. Goddard, and the several
parts of the premises aforesaid by them, respectively claimed, being
the "Paul Ellis Farm," so called in the bill, and the "Lease Lot," so
called in the bill, stand dismissed out of, said bill ; and foreclosure
on the other premuses.
Bennett, J.^° This case comes up by an appeal from the Court
of Chancery. T he bill is brought to foreclose the equity of re dempt ion, of Daniel Aikens and those claiming under him, in certain parc ^s of lands, described in t he bill- of complain t, a nd in the mort*
gage deed from said Aikens to the orator, bearmg date the 19i:h da v
of July, 1845. and recorded the same day. * * *
The more important question
in relation to the "Lease I^ot" so
called. Though
may be true that this lot was, in 1836, leased by
the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, to
Abial Frye for
period of thirty years; and he mortgaged
to William Caryl
and though the premises may have come by quit-claim
to Daniel Aikens, yet
clear, that without resort to what shall be
the effect of the recovery in ejectment, by the Society against F.rye
and Dutton, the present plaintiff cannot rely upon any title which Aikens had to this lot under the Frye lease. Tiie title which Caryl had
from Frye was but
mortgage, and there
nothing in the case to
show, that Caryl's debt against Frye
outstanding, or that
passed
into the hands of Aikens.
His title
stated to be by quit-claim
deed.
As our courts have decided, that
mortgagee cannot mainain ejectrne ri^' ^ftpr th^ rnortg ge debt has been paid, and that^t
rebut the presumption of payment^ the mortgage notes should ^ be
roduced, or accounted for otherwise
would seem to follow, that
so far, at least, there was no title in Aikens for him to convey;
but
claimed that Aikens, after he had executed his mortgage to the
plaintiff, took
durable lease of this lot from the propagation Society, and that this after title, inured to the benefit of Jarvis.
appears, that the date of the Society's lease to Aikens was the
20th day of November, 1848, and recorded the same day; and that
on the 27th day of November, 1848, Aikens conveyed, by
deed of
warranty, the lot to Henry Murphy; and after this. Murphy conveyed
deed of warranty, to Catherine Alurphy;
by
and the question is,
Adiich title shall preva
10 The parts of the statement of facts
and of the opinion
"Paul Ellis Farm" are omitted.
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It is not seriously claimed by the counsel for Catherine Murphy, but
what the subsequent title acquired by Aikens, would inure to the benefit
of Jarvis, so as to estop Aikens and his heirs from claiming title
against him and his assignees ; but it is said that the principle should
not be applied, as between the purchaser and a subsequent purchaser
from the grantor, and that to so apply
would be at war with our
This
point of some importance, and well deserves
registry system.
We need cite no authorities to show, that Aikens himconsideration.
self would be estopped from setting up title against Jarvis, because
he might sue Aikens on his covenants,
he was not estopped; and
said,
the law abhors circuity of action; but
Jarvis can claim
Aikens,
to save circuity of action, yet as
the premises, as against
which
against Murphy no such reason exists, and the only question
shall be compelled to resort to the covenants in Aikens' deeds, Jarvis,
or Murphy? In Trevivan v. Lawrence et al.,
Salk. 276,
was held
that the parties, and all claiming under them, were bound by an estopsubpel, and the court put the case, as between the purchaser and
In
the same case, reported in
sequent purchaser from the grantor.
Mod. 258, and Ld. Ray. 1051, Lord Holt cites 39 Ass. 18, and speaks
of an estoppel, as running upon the land, and altering the interest of
— as creating an interest in, or working upon the estate in the land, and
as running with the land to whoever takes it. The covenants in Aiken
double operation, first as an
to Jarvis, may well be said to have
d^ed
secondly
and
the
to
eestoppeT.
pass
estate, tlie instant that Aikens
arne the owner.
The covenants bound Aikens, as an estoppel, until he took his durable lease from the Society, and then the estate, which devolved upon
him, fed the estoppel, and the estate created by the covenants in
Aikens' deed by way of estoppel, ceased to be an estate by estoppel only,
and became an interest, and gave the orator precisely what he would
have had, in case the durable lease had been executed to Aikens before his mortgage deed to the orator.
The estoppel, when
run
operates upon the title, so as actually to alter the in^th the
terest m It, n the hands of the heir, or assigns of the person bound
stoppel, as well as in the hands of such person himself.
by^the
was said, by Lane, J., in the case of Douglass v. Scott,
Ohio, 198
"that the obligation created by estoppel, not only binds the party
but all persons privy to him
making
the legal representatives of
the party, those who stand in his situation by act of law, and all who
take his estate by contract, stand in his stead, and are subjected to
all the consequences, which accrue to him.
It adheres to the land,
transmitted with the estate,
becomes
muniment of title, and
all who afterwards acquire the title, take
subject to the burden,
which the existence of the fact imposes upon it." We think this view
in accordance with the adjudged cases. See Rawlins' Case,
Coke,
Pollexfen, 60; Christmas et al. v. Oliver, 10 Barn.
52 Weale v.
Cres. 181
Coke. Littleton, 352 (a); Wark v. Willard, 13 N. H. 389;
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Patten, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 324; Dudley v. Cadwell, 19 Conn.
227; Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 567, 49 Am.
of the case, our registry system can ji ave no
Dec. 189. In this view
~
There was no title in Aikens, when he deeded
control of the~question
to Henry Murphy, it had before passed to Jarvis, and was vested in
him. In the case from 24 Pick. (Mass.) 324, the point was specially
made by counsel, that this doctrine was in conflict with their regisThe same
try system; but the court did not regard the objection.
objection has been made in other cases, but without effect.
We see no re ason, why this doct rine should not be extended to a
mortgage deed with the usual covenants, as well as to an absolute
deed, and indeed in the case of 24 Pick. 324, the claimant's title was un -

White

der

V.

mnrfcrafTP rJeed
Though it may be true, that before
a

the lease was executed by the
Society to Aikens, Henry Murphy paid sixty dollars to the Society
towards rent, which was in arrear, and which was to be a part of the
consideration which he was to pay to Aikens for his deed ; but this
cannot create a resulting trust in Murphy, to any portion of the land,
which can avail against the legal title of Jarvis. It was in fact money
paid by Murphy to the use of Aikens. Nothing can be made out of
this, that can aid Murphy in this controversy.
We think then, that the decree of the Chancellor should be reversed, as to Henry and Catherine Murphy with costs ; and a decree
of foreclosure pass against them as to the "Lease Lot," and in other
respects affirmed.^'

RESSER
(Supreme Court of Minnesota,

V.

CARNEY.

1S93.

52

Minn.

397, 54 N.

W.

S9.)

Appeal by plaintiffs, William C. Resser and Charles Davison, from
judgment of the District Court of Ramsey County, Kelley, J.,
entered March 15, 1892, that they take nothing by the action and for

a

costs.

Dickinson, J, Action for breach of covenant of seisi n contained
in a deed of conveyance executed by the defendant to the plaintiffs
in February, 1882. Whatever title the defendant had to convey, and
whatever title may have subsequently inured to the plaintiffs as his
grantees, was derived from the United States through the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company; the land being within the indemnity limit
of the land grant to that corporation.
The chain of conveyances to
which attention is directed is as follows :
In 1879 the Northern Pacific Railroad Company conveyed to Paine,
n A. conveyed premises to B., and later conveyed the same premises to C,
with covenant of warranty "against all persons claiming by, through, or under
A." B. afterwards reconveyed to A., and D., a creditor of A., levied upon the
land as the land of A. Had A. a leviable interest?
See Wheeler v. Young,
infra, p. 862, and cases there referred to.
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and in 1880 Paine conveyed to Kindred, and the latter to the defendant, Carney, all such conveyances being by warranty deed. February 28, 1882, Carney conveyed, by warranty deed containing a
This action is for a breach of the
covenant of seisin, to the plaintiffs.
covenant contained in that deed. Of the purchase price, $4,480, there
On the same day the plaintiffs exewas paid the sum of $2,480.
cuted to their grantor, the defendant, a mortgage on the same land
Subsequently, and in
to secure the unpaid part of the purchase price.
the same year, 1882, the plaintiffs conveyed to other parties, who in
1887, prior to the commencement of this action, reconveyed to the
I n Tulv. 1886. the mortgage given by the plaintiffs wa s
plaintiffs.
foreclosed under the power therein contained, the defendant purcha si ng the property at the foreclosure sa le, and n o redemption w as made
therefrom.
The premises have always been va cant and unoccupied. This action
was commenced in November, 1887. In April, 1891, the United States
executed a patent conveying the land to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, in which patent it was recited that the land had been
selected by an agent of the railroad company, "as shown by his original list of selections, certified under date of March 19, 1883, and
April 9, 1883, by the register and receiver at Fargo, State of Dakota."
It does not otherwise appear when this selection was approved by the
secretary of the interior.
The selection of indemnity lands, which was to be made "under the
direction of the secretary of the interior," (13 St. at Large, p. 367, c.
217, § 3,) did not become effectual, nor did the title pass from the
United States, at least until the selection was approved, or in some
way sanctioned by the secretary of the interior; and hence, so far as
appears in this case, not until the issuing of the patent, in April, 1891,
which evidences such approval.
Musser v. McRae, 38 Minn. 409, 38
Id.,
N. W. 103 ;
44 Minn. 343, 46 N. W. 673 ; United States v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 141 U. S. 358, 12 Sup. Ct. 13, 35 L. Ed. 766.
H ence it will be observed that at the time of the conveyance from the
d efendant to the plaintiffs, February, 1882, the title was still inth e
United States, and that it was not until some nine years thereafte r.
nor until more than three years after the commencement of thisacti on ,
t hat the title was conveyed to the railroad company .
Not until then
could such title have been transmitted, or have inured by operation
of law, to the grantees of that company, immediate or remote. In
o ther words, the covenant of seisin appears to have been wholly brolce n
when it was made, s o that the plaintiffs; had a rjo-ht of action _to
recover the purch ase money paid ; and not until after this actioo was
commenced was "the defendant in a position, so far as appears, to_j nvo ke the application of the principle that a title acquired by a granto r
after a conveyance by him, with covenants, inures to the benefit of
his covenantee.
The question here presented is whether that principle
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covenant broken.
Otherwise expressed, the question is whether the ^
ti tle acquired during the pendency of the action for breach of cove - Vl„--'
nant was a ctually transferred to and vested in the plaintiffs by operatio n
ven
ol law, so, that they were compelled to and did actually acquire
against
If so, that fact would
their wil
without their consent and
probably be available to the defendant in defense of such an action, or
at least in mitigation of damages.
Upon the questio n thus presented, the law cannot be said to be settled. In support, wholly or to some extent, of the proposition "tKat
title acquired by the grantor subsequent to the conveyance by him
unwilling
inures by operation of law to his grantee, even though he
nd hence will mitigate the damages recoverable for
then to accept
reach of covenant or wholly defeat an action for damages, accordBaxter v. Bradbury,
ng to the circumstances of the case^ may be cite
49;
Gilson's-Adm'x,
32 111. 348, 83
v.
260,
King
20 Me.
37 Am. Dec.
Am. Rep. 269; Reese v. Smith, 12 Mo. 344; Morrison v. Underwood,
20 N. H. 369; Knowles v. Kennedy, 82 Pa. 445; Farmers' Bank v.
Glenn, 68 N. C. 35; Cornell v. Jackson,
Cush. (Mass.) 505; Boulter
U.
v. Webster,
V. Hamilton, 15 U. C. C. P. 125, citing doe
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C. O. B. 225. See, also. Knight v. Thayer, 125 Mass. 25. In some of
these cases, however,
may be noticed that the plaintiff* was in possession of the granted lands under his deed,
well supported by authority tha
Qn the contrary, the doctrine
grantee to whom no title passed by the deed of conveyance, who acquired no possession, and no right of possession, may recover th
purchase monev paid^ with interest, in an action for
breach of th
may
acquired
tit
have
covenant of seisin even though the grantor
uring the pendency of such an action, or, perhaps^ even prior to its
commencement
hat the grantee
not to be compelled to acc ept

title in satisfaction of the already broken covenan
mitigation of damages recoverable for the breac
Blanchard v. Ellis,
Gray (Mass.) 195, 61 Am. Dec. 417; Tucker
v. Clarke,
N. Y.
Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 96; Bingham v. Weiderwax,
509; Nichol v. Alexander, 28 Wis. 118; Mclnnis v. Lyman, 62 Wis.
191, 22 N. W. 405; Burton v. Reeds, 20 Ind. 87, 93; Rawle, Cov.
179-182, 256-258, 264, 265; Bigelow, Estop. 440; Sedg.
W.
Land,
While in some of the cases last cited there had
Tr. Title
850.
been an eviction of the covenantee after he had been in possession,
that would not distinguish such cases from that now before us. The
inability of the plaintiffs to enter into possession of this vacant land
without committing
trespass, by reason of the paramount title being
in another, would have the same effect, as respects the right of action
for
breach of the covenants contained in the deed, as would an eviction
Fritz v. Pusey, 31 Minn. 368,
possession had been acquired.
18 N. W. 94; Shattuck v. Lamb, 65 N. Y. 499, 22 Am. Rep. 656.
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last cited present the view of the law
most consistent with reason and with familiar legal principles, as we ll
as the rule most conducive to justice, in its practical application .
It is certain, if the defendant's deed conveyed no title, that the plaintiffs had a legal right, when this action was commenced, to recover
the purchase price paid for a. title. They elected to pursue that remedy,
and still insist upon the legal right. We cannot understand how that
perfect, absolute legal right of action, and especially after an action has
how the right, at the election
been already instituted, is defeated;
of the grantee, to enforce his action for the breach of the covenant is
taken away or lost by any proper application of the principle that
an after-acquired title inures to the benefit of the grantee, by force
of his covenants, and upon principles embraced within the general
doctrine of estoppel. We do not concur in the proposition that the
principle just referred to is effectual to actually transfer and vest in
the covenantee an estate acquired by the covenantor subsequent to his
conveyance. See, in addition to the authorities above cited, Buckingham V. Hanna, 2 Ohio St. 551 ; Burtners v. Keran, 24 Grat. (Va.) 42,
67; Chew v. Barnet, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 3S9, 391. Indeed, that the
estate is thus actually transferred to the covenantee, without resting
in the covenantor, to whom the after-acquired title is in terms conveyed,
is inconsistent with the idea of an estoppel binding the latter and those
in privity with him ; and y et it is not to be doubted that the doctrin e
w hich we are considering really rests upon the ground of estoppel. It
i s founded on equitable principles , and aff'ords to a grantee with covenants a remedy of an equitable nature with respect to a title acquired
by the grantor after he had assumed to convey the same; and doubtless courts of law, at this day, recognize and apply the principle of
estoppel, in such cases, as courts of equity are wont to do. They will
treat the after-acquired title as though it had been conveyed, when
Rawle, Cov. § 258.
equity would decree that a conveyance be made.
right
But t his equitable
is one in favor of the covenantee, restin g
u pon the estoppel of the covenantor to assert, as agamst him, n titl e
If the grantee acquires nothing by the deed to him,
t o the property.
and has and asserts a legal cause of action for covenant broken, jio
p rinciple of e stoppel operates against him, to compel him, perhap s
y ears afterwards, as in this case, to accept, in satisfaction of that legal
c ause of action, wholly or partially, a title which his covenantor ma y
then procu re. The latter, whose covenant has been wholly broken,
has no right to elect, as against the covenantee, and to his prejudice,
whether he will respond in damages for the breach by repaying the
purchase money, or buy in the paramount title, when the value of the
property may have greatly depreciated, and compel the plaintiff to accept that title. T he right of election is. and should be. with the other
party.. He had the benefit of the estoppel, but it is not to be imposed
upt)" him as a burden, at the will of the party who alone is subjec t

To our minds

the authorities
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elect to pursue the action at law, and recov er

fo?a title~which was not conveyed to him . At

^-

in thi s case, at any time
f ore the acquisition of the title by the covenanto r.
The case of Burke v. Beveridge, 15 Minn. 205, (Gil. 160,) did not
require a consideration of the question now before us. The decision
necessarily rested upon another ground; and while, in the opinion
of the court, Baxter v. Bradbury, supra, is referred to wnth approval, we do not. accept the dictum as expressing the law on this subject.
The respondent adopts the memorandum or opinion of the learned
judge who tried the cause, in place of a brief, for the purposes of this
We infer that the respondent relies upon the proposition,
appeal.
upon which the court based its decision, that, by reason of the foreclosure of the purchase-money mortgage, the purchase by the defendant at the foreclosure sale, and the nonredemption therefrom, the
plaintiffs' right of action for breach of the covenant of seisin has been
extinguished ; that it passed from the plaintiffs back to the defendant,
the vendor, when by the foreclosure the plaintiffs were divested, and
the defendant reinvested, with whatever estate or interest was conveyed by the deed. Kimball v. Bryant, 25 Minn. 496, is cited in this
connection.
This contention must rest upon the familiar legal proposition that, a right of action by a grantee upon covenants which run
with the land does not remain in him after he has transferred the estate, but passes with it. But we do not deem the proposition applicable
to the case here presented.
It will be kept in mind that the mortgage was executed by the vendees to the vendor contemporaneously with the conveyance made to the
former by the latter, and for the purpose, merely, of securing the payment of a part of the purchase price.
We may state, without discussing the proposition, that the vendees
were not estopped or precluded, by the covenants in their mortgage
to the vendor, from recovering for a breach of the similar covenants
contained in the deed of the latter to them. Sumner v. Barnard, 12
Mete. (Mass.) 459; Brown v. Staples, 28 Me. 497, 48 Am. Dec. 504;
Smith V. Cannell, 32 Me. 123; Haynes v. Stevens, 11 N. H. 28; Connor V. Eddy, 25 Mo. 72; Rawle, Gov. (5th Ed.) § 266.
In Kimball v. Bryant, supra,
was considered that,
the granl ee
u nder
deed of conveyance with a covenant of seisin conveys the same
may be presumed, "unless there be something to
and to another,
contrary intention," that, although the covenant was broke n
how
jixen
was given, he intends to confer on his grantee the benefit of the
ovenant, so far as necessary for his protection
tn transf er Vn'p rJcrhf
to sue for the br each,_so far as his grantee sustains injury by reaso n
of it. But in case like that under consideration the circumstances do
"show
When the plaintiffs purchased the propcontrary intention."
d id

if

plaintiffs

s

a

it

a

a

;

c

V

l
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a
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l east, he mav so elect, as the
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erty, and took a deed with covenants embracing that of seisin, the
presumption is irresistible and conclusive that the covenant was intended by both parties to the deed to be effectual as an obligatory
assurance of title, p-i vin<y an immediatp right nf ^rUnn to the plaintiff s
i f the covenant should be found to have been broken.
I t would b e
unreasonable to suppose that when the purchasers g ave b ack to the ir
vendor a mortgage of the land, merely to secure the payment of a
part of the purchase price, it was the intention of the parties that the
p urchasers should thereby divest thertiselves of, or relinquish, in fav or
o f their covenantor, the benefits of the covenant, which in the very
sa me transaction they had just taken Trom him tor tneir own pr ot ection. It could not have- been intended that the mortgage should, in
eft'ect, embrace and hypothecate to the vendor his own covenant assuring to his vendees the title which he then assumed to convey. As__bet ween the part ies to such a transaction, the mortgag e back to the
vendor is to be" deemed as reconveving, subject to the condition "o?
defeasance, only such estate as is conveved hv thp mnrtg-agee. to t he
rn ortg^g^^'s-.
It was no t effecUial as between these parties, t o di scha rge the vendo r from his obligation upon the covenant of seisin,
wHTch,^ being then broken, gave to the mortgagors an immediate right
of action. T he general rule that the right of action upon coven ants
which run with the land passes with the estate, and does not remai n
in a cov enan tee after the estate has been transferred, is not a pphcaitl e-^ Smith v. Cannell. 32 Me. 123; Haynes v. Stevens, 11 N. H.
28; Randall v. Lower, 98 Ind. 255; Rawle, Gov. 266; Bigelow, Estop.
(5th Ed.) 411^13.
Hence the plaintiffs, upon the case here presented, were entitled
to recover for breach of covenant. Judgment reversed.^^
12

On the subject-matter of the chapter generally, see Rawle on Covenants
c. 11, and Bigelow on Estoppel (6th Ed.) c 11.
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SECTION

1.— FRAUDULENT

ST.

27

ELIZ.

CONVEYANCES

c. 4 (1585).

Forasmuch as not only the Queen's most excellent Majesty,
Sec. 1.
but also divers of her Highness's good and loving subjects, and bodies
politic and corporate, after conveyances obtained or to be obtained
and purchases made or to be made, of lands, tenements, leases, estates,
and hereditaments, for money or other good considerations, may have,
incur, and receive great loss and prejudice by reason of fraudulent
and covinous conveyances, estates, gifts, grants, charges, and limitations
of uses heretofore made or hereafter to be made, of, in, or out of
lands, tenements, or hereditaments so purchased or to be purchased ;
which said gifts, grants, charges, estates, uses, and conveyances v/ere,
or hereafter shall be, meant or intended by the parties that so make the
same to be fraudulent and covinous, of purpose and intent to deceive
such as have purchased or shall purchase the same ; or else, by the secret intent of the parties, the same be to their own- proper use, and at
their free disposition, colored nevertheless by a feigned countenance
and show of words and sentences, as though the same were made bona
fide, for good causes, and upon just and lawful considerations:
P'or remedy of which inconveniences, and for the avoiding
Sec. 2.
of such fraudulent, feigned, and covinous conveyances, gifts, grants,
charges, uses, and estates, and for the maintenance of upright and just
dealing in the purchasing of lands, tenements, and hereditaments :
Be it ordained and enacted, by the authority of this present Parliament,
that all and every conveyance, grant, charge, lease, estate, incumbrance, and limitation of use or uses, of, in. or out of any lands, tenements, or other hereditaments whatsoever, had or made any time heretofore sithence the beginning of the Queen's Majesty's reign that now
is, or at any time hereafter to be had or made, for the intent and of
purpose to defraud and deceive such person or persons, bodies politic
or corporate, as have purchased or 'shall afterward purchase in fee
simple, fee tail, for life, lives, or years, the same lands, tenements, and
hereditaments, or any part or parcel thereof, so formerly conveyed,
granted, leased, charged, incumbered, or limited in use, or to defraud
and deceive such as have or shall purchase any rent, profit, or commodity in or out of the same, or any part thereof, shall be deemed

^

Cll.

8)

PRIORITIES

811

and taken, only as. against that person or persons, bodies politic and
corporate, his an» their heirs, successors, executors, administrators,
and assigns, and against all and every other person or persons lawfully
having or claiming by, from, or under them, or any of them, which
have purchased or shall hereafter so purchase for money or other good
consideration, the same lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any
part or parcel thereof, or any rent, pront, or commodity, in or out of
the same, to be utterly void, frustrate, and of none effect ; any pretence, color, feigned consideration, or expressing of any use or uses
to the contrary notwithstanding.
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that
Sec. 3.
all and every the parties to such feigned, covinous, and fraudulent
gifts, grants, leases, charges, or conveyances before expressed, or being privy and knowing of the same or any of them, which after the
twentieth day of April next coming shall wittingly and willingly put
in use, avow, maintain, justify, or defend the same or any of them,
as true, simple, and done,, had, or made bona fide, or upon good consideration, to the disturbance or hindrance of the said purchaser or
purchasers, lessees, or grantees, or of or to the disturbance or hindrance of their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, or assigns,
or such as have or shall lawfully claim anything by, from, or under
them or any of them, shall incur the penalty and forfeiture of one
year's value of the said lands, tenements, and hereditaments so purchased or charged ; the one moiety whereof to be to the Queen's Majesty, her heirs and successors, and the other moiety to the party or parties grieved by such feigned and fraudulent gift, grant, lease, conveyance, incumbrance, or limitation of use, to be recovered in any of the
Queen's courts of record by an action of debt, bill, plaint, or information, wherein no essoin, protection, or wager of law shall be admitted
for the defendant or defendants ; and also, being thereof lawfully convicted, shall suffer imprisonment for one-half year without bail or
mainprise.
Provided also, and be it enacted by the authority aforesaid,
Sec. 4.
that this Act, or anything therein contained, shall not extend or be
construed to impeach, defeat, make void or frustrate any conveyance,
assignment of lease, assurance, grant, charge, lease, estate, interest,
or limitation of use or uses, of, in, to, or out of, lands, tenements, or
hereditaments heretofore at any time had or made, or hereafter to be
had or made, upon or for good consideration and bona fide to any
person or persons, bodies politic or corporate; anything before mentioned to the contrary hereof notwithstanding.
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that
Sec. 5.
if any person or persons have heretofore, sithence the beginning of
the Queen's Majesty's reign that now is, made or hereafter shall make
any conveyance, gift, grant, demise, charge, limitation of use or uses,
or assurance of, in. or out of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments,
with any clause, provision, article, or condition of revocation, deter-
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mination, or alteration, at his or their will or pleasure, of such conveyance, assurance, grants, limitations of uses or estates of, in, or out
of the said lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or of, in, or out of any
part or parcel of them, contained or mentioned in any writing; deed,
or indenture of such assurance, conveyance, grant, or gift; and after
such conveyance, grant, gift, demise, charge, limitation to uses, or assurance so made or had, shall or do bargain, sell, demise, grant, convey,
or charge the same lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any part or
parcel thereof, to any person or persons, bodies politic and corporate,
for money or other good consideration paid or given (the said first
conveyance, assurance, gift, grant, demise, charge, or hmitation, not by
him or them revoked, made void, or altered, according to the power
and authority, reserved or expressed unto him or them in and by the
said secret conveyance, assurance, gift, or grant) that then the said
former conveyance, assurance, gift, demise, and grant, as touching the
said lands, tenements, and hereditaments, so after bargained, sold, conveyed, demised, or charged against the said bargainees, vendees, lessees, grantees, and every of them, their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, and against all and every person and persons which have, shall, or may lawfully claim anything by, from, or
under them or any of them, shall be deemed, taken, and adjudged to be
void, frustrate, and of none effect, by virtue and force of this present

Act.
Provided, nevertheless, that no lawful mortgage made or
without fraud or covin, upon good consideration, shall be impeached or impaired by force of this Act, but shall
Sec. 6.

to be made bona fide, and

stand in the like force and effect as the same should have done,

if this

Act had never been had nor made ; anything in this Act to the contrary
in any wise, notwithstanding.^

DOE

ex dem.

OTLEY

v.

MANNING.

(Court of King's Bench, 1807.

9 East, 59.)

In ejectment for certain messuages and premises at St. Mary Magdalen, Bermondsey, in Surry; a verdict was found for the defendants,
subject to the opinion of the Court on the following case.
Thomas
Clendon, being seised in fee of the premises in question, by his will of
the 6th of March, 1750, duly executed and attested, demised the premises (amongst others) to his nephew William Clendon for life ; remainder to trustees during W. C.'s life to preserve contingent remainders ;
remainder to the first and other sons of W. C. successively in tail male ;
1 As to character of American
legislation,
veyances (Ivnowlton's Ed.) p. 622 et seq.
Pure chattels are not XNithin the statute.

(1835.)

see

Bill

Bigclow

on

v. Cureton,

Fraudulent Con2 My.

& K, 503
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remainder to the testator's nephew, Owen Manning-, for life; remainder to trustees during O. M.'s Hf e to support contingent remainders ;
remainder to the first and other sons of O. M. successively in tail
male ; remainder to his own right heirs for ever ; and gave the usual
powers of leasing, in possession, at rack rents, for 21 years ; and also
power to each of the devisees, when in actual possession, to settle
upon such person as he should marry, for her jointure, premises of the
yearly value of £80. for every £1000. he should receive with such wife.
The testator died seised of the premises in 1751; and Wm. Clendon,
his nephew, died in March, 1764, without issue, whereby the estate
By
descended to O. Manning, the next tenant for life, in remainder.
indenture of bargain and sale of the 25th of Nov. 1782, duly enrolled
in C: B., between Owen Manning and George Owen Manning, his eldest son,- of the 1st part, T. Green of the 2d part, and P. Willson of the
3d part, Owen Manning and George, his son, sold and conveyed the
premises to Green in fee, to the intent that he might become tenant
thereof, for the purpose of suffering a recovery, to the use of O. Manning and his assigns for life ; remainder to the said G. O. Manning in
fee; and a recovery was accordingly suffered in Hil. term 23 Geo. III.
On the 15th of March, 1783, G. O. Manning died intestate, and without
issue; whereby the reversion in fee descended to John Manning his
brother and heir at law. By indentures of lease and release of the 11th
and 12th of April, 1783, between Owen Manning, who was thtn in
possession, of the first part, the said John Manning of the second part,
and W. Gill and H. S. Gill of the third part; reciting the former indenture of bargain and sale, and the recovery, and the death of G. O.
Manning, and that divers other messuages, &c., having in like manner
descended to the said John Manning, he was desirous of making some
settlement and provision for the benefit of his mother, in case she
should survive Owen Manning, and of his sisters and younger brother ;
it was witnessed, that in consideration of the natural love and affection
which John Manning bore towards Catharine Manning his mother,
and Jane, Catharine Matilda, Ann, and Matilda Manning, his sisters,
and Charles Manning, his brother, and for making provision for them
for their respective lives, and of 10s. &c. ; Owen Manning and John
Manning conveyed to W. and H. S. Gill in fee, amongst others, all
the said premises, habendum, &c., to the use of Owen Manning for
life, sans waste; remainder to the use of the trustees, during the life
of O. M., in trust to preserve contingent remainders ; remainder to
the use of Cath. Manning for life, sans waste ; remainder to the trustees
and their heirs, upon trust, during the lives of Jane, Catharine Matilda,
Ann, Matilda, and Charles Manning, and the survivor of them, to receive the rents, &c., and pay the same equally amongst his said sisters
and brother, and to the survivor of them ; remainder to John Manning
in fee ; with the like power of leasing as is contained in Clendon's will ;
and a power for Owen Manning, during his life, and Catharine his
mother, during her life, with the privity and consent of John Manning
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and the trustees, or the survivor, his heirs or assigns, testified as therein mentioned; and for John Manning, after his father's and mother's
decease, with the Uke pri\ ity of the trustees, or the survivor, his heirs
or assigns, testified as aforesaid; to execute like leases for 99 years.
Owen Manning died the 9th of Sept., 1801. By indentures of lease
and release of the 16th and 17th of May, 1805, between John Planning
of the first part, R. Otley of the second part, and H., Otley of the
third part ; reciting the indenture of bargain and sale of the 25th of
Nov., 1782, and the deaths of George Owen IVIanning and Owen Manning, and that John Manning had contracted with R. Otley for the
absolute sale of the premises ; it was witnessed, that in consideration
of £1800. to John Manning paid, he conveyed to R. and H. Otley in
fee all the said premises for which this ejectment was brought, being
part of the premises in the last-mentioned deed ; habendum to such
uses as R. Otley should appoint; and in the mean time, and subject
thereto, to the use of R. Otley in fee. The consideration for the conveyance to the lessor of the plaintiff was paid thus ; by a book debt
from John Manning to the lessor of plaintiff £417. 2s. 9d. By cash at
sundry times £1382. 17s. 3d. The book debt was contracted, and £150.
of the consideration money paid, at the date of the purchase contract,
and £387. 5s. 6d. at a subsequent period, but before the execution of
the conveyance of 1805, and before the lessor of the plaintiff had notice of the deed of 1783. The residue- of the consideration was paid,
and the deeds executed, subsequent to such notice. John Manning did
not divest himself of all his property by the conveyance of tlie 12th of
April, 1783. There was no fraud in the last-mentioned conveyance,
unless fraud is to be implied by construction or operation of law. The
question for the opinion of the Court was, Whether the lessor of the
plaintiff was entitled to recover against the defendant Manning? If
the Court should be of opinion that he was, a new trial was to be had,
or an issue granted, as the Court should direct, between the plaintiff
and the defendant Goom, to try the validity of his lease. If the verdict on such new trial or issue should be found against Goom, a verdict
was to be entered against both the defendants. But if the Court should
be of opinion that the lessor of the plaintiff was not entitled to recover against the defendant Manning, the verdict taken for the defendants was to stand. * * *
Lord Ellenborough, C. J., ^ after stating the facts — On this case,
as it is found that there was no fraud in fact in the conveyance of the
12th of April, 1783, the only point for the consideration of the Court
whether
voluntary conveyance, without any valuable consideration, be not according to the legal construction of the stat. 27 Eliz. c.
subsequent purchaser for
fraudulent against
valuable consideration or, in other words, whether in such case the law do not presume
.fraud, without admitting such presumption to be contradicted.
The
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cases in which the construction of the statute of the 27 of Eliz. has
come on to be considered have been numerous ; and in several of those
which arose nearest the time of passing the statute the Judges seem to

liave thought that a voluntary settlement was only prima facie fraudulent against a purchaser, according to the language of the Court in Sir
Ralph Bovy's Case, Ventris, 193 ; where it is said, (Lord Hale being
Chief Justice) "that though every voluntary conveyance carries an evidence of fraud ; yet it is not upon that account only always to be reckoned fraudulent, or to be avoided by a purchaser for a valuable consideration.'' And in Jenkins v. Kemishe or Kemis, which is to be found
in Hardress, 398, and in 1 Lev. 150, in Lavender v. Blackstone, in 2
Lev. 146, and in Garth v. IMois, 1 Keb. 486, the same doctrine is distinctly laid down; and in Style, 446, it is stated to have been said
on a trial at bar (Lord Rolle being then Chief Justice), "that a voluntary
conveyance upon consideration of natural affection hath no badge of
fraud, unless he who makes it be indebted at the time, or in treaty
for the sale of the lands ;" which case Chief Baron Gilbert adopts, and
supports by reasoning of his own, in his Law of Evidence, 235, p. 201,
in the edition of 1801. And in addition to these printed cases, Sir
Robert Eyre, then Chief Justice of C. P., according to a MS. note
formerly belonging to Mr. Justice Clive, in a case of Standon v. Charlwood, tried before him at the London Sittings after Trinity term, 1732,
laid it down, that a voluntary settlement, made upon marriage by Sir
Richard Anderson, was not fraudulent quia voluntary ; but the question was. Whether it was not made with an intent to defraud ; and the
jury so found it. And with this doctrine other of the cases which were
cited by the counsel for the plaintiff may well agree, in which it is
stated, "that conveyances were decided, on evidence given at the bar,
to be fraudulent;" or, "that a jury were directed on evidence;" though
"it must be recollected, that these cases are not so strong as those I
have alluded to, as they are not inconsistent with the possibility of
juries having been directed, what ought to be their conclusion in point
of law, from the facts given in evidence, if the jury should find them
to be true ; for fraud and covin is always a question of law ; it is the
judgment of law on facts and intents. In a more modern case, where
the question was upon the stat. 13 Eliz., that of Cadogan v. Kennett,
in Cowper, 434, Lord Mansfield said, obiter, "the stat. 27 Eliz. c. 4,
does not go to voluntary conveyances, merely as being voluntary ; but
to such as are fraudulent." And in a late case, of Doe v. Routledge,
in the same book, p, 705, where the question arose on the statute now
under consideration. Lord Mansfield, in considering one point in the
case, whether the settlement there, under all its circumstances, were
fraudulent and covinous, stated, "that in the statute there was not a
word that impeached voluntary settlements, merely as being voluntary,
but as fraudulent and covinous ;" and noticed the 3d section, which
subjects parties to such fraudulent grants, who should attempt to defend them, to forfeiture and imprisonment, as if such practices were
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in which light no person making a mere voluntary settlement,
of provision for his family, was ever considered to stand.

;

This section furnishes most unquestionably a very strong argument
in favour of that construction; and had these cases not been opposed
by many others of great weight and authority, there would have been
but Httle doubt in our minds as to this construction being the right one ;
but we have to deal with a class of cases full as numerous, decided by
Judges of tlie greatest eminence, which have given this statute a different construction, and have held that a conveyance without a valuable
consideration is by the statute made void, as fraudulent, against a subThe earliest case in which
sequent purchaser for such consideration.
this is distinctly laid down is Woodie's Case, cited by Tanfield in Colville V. Parker, Cro. Jac. 158, as far back as East, 5th of Jac. I, where
it was adjudged, "that an assignment of a lease of lands by one quasi
in jointure to his wife, he taking the profits, and afterwards selling it
without notice, was within the statute ; though not made in trust to be
revoked, nor with any clause or revocation ; because it was a voluntary
conveyance at first, and shall be intended fraudulent at the beginning."
In this case, though the person making the conveyance continued in
possession and took the profits, it will be observed that there was no
badge of fraud ; as such possession accompanied and followed the
deed; but the Judges might very well apprehend that subsequent purchasers might be continually defrauded by such secret conveyances, if
they should be held good ; and that when the question was between
one, who had paid a valuable consideration for an estate, and another,
who had given nothing, it was a just presumption of law, that such
voluntary conveyance, founded only in considerations of affection and
regard, if coupled with a subsequent sale, was meant to defraud those,
who should afterwards become purchasers for a valuable consideration; and that a different construction would have so narrowed the'
operation of the statute as to leave the persons meant to be protected
by it subject to almost all the mischiefs intended to be guarded against;
and it certainly is more fit, upon the whole, that a voluntary grantee
should be disappointed, than that a fair purchaser should be defrauded.
In Prodgers v. Langham, 1 vSid. 133, a conveyance made by a man in
trust for his daughter till marriage, for her maintenance, and then in
trust to raise a portion for her, was held to be a voluntary conveyance
in its origin, and void by the stat. 27 of Eliz. against purchasers for
valuable consideration; this was in the 15th of Car. II. In White v.
Hussey, Precedents in Chancery, 14, in the beginning of King William's reign, in the case of a conveyance, where the fraud, if any, was
only from its being voluntary, the commissioners of the great seal
were all of opinion that they might decree a conveyance fraudulent
merely from being voluntary, and that, without any trial at law.
In
Gardiner v. Painter, Cas. temp. King, C. P. 65, Lord King said, it
could never be a question, whether a voluntary settlement be good
against purchasers.
This was in the year 1726; and in the next year,
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in Tonkins v. Ennis, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 334, a voluntary settlement was
considered as being made void against a purchaser by the stat. 27 of
Eliz. And this could only have been so held from such settlement
In White v. Sansom,
being in point of law considered as fraudulent.
3 Atk. 412, though Lord Hardwicke is stated to have said, that he
had heard it said in that court, that there are reasonable voluntary
conveyances, which that Court will not interfere to disturb, upon the
construction of these statutes ; yet, according to the same case, he said,
"he hardly knew an instance where a voluntary conveyance had not
And in Lord
been held fraudulent against a subsequent purchaser."
Townsend v. Windham, 2 Ves. 10, he said, "on the 27th of Eliz. every
voluntary conveyance made, where afterwards there is a subsequent
conveyance made for valuable consideration; though no fraud in that
voluntary conveyance, nor the person making it at all indebted ; yet the
determinations are, that such mere voluntary conveyance is void at
law by the subsequent purchase for valuable consideration."
In Roe
V. ]\Iilton, 2 Wils. 356, Lord Ch. J, Wilmot stated the question to be.
Whether there were a good and valuable consideration to support the
limitation therein to Thomas Hammerton, the father of the lessor of
the plaintiff; or whether the limitation were merely voluntary under
the Stat. 27 of Eliz., and bad against a purchaser for valuable consideration ? And the Court held it good ; as the mother giving up her charge
of an annuity on the whole of the estate, and taking it on a part, was
considered as a valuable consideration.
And Lord C. J. De Grey, in
Goodright v. Moses, in 2 Sir W. Black. Rep. 1019, laid it down, "that
the deed in question was only a voluntary conveyance within the
true meaning of the stat. 27th of Eliz. ; being founded only on a good,
and not on a valuable consideration; and therefore could not be set
up against a bona fide purchaser."
And the observation on this case made by the counsel for the defendant, that it seemed that Lord C. J. De Grey had been misled by a case
in 2 Vern. 326, which he referred to ; and which was said not to have
been decided, and on which he was supposed to have relied ; does not
weaken the authority of the case in Blackstone; for Lord C. J. De
not to support the opinion of the Court on the
Grey referred to
lessee for years was
point now before us; but to shew that
purchaser for
valuable consideration.
Lord Mansfield himself (whose
opinion in Doe v. Routledge, and whose dictum in Cadogan v. Kennett,
have been much relied on,) held in the case of Chapman v. Emery,
Cowp. 280, that
voluntary conveyance after marriage by
man on
his wife and children was void by the stat. 27th of Eliz. against
subAnd with resequent mortgagee, whom he held to be
purchaser.
spect to the case of Doe v. Routledge,
may be observed that Lord
Mansfield seems to have supported his opinion by cases, which were
not considered as cases of voluntary settlements; but as cases where
the settlements had for their foundation valuable considerations
such
Aig.Prop. — 52
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was the case of Newstead and Searles, in 1 Atk. 268, which he mentioned by name; for Lord Hardwicke in that case stated "the question
to be, Whether the articles of the 30th of April, 1709, were for a valuable consideration, and binding, or ought to be considered as voluntary and fraudulent, with respect to subsequent creditors and purchasAnd afterwards he said, "I think the settlement no voluntary
ers?"
agreement, but a binding one; the statutes of the 13th and 27th of
Eliz. that make conveyances fraudulent, are voluntary conveyances
made against purchasers for a valuable consideration, or bona fidp
creditors ; but it would be difficult to shew that such a limitation, as in
the present case, has been held fraudulent and void against subsequent
The present is a stronger case ; for here are
purchasers and creditors.
reciprocal considerations both on the part of the husband and wife, by
the provisions under the articles for the second marriage."
And I believe, if it were necessary to go into the examination, it
would be found that in most, if not in all of the cases cited by the defendant, there were reciprocal considerations ; some benefit acquired
by the persons making the settlement, which might fall under the denomination of a valuable consideration ; though perhaps other per?ons
derived a benefit from the settlement, who were not the principal objects of it. As in Jenkins v. Keymys, where the consideration of a
marriage and a marriage portion was held to run through all the estates raised by the settlement on the marriage ; though the marriage was
not concerned in them.
And it must be further recollected, with respect to Doe V. Rotitledge, that upon the strength of the voluntary settlement in that case a marriage was had ; which was noticed by Lord
Mansfield.
And according to the case of Prodgers v. Langham, 1 Sid.
133, a voluntary conveyance, fraudulent against a subsequent purchaser, was held to be made good by a subsequent marriage. And it will be
further recollected, that in Doe v. Routledge there was no bona fide
purchaser.
Subsequently to the case of Chapman v. Emery, the cases
of Evelyn v. Templar, 2 Bro, Chan. Cas. 148, and Doe ex dem. Bothell
v. Martyr, 1 Bos. & Pull. New Reports, 332, have been determined ; in
the last of which it was laid down, "that it cannot now be held that a
prior voluntary conveyance shall defeat a conveyance to a purchaser
for a valuable consideration, without overturning the settled and decided law." And in the first of them
was
e.) Evelyn v. Templar,
said by Lord Thurlow, that so many estates stand upon the rule, that
cannot be shaken. And so late as Mich, term, 1804, in the case of
Doe
Lewis v. Hopkins, the Court of Exchequer held where after
man covenanted to stand seised of an estate to the use of
marriage
himself for hfe, remainder to the use of his wife for life, remainder
to the heirs of the body of the wife begotten by the husband that such
settlement was void, as being voluntary against
lessee of the husband
for 31 years the son of the settlor claiming the estate after his father's
death against the lessee.
To the authority of these cases may be added
the case of Nunn v. Willsmore,
Term Rep. 528, where Lord Kenyon
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said, "if this deed were either actually fraudulent, or voluntary, from
whence the law infers fraud, the consequence insisted on by the plaintiff would follow ; and I admit that if this deed were a voluntary deed,
Thus stand the authorities on both
the law says it is fraudulent."
sides of the question ; and the weight, number, and uniformity of those
which establish the point contended for on behalf of the plaintiff", do
in our opinion very much preponderate; and as many estates depend
upon the rule, it ought not, we conceive, to be shaken. It appears from
the MS. note I have cited, formerly belonging to Mr. Just. Clive, that
Mr, Horsman, in the year 1713, advised the making a mortgage of the
estate settled in strict settlement by Sir R. Anderson after his marriage ; thinking it voluntary and fraudulent as against a purchaser, and
the like advice as that which he gave nearly a century ago, probably
had been given before ; and that it has been given since, and acted on,

a

a

if

it

it,

we cannot doubt ; as Lord Thurlow was not likely to have expressed
himself, as he did in Evelyn v. Templar, unless he had known that
such had frequently been the case.
Feeling ourselves pressed with
these authorities and considerations, we think ourselves bound to give
Much property has, no doubt, been purjudgment for the plaintiff.
chased, and many conveyances settled upon the ground of its having
been so repeatedly held, that a voluntary conveyance is fraudulent, as
such, within the stat. 27th of Eliz. ; and it is no new thing for the
Court to hold itself concluded in matters respecting real property by
former decision upon questions, in respect of which, if it were res
integra, they probably would have come to very different conclusions.
And if the adhering to such determinations is likely to be attended with
inconvenience, it is a matter fit to be remedied by the Legislature,
which is able to prevent the mischief in future, and to obviate all the
inconvenient consequences which are likely to result from
as to
purchases already made. And we cannot but say, as at present advised,
and considering the construction put on the statute, that
would have
been better
the statute had avoided conveyances only against purchasers for
valuable consideration without notice of the prior conveyance.
Our opinion being with the plaintiff, the consequence is, that
there must either be
new trial, or an issue between the plaintiff and
the defendant Goom to try the validity of his lease.^

a
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A., heinp .seised in fee, covenanted to stand seised to use of himself for
life, remainder ultimately to use of B. in fee. A. died, leaving
will hy which
the same premises were devised in fee to C. who ccmveyed them to X.,
purchaser for value. In ejectment by B. against X., the defense was on the statHeld, the statute did not avoid the deed to B. Doe d. Newman
ute 27 Eliz.
V. Rnsham, 17 Q. 15. 72:? (1852).
In Tarry v. Carwarden.
Dick. 544 (177S), it was held that equity at the
purchaser for value, would decree
suit of
specific performance of a contract of sale made after
voluntary conveyance of the same premises.
But
where the suit for specific performance is by the vendor, held othenvise in
Smith V. Garland.
Mer. 122 (1817).
See, also. Clarke v. Willott, L. R.
Exch.
313 (1872), where the vendee, who !iad contracted to purchase the premises aftvoluntary conveyance thereof, sued to recover back
er the vendor had made
deposits which he had made.
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(Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1858.
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13

lid.

2

469.)

Ejectment for a lot of ground, forty-one feet front and one hundred
and fifty-nine deep, on York street, in the city of Baltimore, being
lot No. 17, and part of "Todd's Range," brought on the 29th of August, 1850, by the appellant against the appellees. Plea, Non cul.
The plaintiff, on the whole evidence, asked an instruction to the

jury in substance as follows:
That by the deed of the 14th of May,

Joseph Bankson conveyed to grantees therein named, the property therein described, in fee,
subject to the Hfe estate in and to the same, of the grantor and his
wife and of the survivor of them, and if the jury find from the evidence, that said Joseph Bankson died in 1806, and his widow in 1843,
that the right of action to recover possession of said lot of ground,
1792,

a

a

if

is

a

if

it,

thereupon first accrued to the grantees in said deed named, and their
representatives, and that the deed of 1795, from said Bankson to Diffenderffer, was not sufficient to avoid said conveyance of 1792, although they may find, that the said deed of 1795, was for full value,
and that of 1792, voluntary, and for no other consideration than that
stated therein, provided the jury shall further find, that said last mentioned deed was duly acknowledged and recorded in the records of
Baltimore county court, on the 14th of May, 1792.
The defendants, on the same evidence, asked two instructions to
the jury, in substance as follows:
1st. If the jury find, that the deed from Joseph Bankson, of the
14th of May, 1792, was a voluntary conveyance, and for no other consideration than that stated in
that then the sale by him in 1795, of
the same property to Diffenderffer, and the execution of the deed
therefor to Diffenderft'er, of the 17th of February, 1795,
the jury
shall find such sale and deed, and that the same was for
valuable
consideration, and -without actual notice by Diffenderffer of said deed
of the 14th of May, 1792,
presumptive evidence, that said deed of
the 14th of May, 1792, was fraudulent and void.
2nd. If the jury shall find, that the said deed of the 14th of May,
1792, was only for the consideration therein stated, and shall also
find that the grantor, Bankson, had antecedently thereto conveyed
away all his other property, and was at the time of the execution of
said deed of the 14th of May, 1792, the owner and possessor of no
other property, and
they shall find, that his wife, who had
life
estate under that deed, joined by
relinquishment of dower in the deed
to Diffenderffer, of the 17th of February, 1795, with knowledge that
the same conveyed the title to the grantee, and that she lived till 1843,
and that the three children, the grantees in said deed of 1792, were
then infants and unable to maintain themselves, and that said Bankson never had any property afterwards, other than the purchase money
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received from Diffenderffer, from the said sale to him of said lot, or
what he may have procured by means thereof, and that neither said
Bankson, nor his wife, or any one else, ever communicated to Diffenderffer the existence of said deed of 1792, and that neither he (Diffenderffer) nor Thomas Kell, under whom the defendants claim, ever
had actual knowledge of the same until long after the deed to said Kell
by Henry Dorsey, of 1833, offered in evidence by the defendants, (ii
the jury find such deed, and that the same was for full value,) and
the jury shall also find, that said Diffenderffer, and those claiming under him, held said property from 1795, to the present time, adversarily
under said deed to Diffenderffer of 1795, and that said Cooke never
did set up title to the same under the said deed of 1792, that then the
jury may find that said deed of the 14th of May, 1792, was not bona
fide but fraudulent and void.
The court (Frick, J.) refused the plaintiff's prayer, and granted those
of the defendant. To this ruling the plaintiff excepted, and the verdict and judgment being in favor of the defendant, appealed.
Le Grand, C. J. This case has been discussed at the bar with great
fullness of illustration, and the views of the respective counsel, presented with clearness and cogency of reasoning.
To our minds — looking to past and distinctly recognized adjudications — the questions we are called upon to decide are confined within
a narrow space.
The action is one of ejectment, and the principal
facts of the case may be thus stated :
On the 14th day of May, 1792, a certain Joseph Bankson, by deed,
conveyed (reserving to himself and wife, and to the survivor of them,
a life estate therein) a certain lot of ground and the improvements
thereon, to his three children, Harriet Giles Bankson, Joseph Bankson and Elizabeth Bankson, their heirs and assigns forever, as tenants
in common. The consideration for this conveyance was natural love
and affection, and the nominal sum of five shillings.
On the 17th day
of February, 1795, the aforesaid Joseph Bankson conveyed the same
property to Daniel Diffenderffer, for a valuable consideration, the wife
of Bankson releasing her dower. Diffenderffer immediately took possession, and remained in it until his death in 1809 or 1810, devising
the property to his wife, who continued in it until her death, which
occurred in 1832 or 1833, after which, it was sold by a trustee appointed for the purpose, and the title of Diffenderffer and wife, by
legally executed and acknowledged mesne conveyances, and lastly, by
a deed from Henry Dorsey, became vested in Thomas Kell, who paid
for it $7000, and who remained in possession of it until his death in
1846.
The lessor of the plaintiff claims title under the voluntary deed
of 1792, and the defendants under the deed of 1795, for a valuable
consideration to Diffenderffer, and through the intermediate conveyances down to Thomas Kell, and through and from him down to
themselves. The deeds of 1792 and 1795, were both placed on record
in the proper office on the days of their dates. The widow of Joseph
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Bankson survived her husband until 1843. Elizabeth Cankson, (who
intermarried with a certain John S. Cooke, since dead,) is the only
child of the grantor, being a grantee in the deed of 1792, now living,
There was
the other two children having died without leaving issue.
testimony given on the part of the defendants, for the purpose of
showing that the elder Bankson was apparently in needy circumstances,
and that, at the time of the execution of the deed in 1795 to Diffenderffer, it did not appear, from the public records, he had any other
property than that mentioned in that conveyance, and also, that until
a very short time before the institution of this action, no claim on
the part of the grantees in the deed of 1792, was heard of by the witnesses.
This is substantially the evidence in the cause. The plaintiff
offered one prayer to the court, which was rejected, and tlie defendants two, which were granted.
The defendants contend, that under a proper construction of the
statute of 27th Elizabeth, entitled, "An act against covinous and fraudulent conveyances," and the circumstances of this case, the deed of
1792, under which the lessor of the plaintiff claims title, is void and
of no avail as against the defendants, who claim under the deed of
1795, which was for valuable consideration;
that as to them, it is void
and fraudulent, there being no evidence of notice of the deed of 1792,
and that it was executed with a fraudulent intent in fact.
On the other hand the plaintiff insists, that neither in law, nor in
fact, was there any fraud in the execution of the deed of 1792, and
tliat it is all sufficient to entitle her to recover in this action.
The first inquiry for our determination is: \Vhat is the received
and binding interpretation of the statute of 27th Elizabeth, ch. 4, in
this State?
On this, principally depends, the decision of this case.
Until the year 1807, when was decided the case of Doe v. Manning, 9
East, 59, there was much contrariety of opinion in England — and
doubtless, also in this country — as to the true meaning of 'the statute;
since then, however, the opinion of Lord Ellenborough,
has, in England, put to rest all judicial doubts on the subject.
Were that o[)inion law in this State, there would be an end to the plaintift"'s title under the voluntary deed of 1792.
But it is not the law. In the case
of Warren and Others' Lessee v. Richardson and wife et al, decided
in the year 1837, the Court of Appeals relied upon and adopted the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 280, 8 L. Ed. 120, and in the case of the
Mayor and City Council of Balto. v. Williams, 6 Md. 235, this court
again construed the statute of 27th Elizabeth, and again adopted the
construction placed upon it by the Supreme Court.
Fully concurring
in the correctness of those decisions, we are relieved from all inquiry
as to what may be the law elsewhere.
The principal difference between the doctrine of Doe v. Manning, and that of Cathcart v. Robinson, consists in this: By the former, and mere execution of a voluntary deed raises the presumption — which cannot be rebutted — of fraud
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for value, whilst by the other,
language of Chief Justice Marshall: "A subsequent

as against subsequent purchasers
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sale
in the
rule
settlement not on valuawithout notice, by
person who had made
ble consideration, was presumptive evidence of fraud, which threw
on those claiming under such settlement, the burthen of proving that
This quotation from the opinion of Chief
was made bona fide."
Justice Marshall, contains, to the fullest extent contended for by the^
does
counsel of the defendants, their interpretation of the statute.
void
voluntary deed
not assert the doctrine, in any sense, that
merely — as against subsequent
voluntary;
simply because
presumptive evidence of fraud, where
purchasers for value — makes
there has been no notice to subsequent purchasers, and casts, in such
the burthen of disproving the
case, upon those claiming under
When the subsequent purchaser has notice, no such prepresumption.
Md. 265: "To hold that, with
sumption arises, and as was said in
subject to the presumption
notice to the purchaser, the settlement
of fraud, simply in consequence of the subsequent conveyance for valinue, we think
not required by the language of the statute, and
consistent with correct moral feeling."
This being so, the question then is: Had Diffenderffer notice of the
no evidence in the record showing
voluntary deed of 1792? There
that he had, in point of fact, notice of its existence on that head there
Whether or not, then, he had such notice as will
perfect silence.
bind him, and those claiming under him, must depend upon the effect of our registration laws. The deed of 1792 was placed on record the day of its execution, and, of course, open to inspection in 1795,
when the second deed was made.
In the case of Warren v. Richardson, already referred to, decided
Md. 272, the Reporter,
by the late Court of Appeals, and reported in
note, has drawn the inference from the decision of the court upon
the prayers offered, and from the facts appearing in the record of
that case, and from the fact, that the Court of Appeals, upon the
reversal of the judgment awarded
procedendo, "that the notice which
will bind the subsequent purchaser, need not be actual, but that constructive notice furnished by the recording of the voluntary deed unIn this, we think, he was corder our registry laws,
sufficient."
rect.
There was no evidence, that the subsequent purchasers in that
case had any actual notice of the prior voluntary deed.- If, then, the
fact of the registry of the deed did not affect them with notice, we
are unable to perceive for what purpose
new trial was directed under
We think the court could not otherwise than
procedendo?
have decided, that the registry of the deed affected the subsequent
purchasers with notice, and thereby shifted the onus upon them to
show,
they could, that the deed was fraudulent in fact, and for the
of
purpose
enabling them to do this, ordered a new trial. If the registry of the deed did not have, in the opinion of the court, this effect,
then, the defendants stood in the attitude of subsequent purchasers
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for value, without notice, and the question of law raised by the prayers, became a mere abstract proposition, the decision of which, either
way, would have been of no avail to the voluntary grantees under the
deed.
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But, be this as it may, the interpretation we have sanctioned is fully
In the case of Beal v. Warren and
sustained by express decisions.
Court of Massachusetts, when speakthe
450,
Supreme
another, 2 Gray,
ing of a voluntary deed, under the statute of 27th Elizabeth, say : "No
question is made whether the second grantee had actual notice of the
first conveyance, though, from the relation of the parties, and from
the fact, that there was no attempt to show actual fraud, such notice
Nor would this be, in the absence of
may reasonably be inferred.
fraud, material ; for the registration of the conveyance would be constructive notice, and sufficient notice, to all subsequent purchasers."
In the case of O'Neill v. Cole, 4 Md. 123, the court, referring to a
deed, executed by a female, a short time before her marriage, and
which was contested by her surviving husband after her death, remark
that, "If the appellant, (the husband,) had reason to suppose that his
late wife, before their marriage, had been imposed upon, or induced
to execute a conveyance of which she did not know the contents and
meaning, it was quite proper for him to resist the attempt of the apIn this we think he has
pellee to possess himself of the property.
failed; and
case of fraud
failing in this, he seeks to make out
in law upon his marital rights, there
no reason why he should not
be bound by the notice, which our recording acts impute to others
when seeking to vacate conveyances, or when claiming against tliem."
In the same case, the Chancellor had previously said,
Md. Ch. 174,
that, "It
the settled American doctrine, that the registration of
conveyance, operates as constructive notice upon all subsequent purchasers of any estate legal or equitable in the same property."
And
as was said by a majority of the court, in the case of Williams et al.
V. Banks et al., 11 Md. 250: "It seems to us
contradiction in terms,
to say, that
defrauded by an instrument, when he deals
person
with
perfect knowledge of its existence and of its effect. If our
registration laws have any operation, they certainly do, as they were
designed, give notice to all the world, so that there may be no deceit
If registration laws do not give notice to
practiced upon any one.
the community which will bind
then they are of no use whatever,
for, witliout registration, deeds would be binding inter partes." This
language was applied as well to deeds under the 13th, as to those under the 27th of Elizabeth.
These authorities are all sufficient, in this state at least, to show that
constructive notice, and all sufficient to bind subsequent
registration
purchasers in the absence of actual fraud.
The prayer of the plaintiff was defective, only in the omission, to
require the jury to find the existence of the deed of 1792.
The first prayer of the defendants was erroneous, in ignoring the
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effect of the registration, and requiring actual notice. We do not think
the facts, if found, enumerated in their second prayer, sufficient to have
authorized the jury to find the deed of 1792 was not bona fide, but
fraudulent and void. All those facts might be found, and, nevertheThere must be some pointless, the deed might be bona fide and valid.
ed evidence to establish fraud in fact. We affirm the court below in
its rejection of the plaintiff's prayer, and reverse its decision granting
the prayers of the defendants.
If left to conjecture, we may imagine, that the case was a hard one
on Diffenderffer, as it was undoubtedly on Kell, who paid a full price ;
but it may, also, on the other side, be supposed, that Diffenderffer had
actual as well as constructive notice of the deed of 1792, when he
accepted that of 1795, but, that relying upon what may be very reasonably supposed, at that time, to have been the opinion of the profession, as to the true construction of the statute of Elizabeth, he believed it competent to the elder Bankson to give him a good title. But
with surmises we have nothing to do.
Unless the defendants can
establish fraud in fact, the registration of the deed of 1792, concludes
them in this action.
Judgment reversed and procedendo awarded.*
4

The matter of conveyances in fraud of creditors is not considered here.

It

seems more appropriately considered in the course on Bankruptcy.
PuRCHASEK FOR VALUE. — It is Well Settled that to bring a conveyance under
the protection of the statute of 27 Eliz. c. 4, it is nece.ssary that it be made
upon a valuable consideration.
Upton v. Basset, Cro. Eliz. 445 (1596). The
assumption of liability on the covenants in a lease makes one a purchaser for
value, at least under the saving clause. Price v. Jenkins, 5 Ch. D. 619 (1877).
But see Lee v. Mathews, 6 L. R. Ir. 530 (ISSO). Cf. Townsend v. Toker, L. R.
1 Ch. 446 (1S66) ; Kosher v. Williams, L. R. 20 Eq. 210 (1875).
But a consideration which is merely nominal or colorable, such as "5s. and other valuable
considerations," is not sufficient.
Walker v. Burrows. 1 Atk. 94 (1745). See,
also, Shurmur v. Sedgwick, 24 Ch. D. 597 (1883). The payment of $50 for conveying an estate worth .$25,000 does not make one a purchaser for value. Fullenwider v. Roberts, 20 N. C. 420 (1839). But see Boyer v. Tucker, 70 Mo. 457
(1879).
Marriage is. a valuable consideration.
Prodgers v. Laughan, 1. Sid. 133 (1663) ;
Sterry v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 62, 261 (1814). But only those coming
within the marriage consideration are protected. Johnson v. Legard, 6 M. &
S. 60 (1817) ; Price v. Jenkins, 4 Ch. D. 483 (1876) ; IMackie v. Herbertson, 9
App. Cas. 303 (1884) ; In re Cameron & Wells, 37 Ch. D. 32 (1887) ; De Mestre
v. West, [1891] A. C. 264.
But see Newstead v. Searles, 1 Atk, 265 (1737) ;
Clarke v. Wright, 6 H. & N. 849 (1861) ; Gale v. Gale, 6 Ch. D. 144 (1877) ; Jenkins V. Keymes. 1 Lev. 237 (1668) ; Clayton v. Wilton, 6 M. & S. 67 (1817).
has been held that one taking a conveyance to secure antecedent debts is not
a purchaser for value. Manhattan Co. v. Evertson, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 457 (1837).
See, also, McKay v. Gilliam, 65 N. C. 130 (1871).
So one who has given a mortgage to secure the purchase price, but has in fact paid nothing, is not protected.
Alden v. Trubee, 44 Conn. 455 (1877). A conveyance voidable when entered into for want of consideration may he made valid by matter ex post facProdgers v. Laughan and Sterry v. Arden, supra.
to.
A conveyance to charitable uses has never been regarded as within the statute. Ramsay v. Gilchrist, [1892] L. R. A. C. 412.
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SECTION 2.— RECORDING
I. In England

ST.

7

ANNE,

c.

20 (170S).

Whereas by the different and secret ways of conveying lands, teinemenis, and hereditaments, such as are ill disposed have it in their
power to commit frauds, and frequently do so, by means whereof several persons (who through many years industry in their trades and
employments, and by great frugality, have been enabled to purchase
lands, or to lend moneys on land security) have been undone in their
purchases and mortgages, by prior and secret conveyances, and fraudulent encumbrances, and not only themselves, but their whole families thereby utterly ruined : for remedy whereof, may it please your
most excellent Majesty (at the humble request of the justices of the
peace, gentlemen, and freeholders of the county of Middlesex) that it
may be enacted, and be it enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and
temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and
by the authority of the same, That a memorial of all deeds and conveyances, which from and after the twenty-ninth day of September,
in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and nine, shall
be made and executed, and of all wills and devises in writing made
or to be made and published, where the devisor or testatrix shall die
after the said twenty-ninth day of September, of or concerning, and
whereby any honors, manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments in
the said county, may be any way affected in law or equity, may be registered in such manner as is hereinafter directed ; and that every such
deed or conveyance that shall at any time after the said twenty-ninth
day of September, be made and executed, shall be adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for
valuable consideration, unless such memorial thereof be registered
as by this Act is directed, before the registering of the memorial of
the deed or conveyance under which such subseauent purchaser or
mortgagee shall claim ; and that every such devise by will shall be adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration; unless a memorial of such will be
registered at such times and in manner as is hereinafter directed.
XVI I. Provided, always, and be it further enacted, That this Act
shall not extend to any copyhold estates, or to. any leases at a rack
rent, or to any lease not exceeding one and twenty years, where the
actual possession and occupation goeth along with the lease, or to any
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of the chambers in Serjeants Inn, the inns of court, or inns of Chancery ; anything in this Act contained to the contrary thereof in any
wise notvvitlistanding.

BEDFORD

BACCHUS.

V.

(High Court of Chancery, 1730.

2 Eq. Cas. Ab. G15, pi. 12.)

of lands in Middlesex, and the mortAfterwards B. lent money on the same
gage was duly registered.
security, and his mortgage was registered. Then A. advanced a farther
sum upon the same lands, without notice of the second mortgage.
And it was held by Loud Chancellor King that the registry of the
A. lent money

on a mortgage

a

a

a

if

is,

second mortgage was not constructive notice to the first mortgagee
before his advancement of the latter sum, for tho' the statute avoids
deeds not registered as against purchasers, yet it gives no greater
efficacy to deeds that are registered than they had before; and the
farther
first mortgagee lends
constant rule of equity
that
sum of money without notice of
second mortgage, his whole money
shall be paid in the first place."

V.

DICKINS

(High Court of Chancery,

17G8.

2

MORECOCK

et at.
Amb. C7S.)

piece of ground, and
Henry Fandal leased
for 51 years, to the defendant George Wilson.
On 23d February following, George Wilson assigns the premises to
the plaintifif Morecock, for the remainder of the term, to secure the
sum of £800. and interest.
In 1751, Morecock went abroad, and left the mortgage deed in the
hands of Wilson, having first signed
receipt on the back of
by
16th

June,

1749,

a

On

a

it,

buildings, at Wapping,

Sch.

&

So also in Bushell v. Bnshell,

1

5

a

a

in

it

it,

if

it

which
appeared that Morecock had been repaid the principal and
interest: and this transaction was stated in the bill to have passed at
the request of Wilson, who apprehended he might want money to
carry on trade in Morecock's absence; and promised, that
he borrowed money thereon, he would repay
and restore the mortgage to
Morecock, clear of incumbrances.
In 1755, Morecock returned to England, and Wilson delivered back
the mortgage to him, without having borrowed any money upon it;
where
remained till 1760, when he again trusted Wilson with the
mortgage deed and receipt, with
view, as stated
the bill, to enable
Wilson to borrow
sum
of
large
money upon security of the premises, out of which Morecock was to be paid.
In 1763, Wilson mortgaged the premises to John Athinson, for £300.
Lef.

90 (1803).
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and being pressed by Athinson for payment of the money, prevailed
to sign a writing, by which he agreed to give Athinson
his
demand.
of
priority
It did not appear in the cause, whether the original lease was ever
out of Wilson's custody; or whether it was delivered to Morecock at
the time of the mortgage, and sent back to Wilson, with the mortgage
deed; but it appeared to be in Wilson's hands in 1765, for on 24th
January, 1765, Wilson surrendered up the lease, and took a new
on jMoreccck

lease

for

71

years.

Morecock and Wilson settled their accounts, and there being a balance of i2065. 5s. due to Morecock, it
was agreed, that the new lease should stand as a security for £800.
and interest, at all events : and Wilson gave a bond and judgment for
the remainder of the balance, to be paid by instalments ; but in case
Wilson should neglect to make good any of the payments, it was
agreed that Wilson should give Morecock a security for the same upon
On

the 11th

February,

1765,

the premises:

This deed was registered within a few days afterwards.
On 6th April, 1765, Wilson mortgaged the premises to defendant
Dickins, for £800. and interest; and delivered to him the lease itself.
Dickins had no notice of plaintiff's security at the time he took the
mortgage, but being afterwards informed of it , on 15th February 1766,
gave Morecock a notice in writing, that he would pay him £1000. on
the 25th of March following, or as soon after as an assignment of Wilson's lease could be prepared, according to the agreement of the 11th
February, 1765; and at the same time informed Morecock of the
mortgage assignment to himself of the 6th April, 1765.
Wilson soon after becoming bankrupt, nothing was done in consequence of the notice.

Bill by Morecock, inter alia, to be paid the £800. agreed to be secured on the premises, at all events, prior to the defendant Dickins'
mortgage.
Bill by Dickins, to be paid his mortgage money, or to foreclose.
The question respecting this matter was. Whether Dickins, though
he had not actual notice of Morecock's security at the time he took
the mortgage, should be affected by a constructive notice, arising from
the circumstance of the deed being registered at the time ?
It was admitted by the counsel, for Morecock, that Dickins having
got the legal interest would be entitled to priority, unless he could
be affected by notice.
That there was no evidence of actual notice.
But it was insisted that the registration was notice of itself.
That
to give the Register Act its proper and intended effect, the act of
registration ought to operate as notice; and it was compared to the
case of judgments;
that which is first docketed shall have priority.
On the other side, it was argued for defendant Dickins, That the
Registry Act was made for one single purpose, to give preference to
a purchase deed registered, before a prior deed not registered;
but
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Act gives no greater efficacy to deeds which are registered than
they had before, and the case of Bedford v. Bacchus, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr.
1730, was cited for that purpose;
where a
615, 26th November,
first mortgagee of lands in Middlesex having registered his mortgage,
lent a further sum, without actual notice of a second mortgage, which
had been registered.
Lord King, Chancellor, was of opinion. That
the

ought not to be affected by such constructive notice, but that
rule of equity took place, and the first mortgagee was entitled
That in
to be paid his whole money before the second mortgagee.
the present case, Dickins having got the legal interest, was entitled
to be paid before a prior equitable incumbrancer, unless he was afThat here was no actual notice, and the regisfected by notice.
tration was not constructive notice according to the above determination.
Lord Camden, Chancellor. Q. Whether registration is presumptive evidence to all mankind?
If this was a new point, it might admit of difficulty; but the deand
termination in Bedford v. Bacchus seems to have settled
would be mischievous to disturb it. The act provides for one single case
only, that is, to make unregistered deeds void against registered deeds
no provision by the Act, in a case where all the deeds
but there
Whether
becomes
serious question.
are registered.
And yet
Court of Equity should not say, that in all cases of registry, which
public depository for deeds, and to which any person may resort,
subsequent purchaser ought not to search, or be bound by notice of
decree in equity, or judgment at law?
the registry, as he would of
in
concerned, and
It
which
point
great deal of property
matter of consequence.
Much property has been settled, and
conveyances have proceeded upon the ground of that determination.
In the case of Vandebendy, in the House of Lords, the doctrine
about dower prevailed, because
had been practised in a course
of conveyance. A thousand neglects to search have been occasioned
cannot take upon me to alby that determination, and therefore
it.
If
ter
was
new case,
should have my doubts
but the
closed by that determination, which has been acquiesced
point
in ever since.
he

it

is

;

I

a

is

it

I

it

a

a

a is

is

a

a is
a

a

a

it

is

;

it,

the

V.

LE NEVE.

(Court of Cbancery, 1747.

1

LE NEVE

Aiiib. 436.)

«

Lord HardwickE, Chancellor.® The bill was brought by the plaintiffs, Peter Le Neve and Hugh Pigott, and Elizabeth his wife, late
Elizabeth Le Neve, as the only surviving children of the defendant
Edward Le Neve, by Henrietta his late wife.
Portions of the opinion are omitted.
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The end of the bill in general is, to have the execution of trust of
leasehold estates settled upon the late wife of Edward Le Neve, and
the issue of that marriage, by articles previous to the marriage, dated
1st July, 1718; and that the conveyances made by the defendant Edward L,e Neve, and the defendant Mary his now wife, to trustees,
may be set aside, and delivered up, being made after notice of the articles of the 1st of July, 1718, or of the other conveyances made in
pursuance thereof ; and to have the leasehold exonerated and disincumbered.
The facts are, that in 1718, the defendant, Edward Le Neve, intermarried with his first wife Henrietta Le Neve, who had a considerable fortune; and articles were executed previous to the marriage,
dated the 1st July, 1718, whereby the father of Edward, in consideration of Henrietta's fortune, &c., covenanted with trustees, to
convey to them several estates, and some leasehold amongst the rest,
to permit Edward
near Soho Square in the county of Middlesex;
the
Neve,
to
receive
rents
and
the
profits
Le
younger,
during his own
life, and after his death, to pay to Henrietta £250. a year, in case she
survived Edward; and after the decease of Edward and Henrietta,
then the said estates should remain to their issue in such manner as
Edward the younger should, by will or otherwise, appoint; and for
want of such issue, to the use of Edward Le Neve the father, and his
heirs.
The 16th June, 1719, a settlement was made in pursuance of the
articles.
The marriage took effect; and Edward and Henrietta had issue,
Henrietta died July, 1740, leaving no
plaintiflfs Peter and Elizabeth.
other children.
Twenty-five years after the first marriage, Edward Le Neve entered into a treaty of marriage with the defendant Mary, and by
articles dated the 16th of November, 1743, previous to the marriage, Edward, in consideration of such marriage, covenanted with
the trustees, the defendants Dandridge and Norton, to convey these
very leasehold estates near Soho Square to them, their executors,
&c., within three months after the marriage, in trust to pay to defendant Mary, out of the rents of these messuages, in case she survived
him, a clear annuity of £150. for her life, for her jointure, &c.
The marriage took effect, and three months after, on the 20th January, 1743, a settlement was made pursuant to the articles.
The settled estate, being houses in Middlesex, was subject to the
Register Act, the 7th Q. Anne, cap. 20.
The second articles and settlement were registered, but not the first.
Edward has mortgaged the houses likewise.
The bill is brought, in order to set the second articles and settlement out of the way, and that they may be postponed to the first articles and settlement; upon this equity. That the defendant Mary
Le Neve had notice of them.
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The counsel for the plaintiffs admit, That the registering of the second articles and settlement has, in point of law, affected the leasehold
estates, as the 7th O. Anne gives the legal estate where the effect of
the registering has placed it.
The question is, Whether equity will enable the children of the
first marriage to get the better of the defendant's legal right? And
this will depend upon the question of notice :
1st, Whether it appears sufficiently, that Joseph Norton was attorney for the defendant I\Iary in the transaction of her marriage?
2dly, Whether Norton himself had sufficient notice of tlie first
articles and settlement?
3dly, Whether that will affect Mary as a purchaser, and postpone
her articles and settlement, notwithstanding the Register Act? * * * ^
Whether the notice to NorThe third and last general question
ton will affect the defendant Mary as
purchaser, and postpone her
articles and settlement, notwithstanding the Register Act?
This depends on two things
1st. Whether any notice whatsoever would be sufficient to take from
the defendant the benefit of the Register Act?
2d. Whether personal notice to the defendant Mary
requisite to
postpone her? or, Whether notice to her agent
sufficient to do
likewise?
As to the 1st,
question of great extent and consequence.
in subThe preamble of the statute of the '7th Q. Anne, ch. 20,
stance, "Whereas, by the different and secret ways of conveying lands,
&c., such as are ill-disposed have
in their power to commit frauds,
and frequently do so, by means whereof several persons have been
undone in their purchases and mortgages, by prior and secret conveyances, and fraudulent incumbrances."
Then comes the enacting clause, "That
memorial of all deeds
and conveyances which, after the 27th of September, 1709, shall be
made and executed, and of all wills and devises
writing, whereby
any honours, manors, lands, &c., in the county of Middlesex, may be
any way affected in law or equity, may be registered in such manner
as
after directed
and that every such deed or conveyance that shall
at any time after, &c., be made and executed, shall be adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for
valuable consideration, unless such memorial be registered as by this
directed, before the registering of the memorial of the deed or
act
conveyance under which such subsequent purchaser or mortgagee shall
claim, &c."
What appears by the preamble to be the intention of the act?
Plainly, to secure subsequent purchasers and mortgagees against
prior secret conveyances and fraudulent incumbrances.
Where
person had no notice of
prior conveyance, there the regThe court decided the first two questions in tlie aflirmative.
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isterin^ his subsequent conveyance shall prevail against the prior ; but
if he had notice of a prior conveyance, then that was not a secret conveyance by which he could be prejudiced.
The enacting clause says, that every such deed shall be void against
any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, unless the memorial thereof
be registered, &c. ; that is, it gives him the legal estate ; but it does not
say, that such subsequent purchaser is not left open to any equity which
a prior purchaser or incumbrancer may have ; for he can be in no danger when he knows of another incumbrance, because he might then
have stopped his hand from proceeding.
This case has been very properly compared to cases on the 2'7th H.
8, for inrollment of bargains and sales.
That act is formed pretty much in the same manner with this.
The words of tlie enacting clause: "That from, &c., no manors,
lands, tenements, &c., shall pass, alter, or change, from one to another,
whereby any estate of inheritance or freehold shall be made, or take
effect in any person or persons, or any use thereof to be made tliereof,
by reason only of any bargain and sale thereof, except the same bargain, and sale be by writing indented, sealed, and inroUed, in one of
the King's Courts of Records at Westminster, or else within the same
county, &c., where the same manors, &c., so bargained and sold do lie,
&c. ; and the same inrollment to be had and made within six months
next after the date of the same writings indented, &c. Nor any use
shall pass thereof from one to another."
What is the meaning of this?
Before the mal<:ing of the act, any paper writing passed the use from
the bargainor to the bargainee, whereby great mischief arose ; for it
entangled the purchasers, and injured the Crown, and was contrary
to the rule of law, which required notoriety in purchases by feoffment
and livery, &c.
But what has been the construction of this statute ever since ? Why,
if a subsequent bargainee has notice of a prior, he is equally affected
with that notice as if the prior purchase had been a conveyance by
feoffment and livery, &c.
The operation of both acts of Parliament and construction of them
is the same ; and it would be a most mischievous thing, if a person taking that advantage of the legal form appointed by an act of Parliament,
might under that protect himself against a person who had a prior
equity of which he had notice.
The cases put by the Attorney-General are very material :
Suppose (he said) the defendant Mary had by letter of attorney empowered Norton to transact the affair with her husband, and he by
means of this agency comes to the knowledge of the prior articles and
settlement, would not this affect the principal ? Or suppose a purchaser of lands in a register county orders his attorney to register
and he
neglects to do
and then buys the estate himself, and registers his
own conveyance, shall this be allowed to prevail
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of the consequence
which the register act guards against, of imposition from a prior secret
conveyance, as he had personal knowledge of the first.
There have been three cases on the Register Act :
1. Lord Forbes v. Nelson, 4 Bro. P. C. (Ed. Toml.) 189.
2. Blades v. Blades, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 358, pi. 2.
3. Chival v. Nicholls, 10th December, 1725, in the Exchequer, (1
* * *
Stra. 564.)
Consider, therefore, what is the ground of all this, and particularly
of those cases which went on the foundation of notice to the agent.
The ground of it is plainly this. That the taking of a legal estate after
notice of a prior right, makes a person mala fide purchaser, and not,
that he is not a purchaser for a valuable consideration in every other
respect. This is a species of fraud and dolus malus itself ; for he
knew the first purchaser had the clear right of the estate, and after
knowing that, he takes away the right of another person by getting
the legal estate.
And this exactly agrees with the definition of civil law of dolus
malus. Dig. libr. 4, tit. 3. Dolum malum Servius ita definit. Machinationem quandam alterius decipiendi causa, cum aliud simulater, cum
aliud agitur. Labeo autem posse et sine simulatione id agi ut circumveniatur. Posse et sine dolo malo aliud agi, aliud simulari, sicuti faciunt, qui jus ejusmodi dissimulationem deserviant et tuentur vel sua
vel aliena. Itaque ipse sic definit dolum malum esse omnem callidiatem fallacium machinationem ad circumveniendum, fallendum, decipiendum alterum adhibitum. Labeonis definito vera est.
Now if a person does not stop his hand, but gets the legal estate
when he knew the right was in another, machinatur ad circumveniendum. It is a maxim, too, in our law. That fraus et dolus nem'ini patrocinari debent. Vid. Co. 3 Rep. 78 ; 7 Rep. 38.
Fraud, or mala fides, therefore, it is the true ground on which the
Court is governed in the cases of notice ; and it is a consequence of the
decision of the former question, that notice to the agent is sufficient ;
for if the ground is the fraud, or mala fides, of the party, then it is
all one, whether by the party himself or his agent; still it is a machinatio ad circum.veniendum, and the putting a copy of the first articles and settlement into Norton's hands, to take the opinion of counsel in what manner they could be set aside, is a contrivance to circumvent.
It has been said. If this woman has been imposed on by her husband, she, instead of cheating, has been cheated.
But then who ought to suffer? the person entrusting an agent, or
a stranger who did not employ him? He certainly who trusts most
ought to suffer most.
Mrs. Hatt, the third mortgagee in the case in 2 Vern. mentioned
before, was imposed on ; and so was Moore, in the other case reported
Aig.Prop. — 5.3
a purchaser is out
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there, clearly imposed on; and yet if this was to be any excuse, it
would make all the cases of notice very precarious ; for it seldom happens but the agent has imposed on his principal ; and notwithstanding
that, the person trusting ought to suffer for his ill-placed confidence.
Therefore, in both respects, as agent and trustee, notice to Joseph
Norton, is notice to defendant Mary likewise. And as to the Registry
Act, here is sufficient equity in the plaintiff to postpone the second
those only have been regisarticles and settlement, notwithstanding
tered. And decreed accordingly.*

II. In United
(A)

Statejs

Statutes

CALIFORNIA CIV. CODE

(1908).

Section 1213.
Every conveyance of real property, acknowledged or
proved, and certified and recorded, as prescribed by law, from the time
it is filed with the recorder for record, is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees ; and a certified
copy of any such recorded conveyance may be recorded in any other
As

to the rule of the prindpal case in* an action at law, see Doe d. RobinAllsop, 5 B. & Aid. 142 (1S21), Bayley, .J., there said: "The words of
the statute are that such deeds or conveyances shall be adjudged fraudulent
and void against every subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration.
It is
to be observed that the words 'bona fide purchaser' are not used.
I think, therefore, that we are bound in a court of law to give effect to these words.
That
seems to have been the opinion of the judges in the cases cited, although they
thought that a court of equity would, in some cases, interfere to relieve the
party.
It is so laid down by Lord Hardwicke, in Le Neve v. Le Neve, and the
words of Lord JLansfield, in Doe ex deiu. Watson v. Routledge, Cowp. 712 (1777)
are those : 'Elquity says, if the party Icne^v of the unregistered deed, his registered deed shall not set it aside, because he has that notice which the act of
Parliament intended he should have.' He therefore puts it as a case in which
equity would interfere; and the circumstances of this case shew the propriety
of our adhering to the words of the act; for I am by no means clear that we
should not work great injustice, if we were to decide in favour of rhe defendant."
In Hine v. Dodd, 2 Atk. 275 (1741), a bill was filed by a judgment creditor
to be let in upon an estate in Middlesex preferably to the defendant, a mortgagee of the same estate, on the ground that the defendant had notice of the
judgment before the mortgage was executed. The judgment was entered
March 12. 17.3.3, and registered June 12, 17.3,5. The mortgage was made May
24, 1735, and registered June 2, 1735.
I>ord Chancellor Hardwicke said : "This
case depends upon the notice the defendant had of the judgment before his
mortgage was registered. The register act, the 7th of Anne, c. 20. is notice to
the parties, and a notice to everybody; and the meaning of this statute was,
to prevent parol proofs of notice, or not notice. But notwithstanding
there
are cases where this court have broken in upon this, though one incumbrance
* There
*
*
was registered before another, but it was in cases of fraud.
may possibly have been cases upon notice divested of fraud, but then the
proof must be extremely clear.
But though in the present case there are strong
circumstances of notice before the execution of the mortgage, yet, unon mere
suspicion only, I will not overturn a positive law." See, however, Whitbread
V. Boulnois, 1 Y. «& C. (Ex. R.) 303 (1S35).
8

son
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county, and when so recorded the record thereof shall have the same
force and effect as though it was of the original conveyance.
Section 1214. Every conveyance of real property, other than a
lease for a term not exceeding one year, is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance is
first duly recorded, and as against any judgment affecting the title,
unless such conveyance shall have been duly recorded prior to the
record of notice of action.
Kerr's Cyc. Code.

REVISED LAWS OF ILLINOIS

(1912).

Section 28. Deeds, mortgages, powers of attorney, and other inblruments relating to or affecting the title to real estate in this state,
shall be recorded in the county in which such real estate is situated ;
but if such county is not organized, then in the county to which such
unorganized county is attached for judicial purposes.
Section 30. All deeds, mortgages and other instruments of writing
which are authorized to be recorded, shall take effect and be in force
from and after the time of filing the same for record, and not before,
as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers, without notice ; and all
such deeds and title papers shall be adjudged void as to all such creditors and subsequent purchasers, without notice, until the same shall be
filed for record.
Section 31. Deeds, mortgages and other instruments of writing relating to real estate shall be deemed, from the time of being filed for
record, notice to subsequent purchasers and creditors, though not acknowledged or proven according to law ; but the same shall not be read
as evidence, unless their execution be proved in manner required by the
rules of evidence applicable to such writings, so as to supply the defects of such acknowledgment or proof.
Kurd's Rev. St. c. 30.

REVISED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS

(1902).

A

it,

is

it

is

it,

conveyance of an estate in fee simple, fee tail or tor
a lease for more than seven years from the making thereof,
shall not be valid as against any person, except the grantor or lessor,
his heirs and devisees and persons having actual notice of
unless
or an office copy as provided in section fifteen of chapter twenty-two,
recorded in the registry of deeds for the county or district in which
the land to which
relates
situated.
Chapter 127.
Section 4.

life, or
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(Part

(1909).

L The term "real property," as used in this article^
Section 290.
includes lands, tenements and hereditaments and chattels real, except
a lease for a term not exceeding three years.
2. The term "purchaser" includes every person to whom any estate
or interest in real property is conveyed for a valuable consideration,
and every assignee of a mortgage, lease or other conditional estate.
includes every written instrument, by
3. The term "conveyance"
which any estate or interest in real property is created, transferred,
mortgaged or assigned, or by which the title to any real property may
be affected, including an instrument in execution of a power, although
the power be one of revocation only, and an instrument postponing or
subordinating a mortgage lien ; except a will, a lease for a term not exceeding three years, an executory contract for the sale or purchase of
lands, and an instrument containing a power to convey real property
as the agent or attorney for the owner of such property.
Section 291. A conveyance of real property, within the state, on being duly acknowledged by the person executing the same, or proved as
required by this chapter, and such acknowledgment or proof duly certified when required by this chapter, may be recorded in the office of
the clerk of the county where such real property is situated, and such
county clerk shall, upon the request of any party, on tender of the lawful fees therefor, record the same in his said office. Every such conveyance not so recorded is void as against any subsequent purchaser in
good faith and for a valuable consideration, from the same vendor, his
heirs or devisees, of the same real property or any portion thereof,
whose conveyance is first duly recorded.
Chapter 52, art. 9.

GEN. CODE OF OHIO.

All

mortgages, executed agreeably to the provisions
be recorded in the office of the recorder of the
county in which the mortgaged premises are situated, and take effect
from the time they are delivered to the recorder of the proper county
for record. If two or more mortgages are presented for record on
the same day, they shall take effect from the order of presentation for
record.
The first presented must be the first recorded, and the first
recorded shall have preference.
Section 8543.
All other deeds and instruments of writing for the
conveyance or incumbrance of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, executed agreeably to the provisions of this chapter, shall be recorded
in the office of the recorder of the county in which the premises are
situated, and until so recorded or filed for record, they shall be deemed
Section 8542.

of -this chapter, shall
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fraudulent, so far as relates to a subsequent bona fide purchaser having, at the time of purchase, no knowledge of the existence of such
former deed or instrument.
Page & A. Gen. Code.

OREGON LAWS.
Every conveyance of real property within this
Section 7129.
hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as provided in this
within five days thereafter, shall be void against any subsequent
chaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration of the same
property, or any portion thereof, whose conveyance shall be first
recorded.
Lord's Oregon Laws, 1910.

title

purreal
duly

and Effect of Statutes

(B) Scope of Operation

SIMONSON

state

V.

WENZEL.

(Supreme Court of North Dakota, 1914.

27 N. D. 6.3S, 147 N. W. 804.)

FiSK, J.* This is an appeal from a judgment of tlie district court
of McHenry county, decreeing the foreclosure of a real-estate mortgage
in plaintiff's favor. The appeal is upon the judgment roll proper, appellants' contention being that the conclusions of the trial court are not
warranted by the findings of fact.
Such findings of fact are in substance as follows :
1. That on and prior to March 20, 1906, the defendant, Dakota Development Company, was the owner in fee of the real estate in controversy as disclosed by the public records in the office of the register
of deeds. On such date this company entered into an executory contract with defendant Carl F. Wenzel, in the usual form, whereby, for
a stated consideration of $100, $35 of which wa^ paid in cash and the
balance to be paid in equal instalments on March 20, 1907, and March
30, 1908, with interest, it promised and agreed to sell and convey such
premises to the said Wenzel, such contract obligating the purchaser to
pay all taxes and assessments levied, assessed, or imposed upon the
premises in each year, and also contained a stipulation that "no assignment or transfer of any interest in and to this agreement or the lands
described, less-than the whole thereof, will be recognized by said vendor
under any circumstances or in any event whatever, and no assignment
shall be binding upon the vendor unless approved by its president."
It
also contained a stipulation "that time is to be the very essence of tliis
agreement."
Such contract also contained other stipulations relative
»

Portions of the opiiiion are omitted.
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to the vendor's right to declare a forfeiture in case the vendee failed in
any respect to comply with his part of the contract, but we deem it unnecessary to set such provisions out in extenso.
2. Defendant Wenzel entered into the possession of the premises,
and constructed a dwelling house thereon, which he and his family
occupied as their homestead until about January 20, 1908, when he sold
and assigned such contract to defendant M. C. Krupp.
3. On April 17, 1907, Wenzel and wife, for a valuable consideration,
executed and delivered to plaintiff their promissory note for the sum of
$914.70, payable on November 1st thereafter, with interest at the rate
of 8 per cent per annum ; and to secure the payment thereof they executed and delivered to plaintiff a mortgage on the land in controversy,
which was filed in the office of the register of deeds of McHenry county on April 18, 1907, and recorded in Book 31 of Mortgages, at page
516.
4.

That such note and mortgage have not

been paid, and

plaintiff is

the present owner and holder thereof.

That Carl F. Wenzel paid to the Dakota Development Company
of $35 at the time of the execution of the contract for deed,
but made default in the payment due March 20, 1907, and the same
was not paid until after the assignment of such contract to defendant
Krupp, as hereinafter set forth. That such contract for deed was at
no time recorded or filed for record in the office of the register of
deeds of McHenry county, and the record title of the premises at all
times up to January 29, 1908, remained in tlie Dakota Development
5.

the sum

Company.

On or about January

20, 1908, Wenzel, while in possession of
said land as his homestead, entered into negotiations with defendant
Krupp for the sale to him of the contract for deed aforesaid, and the
premises therein described, upon the terms that such contract was to
be assigned to Krupp, who was to receive a warranty deed of the premises direct from the Development Company.
Wenzel and wife thereupon assigned their interest in such contract to Krupp, and the latter
paid to the Development Company the amount then remaining due upon said contract ($65 and interest), and Krupp also paid to Wenzel the
agreed consideration of $1,000 less the payment aforesaid to the Development Company, and the Development Company did not, nor
did its president or any one of its authorized officials, have any knowledge or actual notice of the execution or delivery of the mortgage to
the plaintiff aforesaid.
7. That defendant Krupp purchased Wenzel's interest in such contract in good faith, and without any actual notice or knowledge of
the existence of plaintiff's mortgage, and he had no intent to cheat or
defraud the plaintiff, but acted in absolute good faith in the making
of said purchase, and purchased and paid for the same in utter ignorance of the plaintiff's mortgage, but he knew that Wenzel and family
were living on and occupying said premises, but had no notice or
6.
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mortgage other than that imparted by the record

8. On January 24, 1908, the Development Company duly executed
and delivered to Krupp a warranty deed in the usual form, conveying
the premises to him, which deed contained the usual covenants, and
which was duly filed for record on January 29, 1908.
9. The trial court also found that the defendant Wenzel was on
March 3, 1910, adjudged a bankrupt in- the Federal court, and on
June 22, 1910, that court, in due form, discharged him from all debts
and provable claims, the notes held by plaintiff being scheduled in such

a

is,

bankruptcy court.
Upon such findings of fact the district court made conclusions of
law favorable to plaintiff, adjudging a foreclosure of his mortgage.
Among other conclusions, the trial court found that at the time of
the execution of the mortgage by Wenzekhe had a mortgagable interest in and to the said premises by virtue of the contract for deed, and
that the recording of such mortgage was due and legal notice to all
the world of the rights of the plaintiff as mortgagee, and that defendant Krupp therefore had constructive notice of such mortgage at the
time he purchased the assignment of the contract for deed to the said
premises, and the conveyance of the premises to hira by the Development Company was subject to the lien of plaintiff's mortgage.
From the above it is apparent that the crucial question for decision
is whether appellant Krupp, who, as the trial court found, in good
faith and for value purchased an assignment of the Wenzel contract
and a deed of the premises from its codefendant, the Development
Company, without any actual knowledge of the plaintiff's mortgage,
was nevertheless affected with constructive notice thereof sO' as to
confer upon plaintiff a lien under his mortgage superior and paramount
to the rights of such defendant.
In answering this question we must
bear in mind the fact, as found by the trial court, that the contract
for deed executed and delivered by the Development Company to Wenzel was not entitled to record, nor was the same disclosed in any way
by the public records, and, as far as such records disclosed, Wenzel
had no interest whatever in the property in controversy, but the same
stood in the name of and was owned exclusively by the Development
Company. It is no doubt true that Wenzel, by such executory contract
of purchase which gave him possession, acquired an equitable interest
in such property which he might sell or mortgage (Cummings v. Duncan, 22 N. D. 534, 134 N. W. 712, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 976); and it is
likewise no doubt true that his possession under the contract operated
to convey notice to the world of his equities thereunder.
But Wenzel's interest under such contract was cognizable merely in equity, not
in law. Miller v. Shelburn, 15 N. D. 182, 107 N. W. 51 ; Cummings v.
Duncan, supra.
His possession under such executory contract operated, no doubt, as notice to the world of his equities thereunder.
It
however, quite
different proposition to say that such posses-
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sion constituted notice of the rights of persons claiming to hold as assignees, vendees, or mortgagees of such equitable interest.
Was appellant Krupp, under the facts, charged with constructive
As stated by appellant's counsel this
notice of plaintiff's mortgage?
suggests two main inquiries.
First, was the mortgage a conveyance within the meaning of the reSecond, was it a conveyance in the chain of title?
cording laws?
Plaintiff's right to recover, depends upon an affirmative answer to
Counsel for appellant assert, with apparent
both of these questions.
confidence in the correctness of tlieir position, that both of such questions must receive a negative answer, and they have presented a very
able and ingenious argument in support of their contention. They apparently concede that under the general statutory rule in other states,
either in express terms or by judicial construction, the record of an
instrument conveying or encumbering a mere equitable estate or interest, as well as a legal estate or interest, operates to give constructive
notice thereof, but they seek to differentiate our recording act from tlie
statutes of other states, and contend for a construction eliminating
from its operation mere equitable interests or liens. As suggested by
them, it is undoubtedly true that the doctrine of constructive notice
by recording instruments is of purely statutory creation, and that the
recording of an instrument not within the statute does not impart constructive notice thereof.
This, of course, is elementary. 2 Devlin,
Deeds, § 646, and cases cited.
The recording acts of this state are embraced in sections 5038, 5039,
and 5042, Rev. Codes 1905.
Section 5038 reads in part as follows : "Every conveyance by deed,
mortgage, or otherwise, of real estate within this state, shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county where such
real estate is situated, and every such conveyance not so recorded shall
be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith, and for a
valuable consideration, of the same real estate, or any part or portion
thereof, whose conveyance, whether in the form of a warranty deed, or
deed of bargain and sale, deed of quitclaim and release, of the form
in common use, or otherwise, is first duly recorded."
Section 5039 defines the term "conveyance" as used in the last section as embracing "every instrument in writing by which any estate
or interest in real property is created, aliened, mortgaged, or encumbered, or by which the title to any real property may be affected, except wills and powers of attorney."
Section 5042 provides:
"An unrecorded instrument is valid as between the parties thereto and those who have notice thereof; but
knowledge of the record of an instrument out of the chain of title does
not constitute such notice."
The first clause of the section last quoted constituted the entire section as originally enacted, but in 1899 the legislature, by chapter 167,
Laws of 1899, added thereto the latter clause, which, no doubt, as

PRIORITIES

Ch. 8)

841

*

*

*

*

*

*

10

The court concluded it was.

is

it

it

§

1

a

is

*

*

a

a

* a

is

is

it,

counsel state, was for the purpose of changing the rule announced by
this court in Doran v. Dazey, 5 N. D. 167, 64 N. W. 1023, 57 Am. St.
Rep. 550. In that case it was held that actual knowledge of the record
of an instrument out pf the chain of title was constructive notice of
and
the original instrument and of the rights of the parties under
mere
knowledge
now
that
by such amendment the rule was changed so
of the record of an instrument out of the chain of title does not constitute notice thereof.
whether plaintiff's mortgage, which
Our first inquiry, therefore,
covered Wenzel's equitable interest under his executory contract to
such an instrument as was
purchase the real property in question,
"conIn other words, was such mortgage
entitled to be recorded.
of
laws
aforesaid.^"
the recording
veyance" within the meaning
We are entirely
Do our recording laws include such
mortgage?
satisfied that this question must also receive an affirmative answer.
The contention of appellant's counsel to the contrary is, we think,
based upon an unwarranted and erroneous construction of our statute.
We are unable to distinguish our law from the Michigan law
and the corresponding statutes in most states. The fact that the Michigan statute in defining the word "conveyance," as used in its recording law, in addition to the language in section 5039 of our Code adds
the words "in law or equity," does not make their statute broader
than ours.
We think the statute would convey the same meaning
without these words, and they were evidently inserted through
superFurthermore, the language in the first porabundance of precaution.
shall be construed
tion of the section, "the term conveyance
to embrace every instrument
any estate or in^^y -which
created, aliened, "mortgaged, or assigned,"
terest in real property
In
clearly was intended to cover
.mortgage of an equitable title.
support of our views see Clark v. Lyster, 155 Fed. 513, 84 C. C. A.
27; 27 Cyc. 1157, and cases cited in note 28 on page 1158; also
476.
Jones, Mortg.
Having reached the conclusion that plaintiff's mortgage was entitled to record under our recording acts aforesaid,
only remains for
us to determine whether the record thereof imparted constructive notice to defendant Krupp at the time he purchased an assignment of
Wenzel's contract and procured the deed from Wenzel's grantor, the
In considering this question
Dakota Development Company.
imin
mind the fact that Krupp knew that Wenzel was in
portant to bear
possession of the premises, asserting equitable ownership under the
contract of purchase, and that he expressly recognized Wenzel's contract rights by purchasing from him an assignment thereof.
In the light of these facts, can Krupp successfully urge that Wenzel's mortgage to plaintiff was out of the chain of title, and hence,
under section 5042, Rev. Codes, the record of such mortgage did not
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constitute notice thereof to him? We think not. The basic fallacy in
consists in the unwarranted
appellant's argument, as we now view
assumption that such mortgage, as to him, was out of the chain of titrue. He dealt with Wenzel, and therefore was
tle.
The reverse
bound in law to know, and in fact did know, 'that he was the equitable owner of the premises, and that his equitable title came from the
He was also
Dakota Development Company through such contract.
bound in law to know, therefore, that Wenzel had
mortgagable interest in the premises, and that he might have sold, assigned, or mortgaged such interest,. and the conveyance in either form would have
been entitled to record.
As to Krupp, therefore, the chain of title did
not stop with the Development Company, but the last link in such
chain was in Wenzel.
He was therefore charged with constructive
notice of plaintiff's mortgage, and bought subject thereto.
would
have been entirely different had he dealt alone with the Development
Company in ignorance of Wenzel's rights. In such event section 5042,
supra, would have afforded him protection, but under the facts
can
have no application.
As said in
476: "The registry of
conJones on Mortgages,
the
veyance of an equitable title
of
notice to
subsequent purchaser
Xhe record
same interest or title from the same grantor.
of
entitled to be recorded
mortgage or other conveyance which
operates as constructive notice to subsequent purchasers claiming
under the same grantor, or through one who
the common source oi
title"— citing Edwards v. McKernan, 55 Mich. 520, 526, 22 N. W. 20.
See also Jones v. Lapham, 15 Kan. 540, wherein Judge Brewer, while
"As
on the supreme bench of Kansas, in speaking to the point, said
to Maggie Murray,
appears that she had knowledge of the equitable
interest, but not of the mortgage. Hull, however, was in possession of
These imthe lots, and had made valuable improvements on them.
Now,
of
she
section
20
the
provements
bought.
conveyance act (Gen.
St.
187) provides that 'every such instrument in writing (and this,
by prior description, includes mortgages, and mortgages upon equitable
interest) shall, from the time of filing the same with the register of
deeds for record, impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof
and all subsequent purchasers and mortgagees shall be deemed to purchase with notice.'
While this general provision, as respects notice,
may be limited, so far as relates to conveyances or mortgages of equitable interests, by the condition of the legal title, and the knowledge which the holders thereof have of the existence of the equity, as
indicated in Kirkwood v. Koester, 11 Kan. 471, yet, aside from tliat
limitation,
of controlling force. Whoever buys
legal estate, having knowledge of an outstanding equitable interest,
chargeable witli
notice of any record of conveyance or encumbrance thereof.
Whoever buys an equitable interest in land
also chargeable with like
notice. In fact, knowledge of an equitable interest carries with
notice of the condition of such interest as
apparent from the public
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We understand that the rule thus stated by Judge Brewer
records."
is generally recognized and well established, and we do not think that
such rule is changed in this state by chapter 167, Laws of 1899, here* * *
tofore referred to.
The District Court will modify its judgment accordingly, and as thus
modified the judgment is affirmed. No costs shall be taxed to either
party on the appeal.

LOSEY

V.

SIMPSON.

(Court of Chancery of New Jersey,

The Chancellor.

1856.

11

N.

J.

Eq. 246.)

is filed upon a mortgage, given by Ferdinand G. Simpson to Pamela Adams, and by her assigned to the complainants. The controversy is in reference to the priority of this mort-

The bill

gage, and a mortgage given by Calvin A. Kanouse to Noah Estell, now
held by the defendant, Mary Estell, as the executrix of the last will

of Noah Estell,

deceased.

Stephen Adams, being indebted to Noah Estell in the sum of twelve
hundred dollars for money lent, had given a mortgage to secure the
same on several tracts of land, embracing the land which is covered
By an arrangement between Adams,
by the mortgages in dispute.
Estell and Kanouse, Adams conveyed to Kanouse the portion of the
mortgaged premises embraced in the disputed mortgages. The money
received by the mortgagee was reduced from $1600 to $1310; and to secure this latter sum Kanouse executed a mortgage to Estell, embracing
the land conveyed in the deed from Adams.
Estell then canceled his
or
delivered
it
to
for that purpose. The
Adams
mortgage,
up
$1600
deed from Adams to Kanouse was dated the 2d of August, 1847. The
mortgage bears the same date. Both were acknowledged on the 12th of
August, 1847. The mortgage was recorded on the 2d day of September of the same year. The deed has never been recorded. It is alleged
that it was, some time after its delivery, destroyed by Kanouse.
Kanouse entered into the possession of the premises under his deed,
and continued in possession until after the execution of the mortgage
under which the complainants claim their priority.
The complainants had a claim against Pamela Adams and Calvin A,
Kanouse for debt, and were prosecuting it at law.
Kanouse offered
He stated to the complainants, through his
to compromise this claim.
attorney, that Pamela Adams owned certain premises, which Stephen
Adams held in his name in trust for her, and that the premises were
sold to one Ferdinand G. Simpson, who was to give to Pamela Adams
a mortgage of sixteen hundred dollars for the purchase money.
Kanouse offered this mortgage to the complainants, if they would advance, in cash, the balance of the mortgage money, after deducting
The proposition was acceded to; and on the
their claim of $797.98.
6th of December, 1849, Stephen Adams, at the procurement of
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Kanouse, executed a deed to Simpson for the same premises which he,
Adams, had, as before stated, conveyed to Kanouse, and Kanouse
Simpson executed a mortgage to Pamela
had mortgaged to Estell.
Adams to secure the purchase money of $1600, and she assigned the
mortgage to the complainants, who, in consideration of the assignment, receipted their claim of $797.98, and for the balance gave their
The
promissory notes, at a short date, which were paid at maturity.
deed to Simpson and the mortgage from Simpson to Pamela Adams
The deed from Stephen Adams to Kanouse,
were duly recorded.
through which Mary Estell, who holds the mortgage from Kanouse to
Noah Estell, claims title, has never been recorded.
The complainants' mortBoth parties claim under Stephen Adams.
gage is subsequent, in date and execution, to that of the defendant,
Mary Estell ; but the complainants claim priority, on the ground that,
at the time their mortgage was executed, the deed from Adams to
Kanouse was not recorded ; and the title on the record being in Stephen
Adams, they insist that the recording of the Estell mortgage afforded
no notice of its existence.
On behalf of Mary Estell, it is insisted that the mortgage she holds
is protected by the very language of the statute ; that the statute declares mortgage void and of no effect against a subsequent bona fide
purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, unless such mortgage shall be recorded at or before the time of recording the said mortgage or conveyance to such subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, and
that, in point of fact, the Estell mortgage was recorded before the subBut, by the very language
sequent mortgage held by the complainants.
of the statute, the deed from Adams to Kanouse is void and of no
effect against the subsequent deed from Adams to Simpson, because
it was not recorded at or before the time of recording the subsequent
deed to Simpson.
The defendant Mary Estell, then, claims under a
grantor whose deed is void, and who, at the time of the conveyance,
had no title against the grantor under whom the complainants hold.
Now it could be of no advantage to Simpson that his recorded deed
should be valid against the unregistered deed of Kanouse, if a grantee under the latter could claim a title superior to that of Simpson's or
of his grantee.
The whole object of the registry acts is to protect subsequent
purchasers and encumbrancers against previous conveyances which are
not recorded, and to deprive the holder of the previous unregistered
conveyance, &c., of the right, which his priority in execution would
have given him at the common law. But if the construction contended for be adopted, this object is totally defeated;
the registry will
afford no protection to an innocent purchaser. When one link in the
chain of title is wanting, there is no clue to guide the purchaser in
his search to the next succeeding link by which the chain is continued.
The title upon the record is the purchaser's protection, and when he
has traced the title down to an individual, out of whom the record does
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the registry acts make that title the purchaser's protection.
The registry of
deed
notice only to those who claim through or
under the grantor by whom the deed was executed. Raynor v. Wilson,
Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 151;
Hill (N. Y.) 473; Stuyvesant v. Hall,
556;
Keller v. Nutz,
Serg.
Ch.
Murray v. Ballou,
Y.)
Johns.
(N.
& R. (Pa.) 446; Lightner v. Mooney, 10 Watts (Pa.) 412; Bates v.
Norcross, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 224; Tilton v. Hunter, 24 Me. 29; Crock-

Leiby v. Wolf, 10 Ohio, 83. Nor will
deed executed by
purchaser be bound to take notice of the record of
prior grantee whose own deed has not been recorded. Embury v. Conner,
Sandf . 98 Roberts v. Borune, 23 Me. 165, 39 Am. Dec. 614.
mortnot recorded, the record of
And where the deed of vendor
gage given by the vendee for the purchase money will not be notice
34
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Veazie v. Parker,. 23 Me. 170; Pierce v.
subsequent purchaser.
without
Taylor, 23 Me. 246. For in any such case the purchaser
clue to guide him in searching the record.
A. L. C. in Eq. 129.
The mortgage to Estell
void against the complainants' mortgage,
bona fide purSimpson, under whom the complainants hold, was
chaser for
valuable consideration without notice of the Estell mortto

11

RANKIN

V.

MILLER.

(Supreme Court of Iowa, 1876.

43 Towa, 11.)

J.

Action in chancery to establish and quiet in plaintiff the title to
the undivided eleven-eighteenths of two hundred and eighty acres of
land in Black Hawk county. The relief was granted as to one hundred
Both parand sixty acres of the land, and denied as to the remainder.
ties appeal. The facts of the case are- stated in the opinion.
Beck,
The admitted or established facts, as we find them in this
are as follows
Plaintiff's title

:

case,

:

is

1.

I.

based upon the following conveyances and facts
November 24, 1853, Benjamin H. Towner entered, at the United
States land office at Dubuque, all the lands in controversy, which are
all in section 13, township 88, range 13 west, and received a certificate

;

a

a

a

11 Tbe balance of the opinion is omitted.
The court concluded that Simpson
was a bona fide purchaser for value.
Van Di^^ere v. Mitchell, 45 S. C. 127, 22 S. E. 759 (1895), contra.
Eliza K., the owner, conveyed to her brother, F. K., who mortgaged the
premises to P. P. recorded. R., after examining the records and satisfjung
Behimself that Eliza had title, took
deed from her, paying value therefor.
cause F. K. had been acting as his sister's agent, E. procured a quitclaim deed
covering the same premises from him. The day after the delivery of the two
In an action
deeds to R., the deed from Eliza to F. K. was placed on record.
by P. to foreclose his mortgage, R. claimed protection as
bona fide purchaser
for value without notice. AVas he entitled to such protection?
purchase money mortgage. The
A. conveys to B., who at once gives back
mortgage is recorded, but the deed from A, to B. is not. A. later conveys to X.,
a bona fide purchaser for value \^ath no knowledge of the deed to B. Does he
have constructive notice?
Hart v.
See Veazie v. Parker, 23 Me. 170 (1843)
Gardner, 81 Miss. 650, 33 South. 442, 497 (1902).
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of entry, issued by the proper officer in the usual form. On the 18th
of October, 1858, a patent was issued to him for the lands.
2. August 13, 1854, Towner sold and conveyed the lands to Daniel
J. and Armstrong Rankin. The deed is lost, but was filed and recorded
in Black Hawk county. The name Ambrose appears in the record inThis
stead of Armstrong, the christian name of one of the grantees.
is alleged to be a mistake, either in the deed or record thereof, and
it is averred that the conveyance was intended to be to Armstrong

Rankin, who was intended

to

be described

therein

as one

of

the

grantees.

Armstrong Rankin died February 1st, 1855, leaving plaintiff as his
only heir. His widow, Nancy M., rnarried Cyrus Hays in 1858.
4. Daniel J. Rankin re-conveyed his undivided interest in the lands
to Towner, who, in July 28, 1861, sold and conveyed the undivided
one-half thereof then held by him to plaintiff's mother, Nancy M.
3.

Hays.
5. In 1863 Nancy M. Hays died, leaving children by her second husband, Cyrus Hays, who subsequently married a second wife, Sarah,
and died February 5th, 1868, leaving one child, the fruit of the last
Sarah Hays died in 1868. Plaintiff, as heir of his father
marriage.
and mother, claims title to eleven-eighteenths of the land in controversy.
Alleged defects and objections to deeds, under which plaintiff's
ancestors acquired title to the lands, will be hereafter stated when
they come up for consideration in this opinion.
n. The defendants' title rests upon the following conveyances :
1. October 13, 1853, Abraham Turner, who is a defendant in this
action, entered one hundred and twenty acres of land in section 13,
township 88, north range 12 west, at the United States land office at
Dubuque, and received the usual certificate of entry, which is number

15,700.
2. On the 28th day of February, 1854, which it will be remarked
was subsequent, in point of time, to the entry of the land under which
plaintiff claims, the register of the Dubuque land office, upon application
of Turner, changed the duplicate certificate of entry. No. 15,700, returned in his office, which had been issued upon Turner's entry of the
land in section 13, township 88, north range 12 west, so that it read
"north range 13 west," being the same description as that of part of
the lands before entered by the grantor of plaintiff's ancestor.
3. A patent was issued to Turner for one hundred and twenty acres
of land in range 13, June 15, 1854.
4. In 1868 a patent was issued to Turner for the land in range
12, and he afterwards
sold and conveyed it to E. K. Ware and D. J.
Coleman.
5. The defendants claim the land in section 13, township 88, north
lange 13 west, which is covered by Turner's patent, under that instrument and conveyances by Turner and his grantees.
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6. They claim title to the other lands in controversy under a sale
and deed by the guardian of plaintiff, made in 1865.
7. For a part of the same land they also set up a tax title based upon
a sale of the land by the county treasurer, for 1862, for the delinquent
taxes of 1860, and a treasurer's deed thereon, dated May 14, 1864.
The remainder of tliese lands are covered by a tax deed recorded in
1865, which is also set up by defendants.
III. It is necessary to consider separately the conflicting claims
and titles set up by the respective parties to the land in controversy.
The first point of inquiry involves the validity of the conflicting patents
covering a part of the land.
At that
1. The validity of Towner's entry cannot be questioned.
time the full and perfect title to the land, both legal and equitable,
was in the government. There had been no sale or transfer of any interest in it which defeated the right of the government to dispose of
in the manner all public lands are disposed of as provided by law.
If we admit that Turner's first entry of lands was made through mistake and the subsequent alteration of his duplicate certificate was
without fraud, Towner's entry
not defeated by these considerations. Turner did not enter the land in range thirteen, and the certificate issued to him did not cover it. There was, therefore, no sale of
that land to him by the government. The land was then sold to Towner
cannot be claimed that
and proper certificate issued to him. Surely,
the
application of Turner,
the register of the land office, simply upon
without proof of the mistake which the evidence shows was not made,
had authority to change the entry and alter Turner's certificate so as
The register was clothed with no auto defeat Towner's prior entry.
thing be done
thority to change the entry, and in no case can such
where
the
land
to
be
of
the
covered by
officer
government
by any
before
sold. U.
Rev. St.
2369 (U. S. Comp.
the change has been
The government having sold the land to
St. 1913,
4777), 2372.
Towner, no other disposition thereof can be made. Arnold v. Grimes,
Iowa,
Cavender v. Smith,
G. Greene, 349, 56 Am. Dec. 541.
"The patent for lands belonging to the United States, when issued
to
party vests in him the perfect legal title, which relates back to
the date of entry of the land. The entry of the land and the issuing of
the certificate of location transferred to him at the time all the property held by the government in the land, and conferred upon him all
'the equity' thereto which
an absolute and unconditional right to the
land." Waters v. Bush, 42 Iowa, 255
Heirs of Klein v. Argenbright,
26 Iowa, 493; Cavender v. Heirs of Smith,
Iowa, 157.
Turner,
The patent to
having been issued contrary to law, for land
which had been before sold by the government,
void, and the patentee acquired no rights under it.
Stoddard et al. v. Chambers,
How. 284, 11 L. Ed. 269; Cunningham v. Ashley et al., 14 How. 377,
14 L. Ed. 462
Wright v. Rutgers, 14 Mo. 585 Boring v. Lemmon,
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Har. & J. (Md.) 223; Perry v. O'Hanlon, 11 Mo. 585, 49 Am. Dec.
100; State v. Delesdinier, 7 Tex. 76; Todd v. Fisher, 26 Tex. 239.
IV. The conchision is reached that Turner's patent conferred no
right whatever in the land which he could convey to another. We do
not understand that counsel deny the correctness of this conclusion,
but seek to avoid its consequences on the ground that defendants are
innocent purchasers without notice of plaintiff's title. This position is
based upon the fact that Towner's deed to plaintiff's ancestor, executed in 1854, was acknowledged before a justice of the peace of
the .state of Illinois and the certificate of acknowledgment, in other
respects, does not comply with the requirements of the law, especially
in failing to show that the grantor acknowledged the deed to be his
voluntary act. At that date, the acknowledgment of deeds for lands in
this state could not be made before justices of the peace in other states.
The deed was recorded October 1, 1855. Defendants insist that, as
this deed was insufficiently acknowledged, though recorded, it does
not impart notice to them of plaintiff"'s title. Code 1873, § 1942.
Let us consider for a moment the position of the parties as claimants of the land in dispute. They claim under distinct chains of titles,
having, however, a common origin in the government. The government
made two grants of the land ; on one, plaintiff's title rests, the other
is the foundation of defendants' title. The deed from the purchaser
to plaintiff's ancestor, under whom plaintiff claims, is defectively acknowledged and it is not, therefore, lawfully recorded. Now, no question of registry, or want of notice, can arise upon the assurances given
by the gr vernment for the land. Arnold v. Grimes, 2 Iowa, 1 ; Heirs
of Klein v. Argenbright, 26 Iowa, 493 ; David v. Rickabaugh, 32
Iowa, 540. Does the law protect defendants because they had no
notice by the record of the deed from the grantee of the government
to the plaintiff's ancestor?
Code 1873, § 1941, the statute requiring the registry of deeds, is in
the following language : "No instrument affecting real estate, is of any
validity against subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration,
without notice, unless recorded in the office of the recorder of the counThe statute protects subsequent purchasers and no others.
ty, etc."
The very language of the statute leads to the conclusion that there
are such as claim under the chain of title of which the deeds affected
by the provision are a part. It is intended to protect the purchaser
whose deed is recorded, against another conveyance that is not recorded, and contemplates the case of conflicting deeds conveying title and
having a common source. No protection is intended against an independent title, distinct from that upon which the recorded deed is
based.
The conclusion is supported by the consideration that, in such
cases, notice in fact by a record thereof could not be given.
No point
of commencement for an examination of the records would be suggested to the party seeking information therein.
The indexes of the
record, which under our statute are a part of the record and serve to
5
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impart notice, would give no aid in such an examination.
It
therefore, our conclusion that the term subsequent purchaser, occurring in
used to describe purchasers claiming under some common
the statute,
This
position
supported by the following authorities
grantor.
218;
Dollarhide,
V.
24
Roe et al. v. Neal et al., Dud. (Ga.).
Cal.
Long
168
Fenno v. Sayre,
Ala. 458 Whittington v. Wright,
Ga. 23
Tilton V. Hunter, 24 Me. 29 Crockett et al. v. Maguire, 10 Mo. 34
Ely V. Wilcox, 20 Wis. 530, 91 Am. Dec. 436; Rodgers v. Burchard
et al., 34 Tex. 441,
Am. Rep. 283; Losey et al. v. Simpson et al., 11
N.
Eq. 246; Bates v. Norcross, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 224; Quirk v.
Mich. 76; Murray v. Ballou,
Thomas et al.,
Johns. Ch. (N. Y.)
566.

YOUNGBLOOD
(Supreme Court of Missouri, 1870.

v.

*

apply.^^

thereby.
*

they are not prejudiced

of registry do not

*

was not in fact recorded;

case where the principles

VASTINE.

46 Mo. 239,

2

It

is
a

cause

it

If, then, the record of the deed would not impart notice provided
for by law, defendants cannot claim any strength for their title be-

Am. Rep. 509.)

;

a

it

;

if

;

It

a

a

a

J.

J-

Bliss,
Sarah G. Wright, deceased, by herself and her trustee,
on the 20th day of July, 1859, executed to E.
Xaupi, in trust, to secure the payment of
promissory note of same date for $3700, given
to Joseph Tuley, then living,
deed of certain real estate, her separate
property, situate on the corner of Pine and Eighth streets, in St. Louis,
which deed was not put upon record until the 19th of October, 1866.
The said Joseph Tuley and Sarah G. Wright died in 1860 and 1861,
and on the first of October, 1865, D. Robert Barclay, as trustee for
Mrs. Ann A. Macdonald, and with her funds, purchased said property of the heirs of said Sarah G. Wright, and received
warranty
deed of the same, which was recorded April 28, 1866.
appears from
the evidence that neither Barclay nor Mrs. Macdonald had any knowlthat the records were examined before
edge of the trust deed to Xaupi
the purchase to see
there were any encumbrances upon the property
that
full consideration was paid for
that the estate of Mrs. Wright
had been settled by the public administrator, and that all debts presented had been paid, but this note was not among them.

The remainder of the opinion relating to other matters is omitted.
nn action by the assignee of
mortgage to foreclose same, the mortgagor
sought to set off certain claims held by him against the mortgagee, which elaimg
had been acquired after the assignment of the mortgage to the complainant.
The mortgagor had no knowledge of the assignment, but the assignment had
been properly recorded prior to the acquisition of the claims.
A statute of the
state, adopting the prevalent equity nile, provided that, "in the case of an assignment of
thing in action, the action of the assignee shall be without prejudice to any set-off or other defense, existing at the time of or before notice of
the assignment."
Should the mortgagor be allowed his set-off?
12

a

a

In

Aig.Pkop. — 54

850

DERIVATIVE

TITLES

(Part

2

This suit was brought by the administrator of Tuley to foreclose his
trust deed, and the contest arises in consequence of the failure on the
pan of Xaupi, to whom it was made, to place it upon record. Had
the second deed been executed by Mrs. Wright while living, there
would be no question that it would hold against the unrecorded deed.
But in some of tlie reported cases upon the subject it is held that the
same preference can not be given to tlie second deed if made by the
I confess I am not struck with the force
heirs of the first grantor.
which
the distinction is made, for it is based
upon
reasoning
of the
deed is inoperative because nothing
second
upon the idea that the
If that
descended to the heirs, and hence they had nothing to convey.
be so, it was because nothing was left in the ancestor that could descend; that his whole estate was divested by the first deed. -If his
whole estate was so divested, how could a second deed, if made by
Yet it is not disputed that such second deed
himself, be operative?
would convey the estate, notwithstanding the first.
Yet the distinction is made by some of our most respectable courts,
and it is apparently recognized by this court. In Hill et al. v. Meeker,
24 Conn. 211, the majority of the court held that the unrecorded deed
from the ancestor so divested him of his title that his son and heir
"took nothing by inheritance that he could convey or mortgage to a
bona fide purchaser who had no knowledge of the deeds." The case
is a much harder one than the one at bar, and the decision is based
upon "a clear distinction between a purchaser from him (the ancestor)
and one from his heir, Arza.
In relation to a purchase from Arza,
the difficulty is that he never had any title."
The same distinction was made in Hancock v. Beverly's Heirs, in 6
B. Mon. (Ky.) 531. The judge delivering the opinion acknowledges
the question to be a doubtful and difficult one, and in reasoning upon
the subject says : "It has always been held that a deed, though never
recorded, is good between the parties, and as to all the world, except
creditors and innocent purchasers for value. The grantor in such deed
can pass no title to his subsequent donee or devisee, and the law will
pass none to his heir, because there was none in him, after his conveyance, to be passed, but in favor of a creditor or bona fide purchaser
for value. Does tlie conveyance of the heir, or donee or devisee, who,
as such, never had title, made to a purchaser for value and without
notice, operate to divest the title conveyed by the unrecorded deed, and,
bringing it in another line of conveyances, vest it in subsequent purchasers?"
This question the court, on the authority of Ralls v. Graham, 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 120, answers in the negative.
Our own court, in McCamant v. Patterson, 39 Mo. 110, 111, seems
to recognize the same doctrine, though, from the peculiarity of the
title to the New Madrid grants, the question in its general application
could not have arisen in that case.
Other authorities, however, equally respectable, have held that the
heir of the grantor in an unrecorded deed can convey a good title to
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylan innocent purchaser f(5r value.
vania, in Powers v. McFerran, 2 Serg. & R. 44, in giving its opinion,
remarks that "the purchaser for a valuable consideration, seeing no
deed on record, had a right, under the sanction of the recording act,
The same
to take for granted that the whole estate had descended."
question was raised in McCulloch v. Eudaly, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 346, and
in sustaining a deed from the heir, the following language is used by
the court: "But it is contended tliat this (the saving to suosequent purchasers) only applies to cases where the purchase should be made from
the same vendor by whom the prior deed was executed. It is true the
subsequent purchaser must hold under the same title ; but whether
The
he holds under the ancestor or heir, it can make no difference.
estate is thrown upon the heii: with all the rights the ancestor enjoyed
and subject to all encumbrances he had created on it."
The subject has also been considered in the State of Illinois, in
Kennedy v. Northup, 15 111. 148; and after reviewing the authorities,
"After much reflection," says
the title from the heir was sustained.
the judge who delivered the opinion, "I am satisfied that this is the
true and proper construction of the statute.
It meets the object designed to be accomplished by the law, and is within the reason which
gave rise to the enactment. It was the object of tlie Legislature to
make patent the titles to real estate, that purchasers might know what
titles they were acquiring.
Where a deed is not recorded, the title
is apparently still in the grantor, and the law authorizes purchasers
who are ignorant of the conveyance to deal with him as the real owner.
In case of his death the heir becomes the apparent owner of the legal
title, and it is equally important and equally as just that the public
may be allowed to deal with him as with tlie original grantor if living."
There is no substantial difference between the statutes of tlie different States whose decisions I have quoted and our own.
Different
language is used, but the same result is aimed at; some expressly declaring unrecorded deeds to be void against subsequent purchasers,
while ours negatively does the same thing by saying that no such in■strument shall be valid except between the parties thereto, etc.
The discrepancy in the authorities has doubtless arisen in part from
the endeavor to reconcile the statute with the subtleties of the old law
of tenures, which treats a title as a substantial entity, and almost applies to it the powers of locomotion.
The attempt involves the reasoner in contradictions, for in one breath it is said that the title passes
by the deed to the grantee and still so remains with the grantor, that
in a contingency it may again pass from him to another grantee, but
if the grantor dies it can not descend like all his other titles, but goes
back to tlie original grantee, with whom it has always remained.
It would be more rational to say that the law controls the manner
in which rights of property are acquired, and that it will not favor any
mode of acquirement that shall encourage fraud.
Thus purchasers
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are required to spread upon record the evidence of their ownership;
and if others suffer from their neglect, the law will not recognize such
Or, in using the language of the law of tenures, we might
ownership.
perhaps say tliat in a conveyance the absolute title rests with the grantor and his heirs in abeyance, to vest irrevocably only upon tlie record
of the deed, and that it will vest in the first grantee in condition to
receive the grant, who shall so place it upon record.
The Circuit Court held that the defendant's deed from the heirs of
Mrs. Wright conveyed the whole estate, whereupon the plaintiff* took
In this
a nonsuit, and his motion to set the same aside was overruled.
the court committed no error, and the other judges concurring, the
judgment will be affirmed.^'

MORSE

v.

CURTIS.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 18S5.
54 Aju. Rep. 456.)

140 Mass.

112, 2 N.

E.

929,

Morton, C. J. This is a writ of entry. Both parties derive their
title from one Hall. On August 8, 1872, Hall mortgaged tlie land to
the demandant.
On September 7, 1875, Hall mortgaged the land to
The mortgage to
one Clark, who had notice of the earlier mortgage.
on
Clark was recorded
January 31, 1876. The mortgage to the demandant was recorded on September 8, 1876.
On October 4, 1881,
Clark assigned his mortgage to the tenant, who had no actual notice
of the mortgage to the demandant. The question is which of these
titles has priority.
The same question was directly raised and adjudicated in the two
cases of Connecticut v. Bradish, 14 Mass. 296, and Trull v. Bigelow,
16 Mass. 406, 8 Am. Dec. 144.
These adjudications establish a rule
of property which ought not to be unsettled, except for the strongest
reasons.
It is true, that, in the later case of Flynt v. Arnold, 2 Mete. 619,
Chief Justice Shaw expresses his individual opinion against the soundness of these decisions;
but in that case the judgment of the court
was distinctly put upon another ground, and his remarks can only be
considered in the light of dicta, and not as overruling the earlier adjudications.
Upon careful consideration, the reasons upon which the earlier cases
were decided seem to us the more satisfactory, because they best follow the spirit of our registry laws and the practice of the profession
13 See Lyon v. Gleason, 40 Minn. 434, 42
N. W. 286 (1889) ; Wliittemore v.
Bean, 6 N. II. 47 (1S32), where it was the devisee of the grantor in the unrecorded deed that made the later deed to the good faith purchaser.
Suppose the grantor in the unrecorded deed himself makes a deed to one
who takes either as a volunteer or with knowledge of the earlier deed, and tliat
grantee in turn conveys to a good faith purchaser.
What would be the position
■of the grantee in the unrecorded deedV
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nnder them. The earliest registry laws provided that no conveyance
of land shall be good and effectual in law "against any other person
or persons but the grantor or grantors, and their heirs only, unless the
deed or deeds thereof be acknowledged and recorded in manner aforesaid." St. 1783, c. Z7, § 4.
Under this statute, the court, at an early period, held that the recording was designed to take the place of the notorious act of livery
of seisin; and that, though by the first deed the title passed out of
the grantor, as against himself, yet he could, if such deed was not
recorded, convey a good title to an innocent purchaser who received
and recorded his deed. But the court also held that a prior unrecorded
deed would be valid against a second purchaser who took his deed
with a knowledge of the prior deed, thus engrafting an exception upon
the statute.
Reading of Judge Trowbridge, 3 Mass. 575; Marshall
V. Fisk, 6 Mass. 24, 4 Am. Dec. 76.
This exception was adopted on the ground that it was a fraud in
the second grantee to take a deed, if he had knowledge of the prior
deed.
As Chief Justice Shaw forcibly says, in Lawrence v. Stratton,
6 Cush. 163, the rule is "put upon the ground, that a party with such
notice could not take a deed without fraud, the objection was not to
the nature of the conveyance, but to the honesty of the taker; and,
therefore, if the estate had passed through such taker to a bona fide
purchaser, without fraud, the conveyance was held valid."
This exception by judicial exposition was afterwards engrafted upon
the statutes, and somewhat extended, by the Legislature.
Rev. St. c.
59, § 28 ; Gen. St. c. 89, § 3 ; Pub. St. c. 120, § 4.
It is to be observed that, in each of these revisions, it is provided that an unrecorded
prior deed is not valid against any persons except the grantor, his
heirs and devisees,* "and persons having actual notice" of it. The
reasons why the statute requires actual notice to a second purchaser,
in order to defeat his title, is apparent; its purpose is that his title
shall not prevail against the prior deed, if he has been guilty of a fraud
upon the first grantee ; and he could not be guilty of such fraud, unless he had actual notice of the first deed.
Now, in tlie case before us, it is found as a fact that the tenant had
no actual knowledge of the prior mortgage to the demandant at the
time he took his assignment from Clark ; but it is contended that he
had constructive notice, because the demandant's mortgage was recorded before such assignment.
It was held in Connecticut v. B radish, ubi supra, that such record
was evidence of actual notice, but was not of itself enough to show
actual notice, and to charge the assignee of the second deed with a
fraud upon the holder of the first unrecorded deed. This seems to us
to accord with the spirit of our registry laws, and with the uniform
understanding of and practice under them by the profession.
These laws not only provide that deeds must be recorded, but they
also prescribe the method in which the records shall be kept and in-
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Pub. St. c. 24,
dexes prepared for public inspection and examination.
14—26.
There are indexes of grantors and grantees, so that, in
title, the examiner
obHged to run down the list of gransearching
If he can start
the
Hst of grantees.
tors, or run backward through
in
the case at bar,
known to have
good title, as,
with an owner who
obliged to run through the index of
he could start with Hall, he
conveyance by the owner of the land in quesgrantors until he finds
stranger
tion. After such conveyance, the former owner becomes
to the title, and the examiner must follow down the name of the new
would be
he has conveyed the land, and so on.
owner to see
hardship to require an examiner to follow in the indexes of grantors
long
the names of every person who, at apy time, through perhaps
chain of title, was the owner of the land.
We do not think this
the practical construction which lawyers and
conveyancers have given to our registry laws. The inconveniences of
such
construction would be much greater than would be the inconvenience of requiring
person, who has neglected to record his prior
time, to record
deed for
and to bring
bill in equity to set aside
the subsequent deed,
was taken in fraud of his rights.
The better rule, and the one the least likely to create confusion of
titles, seems to us to be, that,
purchaser, upon examining the regfrom
the
owner of the land to his grantor,
istry, find
conveyance
which gives him
perfect record title completed by what the law, at
recorded, regards as equivalent to
the time
livery of seisin, he
entitled to rely upon such record title, and
not obliged to search the
records afterwards, in order to see
there has been any prior unrecorded deed of the original owner.
This rule of property, established by the early case of Connecticut
V. Bradish, ought not to be departed from, unless 'conclusive reasons
therefor can be shown.
We are therefore of opinion, that, in the case at bar, the tenant has
the better title and, according to the terms of the report, the verdict
ordered for the demandant must be set aside, and
New trial granted.

WOODS

V.

GARNETT.

(Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1894.

72 Miss.

78, 16 South. 390.)

Bill to cancel defendant's claim to certain land and to recover posDecree for defendants.
Complainant appeals. The opinion

session.

a

a

sufficiently states the facts.
Cooper, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The parties to this suit all claim title from one Riley, who, in 1891,
was the owner of the land in controversy.
On the ninth day of November, A. D. 1891, Riley executed
deed of trust, whereby he conveyed
the land to one M. H. Trantham, as trustee, to secure the payment of
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promissory note of that date for $3,500, payable to the order of C. H.
Pond.
This deed contained the usual power of sale if default should
be made in the payment of the secured debt at maturity, and also provided that Pond, or the assignee of the note, might at pleasure subThis deed
stitute any other person in lieu of the trustee, Trantham.
was acknowledged before Trantham, the trustee, who was a justice of
The certificate stated only that the grantor
the peace of the county.
acknowledged that he had "signed" the deed, omitting the words "and
delivered," as required by law. This deed was filed for record in the
proper ofiice on the twelfth day of November.
(Dn May 6, 1892, Riley executed a. deed of trust to one Oliver, as
trustee, to secure the payment of a debt to W. G. Cocke & Co. of
%Z97.22. This deed also contained a power of sale if the debt secured
Before accepting this security, W. D.
should not be paid at maturity.
Lester, a member of the firm of Cocke & Co., examined the records,
and there saw and read the prior deed, but was of opinion that, by
reason of the defective acknowledgment, and because it had been taken
by the trustee therein, it was not entitled to registration, and, being of
that opinion, decided to accept the deed to secure his firm.
Some time prior to October, 1892, Pond assigned the note executed
About
by Riley payable to him to the complainant, Chas. R. Woods.
this time it was discovered that the deed of trust by which this note
had been secured had not been so acknowledged as to entitle to registration, and thereupon Woods exhibited his bill in equity to enjoin
Riley from disposing of the lands to his injury, and an injunction was
allowed.- The attorney of Woods, being of opinion that a re-execution
and acknowledgment of the deed by Riley, and another registration
thereof, would serve the same purpose as the injunction, sent the clerk
of the chancery court to see Riley and get a re-acknowledgment of the
deed, which he did on October 7, 1892, when the deed was on that day
again filed for record and recorded on the twenty-fourth.
On November 16, 1892, Riley and his wife conveyed the land to the
On November 19, 1892, the land- was
appellee, Mrs. L. A. Garnett.
sold under each of the two deeds of trust, the sales being at different
At the sale under the deed of trust first made, but junior in
places.
record (the Pond deed), the appellant became the purchaser.
At the
sale under the deed junior in date, but the first recorded, the appellee,
Mrs. D. L. Garnett, purchased. The appellant exhibited his bill in
this cause to cancel the titles of the defendants, Mrs. D. L. Garnett and
Mrs. L. A. Garnett, as clouds upon his own, and to recover possession
of the land, they having been let into possession by Riley.
Mrs. D, L. Garnett defends the suit upon the ground that she was a
bona fide purchaser, without notice of the deed of trust under which
complainant claims title. Mrs. L. A. Garnett defends only as to 160
acres of the land, which, she says, was the homestead of Riley at the
time he executed the deed of trust to secure the note to Pond, which
deed, she contends, was void as to the homestead, because Mrs. Riley
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did not join her husband in the conveyance, as is required by law for
the sale or incumbrance of the homestead. In the controversy between
the appellant and Mrs. D. L. Garnett, the question involved is one of
In the controversy with Mrs. L. A.
law, the facts being undisputed.
Garnett, the question is purely of fact, the parties not differing as to
the law, which is plain, and not susceptible of controversy.
1. Were Cocke & Co. bona fide incumbrancers of the land, without
notice of the Pond mortgage ? It has been generally held by the Amerthe
ican courts, though with some exceptions, that, notwithstanding
registry acts, one who has notice of such facts in reference to an unrecorded conveyance, as devolves on him, as an honest man, the duty
of making further inquiry, is to be held as having such knowledge as
In those states
such inquiry, honestly made, would have disclosed.
in which this rule does not apply, it will be found that the registry acts
One who
require actual knowledge of the unrecorded conveyance.
sees upon the record, and reads an instrument improperly recorded,
because not acknowledged or proved as required by law, cannot claim
to be a bona fide purchaser of the property therein described.
He
the
that
what
he
sees
instrument
knows
is
purporting to
copy of an
have been made by the grantor to the grantee. Good faith requires
that he shall prosecute further inquiry, and, if he negligently or wilfully neglects so to do, he is to be held to have known all the facts to
which that inquiry would have led. The notice to Lester by reading
the improperly recorded mortgage, was notice to his firm of the existence of that conveyance, and Cocke & Co. were not bona fide purchasers of the property.^*
2. Where a conveyance is made to one who fails to record his deed
until after another has received and recorded a conveyance from the
same grantor, but with notice of the first deed, what are the rights of
the first grantee against a purchaser from the second, where such
purchaser, having no actual knowledge of the facts, buys after the
record of the prior deed? This question is determinable by a construction of our registry act, for, at the common law, a second purchaser
of the fee could take nothing, since, by the first conveyance, the grantor would have divested himself of all his estate, and would have nothing to convey. Basset v. Nosworthy, 2 Ldg. Cas. in Eq. 110, and note;
Coke on Littleton, 390d.
By our registry act it is declared that the instruments thereby required to be recorded "shall be void as to all creditors and subsequent
purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, unless they shall
be acknowledged or proved and lodged with the clerk of the chancery
court of the county, to be recorded in the same manner that other conveyances are required by this act to be acknowledged or proved and recorded ; but the same, as between the parties and their heirs, and as
to all subsequent purchasers with notice, or without valuable considera1*

But

see Nordman

v.

Kau, infra,

p. 909.
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Code 1880, § 1212;
tion, shall, nevertheless, be valid and binding."
covenant,
agreement, bond,
2457.
"Every
Code 1892, §
conveyance,
all
to
effect,
subsequent puras
take
mortgage, and deed of trust shall
as to all credand
notice,
chasers for a valuable consideration without
itors, only from the time when delivered to the clerk to be recorded."
Code 1880, § 1213 ; Code 1892, § 2458. In Massachusetts and Vermont
it is held that a purchaser is not bound to examine the record, after
the date of a recorded conveyance, to discover whether the grantor
therein has made another conveyance prior in time but junior in record,
but may safely purchase from the grantee in the first recorded conveyance, if he, the purchaser, has no actual notice of the prior deed, and no
Connectinotice of facts which makes it his duty to prosecute inquiry.
cut V. Bradish, 14 Mass. 296 ; Trull v. Bigelow, 16 Mass. 406, 8 Am.
Dec. 144; Morse v. Curtis,^ 140 Mass. 112, 2 N. E. 929, 54 Am. Rep.
456 : Day v. Clark, 25 Vt. 397. And this is said to be the more reasonable rule by the annotators of the leading cases in equity (Le Neve
V. Le Neve, 2 Ldg. Cas. 180), and by Mr. Jones (1 Jones on Mortg.
however, to the contrary,
§ 574.) The decided weight of authority
though Mr. Jones cites none of them as supporting the contrary view,
except the New York decisions. Among others, the following cases
Van Rensselaer v. Clark, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 25, 31 Am.
may be noted
Dec. 280; Westbrook v. Gleason, '79 N. Y. 23; Clark v. Mackin, 30
Hun (N. Y.) 411; Mahoney v. Middleton, 41 Cal. 41; English v. Waples, 13 Iowa, 57 Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443 Erwin v. Lewis, 32
Wis. 276; Van Aken v. Gleason, 34 Mich. 477; Bayles v. Young, 51 111.
127.
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The question has never been decided in this state, though in Harrington V. Allen, 48 Miss. 492, there
dictum in which Judge Simrall,
mistaking the facts of his case, seems to favor the Massachusetts rule.
The decisions in Massachusetts and Vermont, while resulting in practically the same end, proceed on irreconcilable and opposite principles.
In Massachusetts
held that the purchaser from the grantee in the
deed junior in date, but senior in record, need not examine the records
after the date of the registration of the conveyance to his grantor.
Morse v. Curtis, 140 Mass. 112, N. E. 929, 54 Am. Rep. 456. In Vermont
held that he
bound by the constructive notice afforded by
the registration of the first deed, that
notice to him of the fact that
a deed prior to that of his grantor had been made; but
not notice
that his grantor had notice of the first deed and so the conveyance to
the purchaser from the second grantee
preferred in Vermont, not
because the purchaser
himself
purchaser without notice, for the
notice of its existence, nor because his
registration of the prior deed
was
notice, for that may or may not be
without
purchaser
grantor
true, but because the purchaser did not know that his grantor was not
bona fide purchaser, and thus, under the Vermont decision, one may
secure protection as though he were
bona fide purchaser when neither
he nor any one under and through whom he derives title was in fact
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This rule has no recognition except in Vermont, so
such purchaser.
far as we have discovered.
We think the Massachusetts decisions are erroneous, because they
hold that one not bound by the registry law is protected by it. But for
the registry law, where one has conveyed his legal title, he has nothing
left to convey to another, and that other, with or without notice of the
prior conveyance, would get nothing, for his grantor had nothing to
convey. Now, the statute comes and provides that, though a conveyance of the class named in the statute may be made, it shall as to certain persons, viz., creditors and purchasers without notice, be valid only
from a certain time, viz., the time when it is filed for record. In other
words, the operation of the unrecorded conveyance is supended until
it shall be recorded, as against creditors and purchasers without notice,
and, when recorded, it does not operate by relation as against such
persons from the day of its execution, but is effective only from and of
But when filed for record it has
the date of its delivery for record.
full scope and effect against the world. One who buys after that event
can find no protection in the statute, for its terms have been complied
with by the holder of the adverse title. It is no answer to say that it is
inconvenient to the purchaser to examine a long and voluminous record, made after the record of the title of his grantor.
To this the sufficient reply is that, but for the registry acts, he would not have even
the protection which such records afford, but would deal at his peril
with his grantor, and secure only such title as he might assert. If that
grantor Jiad good title because a purchaser for value without notice,
that is a defense to his vendee ; but if such grantor was not such purchaser, then the validity of the title he conveys must depend upon the
character of his vendee, and if such vendee is not a bona fide purchaser
under the common law or the statute, we cannpt perceive from what
source a principle can be deduced which will afford him protection.
It seems clear to us that one who buys an estate cannot invoke the protection of the registry act as against a deed recorded under such act at
the time of his purchase.^'

TEFFT

V.

MUNSON.

(Court of Appeals of New York, 1S74.

57 N. Y. 97.)

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in
judicial department, affirming a judgment in favor of defendants entered upon the decision of the court upon trial at Special Term.
This was an action to restrain defendants, loan commissioners for
Washington county, from foreclosing a mortgage executed to tliem by
Martin B. Perkins and wife.

the third

15 The balance of the opiuion, which
discusses the position and rights of Mrs.
L. A. (Jarnett, is omitted.
See Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443 (1872), a most interesting case.
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On the 18th day of January, 1848, Gamaliel Perkins purchased of
Cortland Hovvland certain lands in Washington county, which were
conveyed to him by warranty deed recorded March 7, 1848, in the
clerk's office in said county. Gamaliel Perkins, immediately after his
purchase, let his son, Martin B. Perkins, into possession of the premises,
who forged a deed of the land from his father to himself and placed
it upon record in the clerk's office of said county, May 27, 1850. On
the 1st day of October, 1850, Martin B. and his wife executed a mortgage upon said land to the loan commissioners of said county, to secure
the sum of $1,000 loaned to him. This mortgage contained covenants
that Martin B. and his wife were lawfully seized of a good, sure, perfect, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance in the premises,
and that they were free and clear of and from all former and other
gifts, grants, bargains, sales, liens, etc. ; and this mortgage was,' on the
day of its date, duly recorded in the book kept by the loan commissioners, as required by law. On the 23d of January, 1860, a deed of
said lands bearing date April 1, 1853, was recorded in the county clerk's
office, which purported to be executed by Martin B. and wife to his
father. On the 16th day of December, 1859, Gamaliel Perkins conveyUntil
ed said land to Martin B., by deed recorded January 14, 1860.
this conveyance from his father Martin B. had no title to tlie land, although he remained in possession of the same from 1848. On the 31st
day of January, 1867, Martin B., being still in possession of the lands,
conveyed them to the plaintiff, who paid full value for the same without any actual notice of the mortgage to the loan commissioners.
The
1867.
deed to the plaintiff was recorded February 9,
The court below decided that plaintiff was not entitled to tne relief
sought and directed a dismissal of the complaint. Judgment was perfected accordingly.
Earl, C. The plaintiff claims that the mortgage to the loan commissioners has no validity as against him, and that his deed has priority
over it under the laws in reference to the registry of deeds and mortIt is a principle of law, not now open to doubt, that, ordinarily,
gages.
if one who has no title to lands, nevertheless makes a deed of conveyance, with warranty, and afterward himself purchases and receives the
title, the same will vest immediately in his grantee who holds his deed
with warranty as against such grantor by estoppel. In such case the
estoppel is held to bind the land, and to create an estate and interest
in it. The grantor in such case, being at the same time the warrantor
of the title which he has assumed the right to convey, will not, in a
court of justice, be heard to set up a title in himself against his own
prior grant ; he will not be heard to say that he had not the title at the
date of the conveyance, or that it did not pass to his grantee in virtue
of his deed. Wark v. Willard, 13 N. H. 389; Kimball v. Blaisdell, 5
N. H. 533, 22 Am. Dec. 476 ; Somes v. Skinner, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 52 ;
Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 528, 567, 49 Am. Dec. 189 ;
Jackson v. Bull, 1 Johns. Cas. 81, 90; White v. Patten, 24 Pick. (Alass.)
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324; Pike v. Galvin, 29 Me. 183. And the doctrine, as will be seen by
these authorities, is equally well settled that the estoppel binds not
only the parties, but all privies in estate, privies in blood and privies in
law; and, in such case, the title is treated as having been previously
vested in the grantor, and as having passed immediately upon the execution of his deed, by way of estoppel. In this case, Martin B. Perkins conveyed the lands to the loan commissioners, by mortgage with
warranty of title, and thereby became estopped from disputing that,
at the date of the mortgage, he had the title and conveyed it; and this
estoppel applied equally to the plaintiff to whom he made a subsequent
conveyance, by deed, after he obtained the title from his father, and
who thus claimed to be his privy in estate. The plaintiff was estopped
from denying that his grantor, Martin B. Perkins, had the title to the
land at the date of the mortgage, and he must, therefore, for every
purpose as against tlie plaintiff, be treated as having the title to tlie
land at that date.
I, therefore, can see no difficulty in this case, growing out of the law
Martin B. Perkins, having title,
as to the registry of conveyances.
He then conveyed tomade the mortgage which was duly recorded.
His father then conveyed to
his father and the deed was recorded.
him and the deed was recorded. He then conveyed to the plaintiff and
Thus the title and record of the mortgage
his deed was recorded.
were prior to the title and record of the deed to plaintiff, and the priority claimed by plaintiff cannot be allowed. Assuming it to be the rule
that the record of a conveyance made by one having no title, is, ordinarily, ^ nullity, and constructive notice to no one ; the plaintiff cannot
avail himself of this rule, as he is estopped from denying that the
The case of
mortgagor had the title at the date of the mortgage.
White V. Patten, supra, is entirely analogous to this. In that case, the
plaintiff derived his title from a mortgage, made to him by one Tliayer,
containing covenants of seizin, warranty, etc., and recorded February
At the time of the execution of this mortgage the title was
19, 1834.
not in Thayer, but in one Perry, his father in law. Perry afterward,
by deed, recorded August 2, 1834, conveyed the land in fee simple
to Thayer, who conveyed the land by mortgage to the defendant, recorded the same day. The counsel for the defendant used the same
arguments in a great measure, which have been urged upon our attention by the counsel for the plaintiff in this case, both as to the title and
the registry of the mortgages; and, yet the court held in a very able
opinion, that the plaintiff had tlie prior and better title.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed,,
with costs.
Reynolds, C. (dissenting.) When Martin B. Perkins gave the mortgage to the loan commissioners he had possession, but no title to the
He had forged a deed of the premises from Gamortgaged property.
maliel Perkins to himself, and caused it to be put on record in the
clerk's office of the county of Washington ; and by this device, imposed
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The forged deed, was, of course, a nulupon the loan commissioners.
Hty, and could not in the eye of the law, have any effect by way of
It conveyed nothing, and was not a
constructive notice or otherwise.
"conveyance" witliin the meaning of tlie recording acts, and did not
It may be assumed,
affect the title to the land "in law or equity."
therefore, that the loan commissioners took the mortgage, knowing that
Martin B, Perkins had no title, it being very clear that they acquired no
legal rights by being imposed upon, against any one, save Martin B.
Perkins. They got no interest in the land, either in law or equity. It
is not in principle, unlike the case of a forged negotiable promissor}It
note, where a bona fide holder for value can have no protection.
follows, therefore, that tlie entr>' of the mortgage in tlie books of the
loan office at the time it was made, was of no legal consequence whatever, except as against the mortgagor.
It was no notice under the rein
the
remotest
degree affect the title to the
cording acts ; for it did not
land described in it. The mortgage contained a covenant of title, and
it seems to be clear, that a title subsequently acquired by Martin B.
Perkins, would, ordinarily, inure by estoppel, or otherwise, to the benefit, of the mortgagees if other rights have not intervened.
The title
to the mortgaged premises was in Gamaliel Perkins, from the 18th of
January, 1848, to the 16th of December, 1859, when he conveyed it to
Martin B. Perkins. By this conveyance, the mortgage given by Martin
B. Perkins to the loan commissioners, in October, 1850, acquired legal
vitality by way of estoppel, or in some other form, and if it had then
been in any proper form recorded, constructive notice of its existence,
as a valid lien upon the property, would have been given to all the
world.
Itis urged, that there was no necessity of making any further
record of the mortgage, because the title in the mortgagees comes unThis will not do.
der the warranty by way of rebutter or estoppel.
It is sufficient, to say, that by virtue of the transactions under which
the defendants look to enforce the lien of the mortgage, the title to the
land is affected, and such a paper must be properly put on record to
bind subsequent purchasers in good faith.
If this be not so, it is impossible to see how a subsequent bona fide
purchaser can have any protection, and when it is said to be impossible
to record the estoppel which gave the mortgage vitality ; it may be answered; that, until the estoppel became operative, the mortgage was a
nullity and the record of it no notice whatever. When, however, Martin B. Perkins obtained the title to the premises, it became by some
operation of law vaHd against him; but it was of no greater force or
effect, than if he had on that day given it to the loan commissioners.
It then, for the first time, affected the title to the land, and in order to
bind subsequent purchasers, in good faith, must be duly recorded, and
this was not done in any such way as to operate as constructive notice
under the recording acts.
It is not questioned, but that the plaintiff is to be protected as a bona
fide purchaser, for value, unless the mortgage given in 1850, and then
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entered in proper order in the books of tlie loan office, which, at the
time, did not affect the title to the land in any way, was constructive
notice of the lien. It is well settled, that a conveyance that is not duly
recorded according to law, even when the actual title has passed, is
not effectual as constructive notice. Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch.
288; Lessee of Heister v. Fortner, 2 Bin. (Pa.) 40, 4 Am. Dec. 417.
Much less can it be, that a conveyance which does not affect the title,
In the very best aspect of the decan give any legal notice whatever.
fendant's case, the record of the mortgage was made out of the order
required by law, and failed to give notice to anybody dealing with the
title to the land. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. White, 17 N. Y. 469 ; Sawyer
In this view, the deed of the
V. Adams, 8 Vt. 172, 30 Am. Dec. 459.
plaintiff was first recorded, and he is entitled to protection in his title.
The judgment should be reversed, with costs, the mortgage declared
no lien upon the land of the plaintiff, and the loan commissioners perpetually enjoined from attempting to enforce it.
For affirmance. Earl, Gray and Johnson, CC.
For reversal, Lott, Ch. C, and Re;ynolds, C.
Judgment affirmed.^'

WHEELER

V.

(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,

YOUNG.
1903.

76 Conn. 44, 55

Atl.

670.)

Action to foreclose a mortgage and for other equitable relief, brought
the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the court,
George W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the
defendant Young, upon his cross-complaint, and appeal by. tlie plaintiff.
Hall, J. The plaintiff asks for a judgment of foreclosure under a
mortgage which on the 13th of December, 1900, was assigned to him
by Burr & Knapp, real estate and mortgage brokers of Bridgeport.
Burr & Knapp as mortgagees received the mortgage from Charles
B. and Edward H. Marsh, builders in Bridgeport, under the firm
name of Marsh Brothers, on the 26th of October, 1900, to secure the
payment of a loan of $3,500 made by them, on that day, to Marsh
Brothers.
The mortgage was recorded on said 26th of October at
3 :01 P. M. Burr & Knapp took no other security for said loan, and
Marsh Brothers are insolvent. Both Burr & Knapp and the plaintiff
took said mortgage in good faith, for value, in reliance upon the certificate of an attorney that the premises were free and clear of all
to

incumbrance, and that the legal title at the
given was in Marsh Brothers, and without
conveyance by Marsh Brothers to the grantor
or of any incumbrance upon said property

time said mortgage was
knowledge of any prior
of the defendant Young,
prior to their mortgage

16 So. also, in Jarvis v. Aikens. supra, p.
801 : Bernardy v. Colonial & U. S.
Mortg. Co., 17 S. D. 637, 98 N. W. 166, 106 Am. St. Rep. 791 (1904).
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Marsh Brothers obtained title to the premises described in the mortgage by a quitclaim deed from Orange Merwin of
Bridgeport, which was executed on the 1st of May, 1900, but not delivered until the 26th of October, 1900, when it was recorded at 3 :05
P. M. On the same day Marsh Brothers paid to Merwin the purchase
price for said property.
Apparently there was no evidence presented at the trial, other than
the facts herein stated, showing the precise time on the 26th of October when either the deed from Merwin to Marsh Brothers, or the
mortgage from Marsh Brothers to Burr & Knapp, was actually delivered, or showing whether or not they were delivered at the same time
and together given to the town clerk to be recorded.
Orange Merwin acquired title from Marsh Brothers by deed executed
and recorded September 8th, 1899. The defendant Harry S. Young,
who is now in possession of the mortgaged premises, claims under a
deed from Alfred Young dated January 2d, 1901. Alfred Young claimed title under a warrantee deed from Marsh Brothers dated April
Marsh
30th, 1900, delivered and recorded on the 7th of July, 1900.
Brothers had, on the 21st of April, 1900, agreed with said Alfred
Young to sell him the lot described in the mortgage, and which was
then owned by Merwin, and to erect a house thereon for $4,600, for
which Alfred Young was to transfer to Marsh Brothers a cottage
valued at $3,800, on which there was a mortgage of $2,800 and was
to give a mortgage back, upon the premises purchased, for the reIn accordance with such agreement Alfred
mainder of the $4,600.
Young conveyed the cottage, and on April 30th, 1900, gave to Charles
B. Marsh a mortgage upon the lot in question for $3,500, upon Marsh's
promise not to use it until the house was completed, which mortgage Marsh, on the same day, assigned to one IMary E. Beardsley, one
of the defendants.
Alfred Young caused no search to be made of the land records to
ascertain the true state of the title to said land, before receiving said
deed from Marsh Brothers, but relied upon the statement of Charles B.
Marsh that they had acquired title to said land. Young was in the employ of Marsh Brothers and did as Charles B. Marsh directed, intending no fraud toward any one.
Marsh Brothers commenced the erection of a house upon said lot
in May, 1900, which was apparently completed on the 26th of October, 1900, and Merwin on said day gave his said deed to Marsh Brothers as aforesaid to enable them to carry out their said agreement with
Alfred Young, which was known to Merwin, and on his business records Merwin treated the sale as a sale to Young.
The plaintiff has purchased for $1,750 the mortgage so assigned by
Marsh Brothers to Mary E. Beardsley.
Upon these facts the defendant Young claims title to the premises in
question, and by his cross-complaint asks that the mortgage of October 26th, sought to be foreclosed, be declared void.
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No question is made and none can be made, upon the facts before
us, but that the mortgage deed to Burr & Knapp, and the Merwin
deed to Marsh Brothers, both of which were deHvered on the 26th of
October as above stated and were received for record by 3 :05 P. M.
of the same day, were left for record within a reasonable time after
they were delivered. The mere fact that the deed of Merwin to Alarsh
Brothers appears to have been received for record four minutes later
than the mortgage of the latter to Burr & Knapp, would not justify
a conclusion, especially under the circumstances of this case, that
Marsh Brothers had not received their deed from Merwin at the time
of the delivery of the mortgage to Burr & Knapp, and that for that
Deeds rereason Burr & Knapp took nothing by their mortgage.
reasonable
time
take
effect
to
the
time they
corded within a
according
Hartford Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Goldwere actually delivered.
reyer, 71 Conn. 95, 100, 41 Atl. 659; Goodsell v. Sullivan, 40 Conn.
The deed and mortgage
83, 85 ; Beers v. Hawley, 2 Conn. 467, 469.
were delivered on the same day. The mortgage recites the ownership by the mortgagor at the time of its delivery of the same property described in the deed. Looking at the record of the two deeds, the
mortgage therefore indicates upon its face that it was delivered after
or at the same time with the Merwin deed. The Merwin deed, con-

is,

fessedly, not having been recorded when the mortgage was delivered,
Burr & Knapp would be presumed to have ascertained that it had been
delivered before they made the loan of $3,500, and the information which they received to that effect does not appear to have been
false. As between the parties to this case and in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary — unless the slight difference in the time the
two deeds were received for record can properly be regarded as conflicting evidence — the Merwin deed must, under the circumstances, be
regarded as having been delivered either before, or at the same time
with, the mortgage, and especially since no one appears to have been
deceived to his injury by the fact that the Merwin deed, which bore
an earlier date than the mortgage, appears to have been received for
record four minutes later than the mortgage.
But we do not understand that the trial court held that the Merwin
deed was in fact delivered after the mortgage, or held that it did
not sufficiently appear that the Merwin deed was delivered first, but
decided that by the common-law doctrine of estoppel the title acquired
by Marsh Brothers from Merwin on the 26th of October inured to the
benefit of Alfred Young, the first purchaser from Marsh Brothers, the
moment Marsh Brothers acquired their title, even assuming that the
deed from Merwin was delivered before the mortgage, and decided that
the title having thus vested in Young there remained nothing which
Marsh Brothers could convey to Burr & Knapp by the mortgage, or
which Burr & Knapp could assign to the plaintiff. *
The rule referred to
that where one without title has conveyed
with covenants of warranty, and has afterwards acquired title, he
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is estopped from asserting his want of title at the time of making
in
and the contention of the defendant
such first conveyance;
effect, that under this rule, upon the facts before us, not only Marsh
Knapp, are estopped from
Brothers, but their mortgagees, Burr
denying that Marsh Brothers had title at the time of their conveyance
to Young on July 7th, 1900.
To carry this doctrine to the extent of giving priority to the title of
one who from his negligent failure to examine the records has been
person having no title, over that of one
induced to purchase land of
who without negligence, in good faith and for value, and without
knowledge of such prior deed, has purchased, after his grantor has acopquired title from one having both the legal and record title,
laws.
of
the
of
our
to
to
and
spirit
the principles
registry
posed
equity
Eq. 229, 234; Calder v. Chapman, 52
Bingham v. Kirkland, 34 N.
T. Co. v. Maltby,
Pa. 359, 91 Am. Dec. 163 Farmers' L.
Paige
Arnold,
v.
18
Ga.
181
361
Savings
Society
Salisbury
Way
(N. Y.)
V. Cutting, 50 Conn. 113, and reporter's note, page 122.
The doctrine of estoppel
one which, when properly applied, "conin
order
to
cludes the truth
prevent fraud and falsehood, and imposes
silence on
party only when in conscience and honesty he should not
Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297, 326,
be allowed to speak."
13 L. Ed. 703.
"As understood and applied in modern times, there
nothing harsh or unjust in the law of estoppels. It cannot be used
but to subserve the cause of justice and right." Buckingham v. Hantitle to pass by conveyance, exna,
Ohio St. 551, 559. "To allow
ecuted and recorded before
suracquired, may, therefore, be
not in their power
prise on subsequent purchasers, against which
to guard, and
the chief aim of the
contrary to the equity which
doctrine of estoppel as molded by the liberality of modern times."
Smith's Lead. Cases (7th Amer. Ed.) page 701, s. p. 634.
not an equitable doctrine,
may be said that such estoppel by deed
but
a rule of the common law based upon the recitals or covenants of
the deed.
We reply, that as rule of law,
has been so far modified
by the registry laws as to be no longer applicable to cases where its enforcement would work such an injustice as to give priority to the title
of one who negligently failed to examine the records before purchasing of
grantor having no title, or who purchased at the risk that
his grantor might thereafter acquire title, over that of a subsequent purchaser in good faith and in reliance upon the title as
appeared of
record. "The whole system of registering deeds of land would become
of no value
purchaser could not rely upon the records as he finds
them." Kinney v. Whiton, 44 Conn. 262, 270, 26 Am. Rep. 462 Whiting v. Gaylord, 66 Conn. ZZ7, 349, 34 Atl. 85, 50 Am. St. Rep. 87. In
the case above cited of Salisbury Savings Society v. Cutting, 50 Conn.
113, the question of whether
deed with covenants of title, given before the grantor acquired title to the land conveyed, and placed on recAig.Prop. — 55
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ord, would prevail over a deed given after the title was acquired, to
purchaser taking it in good faith and without knowledge of the
The case was decided upon
first deed, was left an open question.
was
neither
a purchaser for value
the ground that the second grantee
nor, because of certain facts found, a purchaser without notice of
The note to the case by the reporter,
the title of the first grantee.
the late Mr. Hooker, contains an able discussion of the question left
undecided by the court, in which he reaches the conclusion that the
deed of the subsequent bona fide purchaser for value and without
knowledge of the prior deed, must prevail, under our registry laws,
over that of the prior recorded deed of the negligent grantee. We
think his reasoning is convincing, and is especially applicable to the
facts of the present case.
The plaintiff here asks for the enforcement of the registry laws.
He says that from September 8th, 1899, until October 26th, 1900, both
the legal and the record title to this property was in Orange Merwin,
and that on said 26th of October his, the plaintiff's, assignors. Burr
& Knapp, purchased from those who on the same day acquired title
from Merwin. The defendaht asks for the enforcement of the law of
estoppel, by which he claims that neither Burr & Knapp, nor the
plaintiff, should be permitted to assert that Merwin had title, and
that Marsh Brothers had no title from September 8th, 1899, until
October 26th, 1900.
In inquiring which of the two grantees. Young or Burr & Knapp, has
acted in good faith and without negligence in purchasing from Marsh
Brothers, and which is entitled to priority of title under the registry
laws, we must examine their conduct in connection with certain facts,
with a knowledge of which they are charged by our registry laws.
The effect given by the law of this State to the proper record of
conveyances of land has been very clearly declared in the recent case
of Beach v. Osborne, 74 Conn. 405, 412-415, 50 Atl. 1019, 1118.
We said in that case, as conclusions from the authorities there cited,
"that eveiy person who takes a conveyance of an interest in real estate is conclusively presumed to know those facts which are apparent upon the land records concerning the. chain of title of the property described in the conveyance, and * * * that this presumption of knowledge is for all legal purposes the same in effect as actual
that "this presumed knowledge is present at every step
knowledge;"
he takes, at every act he does," and that his good faith and belief
must be, "consistent with actual knowledge of the facts affecting his
title which are apparent upon the land records ;" that "one who fails
to examine to see what the records disclose concerning the title to the
land he proposes to take, is, in the eye of the law, negligent; and
equity does not as a general rule relieve from the consequences of one's
own negligence."
Applying these principles to this case, we find that Alfred Young,
m the eye of the law knew, when he purchased from Marsh Brothers,
a
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Marsh Brothers on the 8th of SeptemMerwin, and that the title was still in Mer-

that they had no title, but that

ber, 1899, had conveyed to
In contemplawin, and that it so appeared upon the public records.
tion of law, therefore, he did 'not act in good faith, but was negligent
in making such purchase without having first examined to see what the
records disclosed concerning the title to the land he proposed to purWhen Burr & Knapp took their mortgage from Marsh Brothchase.
ers on the 26th of October, they knew that the title to the mortgaged
property had been in Merwin from September 8th, 1899, until October 26th, 1900. Since they had no reason to suppose that one having
no title to the property would convey it during that period, they had
no occasion to search the records to ascertain whether Marsh Brothers
had made any conveyance during that period.
They were only required to search against each owner during the time he held the record title. The deed of Marsh Brothers to Young was not in the line
of record title, and Burr & Knapp were not charged with knowlSee Bingham v. Kirkland, 34 N. J. Eq. 229,
edge of its existence.
and the other cases cited. It is said, however, that the Merwin deed
was not on record when Burr & Knapp took their mortgage on the
26th of October.
But the Merwin deed was not in fact delivered
until that day, and Burr & Knapp had no reason to think that a deed
delivered on that day, and before their mortgage was delivered, that
is, before 3 :01 P. M., ought to, be recorded when their mortgage was
delivered, nor was there any reason why they should require it to
be recorded before accepting the mortgage.
The records showed a
good title in Merwin up to the time of the delivery of the mortgage
Burr & Knapp had only to satisfy themselves that a deed had
deed.
been given by Merwin to Marsh Brothers that day, which was the
fact, and that no conveyance had been made by Marsh Brothers since
As
they received their deed from Merwin, which was also true.
back
the deed of Marsh Brothers to Young and the mortgage
by
Young to Charles B. Marsh were not incumbrances upon the title of
record, -the information given to Burr & Knapp by the searcher, that
"the premises were free and clear of all incumbrance and the legal
title in Marsh Brothers," was entirely consistent with the facts as they
appeared by the records concerning the chain of title, and the fact that
Marsh Brothers had that day acquired title from Merwin. The facts
before us show that Burr & Knapp acted in good faith, and without
negligence, and without knowledge of the Young deed, and that having
on the 26th of October taken a mortgage from those, who on that
day had received a deed from the legal owners, and the owners of
record, their mortgage is valid.
As Alfred Young had no title superior to the Burr & Knapp mortgage when he conveyed to the defendant Young on January 2d, 1901, the defendant Young by his deed of
that date took no title superior to the mortgage. The plaintiff is entitled
to a judgment of foreclosure.
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There is error in the judgment of the trial court and it is reversed,
and the case remanded for the entry of a judgment of foreclosure in
favor of the plaintiff.
(c
In this opinion the other judges concurred/'

HOLDEN

V.

GARRETT.

(Supreme Court of Kansas, 1S79.

23

Kan.

98.)

Action brought by Nina Garrett against Uriah Stephens and MarJ. Stephens, his wife, John Dial, John M. Wheeler, W. H. Ryus,
and Howard M. Holden, upon a note, executed by the said Uriah
tha

Stephens, November 25, 1869, payable in seven years and nine months
after date, witli interest at ten per cent, per annum, and to foreclose
a mortgage given at the same time to secure the payment of said note,
by the said Uriah Stephens and wife, upon certain real estate situated
in the county of Pottawatomie.
The other defendants were made
parties for tlie purpose of determining any interest they might have in
and to said real estate, and the priority of all claims or liens thereon.
Service of summons was duly made upon all of the defendants. Uriah
Stephens, Martha J. Stephens and W. H. Ryus filed no answers, but
made default in said action. John Dial, John M. Wheeler and Howard
M. Holden, each filed separate answers in the action, setting up his
claim or interest in said real estate.
Trial at the August Term, 1878,
of the district court, by the court, (a jury being waived,) when the
court found for the plaintiff, and against all of the defendants except
Dial, whose claim to the land described in his answer tlierein w^as conceded by the plaintiff, and judgment was accordingly rendered in favor
of tlie plaintiff', Nina Garrett, for the amount due on said note, and
declaring said mortgage to be a prior and first lien upon the lands
therein described as against the clairn or interest of any and all of the
other defendants.
Holden brings the case to this court for review.
The facts, as they appear in the plaintiff's petition, the answer of
the defendant Holden, and the testimony on their part, are in substance as follows : Prior to the 25th day of November, 1869, the said
Nina Garrett was tlie owner in fee, in her own right, of the real estate
described in her said petition, situated in the county of Pottawatomie.
On said 25th day of November, 1869, the plaintiff being a minor, said
real estate was sold under the direction of the probate court of Wyandotte county, by virtue of an order of said court, by Eliza J. Stone, the
legally-constituted guardian of the plaintiff", and by her conveyed to
Uriah Stephens. The note and mortgage sued on in said action were
given for a portion of the purchase money therefor.
This mortgage
was not recorded until March 5th, 1875, at which time it was duly
17

371

Iiichardson
(I'Jil'l, ace.

v.

Atlantic Coast Lumber Corporation,

93 S. C. 254, 75

S. E,
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recorded in the office of the register of deeds for the county of Pottawatomie.
On the 4th and 12th days of March, 1874, respectively,
two certain personal judgments were rendered by the consideration
of the district court of Wyandotte county against the said Uriah
Stephens, and in favor of Jacob Luke and John Olson and Nels Olson,
Afterward, executions were issued by the clerk of said
respectively.
district court of Wyandotte county on said judgments, directed to the
and on the 20th day of July,
sheriff of the county of Pottawatomie;
1874, these executions were, by the sheriff of said county of Pottawatomie, levied upon a portion of the lands described in the mortgage of
No sale was made or attempted under and by virtue of
said plaintiff.
executions,
but the same were returned to the court from which
said
they were issued, and ahas and pluries executions issued, which were in
turn levied upon said lands until the 25th day of November, 1876,
when a sale tliereunder was made by the sheriff of the county of PotOn the 30th of March, 1876, the two
tawatomie, to one W. PI. Ryus.
above-named judgments were assigned to Holden, and the assignments
thereof were duly filed in the office of the clerk of the district court
of Wyandotte county. Whatever interest Holden had in said real estate was derived from the said sherift''s sale to W. H. Ryus.
Brewer, J. The contest in this case is between one who claims under the lien of an execution levy, and the holder of a prior but unrecorded mortgage. The judgment was in a county other tlian that
in which the land was situate, and was rendered long after the execution of the mortgage.
The lev^ was made before, but the sale
not till after, the record of the mortgage. There was no actual notice
of the existence of this mortgage. On the one side it is claimed that
by virtue of section 21, ch. 22,'Gen. St. p. 187, which reads as follows : "No such instrument in writing shall be valid except between
the parties thereto, and such as have actual notice thereof, until the
same shall be deposited with the register of deeds for record," the
mortgage is to be considered as though it had no existence, and the
land as free from any incumbrance at the date of the levy, and that
the lien then secured by the levy ripened into a title by the sale, and
was paramount to the lien created by the subsequent record of the
mortgage; and on the other hand it is claimed that the lien of the
levy was only upon the actual interest of the judgment debtor in the
real estate, and that as such interest was in fact limited by the mortgage, only such limited interest was seized and bound by the levy.
Of course, this is but part and parcel of a still broader question,
and that is, does the lien of an execution levy extend to only the actual, or does it also reach the apparent, title of the judgment debtor?
Is the inquiry restricted to the face of the record, or may it pass to
the actual facts ? Authorities are not wanting to support either view,
and cogent reasons may be adduced in favor of each.
On the one
hand it may be said with force that if the mortgage lien is adjudged
paramount, then the section quoted is practically nullified, and an in-
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strument which the statute declares* invalid is pronounced valid ; and
on the other, that if the levy is adjudged paramount, tlien the statute
which authorizes a levy upon the lands, tenements and hereditaments
of the debtor is extended so as to sustain a levy upon lands which are
not in fact wholly his.
With much hesitation, and after a long and careful examination of
the question in its various relations, we have reached the conclusion
that the lien of the m.ortgage must be adjudged prior and paramount.
These are the reasons which have controlled us : It gives exact force
to the statute declaring to what a judgment lien and an execution levy
extend. Judgments "shall be liens on the real estate of the debtor,

Dassler's Comp. Laws 1879, p. 656, § 419. This
The judgactual and not apparent ownership.
contemplates
evidently
which
that
his,
is
a
lien
that
which
and
not
ment
is
simply apupon
pears to be his. How often the legal title is placed in one party when
the equitable title, the real ownership, is in others.
Many reasons
induce this — convenience in managing, facility in passing title, number
of parties interested, and others needless to mention. And yet the
record discloses only the naked legal title. Now if the judgment is a
lien upon all that appears, it will cut off all the undisclosed equitable
rights and interests. To extend the lien to that which is not, but which
appears of record to be the defendant's, is to do violence to the lan"Real estate of the debtor" plainly means that which is in fact
guage.
of or belonging to the debtor. And he who claims under a judgment
lien can take no more than the statute gives. The question is not what
The
rights some one else may have, but what rights does he acquire?
answer to this question must first and chiefly be sought in the statute
which gives and defines the extent of that lien. The section defining
the extent of the execution levy may not be quite so clear in its indications, and yet, taken in connection with that cited concerning the judgment lien, it is perfectly plain. "All real estate, not bound by the lien
of the judgment, as well as goods and chattels of the debtor, shall be
bound from the time they shall be seized in execution."
Dassler's
It might be argued that the words
Comp. Laws 1879, p. 660, § 444.
"of the debtor" only qualify the immediately preceding words, "goods
and chattels," and not the prior clause, "all real estate," etc. ; but, comparing the two sections together, it is plain that no larger or other
interest is taken by the levy of an execution upon real estate outside
the county, than is covered by the lien of the judgment upon real
estate within the county.
Again, this construction of the extent to
which the lien goes was settled early in the history of this court, and
has never been departed from.
In Swarts v. Stees, 2 Kan. 241, 85
Am. Dec. 588, Crozier, C. J., speaking for tlie court, says : "Their lien,"
e., the hen of judgment creditors,) "is upon the lands and tenements
of the debtor, and not upon lands and tenements not in fact belonging
to him." True, the decision in that case was under
different recording act, and much of the argument in the opinion
entirely inapplicathe county."

is

a

(i.

within
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ble to the present question;
but still, the extent of a judgment lien
is plainly recognized and stated.
See also Harrison v. Andrews, 18

Kan.

It may also here

tliat we have had occasion
to notice the fact that priority of lien or title, even in the absence of
actual notice, does not always hinge upon, the mere priority of record.
Other matters may enter into and affect the question, and equities not
shown of record may control.
School District v. Taylor, 19 Kan.
287; Tucker v. Vandermark, 21 Kan. 263.
Again, it may be laid
down as familiar law, that a judgment creditor is not a bona fide purchaser. He parts with nothing to acquire his Hen. He is in a very
different position from one who has bought and paid, or has loaned on
the face of a recorded title.
The equities are entirely unlike. One
has, and the other has not, parted with value upon the face of the
record. If the real prevails over the apparent title, the one is no worse
off tlian before he acquired his lien — has lost nothing; while the other
loses the value paid or loaned.
Hence equity will help tlie latter,
Further, in nearly every
while it ciares nothing about the former.
state in which an unrecorded mortgage has been postponed to a judgment lien, the statute has expressly declared that such a mortgage shall
be void as against creditors ; and tlie courts have laid stress upon this
fact in their opinions. Thus, the statute of Illinois, 1845, p. 108, § 23,
provides : "All deeds, mortgages or other instruments of writing which
are required to be recorded, shall take effect, and be in force after
the time of filing the same for record, and not before, as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers, without notice ; and all such deeds
and title papers shall be adjudged void as to all such creditors and
subsequent purchasers, without notice, until the same shall be filed for
record."
It has been decided under this statute that a deed not filed
for record
as to creditors and subsequent purchasers, wholly without effect. Martin v. Dryden,
Oilman (111.) 187; Cook v. Hall,
Oilman (111.) 575; Choteau v. Jones, 11 111. 300, 50 Am. Dec. 460;
Kennedy v. Northup, 15 111. 148; Curtis v. Root, 28 111. 367; Brookfield v. Goodrich, 32 111. 363.^«
See also McNitt v. Turner, 16 Wall.
352, 21 L. Ed. 341. ^« *
be remarked,

The only other

1

*

*

1

is,

542.

^°

in which we have found or been referred to
Iowa, in which at one time was in force
statute exactly like ours
section like the one first quoted in this opinion.
Under that in Brown
G. Greene (Iowa) 189,
was held that
V. Tuthill,
"lien by attachment will hold against
prior unrecorded deed." The section of
the statute w^as soon after modified, and in
case arising under tlie

a

a

a

a

1

it

a

is

state

18 Not uncommonly the statutes extend the protection to creditors.
By construction, however, the benefit of such sttitutes generally has been limited to
See the cases referred to in 24 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 126
lien creditors.
et seq.
19 A portion of the opinion, in which tlie court reviews the statutes of a
number of states and the decisions thereunder, is omitted.
20 That is, besides Missouri.
See Davis v. Owenby, 14 Mo. 170, 55 Am. Dec. 105
(1851), quoted from and relied upon in the portion of the opinion omitted.
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new law, (Norton v. Williams, 9 Iowa, 528), the court says: "We
incline to .the opinion that, under the statute of 1843, the case of Brown
V. Tutliill is against the current of the decisions."
The weight of authority, therefore, upon the exact statute before
Without exus, is decidedly with the conclusion we have reached.
tending this opinon, we close by saying that our conclusion gives full
and exact force to the statute which creates and defines a judgment
lien; that it is in accord with the prior adjudications of this court;
that it sustains and enforces the real equities of all parties; and that
it is upheld by the decided weight of authority elsewhere upon the
exact question.
The judgment will be affirmed. All the Justices concurring.^*

STERNBERGER

&

WILLARD

(Supreme Court of Ohio, 1S97.

v.

RAGLAND.

57 Ohio St. 14S, 48 N.

E. Sll.)

Error to the Circuit Court of Jackson county.

On the 22d day of January, 1889, the defendant in error, William
Ragland, purchased a town lot in Jackson, from the Wood-Co£fman
Manufacturing Company, then the owner thereof, and obtained a deed
for the same in fee simple. He paid a part of the purchase price, at
the time of the conveyance to him, and gave a mortgage on the lot to
secure the payment of the balance. This mortgage, which contains a
recital that it was given to secure tlie unpaid purchase money, was reAfter
corded in April, 1889. The deed was never filed for record.
the conveyance was made and the mortgage recorded, judgments were
recovered in the court of common pleas of Jackson county, against
Ragland's grantor, which were purchased in good faith by the defendant in error, Morris L. Sternberger, who paid full value therefor ;
and executions issued thereon were levied on tlie lot in question, which
then appeared of record to belong to the judgment debtor, and it was
thereafter sold under the writs to satisfy the judgments.
Sternberger
became the purchaser at the sale, which was confirmed by the court,
and tlie sheriff in pursuance of the order of the court executed a deed
to Sternberger for the lot, in due form of law, which he caused to be
The proceeds of the sale, after payment of the
placed upon record.
taxes,
costs and
were applied under the order of the court toward the
satisfaction of the judgments.
Sternberger then sold, and conveyed
by quitclaim deed, the undivided one-half of the lot to his co-plaintiff
in error, Henry S. Willard, who paid full value therefor, and promptly
placed his deed on record.
21 Under the Ohio mort,gage registry statute a judgment lien takes precedence
over a mortgage executed before the lien attached, but recorded after.
Jackson V. Luce, 14 Ohio, 514 (1846).
But it seems that in Ohio recording of mortgages is really a part of their execution.
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Thereafter, Ragland brought suit to quiet his title to the lot against
Sternberger and Willard, who set up their respective claims to its ownership. The case went on appeal to the circuit court where a finding
was made of the facts, which, in addition to those already stated, are
as follows: "The lot described in the petition was not improved, or
fenced, and not occupied except occasionally for the storage of small
quantities of lumber by the plaintiff, and some fence posts have remained and still remain on said lot; otherwise, said lot was vacant,
and, at the time of the purchase by said Sternberger, at sheriff's sale,
the character and nature of the plaintift''s possession was not of such
nature as to place said Sternberger upon inquiry or notice, nor was it
of such a character as to place said Willard upon inquiry nor notice
when he purchased.
The Wood-Coffman Manufacturing Company
was, upon the deed records of said county, the apparent owner when
the sheriff's sale was made.
The defendant, Morris L. Sternberger,
when he purchased said lot at sheriff's sale, paid value therefor in the
purchase of said judgments, and he had no notice, actual or construttive, of plaintiff's claim thereto, unless the mortgage of plaintiff to said
company was constructive notice, which we hold not to be constructive
notice to him; and the defendant, Willard, when he purchased from
said Sternberger, paid value therefor, and he had no notice, actual or
constructive, of plaintiff's claim, unless such mortgage was constructive notice, which we hold was not constructive notice to him ; and
neither of the defendants had notice of plaintiff's deed to said lot or
claim, thereto."
Upon tliis state of facts the court held, as its conclusions of law,
as appears from the record that : "The Wood-Coffman Manufacturing
Company having conveyed said lot by deed to plaintiff, although said
plaintiff never had said deed recorded, had no further interest in said
lot which could be sold at judicial sale, although it was the apparent
owner of said lot upon the records, and the defendant, Sternberger,
though purchasing said lot for value and without notice, could not obtain title thereto by purchasing at said judicial sale."
Thereupon judgment was rendered against Sternberger and Willard,
which they seek to have reversed here.
Williams, J. The question in the case is whether Sternberger, under the judicial sale, became a bona fide purchaser within the rule
which protects such purchasers against unrecorded conveyances.
It
must be regarded as established by the facts found in the court below,
that there was not- such possession of the lot by Ragland as put Sternberger upon inquiry, or charged him with notice of any claim or equity
of the former, either, when the judgments were recovered, or the executions levied, or when the sale was made and confirmed, or the deed
from the sheriff was received by Sternberger; and also, tliat Sternberger was without any actual knowledge of Ragland's unrecorded
deed, or of any claim by him to any interest in the lot.
The record of the mortgage executed by Ragland for the unpaid pur-
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chase money for the lot, was not constructive notice of his unregistered
deed, to a subsequent purchaser from his grantor.
When a prospective purchaser finds a complete record title in the
proposed seller, he is not bound to examine for mortgages made to
the latter after he became the owner; such a mortgage is not in the
chain of his title, and is not, therefore, constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser, of a prior unrecorded deed made by him to the
The circuit court so held. But, notwithstanding its findmortgagor.
ing that Sternberger was a purchaser at the judicial sale for value and
without notice, actual or constructive, of any adverse claim of Ragland
to the premises he so bought, the judgment of the court was adverse
to him. The judgment appears to rest upon the ground that tlie deed
to Ragland, though unrecorded, divested his grantor of all interest in
the lot, and thereafter nothing remained in tlie judgment debtor, although appearing of record to be the owner of the lot, upon which
the judgments became liens, or that could be sold at judicial sale thereunder.
It is undoubtedly the general rule, except in so far as it is modified
and controlled by statute, that a judgment creditor obtains a lien only
on such interest in lands as his debtor had when the judgment was
rendered, and, it is subject to such equities as could then be successfully asserted against the debtor. But our statute (section 4134, Revised Statutes 1890), requires that all deeds and instruments for the
conveyance of lands, or interests therein, "shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which the premises are situated,"
and provides that, "until so recorded or filed for record, the same shall
be deemed fraudulent, so far as relates to a subsequent bona fide purchaser, having, at the time of purchase, nO' knowledge of the existence
of such former deed or instrument."
This statute renders any prior
unrecorded deed wholly ineffectual to convey the title out of the grantor, as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser from him, and leaves
him with as full and ample power to convey a good title to such subAnd,
sequent purchaser as if the prior conveyance had not been made.
it is settled by the adjudications of this court, that purchasers at judicial sales, without notice of a prior unrecorded deed from the judgment debtor, are within the protection of the statute equally with purchasers at private sale. Scribner's Lessee v. Lockwood, 9 Ohio, 184;
Morris v. Daniels, 35 Ohio St. 406.
The title acquired by Sternberger at the judicial sale was, therefore,
superior to that of Ragland, unless the former is to be denied the
position of a bona fide purchaser because he was the owner of the
judgments under which the sale was made.
It is claimed that as he was the owner of the judgments at the time
of his purchase, and their satisfaction pro tanto was the only consideration he paid, he does not come within the rule in favor of bona fide
purchasers. This position is sought to be sustained by Lewis v. Ander*
son, 20 Ohio St. 281.
But that case simply holds, that; "Where there
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a mortgage of real estate other than a pre-existing debt of the mortgagor, and the mortgagee is not induced thereby
to change his condition in any manner, he cannot be regarded as a
is no consideration

for

bona fide purchaser for value."
That decision is placed upon the ground, as stated in the opinion,
that, "the rule which favors a bona fide purchaser of land, and that
which protects the holder of negotiable paper for value before due
from infirmities affecting the instrument before it was transferred, are
based substantially on the same equitable grounds, and upon tlie policy
of the law which favors trade and the security of titles, as conducive
to the public good."
And in that case, Roxborough v. Messick, 6
Ohio St. 448, 67 Am. Dec. 346, is cited, where the rules applicable in
determining what considerations are sufficient to protect the holders
of commercial paper are fully considered, which, as there laid down,
have since been regarded as the settled law on that subject. It is there
held, that while a voluntary transfer of a negotiable instrument to secure a pre-existing debt, where the parties are left in respect to such
debt in statu quo, tliere being no new consideration, stipulation for
delay, or credit given, or right parted with, is not sufficierit to protect
the holder against equities existing between the prior parties at the
time of the transfer, yet, when the note is transferred in payment of
the precedent debt, the consideration is sufficient to entitle the holder
to such protection. "The weight of authority," says Swan, J., in that
case, "seems to settle the principle, that where a negotiable instrument
of a third person is transferred before due, in payment of a pre-existing debt, and is bona fide received by the creditor, without notice, tlie
defenses existing as between the prior parties cannot be set up against
such holder."
And that learned judge further says, in that case, tliat
there is "no substantial difference between the consideration for the
transfer of negotiable paper in payment of a precedent debt, or in
payment of goods sold at the time of such transfer." Applying these
principles to a purchaser of real property, it was held in Clements v.
Doerner, 40 Ohio St. 632, that a purchaser who takes a conveyance of
real estate in payment of a pre-existing debt is a bona fide purchaser
for value, and entitled to be protected as against a prior defective mortWhen the conveyance is received in paygage made by his grantor.
ment of the debt, there is a change in the situation of the parties ; the
debt is for tlie time being, at least, discharged ; and, though the creditor may be restored, upon failure of his title to the property, to his
right to enforce the collection of the debt, so recovery may be had
for any other consideration parted with for the property, where the
title for any cause fails.
If it be said Sternberger could have the satisfaction of his judgments
vacated and new process issued for the collection of the judgments
out of any property of the judgment debtor, so, any stranger, who
might have become the purchaser at the sale, would be entitled to the
Revised Statutes 1890, §§ 5410, 5412.
same remedy.
The necessity
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of itself, to show that a subof
the parties by the satisfacstantial change occurred in tlie situation
tion of the judgments on the confirmation of tlie sale; and the neglect
of Ragland to have his deed placed on record, does not entitle him to
drive the purchaser, in either case, to that remedy. Had Sternberger
made his purchase at private sale,- instead of at a judicial sale, there
could be no doubt, we think, of the superiority of his right to the property over that of Ragland; and his right in that respect is none tlie
less, because the conveyance was made through the instrumentality of
the sheriff and the forms of judicial proceedings, instead of immediately from the judgment debtor. The deed of the sheriff conveyed a

of resorting to such

a remedy is sufficient,

title as good and complete as the judgment

debtor could have con-

veyed.
In the note to Basset v.

Nosworthy, 2 Leading Cases in Equity, 110,
111, the conclusion reached after a full discussion of the subject, and
review of the cases, is that the weight of authority in tliis country is
"in favor of the proposition that a purchaser at a judicial sale, stands
on the same footing with a purchaser directly from the debtor; and,
that a purchaser at such sale will take the land discharged of any
claim or title, whether arising under an unregistered deed, or a mere
equity, of which he had no notice at tlie time of the purchase, and
which would be invalid as against an ordinary purchaser;" and furthermore, that the rule is the same "when the judgment creditor becomes the purchaser, because the money which he pays goes in satisfaction of the debt; and every additional bid is necessarily an adThe following, among othvantage to the defendant in the judgment."
ers, may be added to the cases there cited in support of the rule as
stated: Foorman v. Wallace, 75 Cal. 552, 17 Pac. 680; Evans v. McGlasson, 18 Iowa, 150; Butterfield v. Walsh, 21 Iowa, 97, 89 Am.
Dec. 557; Rorer on Judicial Sales, sec. 866.
Judgment reversed and judgment for the plaintiffs in error. ^^
22

Minshall and Spear,

versal.

JJ.,

dissented in part and from the judgment

of

re-

See Shirk v. Thomas, 121 Ind. 147, 22 N. E. 976, 16 Am. St Rep. 381 (1SS9),
senible contra.
Compare Gary v. WMte, 52 N. Y. 138 (1873), where a mortgage given as security for a pre-existing debt, there being no surrender of securities nor extension of time by the mortgagee, was held to be inferior to an eai-lier imreSee, too, Western Grocer Co. v. Alleman, 81
corded deed of the mortgagor.
Kan. 543, 106 Pac. 460, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 620, 135 Am. St. Rep. 398 (1910).
A., a creditor of X., acquires a lien by judgment upon land of X. in a state
where creditors are within the protection of the recording acts. A. has no notice of an earlier unrecoi-ded deed by X. On sale of the land under A.'s judgment, B., who knows all about the unrecorded deed, purchases same and receives a deed therefor.
What is the situation as between him and the grantee
in the unrecorded deed? See Grace v. Wade, 45 Tex. 522 (1876).
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WHYBARK.

(Supreme Court of Missouri, 1907. 204 IMo. 341, 102 S. W. 908,
S.] 240, 120 Aiu. St. Rep. 710.).

12

L. R. A. [N.

Woodson, J. This is a bill in equity, instituted in the circuit court
of Butler county, wherein plaintiff seeks to have her title quieted to
five hundred and twenty acres of land. John R. Boyden was one of
He filed an answer claiming
the several defendants named in the bill.
an interest in and to one hundred and sixty acres of said land, and
No point is made
also denied generally the allegations of the bill.

is

is

6,

is,

against the pleadings, and he is the only defendant whose interest is
involved in this appeal.
The facts in the case are undisputed and are as follows :
Seth D. Hayden was the common source of title, and on March 6,
1861, by his warranty deed, for a recited consideration in the deed of
six hundred and forty dollars, conveyed said land to William A. Moore,
and on August 26, 1863, said Hayden, by his quitclaim deed, for a recited consideration of "natural love and affection and five dollars,"
The deed to Hayden
conveyed the same land to Josephine Hayden.
was recorded April 11, 1868, and the one to Moore was recorded December 14, 1874.
The plaintiff's title is derived through mesne conveyances from
Josephine Hayden, while defendant's title is derived through similar
It was admitted that the land
conveyances from William A. Moore.
.was wild and unoccupied. This was all the evidence in the case.
The court found for defendant and rendered judgment for him.
The plaintiff in due time filed his motion for a new trial, which was
overruled by the court, and to the action of the court in overruling said
motion the plaintiff duly excepted, and has appealed the cause to this
court.
I. The sole question involved in this case
did the subsequently
executed quitclaim deed of Seth D. Hayden to Josephine Hayden, dated
August 26, 1863, by virtue of its prior recordation, have the force and
effect of conveying to her the title to the land in controversy by force
and operation of the registry act, and thereby render invalid and inoperative the prior warranty deed made by him to William A. Moore,
1861, but not filed for record until December 14, 1874?
dated March
There
no evidence whatever in this record tending to show that
Josephine Hayden had any notice or knowledge of the execution of the
prior unrecorded warranty deed from Seth D. Hayden to said Moore,
at the time he made the quitclaim deed to her, nor
there any evidence of fraud or collusion between Seth D. Hayden and Josephine
Both William A. Moore and Josephine Hayden neglected for
Hayden.
years to file their deed for record, as provided for by section 923,
Revised Statutes 1899, yet the latter filed her deed about six years prior
to the time when he filed his.
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The statute provides that "no such instrument in writing shall be
valid, except as between the parties thereto, and such as have actual
notice thereof, until the same shall be deposited with the recorder for
record."
Rev. St. 1899, § 925.
According to the provisions of this section, the deed from Hayden
to Moore was invalid and conveyed no title to the land in controversy
in so far as Josephine Hayden was concerned, because she had no noIf the*
tice of its execution at the time she filed her deed for record.
exception mentioned in the section just quoted was the only exception
or limitation to that statute, then there would be no question as to the
title of Josephine Hayden and those claiming under her, but the courts
upon principles of equity and justice have repeatedly held that if Ijhe
subsequent purchaser either had notice of the prior unrecorded deed,
or if he was a purchaser without having paid a good and valuable consideration for the land, then he would take nothing by his purchase and
deed.
Maupin v. Emmons, 47 Mo. 304 ; Aubuchon v. Bender, 44 Mo.
560. The question which now presents itself
was Josephine Hayden
purchaser of the land in question for
good and valuable consideration? The deed recites that the conveyance was made for and in "consideration of natural love and affection and five dollars to him in hand
paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which
hereby
acknowledged."
A valuable consideration
defined to be money or something that
worth money.
Washburn on Real Prop. (4th Ed.) p. 394;
not necessary that the
Chitty on Contracts (11th Am. Ed.) 27. It
consideration should be adequate in point of value.
Although small
or even nominal, in the absence of fraud,
enough to support
contract entered into upon the faith of it.
Forbs v. Railroad, 107
Mo. App. loc. cit. 674, 82
W. 562; Marks v. Bank,
Mo. 316;
Ridenbaugh v. Young, 145 Mo. loc. cit. 280, 46 S. W. 959; Blaine
V. Knapp
Co., 140 Mo. loc. cit. 251, 41
W. 787; Anderson v.
Gaines, 156 Mo. 664, 57
726;
Green
W.
v. Higham, 161 Mo. 333,
61
W. 798,
Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.)
It
694, par.
seems to us that
would be
useless waste of time and energy to
cite authorities in support of the proposition that five dollars or any
other stated sum of money in excess of one cent, one dime, or one
dollar, which are the technical words used to express nominal considerations,
valuable consideration within the meaning of the law of

conveyancing.^*

a

a

23 In Morris v. Wicks, 81 Kan. 790, 106 Pac. 1048, 26 I>. R. A. (N. S.) 681, 19
Ann. Cas. 310 (1910), the consideration paid was one dollar.
Held not suffiBut in Ennis v.
cient to make out
case of bona fide purchaser for value.
Tucker, 78 Kan. 55, 96 Pac. 140. 130 Aw. St. Rep. 352 (1908), a consideration of
^iO, though inadequate, was held sufficient to make out a case of purchaser
for value.
In Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, 135 N. Y. 40, 31 N. E. 994, 31 Am. St. Rep. 809 (1892),
the subsequent conveyance was made toi
child of the grantor in consideration of $10 paid and ani agreement by the Sjrantee to pay annually to designated
persons the receipts from the property.
The property was worth twenty thou-
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is notice of pre-existing equities, and that those who claim under Josephine Hayden had
notice that her title to this land was questionable, and that neither she
nor they could defend upon the ground that they were bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration without notice of the title of the
true owner.
Stivers v. Home, 62 Mo. 473; Mann v. Best, 62 Mo.
been suggested that a quitclaim

deed

Ridge way v. Holliday, 59 Mo. 444.
But the rule last suggested has no application to a case where the
grantee under a subsequent quitclaim deed from the same grantor acquired the title for value and without notice of the former unrecorded
deed.
Fox v. Hall, 74 Mo. 315, 41 Am. Rep. 316. "A purchaser for
value by quitclaim deed is as much within the protection of the registry
act as one who becomes a purchaser by a warranty deed." Munson
V. Ensor, 94 Mo. loc. cit. 509, 7 S. W. 110; Campbell v. Gas Co., 84
Mo. 352; Brown v. Coal Co., 97 111. 214, VI Am. Rep. 105; Elliott
V. Buffington, 149 Mo. loc. cit. 676, 51 S. W. 408; Ebersole v. Rankin,

491

;

Mo. 488, 15 S. W. 422.
Where the controversy is between the vendee of a duly recorded
deed and the vendee of a prior unrecorded deed from the same vendor, the settled rule of law in this State seems to be that the consideration in the latter must be such as the law denominates a valuable conWe know of
sideration as distinguished from a good consideration.
no case which has gone farther and holds that the purchaser under
the recorded deed must have paid a full and adequate consideration
for the land.
If fraud is made an issue in the case, then the inadequacy of the
102

consideration paid may be taken into consideration with all the other
facts and circumstances in the case for the purpose of establishing
fraud; but in the absence of fraud, a want of consideration cannot
be shown against a recital of consideration for the purpose of deBobb v. Bobb, 89 Mo. 411,
feating the operative words of a deed.
4 S. W. 511; Henderson v. Henderson's Ex'rs, 13 Mo. 151; Hollocher, v. Hollocher, 62 Mo. loc. cit. 273; McConnell v. Brayner,
63 Mo. loc. cit. 463 ; McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 475, 30
Am. Dec. 103; Farrington v. Barr, 36 N. H. 86; Kimball v. Walker,
30

in.

511.

sand dollars.
Held that the child was not a purchaser for valuable consideration under the recording statute so as to be preferred over an earlier unrecordThe court said : "We deem it unnecessary to
ed deed of the same grantor.
undertake to determine here what degree of adequacy of price is required to
uphold a subsequent deed first recorded. Upon this branch of the case we have
no occasion to go, fartlier. than to hold that a small sum, inserted and paid,
perhaps because of a popular belief that some slight money consideration is
necessary to render the deed valid, will not of itself satisfy the terms of the
statute, where it appears upon the face of the conveyance, or by other competent
evidence, that it was not the actual consideration."
See, also, Dunn v. Bamum, 51 Fed. 355, 2 C. C. A. 265 (1S92), where the consideration for the second conveyance was $100, the property then being worth
$30,000, and at time of the suit $1,000,000.
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In the case at bar, however, there was no evidence introduced tending to prove the recited consideration of five dollars was not in fact
paid.
Counsel for defendant, in both his oral and written arguments, contends that Josephine Hayden procured her deed from Seth D. Hayden by fraud. It is a sufficient answer to that to say that no such issue
is made by the pleadings in the case, nor was there a word of evidence
introduced at the trial tending to establish that fact.
If defendant wished to rely upon fraud as a defense, he should have
alleged and proved it. The burden of proving such an issue is upon
the defendant.
Jackson v. Wood, 88 Mo. 76; Nauman v. Oberle,
90 Mo. 666, 3 S. W. 380; Taylor v. Crockett, 123 Mo. 300, 27 S. W.
620.

It follows from what has been said that the judgment of the circuit
court must be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. All
concur.^*

THOMAS

V.

STONE

(Court of Chancery of Mieliisan,

&

GRAHAM.

184,3.

Walker Ch.

117.)

This was a bill to foreclose a niortgage.
The complainant, January 31st, 1837, in consideration of $900, conveyed to Stone certain real estate situate in Auburn, Oakland county,
and took back a mortgage on the same premises, for $800 of the purchase money.
On the 24th day of August following, and before the
mortgage to Thomas was recorded. Stone conveyed the premises
to Graham by warranty deed, which was recorded on the same day.
The bill charged Graham with notice of the mortgage when he purGraharn, by
chased, and that nothing had been paid by him to Stone.
his answer, denied all notice, and stated that, at the time of the execution of the deed to him, he executed and delivered to Stone his
obligation for $200, which was unpaid, and also a bond in the penal
sum of $800, conditioned to reconvey a part of the premises to Stone,
on his .return from the South, where he expected to be gone five years.
The bill was taken as confessed against Stone, who was a non-resident
defendant.
Several witnesses were examined by complainant;
and
Graham, by consent of the parties, was examined concerning the
consideration that had been paid by him.
The mortgage to Thomas and the deed to
The: Chancellor.^^
Graham, were given long before the Revised Statutes took effect; and,
by the statute in force at the time for the registry of mortgages, it was
provided that no mortgage, nor any deed, conveyance, or writing, in
the nature of a mortgage, should defeat or prejudice the title or interr
further, Browoi v. Welch, IS 111.
A portion of the opinion is ouiitted.

24 See,
25

343, GS Am. Dec. 549 (1S57).
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est of any hcfna fide purchaser of any lands or tenements, unless the
same had been duly registered.
Laws of Michigan 1833, p. 284, § 2.
A plea of a bona fide purchaser without notice must aver not only a

want of notice at the time of the purchase, but also at the time of its
completion, and of the payment of the money. The money must have
been actually paid before notice.
If a part has been paid, and a part
remains unpaid, the purchaser will be protected in what he has paid,
but not in any subsequent payments made by him. Frost v. Beekman,
1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 301 ;
Jewett v. Palmer, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.)
This is what is meant by bona fide purchaser
.65, 11 Am. Dec. 401.
in the act referred to. Dickerson v. Tillinghast, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 215,
25 Am. Dec. 528. There is no difference "between a purchaser in good
faith, under the recording act, and a bona fide purchaser within the
decision of Courts of Equity in other cases." Grimstone v. Carter, 3
Paige (N. Y.) 421, 24 Am. Dec. 230. The registry laws were designed
to protect subsequent purchasers and mortgagees, who had parted with
their money, and taken a deed, against prior conveyances by their grantors, of which they had no notice. They were not made for the protection of prior purchasers or mortgagees, who stood in need of nothing of
the kind. But equity will not permit a subsequent purchaser to use what
the law has placed in his hand as a shield, for a purpose not necessary
to his protection, and to the injury of a prior bona fide purchaser. By
the English registry laws all prior conveyances are declared fraudulent
and void against subsequent purchasers, whose deeds are first recorded. Sug. on Vend. 498. And, at law, the last conveyance, when
first .recorded, carries with it the legal title, although the vendee had
notice of the prior conveyance ; but in equity, where the intention is
looked at, rather than the words of the registry act, he is held to be
bound by the previous conveyance.
Sug. on Vend. 511, Ed. of
1820.
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Graham denies he had any notice of the mortgage when, he purchased ; and there is no positive evidence on that point. The transaction, when viewed in all its parts, looks much like a piece of contrivance to defraud Thomas.
It is not necessary, however, to go into
the testimony ; for, admitting Graham had no notice of the mortgage,
He has paid nothing. It is not
still he is not a bona fide purchaser.
enough that the party has secured the purchase money ; he must have
in such a way that this Court could
or became bound for
paid
not relieve him from the payment of
as, by
promissory note, which
had been negotiated, or the like. The bond for $200,
has been
no evidence,) would, in the hands
assigned by Stone,' (of which there
the assignee, be subject to all equities existing against
before
was assigned.
Reference to Master to compute amount due, &c.^*
2" What would be the situation
where notice of the earlier conveyance or
claim is received after part, but not all, of the consideration has been paid?
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MARSHALL
(Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1S72,

v.

IS

(Part

2

ROBERTS.

IMinn. 405 [Gil. 3Go], 10 Am. Rep. 201.)

of certain
real estate, and that after having sold and conveyed the same to him,
and knowing his deed was unrecorded, he sold and conveyed the same
premises to other parties, who were purchasers in good faith, and
whose deeds were recorded, brought this action to recover damages
At the trial, after the plaintiff' had introduced his evidence
therefor.
and rested, the defendant moved for a dismissal of the action. The
court granted the motion and judgment of dismissal was entered. The
plaintiff' appeals to this court. The facts upon which the decision is
based, are fully stated in the opinion of the court.
Berry, J. For the purpose of determining the only question necessary to be considered in this case, we may assume that the following
propositions, which plaintiff claims to have proved, or to have oft'ered
to prove, are true as matter of fact:
1st. That on the 12th day of May, 1860, Louis Roberts was the
owner of lot four, in block four, of the town of St. Paul, according to
the recorded plat thereof.
2d. That on said 12th day of ]\Iay said Roberts, together with his
wife, executed and delivered to the plaintiff, Joseph M. Marshall, a
quit-claim deed of all their right, title, interest, claim, and demand,
in and to said lot, which deed through inadvertence on plaintiff's part
has never been recorded.
3d. That on the 2d day of August, 1865, said Roberts (well knowing his deed to Marshall, and Marshall's inadvertent omission to have
the same recorded) for a valuable consideration, executed and delivered (his wife joining) to Uri L. Lamprey a quit-claim deed of all their
right, title, interest, claim and demand in and to said lot, which deed
was duly recorded August 3d, 1865, the said Lamprey at the time of
said conveyance to him, and at the time of paying the consideration
therefor, having no notice of the aforesaid convevance to the plaintiff.
4th. That on the 22d day of May, 1867, said Lamprey and wife, for
a valuable consideration, executed and delivered to William J. Cutler
a warranty deed of said lot, which was duly recorded on the 29th day
of May, 1867, the said Cutler at the time of such conveyance to him,
and at the time of paying the consideration therefor, having no notice of
said conveyance to the plaintiff, and having purchased in good faith.
Plaintiff's claim
that by reason of defendant's deed to Lamprey^,
and the recording thereof, he (plaintiff) has lost his title to the lot in
question, and has therefore suffered damage to the value of said lot,
which damage he seeks to recover of defendant in this action.
the defendant was the owner

;

on the general question, see Youst v. Martin,
Serg.
Wenz v. Pastene, 209 Mass. 359, 95 N. E. 793 (1911).
3

Bearing
(1817)

&

is,

The plaintiff, claiming that

E. (Pa.)

423

'
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If the deed from Roberts to plaintiff conveyed nothing to plaintiff, the subsequent deed to Lamprey can have taken nothing away
from him, or, in other words, it cannot have damaged the plaintiff.
If on the other hand, as would appear from the facts before assumed, the deed from Roberts to plaintiff conveyed a good, title to
the lot in question, or any right, title, interest, claim or demand in or to
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then, neither such good title, nor any such right, title, interest, claim
or demand, could be taken away or impaired by the subsequent conFor the deed to Lamprey
quit-claim deed
veyance to Lamprey.
to pass
in common form, the effect of which, under our statute,
such estate as the grantor could lawfully convey by the ordinary deed
Minn. 291 (Gil. 201),
of bargain and sale. In Martin v. Brown,
held that the legislature by the words "lawfully convey," intend to
limit the estate conveyed by a qmt-claim deed; to such as the grantor has
legal right to convey, and that as he "may not lawfully convey land which he has already conveyed to another, nothing passes
by such deed beyond the grantor's actual interest at the time of the
conveyance. And in Hope v. Stone, 10 Minn. 152 (Gil. 114), where
there was a conveyance (by warranty deed) of all the right, title, inwas held
terest, etc., etc., of the grantor in and to certain land,
that nothing passed to the grantees by the conveyance which the grantor had previously conveyed to the other parties.
See also cases
In Everest v. Ferris, 16 Minn. 26 (Gil. 14), the rule thus
there cited.
laid down in Martin v. Brown,
reiterated
and independently (so
far as appears) of any statute,
held in May v. Le Claire, 11 Wall.
232, 20 L. Ed. 50, that
quitparty who has acquired his title by
claim deed cannot be regarded as
bona fide purchaser without
notice, and that such conveyance passes the title as the grantor held
and the grantee takes only what the grantor could lawfully convey.
The provisions of our statute in regard to the effect of recording
and failing to record deeds, are also in entire harmony with the views
expressed in the case cited. Section 54, ch. 35, Pub. Stat., which seems
to have been in force at the time when Roberts made the deed to
Lamprey, enacts that every conveyance by deed, &c., shall be recorded,
&c., and that every such conveyance not so recorded shall be void,
as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for
valuable
consideration, of the same real estate or any portion thereof, whose
conveyance shall be first duly recorded.
Substantially the same provisions as those above mentioned, are also found in section 24, c. 46,
Rev. Stat, and section 21, c. 40, Gen. Stat., so that our statute in this
These provisions, as
particular seems to have remained unchanged.
will appear upon
moment's reflection, so far from militating against
the views expressed in the cases cited, come to their aid, since
only the purchaser of the same real estate, or any portion thereof, who
by his priority of record cuts out the title of
prior purchaser. For
when the second purchaser obtains by his quit-claim deed only what
his grantor had (his grantor's right, title and interest) at the time

'
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when such deed was made, he is not a purchaser of the same real
estate (or any part thereof) which his grantor had previous!}' conveyed
But besides this, the grantee in a
away and therefore no longer has.
quit-claim deed like that from Roberts to Lamprey, though he may
not in fact have known that his grantor had previously conveyed the
described premises to another, and though he may not in fact have intended to defraud such prior grantee, is not a purchaser in good faith
as against such prior grantee, for nothing is attempted to be transferred to him, except whatever right, title, &c., the grantor has at the
time when the quit-claim deed is executed, so that as in the case of
Hope V. Stone the very terms of the deed are notice of the existence
of the rights which have been conferred upon such prior grantee, or
any other person.
These considerations, as it seems to us, dispose of this case and prevent us from reaching the questions mainly discussed by plaintiff's
counsel.
The judgment entered below dismissing the action is affirmed.^^

Mortsr. Co. v. Hutchinson, 19 Or. ?,?A, 24 Pac 515 (1S90), ace.
v. Hentliorn, 91 Iowa, 242, 59 N. W. 276 (1894);
Reed v. Knights.
87 I\Ie. 181, 32 Atl. 870 (1895) ; Messenger v. Peter, 129 Mich. 93, 88 N. W. 209
(1901) ; Fowler v. Will, 19 S. D. 131, 102 N. W. 598, 117 Am. St. Rep. 938, 8
Ann. Cas. 1093 (1905) ; Thorn v. Newsom, 64 Tex. 161, 53 Ain. Rep. 747 (1885),
27

American

Wickhani

accord in result.
"Under the cloak of quitclaim deeds, schemers and speculators close their
eyes to honest and reasonable inquiries, and traffic in apparent imperfections in
titles.
The usual methods of conveying a good title — one in which the grantor
has confidence — is by warranty deed.
The usual method of conveying a doubtful title is by quitclaim deed. The rule is wise and wholesome which holds
that those who take by quitclaim deed are not bona fide purchasers, and take
only the interest which their grantors had."
Peters v. Cartier, 80 Mich. 124,
129, 45 N. W. 73, 74, 20 Am. St. Rep. 508 (1890).
"While nonregistered deeds are declared void by the statute as to subsequent purchasers for value and v\-ithout notice, still the doctrine is well settled
that a subsequent purchaser, although for value and without actual notice.
who takes under strictly a quitclaim deed — that is, one by which the chance of
title, and not the land itself, is conveyed — will not be accorded the protection
of the statute, for the obvious reason that he contracted for the interest only
that his vendor then had in the land.
If the vendor had previously divested
liiuiself of the title to a portion or all of the land, to the extent of the divestiture there would be no right remaining in the vendor to pass by the quitclaim
It is, then, the interest of the vendor for which he contracts,
to the vendee.
and it is to such interest only that he is entitled under the quitclaim deed."
Thorn v. Newsom, supra.
After the decision in Marshall v. Roberts, the Minnesota Legislature amended the recording statute so that a grantee in a subsequent quitclaim
deed
would be on the same footing, as to prior imrecorded deeds, as a grantee iu a
bargain and sale deed.
Strong v. Lynn, 38 Minn. 315, 37 N. W. 448 (1888).
And
in Maine the rule of Reed v. Knights, supra, has been changed by statute.
Rev. St. 1903, c. 75, § 11.
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BRANCH BANK AT MOBILE.

(Supreme Court of Alabama,

1852.

21

Ala.

125.)
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28 The statement of facts and
api)ears from the opinion.
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In order to disembarrass this case from the confuJ.^^
sion in which so many mesne conveyances involve
we may consider Smith, the defendant, as the vendor to Dubose and Kibbe, and
as holding their mortgage to secure the purchase money.
We may
then, without changing the legal effect of the facts, lay out of view the
sale to Meggison by D. and K., and the foreclosure of the mortgage
taken by them since the land was purchased by their agent,
C. Dubose, who was the mere conduit for convenience sake of the interest
of Dubose and Kibbe to the Bank.
It
too clear to admit of doubt, that an unrecorded mortgage, as
between the parties themselves,
vafid and binding. It
also valid as
to all subsequent creditors or purchasers with notice of its existence.
Ala. 208 Myers v. Peek's Adm'r, Ala. 648 TutSmith V. Zurcher,
Wend. (N. Y.) 226, 21 Am. Dec. 306.
tle V. Jackson,
the mortgagor sells the land to an innocent
equally clear, that
bona fide purchaser, taking
mortgage from him to secure the purchase
decree of sale upon
foreclosure suit, at which,
money, and obtains
his
he
not in condi
himself
or
becomes
the
he
purchaser,
agent,
by
tion to invoke the protection afforded
bona fide purchaser without
notice, so as to defeat the mortgage he has executed to his vendor for
this would be to take advantage of his own wrong.
"His conscience,"
the
says Judge Story, "is still bound by his meditated fraud, and
estate revests In him, the original rights attach."
410.
Story's Eq.
The case, then, resolves itself into this
Considering Dubose and
Kibbe as mortgagors to Smith, whose mortgage was not recorded, and
as the vendors to the Bank, through their agent,
C. Dubose, who
swears he was
mere naked trustee, without any interest whatever,
does the Bank, under the circumstances, and in view of the character of
the deed executed to
bona fide purchaser
occupy the position of
for
valuable consideration without notice, within the meaning of our
statutes declaring mortgages of real estate not recorded within sixty
days to be void as against such purchasers
The instrument under which the Bank claims,
quit claim deed, or,
what
more appropriately designated by the common law term,
release.
The effective words are, "that the said Dubose doth remise, release and forever quit claim, all his right, title, claim, &c., unto the said
Branch Bank, in the full and actual possession now being, and its successors and assigns forever."
said, in the Touchstone (p. 320) that
the words most common and appropriate in
release, are, remisi, relaxavi, and quietum clamavi
and that a release may enure by way of
passing the estate, as where one joint tenant or co-parcener releases
portion of the opinion are omitted.

The

case
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his right to the other ; or by way of passing the right, as where the disseisee releases to the disseisor ; or, it may operate by way of enlarging
an estate, where the releasee has an estate capable of being enlarged,
Gilb.
and is in privity with the releasor ; or by way of extinguishment.
412.
Inst.
vol.
2,
272;
Bouv.
p.
Co.
Lit.
on Ten. 55; Shep. Touch. 321 ;
At the common law, it is said, a freehold title could be released in
five ways: 1. To the tenant of the freehold in fact or in law without
any privity ; 2. To the remainder-man ; 3. To the reversioner without
privity ; 4. To one having a right only by privity ; and, 5. To one hav-*
ing a privity only without right. 2 Bouv. Inst. 412; Gilb. Ten. 53 ; Co.
Lit. 265. So that, according to the principles of tlie common law governing releases, the Bank, the releasee in this case, filling none of the
above requisites, would not take the title of the releasor. But in this
country, the technical rules relating to a release are generally held
not to apply, and a quit claim deed is considered as passing the title of
the releasor, without any warranty as to outstanding titles or incumbrances, but merely against the grantor himself, and those claiming
under him, by descent, or by subsequent conveyances of the same interest previously transferred.
The grantor in this case only purports to release and quit claim the
title and interest which he had. The question then arises, what interest
The plain answer is, the mere equity of redemption,
did he have?
and
this only passed by the quit claim deed. Thus the
more,
nothing
Bank stands in the place of Dubose and Kibbe, the mortgagors, holding
only what they could sell, the equity of redemption.
Were we to hold that M. Dubose intended that his agent, J. C. Dubose, should sell a greater interest than he really had, and by so doing
enable the Bank to shelter itself under the plea of being a bona fide
purchaser for a valuable consideration, so as to defeat the mortgage
which D. and K. had executed to Anderson, we should impute a fraudulent intent to the parties when the deed which their agent has entered
into justifies no such inference.
The unregistered mortgage being valid and effectual as between the
mortgagor and mortgagee, the subsequent sale of the entire estate by
the mortgagor is a fraud upon the rights of the mortgagee ; and the
reason, I apprehend, upon which the statute proceeds in preferring the
subsequent bona fide purchaser to the mortgagee, is, that one of two
innocent persons must suffer by the fraud of a third party, and the
mortgagee, failing to use the diligence which the statute requires in
recording his mortgage, is considered most in default, and is therefore
properly adjudged by the statute to bear the loss.
But we are not allowed by the rules of law, any more than by the
principles of common charity, to suppose fraud, when the facts out of
which it is supposed to arise may well consist with honesty and pure
intention.
Steele v. Kinkle & Lehr, 3 Ala. 352.
We cannot, therefore, in this case presume that the vendor of the
Bank attempted to sell more than he might lawfully sell, which was
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the quit claim.

This was his title, and this alone enures by

To enlarge the interest by construction, would be to make a different
contract from that which the parties have entered into; would be, by
judicial interpretation, contrary to the face of the deed and the facts
on which it is founded, to pass the entire estate, by investing it with
the consequences of a fraudulent sale of the whole, when the grantor
had but the equity of redemption ; and this, too, for the purpose of defeating the just lien of Smith for the purchase money which is due
from Dubose and Kibbe. We feel quite confident no case can be found
which carries the doctrine thus far.
The case of Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. (U. S.) 333-410, 11 L. Ed. 622,
v/hich is cited with seeming approval by this court in Walker et al. v.
Miller & Co., 11 Ala. 1067, fully sustains us in tlie position, that the
Bank, holding a mere quit claim deed, cannot be regarded as a bona
fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice. And we
see no reason why such purchaser should be allowed to invoke the aid
of the registry statute, to avoid a prior mortgage which has not been
recorded, any more than the aid of tlie Chancery Court for his protection.
We express no opinion as to what we should decide, had the deed to
the Bank, even though it contained no warranty, purported to convey
the entire title to the premises, instead merely of that which the grantor had. But we desire to limit our opinion to tlie facts of the case
before us, lest parties should be misled as to the extent of jt. * * *
After

the best consideration

we have been able to bestow upon this

case, we are satisfied that the court mistook the law in several

Its judgment
charges given.
cause remanded.

must, therefore,

BOYNTON

v.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit,

be reversed,

of

the

and the

HAGGART.
190.3.

120 Fed. 819, 57 C. C. A. .301.)

Sanborn, Circuit Judge.
These appeals present controversies between three sets of claimants to the title to certain timber lands in the
state of Arkansas.
Lucetta B. Boynton and her associates, the complainants below, are the devisees under the will of C. O. Boynton, deceased, who brought this suit against James Haggart and William Mc^
Masters, hereafter called the "defendants," to quiet in himself the title
to about 20,000 acres of land which he bought of the Citizens' Bank
of Louisiana in the year 1883. L. D. Rozell and his associates, the
heirs of A. B. Rozell, deceased, intervened in this suit, and claimed the
title to a portion of these lands. There was a hearing and a decree for
the defendants, which the complainants and the interveners challenge
by separate appeals.
The principal question which the appeal of the complainants presents
is whether or not an innocent purchaser under a deed of all the right.
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title, and interest in the lands owned by his grantor in a certain state,
without a more definite description, may successfully hold the lands
which his grantor appeared by the registry to own when he made this
deed as against a claimant under a prior unrecorded conveyance of the
The question arises in this way:
same lands by the same grantor.
From 1873 until October 26, 1883, the records of the counties in which
these lands were situated disclosed a complete chain of title to them
from D. C. Cross, the grantee of the state of Arkansas, to the Citizens'
Bank of Louisiana. On Alay 3, 1880, however, a decree had been rendered in one of the courts of the state of Arkansas in a suit between
the executor, the executrix, and the devisees of the will of Jeptha
Fowlkes, complainants, and the Citizens' Bank of Louisiana, defendant, to the effect that the heirs of Jeptha Fowlkes were the owners of
this land, and that the bank had no title or interest in it. One of the
statutes of the state of Arkansas required those in whose favor such
a decree was rendered to register it in the recorder's office of the county in which the lands it affected were situated within one year after its
rendition, and provided that, "if such decree be not recorded within
such time, it shall be void as to all subsequent purchasers without notice."
Gould's Digest of the Laws of Arkansas, p. 637, § 35. This,

was not recorded until November 4, 1884.
Meanwhile, and in the year 1883, W. L. Culbertson, the agent and
associate of C. O. Boynton, without any notice of this decree, purchased the lands in controversy in this suit from the Citizens' Bank of
Louisiana, paid that bank $13,000 therefor, and took and recorded a
quitclaim deed from it to himself of "all and singular its right, title,
interest, and claim of whatever nature, legal and equitable in and to
all the lands, lots, and parcels of land and any and all interests in the
same belonging to and owned by said Citizens' Bank of Louisiana, in
the state of Arkansas, at the date of this conveyance (except its lands
and interest in Chicot county in said state) ; the said lands and interests
therein conveyed being situated and lying within the counties of Clay,
Crittenden, Craighead, Cross, Greene, Mississippi, Poinsett, and Woodruff, in the said state of Arkansas ; and this conveyance to operate and
be as absolute, full and complete as if the said lands and interests aforesaid were herein specifically described."
Before making this purchase,
Culbertson procured a list of these lands, and an abstract of the reGorded title to them, from which it appeared that the bank had a perfect record title to them, subject only to a tax title, which Culbertson
bought at the same time that he purchased the lands from the bank.
He secured his deed from the bank on September 26, 1883, and recorded it on October 26, 1883. C. O. Boynton, his principal, furnished
the money to make this purchase, and on October 23, 1883, Culbertson
conveyed the lands in controversy in this suit to Boynton by means of a
warranty deed which describes them by government subdivisions, and
this deed was recorded on October 29, 1883.
Culbertson appears to
have been interested with Boynton in the purchase of the lands, but
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what his interest was does not appear. The title of the complainants
rests upon the purchase from the bank and the conveyance to Boynton
The defendants
while he was ignorant of the existence of the decree.
have succeeded to the title of the heirs of Fowlkes under their decree
against the bank of May 3, 1880, and the question is whether that title
or that of the devisees of Boynton should prevail.
Counsel for the defendants argue that the deed from the bank to
Culbertson conveyed only the lands which the bank owned at the date
of the deed, and that, as the title to the lands here in question had been
devested from the bank before the deed to Culbertson was made by the
decree of May 3, 1880, and as the bank did not in fact own any right,
title, or interest in the lands when it made this deed, the deed conveyed
nothing, and the purchasers took nothing thereby. In support of this
contention they cite Brown v. Jackson, 3 Wheat. 449, 4 L. Ed. 432.
That was the first of a long line of decisions rendered by the Supreme
Court in which it held that the grantee in a quitclaim deed could not
become a bona fide purchaser under the registry statutes because the
prior deed had conveyed all that the grantor had, and the form of the
quitclaim deed was notice of that fact to its grantee. Oliver v. Piatt, 3
How. 333, 11 L. Ed. 622; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297,
13 L. Ed. '703; May v. Le Claire, 11 Wall. 217, 20 L. Ed. 50; Villa v.
Rodriguez, 12 Wall. 323, 20 L. Ed. 406; Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100
U. S. 578, 25 L. Ed. 618; Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U. S. 494, 25 L.
Ed. 1065 ; Hanrick v. Patrick, 119 U. S. 156, 7 Sup. Ct. 147, 30 L. Ed.
396.

Counsel for the interveners cite the cases of Adams v. Cuddy, 13
Pick. (Mass.) 460, 25 Am. Dec. 330; Jamaica Corporation v. Chandler,
9 Allen (Mass.) 159, 169; Chaffin v. Chaffin, 4 Gray (Mass.) 280; Fitzgerald V. Libby, 142 Mass. 235, 7 N. E. 917; and Eaton v. Trowbridge,
But these
38 Mich. 454, in support of the position of the defendants.
decisions fail to give any adequate effect or force to the estoppel of
the registry statutes, and are in accord with the early holdings of the
The riper
Supreme Court regarding the effect of a quitclaim deed.
and
more thoughtful consideration of later years have exexperience
ploded the fallacy upon which the earlier decisions of tlie Supreme
Court rested, and have led the court to adopt the rule which has now
become firmly established both upon reason and authority that the innocent purchaser under a quitclaim deed may acquire the title under the
registry statutes as against the holder of a prior unrecorded deed from
the same grantor not^^^ithstanding the fact that the latter had no title,
and had nothing to convey when he executed his second deed. Moetle
V. Sherwood,
148 U. S. 21, 29, 30, 13 Sup. Ct. 426, 37 L. Ed. 350;
United States v. California, etc., Land Co., 148 U. S. 31, 47, 48, 13 Sup.
Ct. 458, 37 L. Ed. 354; Prentice v. Duluth Forwarding Co., 58 Fed.
437, 447, 7 C. C. A. 293, 303 ; Memphis Land & Timber Co. v. Ford, 58
Fed. 452, 7 C. C. A. 304.
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the case at bar should not be governed

it,

by this just and sakitary rule. Registry statutes are legislative extensions of the doctrine of estoppel. They forbid those who have, and
yet withhold from the record, their muniments of title, from asserting
the title those muniments disclose against others who have innocently
purchased the land from him who appears by the record to be the owner
while the holders of the real title silently conceal it. They rest upon
and enforce the equitable proposition tliat he who knowingly conceals
his ownership when he ought to disclose it shall not assert it to the
detriment of his neighbor who has acted in reliance upon his silence.
When Culbertson purchased these lands, the record disclosed a perfect
•title to them in the bank. That record was evidence of title both in the
courts of the land and in the ordinary commercial transactions of men.
Gould's Digest, p. 268, § 26. The agent of the vendor, the bank, furnished to the purchaser a list of these lands, and offered to sell them
to him for his principal.
Culbertson took the list, procured an abstract
of the record title to the lands it described, and bought them in reliance
upon the representation which the record and the silence and inaction
of the grantors of the defendants exhibited.
The defendants, or those under whom they claim, in violation of the
statute, which required them to record the decree of May 3, 1880,
which had devested the title of the bank, silently withheld it from the
record, and thereby induced, or at least permitted, Culbertson and
Boynton to buy from one who had no actual title. May they now be
allowed to avail themselves of tliat decree, to deprive these vendees
of the land, and to entail upon them the loss of their purchase money?
The question is answered by the salutary statute of Arkansas. It declares that, if such a decree is not recorded within one year after its
rendition, "it shall be void as. to all subsequent purchasers without notice."
The evidence is satisfactory — nay, it is conclusive — that Culbertson and Boynton were subsequent purchasers of these lands without notice of this decree, and they fall far within both the reason and
the* terms of the statute whose protection they invoke.
It is true, as counsel insist, that, in the absence of the estoppel of
the registry statutes, a conveyance of what one owns carries nothing
which he does not own, and that under tliat rule the deed to Culbertson
conveyed nothing, because the bank had nothing when it was made.
But the question here is not what the bank owned when that deed was
made.
It is not what the bank could convey. It is what the bank appeared to own by tlie authorized records of the counties in which these
lands were situated. The statute and the negligence of the defendants,
or of their grantors, estop them from proving, or from successfully
claiming, that the title to these lands was other than that which they
permitted it to appear to be upon these records when Culbertson and
The contention that the grantor had nothing when
Boynton bought.
this deed was made, and hence that the purchasers acquired nothing by
It applies with equal cogency to the purchaser
proves too much.
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under every deed subsequent to a prior unrecorded conveyance, and
its adoption would annul every statute of registration, for it may be
said with equal truth of every such subsequent conveyance that the
and tlierefcre the subsequent
grantor has nothing when he makes
purchaser can take nothing.
fallacious, because
The argument
utterly ignores the purpose,
the purthe policy, and the effect of the statutes of registration.
pose and the legal effect of these statutes to make the title that appears of record — the record title — superior in tlie hands of an innowithheld from regiscent purchaser for value to the real title that
tration. Hence, while one who has parted with his title to land by an
unrecorded deed or decree has no title or interest remaining in himself,
yet his deed to an innocent purchaser for value, by virtue of the registry statutes, avoids the effect of the prior unrecorded deed or decree,
and vests the title to the land in the subsequent purchaser to the same
the title of record had been the real
extent as
would have done
instruments are estopped by the statThe
holders
unrecorded
title.
of
the real
ute and their negligence from denying that tlie record title
Timber Co. v. Ford, 58 Fed. 452, 455, 456,
title. Memphis Land
C. C. A. 304, 307, 308. The defendants cannot be heard to say, as
against Culbertson, Boynton, and their successors in interest, that the
Citizens' Bank of Louisiana was not the owner of the lands which
appeared by the records of the counties to be the owner of when Culbertson and Boynton made their purchase.
There
another reason why the title of the complainants must prevail. Boynton was not only an innocent purchaser of these lands, but
he secured them in October, 1883, by means of a warranty deed from
Culbertson, which properly described and conveyed them to him by
If Culbertson could not have claimed the
government subdivisions.
benefit of the estoppel of the registry statute because the deed to him
did not specifically describe the lands, Boynton was under no such
Even in those courts 'in which the rule once prevailed that
disability.
one who takes under
bona fide purchaser,
quitclaim deed cannot be
that rule was sometimes limited to the grantee in such
deed.
did
not apply to those who succeeded to the title of such
grantee by deeds
of bargain and sale or by warranty deeds, and this was
reasonable
limitation.
v.
21
Neb.
199,
Snowden
31 N. W. 661
Tyler,
United
States V. California, etc.. Land Co., 148 U.
31, 47, 13 Sup. Ct. 458,
?i7 L. Ed. 354.
The form of the deed to Culbertson, his grantor, did
not charge Boynton with notice of the unrecorded decree against the
bank, or of any other defect in its title, even
could have charged
A subsequent purchaser of lands properly described in
Culbertson.
not charged with notice of unrecorded conwarranty deed to himself
or
decrees
the
fact that somie prior deed in the chain o.^
by
veyances
title
quitclaim deed, or conveys only the lands which the grantor
then owned, or of which some apparent owner died seised; or which
some bankrupt owned at the time of his adjudication, but he may safely

DERIVATIVE

892

TITLES

(Part

2

rely upon the presumption that the record title Is the real title. Memphis Land & Timber Co. v. Ford, 58 Fed. 452, 455, 456, 7 C. C. A. 304,
307, 308; United States v. California, etc.. Land Co., 148 U. S. 31, 46,
47, 13 Sup. Ct. 458, Z7 L. Ed. 354; Kennedy v. Northup, 15 111. 148,
157; Bowen v. Prout, 52 111. 354, 357; Youngblood v. Vastine, 46 Mo.
239, 242, 2 Am. Rep. 509; Powers v. McFerran, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 44,
47; Earle v. Fiske, 103 Mass. 491, 494.29

MOORE

v.

(Court of Chancery,

BENNETT.
1678.

2 Ch. 246.)

B. with power of revocation by will, and
limits other uses if A. dispose to a purchaser by the will : another
purchaser subsequent is intended to have notice of the will as well
as of the power to revoke, and this is in law a notice ; and so it is in
A. makes

a conveyance to

all cases where the purchaser cannot make out a title but by a deed,
which leads him to another fact, the purchaser shall not be a purchaser
without notice of that fact, but shall be presumed cognisant thereof;
for it is crassa negligentia, that he sought not after it.
The balance of the opinion, relating to other matters, is omitted.
v. I.ibby, 142 Mass. 2,3.5, 7 N. E. 917 (1SS6), there was a mortgage of land descTibed as "the land by me owned" in a certain designated locality, "for boundaries and description reference is made to deeds to me, recorded
in said registry."
In fact the mortgagor had already conveyed a portion of the
29

In Fitzgerald

lands covered by the above description, but the deed had not been recorded at
the time the mortgage was given and recorded, and the mortgagee had no
knowledge of such deed.
Held, that such previously conveyed portion did not
pass by the mortgage, under the recording act. But compare Dow v. Whitney.
147 Mass. 1, 16 X. E. 722 (ISSS), where the conveyance was of "all my interest"
in a specilically described tract of land, "except such portions thereof as
have heretofore sold."
The question was whether such deed placed the grantee
therein in position to give a clear title as against possible prior unrecorded
deeds.
The court said : "A deed of 'all the right, title, and interest,' or of 'all
the interest,' of the grantor in a lot of land, conveys the same title as a deed
of the land. It is the policy of our laws that a purchaser of land, by examining the registry of deeds, may ascertain the title of his gi'antor.
If there is
no recorded deed, he has the right to assume that the record title is the true
The law has established the rule, for the protection of creditors and purtitle.
chasers, that an unrecorded deed, if unlvnown to them, is as to them a mere
nullity. The reasons lor the rule apply with equal force in the case of a deed
of the grantor's right, title, and interest, as in that of a deed of tlie land.
We
are of opinion, therefore, that the deed of Stephen Dow conveyed to his grantee
a title which is good against any prior deed, if unrecorded.
To hold otherwise
would defeat the purpose of the registration laws, and create confusion in the
titles to land."
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MATHER.

(Supreme Court of Michigan,

1872.

25 Mich. 51.)

Appeals in Chancery from Ionia Circuit.
Estiier E. Baker filed her bill against Amos R. Mather, Dennis H.
Burns, Horace Roatch, and Henry W. King to foreclose a mortgage
made to her by Mather and Burns, dated January 21, 1864, but which
was not recorded until March 3, 1869. Roatch and King were made
King alone andefendants as subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers.
swered, and the bill was taken as confessed by the other defendants.,
Subsequently Henry W. King filed his bill against Horace Roatch, Caroline E. Roatch, Esther E. Baker, and Dennis H. Burns to foreclose
a mortgage made to him by said Roatch and wife, dated February 16,
Baker and Burns were made de1869, and recorded March 1, 1869.
Baker alone anor
incumbrancers.
fendants as subsequent purchasers
swered, and the bill was taken as confessed by the other defendants.
These two mortgages covered the same premises, and the question
involved was, which should take precedence. The two cases were heard
together, and the same proofs used on the hearing of both. From tlie
proofs it appeared that the Baker mortgage was a purchase-price mortgage, given on the sale of the premises by Esther E. Baker to Burns
and Mather ; that said Burns and his wife subsequently conveyed their
interest in the premises, subject to said mortgage, to said Mather, who
afterwards conveyed the same, subject to said mortgage (which was
expressly referred to in, and excepted from, the covenant of warranty
in the conveyance), to Roatch ; and that the latter, with his wife, afterwards executed the King mortgage. On the hearing. King's bill was
dismissed as to Esther E. Baker; and decree was entered in tlie suit
brought by the latter, declaring her mortgage a prior lien on the premises to the King mortgage.
King brings both causes to this court by
appeal, where the two are heard together.
Per Curiam, The question in these cases is one of priority between
two mortgages.
The second mortgage was recorded first, and there
is no evidence that the mortgagee therein had actual notice of the existence of the prior mortgage when he took his. It appears, however,
that the deed, under which the mortgagor held the land, expressly referred to this prior mortgage, and made his title subject to it. The
deed was not recorded, but this is an immaterial circumstance.
Everybody taking a conveyance of, or a lien upon, land, takes it with constructive notice of whatever appears in the conveyances which constitute his chain of title. Decrees below affirmed.^"
SOT. sold and conveyed land to D., the deed containing the following: "The
party of the first part (tlie vendor), for and in consideration of the sum of
JJiTOO, to be paid on or before the lirst day of July, 1872, by the party of the
second part." D. took possession, and, in 1874, without having paid T. in full,
conveyed the premises to H., wlao subsequently sold to M. H. and M. had no
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HARLAND.

ISSl.

17 Ch. D. 353.)

Motion.
By an indenture dated the 25tli of October, 1876, the plaintiff conveyed to one Herve two freehold plots of land, being parts of a build-

ing estate at Wimbledon, subject, nevertheless, to the restrictions and
obligations as to building and other matters contained in an indenture
of mutual covenants, also dated the 25th of October, 1876, executed
by the plaintiff and Herve, and the purchasers of other building plots,
One of the covenants contained in the latter
part of the same estate.
deed provided that on the several plots private dwelling-houses only
should be erected.
By an indenture dated the 18th of July, 1878, Herve conveyed the
same two plots of land to the defendant Harland, subject to the same
restrictions and obligations as to building by reference to the deed
of mutual covenants, as were contained in the conveyance to Herve.
The defendant Harland having erected a dwelling-house on the property, by an indenture dated the 29th of March, 1881, demised it to
the defendant Louisa Bennett for the term of seven years, for the
purposes of an "Art College," and the lease contained a proviso that
the defendant Bennett, her executors, administrators, or assigns, should
be at liberty to erect in the garden belonging to the premises a studio,
with necessary rooms connected therewith, of corrugated iron on a
brick foundation, and a covenant by the lessee not to carry on any
trade, business, or employment, on the premises, without the consent
in writing of the lessor, but to use the premises as a private dwellinghouse only, with a proviso, however, that the user of the premises
for the purpose of a school for instruction in art or otherwise should
not be deemed a breach of any covenant in the lease.
Neither the defendant Bennett nor her solicitor was informed or was
aware before the execution of the lease, nor till shortly before tlie issuing of the writ in the action, that there was any restrictive covenant
affecting the land, and she had proceeded to erect the studio which was
nearly completed.
This was a motion for an injunction to restrain the defendants from
erecting, or continuing to erect, or permitting any building or buildings, other than private dwelling-houses, to remain on the land, and
in particular, the building then in the course of erection.
Jessel, M. R. I must say that on the point of laAV I have a very
clear opinion, and not the less so because there are dicta in the books
which at first sight appear to lead to a different conclusion.
I say
actual knowlodse of any claim against the land by T. In an action by T. to
siil).j('ct the land to the payment of the unpaid purchase price, H. and M. claimed to be protected as purchasers without notice.
Deason v. Taylor, 53 MisSr
(;97

(1876).
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at first sight, because, when carefully examined, they do not bear out
the argument which has been supposed to be fortified by, them.
The first question
have to consider is the notice which a man who
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takes a lease has of his lessor's title. It has been settled for more than
a century that he has constructive notice of his lessor's title.
Lord
Eldon treated it as settled law. That means this, that the man \y\^
takes a lease is in a similar position as regards constructive notice as
a man who buys. There could not be any reason for any distinction
between purchasing a fee simple and taking a lease for 10,000 years.
If a man who purchases a fee simple is bound to look into tlie title
in a regular way, so is a man who takes a lease for 10,000 years, or
1,000 years, or for 100 years, or any lease at all, bound to make reasonable inquiry into his lessor's title. Well, what is reasonable inquiry ? It has been held that he is to require the usual title, whatever
the usual title may be.
In this case the lessor's title began in 1878, and if the lessee had
only asked to see the conveyance to the lessor, tliat is without going
back 40 years, she would have found that it was subject to this restrictive covenant, because the grantor in 1878 took care to convey the
land, subject to the covenants, though the covenants themselves were
in a separate deed.
Now it is not to be supposed that I am going to restrict the doctrine
to looking at the actual conveyance — not at all — because that would be
to destroy it altogether.
If the lessor had a conveyance made to him
the day before that would not do, the lessee must ask for the conveyIn this case,
ance to him and a fair and reasonable deduction of title.
as I said before, tlie actual conveyance refers to this covenant, but if
it had not shewn
should have come to the same conclusion,
and that must have appeared
as the conveyance of 1876 referred to
on any investigation of title.
Now
The result, tlierefore,
the lessee had constructive notice.
notice,
was
the
this
constructive
has been argued that
lessee, having
told by the lessor that there was no restrictive covenant, that representation would in equity do away with the effect of constructive noConstructive notice of
tice.
entirely dissent from that proposition.
am godeed
constructive notice of its contents, subject to what
If,
deed
relatnotice
of
have
therefore,
to
you
ing
say presently.
notitle,
of
chain
have
you
ing to the title, and forming
part of the
no excuse for not asking to
tice of the contents of that deed, and
look at
to say you were told that the deed contained nothing which
was necessary for you to look at, otherwise in every case you might
deed without going
statement of the contents of
be satisfied with
to look at it. Of course there may be cases where the deed cannot
be got at, or, for some other reason, where, with the exercise of all the
and then there may be no
prudence in the world, you cannot see
another question.
constructive notice affecting tlie title, but that
deed
no answer to be told that
does not
Where you know of

DERIVATIVE

896

prejudicially affect the title,

as

if it

TITLES

(Part

2

does affect the title you are bound

if

it,

it,

is

is

is

it,

if

it

it,

is

if

a

a

a

is

1,

9

&

5

a

It

I

9

;

1

I

is

it

is

it

a

it,

I

a

is

I

it,

it

if

a

it,

by its contents.
There is a class of cases, of which I think Jones v. Smith, 1 Hare,
43, 1 Ph. 244, is tlie most notorious, where the purchaser was told of
a deed which might or might not affect the title, and was told at the
Supposing you are buying
same time that it did not affect the title.
land of a married man, as in Jones v. Smith, 1 Hare, 43, 1 Ph. 244,
and you are told at the same time that there is a marriage settlement,
but the deed does not affect the land in question, you have no constructive notice of its contents, because although you know there is
If every mara settlement you are told it does not affect the land.
settlement
man's
land
then
all
a
riage
you would
necessarily affected
have constructive notice, but as a settlement may not relate to his
land at all, or only to some other portions of
the mere fact of your
settlement does not give you constructive notice of
having heard of
its contents,
dtDcs not affect the
you are told at the same time
land.
take
under the modern practice, you are not bound to inquire, because the abstract furnished you
an abstract of every document affecting the land, and although you have been told that tlie man
made
marriage settlement, you are not entitled to assume that the
solicitor suppressed improperly the deed of settlement.
take
he might say, "it has nothing to do with you." But
you asked for
that line of cases has no bearing at all on
case where you know the
deed does affect the land, and the question as to the extent to which
does affect the land
to be ascertained only by looking at the deed
itself. Therefore you have no right to rely on the statement of somebody else that the deed which you can look at does not contain somedoes in fact contain.
thing which
have said so much on this point because there
no doubt an observation which was let fall by Lord Justice Turner in Wilson v. Hart,
Law Rep.
Ch. 463, and which does to some extent countenance the
but as regards the case of Carter v. Williams, Law
contrary doctrine
Eq. 678, before the Vice-Chancellor James, that, as
Rep.
read
confirms
entirely
not fair to criticize the words used
my view.
by the Vice-Chancellor, but when you look at the argument addressed
to him you see the objection there was that the covenant was contained
in
collateral deed, which was not recited.
In Coles v. Sims,
D.
M.
G.
cited in Carter v. Williams, the restrictive covenant was
recited in the conveyance. The Vice-Chancellor in Carter v. Williams,
Law Rep.
Eq. 678, says that the covenant
contained in
separate
deed, but what he means
this, that the deed
not noticed either by
way of recital or by being referred to in the deed of conveyance, so
that
person might get
complete chain of title without any notice
of that deed. That
what he means, and that being so, of course
the tenant had asked for his lessor's title, and got
he would not
The solicitor ought no doubt to
necessarily have got that information.
have put
in the abstract
he knew of
but he would not neces-
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sarily know of it. Then the Vice-Chancellor came to the conclusion
that there being no evidence of anything to bring home to the tenant
actual knowledge or notice of the restrictive covenant he could not
hold he had constructive notice of it. Therefore, it appears to me,
that case rather follows out the doctrine of Jones v. Smith, 1 Hare,
43, 1 Ph. 244, and by no means affects the other cases cited where the
document in question affecting the title is recited or otherwise noticed
in the title-deeds. In Carter v. Williams, any one could have accepted
the title without being aware of the document containing the covenant.
I am therefore of opinion that the constructive notice which the
lessee in this case obtained, would not have been done away with by
the most express statement obtained from the lessor that there was no
I must say that I am not satisfied in this case
restrictive covenant.
What appears to have octhat there was any such representation.
curred was this, the lessor did not of course shew his title, but he was
aware that the lessee intended to use this property in the way she atand there was
tempts to use
proviso which excepted such user
from the covenant in the lease, and consequently
person reading
that lease would have assumed, and fairly assumed, that she had
in the way mentioned in the exception from the coveright to use
nant. In that way there was
representation — an indirect representation — and there were in addition to that some further words in the
lease which tended in the same direction.
Therefore
think there was
sufficient to put the lessee off her guard,
were not
may say so,
that she had constructive notice, the effect of which no representation
could have destroyed.
wish to notice one other point
said that the new law as to
the extent of title to be required by purchasers alters the rule.
think
does not: what the Vendor and Purchaser Act does
this,
in order that
lessee may obtain his lessor's title,
makes an express
stipulation to that effect necessary, whereas formerly the rule was
the other way, that without express stipulation the lessee had
right
to the title.
the lessee had expressly stipulated not to
Formerly,
look into his lessor's title,
would not have affected the constructive
notice.
This
the meaning of the doctrine;
you may bargain to
shut your eyes, but
you do wilfully shut your eyes, whether as
bargain or not, you must be liable to the consequences of shutting your
If, therefore, the lessee had formerly expressly bargained to
eyes.
take a lease without looking into the lessor's title, the lessee would
have been bound by constructive notice, and now
the lessee says
nothing
exactly the same as
formerly he had bargained expressly not to look into the lessor's title. Therefore, as he may refuse to take a lease without looking into the title (in some cases, especially in case of building leases, lessees do look into the title, in
otlier cases they do not),
appears to me that the law
uxialtered.
Aig.Pbop. — 57
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and tfiat the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774, and that Hne of
cases applies.
Then the lessee being bound by the covenant, the only remaining
breach of it?
the covenant, and has there been
What
question
not well worded, and will not perhaps carry out the
The covenant
covenant that they "shall
full intention of the covenantee, but
The lessee
erect private dwelling-houses only" on the piece of land.
for
one to
be
rather
absurd
which
would
any
building something
see
that
and
am
to
glad
nobody
describe as
private dwelling-house,
described in the affidavit as
does so describe
corrugated iron
building, not in any way connected with the dwelling-house, or so sitprivate dwelling-house.
uated at present as possibly to be used for
has been built as an addition to the house which
The lessee says
no quesintended to be used as an art studio for ladies. There
tion that
has been erected for that purpose, and not for
private
has been argued that this building, being within
dwelling-house.
the same curtilage as the house, must be treated as appurtenant to
the dwelling-house, and forming part of
in the same way as
billiard-room or smoking-room might be. But this
of
thing
totally
different character.
It could not be suggested that having built
church or
private dwelling-house with
garden,
you then built
chapel at the other end of the garden, that church or chapel would
be treated as
portion of the private dwelling-house, merely because
happened to be within the same curtilage — would be
separate
erection and not
in my opinion
private dwelling-house.
clear
breach of the covenant, and so
shall Vestrain the further proceedall
think
ing with its construction, which
right to order now,
not taken away altogether before the trial of the action
though
to be taken away then. The lessee has,
may order
think,
right
to convert the building
she can into
fair and reasonable adjunct
to the private dwelling-house;
that
the reason
do not now grant
the mandatory injunction asked for.
shall not grant any injunction
against the defendant Harland. and his costs and the costs of ail otlier
parties will be costs in the action.

GALLEY

V.

WARD.

(Supreme Court of New Hampshii-e,

Bill in equity, to

ISSO.

CO

N.

II.

3.31.)

it

it
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set aside the levy of an execution.
Facts found
referee. May 13, 1871, Jane Smith, wife of Robert Smith, beby
tract of land called the "Little Lot,"
ing seized in her own right of
sold
to the plaintiff for $800, and intended and believed that she did
then convey
in fee simple "to him. But the deed, by mistake of the
scrivener, was executed by her husband, in which she merely released
dower and homestead. This was not recorded till November 12, 1875.
September 18, 1878, Jane and Robert executed and delivered to the
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for the purpose of ratifying and confirming
the latter's title, and of fulfilling all that they supposed they did do
The plaintiff entered into possession of the
by their former deed.
plaintiff

a deed
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lot upon receiving the first deed, and has remained in the open, visible,
exclusive, and notorious possession of it ever since, cultivating the
land, cutting the grass, pasturing his cattle therein, cutting off the
wood, rebuilding the walls and fences, and tearing down the buildings,
which were old and dilapidated, and from the best of the timber erecting a coopers' shop.
The defendant Ward, in 1876, without any consideration, assigned
to the defendant Morris a claim against Jane Smith; Morris, in April,
1876, brought suit on this claim, and obtained an execution, which
was levied on the "Little Lot." Before bringing the suit, Morris made
inquiries at the registry of deeds to ascertain if Jane Smith had conveyed this lot, and was informed that she had not. The deed of May
13, 1871, was indexed "Smith Robert
to Galley William."
Before
the attachment, Morris had no knowledge or suspicion that Jane had
sold the lot, and it did not appear when he first learned of it. Ward
and Morris both live in Boston, Mass.
Foster, J. At the time of Morris's attachment and levy, the plaintiff held the equitable title to the "Little lot" by virtue of the agreement made with Jane Smith in 1871, under which he had paid the
full consideration for the property, and had entered into its occupation.
He was entitled to a decree for a specific performance of this agreement, and to such a conveyance as he received September 18, 1878.
2 Story, Eq. § 761; Scoby v. Blanchard, 3 N. H. 170, 177; Hadduck
v. Wilmarth, 5 N. H. 181, 189, 20 Am. Dec. 570; Chartier v. Marshall, 51 N. H. 400; Newton v. Swazey, 8 N. H. 9; Cutting v. Pike,
21 N. H. 347; Kidder v. Barr, 35 N. H. 235, 254; Doe v. Doe, Z7 N.
.H. 268 ; Ewins v. Gordon, 49 N. H. 444.
It is not claimed that Morris had any actual knowledge of the plaintiff's title. He merely knew as a fact that the legal title appeared by
the record to be in Jane Smith.
And if the plaintift''s title is to prevail
in this suit, it must be on the ground of constructive notice. It is
substantially admitted in the brief for Morris, and is undoubtedly
the law in this state, that a purchaser of land, knowing that a third
—an ocperson is in the open, visible, and notorious occupation of
—
tenant,
cupation inconsistent with the idea that he
chargeable
with notice of such facts in reference to the latter's title, whether
legal or equitable, as he would have learned upon reasonable inquiry.
N. H. 262; Hadduck v. Wilmarth,
N. H.
Colby v. Kenniston,
181, 20 Am. Dec. 570; Warren v. Swett, 31 N. H. 332; Patten v.
Moore, 32 N. H. 383 Jones v. Smith,
Hare, 43 Tardy v. Morgan.
McLean, 358, Fed. Cas. No. 13,752; Landes v. Brant, 10 How. 348.
375, 13 L. Ed. 449; Ferrin v. Errol, 59 N. H. 234; Cooper v. Newman, 45 N. H. 339
Nute v. Nute, 41 N. H. 60; Braman v. Wilkinson,
Barb. (N. Y.) 151; Bank v. Flagg,
Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 316; Doo-
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little V. Cook, 75 111. 354; Losey v. Simpson, 11 N. J. Eq. 246; Big.
Fr. 288 ; 1 Story, Eq. § 399, note 4 ; Hill. Vend. 408 ; Jones, Mort.
And the nature of the plaintiff's possession in this case was
600.
sufficient to put a purchaser having knowledge of the facts on inquiry
as to the plaintiff's title.
But it is contended that Morris did not know of the plaintiff's possession of the land, and that therefore the doctrine of constructive
on tlie author-*
notice cannot be applied to him. If he had known
the
plaintiff by
no
title
against
ities above cited he could have gained
When
his attachment and levy. Is his ignorance sufficient excuse
chargeable with
subsequent purchaser
grantee records his deed,
wholly immaterial whether
constructive notice of its contents.
as
of its existence.
knowledge
has
any
he has seen the deed, or
had
he
law
that
of
conclusive presumption
sometimes expressed,
Malone, Real Prop. Trials, 427; Mornotice of the grantee's deed.
rison V. Kelly, 22 111. 610, 74 Am. Dec. 169. On the same ground
a
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such
possesat least
prima facie presumption, that when there
knew
of that
who
purchaser
would
charge
third party as
sion by
title,
ignorant
purchaser
possession with knowledge of an adverse
of that possession without excuse would be equally chargeable. And
this doctrine, in both cases, rests on the ground of fraud or culpable
purchaser's duty to examine the recpart of
negligence. As
the
to
himself
as
legal title he expects to acquire,
ord, to inform
failure to attend to that duty would amount to negligence on his part,
recorded deed,
fraud on previous purchaser under
and would be
title.
By the same
he could, by proving his ignorance, acquire
he
wilfully ignorant of such facts of notorious
mode of reasoning,
purchaser cognizant of those
stranger as would put
occupation by
facts on his guard against some unrecorded deed or equitable claim,
due to his own laches and failure to attend
his want of knowledge
Wall. 232, 18 L. Ed. 303,
to an apparent duty. In Hughes v. U. S.,
Field, J., says that
purchaser neglects to make inquiry as to the
he
not entitled to any greater consideration than
possession, "he
also,
case."
See,
facts
of
the
and ascertained the actual
had made
Edwards v. Thompson, 71 N. C. 177; McKinzie v. Perrill, 15 Ohio
Hare, 734; Gooding v. Riley, 50 N.
St. 162; Bailey v. Richardson,
Hommel v. Devinney,
H. 400, 403^05
Strong v. Shea, 83 111. 575
Patton v. Hollidaysburg, 40 Pa. 206; Perkins v.
39 Mich. 522;
there any distinction in this respect beSwank, 43 Miss. 349. Nor
A creditor
bound by constructive
creditor.
tween
purchaser and
recorded deed, as well as
purchaser, and
notice of the contents of
there seems to be no reason why they should not both stand on the
third party, in
same ground with reference to an equitable title in

Pick. (Mass.) 164, 11 Am.
like the present.
Priest v. Rice,
Mete. (Mass.) 619; Farnsworth v.
Dec. 156; Flynt v. Arnold,
Childs,
Mass. 637,
Am. Dec. 249
Scripture v. Soapstone Co., 50

N. H.
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possession of the land in question, but, so far as
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plaintiff was in
plaintiff or any-

body else was concerned, he was at liberty to examine the apparent
He was not deceived by any misreprecondition of the premises.
He relied on his own judgsentations or concealments of the plaintiff.
Like a purchaser having
ment, and neglected an apparent duty.
him
on
of
facts
to
his
sufficient
guard, he must be held
put
knowledge
chargeable with what he would have learned upon reasonable inquiry
as to the plaintiff's right of possession. And it appears from the case
that he would have learned of the plaintiff's equitable title. His title
therefore cannot prevail in this suit.
It is unnecessary, in the view we have taken of the case, to consider the further question, whether the want of consideration for the
assignment of the claim to Morris by Ward would prevent the former from acquiring a title against the plaintiff.
Decree according to
the prayer of the bill.^^
31 The owner of lands conveyed same to A., B., and C, the deed being duly
recorded. A. took possession, and shortly thereafter acquired deeds from B.
and C. conveying their interests to him. These deeds were not recorded. B.
and C. later made a deed of their undivided interests in the same premises to
D., who paid value therefor with no knowledge of the unrecorded deeds to A.
See Dutton v.
Should D. be charged with notice by reason of A.'s possession?
McReynoUls, 31 Minn. 66, 16 N. W. 468 (lS8:ii; Farmers' & Merchants' Nat.
Bank v. Wallace, 45 Ohio, St. 152, 12 N. E. 439 (1SS7).
Lands were conveyed to A., the deed being properly recorded. A. later conStill later, and
veyed them to her husband, and that deed was not recorded.
while A. and husband were living upon the premises, A. conveyed to B., who
paid value and had no knowledge of the conveyance from A. to her husband.
Should B. be charged with notice of the husband's interest?
See Westerfield
V. Kimmer, 82 Ind. 365 (1882) ; Atwood v. Bearss, 47 Mich. 72, 10 N. W. 112

(1881).

A., a married woman, having purchased certain lands, had a conveyance of
made to B. to hold on her behalf.
B. later conveyed the premises to A.,
but the deed was never recorded. After the death of B., his heirs executed
a deed of these premises to C, who paid value therefor without knowledge of
the rights of A. Since the time of the first conveyance mentioned to B., A.
Should C. be charged with
and her husband have resided upon the premises.
notice of A.'s rights?
See Kirby v. Tallmadge. 160 l'. S. 371). 16 Sup. Ct. 349,
See, also, Phelan v. Brady, 119 N. Y. .587, 23 N. E. 1109,
40 L. Ed. 463 (1S96).
8 L. R. A. 211 (1890) ; Boyer v. Chandler, 160 111. 394, 43 N. E. 803, 32 L. R. A.
same

113 (1896).
AVhat would have been the situation if, instead of A. and her husband being
in possession, a lessee of A. had been occupying the premises? See Hunt v.
Luch, [1902] 1 Ch. 428 ; Randall v. Lingwall, 43 Or. 383, 73 Pae. 1 (1903).
As to whether possession by a gi'antor in a recorded deed is notice of any
rights held by him, see Bloomer v. Henderson, 8 Mich. .395. 77 Am. Dec. 453
(1860) ; Van Keuren v. Central R. Co., 38 N. J. Law, 165 (1875) ; Randall v.
Lingwall, supra; Groff v. State Bank of Minneapoli.s, 50 Minn. 2.34, 52 N. W.
651, 36 Am. St. Rep. 640 (1892) ; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. McCullough,
59 111.
166 (1871).
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(Court of Appeals of New York, 1857.

15 N.

Y.

354.)

The defendant, Brown, was the owner of fifty acres of land in
Hannibal, Oswego county, which, on the 4th of April, 1851, he sold
and conveyed to one Jackson Earl, taking back from Earl a mortgage
for $800 of the purchase money, but omitting at that time to put his
mortgage upon record.
On the 29th of October, 1851, Earl conveyed the land to the plaintiff by deed, which was duly recorded on the same day; and on the
28th of January, 1852, the mortgage from Earl to thfe defendant was
In May following the defendant commenced proput upon record.
This
ceedings for the foreclosure of the mortgage by advertisement.
suit was commenced to restrain the defendant from proceeding with
this foreclosure, on the ground that the plaintiff was protected by
the recording act against the defendant's prior but unrecorded mortgage.

The

was tried before a referee, who reported that he found
as matter of fact "that the plaintiff did not at the time he purchased
the premises have actual notice of the existence of the mortgage
mentioned in the pleadings, given by Jackson Earl to the defendant,"
but also found that he had "sufficient information, or belief of the
existence of said mortgage to put him upon inquiry, before he purchased and received his conveyance of the premises in question ; and
that he pursued such inquiry to the extent of his information and
belief, as to the existence of the said mortgage, and did not find that
such mortgage existed, or had been given."
Upon these facts the referee held that the plaintiff was chargeable
with notice of the mortgage, and dismissed the complaint, and the
plaintiff excepted to the decision.
Judgment was entered for the
defendant upon the referee's report which, upon appeal to the general
term of the fifth district, was affirmed.
Selden, J. The referee's report is conclusive as to the facts. It
states, in substance, that the plaintiff had sufficient information to
put him upon inquiry as to the defendant's mortgage; but that after
making all the inquiry, which upon such information it became his duty
to make, he failed to discover that any such mortgage existed. This
being, as I think, what the referee intended to state, is to be assumed
as the true interpretation of his report.
as to the nature and effect
The question in the case, therefore
of that kind of notice so frequently mentioned as notice sufficient to
The counsel for the plaintiff contends that
put
party upon inquiry.
required in some cases of equitable
while such notice may be all that
in
not
sufficient
cases
cognizance,
arising under the registry acts,
recorded title with knowledge of
to charge the party claiming under
a

is

it

a

is

a

is,

cause

Ch. 8)

PRIORITIES

903

prior unregistered conveyance. He cites several authorities in support of this position.
In the case of Dey v. Dunham, 2 Johns. Ch. 182, Chancellor Kent
says, in regard to notice under the registry act: "If notice that is to
put a party upon inquiry be sufficient to break in upon the policy and
the express provisions of the act then indeed the conclusion would
be different; but I do not apprehend that the decisions go that
Again, in his commentaries, speaking on the same subject,
length."
he says : "Implied notice may be equally effectual with direct and positive notice; but then it must not be that notice which is barely sufficient to put a party upon inquiry."
So in Jackson v. Van Valkenburgh, 8 Cow. 260, Woodworth, J.,
says: "If these rules be apphed to the present case, the notice was
defective.
It may have answered to put a person on inquiry, in
a case where that species of notice is sufficient ; but we have seen that
to supply the place of registry, the law proceeds a step further."
A reference to some of the earlier decisions under the registry acts
of England, will tend, I think, to explain these remarks, which were
One of the earliest, if not
probably suggested by those decisions.
the first of the English recording acts was that of 7 Anne, ch. 20.
That act differed from our general registry act in one important reIt did not, in terms require that the party to be protected by
spect.
Its language was : "And that
the act should be a bona fide purchaser.
every such deed or conveyance, that shall at any time after, &c., be
made and executed, shall be adjudged fraudulent and void, against any
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, unless," &c.
The English judges found some difficulty at first in allowing any
equity, however strong, to control the explicit terms of the statute.
It was soon seen, however, that adhering to the strict letter of the act
would open the door to the grossest frauds.
Courts of equity, therefore, began, but with great caution, to give relief when the fraud was
palpable. Hine v. Dodd, 2 Atk. 275, was a case in which the complainant sought relief against a mortgage having a preference under
the registry act, on the ground that the mortgagee had notice.
Lord
Hardwicke dismissed the bill, but admitted that "apparent fraud, or
clear and undoubted notice would be a proper ground of relief."
Again he said: "There may possibly have been cases of relief upon
notice, divested of fraud, but then the proof must be extremely clear."
Jolland V. Stainbridge, 3 Ves. 478, is another case in which relief
was denied. The master of the rolls, however, there says : "I must
admit now that the registry is not conclusive evidence, but it is equally
clear that it must be satisfactorily proved, that the person who registers
the subsequent deed must have known exactly the situation of the
persons having the prior deed, and knowing that, registered in order to
defraud them of that title."
a
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Chancellor Kent refers to these cases in Dey v. Dunham, supra,
and his remarks in that case, as to the effect, under the registry acts,
of notice sufficient to put a party upon inquiry, were evidently made
under the influence of the language of Lord Hardwicke and the master of the rolls above quoted.
But the English courts have since seen, that if they recognized any
equity founded upon notice to the subsequent purchaser of the prior
unregistered conveyance, it became necessarily a mere question of
They now apply, therefore,
good faith on the part of such purchaser.
the same rules in regard to notice, to cases arising under the registry
acts, as to all other cases.
It will be sufficient to refer to one only among the modern English
cases on this subject, viz., Whitbread v. Boulnois, 1 You. & Coll. Ex.
R. 303. The plaintiff was a London brewer, and supplied Jordan, who
It was the common practice with brewers
was a publican, with beer.
in London to lend money to publicans whom they supplied with beer,
upon a deposit of their title deeds.
Jordan had deposited certain deeds
with the plaintiff, pursuant to this custom. He afterwards gave to one
Boulnois, a wine merchant a mortgage upon the property covered by
the deeds deposited, which was duly recorded.
Boulnois had notice
of Jordan's debt to the plaintiff, and of the existing custom between
brewers and publicans, but he made no inquiry of tlie brewers.
The
suit was brought to enforce the equitable mortgage arising from the
deposit. Baron Alderson held that the notice to Boulnois was sufficient to make it his duty to inquire as to the existence of the deposit ;
that his not doing so was evidence of bad faith; and the plaintiff's
right, under his equitable mortgage, was sustained.
No case could
show more strongly that notice which puts the party upon inquiry is
sufficient even under the registry act.
The cases in our own courts, since Dey v. Dunham and Jackson v.
Van Valkenburgh, supra, hold substantially the same doctrine. Tuttle
v. Jackson, 6 Wend. 213, 21 Am. Dec. 306; Jackson v. Post, 15 Wend.
588; Grimstone v. Carter, 3 Paige, 421, 24 Am. Dec. 230.
I can see no foundation in reason for a distinction between the evident requisite to establish a want of good faith, in a case arising under
the recording act, and in any other case ; and the authorities here referred to are sufficient to show that no such distinction is recognized,
at the present day, by the courts.
The question, however, remains,
whether this species of notice is absolutely conclusive upon the rights
of the parties. The plaintiff's counsel contends, that knowledge sufficient to put the purchaser upon inquiry is only presumptive evidence
of actual notice, and may be repelled by showing that the party did inquire with reasonable diligence, but failed to ascertain the existence of
the unregistered conveyance;
while, on the other hand, it is insisted
that notice which makes it the duty of the party to inquire, amounts to
constructive notice of the prior conveyance, the law presuming that
due inquiry will necessarily lead to its discovery.
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in support
of his position, and among others the cases of Tuttle v. Jackson and ,
In the first of these cases, Walworth,
Grimstone v. Carter, supra.
Chancellor, says : "If the subsequent purchaser knows of the unregistered conveyance, at the time of his purchase, he cannot protect himself against that conveyance ; and whatever is sufficient to make it his
duty to inquire as to the rights of others, is considered legal notice to
him of those rights;" and in Grimstone v. Carter, the same judge says:
"And if the person claiming the prior equity is in the actual possession
of the estate, and the purchaser has notice of that fact, it is sufficient
to put him on inquiry as to the actual rights of such possessor, and is
good constructive notice of those rights."
It must be conceded that the language used by the learned Chancellor in these cases, if strictly accurate, would go to sustain the doctrine contended for by the defendant's counsel. Notice is of two kinds :
actual and constructive.
Actual notice embraces all degrees and grades
of evidence, from the most direct and positive proof to the slightest,
circumstance from which a jury would be warranted in inferring notice.
It is a mere question of fact, and is open to every species of legitimate
evidence which may tend to strengthen or impair the conclusion.
Constructive notice, on the other hand, is a legal inference from established
facts ; and like other legal presumptions, does not admit of dispute.
"Constructive notice," says Judge Story, "is in its nature no more than
evidence of notice, the presumption of which is so violent that the court
will not even allow of its being controverted."
Story's Eq. Juris. § 399.
A recorded deed is an instance of constructive notice. It is of no
consequence whether the second purchaser has actual notice of the
prior deed or not. He is bound to take, and is presumed to have, the
requisite notice. So, too, notice to an agent is constructive notice to
the principal ; and it would not in the least avail the latter to show that
the agent had neglected to communicate the fact.
In such cases, the
law imputes notice to the party whether he has it or not. Legal or implied notice, therefore, is the same as constructive notice, and cannot
be controverted by proof.
But it will be found, on looking into the cases, that there is much
want of precision in the use of these terms. They have been not infrequently applied to degrees of evidence barely sufficient to warrant
a jury in inferring actual notice, and which the slightest opposing
proof would repel, instead of being confined to those legal presumptions of notice which no proof can overthrow.
The use of these terms
by the chancellor, therefore, in Tuttle v. Jackson and Grimstone v.
Carter, is by no means conclusive.
The phraseology uniformly used, as descriptive of the kind of notice
in question, "sufficient to put the party upon inquiry," would geem to
imply that if the party is faithful in making inquiries, but fails to discover the conveyance, he will be protected. The import of the termS:
that
becomes the duty of the party to inquire.
If, then, he per-
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forms that duty is he still to be bound, without any actual notice? The
presumption of notice which arises from proof of that degree of knowledge which will put a party upon inquiry is, I apprehend, not a presumption of law, but of fact, and may, therefore, be controverted by
evidence.
In Whitbread v. Boulnois, supra, Baron Alderson laid down the
rule as follows : "When a party having knowledge of such facts as
would lead any honest man, using ordinary caution, to make further
inquiries, does not make, but on the contrary studiously avoids making, such obvious inquiries, he must be taken to have notice of those
facts, which, if he had used such ordinary diligence, he would readily
This very plainly implies that proof that the party
have ascertained."
has used due diligence, but without effect, would repel the presumption. In this case, it is true, the decision was against the party having
the notice. But in Jones v. Smith, 1 Hare, 43, we have a case in which
a party, who had knowledge sufficient to put him on inquiry, was nevertheless held not bound by the notice.
The defendant had loaned money upon the security of the estate of
At the time of the loan he
David Jones, the father of the plaintiff.
wife,
informed,
David
and
that a settlement was
his
was
by
Jones
was
at
same
time assured that
the
made previous to the marriage, but
it only affected the property of the wife. He insisted upon seeing the
settlement, but was told that it was in the hands of a relative, and that
it could not be seen without giving offense to an aged aunt of the wife,
from whom they had expectations. David Jones, however, after some
further conversation, promised that he would try to procure it for exThis promise he failed to perform.
It
hibition to the defendant.
turned out that the settlement included the lands upon which the money
was loaned. Here was certainly knowledge enough to put the party
upon inquiry; for he was apprised of the existence of the very docuHe did
ment which was the foundation of the complainant's claim.
reasonable
effort
to
see
the
settleinquire, however, and made every
ment itself, but was baffled by the plausible pretences of David Smith.
He said : "The afThe vice-chancellor held the notice insufficient.
fairs of mankind cannot be carried on with ordinary security, if a doctrine like that of constructive notice is to be refined upon until it is extended to cases like the present."
Possession by a third person, under some previous title, has frequently but inaccurately been said to amount to constructive notice to a
Such a pospurchaser, of the nature and extent of such prior right.
session puts the purchaser upon inquiry, and makes it his duty to pursue his inquiries with diligence, but is not absolutely conclusive upon
him. In Hanbury v. Litchfield, 2 Myl. & Keene, 629, when the question arose, the Master of the Rolls said : "It is true that when a tenant
is in possession of the premises, a purchaser has implied notice of the
nature of his title; but if, at the time of his purchase, the tenant in
possession is not the original lessee, but merely holds under a deriva-
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tive lease, and has no knowledge of the covenants contained in the original lease, it has never been considered that it was want of due diligence in the purchaser, which is to fix him with implied notice, if he
does not pursue his inquiries through every derivative lessee until he
arrives at the person entitled to the original lease, which can alone convey to him information of the covenants."
This doctrine is confirmed by the language of Judge Story, in Flagg
He says: "I admit
V. Mann et al., 2 Sumn. 554, Fed. Cas. No. 4,847.
that the rule in equity seems to be, that where a tenant or other person
is in possession of the estate at the time of the purchase, the purchaser
is put upon inquiry as to the title; and if he does not inquire, he is
bound in the same manner as if he had inquired, and had positive notice of the title of the party in possession."
It is still further confirmed by the case of Rogers v. Jones, 8 N. H.
264.
The language of Parker,
in that case,
very emphatic. He
"To say that he (the purchaser) was put upon inquiry, and that
says
having made all due investigation, without obtaining any knowledge of
title, he was still chargeable with notice of
deed,
one did really
exist, would be absurd."
If these authorities are to be relied upon, and see no reason to
doubt their correctness, the true doctrine on this subject
that where
purchaser has knowledge of any fact, sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the existence of some right or title in conflict with that he
about to purchase, he
presumed either to have made the inquiry, and
ascertained the extent of such prior right, or to have been guilty of
degree of negligence equally fatal to his claim, to be considered as
bona fide purchaser. This presumption, however,
mere inference
of fact, and may be repelled by proof that the purchaser failed to discover the prior right, notwithstanding the exercise of proper diligence
on his part.
The judgment should be reversed, and there should be
new trial,
with costs, to abide the event.
Paige,
The question to be decided is, whether under the findto' be deemed to have had at the time
ing of the referee, the plaintiff
of his purchase, legal notice of the prior unrecorded mortgage of the
defendant. The referee finds that the plaintiff had sufficient information or belief of the existence of such mortgage to put him upon inquiry, but that upon pursuing such inquiry to the extent of such information and belief, he did not find that such mortgage existed or
had been given. It seems to me that the two findings are inconsistent
If the plaintiff on pursuing an inquiry to the full
with each other.
extent of his information and belief as to the existence of the defendant's mortgage, was unable to find that
either then existed or had
been given, the highest evidence
furnished that the information received or belief entertained by the plaintiff' was not sufficient to put
him on inquiry as to the. existence of such mortgage. The last part of
this finding effectually disproves the fact previously found of the suffi-
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The two facts are utciency of notice to put the plaintiff on inquiry.
terly inconsistent with each other, and cannot possibly coexist.
The remarks of Parker, Justice, in Rogers v. Jones, 8 N. H. 264,
269, are directly apposite to the facts found by the referee.
Judge
Parker says: "To say that he (demandant), was put upon inquiry,
and that having made all due investigation without obtaining any
knowledge of title, he was still chargeable with notice of a deed, if one
did really exist, would be absurd.''
The sound sense of these observations is clearly shown by the principle of the rule that information
sufficient to put a party upon inquiry is equivalent to evidence of actual notice, or to direct and positive notice. That principle
that such
information will,
followed by an inquiry prosecuted with due diliknowledge of the fact with notice of which the party
gence, lead to
sought to be charged. Hence, in all cases where the question of imprior unrecorded mortgage or conveyance arises as
plied notice of
question of fact to be determined, the court must decide whether the
information possessed by the party would,
had been followed up
examination,
have led to
discovery of such mortgage or
by proper
that such an examination would
conveyance. If the determination
have resulted in
discovery of the mortgage or conveyance, the conclusion of law necessarily results that the information possessed by the
But
the departy amounted to implied notice of such instrument.
of the
stated,
of
the
one
the
information
the
converse
termination
party cannot be held to be an implied notice of the deed or mortgage.
These propositions will be found to be fully sustained by authority.
Keene, 699;
Sugden on Vendors, 552
Myl.
Kennedy v. Green,
Kent's
Com. 172; Howard Ins.
1851,
1052);
of
marg.
page
Ed.
(Am.
Seld.
Super. Ct.) 577, 5'78; same case,
Sandf.
Co. V. Halsey,
v.
398-400a
10
Burgott,
274, 275
Story's Eq. Jur.
Jackson
Johns.
Am. Dec.
Am. Dec. 349; Dunham v. Dey, 15 Johns. 568, 569,
461,
Am. Dec. 328; Jolland
282, in error; Jackson v. Given,
Johns. 137,
Where
Ves. 478; Pendleton v. Fay,
Paige, 205.
V. Stainbridge,
prior
sufficient to lead
party to
knowledge of
the information
unrecorded conveyance, a neglect fo make the necessary inquiry to acquire such knowledge, will not excuse him, but he will be chargeable
party in poswith
knowledge of its existence the rule being that
knowledge of
session of certain information will be chargeable with
all facts which an inquiry, suggested by such information, prosecuted
Super.
with due diUgence, would have disclosed to him.
Sandf.
In
fact
found
Keene,
699.
this
case
the
578;
by
being
Myl.
Ct.)
the
extent
after
an
to
referee,
that
the
the
plaintiff
inquiry
pursuing
of his information, failed to discover the existence of the defendant's
seems to me that neither law nor justice will justify us in
mortgage,
holding the plaintiff chargeable with implied notice of such mortgage.
The doctrine of notice and its operation in favor of prior unrecorded
deed or mortgage rests upon
question of fraud, and on the evidence
it.
Kent's
to
infer
Com. 172. Actual notice affects the
necessary
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conscience, and convicts the junior purchaser of a fraudulent intent
prior conveyance. His knowledge of facts and circumstances at the time of the second purchase sufficient to enable him on
due inquiry to discover the existence of the prior conveyance, is evi15 Johns. 569;
dence from which a fraudulent intent may be inferred.
6
Am.
Dec. 349.
462,
2 Johns. Ch. 190; Jackson v. Burgott, 10 Johns.
Now if it is ascertained and found as a fact, that the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the second purchaser, at the time
of his purchase, were insufficient to lead him, on a diligent examination,
to a discovery of the prior conveyance, how upon this finding can a
fraudulent intent be inferred, and if not, how can he be charged with
notice, which implies a fraudulent intent?
It is not in the nature of
a
same
facts
and circumstances, shall
things, that
knowledge of the
at one and the same time, be held evidence of both innocence and guilt.
I think the rule well established that an inference of a fraudulent intent on the part of a junior purchaser or mortgagee, must in the ab■
sence of actual notice, be founded on clear and strong circumstances,
Mcand that such inference must be necessary and unquestionable.
Mechan v-. Griffing, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 149, 154, 155, 15 Am. Dec. 198;
Hine v. Dodd, 2 Atk. 275 ; Jackson v. Given, 8 Johns. 137, 5 Am. Dec.
328; Norcross v. Widgery, 2 Mass. 509; 2 Johns. Ch. 189; 15 Johns.
,569 ; 8 Cow. 264, 266.
For the above reasons, both the judgment rendered on the repori. of
the referee, and the judgment of the general term affirming the same,
should be reversed, and a new trial should be granted. ,
to defeat the

NORDMAN

V.

RAU.

(Supreme Court of Kansas, 1911. 86 Kuii. 19, 119 Pac. 351, 38 L. R. A. [N. S.]
400, Ann. Cas. 191oB, 1068.)

Mason, J. Johanne Nordman brought an action to enforce her
rights as to a tract of land under a mortgage given by Jacob Rau.
S. A. Webb, a defendant, claimed to be the absolute owner of the
land as an innocent purchaser without notice of the mortgage. Findings of fact were made to the effect that the mortgage was executed
and in fact recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the
county where the land was situated, but was never acknowledged;
that while matters were in this situation a personal judgment was
rendered against Rau, an execution was issued and levied on the
land as his property, and it was sold to Webb at a sheriff's sale, which
was duly confirmed, and under which a deed was subsequently made
to him ; that the resident attorney who acted for Webb in bidding in
the land at the sheriff's sale, knew of the existence and contents of
the record of the unacknowledged mortgage.
The trial court gave
judgment for the owner of the mortgage, holding it to be valid as to
Webb because his agent knew of the actual state of the record. Webb
appeals.

DERIVATIVE

910

TITLES

(Part

2

a

it

is,
it

The appellant argues that inasmuch as the attorney who bid in the
land for Webb represented him only in that particular transaction
and had no other connection with him, the knowledge of the agent
was not equivalent to the knowledge of the principal. It fairly appears,
however, that the attorney gained his knowledge of the state of the
record after having been employed to attend the sale, and before bidding in the property, and that in this aspect of the matter the case
falls within the rule that "a principal is * * * affected with
knowledge of all material facts of which the agent receives notice or
acquires knowledge while acting in the course of his employment."
31
Cyc. 1587. A purchaser at a sheriff's sale is entitled to the protection
of the recording act. Lee v. Bermingham, 30 Kan. 312, 1 Pac. 73;
note, 21 L. R. A. 35.
It is therefore necessary to decide whether an unacknowledged
mortgage, which has been copied into the record book of the register
of deeds, is void against one who buys the property knowing the contents of the record, but is otherwise an innocent purchaser for value.
An instrument affecting real estate is entitled to record only when
it has been acknowledged or proved as provided by the statute. And
where such an instrument is recorded without having been so acknowlWickedged or proved, the record does not impart notice to anyone.
ersham v. Chicago Zinc Co., 18 Kan. 481, 26 Am. Rep. 784; Wiscomb v. Cubberly, 51 Kan. 580, 589, 33 Pac. 320. The statute relating to the effect of a failure to record instruments affecting real estate reads: "No such instrument in writing shall be valid, except between the parties thereto, and such as have actual notice thereof, until
the same shall be deposited with the register of deeds for record."
Gen. St. 1868, c. 22, § 21, Gen. St. 1909. § 1672.
The precise question involved is whether one who has seen and read
in the records in the office of the register of deeds what is in fact
a copy of an existing unacknowledged instrument is to be regarded as
having "actual notice" of the instrument itself, within the meaning of
the statute. In Massachusetts and in Indiana "actual notice" is interpreted as equivalent to actual knowledge.
Webb, Record of Tide, §
222, p. 356, note 3.
But the general rule is that evidence of facts
and circumstances sufficient to put upon inquiry amount to actual
notice. Webb, Record of, Title, § 222, p. 356, note 4. "Actual notice
does not mean that which in metaphysical strictness is actual in its
nature, because it is seldom that ultimate facts can be communicated in
a manner so direct and unequivocal as to exclude doubts as to their
existence or authenticity.
Actual notice means, among other things,
knowledge of facts and circumstances so pertinent in character as to
enable reasonably cautious and prudent persons to investigate and
ascertain as to the ultimate facts."
Pope v. Nichols, 61 Kan. 230,
236, 59 Pac. 257, 259.
"Actual notice may be either express or implied ; that
may consist of knowledge actually brought personally
home, or
may consist of knowledge of facts so informing that
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reasonably cautious person would be Jed by them to the ultimate fact.
* * * Actual notice is implied
only when the known facts are
to investigate further, and when
to
the
specific
impose
duty
sufficiently
Faris v. Finultimate fact."
to
the
such facts furnish a natural clue
nup, 84 Kan. 122, 124, 113 Pac. 407, 408.
This court is of the opinion (not shared by the writer) that one who
has seen the record of an unacknowledged instrument is not deemed
because of that fact to have actual notice of the instrument itself,
upon these grounds : To charge him with such notice is to require
him to assume, without proof and without competent evidence, that
a valid conveyance is in existence corresponding to the unauthorized
copy. If he is required to give any attention to the matter at all he
may with ecjual or greater reason suppose tlie parties to have abandoned whatever intention they may have had to execute such a conveyance, from the fact that they failed to have a certificate of acknowledgment attached. To charge him with actual notice of the existence
of a conveyance because he has seen a copy of it which, without legal
authority, has been written in a book of public records, is essentially
to give such copy the force of a valid record. To hold that the record
of an unacknowledged conveyance, if known to a prospective buyer,
amounts to actual notice of the instrument, is to compel him to give
it force as evidence which the court itself would refuse it. The view
is thus elaborated in Kerns v. Swope (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1833) 2 Watts, 75 :
"1 he registration being without the authority of the law, was the
unofficial act of the officer, which could give the copy no greater validity than the original deprived of legal evidence of execution ; nor
even so much, for an original deed exhibited to a purchaser would
affect him though it were unaccompanied with the evidence of its execution. But here the registry was no better than a copy made by a
private person in a memorandum book ; from which a purchaser would
be unable to determine whether there were, in fact, an indorsement
on the deed, or whether it had been truly copied — especially when neither the copy, nor an exemplification of
would be legal evidence of
the fact
court of justice. Unquestionably
purchaser would not
be afi'ected by having seen the copy of
conveyance among tlie papers
of another, or an abstract of
in
private book. The whole effect
of
registry, whether as evidence of the original or as raising
legal
presumption that the copy thus made equivalent to the original had
been actually inspected by the party to be affected,
derived from the
positive provisions of the law; and when unsustained by these,
registry can have no operation whatever.
Stripped of artificial eflfect,
but the written declaration of the person who was the officer at
the time, that he had seen
paper in the words of the copy which
purported to be an original.
But to say nothing in this place of the
incompetency of such
declaration as evidence of the fact, on what
principle would
purchaser be bound to attend to the hearsay information of one who
not qualified to give it?"
Watts (Pa.) 78.
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The same view was indicated in Banister v. Fallis, 85 Kan. 320, 116
Pac. 822, where it was said of the record of an unacknowledged instrument: "The instrument itself, if there were one, had no validity
except between tlie parties and those having actual notice, not of what
was on record, but of the instrument itself." 85 Kan. 322, 116 Pac.
823.

The judgment

cause remanded with directions
upon the findings quieting the title of Webb.
Mason, J. (dissenting). My own view of the question presented is
this : Wliere a prospective buyer of land sees upon the record what
purports to be the copy of an instrument bearing no certificate of acknowledgment (or a defective one, for the rule would necessarily be
the same), the inference which he would naturally and almost necessarily draw would be that tlie record was made at the instance of the
grantee, and that the grantee claimed to have an interest in the land
under an instrument in the language of the copy. The record would
not be competent legal evidence that such an instrument had been
executed, but it would suggest that probability so strongly that a prudent person having knowledge of it would be put upon inquiry. It
would give him a definite and tangible clue, which, if diligently followed up, would ordinarily bring the truth of the matter to light.
In
the present case, if an inquiry had been prosecuted with reasonable
diligence, the existence of the mortgage would necessarily have been
developed.
In Banister v. Fallis; 85 Kan. 320, 116 Pac. 822, the purchaser of
land objected to the title because the record contained what purported
to be a copy of a contract affecting it. The objection was held untenable because, the contract not having been acknowledged, the record was not evidence of its execution, and no other evidence on the
subject was ofi^ered; and because the contract could not constitute a
cloud in any event, inasmuch as it purported to be made by a stranger
to tlie title. An additional reason was stated in the language quoted
in the foregoing opinion: "The instrument itself, if there were one,
had no validity except between the parties and those having actual notice, not of what was on record, but of the instrument itself." 85 Kan.
322, 116 Pac. 823.
I do not regard that decision as a definite determination of the question here involved.
I think the only case involving the exact question and supporting
the decision here made is Kerns v. Swope (Fa. Sup. Ct. 1833J 2 Watts,
75, cited in the opinion.
That case is disapproved in the American
notes to White &.Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity, vol. 2, p. 152.
In 24 A. & E. Encycl. of L. 142, -143, it is said: "If an instrument be
not * * * entitled to record because of its defective execution or
a failure to comply with some of the prerequisites to recordation, the
record thereof will be a mere nullity and will not operate to give constructive notice. * * * But, * * * of course, such a record
may be instrumental in giving actual notice of the rights claimed unis reversed and the

to render judgment
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der the instrument where the knowledge of its existence is brought
home to the party claiming against such instrument."
Of the four cases cited in support of this text, these three are directly in point : Rooker v. Hoof stetter, 26 Can. Supr. Ct. 41 ; Woods
V. Garnett, 72 Miss. 78, 16 South. 390; and Musgrove v. Bonser, 5
Or. 313, 20 Am. Rep. 117. To these may be added Walter v. Hartwig
et al., 106 Ind. 123, 6 N. E. 5, and Hastings v. Cutler, 24 N. H. 481,
which are directly in point, and Gilbert and others v.' Jess, impleaded,
31 Wis. 110, and Musick v. Barney, 49 Mo. 458, which are substantially so. The New Hampshire case is the leading one on the subThe grounds of the decision are shown by this extract from
ject.
the opinion, which is typical of the reasoning in the other cases :
"As the deed in this case was not executed according to the statute,
the registration as such is inoperative ; that is to say, the registration
But if by means of that
is not constructive notice of the conveyance.
the
defendants
had actual notice of
deed
of
the
defective
registration
as in other cases.
notice
with
the
the plaintiff's title, they are charged
The defendants, when they found the copy of the plaintiff's deed on
record, must have understood that the intended record was to give
information that such a deed had been made, and that the plaintiff
claimed the land under it. This must be regarded as actual notice, such
as every reasonable and honest man would feel bound to act upon."
Hastings v. Cutler, 24 N. H. 481, 483.
K writer in the Central Law Journal, in discussing the source from
which "actual notice" should come, says: "It is not essential in every
case that the notice should come from a party in interest, but that it
should come from some one who is capable not only of informing the
party of the adverse claim, but who can give such definite information as to details as will lead to the acquisition of full knowledge of
the facts. If this is a correct deduction, then the copy of a deed, even
though it were defectively acknowledged, would amount to actual notice of a higher degree than mere oral information of the existence of
such deed, even though the copy was made by a third party, and the
oral information came from a prior grantee. Hence the registry of
a defectively acknowledged deed would amount to notice of the conveyance, provided it were either admitted or proved, that the subsequent
purchaser saw and examined the record where the deed was transcribed."
4 Central Law Jour. p. 293.
The author of Wade on Notice, in an article published in the American Law Review in 1885, said: "Registration of a deed, void for informalities, as constructive notice, coming to the knowledge of tlie
subsequent purchaser, puts him in the direct line of inquiry, and is
actual notice of every fact to which that inquiry would lead."
19
Am. Law Rev. p. 88.
PoRTKR, J. (dissenting).
I concur in the foregoing dissent, and believe that the decision, especially when applied to recorded instruments
Aig.Prop. — 58
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which have defective acknowledgments, may work great injustice
innocent persons, and will produce results which the legislature
adopting the recording act never intended."

(Supreme

(C) Effectiveness

of Record

SIGOURNEY

LARNED..

Judicial Court of

V.

Massachusetts,

1830.

10

Pick.

2

to

in

72.)

This was a bill in equity to redeem. Isaac Amidon, under whom both
parties claimed, made a deed of mortgage to the defendant, dated the
7th

of April,

1827.

It appeared

by the deposition of the register of deeds, that on the 8th
of April, which was Sunday, Amidon came to his dwelling-house and
entered the door while the clock was striking twelve at midnight, and
that Amidon handed the deed to the register, who was a justice of the
peace, requesting him to take the acknowledgment of the deed and to

record

it.

The register received the deed, but he did not recollect whether the
certificate of the acknowledgment was affixed at tjiat time, or after day.
light on the same morning.
The register made a memorandum on the deed, that it was received
and recorded on the 9th of April at one minute after twelve o'clock

a. m.
32 As to what is sufficient "notice" to affect the subsequent purchaser
in
Massachusetts, see I'oinroy v. Stevens, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 244 (lS4n).
But cf.
George v. Kent, 7 Allen (Mass.) 16 (1S63). In Maine, see Spofford v. Weston, 21)
]\Ie. 140 (1S48I; Knapp v. Bailey, 79 Me. 1!)5, 9 All. 122. 1 Am. St. liep. 295
In Ohio, under the mortgage registry statute, the clearest sort of no(1887).
tice d(K's not affect. Mayham v. Coombs, 14 Ohio, 429 (184(j).
And in North
Carolina the same is true as to all conveyances. Wood v. Lewey, 153 N. C.

401, C9 S.

E,

268 (1910).

A. takes possession of land belonging to B. and holds same adversely for the
period of the statute of limitations. B. then sells and conveys the laiid to X.,
who pays value therefor without any knowledge of A.'s righti*. What effect, if
any, does such sale and conveyance have upou A.'s rights V
Lis Tendens.— A purchaser of land from a party involved in litigation regarding the title to that land takes subject to the results of such litigation.
"It
is scarcely correct to speak of lis pendens as alfecting a purchaser through the
doctrine of notice, though undoubtedly the language of the courts often so describes its operation.
It affects him, not beVause it amounts to notice, but because the law does not allow litigant parties to give to others, i>ending the
litigation, lights to the property in dispute, so as to prejudice the opposite party." Bellamy v. Sabiue, 1 De G. & J. 566, 578 (1857). The prlncii)le is as applicable to actions at law as to suits in equity, though the occasions for its
opeiation seldom arise in the case of actions at law.
By statute in many states a notice of the r)ending litigation must be recorded.
Without such recording pursuant to the statute, a bona tide purchaser
for value without other notice of the litigation may acquire rights even from a
party to the suit, which will prevail over the rights of other p.irties, though
successful in the litigation, See, generally, on the subject, 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Juris. § 632 et seq.
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The land was subject to two previous mortgages, which were afterwards assigned to the defendant.
The plaintiff derived his title from an attachment made "instantly
after twelve o'clock" on the morning of the 9th of April, without notice of the mortgage to the defendant.
The plaintiff tendered the sum due on the two mortgages of which
the defendant was the assignee, and the question was, whether the
attachment was to be preferred before the third mortgage.
Per Curiam. Whether a delivery of a deed to the register at his
dwelling-house is equivalent to a delivery at his office, need, not be
determined, as the Court are of opinion, that independently of that
question, the deed to the defendant was received and recorded under
such circumstances as will not allow it to have the preference over
the attachment.
It was not in a state to be considered as recorded,
It should not only be acknowluntil after the attachment was made.
edged, but the certificate of acknowledgment should be completed, before the delivery to the register, in order that such delivery shall conThe certificate of a'cknowledgment is to be a part
stitute a record.
of the record. It is not sufficient that the register is informed of the
acknowledgment ; the object of recording is to give notice to others.
Until this certificate was affixed, the fact that the deed was acknowlBy the statute,
edged and in the register's hands, could not be notice.

;

a

it

;

it

is,

(St. 1783, c. Z7 , § 4,) a deed, to have effect against any but the grantor
and his heirs, and to entitle it to be recorded, must be acknowledged
Here Mr. Ward acted
by such grantor before a justice of the peace.
in the double capacity of justice of the peace, and register of deeds.
He could not consider the deed as in his official custody in the latter
capacity, until he had done his office in taking the acknowledgment of
the grantor in the former, which must necessarily take some time.
The exact time when the certificate was made, does not distinctly apwas not done till the next morning.
tliat
pear ; but the probability
But we do not decide the case upon that ground
had the magistrate
must
proceeded instantly to write the certificate of acknowledgment,
have taken some time, during which the attachment took effect.
Where, in
controverted question of property, the parties stand upon
and in
equal grounds, in point of equity, the legal title shall prevail
such cases slight circumstances are sufficient to determine that priority, upon which the preferable legal title depends. Here we think the
attachment was prior in time, and the maxim prior in tempore, potior
in jure, must decide in favour of the attaching creditor.
Redemption
decreed.
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county, August 24, 1863, to foreexecuted by the defendants,
have
been
close a mortgage alleged to
Andrew Dunn and wife, to the La Crosse & Milwaukee Railroad Company upon the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of section
six, township twelve north, of range nine east, in Columbia county,
to secure one of the bonds of said company for $5,000 payable Jan.
1, 1864; said mortgage bearing date April 11, 1854, and alleged to have
been recorded on that day in the office of the register of deeds for
Columbia county. The plaintiff claimed to hold the bond and mortThe assignment
gage as a bona fide purchaser for value before due.
The action was originally brought against
to him was not of record.
the Dunns, the La Crosse & Milwaukee Railroad Company and Hans
Numerous other defendants were afterwards
Crocker, its receiver.
brought in by amendment, and among them the Milwaukee & St. Paul
Railway Company, Thomas Maloy, Stanislaus Bartosz, and Felix McLindon. The complaint, as amended, contained as against all the defendants, except the Dunns, the allegation, that they had, or claimed,
some interest in, or title to the mortgaged premises which, if any, was
subsequent and subject to the mortgage of the plaintiff.
The Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway answered and, among other
things, denied specially that the plaintiff's mortgage was, at or before
the time of recording witnessed so as to entitle it to record, and alleged
that the record of the same has and shows no subscribing witnesses'
names thereon, and that the said company had since in good faith purchased a portion of the premises covered by said mortgage without
It appeared that
any actual knowledge of the plaintiff's mortgage.
the quarter quarter section embraced in the mortgage had subsequently
been platted as an addition to the city of Portage, and the various lots
thereof conveyed to divers parties, who were made defendants.
The
mortgagor Dunn died before suit brought.
Venue was changed to Milwaukee county. The testimony as to the
witnessing and recording of the plaintiff's mortgage, on which action
was brought, was voluminous and conflicting, but substantially as follows ; The plaintiff offered in evidence the mortgage which purported
to have been signed by Andrew Dunn and Sarah J. Dunn as mortgagors and by H. C. Baker and A. J, McFarlane, as subscribing witnesses, and acknowledged before Harvey C. Baker, as notary public.
The defendant offered in evidence a certified copy of the record of
said mortgage, certified by the register of deeds of Columbia county,
which shows the mortgage the same as the original, except that there
are no witnesses' names in the record. The original record was also
offered showing the same discrepancy.
The deposition of Wm. Owen
was read, who testified that he was the register of deeds of Columbia
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county, at the time the mortgage was recorded ; that he signed the certificate indorsed thereon; that after the recording he compared the
mortgage with the record, assisted by one P. M. Johnson, he holding
the mortgage and comparing, while Johnson read the record ; that the
record was written by Johnson, who was at the time in the employ
of the La Crosse & Milwaukee Company; that the company were
desirous of having their farm mortgages speedily recorded, and made
an arrangement with the register whereby the copying of the deeds
into the records was done by Johnson, and the register thereafter compared with him and certified to the record. The witness was confident
he had compared this mortgage by the mark "ex," made at the foot
of the page, which was, as he was positive, in his own handwriting;
that at the time of the comparing there were no names of subscribing witnesses on the deed ; that, as he thought, the fact was mentioned at the time, and that Johnson said he would go and have witnesses' names subscribed to the mortgage.
Hugh McFarlane testified that he was father of A. J. McFarlane, whose name was upon the
mortgage as witness ; that A. J. McFarlane was dead ; tliat he knew
his handwriting and was positive the signature upon the mortgage
was not his son's handwriting; that the son was 14 or 15 years old
at the date of the mortgage.
Four other witnesses testified to knowledge of A. J. McFarlane's handwriting, and that they thought the
signature upon the mortgage was not his.
The plaintiff, as rebutting evidence, produced P. M. Johnson, who
testified that he recorded the mortgage ; that he could not recollect
whether the witnesses' names were upon the original mortgage at the
time of recording; that it was his special business at the time to see
that the mortgages were properly executed, and, if they had been
wanting, he thought it hardly possible that the fact would have escaped
his notice; that the record was made hastily, and the ottiission of the
names in the record was probably an oversight on his part ; that this
was more likely than that he should have suffered the deed to pass
through his hands incompletely executed. The plaintiff also offered
in evidence the original general index from the office of the register
of deeds of Columbia county and read therefrom the entry of the
reception and record of said mortgage in form and manner as prescribed by section 123, c. 10, R. S. 1849.' The plaintiff also introduced
as a witness Harvey C. Baker, who testified that both the grantors in
the mortgage signed and acknowledged the same before him as notary
and that he subscribed the same as a witness at the time; that A. J.
McFarlane went with him to the house of Andrew Dunn to obtain
the signature and acknowledgment of Mrs. Dunn ; could not positively
remember as to McFarlane's signing; but his best recollection was,
that he was present and witnessed the signing of the mortgage; did
not know young McFarlane's handwriting.
Witness's recollection in
to
the circumstances was quite indistinct.
regard
He was contradicted, as to conversations held with A. B. Alden, who was introduced by
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defendants and testified that Baker had admitted to him that one of
the mortgages given by Dunn had been returned to him by Johnson
to have witnesses procured.
Some evidence was introduced tending
Mrs. Sarah J. Dunn
to impeach his reputation for truth and veracity.
testified that she had no recollection of signing and acknowledging the
mortgage, or of Baker and McFarlane coming to the house, as Baker
had testified.
Thomas Maloy, one of the defendants, admitted in his deposition
that he had heard at the time he purchased his lots, that there was a
defective railroad mortgage said to be upon the lots, but which was
reputed to be good for nothing; that JMary Maloy, his wife, also
owned a lot purchased after the mortgage ; that he was present at the
purchase and did the business for her ; that he had previously heard
that there was such defective mortgage. There was no evidence that
she had heard of, or had any notice of its existence.
Felix McLindon, one of the defendants, admitted in his deposition
that he "knew by report that there was a railroad mortgage on the
place at the time he bought two of the lots covered by the mortgage
in suit."
.Stanislaus Bartosz, a defendant, who owned and lived on several of
the lots, testified that he had no actual knowledge of the mortgage; but
it appeared in evidence that his grantor, Simon Bartosz, had purchased
from H. W. Tenney, one of the parties who had platted the forty acres
embraced in the mortgage in suit, and that Tenney 's deed to Simon
Bartosz contained the clause : "said premises are free and clear from
all incumbrances, except a mortgage to the La Crosse Railroad Company, which I am to save said Bartosz harmless from."
The court below found that the mortgage was not subscribed by
Baker and McFarlane as witnesses at the time of the execution thereof, and not until after the recording thereof, but was so subscribed
afterwards, but was not again recorded; that the plaintiff purchased
the bond and mortgage in regular course of business, and was the
owner and holder thereof ; that none oT the defendants had actual notice of the mortgage, and that the record thereof, before the same was
witnessed, was not constructive notice of the mortgage ; and that the
defendants are entitled to judgment that the complaint be dismissed.
To these findings tlie plaintiff excepted, and appealed from tlie judgment.
Cole, J. Before approaching the legal questions involved in this
Does
case, it is necessary to determine a question of fact. And that
the evidence show that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed was
properly attested when first left at the office of the register, so as to
entitle
to record
There
considerable testimony in the case which
tends strongly to prove that the mortgage had no witnesses when
was recorded.
And the court found as a fact that the mortgage was
not subscribed by the witnesses. Baker and McFarlane, at the time of
its execution and before
was transcribed upon tke records and en-
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tered in the general index, but was subscribed by these witnesses after
it was recorded, and that it was not again recorded. This finding affirms one important fact which is much contested by the defendants,
which is, the genuineness of the signature of the witness A. J. McFarAn attempt was made to prove, and it is arlane to the instrument.
shows,
that McFarlane never signed the mortgued that the evidence
On
gage as a witness, and that his signature thereto is a forgery.
from
this point we will only make the remark, that we are satisfied
the evidence, and especially by an inspection of the writings themselves, of the authenticity of the signature. Whether the mortgage was
subscribed by the witnesses at the time of its execution, and before it
was left at the ofifice for registry, is a question of more doubt, upon
The testimony is quite strong and positive, that the mortthe evidence.
But this tesgage had no subscribing witnesses when it was recorded.
timony is contradicted ; and, considering the circumstances attending
the execution and delivery of the mortgage, we think the probabilities
favor the inference that the instrument was witnessed when it was
left for record. According to this view, there was a mistake in transcribing the mortgage upon the record, by omitting the names of the
witnesses. The weight of the evidence to our minds supports this inIt is to be observed that tlie mortgage is perference or conclusion.
fect and fair on its face, showing two witnesses. A strong presumption fairly arises from the instrument itself, that it was witnessed at
This presumption is not overcome nor rethe time of its execution.
pelled by the testimony offered to show that it was not witnessed at
that time.
In respect to the degree or quantity of evidence necessary to justify
a finding that the subscribing witnesses signed" the instrument after it
was executed and recorded, the case would seem to come within the
rule laid down in Kercheval v. Doty, 31 Wis. 478, where it is said:
"The proposition being to set aside or invalidate a written contract
by evidence of a far less certain and reliable character than the writing itself, the greatest clearness and certainty of proof should be required. It is like the cases where the object is to correct or reform a
deed or other instrument on the ground of mistake, or to set aside or
rescind it on the same ground ; where the rule is, that the fact must
be established by clear and satisfactory evidence."
The testimony offered to show that the mortgage was not witnessed when executed,
and before it was recorded, falls short of this rule. The fact is not
established by clear and conclusive proof that it was not witnessed
when executed. It would serve no useful purpose to go into a detailed
discussion of the evidence upon this point, and we shall not do so. It
-is sufficient to say that, giving to the testimony offered to show that
the mortgage was not witnessed before it was received for record, all
the weight to which it is entitled, it fails to establish that fact in a clear,
satisfactory manner.
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then, that the mortgage was witnessed when it was left
be recorded, the further important inquiry arises as to what effect must be given to the record as constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers for value. This record
was in this state. The entry of the mortgage was made in the general
index book, but the full record of the instrument had no subscribing
witnesses. And therefore the question is, Would such a record operate
as constructive notice to subsequent purchasers^ for value, independent
of any actual notice ? It is claimed by the counsel for the plaintiff that
the record does and should so operate, notwithstanding
the mistake
in the registration or recording of the instrument in extenso.
This
presents a question of no little difficulty, which must be solved by the
application of general principles of law to the provisions of our statute.
It is a familiar rule, that an instrument must be properly executed
and acknowledged so as to entitle it to record, in order to make the
registry thereof operate as constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser. Says Mr. Justice Story : "The doctrine as to the registration
of deeds being constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers, is not
to be understood of all deeds and conveyances which may be de facto
registered, but of such only as are authorized and required by law to
be registered, and are duly registered in compliance with law.
If
are
not
authorized
or
they
required to be registered, or the registry
itself is not in compliance with the law, the act of registration is
treated as a mere nullity: and then the subsequent purchaser is affected only by such actual notice as would amount to a fraud." 1 Eq.
Jur. § 404. See also Ely v. Wilcox, 20 Wis. 528, 91 Am. Dec. 436;
Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 444; Lessee of Heister v. Fortner, 2 Bin.
(Pa.) 40, 4 Am. Dec. 417; Shove v. Larsen, 22 Wis. 142, and cases
cited on page 146.
Under our statute, among other requisites, two witnesses are essential to a conveyance, to entitle it to record. The statute requires every
register to keep a general index, each page of which shall be divided
into eight columns, with heads to the respective columns as prescribed ;
and the duty is imposed upon the register to make correct entries in
said index of every instrument received by him for record, under the
respective and appropriate heads, and immediately to enter in the appropriate column, and in the order of time in which it was received, the
day and hour of reception ; and it is declared that the instrument "shall
be considered as recorded at tlie time so noted."
R. S. c. 13, §§ 142,
In Shove v. Larsen, supra, the effect of this index containing
143.
correct entries of matters required to be made therein was considered.
And it was held that by force of the statute it operated as constructive
notice to a subsequent purchaser.
In that case the index contained an
accurate description of the land mortgaged, but, in transcribing the
mortgage at large upon the records, a mistake was made in the deAnd it was claimed in behalf of the subsequent purchaser,
scription.
Assuming,

at the office

of the register to
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that it was the registration of the instrument at large which alone
amounted to constructive notice. But this construction of the statute
was not adopted, the court holding that a subsequent purchaser was
bound to take notice of the entries in the index, which the law required the register to make. This result seemed to follow necessarily
from the language of the statute, which declared that the instrument
Time might
should be considered as recorded at the time noted.
elapse before the instrument was transcribed at large on the record,
or it might be lost and not transcribed at all, leaving the index the
only record of its contents. And the manifest intention of the statute
seemed to be to make the index notice of all proper entries from its
date, and also of the instrument itself till it was registered in full. The
further consequence would seem necessarily to result from this view
of the statute, that the registration of the conveyance in extenso relates back to the registration in the index, and from thence there is
The doctrine
constructive notice of the contents of the instrument.
of Shove V. Larsen was approved in Hay v. Hill, 24 Wis. 235 ; but
the court refused to make the entry in the index in that case operate
as constructive notice, because upon its very face it bore conclusive eviIn other words, the rectitude
dence that it was not made at its date.
and integrity of the index were successfully impeached by the index
itself. See also International Life Ins. Co. v. Scales, 27 Wis. '640.
Where there is nothing upon the face of the index to impeach or
throw suspicion upon its accuracy, there it would affect a subsequent
purchaser with notice of those facts which the law required to appear therein. Doubtless a still further consequence follows from tliis
construction of the statute, namely, that where by some mistake there
is a discrepancy between the proper index entries and the instrument
as registered, there each supplies the defects of the other in the constructive notice thereby given. That is, it appears to be the intention
of the statute to charge the subsequent purchaser constructively with
such knowledge as the proper index entries afford, as well as with
notice of those facts derived from the registration itself.
He is presumed to have examined the whole record, and is aft'ected with notice
of what it contains. But when the instrument, as registered in full,
appears defective in some material and essential parts which are not
supplied by the index entries, what effect then must be given the record as constructive notice? This is really the difficult question in this
case.
From the entries in the index it would not appear whether the
mortgage was witnessed or not. The presumption from the mere entries themselves would be, that it was witnessed and acknowledged so
as to entitle it to record.
But when the mortgage as registered in
full was examined, it would be found that it had no witnesses and had
no business on the records. As the record itself is only constructive
notice of its contents, it is difficult to perceive how it can go beyond
the facts appearing upon
and charge
purchaser constructively with
fact not in the record.
knowledge of
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One of the counsel for the defendants states the argument on this
point as follows : He insists and claims that the entries in the index
book, so far as they indicated that the mortgage had been filed for
record, indicated also that the mortgage was so executed as to entitle
these entries of it to be made ; but that when the full record was looked
at for all the particulars of the mortgage, and perhaps for the express purpose of verifying the entries in the index, it is found that
the apparent assertion by the index entries that the mortgage was
properly executed was wholly untrue, and that the mortgage in fact
was no incumbrance.
The fact, as truly shown to exist by the full
record, overcomes and destroys the false assertion as to the fact in
the index. And it appearing by the instrument registered that it was
not entitled to record, both the registration and index itself cease to
affect the purchaser with constructive notice.
It is not readily perceived wherein this argument as to the effect
of our various provisions upon the subject of registration is unsound.
The question mainly depends upon the construction of our own statutes.
So far as we are aware, this is the first time the point has been
presented in this court for adjudication.
We have derived but little
aid from the decisions in other states, for the reason that few of them
have similar statutory provisions.
We have been referred by the counsel for tlie plaintiff to two cases in Michigan, Brown v. McCormick,
28 Mich. 215, and Starkweather
v. Martin, Id. 472.
In Brown v.
McCormick the effect of the registry, as notice to subsequent purchasers, was made to turn upon the curative act of 1861, mentioned in the
In Starkweather v. Martin the question was, how far the
opinion.
absence, on the registry of a deed, of any m.ark or device indicating a
seal, or of any statement of the register that the original was sealed,
The
aft'ected the validity of the record entry as evidence of title.
record entry of the deed was made more than forty years before the
cause was decided, by the proper officer, and in the appropriate place
for the registry of deeds, under the law permitting the registry of
only sealed instruments ; and the instrument was in the form of a warranty deed, purporting to be acknowledged and dated at a time when
it was the common and lawful course to seal conveyances, and contrary to official duty to take the acknowledgment unless the conveyance was sealed, and where the conclusion, attestation clause, and certificate of acknowledgment of the instrument all spoke of it as under
The court said that these facts and incidents taken together
seal.
afforded a very strong presumption that the original was sealed.
The doctrine of this case does not seem to have a very strong bearIt may be said that it was
ing upon the question under consideration.
contrary to the duty of the register to record the mortgage unless it
was properly acknowledged and witnessed, and that a presumption
arises that he would not have done so. But in answer to this it may
also be said that the law made it the duty of the register to record, or
cause to be recorded correctly, all instruments authorized by law to be

,
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And

that

the presumption

he performed his duty in recording the mortgage correctly, is as strong
as the presumption that he would not have recorded it unless it was

entitled to registry.
In Shove v, Larsen, a number of cases are referred to which hold
that a mistake in recording a deed, or recording it out of its order,
renders the registration ineffectual as notice to subsequent incumbrancers and purchasers.
The doctrine of those cases would seem to
be applicable to the case before us. The registration and index entries
being incomplete, because showing that the mortgage had no subscribing witnesses, constructive notice could not be presumed of such a
record. For the principle "that the registry is notice of the tenor and
effect of the instrument recorded, only as it appears upon that record,"

fully applies.

Shepherd v. Burkhalter,

13

Ga. 443, 58 Am. Dec. 523.

See, in addition to the cases cited in Shove v.

Larsen

;

Brown

v.
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man, 1 Ohio St. 116; Stevens v. Hampton, 46 Mo. 404; Bishop v.
Schneider, 46 Mo. 472, 2 Am. Rep. 533; Terrell v. Andrew County,
44 Mo. 309 ; Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch, (N. Y.) 288.
The question then arises, whether the evidence shows that any of
the defendants were affected with actual notice of the mortgage. This
question, we think, must be answered in the affirmative, so far as the
defendants Thomas Maloy and Stanislaus Bartosz are concerned.
In the deposition taken on his own behalf, but read as a part of the
plaintiff's case, Thomas Maloy distinctly admits that he had heard,
when he purchased his lots, that there was a defective railroad mortbecause his abstract
gage upon them, but that he did not look for
did not show it.
claimed by one of the counsel for the defendants, that this related to the Aiken mortgage, and not to the one upon
which this action
seems to us, however, that this
brought.
construction
inadmissible
the testimony.
of
He most certainly
totally
refers to the mortgage in suit. And what he had heard about there
defective railroad mortgage upon the property, was sufficient
being
Parker v. Kane,
to put him upon inquiry.
Wis.
65 Am. Dec. 283.
sufficient to put
"What
purchaser upon an inquiry
good notice;
that is, where
man has sufficient information to lead him to
fact,
he shall be deemed conusant of it." Sugden on Vendors (9th London
should be
party,
Ed.) p. 335. "In regard to the inquiry required of
such as
prudent and careful man would exercise in his own business
of equal importance. Accordingly, where the mortgagee
informed
that there are charges affecting the estate, and
cognizant of two only,
he cannot claim to be
purchaser without notice of other charges, because he believes that the two, which satisfy the word charges, are all
the charges upon it.
He
bound to inquire whether there are any
others. The rule with respect to the consequences of
purchaser abstaining from making inquiries does not depend exclusively upon
fraudulent motive
man may abstain from mere heedlessness, or
stupidity, and be none the less responsible for the consequences; but

924

if

he make reasonable

DERIVATIVE

TITLES

inquiry, and is deterred by

(Part

2

a false answer, he

if it be of a character to delude a prudent man." 1 Story's
b ; Jackson v. Van Valkenburgh, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 260.
400
§
Independently of tlie record, Maloy had notice of the existence of the
mortgage, or had a knowledge of such facts as to call for further inHe cannot, therefore, be protected as an innocent purchaser for
quiry.
value.
The defendant Bartosz must be charged with notice of the mortgage
by the recitals in the deed from Tenney and wife to his immediate
He was present when that deed was executed and delivered
grantor.
to his uncle. He testifies that he did not know whether anything was
said about the railroad mortgage at that time or not; that he did not
The purchase was really made by his
understand English very well.
uncle for him. And whether he fully understood the conversation at
the time about incumbrances, he must be chargeable with notice of what
appears in his chain of title. This clause was in the deed to his uncle :
"Said premises are free and clear from all incumbrances except a mortgage to the La Crosse Railroad Co., which I am to save said Bartosz
harmless from." The general rule upon this subject is, "that where a
purchaser cannot make out a title but by a deed which leads him to
another fact, he will be presumed to have knowledge of the fact."
The following authorities are very clear and decisive upon that point:
Fitzhugh V. Barnard, 12 Mich. 105; Case v. Erwin, 18 Alich. 434;
Baker v. Mather, 25 Mich. 51; Howard Insurance Co. v. Halsey, 8
N. Y. 271, 59 Am. Dec. 478; Frost v. Beekman, supra, 1 Johns. Ch.
(N. Y.) 298 ; Gilbert v. Peteler, 38 N. Y. 165, 97 Am. Dec. 785 ; Acer
V. Westcott, 46 N. Y. 384, 7 Am. Rep. 355 ; Coles v. Sims, 5 De Gex,
M. & G. 1. The clause in the deed referred to the mortgage as an existing incumbrance, and he cannot now in good faith claim tliat it is
is excusable,

Eq. Jur.

not a lien upon his property.
The counsel for the plaintiff claims that the defendant McLindon
It is true,
had actual knowledge of the existence of the mortgage.
that
there was
knew
by report
he testified that when he purchased, he
a railroad mortgage upon the property, but he says that the report
stated that the mortgage was void. Were he not protected by another
principle, he could not certainly be regarded as a bona fide purchaser.
But he purchased from S. S. Johnson, or claims through Johnson, in
whom the title stood free from any taint. For the rule is well settled,
that a purchaser affected with notice may protect himself by purchasing of another who is a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration. For a similar reason, if a person who has notice sells to another
who has no notice and is a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, the latter may protect his title, although it was affected with
the equity arising from notice in the hands of the person from whom
Mr. Justice Story says this doctrine, in both of its
he derived it.
branches, has been settled for nearly a century and a half in England.
He states an exception to the rule, which was recog1 Eq. Jur. § 410.
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nized and enforced in Ely v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 91, where the estate became revested in the original fraudulent grantee, when the original
equity 'was held to reattach to it. There is no pretense that McLindon
comes within the exception; and as a bona fide purchase of an estate,
for a valuable consideration, purges away the equity from the estate in
he
protected. It
the hands of all persons who derive title under
does not appear that Johnson's title was derived from
said that
the common source. As we understand the bill of exceptions, an abstract was oftereti in evidence to show title from Dunn, by various
intermediate conveyances, to the defendant, which was ruled out on
a better answer to the objecthe plaintiff's objection.
But perhaps
tion to say that the plaintiff has made the defendants parties under the
general allegation that they claim some interest in or title to the mortThis allegation
gaged premises, which was subject to the mortgage.
adverse,
from Dunn,
interest
was
not
but
was
derived
implies that this
though subsequent in date and inferior in right to the plaintiff's mortgage.

It was further insisted that the evidence showed that the defendant
Mary Maloy had actual notice of the mortgage. We do not think this

is

By The Court.
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It
sustained by the testimony.
attempted to charge her
position
with the same actual knowledge her husband had, because he aided her
does not appear that
when she made her purchase of Martin Maloy.
anything was said at this time about the railroad mortgage, or that she
ever had any notice of it.
does not appear, even, that he was acting
as her agent in any legal sense; and besides,
he were, his knowledge
acquired at another time, when not engaged in her business, ought not
to be imputed to her. Notice, to bind the principal, should be brought
home to the agent while engaged in the business or negotiation of the
would be
breach of trust in the former not to
principal, and when
communicate the knowledge to the latter.
408,
Story's Eq. Jur.
and cases cited in note
The evidence fails to bring her within that
rule.
A number of other questions were discussed upon the argument but
we believe these observations dispose of all the more important ones.
The judgment of the circuit court as to the defendants Thomas
Maloy and Stanislaus Bartosz must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
so oi'dered.^^

5

Parret v. Shaubhut,
Minn. 32.3 (Gil. 258), 80 Am. Dec. 424 (1861), ace.
The matter of acknowledgment, witnessing, etc., as prerequisites to effective
recording, is dependent entirely upon the statutes of the state where the land
is. The student should consult the statutes.
33

DERIVATIVE

926

FROST

V.

TITLES

BEEKMAN.

(Court of Chancery- of New Tork, 1S14.

*

*

(Part 2

1

Johns. Ch.

2SS.)

*

Another, and a more interesting
question, is, respecting the extent and effect of the registry of the deIt was a mortgage for
fendant's mortgage, as notice to purchasers.
This mistake
$3,000, and, by mistake, the registry was only for $300.
is the whole cause of the controversy.
The mortgage act of the sess. 24, ch, 156, declared, among other
things, that the registry of a mortgage should contain, not, indeed, the
mortgage at large, but the essential parts of the mortgage, and, among
other specified parts, "the mortgage money, and the time or times when
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payable." To this register all persons whomsoever, at proper seasons,
are at liberty to have recourse ; and the act declared that mortgages
were to have preference, as to each other, according to the times of
registry, and that "no mortgage should defeat or prejudice the title
of any bona fide purchaser, unless the same should have been duly
This registry is notice of the mortgage to all
registered, as aforesaid."
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees ; and so the act was construed,
and the law declared, by the court of errors, in the case of Johnson v.
Stagg, 2 Johns. 510. The English authorities, on this point, do not,
therefore, govern the case.
The language of those authorities, undoubtedly, is, that the registry is not notice, though that doctrine is
much questioned, and the point seems still to be floating and unsettled.
Bedford v. Backhouse, 3 Eq. Cas. Abr. 615, pi. 12; Wrightson v. Hudson, Id. 609, pi. 7; Morecock v. Dickins, Amb. 678; Latouche v. Dunsany, 1 Schoale & Lefroy, 157; Sugden (3d Lond. Ed.) 524-7; Com.
when,
Dig. tit. Til, Deed, ch. 21, § 11. The only question with us
Is
notice of
the registry notice?
and to what extent,
mortgage
notice beyond the contents of the registry?
unduly registered? or
The true construction of the act appears to be that the registry
and no more, and that the purchaser
notice of the contents of
not to be charged with notice of the contents of the mortgage, any furnot
ther than they may be contained in the registry. The purchaser
It
the business
bound to attend to the correctness of the registry.
of the mortgagee, and
mistake occurs to his prejudice, the conselie between him and the clerk, and not between him and
quences of
the bona fide purchaser.
The act, in providing that all persons might
have recourse to the registry, intended that as the correct and sufficient
source of information and
would be
doctrine productive of immense mischief to oblige the purchaser to look, at his peril, to the contents of every mortgage, and to be bound by them, when different from
the contents, as declared in the registry.
The registry might prove only
snare to the purchaser, and no person could be safe in his purchase,
3
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without hunting out and inspecting the original mortgage, a task of
I am satisfied that this was not the intention,
great toil and difficulty.
as it certainly is not the sound policy, of the statute; nor is it repugnant to the doctrine contained in the books, that notice to a purchaser,
of the existence of a lease, is notice of its contents. Taylor v. Stibbert, 2 Ves. Jun. 437; Hiern v. Mill, 13 Ves. Jun. 118, 120; Hall v.
Smith, 14 Ves. Jun. 426. In that case, the party is put upon inquiry,
or abide the consequences. The decision, in Jackand he must make
son V. Neely, 10 Johns. 374, was made upon the same principle; and
letter of attorney, by which
was held that the recital in
deed of
power.
was made, was notice to the purchaser of the existence of such
But here the statute did not mean to put the party upon further inThe registry was intended to contain, within itself, all the
quiry.
knowledge of the mortgage requisite for the purchaser's safety.
The question does not necessarily arise, in this case, how far the
unauthorized registry of
mortgage, as one made, for instance, withpurout any previous legal proof, or acknowledgment, would charge
chaser with notice of the mortgage. The better opinion, in the books,
seems to be, that
would not be notice, and that equity will not interfere in favour of an incumbrancer, when he has not seen that his mortSchoale
Sugden's Law of Vend. 527;
gage was duly registered.
Am. Dec. 417. But
Bin. (Pa.) 40,
Lefroy, 157; Heister v. Fortner,
here every thing was done that could have been previously required of
The mortgage was duly presented for registry, and
the mortgagee.
This was the
he was not bound to inspect and correct the record.
no reason why
exclusive business and duty of the clerk, and there
the registry should not operate as notice, to the amount of the sum
mentioned therein and, indeed, so far the obligation of the registry
admitted by the bill.
conclude, therefore, that the registry was notice to purchasers, to
the amount, and only to the amount, of the sum specified in the reg*
istry.

TERRELL

v.

ANDREW COUNTY.

(Supreme Court of Missouri, 1809.

44 Wo. 300.)
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Wagner,
The argument in reference to the execution of the
power contained in the mortgage, and the frauds between the Terrells
in the purchase of the property at the mortgagee's sale,
beside and
irrelevant to any issue in the case. If the facts alleged are true, they
may have furnished sufficient reason for Holt, the mortgagor, to move
to set aside the sale but in the absence of any complaint on his part,
the defendant can not make the objection for him.
There
but one
question in this case to be determined.
seems that Andrew county
loaned to one Holt the sum of four hundred dollars belonging to the
common-school fund, for the securing of which he gave personal se-
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curity, and also executed a mortgage on a lot owned by him in the city
of Savannah. The county duly deposited the deed for record with the
recorder of the county, and that officer, in recording the same, by mistake inserted two hundred dollars in the record instead of four hundred dollars, showing an encumbrance for the former instead of the
latter sum. After the mortgage was recorded, Holt applied to one of
the plaintiffs for a loan of money, and offered to secure him by mortgage liens on real estate, the lot mortgaged to the county being among
On examination, the record showed a mortgage for two
the property.

hundred dollars; the money was loaned, and a junior mortgage given
subject to the prior lien. Subsequently the county ordered the lot sold
in default of payment, claiming the full amount of four hundred dolThe plaintiff paid the two hunlars, together with accrued interest.
dred dollars, with interest tliereon, and proceeded to enjoin the collection of the remainder.
The Court of Common Pleas in Buchanan county, to which the cause
was removed by change of venue, rendered judgment of perpetual injunction, and this judgment was reversed in the District Court.
The only question, therefore, is whether, under the law, the record
It
imparted notice for any greater amount than two hundred dollars.
is not pretended that, at the time Terrell loaned the money and took his
mortgage, he had any other notice of the county's claim than that disclosed by the record.
It is contended here on behalf of the county that, according to our
statute, when a person files with the recorder an instrument, it imparts
notice of its real contents to all subsequent purchasers, regardless of any
mistake that the recorder may commit in placing it on record ; that the
statute provides that every instrument in writing, certified and recorded
in the manner prescribed, shall, from the time of filing the same with
the recorder for record, impart notice to all persons of the contents
thereof ; and all subsequent purchasers and mortgagees shall be deemed,
in law and equity, to purchase witli notice. R. S. 1855, p. 364, § 41.
According to the literal interpretation of the section, no notice is imparted till the instrument is actually placed on record, and then it reIt was, no doubt, the intention of the
lates back to the time of filing.
Legislature to give a person filing an instrument or conveyance all the
benefit of his diligence ; and when he deposits the same with the recorder, and has it placed on file, he has done all that he can do, and has
complied with the requirement of the law. From that time it will give
full notice to all subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers.
A person, in the examination of titles, first searches the records;
and if he finds nothing there, he looks to see if any instruments are
filed and not recorded. If nothing is found, and he has no actual noIf he finds
tice, so far as he is concerned the land is unencumbered.
further
no
he
never
an
institutes
;
a conveyance, he goes
inquiry to find
whether the deed is correctly recorded or the contents literally transcribed. Indeed, to attempt to prosecute such a search would be idle
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Grantees do not usually leave their deeds lying in the
and nugatory.
recorder's office for the inspection of the public. After they are recorded, they take them out and keep them in their possession. In a
large majority of cases it would not only entail expense and trouble,
but it would be useless, to attempt to get access to the original papers.
Hard and uncertain would be the fate of subsequent purchasers if
they could not rely upon the records, but must be under the necessity,
before they act, of tracing up the original deed to see that it is correctly
recorded. The statute says- that when the deed is certified and recorded
Cerit shall impart notice of the contents from the time of filing.
tainly ; but this is to be understood in the sense that the deed is rightly
recorded, and the contents correctly spread upon the record. It never
was intended to impose upon the purchaser the burden of entering
into a long and laborious search to find out whether the recorder had
faithfully performed his duty. The obligation of giving the notice
If he fails in his duty, he must
rests on the party holding the title.
If his duty is but imperfectly performed, he
suffer the consequences.
can not claim all the advantages and lay the fault at the door of an innocent purchaser.
But it is said the recorder is required to give bond for the faithful
performance of all the duties enjoined on him by law, and that this
is for the benefit of the subsequent purchaser who is injured by his
dereliction, and that he must pursue his remedy against the recorder.
This bond is for the benefit of any and every person who may suffer
injury by reason of the recorder's neglect to faithfully discharge the
duties of his office. It was not Terrell, in this case, who was injured;
it was Andrew county. The county deposited the deeds with the recorder, and paid him for recording it. Through his negligence and
inattention he did his work inaccurately, so that it imparted notice for
only half the consideration, and the county suffered loss and injury in
consequence thereof. The privity springs and exists between the county and the recorder, and the count}' is the proper party to proceed
against him to recover the loss.
The judgment of the District Court must be reversed. The other
judges concur.

MANGOLD
(Supreme Court of Alississippi,

V.

1884.

BARLOW.
61

Miss. 593, 48 Am. Eep. 84.)

Ballou and wife executed

a deed of trust to Faler & Co. on 19th of
1877,
on
the land in controversy, and on that day it was
February,
lodged with the clerk of the chancery court for record. It was recorded
but the clerk misdescribed the land, giving a different quarter section

from that described in the deed.
Three years afterward the same
grantors executed a deed of trust on the same land to H. H. Barlow,
Aig.Peop. — 59
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was duly recorded on the day of Its execution, 27th
There was no actual notice of the first deed or any-,
to
the
last
.put
grantee on inquiry. In a contest between the prior
thing
and subsequent grantees the court below rendered judgment for the
latter, and from this judgment an appeal is taken.
Campbell, C. J. The question is, who shall suffer loss from an error of the clerk in recording a deed duly acknowledged and lodged with
Does the grantee acquit himself fully of all duty
him for record?
when he delivers the deed to the proper officer for record, or is it his
And if a mistake
duty to see that the instrument is properly recorded?
is made in recording by which a subsequent grantee is misled and injured, whose claim shall prevail, that of the first grantee, who relied
on the officer to do his duty, or of the second grantee, who, in the faith
that the record is true, acts upon it? Shall the deed prevail or the
record of it? There is great contrariety of opinion on this subject in
The courts of New York, Ohio, Vermont, Michigan,
other States.
Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Georgia, Tennessee, ^Missouri, and CaHfornia hold that subsequent purchasers are bound only by what the
record shows, while those of Alabama, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Texas hold tliat a grantee who lodges
the deed for record has done all that is required of him, and that the
deed must prevail although a mistake is made in recording it; that
from the time of its delivery to the proper officer for record it is considered as recorded, and for any error in recording by which a subsequent purchaser is misled and injured, he must look to the clerk for
redress and cannot throw the loss on the first grantee, who did all he
was required to do and should not suffer from the negligence of the
The decided weight of authority seems to be in favor of the
clerk.
view that the record may be relied on by a subsequent purchaser, and
Frost v.
that he cannot be aft'ected by a deed not truly recorded.
Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 288; Beekman v. Frost, 18 Johns. (N.
Y.) 544, 9 Am. Dec. 246; Barnard v. Campau, 29 Mich. 162; Sawyer
V. Adams, 8 Vt. 172, 30 Am. Dec. 459; Sanger v. Craigue, 10 Vt. 555 ;
Terrell v. Andrew County, 44 Mo. 309; Lally v. Holland, 1 Swan
(Tenn.) 396; Baldwin v. Marshall, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 116; Chamberlain V. Bell, 7 Cal. 292, 68 Am. Dec. 260 ; Shepherd v. Burkhalter, 13
Ga. 443, 58 Am. Dec. 523 ; Miller v. Bradford, 12 Iowa, 14 ; Brydon v.
Campbell, 40 Md. 331; Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 449, 19 Am. Rep.
772.
For the other view, are Franklin v. Cannon, 1 Root (Conn.) 500;
Judd V. Woodruff, 2 Root (Conn.) 298 ; :\IcGregor v. Flail, 3 Stew. &
P. (Ala.) 397 ; Mims v. Mims, 35 Ala. 23 ; Nichols v. Reynolds, 1 R. I.
30, 36 Am. Dec. 238 ; Merrick v. Wallace, 19 111. 486 ; Throckmorton v.
Price, 28 Tex. 605, 91 Am. Dec. 334; Glading v. Frick, 88 Pa. 460;
Clader v. Thomas, 89 Pa. 343 ; Beverley v. Ellis, 1 Rand. (Va.) 102.
After the most careful consideration we range ourselves with the
minority, and hold that a grantee fully acquits himself of all duty imposed by law when he lodges the instrument with the proper officer
appellee, which

January,
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for record, and from that time it is notice to subsequent purchasers and
creditors of what it contains, and not of what the recording officers
may make it to show on the record. The clerk is not the agent of the
He has as much
grantee and he is not responsible for his blunders.
has
subsequent
the
officer
a
purchaser.
on
of
as
to
the
fidelity
right
rely
and
when it
contents,
its
office
shows
it
While his deed is in the clerk's
is withdrawn from the office it has annexed a certificate by the officer
that it has been duly recorded. Either this may be relied on, or the
grantee must compare the deed with the record to see if it is truly
The first
This would be an unreasonable requirement.
transcribed.
grantee having done all that he is required to do to give notice of the
instrument may safely repose on the presumption that the recording
officer has done his duty, and if subsequent purchasers or creditors
suffer injury from official negligence or misconduct, they must seek
redress from the party at fault, and cannot visit the loss on him who
has done no wrong. In announcing this view we follow the language
of our statute and the rule most consonant with justice and sound
policy. The statutes declare that certain instruments shall be "void as
to all creditors and subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration,
without notice, unless they shall be acknowledged or proved and lodged
with the clerk of the chancery court of the proper county to be recorded." The grantee is not required to record the instrument or to see
that the officer does his duty. All that is imposed on the grantee is
that the instrument shall be acknowledged or proved and lodged with
the clerk of the chancery court of the proper county.
There his duty
ends.
That done, his deed is not to be void as to subsequent purchasers
or creditors.
That is a performance of the condition without which
it would be void, and the condition having been performed the instrument is discharged of all conditions and is thenceforth valid as to all.
Tlie State has established depositories for instruments to be recorded
and has prescribed the duties of recording officers. This is for the
benefit and protection of subsequent purchasers from a grantor and his
creditors. A grantee must have his deed put in condition for being recorded and must lodge it at the proper place for record.
That is all
that is required of him. He is not a guarantor of compliance by the
recording officer with the law as to recording.
It is not for his benefit
that the recording is to be done, but for others. The State has undertaken to have the recording done, and if one suffers from the negligence of the officer he must seek redress from the officer.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded for a' new trial.
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MARSHALL.
225 Pa. 570, 74

Atl.

550, 25

L. H. A.

[N. S.] 1211.)

Potter, J. The

it

it,

precise question here presented for determination
is whether, when a mortgage is defectively recorded, and wrongly indexed, by inserting a wrong initial, in entering the name of the mortgagor, the correct name being entirely omitted from the record, a purchaser of the mortgaged premises, without actual notice, is chargeable
with notice of such mortgage, and as terre-tenant of the premises, subject to its enforcement against him.
It appears from the record, that on January 20, 1900, L. J. Marshall
executed and delivered to Agnes Prouty a purchase money mortgage,
secured upon premises in Dubois borough, Clearfield county. On February 6, 1900, the mortgage was delivered for record by the mortgagee
to the recorder of deeds for Clearfield county, and the fee for recording
paid to him. The recorder subsequently returned the mortgage to the
had
certifying that
mortgagee, with his certificate indorsed upon
been recorded.

a

a

J.

J.

it

J.

J.

it

The recorder, however, had not recorded the mortgage as executed
Marunder the name of L.
Marshall, and had not indexed
by L.
wherever
the
name
of
mortgagor,
the
But upon the record
shall.
Marshall," and the only name entered on
appeared, was written "S.
Marshall."
the indexes was that of "S.
On August 25, 1903, A. A. La Rue purchased the mortgaged premLa Rue had no
ises and the same were conveyed to him by Marshall.
scire
actual notice of the mortgage to Prouty. On July 10, 1906,
and
Marshall
as
mortgagor
facias was issued on the mortgage against
the
due
balance claimed to be
La Rue as terre-tenant, to recover

is is

a

a

a

J.

mortgagee. La Rue, the terre-tenant, defended upon the ground that
neither the mortgage books nor the mortgage indexes in the recorder's
Marshall or contained
office showed any mortgage executed by L.
on.
sued
of
the
record
mortgage
any
Upon the trial in the court of common pleas, the trial judge directed
point requesting binding instrucverdict for the plaintiff, reserving
motion
The court subsequently overruled
tions for the defendants.
for judgment on the reserved point non obstante veredicto, and entered
The terre-tenant appealed to the Superior
judgment on the verdict.
Court, which affirmed the judgment of the court below. The present
appeal
by the terre-tenant from the decree of the Superior Court,
which
assigned for error.^"^
An examination of the cases cited in the opinion of the Superior
Court, shows that none of them presented facts similar to those in the
case at bar, and in none of them was the exact question here presented,
3r.

The

case below is reported

in

30 Pa. Super.
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considered. Thus in Speer v. Evans, 47 Pa. 141, the case turned upon
question of actual notice, and it was held that actual notice is
equivalent to the constructive notice given by the mortgage index.
In Brooke's Appeal, 64 Pa. 127, the point decided was, that, under the
Act of May 28, 1775 [1715], 1 Smith's Laws, p. 94, a mortgage has
priority of lien from the moment when it is left with the recorder for
record, not from the time when it is actually recorded. In Schell v.
Stein, 76 Pa. 398, 18 Am. Rep. 416, the instrument was properly recorded, but not indexed, in a general index.
It was held that as the
law then stood, the recorder of deeds was not required by the Act of
March 29, 1827 (P. L. 154), to keep a general index of all the deed
and mortgage books in his office, but only to keep an index for each
book. The law in this respect has been changed by the Act of March
18, 1875 (P. L. 32), and general indexes are now required to be kept,
and failure to index renders the record defective.
The case of
Wood's and Brown's Appeal, 82 Pa. 116, also arose before the passage
of the act of 1875, and it held, that the entry of the mortgage in the
proper book gave it a lien, which failure to index would not disturb.
The case of Glading v. Frick, 88 Pa. 460, also arose before the act of
1875.
It was there decided that, "Where certain instruments of writing are not required by law to be recorded in a particular book, they
may be recorded in any book kept by the recorder ; and a building conIn Wyoming Natract is valid although recorded in a deed book."
tional Bank's Appeal, 11 Wkly. Notes Cas. 567, the syllabus reads:
"Where a mortgage is left for record and actually recorded, its lien
will not be postponed to a subsequent judgment, by reason of the facf
that the recorder has failed to enter Uie same on the book of entries,
But this court was careful to point out (page 568)
or upon the index."
that, "The mortgage in question was left at the recorder's office in
1873, prior to the passage of the act of March 18, 1875, so that it is
not necessary to inquire whether the failure to index deprived the
Clader v. Thomas, 89 Pa. 343, and Paige
mortgagee of his security."
v. Wheeler, 92 Pa. 282, enunciate no new principle, and both cases
arose prior to the act of 1875. Stockwell v. McHenry, 107 Pa. 237,
52 Am. Rep. 475, does not bear directly upon the question raised by
the present appeal.
As pointed out by the Superior Court, the case
related to an instrument recorded in 1865, and therefore the indexing
act of 1875 did not apply. It was expressly held (107 Pa. 244, 52 Am.
Rep. 475) that the act of 1875 was not retroactive.
In the case of
Farabee v. McKerrihan,. 172 Pa. 234, 33 Atl. 583, 51 Am. St. Rep. 734,
the mortgage was actually recorded and indexed, but in the deed book
and deed index, and not in the mortgage book and mortgage index. It
was held that as recording in the deed book, and indexing in the deed
index placed the incumbrance in the line of title of the mortgagor,
where it could be discovered with the same ease and certainty as if it
had been placed in the mortgage book index, by anyone examining tli«
title, it was sufficient notice to preserve the lien.
the
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The great object to be attained, by recording and indexing an instrument affecting the title to real estate, is to give notice of the incumbrance. This principle seems to have been overlooked in the present
case, for in reaching a conclusion, both the Superior Court and the trial
court apparently gave little heed to the fact that the prime purpose of
the law, in providing for the recording of deeds and mortgages, is to
give notice to intending purchasers, or to others who may be interested,
that the conveyance or incumbrance stands in the line of title to the
property which it describes. The object of the recording acts is to give
notice to the world of that which is spread upon the record. Therefore,
4he record is constructive notice to all persons, without regard to the
fact of actual notice. Under our system, the record is open to everyone
who desires to ascertain the condition of the title to any piece of real
estate, in so far as its ownership is concerned, or as to incumbrances
thereo-n, and everyone is bound to take notice of what the record shows,
and searchers may rely upon the record as it stands. If this were not
so, no one would be safe in purchasing real estate, or in loaning upon
the strength of
as security.
In the present case, the mortgage sued upon was never correctly
recorded. The mortgage on record purports to have been executed by
Marshall, and the name of L.
S.
Marshall does not appear upon it.
The record of
Marshall
not notice to
mortgage given by S.
for
incumbrances
Marshall.
The same
anyone seeking
against L.
error was made in indexing the instrument.
It was indexed as S.
Marshall, and no mortgage given by L.
Marshall appears upon the
index. As the statute requires the recorder to keep mortgage indexes,
and section
of the Act of March 18, 1875 (P. L. 32), expressly prothat
the
vides
entry of r^ortgages in said index, shall be notice to all
persons of the recording of the same, the appellant here was entitled
to rely upon what appeared on the index, and that showed no mortMarshall.
gage given by L.
Considerable stress was laid upon the fact that tlie recorder had
certified that the mortgage was recorded but that can make no differthe only question
ence whatever as to notice to the purchaser, which
that concerns him. He never saw the certificate of the recorder; that
was given to the mortgagee, and was for her benefit. If the recorder
was negligent in his duty, and gave her
false certificate, she has
doubtless her right of action for damages against him. But the error
made by the recorder does not alter the fact that no notice of the
mortgage, either actual or constructive, was given to the purchaser.
He therefore took the land free of any such incumbrance, and
cannot be enforced against him. The motion for judgment in favor of
defendant, non obstante veredicto, should have been sustained.
It should be remembered that in this case the mortgage was neither
recorded properly nor indexed properly
both recording and indexing
were alike defective, and each of the defects was fatal to the claim of
the mortsrasfee.
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so by the

Act of March

18,

the first section, the recorder

to prepare and keep two general indexes, the one direct, and the other
ad sectum,, of all mortgages recorded in his office, goes on to provide :

"Sec. 2. As soon as said indexes are prepared, it shall be the duty
the recorder to index in its appropriate place and manner every
deed and mortgage thereafter recorded in his office, at the time the
same is recorded, and in case he neglect to do so, he and his sureties
shall be liable in damages to any person aggrieved by such neglect."
In Pyles v. Brown, 189 Pa. 164, 168, 42 Atl. 11, 12, 69 Am. St. Rep.
794, our Brother Fell said that this act 'Svas probably passed to remedy
the defects in the recording acts pointed out by Chief Justice Agnew
in the opinion in Schell v. Stein, 76 Pa. 398 [18 Am. Rep. 416], decided
in 1874."
There it was said (76 Pa. 400^ 18 Am. Rep. 416) : "The
question presented by the record in this case is, whether a deed regularly acknowledged or proved, and recorded in the proper book, and
indexed in the separate index appropriated to the book, but not in the
If
general index of all the deed books, is not defectively recorded.
it be, tlie conceded principle
that
deed defectively registered
no law
nullity as to subsequent purchasers or mortgagees. There
which requires the recorder to keep
general index to all the deed or
That
mortgage books in his office.
great convenience, and in
evident,
the populous counties of the state has become a necessity,
but
the province of the legislature, and not of this court, to make
this convenience or the necessity the subject of law."
The needed legislation thus pointed out, requiring the keeping of
general indexes, was provided by the act of 1875, and thereafter under
the reasoning of Justice Agnew, supra, the failure to index in the general index became such
defect in the recording, as to make
nullity
to subsequent purchasers or mortgagees."*^
In Jones on Mortgages (6th Ed. 1904)
515,
said: "If the
record of
deed be defective for any cause,
constructive notice
of only what 'the record contains, in case the record
not an accurate
transcript of the instrument. This
the view sustained by the greater
number of decisions and by the greater weight of reason, as distinguished from the view that the filing of the deed operates as
record
of
and that
constructive notice from such time of the actual
contents of the deed," citing Heister v. Fortner,
Bin. 40,
Am. Rep.
417; Schell v. Stein, 76 Pa. 398, 18 Am. Rep. 416, and cases in California, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Jersey, New York, Virginia and Wisconsin.
So also in
Pomeroy's Equity Juris. (3d Ed., 1905)
654, there
clear statement of what 'we. think
sound principle.
there
said
"A record
constructive notice only when and so far as
true copy, substantially even
not absolutely correct, of the instru-
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So, also, in Iowa the failure to index is fatal.
Iowa, 510, 83 Am. Dec. 427 (1S64).

Barney

v.

McCarty,
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ment which purports to be registered, and of all its provisions.
Anymaterial omission or alteration will certainly prevent the record from
being a constructive notice of the original instrument, although it may
appear on the registry books to be an instrument, perfect, and operative in all its parts. The test is a plain and simple one. It is whether
the record, if examined and read by the party dealing with the premises, would be an actual notice to him of the original instrument and
of all its parts and provisions. B}'' the policy of the recording acts, such
a party is called upon to search the records, and he has a right to rely
upon what he finds there entered as a true and complete transcript of
any and every instrument affecting the title to the lands with respect
to which he is dealing. A record can only be a constructive notice, at
* * * The same rule
most, of whatever is contained within itself.
.applies to the record of miortgages and all other incumbrances which
The language, both of the original and of the record,
can be recorded.
must be such that if a subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer should
examine the instrument itself, he would obtain thereby an actual notice
of all the rights which were intended to be created or conferred by it."
In the case at bar, the duty was upon the mortgagee" to give notice
that L. J. Alarshall had executed to her a mortgage upon the premises
in question. If from any cause she fell short of giving legal notice, the
consequence must fall upon her. She cannot hide behind the mistake
of the recorder. It is an easy matter for a mortgagee, or a grantee in
each particular instance, either in person, or by a representative, to
look at the record, and see that the instrument has been' properly entered. The instrument itself is at hand. The names of the parties are
known, and comparisons are easily made. How would it be possible
for a subsequent purchaser to know anything about the facts? The
duty thus imposed upon the mortgagee in this respect, involves no
more, and no less, than is required of a mortgagee, for his own protection, when before the money is paid out upon the loan, an inspection
of the judgment indexes is necessary to see whether or not a judgment
has been entered against the mortgagor upon the same day on which
the mortgage is recorded.
Some care must be exercised in every such
There is every reason why it should be made the duty
transaction.
of the mortgagee to see that his instrument is properly recorded. This
will not in any way interfere with the principle that when the instrument is certified as recorded, it shall import notice of the contents from
But that must be understood as in connection with
the time of filing.
As said above, the record is notice
an instriiment properly recorded.
of just what it contains, no more and no less. The obligation of seeing
that the record of an instrument is correct, must properly rest upon its
If he fails to protect himself, the consequence cannot justly
holder.
be shifted upon an innocent purchaser.
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed, as is also that of
the court of common pleas, and it is ordered that judgment in favor
of the terre-tenant be entered, non obstante veredicto.
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v.

(Court of Appeals of New York, 1881.

DAKE.
87 N. Y. 257.)

Earl, J.

This action is brought to foreclose a mortgage which was
executed by the defendant Teeple and his wife, to the plaintiff on the
4th day of June, 1870, upon lands in Livingston county, to secure payment of the sum of 82,000 with interest.
On the 7th day of December, 1870, the plaintiff left the mortgage
at the office of the clerk of Livingston county, for record, and paid
On the same day the clerk duly transcribed
the fee for recording it.
the mortgage in full, in the proper record book in his office, and indorsed on it his certificate in due form, and returned the mortgage,
The clerk omitted, however, by mistake,
so indorsed, to the plaintiff.
to index the mortgage, and the plaintiff was ignorant of the omission

a

is

;

it

it

is,

a

it,

a

it

a

it,

until September, 1875, when the omission having been discovered, the
mortgage was indexed by the clerk. The defendant, Jabez W. Dake,
is the assignee of two mortgages executed by Teeple, on the same
premises, one prior to the plaintiff's mortgage, dated April 6, 1868, for
$600 and interest, given to one Nichols; the other, executed to one
Baity, on the 14th of March, 1874, duly recorded and indexed on that
day, and assigned by Baity to Dake, on the 10th of March, 1875. The
mortgage to Baity was given to secure the payment of the sum of $1,400 loaned by Baity to Teeple at the time of the execution of the
Baity procured
mortgage. Before making the loan, and in view of
from the clerk
certificate of search, as to the title to the premises,
and incumbrances thereon. The certificate did not show the existence
of the plaintiff's mortgage, and Baity had no actual notice or knowluntil after he assigned his mortgage to Dake. The assignedge of
valuable consideration, and was duly recorded
ment to Dake was for
Dake saw the ceron the 16th of March, 1875.
Before taking
tificate of search which Baity had, and also procured for himself
certificate of search from the clerk, which, as well as the one in Balty's
hands, did not show the existence of the plaintiff's mortgage, and Dake
had no actual notice or knowledge of such mortgage till the 6th of
whether the
December, 1875. The question now to be determined
plaintiff's mortgage or the Baity mortgage shall have priority, Dake
claiming that although the plaintiff's mortgage was prior in time,
lost its priority because
was not indexed.
We have carefully examined the able and exhaustive briefs submitted to us, and are satisfied that no error was committed in the court
below by its holding that plaintiff's mortgage had the priority. The
carefully prepared and able opinion of Smith, J., at the Special Term,
leaves but little now to be said
but as the question
claimed to be
new one in tliis State, we will briefly state the reasons for our affirmance of the judgment appealed from.
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The plaintiff's mortgage, being prior in time, is entitled to priority
over the Baity mortgage, unless it has lost such priority by force of
It is
the Recording Act, and a reference to it is therefore needful.
found in chap. 3, part 2, of the Revised Statutes, which chapter is entitled, "of the proof and recording of conveyances of real estate, and
the canceling of mortgages."
Section 1 provides, that "Every conveyance of real estate within this State, hereafter made, shall be recorded in the office of the clerk of the county where such real estate
shall be situated; and every such xonveyance not so recorded, shall
be void as against any subsequent purchaser, in good faith and for a
valuable consideration, of the same real estate, or any portion thereof,
The' record here inwhose conveyance shall be first duly recorded."
tended was plainly a copy of the conveyance, transcribed into the
Section 2 provides, that "Different sets of
proper book of records.
books shall be provided, by the clerks of the several counties, for the
Section 24 provides, that "Every
recording of deeds and mortgages."
conveyance entitled by law to be recorded, shall be recorded in the
order, and as of the time, when the same shall be delivered to the clerk
for that purpose, and shall be considered as recorded, from the time
of such delivery."
Section 25 provides, that "The recording officer
shall make an entry in the record, immediately after the copy of every
conveyance recorded, specifying the time of the day, month and year
when the said conveyance was recorded, and shall endorse upon every conveyance recorded by him, a certificate, stating the time as aforesaid, when, and the book and page where, tiie same was recorded ;"
and a later section (38) provides that the term "Conveyance" shall embrace a mortgage.
Here there is a complete system for the registry of deeds and mortgages prescribing the place and mode of registry, and not one word
is said of any index to be made.
It will be observed that the clerk
is not required to certify, upon the conveyance recorded, tliat he has
indexed the same, and yet if the index was an essential part of the record, it cannot be supposed that a matter so important would have
been omitted from the certificate required.
By chapter 313 of the Laws of 1826, county clerks were required
to make separate indices in separate books of all deeds and mortgages
recorded or registered in tlieir respective offices, whenever directed
by the Court of Common Pleas, and it was provided that they should
be paid for making such indices by the board of supervisors, and that
was the first act in this State, in reference to indexing deeds and mortIt did not provide for indexing conveyances thereafter to be
gages.
recorded.
The only provision in the Revised Statutes on the subject of indexing conveyances is found in part 3, chapter 3, article 2, which article
is entitled "Of the powers and duties of certain judicial officers."
Section 61 of the article provides, tliat "It shall be the duty of the clerk

'
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of each county in the State, and of the register of the city and county
of New York, to attach to every book kept in his office, in which deeds
or mortgages shall be recorded, or collectors' bonds entered, an index
to the matters contained in such books, arranged in alphabetical order,
under tlie names of the several parties to such matters, with references
to the pages where the same may be found, which, together with such
books, shall at all proper times be open for the inspection of any person paying therefor the fees allowed by law." That section is still in
force ; it does not make the index a part of the record ; it recognizes
the record as complete without the index, and simply provides for an
index to the records.
The first lav/ requiring county clerks to make and keep books of
general indices is found in chapter 199 of tlie Laws of 1843, section
1 of which provides, that "The clerks of the several counties in this
State, and the register of the city and county of New York, in those
counties in which general indices of deeds and mortgages have not
been made and preserved, according to the act passed

April

18th, 1826,

shall provide proper books for making such general indices, and shall
form indices therein in such manner as to afford correct and easy refThere
erence to the several books of record in their offices respectively.
shall be one book for deeds and another for mortgages. In each book
there shall be made double entries, or two lists of names, in alphabetiIn one shall be set the names of the grantors or mortgacal order.
gors, followed by the names of their grantees or mortgagees ; and in
the other, the names of the grantees or mortgagees, followed by the
names of the grantors, or mortgagors, leaving proper blanks between
each class of names for subsequent entries ; and in those counties in
which indices were made under the said act of April 18, 1826, and
have been preserved, the several clerks shall complete the same by
bringing them down to the present time, and in either case, the said
clerks shall keep the said indices complete by adding to the lists, as
And section 2
deeds and mortgages shall be sent in to be recorded."
provides, that "Each county clerk is hereby authorized to charge in his
account against his county, all necessary expenses which he may incur
in the purchase of books for such indices, and at and after the rate of
fifty cents for every hundred names, which he may enter in such book."
■The indices here provided for clearly form no part of the record, but
are intended, in the language used in section 1, "to afford correct and
easy reference" to the books of record ; and the record is thus recognized as existing independently of the indices.
It must be noticed
further, that while a person who procures a conveyance to be recorded
must pay the clerk his fee for recording, it is provided in. section 2
tliat the expense of indexing is a public charge.
I have thus quoted at length the main provisions of the Recording
Act, and of the acts in reference to indices, that the full force of the
language used in them may be fully and easily comprehended;
and
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thus It Is plainly seen that there is nothing in them which makes the
index a part of the record. It is clear that the only purpose which was
intended to be served by the indices is as a guide to the records for
the convenience of searchers.
That our conclusion is the correct one is made still more manifest
by section 26 of the Recording Act, which provides that the transcript
of any record of a deed or mortgage, recorded as provided in the
act, may be read in evidence, when certified by the clerk to be a true
The record intended in that section is unquescopy of such record.
tionably the record made by a transcript of a conveyance in the proper
book, as provided in the act, and the index is no part of such record
which is required to be certified.
It was never heard that a certified
copy of the record of a deed or mortgage was objected to, or excluded
as evidence, because a copy of the index was not included as a portion of the record; and yet if it formed an essential portion of tlie
record, it would always have to be certified as part thereof.
There is nothing in the history of the legislation on the subject of
the registration of deeds and mortgages, from the earliest time in England and in this State, which tends, in the least degree, to show that
it has ever been supposed that indexing was any essential or necessary
part of registration.
Such legislation is ably reviewed in the opinion
of Smith,
at Special Term, and needs no further notice here.
Whatever forms part of
perfect record, as prescribed in the act,
essential
that
the conveyance must be recorded in the proper
book, in the proper order, and with substantial accuracy. If the record
be defective in any thing essential,
will not serve the purpose of
giving constructive notice to subsequent bona fide grantees or incumbrancers.
no
claimed, on the part o£ the appellant, that
the Index
useless, and even worse than useless, as
part of the record,
might operate to ensnare and mislead persons relying upon it.
true that an index may, by mistake, be omitted
but such mistakes
must rarely occur, and the legislature undoubtedly deemed
sufficient
to make
part of the duty of county clerks to make the indices.
an adequate guaranty that the indices will be sufficiently correct and
reliable that county clerks are liable to be indicted
they willfully or.
fraudulently omit to make them correctly, and are at the same time
liable in
civil action to the party injured by their omission or neglect.
The duty to make the indices
public duty, for which the clerks
are paid by the public, and for the violation of such
cannot
duty,
be doubted that any one of the public specially injured has his action.
When conveyance
delivered to the clerk the statute provides, that
shall be "considered as recorded from the time of such delivery."
After such delivery nothing more need be done to keep the record
perfect, except at the proper time to record
in its proper order, in
the proper book; and yet
the conveyance, in the meantime, before
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the record thereof, should be mislaid in the clerk's office, or lost or purloined, the record would still remain complete. In such case there

could be no index of such conveyance, because, until the time for recording it had arrived, it could not be known in what book, or in what
place in any book, it would be recorded.
That the index is no part of the record, and may be omitted by the
clerk without impairing the record, is the view sanctioned by tlie curIn
rent of decisions, in the other States, and by elementary writers.
4 Kent's Com. 174, note, it is said: "An index or alphabet of a mort-

gage is no part of a mortgage, and a mortgage is duly registered if
no index of it is made." In 1 Washburn on Real Property, 578, the
rule is laid down as follows : "The proposition is a general one, that
an irregular registration of a deed is no notice to others of the existence
of such deed ; but an omission of the register to note the time of receiving the deed for record, or to enter it in the index or alphabet, will
not invalidate the effect of the registration ;" and in 1 Hilliard on
"The record of a mortgage is
Mortgages, 721 (4th Ed.), as follows:
sufficient, though not mentioned in the alphabet, or index ;" and also
in 1 Jones on Mortgages as follows : "The index is no part of the
record, and a mistake in it does not invalidate the notice afforded by
a record otherwise properly made ; although the mortgage be omitted
from the index it is just as much an incumbrance upon the land, and
notice of it from the time it was left for record, or transcribed, affects
all subsequent purchasers."
It may be that the index, both for convenience and safety, should
be made a part of the record ; but until it is so made by the legislature, we can but pronounce the law as it is.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
Judgment affirmed. ^^
S7 The Toerens System.— The present system of recording, under which, as
is evident from the cases above, only instruments of title are recorded or filed,
has many sliorteomings.
Even after the most careful examination of the records, showing, perhaps, a perfect record title in a certain person, no one can be

wholly safe in relying thereon. There are many matters, any one of which
would be amply sufhcient to upset completely such apparently perfect title, that
do not .show upon the records, and that cannot be disclosed by an examination
In fact many of such matters are almost impossible of disclosure by
thereof.
an ordinarily careful additional examination outside the records.
Among the
many matters which may thus affect an apparently perfect title are nondelivery, forgery, incapacity, etc.
See 12 Mich. L. Rev. 3S9 et seq.
Aside from the foregoing, the recording system ordinarily involves at each
sale or incumbrance an expert examination of the entire record, which means
expense, often large expense.
Because of these deficiencies of the prevalent system there has been a steadily growing demand for something better. By many it is claimed that the
so-called Torrens System of Land Title Registration mil obviate many, if not
all, our present ills. Under that system title itself is registered, and' therein
lies the fundamental difference between it and our present system of recording title instruments.
The system takes its name from Sir Robert R. Torrens,
a native of Ireland, who emigrated to Australia in 18-10, later becoming the
first Premier of South Australia. It is said that it was in 1S50, when he was

"
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collector of customs at Adelaide, that he first thought of applying to land the
In 185S. the first
method of registering and transferring ownership in ships.
"Torrens Title Act" went into effect; in South Australia, largely through the
Although the system in England and her
efforts of Sir Robert R. Torrens.
dependencies and in the United States is known by his name, he was by no
means its inventor, so to speak, for similar systems had been in operation in
Sheldon, Land Registration, c. 7.
parts of Europe for many years.
In the United States the flrst difnculty is to draw a statute that will withobjections.
The first American statute introducing the
stand constitutional
Torrens System was enacted in Illinois in 1895 ; the second, in Ohio in 1890.
California", Massachusetts, Oregon, Minnesota, Colorado, Washington, and New
York followed. The first Torrens Act in Illinois was held unconstitutional.
Following
People V. Chase, 165 111. 527, 46 N. E. 454, 36 L. R. A. 105 (1897).
that decision, the Illinois Legislature enacted a new statute, which has so far
The Ohio statute of 1896 also was held inwithstood constitutional attacks.
State V. Cuilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551, 38 L. R. A. 519. GO Am.
valid.
In 1913, the Ohio Legislature, pursuant to provisions of
St. Rep. 756 (1897).
an amendment to the Constitution adopted in 1912, enacted a new statute for
registration of land titles.
The statutes are too lengthy to give even in summary. The procedure in
bringing land under the system and the manner of dealing therewith afterwards are well stated in the following language used by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in State v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 N. W. 175, 57 L. R. A. 297, 89
Am. St. Rep. 571 (1902), in which the court declared the Minnesota Torrens Act

constitutional :
"The act provides, among other things, that the owner of any estate or interest in land may have the title thereto registered by making an application
in writing, stating certain facts, to the district court of the county wherein
the land is .situated. Thereupon the court has power to inquire into the state
of the title, and make all decrees necessary to determine it against all persons,
The application must be filed and docketed in the office
known or unknov.-n.
of the clerk of the court, and a duplicate thereof filed with the register of
The application is then referred by
deeds, who is ex officio registrar of titles.

*

*

*

*

'■■

the court to an examiner of titles, who investigates the titles, and inquires as
to the truth of the alk\gations of the application, particularly whether the land
is occupied or not, and makes and files a report of his examination with tlie
Upon the filing of the report the clerk issues a summons by order of
clerk.
the court, wherein the applicant is named as plaintiff, and the land described,
and all other persons knowai to have any interest in or claim to the land and
'all other persons or parties unknown' claiming any interest in the real estate
The summons must be
described in the application are named as defendants.
directed to such defendants, and require them to appear and answer within
twenty days. It must be served in tlie manner now provided for the service
of summons in civil actions, with this exception : That the summons shall be
served on nonresident defendants and upon all unknown persons by publishing
it in a newspaper printed and published in the coimty where the application
is filed once a week for three consec-utive weeks. In addition to such publication the clerk shall, within twenty days after the first publication, mail a copy
of the summons to all nonresident defendants whose place or address is known,
and the court may order such additional notice of the application as it may
Any interested party may appear and answer. If no appearance is
direct.
made, the court may enter the default, but must take proof of the applicant's
right to a decree, and is not bound by the report of the examiner, but may reIf appearance is made, the case shall be set for trial, and
quire further proof.
If the court finds that the applicant has title
heard as other civil actions.
proper for registration, a decree confirming the title and ordering registi-ation
shall be entered. Every such decree shall bind the lands and quiet title there^
to, except as othei-\;\'ise provided in the act, and shall be forever binding and
conclusive upon all persons, whether mentioned by name or included in the expression 'all other persons or parties unknown,' and such decree shall not open
*
except as proby the reason of absence, infancy, or other disability
Every person receiving a certificate of title and
vided in the act.
every subsequent purchaser in good faith takes the same free from all incumbrances, except such as are noted thereon. Upon entering the decree of
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registration, a certified copy thereof must be filed by the clerk in the office of
the registrar of titles, who proceeds to register the title pursuant to the decree.
This he does by entering an original certificate in the registry of titles, and delivering a duplicate thereof to the o\A'ner, who may thereafter convey his title
by the execution of deeds and the surrender of his certificate to the registrar
for cancellation, who issues a new certificate to the purchaser."
And such is the only method by which the land, after registration, may be
conveyed ; the old duplicate certificate must be delivered up and canceled; and
a new certificate issued to the new owner.
Most of the statutes, as in Minne'
sota, still preserve the use of the deed, which, however, does not act in itsel"
as a conveyance, even after complete execution.
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ACCEPTANCE,
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To bind public corporation,
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ADVERSE POSSESSION,

,

Disabilities, 91 Doe.
Minerals, 80 note.
Tacking, 24-43.
What constitutes, 43-80.
Claim of title, 43 Ricard, 51 French, 56 Preble, 61 Bond.
Devisee for life under invalid will, 68 Hanson.
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BOUNDARIES— Continued,
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Necessity for, 394 Harris, 395 Lego, 401 Morehead.
On private way, 429 Saccone.
Streets and streams, 421 Sizer, 426 note, 436 C. & E. I. R. Co., 43S Ix)w,
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COMMON RECOVERY,
Defined, 160.
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IBS note.
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81 Jackson, 82 note.
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upon, 804 Resser.
Release of covenantor, 778 note.
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Broken covenants, 754 Lewes, 755 Kingdon, 757 Kiugdon, 759 Mitchell, 767 Schotield.
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Andrew, 748 Williams, 749 Beardsley, 753 St. Clair.
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Bed'doe, 740 Solberg.
Successive covenants, 776 Wilson.
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TO STAND SEISED,
in futuro by, 255 Roe.
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236.
255 Roe, 258
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Murray.

CREATION OF EASEMENTS BY IMPLICATION,
See

Implication.

CROPPING CONTRACTS,
See Years,

Estates for.
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CURTESY,
Defined, 580.

582 Mattock, 583 note, 584 Foster.
Nature of husband's title, 595 Watson.
Interest remaining in wife, 584 Foster.
Seisin of wife, 588 Borland's Lessee.

Extent of interest,

DEDICATION,

Acceptance to bind lando^Tier, 182 Cassidy.
Municipality, 183 Downing.
Proof of, 184 Ogle.
By equitable o'mier, 165 Cincinnati.
Character of user required, 164 Rex, 174 Waters,
Effect of, 163 Lade. 165 Cincinnati.
For cemetery, 177 Wormley.
Grantee unnecessary, 165 Cincinnati.
Length of time required, 163 Rex, and note.
Limited, 164 note.
Proof of, 164 Rex, 174 Waters.

177 note.

DEFEASANCE,
•

Defined, 231.

DELIVERY,
Acceptance, 375 Thompson, 383 note, 384 Welch.
escrow to grantee, 334 Whyddon, 335 Hawksland, 336 Williams, 336
London F. & L. Prop. Co., 342 Wipfler, 344 Lee.
To agent of grantor and grantee, 336 London F. & L. Prop. Co.
Effect of improper delivery by custodian, 347 Everts, 351 note, 352
Schurtz.
Necessity for valid contract, 357 Campbell, 360 note.
When title passes, 361 Hull, 362 Farley, 362 Hall, 365 May, 368 Scott,
370 Baker.
Manual not required, 288 Doe, 295 Fryer, 297 Mitchell, 303 Matson, 305
Burnet.
Recording as presumptive, 297 Mitchell, 300 note.
Requisites of in general, 297 Stanton, 281 Curry, 282 note, 283 Tisher, 2S6

In

Parrott.
To third party, 288 Doe.
To be delivered on grantor's death,

308 Wheelwright, 312 Ruggles, 314
Johnston, 316 Moore, 316 note, 320 Owings.
When title passes, 322 Stone, 325 Stonehill, 329 Smiley, 331 Rathmell.
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Abolished,

156-943.

11 note.

Right of entry lost

When arises, 9.

by, 5, 159.

DESCRIPTION,
See

Boundaries; Exceptions

DEVISE,

and Reservations.

Defined, 232.

DISABILITIES,
See Adverse Possession.

DISSEISIN,

By election,

9.

Defined, 3, 4, and note.
Distinguished from dispossession, 7 Smith.
Effect of, 4.
Remedies upon, 4-7, 159.

DOWER,
Barred how,
Defined, 597.

619 Ingram,

620 Grady,

622

Catlin,

624 Robinson.
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DOWER— Continued,
Fraudulent conveyance, effect upon, 624 Robinson.
In estates held for husband in trust, 600 Shoemaker.

In

600 Shoemaker, 602 Bates.
on death of husband, 603 Edveards.
Momentarily held, 598 Holbrook.
Upon condition subsequent, 608 Ellis.
Nature of interest while inchoate, 612 Flynn, 616 note.
After death of husband, 610 Wallis.
Protection of against waste, 616 note.
Signing deed as bar of, 622 Catlin.
Statutory modifications, 627 note.
Taxation of under inheritance tax, 616 Crenshaw.
Value determined as of when, 624 note.
Where husband had executed escrow deed, 365 note.
Deed to be delivered on death, 329 Smiley.
Widow of surviving joint tenant, 597 Broughton.

remainder,

Limitation over

EASEMENTS,
See

Implication.

EMINENT DOMAIN,

Extent of interest acquired,
Nature of title by, 154 note.
When title passes, 154 note.
ENTIRETIES, ESTATE BY,

154 note.

Created how, 686, 692 Thornburg,
Defined, 689.

ENTRY,
Restoration

of seisin

ESTATES CREATED,
ESTOPPEL BY DEED,
-

698 Pegg.

by, 4.

547-733.

By representation, 783 Hannon, 789 note.
Effect of warranty, 779, 780 Jackson, 790 Ayer.

In

quitclaim

deed, 781 Bayley.

Transfer of after-acquired title by, 793 Doe, 796 note, 796 Perkins,
Jordan, 801 Jaiwis, 804 Resser.
As affecting actions upon covenants for title, 804 Resser.
Effect of recording statutes upon, 858 Tefift, 862 Wheeled.
ANT) RESERVATIONS,
Coal reserved, 449 Whitaker.
Easement "reserved," 455 Dee, 461 Smith's Ex'r.
Exception of part of water privilege, 450 note.
Must not be repugnant, 449 Dorrell.
Pleading, 452 note.
Road "reserved," 452 Kister.
To stranger, 463 Haverhill Sav. Bank.

EXCEPTIONS

See

Implication.

EXCHANGE,

Defined, 161.

EXECUTION OF DEEDS,

275-393.

PEE SIMPLE,

Defined, 547.
How created, 547 and note.
Conflicting clauses, 548 McCullock, 549 note, 550 Carl Lee.
Upon limitation, 552 First Universalist Soc

FEE TAIL,

of issue extinct, 579.
Defined, 557, 558.
How converted into fee simple, 560 Ewing.
After possibilitv

797
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FEE TAILr-Continued,

How created, 558, 559.
Recognized in modern cases, 560 Ewing.
Statute De Donis, 556.
Under statutory modifications, 566 Dungan, 569 note.

FEOFFMENT,
Defined, 156.
Necessity for, 156.
Tortious, 4, 158.

FINE,

Defined, 160.

FORCIBLE ENTRY,

Rights of tenant upon,
652 Low, 657 note.

636

Turner,

638

Hilary,

639 Pollen,

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES,

645 Reader,

Voluntary conveyances where subsequent conveyances for value,
820 Cooke.

Purchaser

for value,

812 Doe,

825 note.

GRANT,

Defined, 162.

HUSBAND'S INTEREST IN WIFE'S REALTY,
After birth of issue, see Curtesy.
Before birth of issue, 580 Montgomery.

IMPLICATION,

General, 466 Coppy, 467 Robins, 469 Palmer.
Implied grant.
Construction, 538 Weeks, 541 City of Battle Creek.
Necessity, 469 Pinnington, 494 Brigham.
Quasi easements that are apparent, 535 Butterworth.
Continuous, 474 Polden, 526 Tooth, 527 Liquid Carbonic Co., 529
Adams.
Necessai-y, 518 Buss, 526 Tooth.
Implied reservation where necessity, 469 Pinnington, 494 Brigham, 491
Ray, 497 note, 500 Mancuso, 511 Brown.
Reciprocal easements, 486.
Simultaneous conveyances, 487 Phillips.

JOINT TENANCY,

Created how, 686, 690 Mustain,
Defined, 685, 686.

Partition,

692 Thornburg.

687.

LAPSE OF TIME,

Disabilities, 91 Doe.
Effect of when coupled with possession, 19-43.
Tacking possessions in defense, 24 Goody, 31 Shannon,
Sherin, 36 McNeely.
In attack, 26 Carter.
Prescription, 139 note.
Privity, 36 McNeely, 39 Kldi,

LEASE,

Defined, 161.
See Surrender.

LIFE ESTATES,

Created, 572.
Defined, 570.
For indefinite time, 575 Thompson.
Life of lessee and others, 573 Rosse.
Life of lessee and heir, 573 Amos.
See Curtesy; Dower; Fee Tail.

32

Harlan,

34
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LIGHTS,

Easement of by implication,

Palmer, 491 Ray.

4G9

LIS PENDENS,

Doctrine of, 914 note.
Record, of, 914 note.

MODE OF CON^EYANCl!:,

Common law, 156-232.
Modern statutes, 268-275.
Statute of Uses, 232-268.

MONUMENTS,
See Boundaries.

NOTICE,
See Record.

PARTITION,

Defined, 162.

POSSESSION,
Basis for ejectment, 11 Asher, 26 Carter.
Compensation in eminent domain, 13 Perry.
Taxation, 16 note.
Effect of wrongful possession upon owner, 17 Sohier.
For period of statute of limitations, 21 Hughes, 72 Dean.
See Adverse

Possession.

PRESCRIPTION,

Adverse user, 121 Pavey, 125 Barber, 128 Lechman.
Character of rights subject to acquisition by, 112 Webb, 121 note.
Continuity of user, 132 Lehigh V. R. Co,
Intervening disabilities, 94 Wallace, 104 Lamb.
Light and air, 111, 112, 117 Hubbard.
Tacking, 139 note.
TheoiT and development, 94 Wallace.
Time period commences, 114 Sturges.
Servient estate held by tenant, 109 Baxter.

PRIORITIES,
See

Record,

Fraudulent Conveyances;

PRIVITY,

See Lapse

of Time.

I'ROPERTY CONVEYED,
See

Boundaries;

Exceptions

and Reservations.

PURCHASER FOR VALUE,
See

Fraudulent Conveyances

QUARANTINE,

Widow's right of,

610

;

Record.

Wallls.

RECORD,
As notice in England,

827 Bedford, 827 Morecocfe.
United States, 837 Simonson.
Necessity of as against purchaser from heir, 849 Youngblood.
Creditors, 868 Holden.
Grantee in quitclaim, 882 Marshall, 834 note, 885 Smith's
Boynton, 892 note.
Grantee of purchaser with notice, 852 Morse, 854 Woods.
Purchasers for value, 877 Strong, S78 note, 880 Thomas.
Purchasers on execution, 872 Sternberger.
Notice instead of, 829 La Neve, 834 note.
Knowledge of deed on record improperly, 909 Nordman.

In

Heirs, 88T
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RECORD — Continued,

Possession, 898 Galley, 901 note, 902 "Williamson,
Recitals, 892 Moore, 893 Baker, 894 Patman.
Of equitable title, 837 Simonson.
Lis pendens, 914 note.
Unacknowledged deed, 914 Sigoumey.
Out of chain of title, 843 Losey, 845 Rankin, 854 Woods.
Sufficiency of, 916-943.
Incorrect; amount stated, 926 Frost, 927 Terrell, 929 Mangold.
Index, 932 Prouty, 937 Mutual L. Ins. Co.
Names of witnesses omitted, 916 Pringle.

RELEASE,
Defined, 187.

REMAINDERS,
RESERVATION,

731-733.

See Exceptions

REVERSIONS,

and Reservations;

Implication.

731-733.

SEALING,
Abolished, 278,
Required, 275 Jackson.
Sufficiency of, 278.

SEISIN,

Defined, 2.
Importance of, 2,
Mystery of, 1.

7

SIGNING OF DEEDS,
STATUTES,
Enrolments,

note.
275.

247.

Frauds, 157.
Fraudulent conveyances,
Limitation, 19-21.
Recording,
Uses, 236.

810-812.

826, 834r-837.

STREAMS,
See Boundaries.

STREETS,
See Boundaries.

SUFFERANCE,

Tenancy at, 636.

SURRENDER,

Defined, 188, 189.
In fact by cancellation, 190 Lord Wai*d.
Conditional, 191 Allen.
In law.
Acceptance of third party as tenant, 207 Thomas.
Incorporeal property, 221 Lyon.
New lease not creating interest intended, 195 Davison, 197 Zick, and
note, 200 SchiefCelin.
New lease to commence in futuro, 195 Ive.
Reletting after abandonment, 209 Walls, 211 Gray, 217 Oldewurtel,
220 note.

Yielding possession to landlord,

TACKING.

See Lapse

TAX TITLES,

of Time.
155 note.

206 Whitehead.
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TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES,
Created how, 6S9, 692 Thornburg,
Defined, 689.
See Concurrent Ownership.

698 Pegg,

TENANTS IN COMMON,

Created how, 687, 688, 698 Pegg.
Defined, 687.
See Concurrent Ownership.

TORRENS SYSTEM,
TRUST,

941 note.

Use upon a use upheld as, 262 note.

USES,

Active, 266 lire, 268 note.
After Statute of U.ses, 239-268.
Bargain and sale, 236.
Before Statute of Uses, 232-238.
Covenant to stand seised, 236.
Created how, 235, 236.
Enforcement of, 233.
Enrolments, Statute of, 247.
Estates in, 234.
Operation of Statute of Uses, 239 Green; 248 Lutwich.
Personal property, 266 Ure.
Raised in connection with common law conveyance, 239-246.
Raised independently of common law conveyance, 247-261.
Reasons for introduction of, 232.
Resulting, 235, 240 Sbortridge, 241 Armstrong, 241 Van der Volgen.

Shifting,

234.

Springing, 2.34.
Statute of, 236.
Use upon a use, 261 Tyrrel, 262 Doe.

WATERS,
See Boundaries

;

Accretion.

WAYS OF NECESSITY,
By implication,

469 Pinnington,

494 Brigham,

495 Dabney.

WIFE'S INTEREST IN HUSBAND'S REALTY,
See

Dower.

WILL,
See Devise.

WILL, ESTATE AT,

Defined, ^34, 0:^5, 636.
Determined by conveyance, 641 Curtis.
When, &36 Ix^ighton.
Where rent payable periodically, 642 Say.
See

Forcible Entry.

YEAR TO YEAR, ESTATES FROM,

Assignable, 657 Braythwaite,
Entry under agreement for lease and payment of periodic rent, 657 Brayth*
waite.
Void parol agreement for lease providing for periodic rent, 665 Griswold.
Void parol lease, 664 Clayton, 665 note.
Holding over, 670 Right, 672 Ilerter, 675 Goldsborough, 677 King.
Notice to quit, 650 Arltenz.
Payment based on goods purchased, as periodic rent, 0G9 Lyons.
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YEAR TO YEAR, ESTATES FROM—

Continued,
Terms of, as contained in agreement for lease unexecuted, 660 Doe, 662
Coudert.
When terminable, 657 Layton, 662 Coudert

YEARS, ESTATES FOR,

Created how, 628, 629.
Cropping agreements as, 629 Hare, 630 Caswell,
Defined, 628.

WX8T FUBLIBHING

CO., FBINTBBB,

BT. PAUL.

631 SteeL
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